Open Research Online The Open University’s repository of research publications and other research outputs Britain and Menorca in the eighteenth century Thesis How to cite: Britain and Menorca in the eighteenth century. PhD thesis The Open University. For guidance on citations see FAQs. c 1994 The Author https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ Version: Version of Record Link(s) to article on publisher’s website: http://dx.doi.org/doi:10.21954/ou.ro.0000e060 Copyright and Moral Rights for the articles on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright owners. For more information on Open Research Online’s data policy on reuse of materials please consult the policies page. oro.open.ac.uk Britain and Menorca in the Eighteenth Century David Whamond Donaldson MA Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Arts Faculty The Open University August 1994 Volume Three of Three Chapter Eight The Defence of Menorca - Threats and Losses----- p. 383 Chapter Nine The Impact of the British presence in Menorca p. 426 Chapter Ten The Final Years,, ý,.. p. 486 Epilogue and Conclusion' p. 528 Appendix A Currency p. 544 Appendix B List of holders of major public offices p. 545 Appendix C List of English words in Nenorqui p. 546 Bibliography p. 549 Chapter Eight. The Defence of Menorca - Threats and Losses. Oh my country! Oh Albion! I doubt thou art tottering on the brink of desolation this dayl The nation is all in a foment u on account of losing dear Minorca. This entry for 18 July 1756 in the diary of Thomas Turner, a Sussex shopkeeper, encapsulated the reaction of the British ýeen public to the news that Menorca had lost to the French at a time when, such was the vaunted impregnability of Fort St. Philip, ordinary citizens were prepared to wager as much 2 as E100 that the island would never be taken. But Turner's comments were a lament which might have been recorded in any of the years during which Menorca was British when, as in 1756, the garrison was denied the naval support without which the island was indefensible. Located at a sailing distance of only one day from France and two days from Spain - Britain's recurrent enemies in the eighteenth century - the island could never be regarded as a secure British possession. Spain's resentment at losing Menorca in 1713 persisted throughout the century, and its recovery was a recurrent 3 objective in all the treaties between Spain and her allies. Consequently, even at times when Britain was not at war, any intelligence of a significant increase in military or naval activity in Spain or in the south of France was a cause of anxiety to the commanders in Menorca. Philip V's recapture of Mallorca in 1715 and the undisguised ambition of Alberoni, his Chief Minister, to re- 383 establish Spain's influence in the western Mediterranean, gave rise to anxieties in the early years of British rule. Kane's leave was cancelled in 1715, when it was feared that the Jacobites might offer Gibraltar and Menorca to Spain in return for her support for the Pretender to regain the 4 British crown, and while subsequently on leave in London, Kane warned the Secretary of State of, the dangers of an attack from Mallorca. 5 Lord Forbes, commanding in Menorca during Kane's absence, was reported to be 'vastly apprehensive of Spanish designs' and 'depending on being attacked' in July 1717.6 Although the, fleet despatched to the Mediterranean under Admiral Byng brought troops to relieve the garrison regiments in Menorca before sailing on to defeat the Spanish fleet off Cape Passaro in Sicily in August 1718, Forbes reported great consternation when another Spanish fleet (actually on its way to Sardinia), lay menacingly off the coast of Menorca for eight days in August 1719.7 In the 1720s, of the two British Mediterranean possessions, Gibraltar was the focus of Spain's attention when two unsuccessful attempts to besiege the Rock were mounted (1720,1727-1729), but it was Menorca which was the more threatened in the 1730s, years in which Spain adopted a more aggressive policy in her relations with Britain. In the New Worldp Spain attempted to re-establish the monopoly of trade which she had enjoyed before 1713, and set out to limit the abuses in trade which the Asiento concession had opened up to British merchants; in Spain economic reforms were introduced which discriminated against British trade and, in 1732, Spain recaptured Oran on the north African coast, where she established a naval base which threatened 384 British naval supremacy in the western Mediterranean. In 1730, Kane and Carpenter had secured the appointment of Samuel Scot as British vice-consul in Mallorca, specifically so that he could give 'timely warning' of any Spanish preparations which could have 'any design for surprise' 8 against Menorca. Kane was, consequently, advised of the Spanish build-up to the expedition to Oran in 1732,9 and of the preparations for the Spanish expedition to Naples, in 1733.10 Before the destinations of both expeditions were known, Kane was apprehensive that Menorca could be their objective but, despite his warnings to the ministry, no 11 British naval force was despatched to the Mediterranean, and Kane was advised to seek help from Gibraltar if he 12 considered Menorca to be threatened. No such application was made until 1738, when it became clear that the Spanish were mounting another expedition, the known objective of which was the capture of Menorca, and the Menorca garrison was strengthened by the arrival from Gibraltar of the 26th regiment. Philip V was seriously contemplating an attack on Menorca as early as the Spring of 1738.13 By June 1738, the composition of the expeditionary force had been established, its commander appointed - the Duke of Montemar - and a detailed estimate of the cost had been produced. The campaign was expected to last three months and cost some ten million pesos. Montemar received a steady flow of intelligence from Menorca from a Spanish agent in the island, Juan Ballester. Ballester provided information on the disposition of the British troops, the poor state of the fortifications of St. Philip's, the low morale of the British troops (suggesting 385 some would desert if the Spanish achieved a landing, and many more would join them if offered an inducement of ten pesos and the promise of af ree passage to the country of their choice). He even went so far as to suggest landing places for the expedition, to forecast that a siege of two to three weeks would suf f ice, and to produce a map of the attack on the fort as he envisaged it (Fig. 8.1). But with Ballester's information and plans came a warning that it would be wise to proceed with caution against an island belonging to a nation whose navy was considered to be 'superior I to the Spanish fleet. In the event caution did prevail, even after war had been officially declared in December 1739, helped by the fact that the British squadron in the Mediterranean under the command of Admiral Haddock, had increased in number f rom eight ships in April 1739 to nineteen in October 1739.14 But it was not until the Spanish expedition had been re- routed to northern Italy in the spring of 1741, that Haddock was confident of discounting the likelihood of 15 an immediate attack on Menorca. Even though the Anglo-Spanish conflict subsequently merged with the War of the Austrian Succession and lasted until 1748, no other threats were posed to the security of the island in those years. Although renewed British possession of Menorca after 1763, and the retention of Gibraltar made a genuine reconciliation between Spain and Britain impossible, during the second period of British rule only the Anglo-Spanish dispute over the Falkland Islands in 1770 threatened the security of Menorca until the demands of the War of American Independence sapped British naval and military resources to 386 Figure B. I. MEL 1Ao . r4wo la ILI N V 1. rz I 4j, c-% ta "a cz ,, D- . r C '%4xpI 't 64 CA 9--vV)I 11- 0- iiý-. .'s 'ýý -s1T c"t a the extent that Gibraltar and Menorca, with weakened garrisons and very limited support, appeared achievable conquests to Spain and France. The Falklands dispute was serious enough for General Mostyn, the Governor, and all other absentee officers, to be ordered to their posts in 16 Menorca, and for Johnston, commanding in Mostyn's absence, to send London warnings of the build-up of Spanish troops in 7 Mallorcal. and, even though he was apprehensive of an attack, he had sent two companies of artillery to strengthen the 18 Gibraltar garrison. In the event no attack was mounted on either Gibraltar or Menorca and,. although the British Ambassador in Madrid correctly discounted the possibility of an attack on Menorca in 1775,19 it was becoming increasingly obvious that both British possessions were far from secure. As early as March 1776, Murray sent the Secretary at War two possible scenarios of a Spanish attack 20 on Menorca, together with his plans to thwart them. Barrington replied that: His Majesty's Ministers do not think the present situation of affairs makes it necessary or advisable that all absent officers should be ordered to join 21 their corps in Minorca. Nevertheless, Murray remained convinced that Menorca would be attacked and took prudent steps to put the island on a war footing, even to the extent of sending the 'female part' of 22 his family out of the island, together with his 'Plate, Books, Pictures and best Furniture.