Political Aspects of the Loss of Minorca and the Subsequent Public Disgrace, Trial, and Execution of Admiral John Byng, 1755-1757
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Political aspects of the loss of Minorca and the subsequent public disgrace, trial, and execution of Admiral John Byng, 1755-1757 Item Type text; Thesis-Reproduction (electronic) Authors Von den Steinen, Karl, 1942- Publisher The University of Arizona. Rights Copyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author. Download date 04/10/2021 04:17:53 Link to Item http://hdl.handle.net/10150/318938 POLITICAL ASPECTS Of THE LOSS OF MINORCA AND THE SUBSEQUENT PUBLIC DISGRACE, TRIAL9 AND EXECUTION OF ADMIRAL ' JOHM BYNG9 '1755-175? -':'^ Karl von den Steinen A Thesis Submitted, to the Faculty of the .DEPARTMENT O F ■HISTORY In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements . , For the Degree of : . ; V ; ' : MAiSTER OF. ARTS X. In the Graduate College . ■ THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA 1 9 6 4 STATEMENT BY AUTHOR This thesis has been submitted in partial fulfill ment of requirements for an advanced degree at the Univer sity of Arizona and is deposited in the University Library to be made available to borrowers under rules of the Library. Brief quotations from this thesis are allowable without special permission, provided that accurate acknow ledgment of source is made. Requests for permission for extended quotation from or reproduction of this manuscript in whole or in part may be granted by the head of the major department or the Dean of the Graduate College when in his judgment the proposed use of the material is in the interests of scholarship. In all other instances, however, permission must be obtained from the author. SIGNED APPROVAL BY THESIS DIRECTOR This thesis has been approved on the date shown below: f). Aj, +^5 ________________ {T/z 7/(, $£_______ D. N. LAMMERS Date Assistant Professor of History ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The author particularly wants to thank Dr* Do No Lammers, Assistant'Professor of History, for his tireless and unselfish assistance in the preparation of this thesiso Dr0 Laamers’ valuable advice and con structive criticism as, thesis director have materially improved both the content and the presentation of the worko The author also wishes to express his appreciation to Dro <J, Ho' Vignery, Assistant Professor of History, for his useful suggestions during the preparation of this thesis. Karl von den Steinen TABLE OF CONTENTS . Chap t er ' ' :: Page I. ' IMTBOWCTION. o o .> v .»'v,' 0 , , o = . '« 1 II0 BETTISH STRATEGTj GO'I^HMMEMT M D NAVY . 5 Stra.tegy through Mahch'.1756, » « » , » » . 5 ■ /The■ Britishv.Tiate^ligehc'e!/System;;,../-... .o>-*' » , » 21 . .The Inner Workings of the- Newcastle , N 3LIX X S fry' -.O' O ' O . ■ O 0 0 .>’0 O 0, 0, O O 0 0 O O O 2 5 • Admiral Lord Anson0 0 <> « « , » « » » ■» = . » • 3o III. THE BELIEF OF ADHIBAL BYNG. 4-8 ■ Admiral John Byhg . H .. = . ' . , . = 48 The Belief of Admiral Byng. = . = . 59 ,■ The Censor ship of Byng* s Dispatch „ .■ . ?2 IVo • THE PUBLIC LISGEACE OF ADMIBAL'BYNG AND ' THE FALL OF 'THE NEWCASTLE MINISTEY . ?8 ; The Government* s Publicity Campaign .. .■ ?8 ; The Reaction against the Ministerial ; , : , Public ity Campaign '. ' . „ > . , 88 Admiral Byng*s Publicity Campaign o. 94 The Fall,of the Newcastle Ministry. 104 ■ ; V . THE TRIAL■AND EXE CUTION OF ADMIRAL BYNG . 114 ; , . Ministerial Efforts to Thwart Byng" s Defense . > . 114 . 4 The Trial of Admiral Byng. '. .. 122 The Verdict » . '. 130 Attempts to Save Byng . » . » ° ° ° ° » » . 136 The 'Parliamentary Debates on Byng . • . ' .- . 143 APPENDIX -1. CHRONOLOGY . „ . ...... 160 SELECTED: BIBLIOGRAPHY,:... .. , , 163 xv ABSTRACT The loss of the British island possession of Minorca to the French in 1756 was caused by a faulty strategic policy which prevented timely and adequate reinforcement of forces in the Mediterranean, This strategic evaluation may be traced to Admiral Lord Anson, First.Lord of the Admiraltyo Anson, brilliant as a seaman, administrator9 and leader of men, lacked, the. highest measure of strategic capability. This lack, in turn, may be traced to the training of officers in the Eighteenth Century Royal NaVy, which stressed prac tical seamanship and rigid tactics and which totally omitted formal strategic instruction. Ansoh was unable to overcome the mental restrictions of his training to realize that the Royal. Navy was strong enough both to protect Britain from invasion and to thwart French efforts in the Mediterranean. Admiral Byng, commander of the belated relief expedition, showed similar lack of strategic ability in the Mediter ranean when he did not recognize the practicability of a blockade of French supply lines as opposed, to an immediate encounter with the French squadron. The adoption of Anson's faulty strategy as govern ment policy clearly shows the patronage system in action. This government, totally devoted to the Duke of Newcastle, " ■ ■ :r i ■ accepted this interpretation because it was approved by the Duke 0 The other members of the government lacked either the ability or the initiative to question Anson’s interpretation and, hence, it became the government’s policy= Later, when this policy proved erroneous, the ministers’ actions to avoid blame in the affair show the injustice and disgrace possible when the key positions in the patronage structure were occu pied with weak and incompetent men. The ultimate result of the governmental publicity campaign and questionable legal procedures was the execution of the Admiral they had sent to command their weak and belated relief expedition, John Byngo CHAPTER I ' INTRODUCTIQM , On 9 March 1756 "bhe Duke of Newpastle called a meet ing of the Inner Committee of the Cabinet Connell* The meeting was attended by Newcastle and his chief advisors: The Earl of Hardwlckel George Anson$ the. Earl of Granvilles Henry Pox, the Earl of Holdernesse, and Thomas Robinson* • Newcastle6 s agenda for the meeting reflected the growing gravity of the French threat to Britain: "Advices from Sp a in--Port ■ Mahon— squadron for the Mediterranean— Cressener's intelligence— Port Mahon— Canada-— 8000 men— Invasion: * * The Immediate reason for the meeting was an alarming report about the Mediterraneans the French were seriously planning an invasion of the British island pos session of Minorca so that they could offer it to Spain in return for support in the impending war with England* This immediately brought the neglected problem of the Mediter- 7.v, ■ 2 ' . ■ - ■■■ - ' ranean to the fore* ; • : *1 . ' - ■ • ' Newcastle's; agenda quoted in Dudley Pope, At Twelve Mr* Byng was Shot (Philadelphia: J. B* Lippincott Co., 1962) 2; . • ... : / -: - ibid* ': ■ : ■ ■ '' < - ; The island of Minorca symbolized British superiority in the Western Mediterranean» A British possession since the Peace of Utrecht (1713)s Minorca was ideally situated to cover the trade routes to Italy and the Levant e The island had originally been taken to implement a plan to control the Mediterranean by keeping a British naval squadron inside the straits of Gibraltar during the winter months. If a squadron were stationed at the excellent harbor of Port Mahon, the French port of Toulon might be blockaded with ease, Minorca* & major value was, indeed, military, as the island was not self-supporting in trade. With Gibraltar and. Minorca& the British held the strategic keys to control of the Western Mediterranean» These .oritical possessions, how ever, had been severely neglected, despite the darkening in- teiviati,onal situation o f '1755^ r The threat to Minorca was only one aspect of the growing French menace to Britain,; French efforts to contain the British colonies in Worth America were rapidly escalating into full-scale war. Since the Treaty of Aix-la-Chappelle . ^Julian S, Corbett, England in the Mediterranean, 1603-1713 (Londong. Longmans, Green and Co,, 1917)9 II9 5^4- 45; Erich Eyck, Pitt Versus Fox: Father and Son (London? G, Bell and Sons, 1950), p, 72; G, J, Marcus, A Naval History of England? ^ The Formative ^Centuries (Boston? Little, Brown and Co0, 19§1)9 pp, 235-36; Brian Tunstall, Admiral Byng and ■ the Loss of Minorca (London? Philip Allan and Co,, 1925T7 >e, pp, 60-61, .(17^8) the French had been pursuing a policy of isolating the English colonies along the Atlantic Coast with a chain - of forts along the. Ohio-Hississlppl Valley0 The English colonists, however, thought themselves entitled to un limited expansion to the west. Clashes between French and British colonial forces became increasingly frequent and serious during 1755° The defeat of General Braddock at Fort Duquesne alarmed the British and determined them to act against French reinforcements being sent to Canada, Admiral Boscawen was ordered to intercept a French convoy but managed to capture only two ships. The result was increased tension between Britain arid France, The French severed diplomatic relations with London, 'The British made open war virtually , certain by sendirig their Western Naval Squadron, under Admiral John Bytig, to raid French commerce. The result was the capture of some "'three hundred French merchantmen. Ten sion increased, French military and naval preparations were observed both on the Channel Coast and at Toulon, Great alarm was taken at the■Channel Coast; preparations, for they were rumored to be desighed,for an invasion of England, The Toulon preparations seemed less important, and their object ive was not.clearg both North America and Minorca had been mentioned. The British concentrated their efforts in the Channel at the expense of the Mediterranean, Only with the arrival of the report on 9 March did the government face the seriousness of the French threat in the Mediterranean« The information available to the government before 9 March 1756 clearly indicated an attack on Minorca, but did not conclusively show the primacy of that operation over the one across the Channel, The reaction of the Newcastle minis try to these threats sheds light on the structure of mid- .Eighteenth Century English government and upOn the state of naval training-and strategy in this period.