40 Valdai Paper Lessons of the Greek Tragedy Pdf 1.3
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First Thoughts on the 25 January 2015 Election in Greece
GPSG Pamphlet No 4 First thoughts on the 25 January 2015 election in Greece Edited by Roman Gerodimos Copy editing: Patty Dohle Roman Gerodimos Pamphlet design: Ana Alania Cover photo: The Zappeion Hall, by Panoramas on Flickr Inside photos: Jenny Tolou Eveline Konstantinidis – Ziegler Spyros Papaspyropoulos (Flickr) Ana Alania Roman Gerodimos Published with the support of the Politics & Media Research Group, Bournemouth University Selection and editorial matter © Roman Gerodimos for the Greek Politics Specialist Group 2015 All remaining articles © respective authors 2015 All photos used with permission or under a Creative Commons licence Published on 2 February 2015 by the Greek Politics Specialist Group (GPSG) www.gpsg.org.uk Editorial | Roman Gerodimos Continuing a tradition that started in 2012, a couple of weeks ago the Greek Politics Specialist Group (GPSG) invited short commentaries from its members, affiliates and the broader academ- ic community, as a first ‘rapid’ reaction to the election results. The scale of the response was humbling and posed an editorial dilemma, namely whether the pamphlet should be limited to a small number of indicative perspectives, perhaps favouring more established voices, or whether it should capture the full range of viewpoints. As two of the founding principles and core aims of the GPSG are to act as a forum for the free exchange of ideas and also to give voice to younger and emerging scholars, it was decided that all contributions that met our editorial standards of factual accuracy and timely -
The Rise of Syriza: an Interview with Aristides Baltas
THE RISE OF SYRIZA: AN INTERVIEW WITH ARISTIDES BALTAS This interview with Aristides Baltas, the eminent Greek philosopher who was one of the founders of Syriza and is currently a coordinator of its policy planning committee, was conducted by Leo Panitch with the help of Michalis Spourdalakis in Athens on 29 May 2012, three weeks after Syriza came a close second in the first Greek election of 6 May, and just three days before the party’s platform was to be revealed for the second election of 17 June. Leo Panitch (LP): Can we begin with the question of what is distinctive about Syriza in terms of socialist strategy today? Aristides Baltas (AB): I think that independently of everything else, what’s happening in Greece does have a bearing on socialist strategy, which is not possible to discuss during the electoral campaign, but which will present issues that we’re going to face after the elections, no matter how the elections turn out. We haven’t had the opportunity to discuss this, because we are doing so many diverse things that we look like a chicken running around with its head cut off. But this is precisely why I first want to step back to 2008, when through an interesting procedure, Synaspismos, the main party in the Syriza coalition, formulated the main elements of the programme in a book of over 300 pages. The polls were showing that Syriza was growing in popularity (indeed we reached over 15 per cent in voting intentions that year), and there was a big pressure on us at that time, as we kept hearing: ‘you don’t have a programme; we don’t know who you are; we don’t know what you’re saying’. -
Election and Aftermath
Order Code RS20575 Updated June 9, 2000 CRS Report for Congress Received through the CRS Web Greece: Election and Aftermath (name redacted) Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division Summary Prime Minister Simitis of Greece called an early election for April 9, 2000 because he believed that his government’s achievement in meeting the criteria for entry into the European Monetary Union (EMU) would return his PanHellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) party to power. PASOK’s narrow victory endorsed Simitis’s decision, but the opposition New Democracy’s (ND) strong showing also validated Costas Karamanlis’s leadership of that party. The election continued a trend toward bipolarism, as votes for smaller parties, except for the Communists, declined appreciably. Simitis reappointed most key members of his previous government, and brought in close allies and technocrats to carry out a revitalized domestic agenda. In foreign policy, the government will try to continue the Greek-Turkish rapprochement, to help stabilize the Balkans, and to move closer to Europe through the EMU and the European Security and Defense Policy. Greek-U.S. relations are warm, but intermittently troubled by differences over the future of the former Yugoslavia, terrorism and counterterrorism in Greece, and minor issues. This report will be updated if developments warrant. Introduction1 On February 4, 2000, Prime Minister Costas Simitis called an early election for April 9, six months before his government’s term was to expire. On March 9, parliament reelected President Costas Stephanopoulos and Greece applied for membership in the European Monetary Union (EMU) single currency zone. -
Calendar of Benoît Cœuré, January 2018 1
Calendar of Benoît Cœuré Member of the ECB’s Executive Board January 2018 Date Meeting / Event (incl. topic / meeting participants, as applicable) Location Sunday, 7 January Bank for International Settlements (BIS) – bi-monthly meetings Basel Monday, 8 January Meeting with German Ministry of Finance, Mr Levin Holle, on Basel regulatory issues Financial Stability Board (FSB) Steering Committee Basel Tuesday, 9 January Executive Board ECB Governing Council ECB ECB farewell dinner for Chair of Board of Governors of US ECB Federal Reserve System, Ms Janet Yellen Thursday, 11 January Eurogroup Working Group Brussels Friday, 12 January Eurogroup Working Group Brussels Bellagio Group meeting ECB Saturday, 13 January Bellagio Group meeting ECB Monday, 15 January Meeting with Hellenic Bank Association (HBA), on Greek banking ECB system Meeting with European Investment Bank (EIB), Mr Andrew ECB McDowell and Ms Debora Revoltella, on prospects for investment in the euro area Tuesday, 16 January Meeting with Graduate Institute of International and Development ECB Studies (Geneva), on digital currencies Executive Board ECB Wednesday, 17 January Meeting with Norges Bank, Mr Jon Nicolaisen, Mr Torbjørn ECB Hægeland and Mr Audun Grønn, on issues of common interest Meeting with media ECB Meeting with Bulgarian Presidency of the Council of the ECB Calendar of Benoît Cœuré, January 2018 1 European Union, Deputy Minister of Finance, Ms Marinela Petrova, and Deputy Governor of Българска народна банка (Bulgarian National Bank), Mr Kalin Hristov, on the Presidency’s work programme Meeting with BNP Paribas, on global economic prospects ECB Meeting with Bruegel, on economic situation in the euro area ECB Thursday, 18 January Meeting with French Embassy in Berlin, Mr Etienne Oudot de ECB Dainville, on euro area issues Meeting with Independent Evaluation Office (IEO) of the ECB International Monetary Fund (IMF), Mr Prakash Loungani and Mr Laurence M. -
A Look Into the Future
GREECE AND THE GLOBAL DISRUPTIVE ENVIRONMENT A look into the future AGENDA DAY ONE MONDAY, NOVEMBER 28, 2016 13:00 REGISTRATION | WELCOME RECEPTION 13:30 OPENING REMARKS Elias Spirtounias Executive Director, American-Hellenic Chamber of Commerce Simos Anastasopoulos President, American-Hellenic Chamber of Commerce 13:45 WELCOME ADDRESS Theodore Fessas Chairman, SEV Hellenic Federation of Enterprises 13:50 THE U.S. PERSPECTIVE Geoffrey Pyatt U.S. Ambassador to Greece 14:10 KEYNOTE ADDRESS Benoît Cœuré Member of the Executive Board, European Central Bank 3 ❯ 27TH ANNUAL THE GREEK ECONOMY CONFERENCE NOVEMBER 28 & 29, 2016 | ATHENAEUM INTERCONTINENTAL HOTEL 14:30 KEYNOTE ADDRESS THE GREEK DEBT: ACCELERATING THE TURNAROUND OF GREECE GOVERNMENT FINANCES Euclid Tsakalotos Minister of Finance of Greece 14:50 KEYNOTE ADDRESS THE MOST IMPORTANT REFORM IS WINNING THE TRUST & CONFIDENCE OF TAXPAYERS AND THE GLOBAL CAPITAL MARKETS Paul Kazarian Founder, Chairman & CEO, Japonica Partners USA & Special Advisor to CEPS Task Force on Improving Performance of EU Member State Government Balance Sheets 15:20 PANEL DISCUSSION GREECE’S DEBT, ECONOMY AND REFORMS UNDER THE MICROSCOPE There is a great debate on whether the Greek debt is sustainable and whether additional debt relief is needed. What is the truth? Is the new debt relief enough for Greece to turnaround its economy and attract investment? Is the State capable of managing and controlling its finances? How important is the role of Greek debt in the IMF’s decision to participate in the new program and why? What do the markets anticipate from Greece and the European Partners? Are the reforms under discussion so necessary for the economy and why? What are the most important steps the country should take to turnaround the economy? Paul B. -
S Account of the Greek Crisis: a Self-Incrimination Pt 1
Yanis VaroufakisâEuros"s Account of the Greek Crisis: a Self-Incrimination Pt 1 https://internationalviewpoint.org/spip.php?article5474 Yanis VaroufakisâEuros"s Account of the Greek Crisis: a Self-Incrimination Pt 1 - Features - Economic and debt crisis - Publication date: Wednesday 25 April 2018 Copyright © International Viewpoint - online socialist magazine - All rights reserved Copyright © International Viewpoint - online socialist magazine Page 1/39 Yanis VaroufakisâEuros"s Account of the Greek Crisis: a Self-Incrimination Pt 1 Proposals Doomed to Fail In his latest book, Adults in the Room [1] Yanis Varoufakis gives us his version of the events that led to the Tsipras governmentâEuros"s shameful capitulation in July 2015. It essentially analyses the period 2009-2015, though it makes incursions into earlier periods. With this voluminous work (550 pages), Yanis Varoufakis shows that he is a gifted narrator. At times he succeeds in moving the reader. His direct and vivid style makes it easy to follow events. From the authorâEuros"s demonstration, we can clearly see that his behaviour and the politico-economic orientation he defended contributed to the disaster. Yanis Varoufakis clearly claims to have played a major role in working out the strategy adopted by a handful of Syriza leaders âEuros" Alexis Tsipras, Yanis Dragasakis, and Nikkos Pappas, essentially âEuros" before their victory in the January 2015 election. Varoufakis does not plead guilty. He is convinced that had Tsipras actually taken the orientation he proposed and which Tsipras had agreed to late in 2014, the result would not have been defeat for the Greek people. Contrary to the conviction Varoufakis expresses, an attentive reading of his book leads to the conclusion that he contributed to that defeat Varoufakis explains how he gradually convinced Tsipras, Pappas, and Dragasakis not to follow the orientation adopted by Syriza in 2012, then in 2014. -
SYRIZA, Bloco and Podemos
Transnational networking and cooperation among neo-reformist left parties in Southern Europe during the Eurozone crisis: SYRIZA, Bloco and Podemos Vladimir Bortun The thesis is submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy of the University of Portsmouth. March 2019 Abstract European parties to the left of social democracy have always lagged behind the main political families in terms of transnational cooperation at the level of the EU. However, the markedly transnational character of the Eurozone crisis and of the management of that crisis has arguably provided a uniquely propitious context for these parties to reduce that gap. This research project aims to establish whether they achieved that by focusing on three parties that were particularly prone to seeking an increase in their transnational cooperation: SYRIZA from Greece, Bloco de Esquerda from Portugal and Podemos from Spain. For these parties not only come from the member states most affected by the crisis, both economically and politically, but they also share several programmatic and strategic features favouring such an increase. By using a mix of document analysis, semi-structured interviews and non-participatory observation, the thesis discusses both the informal and formal transnational networking and cooperation among the three parties. This discussion reveals four key findings, with potentially useful insights for wider transnational party cooperation that are to be pursued in future research. Firstly, the transnational networking and cooperation among SYRIZA, Bloco and Podemos did increase at some point during the crisis, particularly around SYRIZA’s electoral victory in January 2015. Secondly, since the U-turn of that government in July 2015, SYRIZA’s relationship with both Bloco and Podemos has declined significantly, as reflected in their diverging views of the EU. -
Greek Color Theory and the Four Elements [Full Text, Not Including Figures] J.L
University of Massachusetts Amherst ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst Greek Color Theory and the Four Elements Art July 2000 Greek Color Theory and the Four Elements [full text, not including figures] J.L. Benson University of Massachusetts Amherst Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/art_jbgc Benson, J.L., "Greek Color Theory and the Four Elements [full text, not including figures]" (2000). Greek Color Theory and the Four Elements. 1. Retrieved from https://scholarworks.umass.edu/art_jbgc/1 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Art at ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has been accepted for inclusion in Greek Color Theory and the Four Elements by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Cover design by Jeff Belizaire ABOUT THIS BOOK Why does earlier Greek painting (Archaic/Classical) seem so clear and—deceptively— simple while the latest painting (Hellenistic/Graeco-Roman) is so much more complex but also familiar to us? Is there a single, coherent explanation that will cover this remarkable range? What can we recover from ancient documents and practices that can objectively be called “Greek color theory”? Present day historians of ancient art consistently conceive of color in terms of triads: red, yellow, blue or, less often, red, green, blue. This habitude derives ultimately from the color wheel invented by J.W. Goethe some two centuries ago. So familiar and useful is his system that it is only natural to judge the color orientation of the Greeks on its basis. To do so, however, assumes, consciously or not, that the color understanding of our age is the definitive paradigm for that subject. -
Of Social Ecology
104 RET}IINKING ECOFEMINIST POLMICS clearly are, we wiII pay dearly for the loss of rational poli activity. A mystical tendency that indulges our fantasiesand st renders us captive to a commodified society may eventually, spite its good intentions, help to deprive us of our freedom individuals and to diminish our activism as social beings' Chapter 5 Historically, the Left has always tried to appeal to the best people, to their highest moral and intellectual selves'Mind, cri initttittg, and intellectuality are precious human attributes cannot be surrendered without leading to easily manipulated ceral reactions evoked by magic, rituals, and ultimately " Dialectics in the Ethics sive leaders" for ends other than freedom. As the Senecawriter Mohawk has forthrightly put it, "[t seems like every time say they'll do the thinking for you, they fuck you over"'I w of Social Ecology responsible people, doing the best thinking, not somebody v dreamed something."" As the forms of our domination increasinglysophisticated, it behoovesus to boldly "dare to know, in Kant's phrase, rather than to play childish games of "truth As a dialectical philosophy, social ecology arguesthat hu- dare." manity must be understood os the history of humanity, and that nature must be understood as the history of nature. ]ust so, it also arguesthat sciencemust be understood as tle history of science.It advancesthe view that there is much to be gained from examining the role that previous cosmologistsplayed in the developmentof our own in considering the problem of nature and humanity's relationship to each other, and that earlier peoples in Western culture have asked important questions tlat our present-day sci- enceignores. -
2017 Delphi Economic Forum Speakers • Giorgia Abeltino
2017 Delphi Economic Forum _Speakers Giorgia Abeltino Director Public Policy of the Google Cultural Institute, Director of Public Policy for Italy, Greece & Malta Helene Ahrweiler Rector, President of the Administration Council of the European Cultural Centre of Delphi Dr. Maria Chr. Alvanou Criminologist, ITSTIME Research Team Savvas Anastasiadis Member of the Parliament, New Democracy party Dr. Despina Anastasiou Regional Leader, Dow Central Europe; President, Dow Hellas Simos Anastasopoulos President, American Hellenic Chamber of Commerce; Chairman and CEO, PETSIAVAS S.A. Dr. Andreas A. Andreadis President, Greek Tourism Confederation - SETE Nikos Andritsos Journalist, Director, SKAI 100,3 Dimitris Androulakis Project Leader, BCG Athens Alexandros Angelopoulos CEO, Aldemar Resorts Eleni Angelopoulou Head of Division in the Crisis Management Division, European Central Ban William J. Antholis Director and CEO, Miller Center, University of Virginia Peggy Antonakou CEO Microsoft Hellas, Cyprus & Malta Eva Antonopoulou Anchorwoman, SKAI TV Pascal Apostolides General Manager, AbbVie Pharmaceuticals SA; President, SFEE Dr. Vassili Apostolopoulos CEO, Athens Medical Group & President of the Board of Directors, Hellenic Entrepreneurs Association Vangelis Apostolou Minister of Agricultural Development & Food Grigorios Apostolou Head of Frontex LO/EUTRF in Greece Nadia Arbatova Head, European Political Studies Department IMEMO, Russian Academy of Sciences Mark Arey Executive Director, The Hellenic Initiative, USA Despina -
Syriza's Rise and Fall
Interview: New Masses—13 stathis kouvelakis SYRIZA’S RISE AND FALL Syriza won power in January 2015 as an anti-austerity party—the most advanced political opposition so far to the hardening deflationary poli- cies of the Brussels–Berlin–Frankfurt axis. Six months later, the Tsipras government forced through the harshest austerity package Greece had yet seen. This trajectory was a predictable outcome of the contradiction embod- ied in Syriza’s programme: reject austerity, but keep the euro. Why was Tsipras so incapable of envisaging a course inside the eu but outside the Eurozone, the position of Sweden, Denmark, Poland and half a dozen other European countries? irst, one shouldn’t underestimate the popularity of the euro in the southern-periphery countries—Greece, Spain, Portugal—for whom joining the eu meant accessing political and economic modernity. For Greece, in particular, it meant Fbeing part of the West in a different way to that of the us-imposed post- civil war regime. It seemed a guarantee of the new democratic course: after all, it’s only since 1974 that Greece has known a political regime similar to other Western countries, after decades of authoritarianism, military dictatorship and civil war. The European Community also offered the promise of combining prosperity with a social dimension, supposedly inherent to the project, which sealed the political com- pact that emerged after the fall of the Junta. Joining the euro seemed the logical conclusion of that process. Having the same currency as the most advanced countries has a tremendous power over people’s imagination—carrying in your pocket the same currency as Germans or Dutch, even if you are a low-paid Greek worker or pensioner—which new left review 97 jan feb 2016 45 46 nlr 97 those of us who’d been in favour of exiting the euro since the start of the crisis tended to underestimate. -
As a Pdf File
1 Interview with Eric Toussaint, spokesperson and co-founder of the international network of the Committee for the Abolition of Illegitimate Debt INTRO (CADTM). Interview by Benjamin Lemoine. This interview presents the genealogy From Africa to Latin America, citizens’ of the anti-debt struggle, the campaigns participation in audits ushers in hope. for debt cancellation, the empirical However, most of the time their purpo- foundation, the political battles and the se is lost due to the neglect of the cru- concepts of the “illegitimate”, “illegal” or saders-turned-rulers, where the rulers “odious” nature of public debt. In other have the final say vis-à-vis the financial words, how it is necessary for the Com- system. Yet, sometimes the audits are mittee for the Abolition of Illegitimate immensely successful. We review the Debt (CADTM) – formerly known as the experience of the audit of the Greek so- Committee for the Abolition of Third vereign debt, full of intrigues and unex- World Debt – to ally with opposition pected twists in which it took very little forces and social movements, where to tip the balance. When the hopeful the concepts and the people involved dream for a new international coope- can challenge and overpower debt and ration (a conference in London on the its «system” once the government hears Greek debt as requested by Alexis Tsi- their voice. Yet, for CADTM the outright pras) seems naive and where, according priority is to fortify the activities descri- to Eric Toussaint, unilateral sovereign bed below rather than lobbying. decisions are indispensable in order to reverse the balance of power.