Volume 14 Number 3 • 2005
EDITOR Prince Mashele
GUEST EDITOR Chris Maroleng
EDITORIAL BOARD Festus Aboagye Jakkie Cilliers Anton du Plessis Peter Gastrow Iqbal Jhazbhay Len le Roux Sarah Meek João Porto
The vision of the Institute for Security Studies is one of a stable and peaceful Africa characterised by sustainable development, human rights, the rule of law, democracy and collaborative security. As an applied policy research institute with a mission to conceptualise, inform and enhance the debate on human security in Africa the organisation supports policy formulation and decision making at every level towards the enhancement of human security for all in Africa.The Institute supports this vision and mission by undertaking applied research, training and capacity building; working collaboratively with others; facilitating and supporting policy formulation; monitoring trends and policy implementation; and collecting, interpreting and disseminating information. © Institute for Security Studies, 2005
Copyright in the volume as a whole is vested in the Institute for Security Studies, and no part may be reproduced in whole or in part without the express permission, in writing, of the ISS. It should be noted that any opinions expressed are the responsibility of the authors and not of the ISS, its International Council, the Trustees, or any funder or sponsor of the ISS. ISSN: 1024-6029 First published by the Institute for Security Studies, P O Box 1787, Brooklyn Square Pretoria 0075 SOUTH AFRICA Tel: +27-12-346-9500/2 Fax: +27-12-460-0998 email: [email protected] 67 Roeland Square, Drury Lane, Gardens Cape Town 8001 SOUTH AFRICA Tel: +27-21-461-7211 Fax: +27-21-461-7213 email: [email protected] www.iss.org.za
Layout and printed by Lesedi Litho Printers CONTENTS
EDITORIAL
CHRIS MAROLENG 1
FEATURES
ZIMBABWE’S MARCH 2005 ELECTIONS: DANGERS AND OPPORTUNITIES 5 Peter Kagwanja
THE PRISONERS OF HOPE: CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE OPPOSITION 19 Brian Kagoro
THE LAND IS THE ECONOMY 31 Revisiting the land question Lloyd Sachikonye
AFRICA WATCH
THE DYNASTIC SUCCESSION IN TOGO 47 Paul Simon Handy
SUDAN: ALL QUIET ON THE EASTERN FRONT? 53 Richard Cornwell
THE AFRICAN UNION MISSION IN SUDAN 57 Henri Boshoff
A PLACE TO CALL HOME? 61 Mariam Jooma
THE GACACA PROCESS Stephanie Wolter 67
TRENDS & MARKERS 69 Some facts about Zimbabwe
ESSAYS
ZIMBABWE’S ZEZURU SUM GAME 77 Chris Maroleng
SECURITY GOVERNANCE IN SOUTH AFRICA Gavin Cawthra 95
WAR AND HIV PREVALENCE 107 Taddesse Behre, Hagos Gemechu and Alex de Waal
COMMENTARY
ZIMBABWE: GOVERNANCE THROUGH MILITARY OPERATIONS 117 Martin Rupiya
ZIMBABWE: BEYOND THE DEMOCRATIC IMPASSE 119 Cheryl Hendricks
AID, GLENEAGLES AND THE RUN-UP TO THE MILLENNIUM + 5 SUMMIT 123 Prince Mashele and Jakkie Cilliers
BOOK REVIEWS
WAR AND THE NEW DISORDER IN THE 21ST CENTURY 129 Jeremy Black
YOU, THE PEOPLE - THE UNITED NATIONS, TRANSITIONAL 131 ADMINISTRATION AND STATE-BUILDING Simon Chesterman
SECURITY SECTOR GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA: A HANDBOOK 134 Nicole Ball and Kayode Fayemi (eds) EDITORIAL
ZIMBABWE UNDER THE SPOTLIGHT CHRIS MAROLENG
Frequently publicised pronouncements by were held on 31 March 2005. The participants, President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe that who formally presented their views at this were made before the 2005 parliamentary poll, roundtable, authored the essays contained in which optimistically indicated that he might be this special edition of the African Security contemplating retiring from office, have revived Review (ASR). The main focus of this edition the ongoing speculation about the precondi- of the ASR is the analysis of the on going crisis tions that the aging head of state would require in Zimbabwe and the possible solutions to the to be in place before he relinquishes his posi- challenges that face this country. tion in government. More broadly, there has The delegates at the roundtable generally also been increasing debate about the possible agreed that Zimbabwe was in a state of unprec- shape of a post-Mugabe dispensation, and how edented crisis. There may have been differences this government might begin to tackle the seri- in the articulation of the causes and nature of ous economic and political difficulties facing the crisis. Nevertheless, the participants con- this country. Even members of Zimbabwe’s curred that Zimbabwe is facing a multi-layered ruling establishment now commonly accept crisis that requires a multi-pronged approach. that the formal economy is in a state of near One of the themes common in all the papers collapse. Whatever their publicly stated posi- relates to the various effects that the decline tions, leading figures in ZANU-PF admit that in the economy has had on the domestic a return to international respectability and the political balance of power. The decline of the resumption of aid and loan flows are urgently economy and the deficit in democracy have needed if a complete economic meltdown is had an effect on the living standards of the vast to be averted. The difficulty has been in find- majority of Zimbabweans and have created a ing a common position that establishes a road groundswell of support for opponents of the map for Zimbabwe’s recovery, which is both current government, whose mismanagement functional and acceptable to all the key stake- and corruption are seen to be at the heart of the holders. problem. Much of this discontent is manifested In order to facilitate a discussion of theses top- through the support given to the Movement for ics, the African Security Analysis Programme at Democratic Change (MDC). In this light there the Institute for Security Studies invited a small must obviously be questions about the viability group of experts and analysts from Zimbabwe of the MDC in a ZANU-PF dominated parlia- and South Africa to participate in a roundtable ment especially if the international community discussion entitled ‘Zimbabwe: Imagining the does help alleviate the economic crisis in the future’, before the parliamentary elections that aftermath of an anticipated acceptable political
CHRIS MAROLENG is a Senior Researcher in the African Security Analysis programme at the Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria. 2 African Security Review 14(3) • 2005 settlement. This systemic vulnerability of the this country, in order to hopefully assist in the MDC is considered by more than one of the various on going processes aimed at seeking authors. solutions to this protracted crisis. Noble efforts The Zimbabwean opposition, its civil soci- were made by the authors and participants of ety and the Southern African Development the roundtable to imagine and contribute to Community (SADC) region are gripped by the creation of a better future for Zimbabwe. a pervasive uncertainty as to what should be A future that will hopefully provide the people done to take Zimbabwe out of this largely self- of this country with the freedom from want, induced quagmire. The participants agreed that hunger, and fear that they have struggled so the solution to the Zimbabwe crisis will have, hard for, particularly at a time when this county realistically and very delicately, to balance, has just commemorated it silver jubilee of inde- amongst other things, economic and political pendence. exigencies and justice and reconciliation con- Thanks must go to the authors themselves cerns. The balance of forces in the country is whose tireless efforts have produced this work. too close to call and thus no single entity can A special word of thanks must also go to go it alone. the members of the African Security Analysis This compilation of papers covering various Programme, particularly Dr. Joao Porto and topics pertaining to the crisis in Zimbabwe, Richard Cornwell, who have helped and was put together in the spirit of enhancing the provided invaluable advice every step of the broader understanding of the challenges facing way. FEATURES
ZIMBABWE’S MARCH 2005 ELECTIONS: DANGERS AND OPPORTUNITIES PETER KAGWANJA
THE PRISONERS OF HOPE: CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE OPPOSITION IN ZIMBABWE BRIAN KAGORO
THE LAND IS THE ECONOMY Revisiting the land question LLOYD SACHIKONYE
FEATURE
ZIMBABWE’S MARCH 2005 ELECTIONS: DANGERS AND OPPORTUNITIES PETER KAGWANJA
On 31 March 2005, Zimbabwe held its parliamentary polls, the sixth since the country gained independence in 1980. These elections were widely viewed by analysts as representing a rare chance to end political tensions and pull the country back from the brink of instability by breaking the political deadlock that has dominated it since the controversial presidential elections in 2002.1 In recent years, a great deal has been published on what has come to be known as the ‘Zimbabwe crisis’, a classic case that has reinforced cynical views about the weakness or failure of post-colonial states in Africa.2 The current situation is deeply rooted in President Robert Mugabe’s politicisa- tion of land-related historical injustices and tensions. Arguably, he did this to stem the tide of the pro-democracy movement and to sustain his Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) government in power, in the wake of the seizure of white commercial farms from 2000 onwards and the resultant downward plunge of the economy. Although it is obvious that Zimbabwe’s political future hinged on these elections, it is now clear that the outcome has been judged to be unacceptable to the parties contesting it, especially the MDC, which has constantly pointed out the lack of a level playing field. Since these elections have failed to gain a degree of national, regional and international acceptability, this paper will question whether this event has given Zimbabwe another opportunity to resolve the political impasse. Current assessments would suggest that this is not so and that Zimbabwe will return to its previous state of political paralysis
Introduction dialogue or ‘quiet diplomacy’, which was mediated by South Africa and supported by key The prevailing political deadlock between the international players including the United States ruling ZANU-PF government and the opposition (US), regional actors including the Southern Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) harks African Development Community (SADC) back to the flawed 2000 parliamentary elections and South Africa itself, these parties looked to and the 2002 presidential elections, which the the March 2005 elections as a chance to end MDC claimed were ‘stolen’. Since April 2004, the stalemate. This suggested an opportunity after the evident failure of inter-Zimbabwean to ease the attendant political atmosphere of
DR PETER KAGWANJA is a research associate at the University of Pretoria and the director of the Southern Africa Project of the International Crisis Group. He would like to thank Chris Maloreng of ISS who convened the policy forum ‘Zimbabwe: Imagining the Futures’, where this paper was first presented. While the paper draws heavily from the author’s experience and work with the International Crisis Group, the views expressed here are his and not those of the Crisis Group. 6 African Security Review 14(3) • 2005 confrontation and counter the risk of civil The MDC saw the March elections as a conflict in Zimbabwe. chance to resolve the national crisis, but insisted Organising and winning a credible election on full implementation of the SADC principles in 2005 - according to the thinking of the ruling and guidelines governing democratic elections ZANU-PF stalwarts - offered a viable strategy as a condition for its participation. In February, for self-rehabilitation and a coming-in from the yielding to pressure from its internal supporters political cold (the isolation and sanctions imposed (who argued that the party should not deliver by the international community). In June 2004 victory to ZANU-PF unchallenged) and to calls the government announced that it would soon from regional and international players that introduce reforms to the electoral system. It it should take part in the elections, the MDC later endorsed the principles and guidelines reversed its poll boycott. governing democratic elections promulgated by SADC at its summit in Mauritius in August 2004. But while the government introduced An electoral minefield some changes to the electoral system, including setting up the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission The possibility of creating a political environment (ZEC), establishing an independent election in which all parties could compete on an equal court, and instituting technical reforms focused basis was minimised by the restrictive law regime on procedures for polling day, many analysts that exists in the country, which undermined the dismissed these changes as cosmetic and basic freedoms of association, movement and essentially a ploy to hoodwink the international assembly.4 In the aftermath of the controversial community. elections in 2002, the government used the Public The repressive system of governance the Order and Security Act (POSA) to prohibit and Mugabe administration introduced during the shut down public meetings of the MDC and 2002–2004 hiatus remained intact, making civil society organisations, to repress dissent, the platform of electoral competition uneven persecute its opponents, and muzzle and even and casting into serious doubt the freeness outlaw sections of the media. In August 2004 and fairness of the parliamentary poll held in the MDC made efforts to seek redress from March 2005. In addition, a plethora of restrictive the courts when POSA was employed to bar laws undermined the fundamental freedoms its leader, Morgan Tsvangirai, from addressing of expression, association and assembly; party and public meetings, but the courts were weakened the opposition; muzzled the media; not sufficiently free to pass a non-partisan and and emasculated the judiciary. State-sponsored meaningful verdict.5 political violence linked to the youth militias The POSA was reinforced by the recently and the increasingly political role played by the promulgated Criminal Procedure and Evidence security forces, the intimidation of government Amendment Act (CPEAA). Rigorous application opponents, and the stifling of dissent contributed of the Broadcasting Services Act (BSA), together to a narrowing of the political space. Ironically, with the Access to Information and Protection of shortly before the elections, polling data Privacy Act (AIPPA), which requires journalists suggested that the combination of terror tactics and media houses to register with the government, and propaganda had not only emboldened and curtailed the freedom of the media in general and given a new lease of life to authoritarianism, but the free reporting of elections specifically. Under also improved the popular ratings of Mugabe the AIPPA, three papers were closed down, and the ZANU-PF.3 This occurred despite the including the leading independent newspaper, the economic meltdown in the country, which Daily News. The Public Voluntary Organisation resulted in desperate economic conditions for (PVO), which requires organisations that provide the vast majority of Zimbabweans. The existence welfare services and treatment to register and has of a repressive authoritarian system posed serious been in force since 1996, was utilised to deny obstacles to the campaigning activities of the registration to NGOs deemed not supportive of main opposition party, the MDC, during the the government’s party. March 2005 parliamentary elections. The ruling party also used its majority in Feature 7 parliament to pass the controversial Non- security, has been widely used to monitor and Governmental Organisation (NGO) Bill, which punish dissent.12 While there was a remarkable provided for the “operation, monitoring and decline in political violence ahead of the March regulation of all non-governmental operations” 2005 elections, physical intimidation by the and tended to criminalise the activities of security forces marred the seven by-elections human rights and governance NGOs.6 Although that have been held since the 2002 presidential Mugabe, capitulating to international pressure, poll. In April 2004, the ruling party used failed to sign it into law and referred it back to intimidation and violent tactics to win an MDC parliament in early 2005, its devastating impact parliamentary seat in Harare.13 The security has already been felt by civic groups, which forces were involved in the arbitrary detention have imposed self-censorship to avoid being of opposition politicians, the dispersal of MDC outlawed.7 The NGO Bill was driven in part by rallies and assaults on civilians, especially in the the government’s paranoia about external funding low-income suburbs of Harare and Bulawayo. of the MDC and its civic partners, especially the The result was a traumatised and intimidated financial support supplied by foreign donors citizenry, and an environment of psychological to NGOs dealing with human rights issues. It fear that undermined free participation in the also restricted the capacity of these groups to electoral process.14 undertake civic education programmes.8 The In addition to the coercive role played by provisions of the Bill include the stipulation the security mechanisms of the state, political that “foreign non-governmental organisations violence is linked to the training of the youth that are providing food will not be able to militias, which implicitly incites them to the use continue doing so without restriction”,9 because of physical force. As part of President Robert they threaten the government’s monopoly over Mugabe’s strategy for youth mobilisation before food distribution, which is a valuable source of the 2005 parliamentary election, in the middle patronage and influence over voters. Sadly, as a of 2004, he warned the ZANU-PF youth league result of the legislation, some 10,000 jobs in the that if his party lost the election they would be NGO sector are at risk of being lost, at a time directly answerable. It is estimated that more that the country’s unemployment has risen to than 40,000 youth militia have graduated from over 70 per cent.10 the national youth training centres, also known as “Border Gezi” (after a former ZANU-PF Political violence Secretary for the Commissariat and Minister of Youth and Employment).15 The training of Far from maintaining a professional distance young people to fulfil a quasi-military role is from politics, Zimbabwe’s security forces – the firmly part of ZANU-PF’s electoral matrix. In police and the Central Intelligence Organisation 2002 the government made public its plan to (CIO) – are dominated by war veterans who establish 35 youth training centres nationwide are members of ZANU-PF. They have publicly and to increase its budget allocation to the declared that would not salute a president who National Youth Service Programme from Z$418 was not a veteran of the anti-colonial war, a tacit million (about US$79 million) in 2002 to Z$2 reference to the leader of the MDC, Morgan billion (US$380 million) in 2003.16 The idea Tsvangirai.11 of such training is not unique to Zimbabwe, but While this party–military nexus helped the government has exploited the vulnerability stabilise the state and shielded the government of the mass of poverty-stricken and unemployed from any possible military takeover, the young people who are lured into the national politicisation of the armed forces is a serious youth service by the promise of salaries, food impediment to democratic transition. In the past and clothes, to create an army of pawns in four years the police, army and air force have been their political chess game. Equipped with skills called upon to crush political demonstrations. In which can be applied to suppress and even addition, the CIO, which under the Minister torture supporters of the opposition, these young of State for National Security in the President’s Zimbabweans have been responsible for the use Office is responsible for internal and external of violence to ring-fence rural areas as ZANU-PF 8 African Security Review 14(3) • 2005
‘zones’.17 as banning increases in school fees and imposing Besides being used to monitor public dissent, restrictions on the ability of local authorities members of the militias have undertaken an array to increase tax rates, in order to win popular of political projects. These range from ensuring support. It has also used the land issue as compliance with government price controls and an electoral tool, by dangling the promise of distributing food for the Grain Marketing Board land allocations like a carrot in front of MDC (GMB) to setting up roadblocks,18 torturing leaders, to induce defections and extend its opposition loyalists, and destroying their property. patronage network. In early September 2004 For example, in August 2004 ZANU-PF youths Harare’s executive mayor, Sekesai Makwavarara, abducted and assaulted Mbare Mutukwa, an decamped from his party and joined the ranks of MDC official, rendering credible the widespread ZANU-PF after reportedly having been granted suspicion that the government has been training land the previous month.22 Land has also been a these young people to create a private army crucial instrument in maintaining the loyalty of that can be used to its electoral advantage.19 the military and the police, who have been given International organisations such as the Geneva- large swathes of farmland and urban plots. based International Parliamentary Union (IPU) have in the past called on the government to Food as a political weapon ensure a violence-free electoral environment by immediately putting an end to the recruitment On 12 May 2004 President Mugabe’s government of party militias.20 told donors that Zimbabwe would not require food aid in 2004–2005, as it anticipated a bumper harvest.23 In an interview with Sky A dangerous game: Land and food News, the president disclosed that the country politics would halt food imports in the light of an anticipated harvest of 2.4 million tonnes of Zimbabwe’s troubled economy inevitably maize.24 (Zimbabwe consumes at least 100,000 became part of electoral politics ahead of the tonnes of this staple cereal per month, about 1.2 March 2005 parliamentary contest. Before the million tonnes a year. In addition, the country election, Reserve Bank’s governor Gideon Gono requires 600,000 tonnes for its strategic grain announced that the new monetary policies he reserve stock.) Despite the president’s claim, it had introduced had brought inflation down soon became clear that the country was facing from an annual rate of 624 per cent in January serious food insecurity. The UN Food and 2004 to less than 130 per cent in January 2005. Agriculture Organisation (FAO) and the World However, this was widely viewed as an electoral Food Programme (WFP) survey report in July gimmick: the prices of fuel, food and other basic 2004 predicted a deficit of 325,000 tonnes of necessities have skyrocketed since the election. maize.25 The Zimbabwe Vulnerability Assessment More than 75 per cent of the population live Committee (ZimVAC) report indicated that below the poverty line, in spite of Gono’s 2.3 million people in rural areas would need claims.21 The production of traditional crops food aid in 2004–2005. Government sources for export, such as tobacco, has plunged to such as the bipartisan Portfolio Committee on an all-time low of 60 million kilograms this Lands and Agriculture, set up by parliament in season (from a peak of 220 million five years August 2004 to verify government crop yield ago), leading to a serious deficiency of foreign estimates, gave conflicting figures on the last currency. This has been reflected in the long maize harvest. In spite of the government’s queues for fuel and the soaring prices of food, assertion of food sufficiency, an August 2004 which many can no longer afford to buy. In report of the Bulawayo Council indicated that addition, the country is experiencing serious 125 people had died of hunger and malnutrition- shortfalls in food production that are directly related causes in the March–July 2004 period.26 linked to the recent droughts and to the fast-track The executive mayor of Bulawayo, Ndabeni land redistribution programme. Ncube, and the Director of Health, Dr Zanele The government has adopted measures such Hwalima, confirmed in September that deaths Feature 9 associated with food shortage in the famine- At the intra-ethnic level, the contest matched stricken opposition stronghold of the Bulawayo the two principal rival Shona sub-groups, the province had increased to 161. The government Karanga, who mainly occupy Masvingo and responded to these reports by threatening the Midlands provinces, and the Zezuru, who come Bulawayo City Council with ‘drastic action’ from the Mashonaland Central, East and West for releasing the statistics.27 However, at a provinces.31 meeting on 1 June 2005 with the UN envoy The Zezuru faction is led by a retired army on humanitarian needs, James Morris, Robert general, Solomon “Rex” Mujuru, a long-standing Mugabe accepted UN food aid in a retreat after ally of Mugabe. To counteract the Karanga declaring only two months previously that his faction, the Zezuru group has forged alliances cash-strapped government had enough resources with such influential Matabele politicians as to avert looming starvation in the country. John Nkomo (ZANU-PF’s chairman) and Morris said: “President Mugabe accepts and Dumiso Dabengwa, a former commander of welcomes food aid from the United Nations the Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army but it’s not immediately clear how much is (ZIPRA), the armed wing of the Zimbabwe needed because we are meeting with relevant People’s Union (ZAPU), and a ZANU-PF [government] ministers to work through the politburo member. On the other side, the numbers. We will be able to establish the fuller Karanga faction, which is closely identified details as we go along.”28 with Emmerson Mnangagwa, another long- established ally of the president and the secretary of the ZANU-PF administration, Things falling apart? feels that it is their ’time to eat’, since the Zezurus have controlled most of the national In May 2004 President Mugabe announced that cake for many years. The Zezuru faction have he would not seek re-election in 2008 and might made attempts to taint Mnangagwa’s record by retire before then, adding the rider that he was covertly making known his role, when he was having difficulty in identifying a successor.29 state security minister, in masterminding the The announcement sparked off a vicious power Gukurahundi, a military assault against ZAPU struggle that threatened to rip ZANU-PF apart, during which the army slaughtered more than both during and after the December 2004 party 20,000 people in Matabeleland in the 1980s. congress. The contest in ZANU-PF primarily Additional damage was done to Mnangagwa’s revolves around the old guard’s refusal to hand faction by a number of adverse press reports on over political power to a new crop of youthful his alleged role in the looting of diamonds and politicians and Mugabe’s indecision over naming other resources from the Democratic Republic a successor. However, the immediate trigger for of the Congo during Zimbabwe’s intervention the current crisis within ZANU-PF was the need in that country’s war.32 to fill the vice-presidential position that had been The anti-corruption campaign that the left vacant by the death of Simon Muzenda in Mugabe government launched became a handy October 2003. Ambitious leaders in the party felt weapon in the internecine party war. Solomon that the second vice-presidential slot, currently Mujuru is a key member of the committee held by the ageing and frail Joseph Msika, was investigating ZANU-PF companies.33 The vast also open to contestation.30 majority of those implicated in corruption scandals have been indirectly linked to Mnangagwa, including three directors tied to The ethnic factor ZANU-PF companies: Dipak Padya, Jayant The scramble for the presidency opened serious Joshi and Manharlal Joshi, who have fled to ethnic and intra-ethnic cleavages. Although the UK.34 In August the government seized a efforts have been made to ensure equitable mining empire owned by Mutumwa Mawere, a power-sharing between the Shona and the businessman who built his fortune partly through Ndebele, most members of Mugabe’s inner Mnangagwa’s political patronage. The reactions circle hail from his Shona sub-group, the Zezuru. to the probe became increasingly violent and 10 African Security Review 14(3) • 2005 partisan. At one point Mnangagwa threatened long knives’, on the eve of the opening of the to shoot policemen who sought to interview party’s congress, which was to be held from 1 to him about his alleged involvement in gold- 5 December, the Mujuru faction stepped up the smuggling. He has since warned his detractors pressure for a woman candidate to be chosen that he will not go down alone. for the position of vice-president. This would At inter-ethnic level, the minority status of also block the candidacy of Mnangagwa.39 In the Ndebele is proving an additional hurdle for a counter-manoeuvre, the Mnangagwa camp their leaders. Under the terms of the ZANU-PF/ joined ranks with the Young Turks and pushed ZAPU Unity Agreement of 1987, one of the two for the retirement of the ageing Msika to create vice-presidents must be an Ndebele from ZAPU a second vacancy.40 At the famous Tsholotsho and the other a Shona from ZANU. This power- meeting (so called after Jonathan Moyo’s home sharing arrangement has disadvantaged ambitious constituency, where the meeting was held), the Ndebele such as the ZANU-PF chairman and stage was set for a classic palace coup, which Speaker of Parliament John Nkomo, who want was intended to see the replacement of all to enter the race for the presidency. Because the positions in the Presidium, except Mugabe’s, by second vice-presidential slot is already occupied Tsholotsho members. by a former ZAPU stalwart, Msika,35 the vacant The plan, however, was nipped in the bud. position is reserved for a Shona. ZANU-PF announced that it was re-nominating Msika as first vice-president and Joyce Mujuru as second vice-president. All members of the Generational and gender factors Tsholotsho camp were reprimanded and those The struggle for leadership of ZANU-PF was holding key positions in the party politburo characterised by attempts to use generational were demoted or removed from their positions. differences to trump ethnicity by a small but Analysts interpreted this as the silencing of the vociferous group of ‘Young Turks’, which party’s ‘hawks’ and the elevation of its ‘doves’. included the fiery former Information and The election of Joyce Mujuru has been hailed Publicity Minister, Jonathan Moyo; the Minister as a positive step towards grooming a moderate of Agriculture, Joseph Made; and the former leader as Mugabe’s possible successor, although Justice Minister, Patrick Chinamasa. This faction some view her as a pawn in a political game that attempted to exploit its previous control of the is being played by men. The possible elevation of media to project itself as representative of a John Nkomo (who is ZAPU and Ndebele) in the new youthful ZANU-PF and to denigrate other future to replace Msika is considered the final potential successors to Mugabe. step that would usher in a team of moderates to Solomon Mujuru’s Zuzuru faction astutely lead a ZANU-PF that is committed to political played the gender card to blunt the generational and economic reform. challenge and out-manoeuvre its ethnic rivals. However, the party emerged from the fray On 5 September 2004 the ZANU-PF Women’s badly divided, and Mugabe has increasingly League congress passed a resolution urging that become a factional leader. The key positions in a woman should fill the vacant vice-presidential the party, government and security forces are post.36 Mugabe’s wife, Grace, endorsed the now held by members of his Zezuru group and resolution, which was taken as an indication by fellow veterans. that the president himself might be supportive of the move.37 On 22 November ZANU-PF announced it was nominating Joyce Mujuru, the Domesticating SADC’S electoral Minister for Water Resources and Infrastructural guidelines Development, for the position.38 Besides being Solomon Mujuru’s wife, Joyce Mujuru is a On 7 September 2004, against the backdrop of heroine of the war of liberation. She has also domestic and international pressure to comply earned great credibility by being Zimbabwe’s with the principles and guidelines for democratic longest-serving cabinet minister. elections that had been adopted in Mauritius by In what has been dubbed ‘the night of the SADC the previous month, the Zimbabwean Feature 11 government introduced a bill to create the its ability to offer a realistic alternative to independent Zimbabwe Electoral Commission the Mugabe/ZANU-PF government.42 The (ZEC). Mugabe signed both the Election Bill government has proved adept at using the twin and the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission Bill tools of coercion and co-option to undermine into law in January 2005. The commission’s the MDC’s solidarity and has effectively reviled remit is not only to organise and supervise all it as the stooge of foreign interests hostile to the presidential, parliamentary and civic elections Zimbabwean liberation struggle. and referendums, but also to control the As propaganda took its toll on the MDC, registration of voters; ensure the proper custody the party began to show cracks at leadership and maintenance of voters’ rolls; design, print level. The tactical divisions that emerged and distribute ballot papers; procure ballot undermined its ability to strategise and find boxes; and establish and operate polling centres. ways to take on the ZANU-PF juggernaut. The ZEC is also to conduct voter education A recent well-researched study by the South programmes and give accreditation to local Africa-based Institute for Security Studies (ISS) and international observers of elections and identified two broad factions in the MDC43. referendums.41 The first is identified with Morgan Tsvangirai The nomination of members to the and the national executive council, most of Independent Commission was hailed as “fairly whose members failed to win parliamentary independent” and non-partisan. But the main seats in 2000. The preferred tactics of this wing threat to its effectiveness was the slow pace of favour the use of trade union-style mass action its implementation, including the setting up to oust Mugabe from power. Apart from driving of an office and developing the capacity to the abortive mass action campaign code-named fulfil its numerous functions. It was further the “final push”, which was brutally crushed by hindered by the existence of other institutions the security forces in April 2003, this faction was and authorities, some of them with overlapping at the forefront of those pushing for a boycott of functions, which are also involved in the the 2005 elections. electoral process and have the backing of the The second grouping, led by the MDC’s law. These include the Registrar General’s office, Secretary General, Welshman Ncube,44 gives the Delimitation Committee and the Election priority to talks with ZANU-PF to resolve the Supervisory Committee. The independence of political impasse, which its members believe the election management body was viewed as arises primarily from the question of political essential to the credibility of the outcome. legitimacy. They consider that a negotiated But electoral reforms and the existence of the solution would be quickly followed by commission would never have been sufficient to governance and economic reforms, a return ensure that the elections were free and fair. This to rule of law and an end to the humanitarian is mainly because it can be argued that in the crisis.45 It was anticipated by many observers last election the ZEC was not operating within that after the March elections, this group would a free political environment. It is now clear after play a pivotal role in steering Zimbabwe out of the 2005 poll that further electoral reforms will crisis by entering into post-election talks aimed need to be accompanied by comprehensive at national reconciliation. This prospect seems political reforms, which will grant equal status to increasingly remote as the ruling party, buoyed all parties and tolerance of opposing views. by its landslide victory at the polls, looks to entrench its dominance while simultaneously marginalising the opposition. Mugabe has The MDC: The hazards experienced by unequivocally ruled out any chance of talking to opposition parties the MDC and snubbed the appointment by the African Union Chairman, Nigeria’s Olusegun Since the MDC celebrated its fifth anniversary Obasanjo, of former Mozambican president, on 11 September 2004, its resounding defeat Joachim Chissano, to broker the Zimbabwe at the polls has raised serious questions about stalemate. 12 African Security Review 14(3) • 2005
The political cost of the election boycott during the election. Tsvangirai himself took up a less belligerent stance, calling for national The cost of trade-union-style militancy was the reconciliation and dialogue with ZANU-PF and loss of the party’s urban clout. For example, reiterating to President Mbeki of South Africa by urging a mass resignation of its civic leaders and Prime Minister Bérenger of Mauritius from Harare municipality in November 2004, that the MDC were willing to take part in the the MDC effectively surrendered its strongest elections if the SADC principles and guidelines power-base to ZANU-PF, which quickly were implemented in full.50 The acquittal also appointed a committee to run the city. As offered another chance for regional players such noted, in August 2004 the MDC announced as South Africa to revive the stalled inter-party that it would not participate in the forthcoming talks in advance of the elections.51 Accordingly by-elections and the March 2005 elections President Mbeki convened numerous meetings unless ZANU-PF implemented in full the with the Zimbabwean government and the SADC electoral principles and guidelines. The leaders of the MDC. ruling party responded by stating that even Another benign effect was that the MDC though it would proceed with the elections embarked on internal consultations, which led with or without MDC participation, it would to the reversal in early February of the party’s 46 comply with the principles and guidelines. earlier decision to boycott the elections. The declaration that the MDC intended to boycott the elections exacerbated divisions within the party, with some parliamentarians arguing that the decision had been taken Regional actors and initiatives exclusively by the executive council, with insufficient advance consultation. Legislators The Southern African Development Community such as Trudy Stevenson and Job Sikhala openly has been increasingly vocal in calling attention dismissed a boycott as being out of the question to the ZANU-PF government’s deviations from and declared that they intended to contest the rule of law and good governance, although the 2005 elections. The MDC’s civil society South Africa, its most prominent member, allies also expressed reservations about the continues to avoid direct criticism.52 exclusionary and non-consultative manner in The Protocol on Principles and Guidelines which the decision had been taken. For instance, Governing Democratic Elections adopted by the the chairman of the National Constitutional organisation’s 14 heads of state at their August Assembly, Dr Lovemore Madhuku, told the 2004 summit has, as described above, become author that the most rewarding tactic the MDC the focus of much of Zimbabwe’s internal could have adopted would have been to push political manoeuvring and of international for appropriate constitutional reform rather activity. The protocol, which has been hailed than a boycott.47 The business sector likewise as a landmark in the democratisation of the indicated its unhappiness over the boycott, region, was substantially inspired by the which it saw as potentially hampering its efforts African Union’s Declaration on the Principles to attract the foreign investment needed to Governing Democratic Elections in Africa.53 resuscitate the economy.48 Signatories to the SADC protocol are expected The confrontational nature of politics in to adhere to nearly a dozen core principles. Zimbabwe eased somewhat after the acquittal by These range from ensuring the full participation the High Court in Harare on 14 October 2004 of citizens in the political process, freedom of of Morgan Tsvangarai, who had been charged association, political tolerance, and elections at with treason. This created an opportunity for regular intervals to guaranteeing equal access talks and attempts to close the gap between to the state media for all political parties and the rival MDC and ZANU-PF.49 The acquittal providing all citizens with the right to vote was also directly responsible for a toning down and to run for office. Other requirements of MDC rhetoric and the remarkable decline are to ensure an independent judiciary and in incidents of political violence before and impartial electoral system, and to provide voter Feature 13 education.54 Political parties are obliged to when the American president, George Bush, accept and respect those election results that are visited South Africa, Mbeki undertook to find a proclaimed free and fair by competent national solution to the crisis in Zimbabwe within a year, electoral authorities, in accordance with the law via the resumption of inter-party talks. of the land, but are also to be guaranteed the However, although South African mediators right to challenge results. got the two sides to engage in informal The most innovative part of the protocol dialogue, the June 2004 target passed without (which should have had considerable relevance significant change. The Director General for for Zimbabwe’s March 2005 elections) is the the Department of Foreign Affairs, Ayanda provision for a SADC observer mission, the Ntsaluba, said that the meetings were going mandate and operational guidelines of which nowhere, because neither the MDC nor ZANU- are set out in detail. The protocol also defines in PF felt the need for consultation with the explicit detail the responsibilities of the member other. South African Deputy Foreign Minister state that is conducting the elections. The Sue van der Merwe said in August 2004 that SADC observer mission, in the final assessment the ZANU-PF by-election victories and its of their performance, seemed to have been increasing focus on the March 2005 elections driven by political imperatives (especially its were partly responsible for the collapse of the rather obfuscating position that the Zimbabwe talks.56 While conceding that the meetings political impasse is a direct product of land have not produced tangible results, officials seizures and the country’s efforts to follow deny that there is nothing to show for their black political power with economic power) efforts.57 South African government insiders and not by a clear-cut requirement to deliver argue that in 2002 Zimbabwe was on the brink a even-handed and technical assessment of of anarchy and that their diplomacy defused compliance based on the guidelines established tensions, buying time to work towards gradual in the protocol. reform. “Transforming a totalitarian regime into The SADC principles and guidelines, while a democracy is far easier and less costly in terms providing a useful framework within which of lives and resources than getting a country domestic groups and governments could press out of anarchy and introducing democracy,” ZANU-PF to level the electoral playing field, said one official.58 Other South Africans said were not legally binding. Nor did they come approvingly that Zimbabwe is more stable equipped with penalties for non-compliance, today than it was two years ago. though President Mbeki pointed out that “the South Africa’s position as a mediator has been SADC Treaty gives the possibility for member hampered by discord and policy disagreements states of the community to be excluded from on the Zimbabwe question. South Africa’s ruling the regional body if they are found to be in African National Congress (ANC) party appears 55 violation of the treaty”. Getting the Mugabe to have been nudging ZANU-PF stalwarts to regime not only to reform the electoral system move faster on reforms by opening up society comprehensively but also to initiate the extensive and restoring democracy to defuse domestic political reforms required to rescind restrictive and international opposition. Since June 2004 laws will require concerted efforts by as wide a the ANC has received ZANU-PF delegations.59 range of regional and other international actors It is alleged that at one of these meetings, as possible. the leader of the ZANU-PF contingent, John Nkomo, a moderate, asked for and received South Africa: Ties that blind some sort of assurance that the ANC would Undoubtedly, South Africa has emerged as the help the party secure a convincing majority most influential external actor in the Zimbabwe in the March 2005 parliamentary elections.60 crisis. In the aftermath of the disputed While the ANC–ZANU-PF connection has presidential elections in 2002, it advocated an been taken by critics as the reason for South inter-Zimbabwean dialogue between ZANU- Africa’s pro-Mugabe position and moderate PF and the MDC as the most likely means of approach to the Zimbabwe crisis, it has not resolving the political impasse. In July 2003, been welcomed by all party members: this tie 14 African Security Review 14(3) • 2005 has caused ripples within the ANC.61 Human and People’s Rights, which had visited In contrast to the official policy adopted by Zimbabwe two years earlier (24–28 June 2002) the ANC, South Africa’s civil society has taken and which was highly critical of the Mugabe a more hardline position on Zimbabwe since government’s human rights record. Although the onset of the current crisis in 2000. Although the report was referred back to Harare for the South African Christian church supported further consultation, with the notation that its counterpart in Zimbabwe in putting pressure the Zimbabwe situation was a political crisis on ZANU-PF to open up society, it has become that required negotiations at the highest level, more conciliatory. For example, the South it was recently adopted by the AU at its African Council of Churches (SACC) made a summit in Abuja, Nigeria.64 This has increased plea to both ZANU-PF and the MDC to join pressure on Zimbabwe to show greater respect a forum for a dialogue that would be similar to for human rights to avoid isolation by this South Africa’s Convention for a Democratic powerful regional body. South Africa (CODESA). The Congress of Although Nigeria lacks the clout that South South African Trade Unions (COSATU), on Africa has in Harare, it is without doubt a the other hand, adopted a more aggressive major player in African regional politics and has stance in defending the MDC and calling on been a very vocal critic of Zimbabwe’s human Zimbabwe’s government to respect human rights record.65 As one of the underwriters of rights. In late October 2004 COSATU’s recent regional initiatives, including the New decision to send a ‘fact-finding’ mission to Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) Zimbabwe to ascertain whether conditions exist and its Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), for free and fair elections (and the mission’s Nigeria feels that Zimbabwe is endangering deportation shortly after its arrival) seriously their credibility.66 Being the current chair of embarrassed its ANC partners and the Mbeki the Commonwealth’s Heads of Government government.62 In February COSATU made Meeting (CHOGM), Nigeria is also responsible another abortive effort to send a fact-finding for assessing whether Zimbabwe has made party, but managed only to hold a border enough progress on good governance for its meeting with its Zimbabwe counterpart, the membership of that body to be revived.67 Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU). In contrast, the announcement by the white- dominated Democratic Alliance (DA) of South International actors Africa that it would follow in the footsteps of COSATU and send a mission to Zimbabwe The European Union stirred up racial sentiments that helped ZANU- PF rather than the opposition. Although the The European Union (EU) and its member South African business community – which states rested their hopes for an improvement has recently invested in mining, property and in Zimbabwe on the outcome of the 2005 farming business 63 in Zimbabwe – has kept a parliamentary elections. Since 2002 the EU low profile, it has vested interests in ensuring a has maintained sanctions targeting 95 key return to normality in Zimbabwe. It is therefore individuals in the Zimbabwe government and likely to exert pressure on the South African ruling party. These include Mugabe, his vice- government to step up its role in resolving the presidents, cabinet ministers, leaders of ZANU- political stalemate in Zimbabwe. PF and the uniformed services, as well as family members, although the travel ban in particular 68 The African Union: Bark, but no bite has not always been airtight. A number of EU member states, such as Sweden, have recently Since June last year, the AU has become intensified their expressions of concern over more vocal about Zimbabwe’s deteriorating the deterioration in Zimbabwe’s political, social human rights situation. On 3 July 2004, the and economic situation.69 AU Executive Council at foreign minister The United Kingdom (UK), the former level adopted a report by the Commission on colonial power, has been the most active. Feature 15
However, its rhetoric has oscillated between Snyder, said: “[T]he jury is still out as to calls for regime change and more moderate whether South Africa has done enough to help expressions of the need to restore the rule of resolve the crisis.”74 law through free and fair elections. Thus, Prime In September, however, the new US Minister Tony Blair recently told the House of ambassador to South Africa, Jendayi Frazer, Commons: expressed a more sceptical attitude: “It’s not evident that [quiet diplomacy] is working at [W]e work closely with the MDC on the this point. There is clearly a crisis in Zimbabwe measures that we should take in respect of and everyone needs to state that fact. The Zimbabwe, although I am afraid that these economy is in a free fall. There is a continuing measures and sanctions, although we have repressive environment. There needs to be a them in place, are of limited effect on the return to democracy.”75 In her first address Mugabe regime. We must be realistic about to journalists in Johannesburg, she called on that. It is still important that we give every countries in the region to acknowledge the crisis chance to, and make every effort to try to and to form a “coalition of the willing” to push help, those in South Africa – the southern for regime change.76 part of Africa – to put pressure for change In contrast, the then Secretary of State, on the Mugabe regime, because there is no Colin Powell, spoke more cautiously of “regime salvation for the people of Zimbabwe until restoration” at the swearing-in ceremony of the that regime is changed.70 new ambassador to Zimbabwe, Christopher Dell. Describing the Zimbabwe crisis as a danger Britain’s comments on Zimbabwe have been to its own citizens, “a drain on the region” and remarkably low-key, stressing instead its “a calamity-in-the-making for the international partnership with Zimbabwean society.71 Although community”, Powell called for concerted efforts Mugabe announced an ‘anti-Blair campaign’ in by Zimbabweans, SADC members and the wider February, Britain has not fallen into the trap of international community, while noting that the responding to this nationalist rhetoric. This has problems transcend any one man (meaning aided the cause of the opposition. Mugabe).77 Arguing that the constitutional foundations of a pluralist democracy exist The United States in the country, he stated that “[t]he political Since the beginning of the current crisis in 2000, regime in Zimbabwe has been degraded, but its Zimbabwe has occupied a fairly prominent constitutional basis remains intact. Zimbabwe place on Washington’s Africa agenda. In spite of needs regime restoration. It needs to restore the this, the Bush administration - which imposed rule of law, and the country’s former pluralist targeted sanctions against senior Zimbabwe life.”78 Powell said Dell was going to Harare: government and party figures that are similar to those of the European Union (EU) - has … not to accuse or complain, not to point consistently appeared divided over how to fingers or make demands. We’re sending act to bring about a return to democracy and him to work with Zimbabweans to build the economic revival of the country.72 As a society that respects the rule of law and noted earlier, the US has tended to support a human rights, that cares first and foremost position appreciative of South Africa’s policy of about the wellbeing of its citizens, and that quiet diplomacy, rather than pursue a forceful contributes to regional peace and stability. position of its own.73 For most of the year after President Bush’s visit to South Africa And he urged Mugabe to adjust his course and in July 2003, the US appeared to count on restore his status as a great African leader before South Africa to find a viable solution to the it was too late.79 Zimbabwe crisis. As late as July 2004 – after the Speaking at her confirmation hearing in expiration of the twelve months within which January 2005, the new US Secretary of State, Mbeki had predicted success – the Assistant Condoleezza Rice, named Zimbabwe as one of Secretary of State for African Affairs, Charles the “outposts of tyranny” in the world (together 16 African Security Review 14(3) • 2005 with Cuba, Myanmar and Belarus). While this the political crisis, they will need to tone down catapulted Zimbabwe back onto the global radar their rhetoric and support solutions designed by screen, it also signified what appeared to be a African leaders. Colin Powell’s idea of regime hardening of the American position towards restoration resonates well in Africa and could Zimbabwe. Inside Zimbabwe, Secretary Rice’s lead to partnerships with regional players which remarks were viewed as expressing support for might help to resolve the crisis. its repressed civil society, though they also Mugabe and ZANU-PF, who have managed to pushed the ZANU-PF leadership to step up its polarise the political environment in Zimbabwe anti-West rhetoric in the run-up to elections. into a contest between nationalists or patriots and colonialists/imperialists and their ‘puppets’, pay most heed to African institutions such as Conclusion Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the AU and their member states, Recently, President Mugabe’s government has especially South Africa. These groupings, if they made some attempts to respond to the pressure are backed by Western partners, have a chance exerted by Zimbabwean stakeholders, regional of offering solutions to the political impasse in actors and the wider international community Zimbabwe. These partners must press not only to dismantle some aspects of its repressive for technical electoral reforms but for political system of governance, introduce reforms to the change, including the repeal or amendment of electoral system, and ensure an environment repressive legislation. conducive to transparent elections. This opening needs to be exploited, to reduce the high level of political tension and pull Zimbabwe Notes 1 See for example, International Crisis Group Africa from the brink of conflict. The need for new Report 86, Zimbabwe: Another election chance, strategies and understanding has been captured Brussels and Pretoria, 30 November 2004. by Morgan Tsvangirai: “Zimbabwe needs a new 2 See P Bond & M Munyanya, Zimbabwe’s plunge: start. Zimbabwe needs a new beginning.”80 Exhausted nationalism, neo-liberalism and the search for social justice, University of Natal Press, While the ruling party is torn apart by internal Pietermaritzburg, 2002; S Chan, Robert Mugabe: power struggles, the opposition needs to unite A life of power violence, Tauris, London, 2003; behind a common strategy and set of tactics if it and G Hill, The battle for Zimbabwe: The final countdown, New Holland, 2003 and Struik is to provide a credible and viable alternative. Publishers, 2005. Mugabe is still very much considered a great 3 See A Chikwanha, T Sithole & M Bratton, The African and statesman, and African leaders remain power of propaganda: Public opinion in Zimbabwe, highly sensitive to criticism of him from outside 2004, Afro-Barometer working paper 42, 2004. 4 See World Organisation Against Torture, Open Africa. Significantly, the same Southern African letter to Mr Robert Mugabe, President of the Development Community (SADC) summit that Republic of Zimbabwe, 13 August 2004. adopted the protocol on election principles and 5 MDC takes POSA to court, Zimbabwe guidelines in August 2004 was marked by sharp Independent, 13 August 2004. The police denied Tsvangirai permits to address campaign meetings in 81 criticism of Western policies on Zimbabwe. the rural areas of Bikita East, Bikita West, Masvingo Uganda’s president, Yoweri Museveni, on a North, Gutu South, Gutu North, Gokwe Central, solidarity visit to Harare, dismissed regime Gokwe East, Gokwe West, Kadoma Central, change as an option for Zimbabwe, saying: Silobela and Hwedza. 6 A Tsunga & T Mugabe, Zim Bill: Dangerous for “[I]t can’t be for black Africa. It cannot happen human rights defenders, Zimbabwe Lawyers for here.”82 Mugabe, when accepting the credentials Human Rights, 2004. of the new UK, US, Australian and Nigerian 7 See N Ncube, NGO Bill declared unconstitutional, Financial Gazette (Harare), 18 November 2004; heads of mission, reacted to Ambassador Frazer’s and Amnesty warns on Zimbabwe NGO Bill, comments by threatening that “we will turn South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC), our people into guerrillas again should the 19 November 2004. need arise”.83 If Zimbabwe’s Western partners, 8 Interview, February 2005. 9 Interview with an official of the South African including the US, the UK and the European Non-Governmental Organisation Council Union (EU), are to be effective in resolving (SANGOCO), September 2004. Feature 17
10 Zimbabwe Human Rights Forum, NGO Bill 2004, 36 Women’s League eye vice presidency, Sunday Mail, No 2. 5 September 2004. 11 C Chinaka, Zimbabwe security chiefs line up 37 Ibid. behind Mugabe, but …, Reuters, 11 January 2002 38 Mujuru nominated VP, The Herald OnLine, 23 12 Soldiers have reportedly abducted, tortured and November 2004. carried out extra-judicial killings of opposition 39 Interview with a ZANU-PF leader, September members at the behest of, and in support of, the 2004. ruling party; US Department of State, Zimbabwe: 40 Interview with a civil society leader, August 2004. Country report on human rights practices, 25 41 Government adopts Electoral Draft Bill, The February 2004. Herald, 8 September 2004. 13 Zim poll violence ‘worrying’, Mail & Guardian, 7 42 Interview with senior MDC officials, November April 2004. 2004. 14 US Department of State, Zimbabwe, op cit. 43 C. Maroleng, “Zimbabwe’s Movement for 15 Interviews in Harare, January 2005. Democratic Change: Briefing notes’. Situation 16 These youth training centres are named in honour Report. Institute for Security Studies. 3 May 2004. of one of Zimbabwe’s liberation heroes, who died 44 Adherents include the MDC’s secretary general, in a car accident. Welshman Ncube, and most of the party’s 17 Taught to hate, Mail & Guardian, 19 August 2004. parliamentarians, including National Executive 18 A Reeler, The role of militia groups in maintaining Council members who won seats in 2000. The ZANU-PF power, ZWNEWS.com, March 2003. latter have played a key role in the South Africa- 19 Compulsory ‘patriotism’ camps for Zim youth, mediated inter-party talks with ZANU-PF. They Zimbabwe Situation website, 29 January 2002, have a powerful ally in South Africa’s ANC
56 This analysis is based on extensive interviews with Zimbabwe>, 25 March 2005. South African officials between April and August 69 Sweden’s Pierre Schori, the head of the EU 2004. observation delegation during the March 2002 57 Interview with South Africa government officials. presidential elections, was deported by Zimbabwe 58 B Boyle, Mbeki cements ties with ZANU-PF, prior to the vote. In protest the EU refused to select Sunday Times, 11 July 2004. an alternate. 59 Quiet diplomacy or quiet support, ask DA, THE PRISONERS OF HOPE: CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE OPPOSITION IN ZIMBABWE BRIAN KAGORO There are many debates as to what constitutes the essence of our African humanity and, indeed, Zimbabwean-ness. The country has had a difficult but illustrious history characterised by turmoil and tenacity, chaos and courage, corruption and compassion. Zambia’s Kenneth Kaunda once described forgiveness as “a constant willingness to live in a new day”. In this article I intend to demonstrate why there has not been any revolt in Zimbabwe, despite unparalleled repression. Perhaps it is the ingrained capacity of Zimbabweans to constantly hope for a new day that has made us prisoners of hope. I wish to focus my comments on the effect the ZANU-PF’s authoritar- ian regime has had on political opposition in Zimbabwe, on the architecture of civil society, and in particular on the role of civil society organisations. A particular area of concern is the threat to their functioning posed by the new NGO Bill. Introduction We felt the moment demanded of us a spirit of magnanimity rather than that of On the evening of ZANU-PF’s victory at the arrogance, a spirit of national unity rather polls on 4 March 1980, prime minister-elect than division, a spirit of reconciliation Robert Mugabe addressed the nation on radio rather than vindictiveness and retribution … and television. He assured peace and stability We felt that the past and its wounds and for individuals and the nation as a whole. grievances had to be buried and forgotten, He promised to uphold both the letter and but that the past, and the lessons it had the spirit of the constitution, to maintain taught us all about evils of racial oppression, fundamental rights and freedoms, including undemocratic rule and economic property rights, and to secure the pensions of exploitation, had always to be remembered. public servants. These were the promises upon To us, the time had now come for those which the independent nation of Zimbabwe who had fought each other as enemies to was to be founded, and it was through accept the reality of a new situation by visionary and pragmatic leadership that further accepting each other now as allies who, in bloodshed had been averted. At the time spite of their ideological, racial, ethnic or Mugabe argued that “[o]nly a government that religious differences, were now being called subjects itself to the rule of law has any moral upon to express one loyalty to Zimbabwe right to demand of its citizens obedience to the and embrace nationhood.2 rule of law …”. 1 BRIAN KAGORO is Chairperson, Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition. 20 African Security Review 14(3) • 2005 In his book Our leadership and the destiny of to the government, it constructed barriers that Tanzania, Julius Nyerere observed that when forbade such ideas. people find that things are going wrong, they ZANU-PF leaders often behaved like expect to receive explanations - and corrections militia supervisors, frequently reminding the where possible. When remedial actions are people of the need for silence in the ranks. This not forthcoming, people lose faith in the suppression of the rank and file did not heal the integrity of the government, and gradually that regional and ethnic cleavages established during government loses their support and consent. the war of liberation. Repeatedly, rumours Sadly, Zimbabwe has long since reached this of factionalism in Masvingo province and stage. The abysmal decline of Zimbabwe is Manicaland made headlines in the media. What the result of several factors, some internal and would otherwise have been straightforward others external. political competition within the body politic It shall be argued here that Zimbabwe’s effectively became ethnic/regional contests. current dilemma is the result partly of a Some argued that the so-called national dysfunctional transition from colonial rule party was essentially a tribe/region that had to independence and partly of the failure of made itself into a party. This was particularly ZANU-PF to transform itself into a party true of the people from Matabeleland, Midlands capable of democratic government. Both these and Manicaland, who felt marginalised by the lines of argument explain the Zimbabwean government. Mugabe’s response was to engage situation, in particular the politics of chaos in a very complex and delicate ethnic/regional and coercion that prevail. In other words, the balancing act in his allocation of government Zimbabwean crisis is the result of a failure of appointments and party positions. Ultimately, leadership and of the political-party system. ZANU-PF, a party that claimed after the 1987 Good governance entails the accountability of Unity Accord to be national and to speak in the leadership to the electorate; respect for, and the name of the totality of the people, secretly, protection of, fundamental human rights; and sometimes even openly, organised an authentic respect for the constitution and rule through regional dictatorship. The ministers, the just law. In the Zimbabwean polity, however, members of cabinet, the ambassadors, top civil values have never taken precedence over servants and heads of parastatals were chosen visions, strategic plans and actions. In sum, the largely from the same region as the president; real problem with the post-independence state sometimes directly from his own family. The is that its politics have been transacted largely seeds of a bitter succession wrangle were sown in an ethical vacuum, with no clear baseline to soon after the Unity Accord and fertilised by establish right and wrong. this intricate regional balancing act. Zimbabwe’s crisis of governance, therefore, must be located within the context The ruling party’s dilemma of dysfunctional political parties as well as ideological and moral bankruptcy. It is a crisis Prior to the February 2000 constitutional of both leadership and followership. This can referendum, ZANU-PF could be described be explained, in part, by the godlike influence as a party that was confident of its ability to wielded by the leader. ZANU-PF, from an overcome serious challenges to its political outsider’s perspective, is organised like a gang hegemony in Zimbabwe. The presence of in which the toughest persons prevail, which the party leadership at all levels of society inevitably results in an “infallible leader” or induced silence and fear among the people. “big man” syndrome. The ascendancy of such Party supporters often behaved like a choir personalities and their power over others is reduced to docility and praise-singing for the often mentioned and people become complicit government and the leader. The party did in this perception, having no hesitation in not countenance the expression of popular declaring that such leaders induce terror in discontent. Instead of taking as its fundamental their collaborators and enemies alike. purpose the free flow of ideas from the people Since the mid-1990s the country has been Feature 21 obsessed with the question of who is to to gaining private wealth, or holding a post succeed Mugabe. What will happen to the in the government, or stepping up the ladder, country if Mugabe steps down or somehow obtaining promotion and making a career for disappears? Many people in our society themselves. The founders of the MDC had seem to have abdicated any sense of political keenly observed how these self-serving party purpose that is not identified with him. Some militants perverted the nature of national have become irresponsible, oblivious to politics. Those who started the MDC were everything and essentially preoccupied with actuated by the desire to replace mob-rule with the comfort of doing nothing. Perhaps not all a “more tolerant politics, an accountable, truly Zimbabweans are guilty of indifference; others national and transparent way of governance”.3 might genuinely suffer from various degrees of At the time of writing the MDC has been ignorance. The resolution of the Zimbabwean in existence for almost six years, and so it is crisis might actually be related to the resolution apposite to inquire whether it has realised any of the ZANU-PF succession dilemma. This is of these ideals in its operations and leadership. why the ZANU-PF congress - with all the That is, setting aside the obvious external attendant drama - was a significant national threats it labours under, to ask the question: event. It confirmed for those within ZANU- is the MDC tolerant of opposition/diversity, PF what those of us outside have known for accountable, transparent and peaceful? Space decades: that authoritarianism reigns supreme constraints do not permit me to delve into at the chicken-house. Some important actors this subject; readers should come to their own within the ruling party have insinuated that the conclusions. While doing so it may also be presidium had become the party, the congress an idea to ask the question: does the MDC and the constitution, operating above the will represent a different leadership model from of the electorate. that of ZANU-PF? In addition, does the It is common cause that the judiciary MDC have the depth of leadership to present has become hostage to the ruling party, as a true alternative to the gang-like parties that has parliament. In an environment of single- Zimbabwe has seen so far? party dominance it is safe to surmise that the complaints made by Jabulani Sibanda and others concerning ZANU-PF’s internal The Rhodesian demon: Instrumental authoritarianism come down to what statism - a legacy from bygone days is essentially (as manifested outside the ruling party circle) the national problem of The fundamental problem with Rhodesia was governance. Resolving one would effectively twofold: the refusal of white settlers to accept the solve the other. principle of universal adult suffrage embodied in the slogan “one person, one vote”, and the racial segregation of society. These primary The vision for change and the MDC evils combined to form a lethal economic, political and social policy framework. The working people of Zimbabwe, who The 1980 independence elections signified yearned for a political structure that was a symbolic end to colonialism and injustice. organised differently from ZANU-PF, formed Nevertheless, the economic inequalities and the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) Rhodesian state apparatus remained intact. in 1999. These people did not see a political Repressive laws such as the Law and Order party as an authority, but as a vehicle through Maintenance Act were not repealed; they were which they as the people could exercise their simply deracialised. The former freedom fighters rights and express their will. The Zimbabweans and war collaborators were not rehabilitated. who founded the MDC had observed the Thus the new nation continued to harbour dangers inherent in conflating the party with the violent legacy and horrors of the era the government. They had seen impostors preceding the Lancaster House negotiations. pretending to be party militants as a short-cut The politics of retribution that have manifested 22 African Security Review 14(3) • 2005 themselves in the last four years are outgrowths has been inherited through the policies, laws of the critical national questions that were not and institutions established by the colonial addressed, as they should have been, during governments, the main areas of contestation the period of transition to majority rule. being political power and control over the On 18 December 1981 the ZANU economy. The unequal wealth and income headquarters in Harare were bombed. But for distribution in Zimbabwe remains a sheer good fortune, Mugabe and his central contributory factor. committee would have been killed.4 In 1982 At the time of writing, Zimbabwe had the air force base at Thornhill was sabotaged. endured two national elections since the Apartheid-ruled South Africa was behind these February 2000 referendum: the June 2000 assaults on Zimbabwe’s sovereignty. Mugabe parliamentary election and the March 2002 and other leaders in Southern Africa, like presidential election. The country has also President Samora Machel of Mozambique, experienced several by-elections (Bikita West, knew very well that it was South Africa’s Marondera West, Kadoma West, Kuwadzana, plan to stir up violence in Zimbabwe. The Zengeza, Makonde, Highfields, Insiza, and common thinking within ZANU-PF was that Lupane) as well as a host of local authority South Africa had enlisted the help of internal elections. All were contested in an atmosphere collaborators. As a result, Mugabe branded of violence and hatred. In the presidential poll in leaders of the opposition as malcontents. 2002 ZANU-PF went to extraordinary lengths This was followed by the deployment of the to secure an election victory. The election Korean-trained Fifth Brigade in the Midlands failed to meet the fundamental requirements and Matebeleland regions in 1983. Horrible of the constitution of Zimbabwe, international murders, rapes, abductions and torture were human rights law, the norms and standards perpetrated by these armed forces. The demon adopted by the SADC Parliamentary Forum, of Rhodesia had resurfaced, as the same laws and those of all African electoral institutes. and tactics that had been used in the old It is apparent that the largest proportion of regime were employed against the people of administrative hitches were experienced by Midlands, Matebeleland and Chipinge. (It is groups known to be generally sympathetic to also important to note that ZANU-PF had lost the opposition. Many people in Zimbabwe the 1980 elections in these regions to ZAPU and had no access to views other than those ZANU (NDONGA) respectively.) After the of the ruling party during the campaigning loss of many lives and the disruption of whole period. The police prevented the MDC from communities, the madness in Matabeleland holding rallies. The state-controlled media ended with the signing of the Unity Accord (still operating an unconstitutional monopoly on 22 December 1987. For a significant period over radio and television) ran a propaganda afterwards, Zimbabwe enjoyed relative peace. campaign in favour of ZANU-PF. The heads The next major unravelling of the social of the security forces made it clear they fabric occurred when ZANU-PF lost a would not accept the opposition candidate if constitutional referendum, organised under he won the election. The voters’ roll, which the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) was in complete disarray, was kept secret. on 12 February 2000, to civil society groups Urban dwellers, most of whom supported and opposition political parties. Since then, opposition candidates, were discouraged or the state has been implicated in a vicious cycle prevented from voting through the restricted of organised violence and human rights abuses, number of polling stations. The Electoral targeted mainly at perceived supporters of the Supervisory Commission (ESC) had to rely principal opposition party, the MDC. on monitors chosen by government and the The spectrum in which violence occurs number of independent observers allowed in Zimbabwe is broad; thus to make peace, to monitor the election was severely limited. violence has to be approached in its raw There were also indications of vote rigging. In nature. It has been adequately demonstrated contrast to the severe reductions in the number that the violence that besets Zimbabwe today of urban polling stations, many new rural Feature 23 mobile voting stations were introduced. In the pseudo-moral base. Indeed, authoritarianism ultimate analysis the presidential election was often gains support for its actions by justifying neither free nor fair, even though the right a supposedly moral position to the mass of to freedom and fairness belongs not merely the people - often at the expense of truth and to the contestants but to the people. The integrity.9 This has been true of the new NGO state’s actions were not only unconstitutional, legislation. but a betrayal of the fundamental rights and In the fluid political and economic the ideals of the liberation struggle. All the situation that prevails in Zimbabwe, civil foregoing vitiated the legitimacy of ZANU-PF’s society organisations (CSOs) have acted as victory and launched Zimbabwe’s government watchdogs over the political protagonists and into a crisis of legitimacy.5 as safety nets for the millions of Zimbabweans living below the poverty datum line (PDL). Their advocacy of transparency, human rights Attack on civil society and good governance (both local and national) has enabled citizens to participate more The Minister of Public Service, Labour and meaningfully in the policy-making process. Social Welfare, Paul Mangwana, was quoted in In modern political systems, elections are an a local newspaper on 5 April 2004 as having insufficient gauge of the performance of any said the following about civil society groups: government, no matter how popular or well intentioned, hence the need for governments Some NGOs and churches are causing too that are committed to genuine democracy and much confusion in the country because development to consistently interact with civil they are converting their humanitarian society. The role of governing in a democracy programmes into politics … The government carries a dual obligation: to exercise state cannot allow that to happen, so we are authority responsibly, and to accept criticism saying they should go under scrutiny where from the governed in a responsive manner. we revise all modalities of their operations The very notion of a law-governed state in the country. 6 presupposes that all authority is exercised in the general interest of the citizenry, and that These sentiments were uttered prior to the the government’s interests are not in conflict tabling in parliament of the most vicious with those of the free individuals it purports to instrument of repression so far, the NGO Bill. represent. In other words, that responsibility The implications of the new NGO legislation and accountability are necessary concomitants can best be understood within the context of of power. The NGO Act is a disingenuous Zimbabwe’s history of relations between the attempt by the state to shield itself from state and civil society. scrutiny by its own citizens. Zimbabwe’s experience of colonialism, imperialism and dictatorship taught us that political domination has to be secured first as State-civil society relations in Zimbabwe a political victory, in which public relations play a part.7 However, such a victory can be Relations between the state and civil society secured only if it is accompanied by a sense of in Zimbabwe have always been contentious. justice, or at least justification.8 The arguments Examples abound of serious curtailment of given by the government of Zimbabwe for the activities of civic organisations during the exercising control over civic space and the Rhodesian era. This was often done under citizenry, and for increased supervision and the guise of defending national sovereignty or surveillance of civil society, have great appeal fighting the so-called terrorists (black freedom and, indeed, many supporters within the fighters). Advocating democratic governance political establishment. The justification for was seen as terrorism - and therefore banned - by the this intrusion on democracy is not rooted in minority racist regime of Ian Smith. Rhodesian power or guns, but in reasoning that has a state authoritarianism was justified under the 24 African Security Review 14(3) • 2005 seemingly benign guise of defending state through acts of defiance. The settlers’ notions security and national sovereignty. This rigid of criminality thus became the black majority’s construction of politics produced murderous notions of justice and redemption. identities and a morality that condoned the use of terror against people representing any kind Coercion (force) of different view or opposition. Rhodesian authoritarianism was rooted Coercion naturally followed from not only in racism but also in the denial of criminalisation. The government gave the arms equal citizenship and rights to those citizens of state (such as the intelligence unit, army critical of the government of the day. It made and police force) the power to maim and human rights a privilege to be dispensed kill on the most nebulous suspicion that a at the discretion of state elites. It justified prohibited political act had been, or was about intolerance, violence and political xenophobia to be, committed. This power became a sword in the name of patriotism. Conversely, criticism hanging over the heads of those citizens who of government policies was characterised as dared to defy the colonial state and its many anti-state and treasonous. Supervision and layers of illegitimacy. Notably, repressive laws surveillance were entrenched in a culture of the gave rise to, and justification for, the pervasive containment of discontent. Many laws were problem of police brutality. Extreme physical enacted to limit and criminalise the right of force used against the state’s perceived political the citizenry to question authoritarianism. This opponents became an acceptable institutional was particularly true of repressive laws such as practice among the security forces. It is arguable Law and Order Maintenance Act (LOMA), that the administrative arms of government had which empowered the police to detain citizens equal disdain for the voices of the opposition without trial. under colonial rule. Zimbabwe’s pre-independence history demonstrated a tendency for civic formations Co-option to transform themselves into political entities that would later wage war against colonial rule The media, state security forces and public order and compete for power. It also created another laws contained various clauses that encouraged trend in which the state’s predictable response citizens to spy on one another, with the result to growing unpopularity has always been that some people became willing agents for the either to ban civic formations, or to introduce colonial state. These laws also attempted to stringent licensing requirements for them. create false distinctions between so-called good The Rhodesian regime’s response to African and bad citizens. Perhaps one can call this a calls for democratisation can therefore be state-determined civic morality. There were framed into three broad approaches: consequences (good and bad) for associating with either group of citizens. Criminalisation Zimbabwe’s colonial history therefore teaches us that authoritarian state politics This had a dual application. The state require certain pre-conditions for the survival criminalised all forms of democratic protest and of the regime: discourse, and the citizenry saw the state and its agencies as criminal elements that prevented • Coercive arms of state must be efficient, the exercise of their rights. This severe limitation loyal and ruthless. by the government of democratic space and • Civic authorities and institutions such as dissenting voices led to the armed struggle. the courts and the civil service must be Deviance or extra-legal activity became part of complicit with the government’s aims. the inevitable strategy towards liberation from • Civic, economic and political spaces in colonial rule adopted by these civil society society must be closed up. This results in groups. Arguably, laws passed by a criminal patronage and repression because no other settler regime could be responded to only organised conduit of expression or action is Feature 25 possible outside the state. rights and governance. The increased number • Information must be controlled by the of human rights violations combines with political elite, who use the private and adverse socio-economic conditions to cause public media as mouthpieces. Through rapid changes in the needs of the communities their monopoly over the public media, that CSOs serve. This requires consistent print and electronic, these politicians define reorientation of programmes to make them for the country what is to be true, what has more responsive and relevant to the needs of to be true, who is entitled to know such their target groups. In essence, the prevailing truth, and the form in which it should be environment precludes the implementation told. The net result is that the ruling elite of project activities and processes within the assumes a monopoly over all legitimate parameters set by their original mandates. conduits of expression and information More significantly, both aid agencies and in the hope that it will become the only their partners have been forced to shift their source of knowledge within the country. activities to more discreet arrangements because • Tight controls must be maintained over the the operating environment in Zimbabwe has operation of all social movements, NGOs become so difficult. and organised groups in civil society. This Several donor countries and aid agencies is often achieved through a complex system have had to decide whether to stay on in of criminalisation, licensing, supervision Zimbabwe. These aid agencies have found and surveillance. The crudest manifestation themselves in a quandary about whether of this occurs when the government seeks to engage or disengage. They also need to to control the funding and leadership of reconcile the tension between seeking to non-state entities. strengthen Zimbabwean civil society and signalling their disapproval of the prevailing The rationale for repressive legislation in politics of chaos. The donor/aid agencies Rhodesia went beyond the limited intention remaining in the country are now faced with of silencing dissent and criticism. The real a government that intends to exercise greater objective was to create a compliant citizenry. control and supervision of their activities (and This article suggests that political and legal especially those of their local partners). The systems generally have the capacity - if not limitations contained in the NGO Act will resisted - to drastically impinge upon our lead to a withdrawal of aid from vulnerable citizenship. Clearly there are parallels between social groups that the government has been Rhodesia and independent Zimbabwe on this unable to support effectively over the last two aspect. decades. In this sense the new NGO legislation directly threatens the chances of survival of 10 The operating environment of NGOs these groups. Many CSOs are working to create an environment conducive to the support of Zimbabwe’s recent history has seen the human rights, the promotion of economic government enacting legislation that circumscribes and criminalises the activities growth, and the development of sustainable of key sectors of civil society. There have been social services. The key question is: what incidents of indirect threats and state-sponsored legislative, strategic and resource interventions attacks on individuals and organised elements are required to achieve such an environment? of civil society. Several government ministers What should NGOs define as their primary have threatened unspecified harmful action objective? How can NGO operations be made against NGOs and civil society generally. more sustainable in the prevailing environment? Given the extreme polarisation arising from How can NGOs be made more transparent and the political context described above, CSOs accountable to their constituents and funders, working in Zimbabwe cannot avoid coming and to each other? How can NGOs be secured face to face with issues of fundamental human as operating in a non-partisan arena, free from 26 African Security Review 14(3) • 2005 foreign control and political-party interests? (ACHPR) after its fact-finding mission to Should these questions be made into legislative Zimbabwe. According to the Herald of 6 July objectives at all? These matters merit an open 2004, “the report was similar to reports produced and robust national discussion. This is primarily by the British-funded Amani Trust, which is because policy regarding the regulation of well known for its anti-Zimbabwe stance and CSOs in a democracy must be consensually falsifying the situation in the country”. The evolved. Further and as far possible, there Sunday Mail of 11 July 2004 carried a story must be a clear distinction between the state accusing the Zimbabwe Association of Doctors and civil society. This can be achieved through for Human Rights (ZADHR) of being a political self-regulation of the civil society sector, while grouping which had been instrumental in the government retains a monitoring role. To the compilation of the ACHPR’s report on gross extent that the proposed NGO Act seeks to human rights abuses in Zimbabwe. control and constrain the operations of CSOs, A week later, the Sunday Mail reported it threatens the autonomy and existence of a that the Minister of Local Government, robust civil society. The NGO Act proposes Public Works and National Housing had to introduce a regime change of voluntarism accused NGOs of creating parallel governance enacted from above. structures in their areas of operation (instead The real motivation behind the new of fulfilling their proper mandates) in an legislation governing CSOs was the desire to effort to help the opposition to destabilise the ensure that the March 2005 parliamentary country. It is apparent from the foregoing that election would be won without any adverse the motivation behind the new law is purely local or international reporting on human political. The bill must therefore be seen as a rights violations. We can assume that the visceral reaction to criticism of the country’s government believed that this could be shoddy human rights record. achieved through banning or collapsing those groups that have built the capacity to report on human rights violations. Tsunga and Mugabe11 Proposed changes: General overview of have summarised the government’s motivation the NGO Bill thus: The new NGO legislation constitutes a grave A desire by government to restrict abrogation by the government of Zimbabwe, democratic space and reduce scrutiny of not only of its responsibilities to the citizens of its human rights record; Zimbabwe, but of its obligation to the regional A desire by government to further limit and international community. The new enjoyment of universally recognised rights legislation for NGOs proposes to criminalise and fundamental freedoms by the people foreign funding for this range of crucial work. of Zimbabwe; Banning all foreign funding will not only put a stop to essential support activities, but it will To create a black-out of news on work against the values these human rights Zimbabwe filtering out to the regional and NGOs propound. In essence this is tantamount international community; and to undermining democracy in Zimbabwe. To reinforce an uneven playing field The NGO law creates an NGO Council in matters of political governance and composed of five nominees from civil society maintain the status quo.12 and nine government representatives, all appointed by, and at the discretion of, the The immediate reason for the attempt to Executive. Furthermore Section 10 of the bill have the NGO Act passed before the 2005 details the information which directors of parliamentary elections seemed to be the NGOs will be compelled to provide when government’s vindictive and punitive response applying for their organisations to be registered to the adverse report published by the African by the NGO Council. These requirements Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights are needlessly intrusive and show an appetite Feature 27 on the part of government to use the law as the possibilities it holds for scams and a tool of intelligence-gathering against the incompetence are enormous. It would be NGOs, their boards and management. These reasonable to attempt to ensure that donors’ provisions are sinister. money ends up where it is intended to go, that As already indicated, the new NGO bodies representing themselves as existing for Council will have only five NGO nominees charitable purposes actually carry them out, (who will not be elected by NGOs). However, that money is not wasted on administration, there will be nine high-ranking government unnecessary and frivolous travel, and so on. employees, plus the registrar, chosen from All of this can be done without interfering with different ministries or departments. Apart from two important constitutional rights, those of the question of why certain ministries are freedom of expression and of association. involved at all (for example the Office of the It is thus constitutional to provide that President), it is quite clear that effective control NGOs be registered, and it would follow of the council will be placed in the hands of that it would be constitutional to provide for the government’s representatives. They will some mechanism for registration, and a person unquestionably be instructed by their political or board to supervise the process. However, masters as to what line to take. When one there is no restriction in the constitution on looks at the powers of the council, it is again the purposes for which an association may impossible to justify the control given to the be formed. The only limitations that may be government over NGOs. imposed under any law are those interests of The new NGO Bill also distinguishes defence, public safety, public order, public between local and foreign NGOs. The reason morality or public health. (These are similar for this distinction is that, although both have to the permissible restrictions on freedom to be registered, a foreign NGO may not of expression.) To the extent that the new be “if its sole or principal objects involve or NGO legislation exceeds these constitutionally include issues of governance” (clause 9(4)). This permissible parameters it is ultra vires the provision is a clear infringement of the rights constitution of Zimbabwe. There is thus to freedom of expression and association. To ample room to challenge the new legislation prohibit the advocacy by anyone, foreign or or some of its provisions on the basis that it is not, of good governance or the promotion patently unconstitutional. of human rights cannot possibly be healthy - certainly not in a democratic society. Indeed, Conclusion one would imagine that any attempt to control the advocacy of human rights is the antithesis The political players in Zimbabwe have a of what is expected of a democracy. While daunting task if they hope to resolve there is room for disagreement on the scope Zimbabwe’s multi-layered crisis. The situation of human rights, a democratic society should on the ground, viewed objectively, suggests embrace open and robust debate on all matters that if the crisis is not resolved, the following of significance, human rights being one of consequences are to be expected. them. The proposed NGO legislation also • The crisis will deepen and all the problems makes provision for the declaration of all highlighted above will be exacerbated. foreign funding. It is difficult to see how the • There will be a further decline in the requirement for disclosure can be justified national economy and in the GDP. under any of the enumerated grounds. If • Key national institutions and sectors - freedom of association exists, and the objects of in particular education, health, tourism the association are lawful, it is of no concern to and agriculture - will collapse, leading to anyone who is funding the association. There is further cycles of poverty. This will have a nothing sinister or subversive in the promotion contagion effect on the entire Southern of human rights or good governance. African Development Community (SADC) The NGO world is a big industry and region. 28 African Security Review 14(3) • 2005 • Existing socio-economic problems such as and political prospects of Southern African poverty, the HIV/AIDS infection rate and Development Community (SADC), the the number of deaths resulting from that AU, and NEPAD. More generally, it disease will extrapolate. The latest United impinges on the welfare of the peoples of Nations Economic Commission for Africa the region. (UNECA) figures show a severe decline in the social indicators measured by the Zimbabwe is caught in a destructive political Human Development Index (HDI). impasse that will require decisive intervention • The rights and welfare of women and by the sub-region beyond the Guidelines and other vulnerable groups (over 80 per cent Principles on Free and Fair Elections. of the population are now living below the poverty datum line) will deteriorate Creating an enabling environment further. To create a future environment conducive • There will be a lasting reversal of the gains to holding credible, legitimate, free and fair made by the country in the first ten years elections and avoiding similar controversy to after independence. This will also taint the image and achievements of the liberation that surrounding the March 2005 parliamentary movements. poll, the following conditions have to be • The deep psychological scarring and fulfilled: emotional trauma suffered by poor and marginalised people in particular will • The youth militia should be disbanded. become more difficult to heal. • The partisan distribution of food should • The possibility of civil strife breaking out be stopped. will increase. • All arbitrary arrests, intimidation, and subjective prosecution of members of the opposition and civil society activists Regional implications should cease. The Southern African Development Community • Activists from civil society and opposition (SADC) region cannot wish the Zimbabwean political parties should be released, and question away; nor can it afford to ignore it. unjustified political prosecutions of such persons withdrawn. • The Zimbabwean crisis is already affecting • Repressive laws, in particular Public Order the region. No country in Southern Africa and Security Act (POSA), Access to is untouched by it. Some of these states Information and Protection of Privacy Act are tightening their immigration laws and (AIPPA), Non-Governmental Organisations policies to deal with the ever-growing Act (NGOA) and the Broadcasting Services numbers of Zimbabwean economic and Act should be repealed or suspended. political refugees. • Equal access to the mass electronic media • Notwithstanding the benefits that have should be allowed to all political players. accrued to some countries in the region through replacing Zimbabwe’s market share in the European Union (EU) and the These preconditions represent the immediate international markets, the interdependent expectations of Zimbabwean civil society. They nature of the regional economies means should be put in place through a memorandum that Southern Africa’s economic welfare of agreement endorsed by all stakeholders. This is being undermined by the persistence of would give Zimbabwe the opportunity to the Zimbabwe crisis. live down its rogue state image and become • The continued prevarication by some a better version of itself. But such a move regional leaders over supporting the would take great political will, commitment process of political transition in Zimbabwe and leadership. The effort to turn Zimbabwe jeopardises the current and future economic around and transform its politics from the Feature 29 uncivil politics of grudge and hate into a more civil society and the opposition. In a sense it is democratic model will require encouragement suggested that repression, injustice and denial of freedom are acceptable defenses against the siege and solidarity from the Southern African factor. That therefore, the motivation on the part Development Community (SADC) and AU of government is purely to protect Zimbabwean governments and from civil society throughout citizens as opposed to safeguarding the power Africa. fortunes of the regime. 8 There has been a desperate attempt after the corruption-riddled land reform exercise to create Notes a new justification for subverting democratisation projects. The government has conveniently hinged 1 Adapted from Victor De Waal (1990) the politics its defense on a narrow construction of sovereignty of reconciliation, Africa World Press, Trenton. and pan-Africanism that dismisses the discourse of Speech by Prime Minister Robert Gabriel Mugabe, human rights as a privilege that government is addressing the Assembly of the Organisation of entitled to confer or withdraw. African Unity in Freetown, Sierra Leone, on 22 9 The African Commission on Human and Peoples July 1980. Rights (ACHPR) sent a fact-finding mission 2 Ibid, p.46. to Zimbabwe, which established that there are 3 Mugabe, ibid. numerous violations of fundamental rights by the 4 Ibid, p.92. Zimbabwean government. 5 The crisis of legitimacy extends to the presidency 10 The ideal of developing solely on African of Mr. Mugabe, his government’s actions and resources is one to be cherished. But rhetoric policies. It brings into serious dispute the regional must meet reality. Zimbabwe currently does not political leadership’s commitment to democracy have sufficient resources to meet the social needs and political pluralism. of her citizens. Whilst political elites can posture 6 Herald Newspaper, 5 April 2004, comments and pontificate about grand political theorems, attributed to Minister of Public Service, Labour the masses need primary health care; basic social and Social Welfare, Paul Mangwana. services and freedom to live and earn a living. 7 For instance an junior minister in the president 11 A Tsunga & T Mugabe, (2003), ‘Zimbawe’s NGO Mugabe’s office boasted on the main news on bill: Dangerous for human rights defenders: ZTV on 30 July 2004, that “we have successfully Betrays Degree of Government Paranoia and defended our régime”. The justification peddled Contempt for the Regional and International for the enactment of Rhodesian/Apartheid-type Community’, Unpublished Mimeo. laws is the claim that Zimbabwe is under siege 12 Unpublished mimeo, Zimbabwe Lawyers for from imperial forces and their stipendiary in Human Rights, Harare. FEATURE THE LAND IS THE ECONOMY Revisiting the land question LLOYD SACHIKONYE This article revisits Zimbabwe’s land question from the vantage point of having been written five years after the ‘fast-track’ land redistribution programme was launched. Without belittling the accomplishments of land reform in the first 19 years of the country’s independence, it is generally clear that the sweeping programme of 2000-2003, the most comprehensive of its kind, created a new paradigm. Clearly, the consequences will take many years to work themselves out through the country’s political, economic and social fabric. The article briefly defines what may be termed ‘old’ and ‘new’ versions of Zimbabwe’s land ques- tion before outlining the salient aspects of the reform process itself. It then assesses the outcomes of the redistribution, the apparent lacuna between ‘land’ and ‘agrarian’ reform, and the debate that the reform process itself has kindled. Transforming land distribution into qualitative agrarian reform has proved an Achilles heel in the arguments put forward by the proponents of the fast- track programme. Finally, recommendations are provided as to what is necessary to secure land and agrarian reform in the short, medium and long term. Introduction unjust expropriation of land by colonial states. In most instances, the best-endowed land Struggles over access to resources historically was owned and occupied by white farmers, have constituted the stuff of politics, and con- while some of the indigenous people who had tinue to do so in modern societies. In Southern previously lived on it were evicted and assigned Africa, one of the most profound causes of such inferior land. The patterns of land allocation struggles has related to the ownership and control under colonial rule were thus defined in terms of land. This question assumed its most acute of conquest. Zimbabwe was no exception to form in former settler-colonies, and it was in one this pattern. For instance, under the Land of them, Zimbabwe, that contestation over land Apportionment Act of 1930, some 51 per cent took its sharpest form between 2000 and 2003. of land was reserved for white settlers (who numbered about 50,000), 30 per cent for African The ‘old’ and ‘new’ land questions reserve areas (for about 1 million blacks), and the remainder for commercial companies and In Southern Africa, the historical ‘land question’ the colonial government.1 When what was centred on the forms and consequences of then Rhodesia, gained independence in 1980, LLOYD SACHIKONYE is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Political Science at the University of Zimbabwe. 32 African Security Review 14(3) • 2005 the pattern of land ownership was as follows. Against the background of economic Some 6,000 white farmers owned 15.5 million structural adjustment in the 1990s, and the hectares; 8,500 black farmers operating on a economic hardships associated with it, the small scale held about 1.4 million hectares; pressure to broaden the ambit of the land and approximately 4.5 million communal question (and the means of its resolution) farmers eked out subsistence livelihoods on intensified. This took political form in the 16.4 million hectares. Most of the communal demands increasingly made by the war veterans land was located in the drier ecological regions and the black economic empowerment groups. where the soils were poor.2 The backlog on resettlement also remained Against this background, the principal ele- considerable. About 90,000 of a projected total ments of the land question were focused on of 162,000 remained to be resettled, although historical injustice and inequity. Inevitably, funding for this purpose had more or less dried the demands of the colonised and dispossessed up. revolved around redress in the form of land In the 1990s there was a discernible shift redistribution, and fairness in the form of in how the land question was interpreted. equitable access to sufficient resources to make In an attempt to redesign its land policy, the land productive. These demands continued the Zimbabwe government indicated that to be made after independence, because the the promotion of ‘emergent large-scale black pace of land reform was slow. The focus on the farmers’ would form part of its thrust to address land question was thus narrowed to recovery the land question. There were some 500 such of land from white commercial farmers, for farmers in the mid-1990s, and perhaps about redistribution amongst communal farmers who 800 (compared with 4,500 white farmers) by the were landless or lacked sufficient land, and to end of the 1990s. There was clearly a growing a smaller extent to unemployed farm workers. number of blacks who aspired to become Promoting access to land for the majority of members of a new agrarian middle class and the indigenous people was expected to create who supported the type of land reform that stability in land property rights.3 would release resources to them. Another For the first decade of independence, the new element was an emphasis on land tenure land question thus revolved around how funds reform. In general, land redistribution was could be mobilised to purchase farms for expected to enable the country to attain both the resettlement programme. Much of the self-sufficiency in domestic food production academic and policy discussion related to the and a balance between equity, productivity and effect of the Lancaster House constitutional sustainability.5 As can be seen, the parameters constraints on land redistribution, especially of the land question were being significantly in the form of the ‘willing seller, willing buyer’ extended in the last decade of the 20th principle, and the amount of British funding century. provided for resettlement.4 The narrative and The fast-track reform programme (FTRP) debate arising from writing on these matters that began in 2000 was the catalyst for what will not be reviewed here. The observation may became a new land question. The programme be made, however, that this narrow perspective entailed a comprehensive redistribution of land on the land question (that is, an exclusive that was accomplished with considerable chaos, focus on resettlement of farmers operating on disorder and violence. As about 11 million hec- a small scale through the ‘willing seller, willing tares changing hands within a three-year period, buyer’ approach) was inadequate to respond it was the largest property transfer ever to occur to other, growing, pressures for reform. These in the region in peacetime.6 The new elements included the black bourgeoisie’s aspirations it introduced to the land question arose from to own land; pressure for tenure reform; and several factors. the imperative to link land reform to a broad First, there was a replacement of nearly development strategy. More generally, the 4,000 white farmers whose land had been trans- desire for historical redress through restitution ferred by the state to 7,200 black commercial continued unabated. farmers and 127,000 black recipients of small Feature 33 farms by October 2003. The stage was thus set were no officially defined targets or any clear for a new large-scale farming class under the direction to the occupations. The elements of A2 model and a household-based small-scale orchestration, coercion and violence created farming class under the A1 model. A1 and A2 a concoction of disorder and lawlessness that are models for land reform introduced during was ill suited to a reform process. There was the fast track land reform programme that considerable tension between the executive was instituted in the year 2000. A completely and judiciary branches of the state over the new set of social relations were to emerge as undermining of the rule of law during the land a consequence. In due course, there would be occupations. In the two years that followed struggles and conflicts over ownership of this some judges were forced to resign because of newly acquired land. a restructuring of the judiciary. This process Second, there was massive displacement resulted in the appointment of judges who were of farm workers as an accompaniment to the more sympathetic to the government’s position eviction of white farmers. The fate of the on land. approximately 200,000 farm workers was to In the period between July 2000 and the constitute yet another element of the new end of 2002 violence and lawlessness continued land question. Disputes over land and housing to disrupt production and undermine human rights were to develop between these displaced security. From July 2000 onwards, the workers and the new farming classes. government defined the parameters of the land Third, the resumption of production on the distribution process (also termed jambanja) newly acquired farms would pose a challenge more clearly. It was to be implemented at whose outcome would reinforce or undermine an accelerated pace through a fast-track the case for fast track reform. The collapse of programme, under the provisions of which 1 the levels of productivity is probably the most million hectares would initially be acquired to important issue the FTRP programme has resettle 30,000 households. Thereafter another raised. The link between agriculture and other 4 million hectares would be expropriated to industries, and the challenge of resuscitating the accommodate about 120,000 households communal areas are two further questions that within three years. need to be considered. However, the target of the programme soon grew exponentially: from 5 million hectares to 9 million, and then to 11 million in the The outcomes of the fast-track programme following two years. It was now envisaged that altogether 300,000 households and 51,000 A considerable amount of literature on how black commercial farmers would receive land the FTRP was implemented between 2000 and under the A1 and the A2 models respectively. 2003 already exists; its scope ranges from com- In reality, however, only about 127,000 hou- missioned official reports to early independent seholds and 7,200 commercial farmers had been analytical assessments.7 In addition, there are allocated land by mid-2003. interesting blow-by-blow accounts of the pro- Although the government announced that cess by some of farmers who were affected.8 the programme would be complete by August There are also useful evaluative accounts that 2002, this was not to be. Land occupations cover the later stages of the FTRP.9 There is continued until mid-2003, and then on a dimi- therefore little need to revisit the narrative on nished scale in 2004. Although the government the programme except where it contributes to began to instil some order and regulation into the argument of this article. the fast-track process from mid-2003, inter- To put it schematically, the first phase of the mittent occupations of farms and evictions of reform process, the onset of the ‘land occupa- farmers continued, even into 2005. This last tions’, started soon after the referendum on the phase of the process included the ‘land grab’ government-sponsored constitution in February by the black elite, in contravention of the 2000 and continued in the build-up to the June government’s ‘one person, one farm’ policy. 2000 general elections. In this phase there There was considerable resistance to this policy. 34 African Security Review 14(3) • 2005 Conflicts between the new commercial farmers their land under new land legislation. Very and settlers on small farms also broke out from few of them had received compensation at the time to time during this phase.10 time of writing. While some began to farm in Against the background of this controversial Mozambique, Malawi, Zambia and Nigeria, and turbulent land reform process the author most of them have stayed on in Zimbabwean attempts to assess its outcome in terms of land cities and towns. Meanwhile, as already noted, ownership, production patterns and emerging under the A1 model an estimated 127,000 far- social relations. mer households were allocated small parcels of Clearly, the land transfers resulting from the land that amounted to 4.23 million hectares. occupations were substantial. As was observed Some 7,200 black commercial farmers received above, this was the largest change in ownership 2.19 million hectares under the A2 model.11 of property in the region, and it happened As Tables 1 and 2 show, the extent of land extremely rapidly. Ninety per cent of the 4,500 redistribution has been quite significant by white commercial farmers were evicted from any standard. By July 2003, the amount of Table 1 Land distribution prior to the FTRP, 2000 Area (million ha) % Category June 2000 Large-scale commercial 11.8 30 Small-scale commercial 1.4 4 Communal area 16.4 41 Resettlement area 3.7 9 National and urban parks 6.0 15 State land 0.3 1 Total 39.6 100 Source: Utete Report, 2003 Table 2 Land ownership patterns after the FTRP, 2003 Area (million ha) % Category June 2003 A1 4.2 11 A2 2.2 4 Old resettlement area 3.7 9 Communal area 16.4 41 Large-scale commercial 2.6 6 Small-scale commercial 1.4 4 National and urban parks 6.0 15 State land 0.3 1 Other 2.8 7 Total 39.6 100 Source: Utete Report, 2003 Feature 35 Table 3 Allocation patterns and take-up rates per province Number of HH* Model A1 Model A2 Take-up rate Province beneficiaries ha ha A1 A2 A1 A2 Midlands 513,672 181,966 16,619 229 90 48 Masvingo 686,612 753,300 22,670 773 95 79 Manicaland 195,644 77,533 11,019 463 92 42 Matabeleland South 683,140 191,697 8,923 271 100 100 Matabeleland North 543,793 142,519 9,901 191 120 94 Mashonaland East 302,511 250,930 16,702 1,646 93 45 Mashonaland West 792,511 369,995 27,052 2,003 97 50 Mashonaland Central 513,195 230,874 14,756 1,684 89 73 Total 4,231,080 2,198,814 127,192 7,260 97 66 **HH = households Source: Utete Report, 2003 Furthermore, a new land law stipulated maxi- Although these sizes have not always been fully mum sizes for farms per agro-ecological region. adhered to, these were as follows. Table 4 Natural regions and maximum farm sizes Natural region Maximum farm size (ha) 1 250 2a 350 2b 400 3 500 4 1,500 5 2,000 land used for large-scale commercial farming although there have been one or two exceptions. had shrunk to 2.6 million hectares, from 11.8 For example, maize production declined from million in 1999. an average annual output of about 1.7 million In sum, the FTRP involved a very radical tonnes in the mid-1990s to between 0.9 million and wholesale transfer of land from one class of and 1 million tonnes in 2000-2004. Between owners to a new class of black farmers, whether 2001-2002 and the present, the country has their new land holdings were small or large. To needed to import maize to meet its population’s that extent, land-ownership patterns underwent nutritional requirements. From being a regional a massive change. breadbasket, Zimbabwe has become a food What alteration was there in production importer. Similarly, wheat production has fallen patterns under the FTRP? To what extent has by about 20 per cent from the average annual the allocated land been utilised for production output in the mid-1990s. Declines in the of both food and industrial crops? production of soya beans and groundnuts have A distinctive trend in most agricultural also been reported.12 In industrial crops, from production since redistribution has been a an average annual output of about 200 million decline in output over the past four years, kilograms, tobacco production plummeted to 36 African Security Review 14(3) • 2005 65 million in 2003-2004.13 There was also a these crops fall mainly under the domain of smaller drop (of about 10 per cent) in the large corporate plantations. Although some cotton output of both large-scale and small- of their land has been listed for state appro- scale farmers during this period.14 Significantly, priation, the day-to-day operations of these the production of sugar, tea and coffee has plantations have been very little affected by generally remained steady since the beginning land reform. of land reform in 2000. Finally, there appear It would appear that the productivity levels to have been small increases in the production of farmers who are active on a small scale are of paprika, citrus and vegetables between 2000 still relatively low. These levels may be com- and 2004, as well as in floriculture.15 pared with those of white commercial farmers This overview of production trends provides recorded in 2001. The yield per hectare for the a much more mixed picture than is often painted following crops grown by resettled people with of the impact of the land reform programme small farms in 2003 is shown in Table 5. on agricultural production. While there has Clearly there is a huge difference between been a collapse in some sub-sectors, not all of the productivity levels of the white farmers them have suffered big declines, despite the operating on a large scale, who have now largely chaos that accompanied the implementation been expelled from the farms, and those of the of the reform. This phenomenon needs to be resettled farmers who are working smaller farms. explained. The drop in maize and tobacco The comparison cannot be extended to include yields is partly because of contraction in the productivity of the resettled 7,200 black the numbers of white commercial farmers farmers operating on larger-scale farms, because engaged in growing these crops. Also, their the information was not available to the author intensive farming methods, which were aided at the time of writing. However, the production by irrigation, have not yet been replicated on levels of the new owners of large farms are black farms, whether large or small. Few of the likely to be a fraction of those achieved by the new farmers have the financial resources and evicted white farmers. In sum, the land that technical skills required to cultivate tobacco and was taken now produces much lower yields per maize with equal success. This is not the case cultivated hectare. The larger number of new with cotton production, because small farmers farmers (occupying 130,000 small-scale and produced the bulk of the crop even before the 7,200 commercial farms, as previously stated) reform process began. In consequence, yields has not made an immediate positive impact of cotton have been only marginally affected on production levels. Lack of skills, experience under the FTRP. Accurate production figures and financial resources hamper the productivity for horticulture are not easily accessible, so little of new farmers. It is likely to take many years can be said about that aspect of agriculture. before the productivity levels achieved by the The explanation for the sustained levels in white commercial farms can be attained. the production of sugar, tea and coffee is that Another significant outcome of the FTRP is Table 5 Productivity per hectare on resettled farms and large-scale commercial farms Small resettled farms in 2003 Product Large commercial farms in (kg per ha) 2001 (kg per ha) Maize 596 4,809 Wheat 1,032 5,741 Flue-cured tobacco 888 2,811 Cotton 507 2,232 Soya beans 421 2,505 Source: Central Statistical office, 2002, 2004 Feature 37 an emerging rearrangement of social relation- Those farm workers who have continued ships in the agrarian sector, caused by the mas- to live on the farms find themselves coexisting sive scale of land redistribution. Admittedly, in an unequal relationship with the resettled given the short time frame of five years, the farmers. They provide labour to the new class present situation is still fluid. The predominant of landowners, particularly black commercial relationships before the resettlement program- farmers in the A2 category. In the course of me began were those between the 4,500 white one survey, it was observed that “the new farmers and 320,000 black farm workers. These farmer looks down on ex-farm workers. These have now been replaced by relationships between workers are not, in any way, getting paid better the resettled farmers who have been alloca- than before”.18 On some of the farms, the com- ted large and small farms and the remaining pounds that originally housed farm workers farm workers (estimated as numbering between were appropriated by the landowners and the 80,000 and 90,000) and 200,000 workers no workers expelled. On others, the new farmers longer employed on farms. By and large, the torched the houses of farm workers in a bid to resettled farmers have been the primary bene- evict them en masse. Where the workers were ficiaries of land reform; but this has tended not evicted, the number of jobs declined signi- to happen at the expense of the farm workers. ficantly because of a downscaling of operations. It is ironic that the government authorities This forced workers to use their compound see the ‘success’ of reform as consisting in the houses as dormitories while they went searching creation of 127,000 small farms and 7,200 large for employment from farm to farm. The pic- ones, while apparently paying little attention to ture of the farm worker class that is emerging is the 200,000 farm worker households that have therefore characterised by such descriptions as been displaced by the process. ‘itinerant’, ‘poor’, and consequently ‘unstable’. As observed elsewhere, the relationship This perception is reinforced by a recent sur- between the occupiers who wish to become vey of living conditions of former farm workers farmers and the farm workers was uneasy during in the Mazoe farming district in Mashonaland the ‘land grab’ between 2000 and 2003.16 Farm Central province.19 workers were viewed as standing between the The survey offered five key findings. First, it aspirant farmers and their goal, which was was found that farm workers’ rights to housing seizing ownership from the white commercial on the farms were threatened by the new farmers who employed the workers. In some farmers. Their insecurity was compounded by instances, clashes between the two groups a lack of government policy on the situation of occurred. The occupiers had a vested interest former farm workers who continued to live on in disrupting production on farms so that the the farms where they had been employed. The white commercial farmers would leave, or share authors observed that apart from the threat of their farms with them through subdivision. eviction, these people were denied access to During the occupations, therefore, they viewed essential services such as water and electricity if the farm workers as representing a buffer they failed to comply with the dictates of the between the white farmers and themselves. new owners.20 Instances of verbal, physical and At the same time, the farm workers were sexual abuse of farm workers were reported. hostages to the situation: they might have Second, for those farm workers who were wished to stake a claim on land, but they could given employment, jobs were offered mostly on not agitate for it openly except through their a contract, casual or piecework (maricho) basis. union, the General and Agricultural Plantation Moreover, underpayment was widespread; and Workers Union (GAPWUZ). However, some some farm workers had had to go for several farm workers did join in the occupations, months without pay.21 It was scarcely surprising although not on the farms on which they were that the new farmers were experiencing a employeded.17 For most farm workers, however, labour shortage. In contrast, the survey this was not the preferred option. They hoped found that the few remaining farms under to retain their jobs, or to be provided with land the management of white producers offered for resettlement in their own right. better working conditions for farm labourers 38 African Security Review 14(3) • 2005 in terms of wage levels, leave conditions, and 99,000 for A2 model land.23 If this infor- accommodation and other incentives. Third, mation is correct, then well under half of those relations between farm workers and the new who have applied for land have received it. The farmers were still characterised by mutual problem of land shortage will therefore persist. distrust. This contrasted with the situation on the ‘old’ and the remaining white-owned farms, where relations were generally good. The debate over fast-track reform Fourth, those who were employed on the new farms and those that had lost their jobs Surprisingly, perhaps, until recently there has were all in a vulnerable situation that forced been no major analytical debate over land and them to supplement their incomes through fis- agrarian reform in Zimbabwe. Somehow the hing, petty trading, theft and prostitution.22 dominant position has been that it was not a Finally, other types of relationships besides question of whether there should be reform, those between the new farmers and workers because the need for it was widely accepted may yet evolve. Besides providing wage-labour, across the political and social spectrums. Even some farm workers may become new tenants the Commercial Farmers’ Union (CFU) recog- or sharecroppers, especially on underutilised nised and accepted the need for reform, as did farms. Some resettled farmers may find it the donors from the international community. necessary to supplement their crop incomes The only contentious issues concerned the through sub-contracting their labourers to more mode, scope and pace of implementation of productive farms that are short of workers. the reform. In retrospect, it is amazing that, Relations between the owners of small-scale in spite of general recognition of the need for and large-scale farms have been marked on large-scale land redistribution, the issue should occasion by mistrust and tension. The eviction have become so polarised in 2000 that the of smallholders in 2004 and early 2005 from FTRP should have been adopted in an atmos- large farms points to a continuation of conflicts phere of extreme disorder and violence. over access to land. (The main reason that was It was the mode of implementation of the given for the evictions, especially in the three FTRP that sparked an interesting, if narrow, Mashonaland provinces, was that the small debate among some scholars. One of the farms were on land that had originally been main contributions was by a researcher who designated as belonging to the A2 model.) has written extensively on post-independence This type of inconsistency is also shown by agrarian issues in the country.24 Sam Moyo made the instances in which political influence was several observations and assertions regarding the used to gain access to prime land. The problem land occupations that sparked the FTRP. First, of multiple farm ownership by prominent he noted that by the early 1990s a political and political figures, in contravention of the ‘one social vacuum existed in what has been termed person, one farm’ policy, remains unresolved. the leadership of the land reform agenda. Clearly, the Zimbabwe government has been However, while civil society groups failed to indecisive in its handling of an avaricious but rise to the challenge, the war veterans were able powerful section of the new black landed elite, to do so in 1997. Second, the land occupations which includes ministers, parliamentarians, themselves should have been viewed as a army and police chiefs, and senior civil servants. mobilisation process towards “expanding the After five separate audits of land ownership, the social constituency of land occupiers and government has offered no satisfactory answer creating political legitimacy for the formalisation to the question of multiple farm ownership. of compulsory land acquisition”.25 Third, This problem is likely to provide the basis for while Moyo conceded that the widespread land-based conflicts in the future. occurrence of violence was a negative feature To illustrate the point that the land redis- of the land occupations, he argued that its tribution issue has not been solved once and scale had been exaggerated. He added that the for all, the government has stated that 249,000 violence had not been a contributing factor to people remain on the waiting list for A1 model maintaining the hold of the ruling ZANU-PF Feature 39 party over the rural electorate. Fourth, whatever revolution’.32 Chitiyo is aware that there are negative consequences had resulted from the strong rationalist arguments that the revolution occupations, Moyo predicted that they would was ‘chaotic’ and ‘unsustainable’ and that, far be of relatively short duration when set against from being a developmental project to pro- the long-term benefits of “assuaging historical mote poverty alleviation, it was essentially a grievances and addressing a problem that has political gimmick that was likely to result in the been neglected for 20 years by a model of destruction of the national economy. However, reconciliation which did not include justice he offers a counter-position: that the revolution or reparation”.26 In an argument supporting was essentially one of agrarian empowerment, the ends justifying the means, he contended not agrarian rationalism, and as such could be that the authoritarianism that accompanied termed successful.33 In sum, this position ack- the FTRP might later yield “a framework for nowledges the central role played by violence democratisation”.27 Finally, he argued that land in the land reform process:34 transfer would make the agricultural sector more efficient, because many more people would be [T]he state’s desperate need for political engaged in producing for the economy. More allies created a tripartite ‘survivalist’ alli- generally, land distribution would increase the ance which gave unprecedented empo- possibility of participation in the economy werment to hitherto marginalised groups, for a wider range of people, rural and urban, peasants and war veterans, through the whether they belonged to the poor or the coercive apparatus of the state. The aims middle classes.28 were symbiotic: to ensure regime survival … The analytical responses to Moyo’s arguments Each project depended on the other, with defending the FTRP have focused on the issues violence or the threat thereof being the of violence and the productivity potential of common medium … the new farmers. It is difficult to understand his equivocations over the scale and effects This analysis appears to provide a more convin- of the violence that accompanied the reform cing explanation of the events attendant on the programme. His assertion that violence was not implementation of the FTRP than those that used as a political tool in the elections in 2000 seek to minimise or sanitise the high levels of and 2002 is not credible in the light of events. violence and chaos. This is why scholars have expressed concern Finally, it is still debatable whether the divi- that Moyo’s position regards state-sponsored sion of large farms into many small ones will political violence and other perversions of contribute to higher productivity. It has been democratic practice as epiphenomenal, or argued that such a claim is historically conten- secondary to the issue of radically restructuring tious.35 The binary opposition that marks the 29 the economy. Similarly, Moyo’s dismissive debate over an inverse relationship between attitude to the fate of farm workers under land farm size and productivity, and between small reform is worrying, especially in view of his own and large farms as paths towards development, previous work on the workers and the empathy should be treated with some scepticism. As he displayed towards them in the past.30 While Bernstein argues:36 liberal democracy and neo-liberalism have clear limitations in the context of equity and redistribution, authoritarian nationalism of [I]n the Southern African context, it cannot the kind asserted in Zimbabwe during this be assumed that or simply asserted - as it often period was a dangerous development, because is on behalf of redistributive land reform it could open the way to corrupt, abusive and - that land in large agrarian properties is exclusionary practices in the implementation of generally (in empirical terms) or necessarily land reform.31 (on deductive grounds) ‘underutilised’ or Another analyst has observed that while otherwise socially ‘inefficient’. there has been a ‘retro’ revolution in land redistribution, it is nevertheless ‘a genuine Earlier in this article, wide differentials in yields 40 African Security Review 14(3) • 2005 and productivity on large and small farms after up rate,39 because the resettled farmers could land reform were demonstrated. These statistics not secure loans from financial institutions undermine the uncritical assumption that small owing to the mandatory requirement that farms are necessarily superior in productivity to they produce collateral support in one form or large ones. another. Uncertainty persists over what form of tenure security will be offered: 99-year leases are one option. Conclusion: Towards the future An explicit land policy This article has described the trajectory taken by, and the limitations of, the FTRP. Five years Astonishingly, in spite of the comprehensive after it was launched, the weaknesses and gaps reach of the FTRP, there is no clearly arti- in the programme remain glaring. However, culated government land policy. Instead the it is now becoming possible to make a sober government’s actions on land reform and rela- review of the programme, free of the heated ted issues have been characterised by ad hoc emotions and flamboyant rhetoric that were and unsystematic interventions. These do not unleashed to generate support for it at the amount to a coherent land policy. Any discus- time. In the author’s view, at least ten sets of sion of matters such as the distribution of land, issues will need to be addressed, as a matter of the allocation of areas for specific land use, land urgency, to redress the current shortcomings of tenure and ownership, and use of the environ- the programme. Successful implementation of ment should be guided by a fully detailed and the recommended measures will depend on a ratified national land policy.40 Such a policy return to political normality, legitimacy and the should be debated in appropriate forums before rule of law by the government. being finalised and adopted. In the meantime, the existing policy documents on land do not anticipate the reach, depth and accelerated pace Legal transfer of land that characterised the way in which the FTRP The continued uncertainty over the legal status was carried out.41 of land that has been seized by the state and transferred to individual settler producers under Payment of compensation the A1 and A2 models undermines confidence in the land reform process. Delays in the legal The issue of payment of compensation to transfer of the land affect the resettled, the large-scale commercial farmers whose land and displaced and the remaining white commercial equipment were seized has not been addressed farmers. This is likely to have a detrimental systematically. While a small proportion may effect on productive use of the land.37 There are have received compensation, most have not. as yet no clear mechanisms to ensure security of Concerns over compensation are in many ways tenure for farmers under either the A1 or the A2 concerns about justice. It has been observed that some donors and other members of the models. Unless clarity is reached on this issue, international community may not be pre- the new farmers may not be prepared to make pared to support the land reform process in substantial investments in their properties and Zimbabwe financially unless fair compensation production capacities. The granting of clearly is seen to be made to those farmers who were defined land rights and responsibilities would evicted from their land. unlock the value of their land, and enable it At the very least, compensation should be to be used as collateral for loans that would awarded for improvements that the evicted allow new farmers to develop their land to its farmers made to the land and for property full productive potential.38 The Presidential seized or damaged during the farm occupations. Land Review Committee has acknowledged Compensation levels need not be excessive, that the absence of some form of title for A2 according to some analysts.42 Meanwhile, the model land was one reason for the low take- Utete Report recommends that A2 model Feature 41 farmers pay for all improvements made by The challenge of building an adequate input the previous farm owners, such as housing, supply chain should be addressed as a matter irrigation facilities, tobacco barns and other of urgency. However, the manufacture and infrastructure.43 They should also pay for distribution chain for farming necessities standing crops at the time of the transfer of must be sustained by a financial structure land. If this were to happen, it would lighten that affords credit facilities to all farmers. The the burden on the government to some extent. current system appears to favour the interests It would also resuscitate the goodwill of the of large commercial farmers; it has not been international community. sufficiently responsive to the needs of farmers resettled on small properties. The founding Rebuilding skills of an agricultural bank would go some way towards meeting these needs. Even so, such a Skill levels (which are essential if productivity bank would have to make a special effort to is to rise) are relatively low on most resettled cater for those operating on small farms. farms, as was observed in a previous section. There is consensus among analysts that Clearly, a significant number of resettled greater competition should be encouraged in farmers do not have adequate farming skills.44 the input supply sector, especially for tillage, Extension support has not been provided for seed and fertiliser distribution. At present, the large new class of growers. The more parastatals such as the District Development intensive production processes require skills that Fund (DDF), the Agricultural and Rural government extension services are ill equipped Development Authority (ARDA) and the to provide at present. Some organisations Grain Marketing Board (GMB) dominate the have suggested that a programme should be market.46 The ministries responsible for land and introduced to recover a major portion of the agricultural affairs should consider reviving the skills that have been displaced by the FTRP.45 input procurement and distribution stakeholder For example, they propose that a package committee, which once played a major role in of incentives should be offered to persuade forecasting and monitoring the availability of displaced farmers and former farm workers who various inputs, and in recommending pricing, possess farming experience and skills to move import and procurement measures. Finally, back into agriculture. Such a package would a United Nations Development Programme combine a restitution of property rights, and study47 has recommended the setting up of the offering of soft loans and grants. It would an independent trust fund that would provide also offer opportunities to former farm workers resources for the resettlement process including that would improve the productivity levels of basic infrastructure, equipment, tools, training commercial agriculture. for capacity-building and technical assistance. Rebuilding infrastructure and services Food security The infrastructure that is urgently needed in The land reform process has contributed to the the agricultural areas includes roads, bridges, undermining of food security in Zimbabwe. irrigation facilities, livestock dipping tanks and Although drought conditions in 2001-2002 marketing depots. In addition, the new farmer were a factor in the reduction of the grain households need schools, clinics and housing. harvests, the FTRP was largely responsible for Currently, much of the existing infrastructure is destabilising food production, especially in the woefully inadequate or in a dilapidated state. large-scale commercial farming sector. By 2003, There is also a pressing demand for credit that sector was producing only 10 per cent of and inputs such as seed and fertiliser. A the amount of maize that it did in 2000. As a major weakness in the land reform process consequence about 50 per cent of the popula- has been the inadequate provision of these tion depended on food aid between 2002 and essential requirements for new farmers, which 2003. In 2004-2005, this figure dropped to has led to the current low production levels. about a third of the population. It is imperative 42 African Security Review 14(3) • 2005 that the government introduce measures and possible, local committees should work out the incentives that will restore food production. format and scope of these forums. The latter Only by adopting a more realistic approach and are recommended as a means to open dialogues providing pragmatic support to food producers on various policy, legislative and administrative can the government achieve food security for matters, and to make negotiations between the country’s inhabitants and make Zimbabwe government and key stakeholders possible.50 not only self-sufficient but a food exporter once more. The government will have to overcome its ‘denial syndrome’ over the food question if Farm workers it is to accomplish this. It will have to abandon wishful thinking and propaganda, such as its The plight of the approximately 200,000 farm claims that it was anticipating a harvest of 2.4 workers who lost their jobs as a result of the million tonnes of maize in 2004. FTRP should be addressed more urgently than The issues of productivity, relatively easy has been the case since 2000. Most live under and rapid access to credit, and inputs for the extremely difficult conditions and some have owners of large and small farms should be become destitute. As observed earlier, farm addressed in relation to food security. Pricing workers who are jobless, landless and without incentives could have a vital role to play in homes in communal areas have tried various encouraging growth in the number and effec- coping strategies. Piecework on the farms where tiveness of food producers. Furthermore, the they live is often temporary, insecure and country must build strategic grain reserves. badly paid. Some earn income from informal trading in agricultural produce and second- Mediation and participation hand clothes, and in craft materials in local markets. These activities should be supported Earlier in this article, an allusion was made to by the setting up of market stalls and depots for the growing number of land-based disputes buying and selling their wares in nearby towns and conflicts between the owners of large and and communal areas. Assistance in developing small farms, and between farmers and farm distribution networks and services would boost workers. These disputes could undermine the the growth of small craft industries using local land reform programme. Therefore, the African raw materials. Institute for Agrarian Studies has recommended Female workers who are no longer employed that urgent steps should be taken to establish on farms should be supported by helping them 48 dispute resolutions institutions. This would to start income-generating projects such as require certain preconditions. First, the capacity rearing poultry, sewing clothes and uniforms, of the Administration Courts to handle wide- baking and jam-making. The skills that farm ranging land disputes and conflicting claims workers have acquired in crop production, the to ownership must be strengthened. Second, use of agricultural machinery, the repair and a new, democratised village and district court maintenance of equipment and the use of agro- system that works with, but is independent of, local government, traditional leadership chemicals should not be wasted. As suggested structures and land administration committees above, a programme should be introduced to would be required.49 tap into their skills and use them effectively. In the same vein, mediation structures should There is a concomitant need to identify be established at local level. These would involve specialised skills among former farm workers representatives of all the interested parties. Such and to initiate a programme of certification of a structure could adjudicate conflicts and serve such skills. The compilation of skills databases as a non-partisan forum for regular consultation that are accessible to new farmers, whether their on matters of mutual interest, for example land allocations are large or small, could benefit access to water and other natural resources, the both the farmers and the skilled workers.51 provision of social services, and various means Finally, there is a strong case for providing land of earning a livelihood from the land. As far as to those farm workers who have lost their jobs Feature 43 and have no other means of earning a living. ment, planning for infrastructure and services, Comprehensive agrarian reform monitoring and evaluation of the programme, and marketing and outreach services. As this article has shown, the Zimbabwe One of its immediate tasks would be to government has adopted a piecemeal approach conduct a land audit that would focus on the to the land question. The redistribution of current distribution of land ownership and the land has not been integrated into a wider legal status of the acquisition process. In this agrarian and development strategy.52 There is way information on “how, when and which one other glaring weakness in the FTRP: in farmers lost their land and how, when and by its quest to deal with the land question, the whom the land was taken over”58 could be government did not address the critical issues assembled. of land use, agricultural production and land The Zimbabwe government appointed a administration.53 However, there is growing Land Board in late 2004 that had a much more realisation that certain conditions are essential restricted mandate than that described above. to agricultural transformation including There is no broad representation of interested sustainable growth in productivity. Such parties on the board, and it has little autonomy. growth is largely dependent on the successful There is therefore a need seriously to consider development of key partnerships and alliances the concept of a Land Commission as outlined between government and private stakeholder above. It would stand a stronger chance of groups; strong institutional arrangements; earning legitimacy in the eyes of national stake- research and development; market linkages and holders and the international community. This improved human capacity.54 is a prerequisite for a much broader and more Some analysts believe that agrarian sustainable programme of agrarian reform in upliftment should be tied to a vision of industrial Zimbabwe. transformation.55 The structural evolution of the economy requires that an increasing percentage Notes 1 R Palmer, Land and racial domination in of employment and contribution towards the Rhodesia, Heinemann, London, 1977. gross domestic product (GDP) should come 2 Report of the Presidential Land Review from industry rather than agriculture. Only Committee, Harare, 2003 (Utete Report). as the engine of industrial growth gathers 3 S Moyo, The land question, in I Mandaza momentum will people migrate from the (ed), Zimbabwe: The political economy of transition, CODESRIA, Dakar, 1986. countryside to urban centres, reducing the 4 See H Moyana, The political economy of land in pressure on natural resources and freeing up Zimbabwe, Mambo Press, Gweru, 1984. land for farmers who wish to expand their 5 Ministry of Agriculture (Zimbabwe), National operations and incomes.56 land policy, Harare, 1990. 6 See A Hammar, B Raftpoulos & S Jensen, Zimbabwe's unfinished business, Weaver Press, An institutional framework for reform Harare, 2003; and L M Sachikonye, The situation of farm workers after land reform in Zimbabwe, In order to implement the recommendations a report prepared for the Farm Community Trust that have been outlined in this section, a new of Zimbabwe, 2003. institutional framework must provide a struc- 7 See United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Zimbabwe land reform and resettle- ture that will oversee the land and agrarian ment: Assessment and suggested framework reform process. Proposals for such a structure for the future, UNDP, Harare, 2002; Farm have suggested it be called a Land Commission Community Trust of Zimbabwe (FCTZ), or a National Land Board. One argument is Assessment of the impact of land reform on farm worker livelihoods, FCTZ, Harare, 2002; N that since the process relating to the FTRP is Marongwe, Conflicts over land and other natural complex, highly centralised and opaque, a Land resources, ZERO, Harare, 2002; Hammar et al, Commission should be established to simplify op cit; C Maroleng, Zimbabwe: Reaping the decision-making and to delegate more power to harvest? ISS Situation Report, Pretoria, 2004. local authorities.57 The commission would be 8 See C Buckle, African tears, Jonathan Ball, Johannesburg, 2001; Commercial Farmers' responsible for settler identification and place- Union (CFU), The status of commercial farming 44 African Security Review 14(3) • 2005 in Zimbabwe, CFU, Harare, 2003; and A Farren, ished business: Rethinking land, state and nation, L Farren & G Hunter, Voices of Zimbabwe, in Hammar et al, op cit. Covos Bond, London, 2001. 9 See International Crisis Group (ICG), Blood 30 S Moyo, D Amanor-Wilks & B Rutherford, and soil: Land, politics and conflict prevention Land reform and changing social relations for in Zimbabwe and South Africa, ICG, Brussels, farm workers in Zimbabwe, Review of African 2004; M Masiiwa (ed), Post-independence land Political Economy 84, 2000. reform in Zimbabwe, FES WHAT IS FES? FES 31 B Cousins, The Zimbabwe crisis in its wider stands for Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, a German context: The politics of land, democracy and Foundation.], Harare, 2004; Utete Report, op development in Southern Africa, in Hammar et cit. al, op cit. 10 See Lloyd M Sachikonye, Inheriting the earth, 32 K Chitiyo, Harvest of tongues: Zimbabwe's Catholic Institutte for International Ralations third Chimurenga and the making of an (CIIR), London, 2004; African Institute for agrarian revolution, in K Colvard & M Lee (eds), Agrarian Studies (AIAS), Agricultural sector and Unfinished business: Politics of land in Southern agrarian development strategy, final draft, 2004 Africa, African Institute of South Africa Pretoria, (mimeo); ICG, op cit. 2003, p.14. 11 Utete Report, op cit. 33 Ibid. 12 See Central Statistical Office, Crop production 34 Ibid. in resettlement schemes, Harare, 2004; AIAS, op 35 H Bernstein, Land reform in Southern Africa in cit. world-historical perspective, Review of African 13 AIAS, op cit. Political Economy 96, 2003, p.23. 14 Central Statistical Office, 2004. 36 Ibid. 15 AIAS, op cit. 37 AIAS, op cit. 16 Sachikonye, 2003, op cit. 38 Vision for Agriculture, Towards a shared vision: 17 See ibid; FCTZ, op cit. Proposals for a policy framework and pro- 18 Interviews conducted by the author, October grammes, Harare, 2003. 2002. 39 Utete Report, op cit. 19 R Mbetu & N Musekiwa, Farm labour conditions 40 UNDP, op cit. in the post-land reform era: Livelihoods, short- 41 Utete Report, op cit. age and instability, draft report, FCTZ, Harare, 42 ICG, op cit. 2004. 43 Utete Report, op cit. 20 Ibid. 44 AIAS, op cit. 21 Ibid. 45 Vision for Agriculture, op cit. 22 Ibid. 46 Utete Report, op cit. 23 Financial Gazette, 15 July 2004. 47 UNDP, op cit. 24 S Moyo, The land occupation movement 48 AIAS, op cit. and democratisation in Zimbabwe, in M 49 Ibid. Masiiwa (ed), Post-independence land reform 50 Ibid. in Zimbabwe, FES, Harare, 2004. (This article 51 Utete Report, op cit. originally appeared in the Millennium Journal of 52 See Informal Think Tank Group (ITTG), Seeking International Studies 30(1), 2001. ways out of the impasse on land reform in 25 Ibid. Southern Africa, Pretoria, 2003 (mimeo); 26 Ibid. Sachikonye, 2003, op cit.. 27 Ibid. 53 Maroleng, op cit. 28 Ibid. 54 Utete Report, op cit. 29 A Hammar & B Raftpoulos, Zimbabwe's unfin- 55 Vision for Agriculture, 2003. AFRICA WATCH THE DYNASTIC SUCCESSION IN TOGO Continental and regional implications PAUL SIMON HANDY SUDAN: ALL QUIET ON THE EASTERN FRONT? RICHARD CORNWELL THE AFRICAN UNION MISSION IN SUDAN Technical and operational dimensions HENRI BOSHOFF A PLACE TO CALL HOME? MARIAM JOOMA THE GACACA PROCESS STEPHANIE WOLTERS TRENDS & MARKERS Some facts about Zimbabwe AFRICA WATCH THE DYNASTIC SUCCESSION IN TOGO Continental and regional implications PAUL SIMON HANDY Introduction political party during his rule, will defend his record by pointing to the numerous mediation The presidential poll that took place in Togo efforts he made to help solve a number of on 24 April 2005 was certainly not a model of crises in West African countries (for example transparency. On the contrary, it consecrated a Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia and Sierra Leone). dynastic succession and deepened the societal On the other hand, Eyadéma’s involvement divide in a country that has suffered 38 years of in external conflicts was often regarded by autocratic rule. his critics as a move to distract attention The role played by the Economic Community from the disastrous political, economic and of West African States (ECOWAS) and the social situation into which the country has African Union (AU) in Togo has raised a series ineluctably drifted since the 1980s. There of questions which suggest the limitations of a is a vast discrepancy between the official wholly African management system for govern- image of Eyadéma as the mediator in violent ments in peril. The poorly prepared monitoring conflicts affecting neighbouring countries and of the elections in Togo by ECOWAS and its the internal Togolese reality – where he was a assessment of the poll as generally free and fair military dictator who controlled an extremely have somewhat undermined its credibility. Yet repressive government apparatus. The tension in other instances, most notably in conflict between the official rhetoric and the hardships management, the organisation has proved its caused by the harshness of his regime were ability to intervene in a constructive way. In characteristic of Eyadéma’s rule. another sense, one could argue that an oppor- Viewed from this perspective, the attempt tunity has been lost: since Togo is a small of the army to impose an unconstitutional country, with limited strategic importance, the succession on Togo was typical of Eyadéma’s regional and sub-regional organisations could style of government, in which the basic have made it an example of their determination mechanisms were suppression of dissent and to solve the kind of political crisis into which containment of democratic reform. When Togo was plunged. Similar situations might the democratisation process began in 1990 occur elsewhere in the continent in the future. in neighbouring Benin, threatening to reach Togo, Eyadéma’s days in power seemed Togo under Eyadéma: A long tradition numbered. Nevertheless, under the pressure of spurious reforms and electoral of the international community (especially manipulation France), various democratic reforms were Supporters of Eyadéma in the army and the introduced by the National Conference (in Rally of the Togolese People (RPT), the sole July and August 1991) in an attempt to open DR PAUL SIMON HANDY is an independent analyst based in Berlin, Germany. 48 African Security Review 14(3) • 2005 up the political system. To some, this appeared for several months before his death, the to augur the dawn of a new political era in surprise expressed by Eyadéma’s entourage Togo. when he died indicates how unprepared his A prime minister chosen from civil society supporters were for such an eventuality. After was appointed and a legislative organ was cre- the presidential election in 2003, Eyadéma had ated to design a new constitution. The posi- started to groom Faure Gnassingbé, his eldest tion of head of state was downgraded to that son, as his successor. Legislative elections of a merely representative figure. However, planned for the end of 2005 were meant to drawing on his control of the army, Eyadéma secure Gnassingbé’s appointment as Speaker reclaimed the power he had lost through a of Parliament. strategy which observers termed a ‘putsch by However, Eyadéma’s sudden death radi- instalments’. cally altered these calculations – and the The repression of political forces opposing subsequent events are well known. The army the government party that followed reached a moved quickly and on 6 February the chief climax when several prominent personalities of staff of the army swore allegiance to Faure were assassinated. An attempt was made in Gnassingbé, pronouncing him the new head 1991 to eliminate Gilchrist Olympio, the presi- of state. In doing this, the army overrode the dent’s most important opponent and the son provisions of the constitution, which call for of the first president of the country, Sylvanus the Speaker of Parliament to take over if the Olympio.[S2] Although Olympio found asy- president dies while in office. The officers lum in Ghana and France, he was barred from took advantage of the absence of the Speaker, taking part in subsequent presidential elec- who was abroad at the time, to appoint Faure tions on the grounds that he had been living Gnassingbé, aiming at a fait accompli which abroad for more than 12 months. Eyadéma’s they thought would be tolerated by the inter- rule of terror also forced many Togolese to national community. flee to neighbouring countries such as Benin and Ghana. Strong diplomacy at the beginning of Between 1993 and 2003, Eyadéma organ- the crisis ised three presidential polls of dubious While President Jacques Chirac was still look- credibility. It should be recalled that his can- ing for an appropriate diplomatic formula to didacy in the last of these elections was only honour the memory of Eyadéma as a “per- made possible by a constitutional amendment sonal friend and a friend of France”, the chair- that allowed the president to serve more than man of the AU Commission, Alpha Oumar two terms. Not surprisingly, the refusal of Konaré, was describing the events in Togo as the Togolese government under Eyadéma to a military coup which he was not prepared implement the governance reforms requested to accept. This unusual statement from the by the donor community and the persistent executive chief of the AU was seconded by manipulation of presidential and legislative the current chairman of the AU, Nigerian elections caused the European Community President Olusegun Obasanjo. The president to suspend its development cooperation in of ECOWAS, Mamadou Tandja of Niger, also 1993. In fact, the death of Eyadéma occurred announced his intention not to recognise the at a crucial moment, because his government new government. He suggested that the coun- had just begun talks with the EU in the hope try return to the constitutional order. of ending Togo’s long isolation and resuming The determination of African leaders to cooperation. oppose the action of the Togolese army led countries outside Africa to condemn the coup The troubling failure of African in Togo and to call for properly conducted organisations to manage the crisis presidential elections. The imposition of sanc- Although rumours of Eyadéma’s ill health tions on the new government in Lomé by had been circulating in Togo and the region ECOWAS was seen as a logical extension of Africa Watch 49 the body’s commitment to restoring order in Gnassingbé with 60.8% of the votes (with Togo. 38% for Bob Akitani), urban violence erupted The resignation of Faure Gnassingbé three spontaneously in Lomé and other cities. The weeks after his appointment by the army heavy-handed response to the protest by the must therefore be attributable to the efforts security forces is said to have caused more of African diplomacy. After a meeting with than 100 deaths. Some 20,000 Togolese fled to President Obasanjo in Abuja, Eyadéma’s son Benin and Ghana as a result. agreed to step down and to arrange for elec- What was most surprising was not the tions to be held within the timeframe stipu- designation of Faure Gnassingbé as the winner lated by the constitution. ECOWAS promised of the polls, but the euphemistic assessment to observe the electoral process to ensure the of the electoral process by ECOWAS, which fairness and transparency of the poll. On described it as basically fair, while conceding grounds of the shortness of the notice, the EU that a few irregularities had taken place. In the did not send observers, but it gave financial same vein, the former colonial power, France, assistance to the ECOWAS mission. which had retained strong ties with Eyadéma’s family since 1967, expressed its satisfaction, A conciliatory attitude with the regime while the European Commission merely during the transition ‘took note’. The US, however, questioned the legitimacy of the presidential election. Yet The country’s opposition parties welcomed even if they were not satisfied with the way in the return to the constitutional order, and which the election had been conducted, the even set their divisions aside to nominate a EU Commission and the US called on the sole candidate, Bob Akitani of the Union des new government to begin a dialogue with the Forces du Changement (the UFC, the party opposition in order to bring about national of Olympio). Nevertheless, opposition parties reconciliation. strongly protested against the timeframe set Taking a tougher line, the EU parliament for the elections, which allowed merely 60 expressed its strong opposition to the new days for campaigning, as well as the unpre- dispensation in Lomé. A resolution adopted paredness of the authorities to ensure a fair on 11 May states: election process. One of the greatest points of contention was the disorder of the existing [T]he circumstances in which recent electoral rolls. elections were held did not comply with Although several appeals were made for the principles of transparency, pluralism the postponement of the election, these were and the freedom of the people to determine ignored by both the interim government and their own future, principles which were ECOWAS. Even the dramatic resignation guaranteed by the relevant regional and two days before the poll of the RPT Minister international instruments, and that the of the Interior, François Esso Boko, who was legitimacy of the authorities established in charge of the organisation of the election, on the basis of these elections may not be did not seem to deter ECOWAS observers. acknowledged. Arguing that the conditions for a transparent The extreme divergence between the verdicts and fair election could not be met, Boko, a of ECOWAS and France on the one side and former protégé of Eyadéma, called for a post- Togo’s other international partners on the ponement of the poll for at least one year. other poses a series of questions. He was forced to seek refuge in the German Embassy to escape the army, which wanted to Conclusion try him for treason. That the election was held on 24 April After a violent transition, a manipulated elec- was a sign of the determination of the ruling tion and a military power base that has been party to move quickly. When the Electoral reinforced, what can the political future hold Commission announced the victory of Faure for Togo? The deep division between the 50 African Security Review 14(3) • 2005 great majority of people (mostly in the south) money and strong internal and external sup- and the small, privileged elite in the north port) make it difficult for opposition leaders can hardly be bridged by any formulaic gov- to take over. Again, the great majority of ernment of national unity headed by Faure army officers come from Eyadéma’s home Gnassingbé. Although this solution is backed region, and the army retains its power over the by ECOWAS and some important actors country’s political fortunes. A president from outside Africa, such as the US and the EU the opposition would certainly not have total Commission, the feeling in Togolese opposi- control of the army. The second reason might tion parties and civil society organisations is have to do with the personality of the oppo- that a great opportunity to make fundamental sition’s leaders, some of whom are thought to reforms in the political life of the country has be too radical, a factor Eyadéma knows how to been lost. ECOWAS in particular has failed exploit politically. Also, Eyadéma’s family has to earn moral credit because it has not been many friends and important diplomatic ties in perceived as a neutral party. Even before the the West African region. poll, the opposition parties were accusing Another reason for ECOWAS’ preference ECOWAS of tacitly supporting the candida- for the status quo may spring from the cur- ture of Gnassingbé by closing their eyes to the rent situation in West Africa. Owing to the massive irregularities in the electoral process. conflict in Côte d’Ivoire, the port of Abidjan From a normative perspective, the West is no longer able to play the role of main sea African organisation did not honour its port for the region. Landlocked countries such commitment to fostering good governance. as Burkina Faso and Niger (whose president is As the only organisation officially accred- the chair of ECOWAS) are increasingly using ited to observe the election process in Togo, the port of Lomé as an alternative. A sudden ECOWAS had a responsibility that it did little political change in Lomé could have a direct to fulfil. It sent only 150 electoral observers, effect on their imports and exports, which is most of whom were deployed only a few days why some West African countries may prefer before the poll took place. Therefore they continuity. were unable to make an adequate assessment Last but not least, it is hard to imagine of the preparations for the elections. The final that France did not support the candidacy of report produced by ECOWAS underplayed Eyadéma’s son. France was the only Western the extent of irregularities that occurred during country that failed to condemn the uncon- the poll (such as the confiscation of ballots by stitutional coup; it was also the sole member soldiers and the falsification of voting cards), of the international community to back the and therefore failed to fulfil the requirements ECOWAS declaration that the election result of impartiality. was legitimate. Its great influence in the region, The leaders of ECOWAS apparently opted especially on the Francophone countries, must for a pragmatic solution to the Togolese crisis, also have played an important role. Because preferring political continuity (as symbolised France is Togo’s most important partner, its by Eyadéma’s son) to political change (as unconditional support of Eyadéma’s regime represented by the opposition leaders, some has complicated, once again, the position of of whom are known for their radical views). the EU in the country. The la0the country and the subregion. But this By maintaining the status quo at the price of eventuality might have been assessed as too a flawed election, ECOWAS chose to uphold risky by West African leaders, at a time that an obsolete conception of stability. It could Côte d’Ivoire is still not out of danger. be argued that the sub-regional organisation The reasons for the choice made by did not expect free and fair elections in Togo ECOWAS are manifold. The first can be in the first place – the realpolitik approach it found in the national politics of Togo. The adopted may have been based on the argument military-ethnic nature of Eyadéma’s regime that a gradual opening of the political system and the power of his successor to mobilise in Togo was the best option on offer, because huge resources (in the form of coercion, a sudden regime change in the face of a hostile Africa Watch 51 army would have been disastrous. The current problem rather than the solution, ECOWAS expectation of most leaders in the region is should consider recommending a government that the parliamentary elections to be held of national unity only as part of a broader later this year will give Gilchrist Olympio transition process. After a period of transition, the chance to take his place in the domestic fair and transparent general elections should political scene. Even so, the political signal be held under international supervision. A sent to other countries, which may consider profound dialogue is needed in Togo to assess, similar solutions to their own succession among other issues, the excessive influence of dilemmas, was the wrong one. As for the AU, the army over political life. As for the opposi- its silence following the strong commitment tion, their most important and representative made by President Konaré at the beginning of the crisis could be taken to suggest the AU has leaders should renounce their everything-but- also adopted the realist option. nothing strategy. By considering the option Although it is unlikely that Togo’s politi- of cohabitation with the RPT under certain cal fortunes will develop along the lines of conditions, they would help to calm the boil- those of Côte d’Ivoire, the election of Faure ing political climate. Otherwise, Togo after Gnassingbé will not automatically lead to Eyadéma will simply be a pale copy of Togo social peace in Togo. To avoid being part of the under Eyadéma. AFRICA WATCH SUDAN: ALL QUIET ON THE EASTERN FRONT? RICHARD CORNWELL At the beginning of 2005 a few well-informed principally on issues of power-sharing and observers on Sudanese affairs issued warnings autonomy as these concerned the oil-rich that the international community’s focus on south. This in itself has to be borne in mind the appalling humanitarian and political cri- in discussion of how the CPA might indeed be sis in Western Sudan should not be allowed made nationally ‘comprehensive’. to obscure another possible disaster in the For many northerners, including the neglected east among the Beja. Beja, it was the process of administrative The Beja are a non-Arab Muslim people and economic centralisation initiated in the numbering in excess of 2.5 million, speaking 1970s by General Nimieri and continued dialects of the TuBedawiye language. They by subsequent administrations that brought have occupied the Red Sea Hills and Sudan’s about the most significant erosion of such eastern deserts for centuries and their set- rights as they might claim as citizens. The tlements straddle the Egyptian and Eritrean abolition of native administration in the borders. Though some Beja farm on wadi land, northern provinces and its replacement by most have eked out a traditional existence as provincial councils may have looked like nomadic herders of camels, cattle, sheep and progressive reform, but its effect was to reduce goats. Associated with them in their isolation the influence of traditional heads and increase and marginalisation are the Rashaida, Arabic- that of local government bodies dominated by speaking and relative newcomers to the Red administrators and merchants well connected Sea Hills, whose ancestors migrated from the to the authorities in Khartoum. Also from Saudi peninsula in the 19th century. Like the 1970 onwards, legislation was passed by Beja, among whom they live, they are pasto- means of which local peoples were deprived ralists. of control over their land resources, which The fate of the Beja and Rashaida serves became increasingly subordinated to the as a reminder that the nature of the historic demands of cotton plantation and mechanised grievances of Sudan’s marginalised majority agricultural schemes run by the politically well against their rulers in Khartoum depends to connected. some extent on whether we are talking about Severe and protracted drought in the 1980s the north or south of the country. This is killed off perhaps 80 per cent of the Beja’s live- important, because the Comprehensive Peace stock, forcing many to take up meagrely paid Agreement (CPA) concluded in January 2005 employment either in Port Sudan or as labour- between Khartoum and the Sudan People’s ers on the mechanised agricultural schemes. Liberation Movement (SPLM) focused For decades the Beja had augmented their RICHARD CORNWELL is a senior research fellow at the African Security Analysis Programme, Institute for Security Studies. 54 African Security Review 14(3) • 2005 pastoral livelihoods with subsidiary activities 2002 the Beja Congress had extended this in time of need, but economic alternatives rebel control to include Hameshkoreb and ter- to herding now became the permanent lot of ritory towards Karora near the Red Sea coast. many tribesmen, as economic changes to the When Eritrea and Ethiopia went to war local social and political fabric are probably with each other in 1998, Asmara’s support for irreversible. The Red Sea region also came NDA’s militants was reduced, and the organi- under pressure from new waves of migrants in sation began to engage more seriously with the 1980s: West Africans, Darfurians, Nubians Khartoum on a diplomatic level. Although displaced by the flooding of Lake Nasser, and some Beja leaders found accommodation pos- refugees from the Eritrean conflict. This added sible with the Sudanese government, others a potentially more national dimension to local felt that the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) grievances, which has been reflected lately in in particular had ceased to take Beja interests closer cooperation between political groups seriously, and in December 2004 walked out claiming to represent the marginalised in east of the NDA talks then beginning in Cairo and and west. which concluded with agreements in January A year after Beshir seized power a number and June 2005. of Beja army officers were executed in a purge Although a group of leaders claiming of ‘unreliable’ elements. The new regime also to represent the Beja Congress are still in continued with the alienation of tribal lands Khartoum with a view to further negotiations, and the suppression of local Muslim traditions others in the Red Sea Hills have maintained held to be at odds with the ‘orthodoxy’ as pro- a more belligerent position. In January 2005 claimed by Khartoum. elements of the Beja Congress and the Free Initially the Beja sought to keep alive their Lions carried out raids on a police station. A political resistance through the Beja Congress, few days later, political demonstrations among which had been established in the 1960s and the Beja in Port Sudan, where they now make had revived in the brief periods of democratic up almost half the population, elicited a sav- government since. In 1989, the Beja Congress age response from the authorities in which threw in its lot with the National Democratic more than 20 demonstrators were killed and Alliance (NDA), which had been formed by hundreds detained without trial. Sudanese political parties and unions banned At about this time the Beja Congress and by the new National Islamic Front regime. In the Free Lions confirmed their military alli- March 1990 the Sudan’s People Liberation ance under the banner of ‘The Eastern Front’. Movement/Army (SPLM/A) joined the alli- In May they succeeded in kidnapping three ance, whose initial priority was to restore local administrators, and the following month democracy by political means, but by 1994 the launched a more spectacular operation in collapse of Eritrea’s relations with Khartoum which they attacked government outposts out- over the latter’s sponsorship of Islamic insur- side the garrison town of Tokar, and claimed gency against Asmara led Eritrea to allow the to have captured a number of Sudanese opening of a military campaign from inside troops and amounts of arms and ammuni- its territory. Most of the constituent parts of tion. Khartoum’s response was to issue stern the NDA provided military forces on this new warnings to Asmara, which it blamed for front, but the majority came from the Beja stimulating the rebellion, much as it blamed Congress and the most experienced from the the Eritrean government for supporting the Sudan People’s Liberation Army’s (SPLA’s) Darfurian insurgency. Beja allegations that New Sudan Brigade. There was also a group indiscriminate aerial bombardment of civilians from the Rashaida, the Free Lions Forces, had also occurred have as yet been uncon- which raided across the territory south of firmed by independent sources. Kassala. These incidents gave some credibility to By the late 1990s the NDA had held a strip suggestions that Khartoum was about to face of land along the Eritrean border between a second front in the east, and one that Kassala and Hameshkoreb, and by October would involve an armed insurgency close to Africa Watch 55 the country’s strategic communications and At the time of writing, the AU has brought pipeline through Port Sudan and near to the sufficient pressure to bear upon Darfur’s regional centre of Kassala. Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and Justice and It has to be noted, however, that although Equality Movement (JEM) to induce them the Red Sea Hills may offer a useful base area to sign a Declaration of Principles with the from which armed groups might raid govern- government of Sudan that will shape the next ment positions and essential infrastructure, the round of peace negotiations, scheduled to crucial nature of the communications network commence towards the end of August. This, and, indeed, its very existence would also make the relative lull in the direct violence on the it imperative, and relatively easy, for Khartoum ground, and promises of a substantial increase to deploy overwhelming force in its defence. in the size of the AU monitoring force, may The withdrawal of SPLA forces from the area, well serve to divert such global public atten- in terms of the Naivasha agreement, has also tion as the Darfurian atrocities have gar- made a repeat of earlier rebel successes in the nered. Whether any of the signatories of the region improbable, claims of reinforcement Declaration of Principles can exercise control from Darfurian migrants nothwithstanding. over their forces on the ground remains to be Whether considerations of the likely civilian seen. costs of such a renewed campaign will weigh The international focus on Sudanese affairs heavily in the calculations of its advocates is has now shifted to the inauguration of the a moot point. A war on two fronts remains at interim process proper, the promulgation of present a remote possibility, particularly at a the interim constitution, the formal inclu- time that Khartoum is reaping the diplomatic sion of the SPLM in the executive and leg- benefit of the favoured position granted it in islature, and the dawn of what some, against consequence of the Naivasha accords. all evidence to the contrary, believe will be a Ironically, Khartoum’s position has ben- efited from the inclusion of the SPLM as a national process of democratisation. junior partner in the administration, though No one disputes that there are plenty at the expense of ignoring very real questions of spoilers still able to upset the political about the SPLA’s claims to represent southern and diplomatic process. The Umma Party interests. For the moment, however, one can and some other northern opposition groups expect that such questions of representivity will remain unconvinced; the Nuba and the be restricted to commentators from outside the inhabitants of Blue Nile wait to see what this policy process, especially now that the NDA, or peace will mean for them; numerous southern at least part of it led by the DUP, has signed up armed militias have still to be brought into the to the CPA. It was interesting that John Garang fold; and the SPLM itself will be subjected to went to Asmara immediately after the signing internal strains as seldom before. But it is the of the Cairo Accord with the NDA in June, potential for ‘internal’ spoilers that gives the for talks with President Isaias Afewerki. While most pause for thought: will the military junta there he expressed his sympathy for the plight and the SPLA be able or willing to yield the of the Darfurian and Beja insurgents, senti- advantages they have secured at Naivasha and ments that might earlier have elicited rebuke open the political arena to competition that from Khartoum. That none was forthcoming must ultimately threaten the commanding suggests that Garang enjoyed President Beshir’s heights they now grudgingly share with one tacit support in his efforts to sell the CPA to the another? A study of political history in general other marginalised northern groups as the only and of Sudan in particular would suggest that framework for addressing their grievances. The this is unlikely. On this reading, a democratic backing of the international community, eager outcome in Sudan, if it is to emerge at to dissemble the democratic shortcomings of all, will more probably be the outcome of the peace agreement they must now support developments unforeseen, and unwished for, and defend, may also be assumed.1 by the protagonists. 1 Please note that this article was written before John Garang’s death. AFRICA WATCH THE AFRICAN UNION MISSION IN SUDAN Technical and operational dimensions HENRI BOSHOFF The signing of the Humanitarian Ceasefire • 1,647 soldiers as part of the protection Agreement on 8 April 2005 by the government force from Nigeria (587), Rwanda (392), of Sudan (GoS), Sudan Peoples Liberation Gambia (196), Senegal (196), Kenya (MP) Movement/Army (SPLM/A) and the Justice (35), South Africa (241) and Mozambique and Equality Movement (JEM) paved the way (1 x strengthened company of approxi- for the African Union (AU) to approve the mately 280 men) African Mission in Sudan (AMIS) on 28 May 2005. Later the first deployment of a force Mission statement and mandated composed of 80 military observers (MilObs) tasks and 600 soldiers as protectors was approved. At the 17th meeting of the PSC the mission AMIS was deployed with a mandate to was enlarged to make provision for a staff of monitor and observe compliance with the 3,320 and a budget of US$220 million. After a Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement of 8 April joint assessment of AMIS, the PSC decided on 2004 and assist in the process of confidence 28 April 2005 to further enlarge the mission building. It is also mandated to contribute to 6,171 military personnel and 1,560 police, to securing the environment for the delivery with a budget of US$466 million. of humanitarian relief and, beyond that, the return of internally displaced persons (IDPs) Force structure and refugees. The table below presents a sum- mary of the mission’s principal tasks. At the moment AMIS has deployed a force of 3,320 personnel. This includes 2,341 military Mission structure personnel, among them 450 MilObs, up to 815 civilian police personnel, and the appro- Ambassador Baba Gana Kingibe has been priate civilian staff. At the end of May 2005, appointed special representative of the African the force levels were as follows: Union (AU) in Sudan. In that capacity, his role is to ensure the overall direction and coordi- • 454 MilObs; nation of the activities of the mission and to • 245 civilian police; maintain close contact with the Sudanese par- • 26 international and Cease fire ties, the UN and all other concerned actors. Commission mem bers; Ambassador Kingibe has already assumed his HENRI BOSHOFF is a military analyst at the African Security Analysis Programme, Institute for Security Studies. 58 African Security Review 14(3) • 2005 AMIS' tasks • Conduct area reconnaissance to determine sector sites and priorities of operation. • Establish sector headquarters (HQs) and sites according to the scheme of deployment. • Liaise with the local authorities of all parties at sector and tactical area of responsibility (TAOR) levels. • Monitor and verify the activities of all parties and the security situation in and around declared safe areas. • Monitor and verify the provision of security for returning IDPs and in the vicinity of existing IDP camps, through the GoS. • Monitor and verify the cessation of all hostile acts by all the parties. • Monitor and verify hostile militia activities against the population. • Monitor and verify the overall security situation within the area of responsibility (AOR). • Monitor and verify attempts of the GoS to disarm government-controlled militias. • Investigate and report allegations of violations of the 8 April 2004 Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement. • Protect AU personnel, equipment and installations. • Protect observer patrols on vehicle and heli-borne deployment as required. • Be prepared to protect civilians under imminent threat in the immediate vicinity, with- in capabilities. • Be prepared to protect both static and mobile humanitarian operations under immi- nent threat and in the immediate vicinity, within capabilities. • Provide a visible military presence by patrolling and establishing temporary outposts in order to deter uncontrolled armed groups from committing hostile acts against the population. duties in Khartoum and is in regular contact mander). South Africa has provided the head with the Sudanese parties and members of of the AMIS civilian police component and the international community, including the Ghana the deputy head. Furthermore, and United Nations (UN) Secretary-General’s spe- in order to give back-up to the mission with cial representative, Jan Pronk. strategic planning and management support, Major General Festus Okonkwo from a team known as the Darfur Integrated Task Nigeria has been appointed force commander. Force (DITF) has been established at the AU As such, he chairs the Ceasefire Commission Commission. The mission structure is there- (CFC) with Brigadier General Jean Bosco fore as follows: Kazura of Rwanda (the deputy force com- Mission Structure Head of Mission Political & CAO Civ Pol FC Humanitarian Affairs X8 Sector + Company MilOb MilOb MilOb MilOb Team+ Team+ Team+ Team+ Platoon Platoon Platoon Platoon Each MilOb Team MilObs consists of ten Africa Watch 59 The military component and military In addition to the above, the military com- sectors of AMIS ponent has established eight sector sites that the MilOb teams operate from (within the The military component of AMIS consists of boundaries of their TAORs). The TAORs are the following: based on current regional and administrative boundaries and are consistent with those • Force HQ; proposed for the civilian police component. • One airmobile special forces company, Each MilOb team consists of ten MilObs, with which will constitute the military compo- representation of the parties, and an infantry nent reserve; protection platoon. Sector HQs will have a • One explosive ordinance device (EOD)/ support group (level I medical facility, mainte- de-mining platoon; nance package and fuel operators). • One light field engineer platoon; The military and the civilian police HQs • One military police platoon; of AMIS are located in El Fasher, which is also • Military interpreter pool; the HQ for sector 1 (see map below). There are • Eight sector HQs; seven other sectors located as follows: Nyala • Four MilOb teams for each sector; (sector 2), El Geneina (sector 3), Kabkabiyah • One enhanced infantry company in each (sector 4), Tine (sector 5), Kutum (sector 6), sector; and Zalinguei (sector 7) and El Daien (sector 8). • One helicopter squadron in three selected sectors with six to nine (El Fasher) medium transport helicopters (these will eventually be civilian assets). 60 African Security Review 14(3) • 2005 Deployment concept and logistics Abuja and the DITF are US$221,767,565; US$1,881,500; and US$3,646,379 respec- Following the approval of the mandate, AMIS tively. This brings the total estimate to was deployed as follows: US$227,295,443. It should be noted that US$248,418,670 has already been pledged by • Phase 1: M + 30 reconnaissance and logis- AU partners. tic development; According to a report by the UN Secretary- • Phase 2: M + 45 developing military com- General dated 3 May 2005, AMIS is effective ponent HQ and the cur- where it is deployed and needs strengthening rent operation; so that it can expand its presence to cover • Phase 3: M + 60 initial establishment of more of the vast and difficult terrain of Darfur. sector HQs and team This was coincident with the findings of an sites at sector centre; AU assessment mission that visited Darfur • Phase 4: M + 75 full establishment of sec- in March 2005, which noted that AMIS is tor HQs and team sites extremely hard pressed to implement its man- at sector centre; date effectively and that the mission remains Phase 5: M + 120 full deployment through- well short of being fully operational. Its weak- out the sectors. ness can be pinned down to three categories: command and control, logistical support and As regards logistics, the mission has 572 vehi- operational practice. cles, 18 helicopters and 2 fixed-wing aircraft The second phase of deployment, June for the transport of goods and personnel. The to August 2005, will see the deployment of communication equipment, which comprises more troops that will allow AMIS to reach 105 Thurayas, 467 VHF vehicle radios, 169 HF a force level of 5,887 military personnel and vehicle and base station radios, 1,206 hand- 1,560 civilian police – this will undoubtedly held radios and VHF base stations, has arrived improve the effectiveness with which the mis- in Khartoum. sion accomplishes its mandate and tasks. By the end of May 2005, vehicle and In addition, a third phase is foreseen, to be communication requirements (which, until decided on in September 2005. This phase recently, constituted critical constraints) were would require a major increase in the AMIS, successfully addressed. Furthermore, the US an increase estimated by the AU and the UN government has provided equipment for three to bring AMIS to a total strength of 12,300 rapid response teams, and a request for fund- military, police and civilian personnel. The ing for equipment for other teams has been specific aim of the third phase, which might be submitted to the UK government, which has viewed as a follow-on mission since it would agreed to provide assistance. This will enable take the operation to an entirely new stage, the mission to rapidly deploy small units so would be to adequately secure the environ- that it can undertake preventive deployments, ment throughout Darfur so that all displaced among others. persons would be able to return to their homes. This will require close coordination between the military, civilian police, humani- tarian and development organisations, civil Funding and what is to come authorities and the affected population, and Current budget estimates for the enhanced should aim at completion before the spring AMIS, the Inter-Sudanese Peace Talks in 2006 planting season. AFRICA WATCH “A PLACE TO CALL HOME?” MARIAM JOOMA The forced repatriation of Rwandan lar time? refugees As detailed in the article by Stephanie Wolters in this section, the traditional gacaca While the displacement of people caused by courts were set up alongside the formal justice armed conflict and persecution in the Great process as a way of addressing the backlog of Lakes region is not new, recent events surround- cases surrounding crimes committed during ing the forced repatriation of Rwandan asylum the 1994 genocide. The trials are meant to seekers in Burundi and their Burundian coun- bring victim and perpetrator together in front terparts in Rwanda not only suggest a worrying of their communities in an attempt to simul- disregard for international humanitarian law taneously address justice and reconciliation. by these governments, but also demonstrate However, many (including whole communi- the extent to which asylum may be politicised. ties) are sceptical about the extent to which An analysis of these events highlights the con- justice and reconciliation can be weighted tinuing vulnerability of asylum seekers, refu- against each other. Tied to the issue of guilt gees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) in is the pressure that victims may feel to forgive this highly volatile region – a vulnerability that the perpetrators – for some, a function of contributes to undermining any prospect of a the need to safeguard themselves and their durable peace in the region. families against relatives and friends of the Towards the end of March 2005, media accused. Several aid workers believe that this organisations reported that more than 2,000 fear of retribution may explain the rumours of Rwandans were fleeing their country to neigh- what some call a ‘counter-genocide’: this time bouring Burundi. Reports were unclear about against Rwandan Hutus. the reasons for such a large-scale exodus but It should be noted here that the term suggested that possibly many Rwandans feared ‘asylum seeker’ refers to an individual who persecution as a result of the gacaca trials. has fled persecution or human rights abuses Yet, in the absence of adequate demographic in his or her country of origin, but is awaiting profiles of those who were fleeing, it becomes the outcome of an application for asylum. difficult to understand the motivations for the Once this application has been approved this spontaneous exodus. What common factors individual is considered a ‘refugee’ by the host bound these Rwandans together? Were they country. However, the difference in technical victims or perpetrators of violence in the past? terms does not erode the right to protection for What prompted them to leave at this particu- both categories of people as set out in the 1951 MARIAM JOOMA is a researcher at the African Security Analysis Programme, Institute for Security Studies. 62 African Security Review 14(3) • 2005 International Convention on Refugees. Simultaneously, a Rwandan information cam- After the exodus referred to above, the paign aimed at encouraging the asylum seekers Burundian government called on the United to return home began. Nations High Commissioner for Refugees On 20 May the Rwandan prime minister (UNHCR) for assistance. The agency agreed convened a meeting with several representatives to assist on condition that the asylum seekers of local government, security bodies and the were moved away from the border area for attorney general to discuss the ‘root causes’ for security. By 18 April Burundi’s Minister of the flight of people. In this meeting, the mayor Interior, Didace Nzikoruriho, announced that of Butare suggested that those fleeing Rwanda the incoming population were being moved may have links to the Burundian rebel group, to temporary camps at Songore in the north- the Front Nationale de Libération (FNL), add- eastern province of Muyinga and Cankuzo, ing that refugee camps might be being used as explaining that “the government and its part- bases for new recruitment and training. Prime ners are yet to decide on more long-term places Minister Bernard Makuza concluded that secu- to relocate them”.1 At this juncture media rity considerations needed to be prioritised reports put the number of Rwandan asylum in order to stem the tide of people fleeing to seekers at between 5,000 and 7,000. Burundi. On 6 May the Rwandan government dis- On 31 May Burundian authorities order patched a task force to visit these refugees, alleg- the dismantling of several border sites and edly to ‘mobilise’ them to return. On the same closed two transit sites. Those housed at these day, it was reported that many were already sites were moved to one ill-equipped and over- returning to Rwanda, making their way either crowded transit centre at Songore in northern by transport provided by the Rwandan govern- Burundi (able to accommodate 800 refugees, ment or on foot. As Charles Ntakirutimana, the centre now sheltered over 6,000 people). mayor of the border district of Mugombwa, UN agencies raised concerns about the severe explained at the time, the task force “is telling pressures on sanitation and water access. them that gacaca [will] not victimise anyone. On 11 June the governments of Burundi The taskforce, consisting of mayors from Butare and Rwanda signed a bi-lateral pact regulating province as well as officials from central gov- the exchange of what were now labelled ‘illegal ernment, is telling people there is no reason to immigrants’. A joint press release described the flee.”2 It is extremely doubtful whether this vul- actions of the asylum seekers as unfounded, nerable population would voice their concerns stating that “all measures will be taken to to a taskforce composed of state officials, how- ensure that these people are repatriated without ever. The spectre of forced repatriation became delay”.3 UNHCR representatives from both clearer as events unfolded. Burundi and Rwanda were not admitted to the On 23 April the Burundian government meeting, however, and were effectively barred halted all transfers from border areas to inland from accessing the displaced. centres. Yet, there was still little information Merely three days later, the Songore tran- on who actually constituted this refugee popu- sit site was closed – with an estimated 5,000 lation, though it was believed that women people returning home on transport provided and children made up the majority. Some by the Rwandan government. The governor weeks later, on 17 May, the UNHCR reported of Burundi’s Ngozi province, Felix Niragira, that hundreds of asylum seekers who fled to confirmed reports that six asylum seekers had Burundi may have been intimidated to return jumped out of the trucks, saying that “the escap- home. The agency explained that most of the ees certainly have something to account for in departures took place between 4 pm and 9 am their country”.4 At this point, the UNHCR was when UN country staff in the area were subject still unsure whether the return was voluntary to curfew. Four of the seven temporary hous- or forced – in the latter case, both governments ing sites were empty, and asylum seekers were would be in clear contravention of the Refugee seen to leave on trucks sent by the Rwandan Convention. Protais Musoni, Rwanda’s Minister government, while a large number left on foot. for Local Government, promptly dismissed the Africa Watch 63 international outcry which surrounded these assistance and protection. events, reaffirming his government’s now offi- While the movement of people is a global cial view that these people were “running away phenomenon, the term ‘refugee’ or the spectre from justice”.5 of nameless masses of people fleeing violence The Rwandan-Burundian case demonstrates and persecution is largely associated with con- the impotence of international rights-based law flicts on the African continent. Indeed almost in the face of conflicting domestic political 30 per cent of the world’s refugee population aims. originate from Africa. According to the most recent global refugee update compiled by the To be or not to be a refugee UN the total number of refugees fleeing civil and inter-state war on the continent stands at As this year’s World Refugee Day marks around three million people. If we consider more than 50 years since the signing of the the highly porous nature of borders between International Convention Relating to the Status states on the continent, undocumented asylum of Refugees, the need to revisit the spirit of the seekers will add a significant portion to this convention, and assess the practical actions of number. its 136 signatory states is more relevant than For governments in the north, one of the ever. Certainly the protections set out in the means of fighting the ‘war on terror’ in the 1951 convention and the subsequent 1967 post-11 September context has been to impose protocol represent the only “wall behind which increasingly stringent immigration laws – yet refugees can shelter”, as described by the direc- this has resulted in the conflation of two sepa- tor of the UNHCR Protection Department, rate issues: economic immigration and asylum Erika Feller, and remains the fundamental from persecution. The newly confirmed High basis for the agency’s work across the globe.6 Commissioner for Refugees, former Portuguese Mandated to be the lead agency for coordinat- Prime Minister Antonio Guterres, has been ing assistance to refugees in the aftermath of critical of the tendency to confuse refugees and World War II, the UNHCR was not expected asylum seekers with terrorists and economic to be operational for more than three years! migrants when the former were victims of ter- However, the agency’s importance has grown rorists themselves. Guterres recently noted that exponentially as the conflicts in the former “refugees do not migrate because they want to zones of cold-war influence continued in vary- improve their situation, they migrate because ing degrees of intensity. Currently some 19.2 they are being persecuted”.7 The following table million displaced people across the globe reaf- presents, in summary, answers to some of the firm the critical need for basic humanitarian most common questions concerning refugees: Who is a A refugee is a person who "owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for refugee? reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion is outside the country of his nationality, and is unable to or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that coun- try". 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees How are Governments normally guarantee the basic human rights and physical security refugees of their citizens. But when civilians become refugees this safety net disappears. protected? UNHCR's main role in pursuing international protection is to ensure that states are aware of, and act on, their obligations to protect refugees and persons seeking asylum. However, it is not a supranational organisation and cannot be considered a replacement for government responsibility. Countries may not forcibly return refugees to a territory where they face danger or discriminate between groups of refugees. 64 African Security Review 14(3) • 2005 What are the Refugees are required to respect the laws and regulations of their country of asy- obligations of a lum. refugee? Who decides Governments establish status determination procedures to decide a person's legal standing and rights in accordance with their own legal systems. The UNHCR who is a refugee? may offer advice as part of its mandate to promote refugee law, protect refugees and supervise the implementation of the 1951 Refugee Convention. The agency advocates that governments adopt a rapid, flexible and liberal process, recognis- ing how difficult it often is to document persecution. The UNHCR's 64-member Executive Committee sets non-binding guidelines and the agency's Handbook on procedures and criteria for determining refugee status is an authoritative interpre- tation of the 1951 Convention. In countries that are not party to international refugee instruments but that request the UNHCR's assistance, the agency may determine a person's refugee status and offer its protection and assistance. Are persons The 1951 Geneva Convention, the main international instrument of refugee law, fleeing war or does not specifically address the issue of civilians fleeing conflict, though in recent war-related years major refugee movements have resulted from civil wars, ethnic, tribal and religious violence. However, the UNHCR considers that persons fleeing such conditions (such conditions, and whose state is unwilling or unable to protect them, should be as famine and considered refugees. Regional instruments such as the AU convention support ethnic violence) this view. Some countries argue that civilians fleeing generalised war or who fear refugees? persecution by non-state groups such as militias and rebels should not be given formal refugee status. It is the UNHCR's view that the origin of the persecu- tion should not be decisive in determining refugee status, but whether a person deserves international protection because it is not available in the country of origin. What rights does A refugee has the right to safe asylum. However, international protection com- a refugee have? prises more than physical safety. Refugees should receive at least the same rights and basic help as any other foreigner who is a legal resident, including freedom of thought, freedom of movement and freedom from torture and degrading treat- ment. Economic and social rights are equally applicable. Refugees should have access to medical care, schooling and the right to work. In certain circumstances when adequate government resources are not immediately available, including the sudden arrival of large numbers of uprooted persons, the UNHCR and other international organisations provide assistance such as financial grants, food, tools and shelter, schools and clinics. With income-generating and skill training projects, the UNHCR makes every effort to ensure that refugees become self-suf- ficient as quickly as possible. The challenges of reintegration and rehabilitation The UNHCR emphasises that refugee numbers No contracting state shall expel or return are declining globally, with an unprecedented (‘refouler’) a refugee in any manner level of voluntary repatriation. The emphasis whatsoever to the frontiers of territories on the ‘voluntary’ nature of repatriation is where his life or freedom would be particularly important to the work of the threatened on account of his race, religion, agency as outlined in Article 33 of the Refugee nationality, membership of a particular Convention: social group or political opinion.8 Africa Watch 65 In fact, over a four-year period the global refu- bilise populations in distress during emergency gee population has fallen by 24 per cent9. But periods. Strengthening governments’ ability to these figures suggest another trend in human positively contribute and lead processes of population movements, that of a steadily socio-economic reintegration of their popula- increasing number of IDPs. The Sudanese case tions is key to their long-term success as well highlights the enormous challenges facing that as preventing former refugees and IDPs from country as it begins to contemplate post-con- re-entering the ‘revolving door of displacement’. flict reconstruction in the south. It is estimated Viewed from the perspective of conflict preven- that over four million people have been inter- tion, the successful socio-economic reintegration nally uprooted by the war in southern Sudan of refugees and IDPs is instrumental in ensuring and as many as 600,000 of them are refugees peace in post-conflict societies. in the seven neighbouring states. While the increasing movement towards Conclusion returning ‘home’ is a testament to the success of ongoing peace-making initiatives on the According to the UNHCR in Rwanda, the continent, one of the main challenges to build- majority of repatriates were received by their ing peace is the socio-economic reintegration communities rather than by local authorities. and rehabilitation of uprooted individuals in There is now clear evidence that most of them their countries and communities of origin. were women and young children – challeng- Yet, as noted in a recent IRIN news agency ing the validity of the Rwandan government’s report on the experiences of refugees who claim that they fled because of fear of being have returned home, the “initial euphoria of prosecuted by the gacaca trials. It is more going back turns sour and leads to frustration likely that those who fled did so from fear of as families struggle to reintegrate into societies general insecurity and intimidation emanating ravaged by war and social dislocation”.10 from the tense situation created by the gacaca This should not come as a surprise. Life as process. a refugee is characterised by dependence on The Rwandan government’s qualification external aid, either from UN agencies such as of the group as a subversive and criminal entity the World Food Programme (WFP) or govern- is a stark violation of the principles of interna- ment bodies of the host country. Indeed, the tional law. Jean Pierre Misago of the University levels of either self-sufficiency or dependency of the Witwatersrand’s Forced Migration Unit while in exile have an important bearing on the explains: “Everybody should be allowed to subsequent pace of economic reintegration.11 apply for asylum, after which the appropriate The need for a coordinated socio-economic authorities would make an informed decision reintegration strategy (as an integral and fun- in line with international law.”12 More impor- damental part of post-conflict reconstruction tantly, and following from the chronology of efforts) has been highlighted, inter alia, by the events detailed above, political machinations UN Secretary-General’s 2005 report entitled have largely determined the status of this vul- In larger freedom: development, security and nerable population. human rights for all, which calls for, among Aid workers in Burundi maintain that the other things, the incorporation and adoption move had been anticipated for some time, but of a developmental approach to peacekeeping aside from trying to open up dialogue chan- efforts. nels between government and humanitarian While UN agencies are mandated to pro- agencies, they were impotent to stop Rwanda’s vide relief and development assistance, the actions. In addition, the pressure mounted on responsibility for reintegration must perforce a Burundian government struggling to retain also lie with government institutions in the re-label the refugees. state in question. This should not be interpret- The movement of people is symptomatic ed as a call for the reduction of international of the broader challenges to peace-building in donors’ assistance – critical, particularly to sta- a region that has been characterised by inter- 66 African Security Review 14(3) • 2005 necine violence and instability. For the thou- 6 UNHCR, A timeless treaty under attack, Refugees sands of people who continue to be displaced 2 (123), 2001, p 6. 7 D Wallis, West should learn lessons from Uganda, and those who make the decision to return THE GACACA PROCESS STEPHANIE WOLTERS Eleven years after the Rwandan genocide in may be accused of having participated in the which up to a million Tutsis and moderate killings. Once the information gathering period Hutus were killed, the Rwandan government is completed, the courts move to the trial phase has launched a national judicial process aimed during which the accused will have an oppor- at bringing the perpetrators of the genocide to tunity to defend themselves, or to plead guilty justice. Although trials of genocide suspects have and confess. The hearings of the gacaca courts been under way since 1996, according to some are public and mandatory, and are intended to estimates it would have taken the Rwandan promote widespread participation with the aim judicial system up to 150 years to try the over of getting as much information as possible about 100,000 people already detained on charges of what happened during the genocide. genocide. Faced with this reality, the Rwandan So far, the experience of the pilot phase of government created the gacaca courts in 2001. the gacaca courts indicates that participation They were subsequently introduced in a small is high during the introductory stage of the number of pilot areas in two phases in 2002, and process, largely as a result of curiosity, and tends at national level in early 2005. to taper off somewhat later on. This has been One of the key objectives of the gacaca attributed to a number of things, ranging from courts is to eradicate the ‘culture of impunity’ fear of reprisals for speaking openly and accusing in Rwanda. Many Rwandans feel strongly that if people, to a significant loss of work time when the authors of past ethnic massacres in Rwanda attending the weekly meetings. had been properly punished, the 1994 genocide It is too early to evaluate how participation would not have taken place. Without proper at national level will evolve; however, the justice, they say, impunity cannot be eradicated, introduction of the gacaca courts at national and reconciliation, which is the second key level has created an atmosphere of heightened objective of the process, will remain impossible. tension around the process. Observers agree that Based on a traditional form of community- while the gacaca process was taking place in only level conflict resolution, the gacaca courts are a few areas of the country, it remained a source essentially grassroots courts presided over by of curiosity. However, now that it has been a group of nine judges who are elected by the introduced on a nationwide level, it has become community. The gacaca courts meet once a a reality for all Rwandans – a reality that will week, initially to gather, collate and, to some force Rwandans to revisit the darkest period of extent, verify information about what happened their history each week for as long as the gacaca during the genocide, who was killed, and who courts function. Revisiting this period of their STEPHANIE WOLTERS is a freelance journalist and currently writes the Economist Intelligence Unit’s DRC Quarterly Country Report. Between 2001 and 2003 she was chief news editor of MONUC’s Radio Okapi in the DRC. 68 African Security Review 14(3) • 2005 history means that Hutus and Tutsis will regularly courts are the government’s way of settling past be reminded of a time that their communities scores, even if this is not really the case. were violently at odds with one another, and Misgivings about the gacaca courts are not just when ethnic differences were a matter of life and the domain of the Hutu community, however. death. There is growing concern that the regular Many genocide survivors are also wary of the harkening back to this period during the gacaca process, essentially because they perceive the courts could do more to damage the relationship confession procedure as amounting to a de facto between these two communities than to heal it. amnesty for the perpetrators. The confession An additional factor which fuels concerns that procedure is a cornerstone of the gacaca process: the gacaca process may prove divisive rather if a person confesses, pleads guilty and asks for than reconciliatory is that the gacaca courts will forgiveness, his or her prison sentence will be not investigate killings that happened after the reduced by up to half. This reduction in the genocide and that were frequently perpetrated prison sentence, coupled with what the survivors by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) against say is the accused person’s lack of sincerity, has Hutus. Many see this as selective justice and led many survivors to question the credibility of have criticised this omission as being unfair and the gacaca process. at odds with a national reconciliation process. Most neutral observers agree that there is a Exacerbating the concern that the gacaca very real risk not only that the gacaca courts may courts might be perceived as being one-sided fail to meet their objective of trying all those is the fact that the Rwandan political arena involved in the genocide – the latest official fig- remains extremely closed. Opposition parties ures put this number at 800,000 people, which have been sidelined while almost any criticism would take the courts up to 20 years to try – but of the government is labelled divisionist. This also that the gacaca process may backfire and means that the type of debate which a judicial heighten tensions between the two main ethnic process such as the gacaca tribunals would be groups in Rwanda. At the same time, there is expected to generate cannot be held openly. widespread agreement that the perpetrators of This lack of freedom to criticise a process that the genocide must be brought to some sort of has massive implications at national level only justice so that the country may move beyond its serves to enforce the impression that the gacaca still very painful and very recent past. AFRICA WATCH TRENDS AND MARKERS Some facts about Zimbabwe Zimbabwe Background: The UK annexed Southern Rhodesia from the South Africa Company in 1923. A 1961 constitution was formulated that favored whites in power. In 1965 the government unilaterally declared its independence, but the UK did not recognise the act and demanded more complete voting rights for the black African majority in the country (then called Rhodesia). UN sanc- tions and a guerrilla uprising finally led to free elections in 1979 and independence (as Zimbabwe) in 1980. Robert MUGABE, the nation's first prime minister, has been the country's only ruler (as president since 1987) and has dominated the country's political system since independence. Short Form: Zimbabwe Local Short Form: Zimbabwe Long Form: Republic of Zimbabwe Local Long Form: Zimbabwe Script Form: Zimbabwe Abbreviated Form: Zimbabwe Former Name: Southern Rhodesia, Rhodesia Territory of: NA Zimbabwe Head of State: Executive President Robert Gabriel MUGABE Zimbabwe Government Type: parliamentary democracy Zimbabwe Independence: 1980 April 18 (from UK) Zimbabwe Constitution: 1979 December 21 Zimbabwe National Holiday: Independence Day, 18 April Zimbabwe International Organization Participation: ACP, AfDB, C, CCC, ECA, FAO, G-15, G- 77, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICFTU, ICRM, IDA, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, ILO, IMF, Interpol, IOC, IOM (observer), ISO, ITU, NAM, OAU, OPCW, PCA, SADC, UN, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNIDO, UNMIK, UPU, WCL, WFTU, WHO, WIPO, WMO, WToO, WTrO Zimbabwe Administrative Divisions: 8 provinces and 2 cities* with provincial status; Bulawayo*, Harare*, Manicaland, Mashonaland Central, Mashonaland East, Mashonaland West, Masvingo, Matabeleland North, Matabeleland South, Midlands SOURCE: htt://www.phrasebase.com/countries/zimbabwe.html, 19 September 2005. 70 African Security Review 14(3) • 2005 Zimbabwe Dependent Areas: NA Zimbabwe Legal System: mixture of Roman-Dutch and English common law Suffrage: 18 years of age Zimbabwe Executive, Legislative and Judicial Branches: Executive Branch: chief of state: Executive President Robert Gabriel MUGABE (since 31 December 1987); Co-Vice Presidents Simon Vengai MUZENDA (since 31 December 1987) and Joseph MSIKA (since 23 December 1999); note - the president is both the chief of state and head of government head of government: Executive President Robert Gabriel MUGABE (since 31 December 1987); Co-Vice Presidents Simon Vengai MUZENDA (since 31 December 1987) and Joseph MSIKA (since 23 December 1999); note - the president is both the chief of state and head of government cabinet: Cabinet appointed by the president; responsible to the House of Assembly elections: presidential candidates nominated with a nomination paper signed by at least 10 registered voters (at least one from each province) and elected by popular vote; election last held 9-11 March 2002 (next to be held NA March 2006); co- vice presidents appointed by the president election results: Robert Gabriel MUGABE reelected pres- ident; percent of vote - Robert Gabriel MUGABE 56.2%, Morgan TSVANGIRAI 41.9% Legislative Branch: unicameral parliament, called House of Assembly (150 seats - 120 elected by popular vote for five-year terms, 12 nominated by the president, 10 occupied by traditional chiefs chosen by their peers, and 8 occupied by provincial governors appointed by the president) elections: last held 24-25 June 2000 (next to be held NA 2005) election results: percent of vote by party - ZANU-PF 47.2%, MDC 45.6%, ZANU-Ndonga 0.7%, United Parties 0.7%; seats by party - ZANU-PF 63, MDC 56, ZANU-Ndonga 1 Judicial Branch: Supreme Court; High Court Zimbabwe Party Leaders: Movement for Democratic Change or MDC [Morgan TSVANGIRAI]; United Parties [Abel MUZOREWA]; Zimbabwe African National Union-Ndonga or ZANU- Ndonga [leader NA]; Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front or ZANU-PF [Robert Gabriel MUGABE]; Zimbabwe African Peoples Union or ZAPU [Paul SIWELA] Zimbabwe International Disputes: NA Zimbabwe Illicit Drugs: transit point for African cannabis and South Asian heroin, mandrax, and methamphetamines destined for the South African and European markets ZIMBABWEAN GEOGRAPHY FACTS Location of Zimbabwe: Southern Africa, between South Africa and Zambia Continent: Africa Land Area Total: 390,580 sq km Region: Southern African Land Area Land: 386,670 sq km Zimbabwe Capital: Harare Land Area Water: 3,910 sq km Current Time: Latitude: 020 00 S Border Boundary Land: 3,066 km Longitude: 030 00 E Border Boundary Coastline: 0 km Arable Land: 8.00 % Pastures: 0.00 % Crops: 1.00 % Woodlands & Forests: 0.00 % Africa Watch 71 Highest Elevation: 2,592 m Location: Inyangani Lowest Elevation: 162 m Location: junction of the Runde and Save rivers Largest City in Zimbabwe: Harare Harare Population: 1,686,000 Threatened Species in Zimbabwe: 38 Environmental Issues in Zimbabwe: deforestation; soil erosion; land degradation; air and water pollution; the black rhinoceros herd - once the largest concentration of the species in the world - has been significantly reduced by poaching; poor mining practices have led to toxic waste and heavy metal pollution Zimbabwe Environmental Agreements: party to: Biodiversity, Climate Change, Desertification, Endangered Species, Law of the Sea, Ozone Layer Protection signed, but not ratified: none of the selected agreements Irrigated Land in Zimbabwe: 1,170 Bordering Countries of Zimbabwe: Botswana 813 km, Mozambique 1,231 km, South Africa 225 km, Zambia 797 km Zimbabwe Natural Resources: coal, chromium ore, asbestos, gold, nickel, copper, iron ore, vana- dium, lithium, tin, platinum group metals Zimbabwe Terrain: mostly high plateau with higher central plateau (high veld); mountains in east Comparative Area of Zimbabwe: slightly larger than Montana Notes on Zimbabwe's Geography: landlocked; the Zambezi forms a natural riverine boundary with Zambia; in full flood (February-April) the massive Victoria Falls on the river forms the world's larg- est curtain of falling water ZIMBABWEAN CLIMATE General Climate in Zimbabwe: tropical; moderated by altitude; rainy season (November to March) Natural Hazards in Zimbabwe: recurring droughts; floods and severe storms are rare ZIMBABWEAN ECONOMY Overview of the Zimbabwe Economy: The government of Zimbabwe faces a wide variety of dif- ficult economic problems as it struggles to consolidate earlier moves to develop a market-oriented economy. Its involvement in the war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, for example, has already drained hundreds of millions of dollars from the economy. Badly needed support from the IMF has been suspended because of the country's failure to meet budgetary goals. Inflation rose from an annual rate of 32% in 1998 to 59% in 1999, to 60% in 2000, and to 100% by yearend 2001. The economy is being steadily weakened by excessive government deficits, AIDS, and rampant inflation. The government's land reform program, characterized by chaos and violence, has derailed the commercial sector, the traditional source of exports and foreign exchange and the provider of 72 African Security Review 14(3) • 2005 400,000 jobs. Distribution of income is extremely unequal. Zimbabwe GDP: $28,000,000,000 USD Zimbabwe Currency: Zimbabwean dollar GDP per Capita: $2,450 USD Currency Code: ZWD GDP Growth Rate: -6.50 % Currency Exchange Rate History: Zimbabwean dollars per US dollar - 54.9451 (December 2001), 54.9451 (2001), 43.2900 (2000), 38.3142 (1999), 21.4133 (1998), 11.8906 (1997) GDP of Agriculture: 11.00 % GDP of Industry: 14.00 % GDP of Services: 75.00 % Zimbabwe Inflation Rate: 100.00 % Zimbabwe Population in Poverty: 60.00 % Zimbabwe Unemployment Rate: 60.00 % Zimbabwe Tourism: 2,103,000.00 visitors each year Consumption by lowest 10%: 1.80 % Electricity Exports: $2,500,000,000 USD Consumption by upper 10%: 46.90 % Electricity Imports: $2,600,000,000 USD Electricity Production: 6,425,000,000 kWh Electricity Exports: 0 kWh Electricity Consumption: 10,475,000,000 kWh Electricity Imports: 4,500,000,000 kWh Electricity Production by Source: Fossil Fuel: 53.31 % Nuclear: 0.00 % Hydro: 46.69 % Other: 0.00 % External Debt: $5,000,000,000 USD Received in economic aid: $200,000,000 USD Donated in economic aid: $0 USD Zimbabwe Agricultural Products: corn, cotton, tobacco, wheat, coffee, sugarcane, peanuts; cattle, sheep, goats, pigs Zimbabwe Primary Industries: mining (coal, gold, copper, nickel, tin, clay, numerous metallic and nonmetallic ores), steel, wood products, cement, chemicals, fertilizer, clothing and footwear, foodstuffs, beverages Industrial Growth Rate in Zimbabwe: -10.00 % Zimbabwe Primary Imports: $1,500,000,000 USD - machinery and transport equipment 34%, other manufactures 18%, chemicals 17%, fuels 11% Import Partners: South Africa 46.3%, UK 7.2%, Germany 2.5%, US 2.8%, Japan 2.5% Zimbabwe Primary Exports: $2,100,000,000 USD - tobacco 30%, gold 11%, ferroalloys 9%, tex- tile/clothing 3% Export Partners: South Africa 12.1%, UK 8.5%, Japan 7.7%, Germany 6.1%, China 5.4% Africa Watch 73 Gini Index: 56.80 % Zimbabwe Labor Force: 5,500,000 Zimbabwe Labor Force by Occupations: agriculture 66%, services 24%, industry 10% ZIMBABWEAN COMMUNICATIONS Radio Broadcast Stations: 28 Radios: 1,140,000 Television Broadcast Stations: 16 Televisions: 370,000 Mainline Telephones: 212,000 Mobile Phones: 111,000 Internet Service Providers: 6 Internet Users: 30,000 Internet Country Code: .zw Newspapers: 19 Two Letter Country Code: ZW Weights & Measures: Phone Country Code: +263 Electricity: Volts Zimbabwe Telephone Systems: general assessment: system was once one of the best in Africa, but now suffers from poor maintenance; more than 100,000 outstanding requests for connection despite an equally large number of installed but unused main lines domestic: consists of microwave radio relay links, open-wire lines, radiotelephone communication stations, fixed wireless local loop installations, and a substantial mobile cellular network; Internet connection is available in Harare and planned for all major towns and for some of the smaller ones international: satellite earth sta- tions - 2 Intelsat; two international digital gateway exchanges (in Harare and Gweru) ZIMBABWEAN TRANSPORTATION Highways: 8,692 km Railways: 3,077 km Pipelines: 212 km Waterways: 0 km Airports: 17 Heliports: 0 Motor Vehicles: 51 per 1k people CO2 Emissions: 18,203,000 Metric Tons of CO2 / yr Per Capita CO2 Emissions: 1.60 MT of CO2 / yr Zimbabwe Merchant Marines: NA Zimbabwe Ports and Harbors: Binga, Kariba ZIMBABWEAN PEOPLE Population: 11,376,676 people Birth Rate: 24.59 births per 1k people Population Density: 33.00 people per sq km Death Rate: 24.06 deaths per 1k people 74 African Security Review 14(3) • 2005 Population Growth: 0.05 % per year Fertility Rate: 3.21 babies born per woman Population Male 0-14: 2,178,073 Population Female 0-14: 2,128,287 Population Male 15-64: 3,376,850 Population Female 15-64: 3,268,315 Population Male 65+: 213,286 Population Female 65+: 211,865 Population 0-14: 37.90 % Literacy Rate: 85.00 % Population 15-64: 58.40 % Literacy Rate Male: 90.00 % Population 65+: 3.70 % Literacy Rate Female: 80.00 % Population Male: 51.50 % Population Female: 48.50 % Life Expectancy at Birth: 36.50 years Infant Mortality Rate: 62.97 babies die per 1000 babies born Life Expectancy at Birth Male: 37.87 years Life Expectancy at Birth Female: 35.10 years AIDS/HIV Rate: 25.06 % People Living with AIDS/HIV: 1,500,000 People who Died of AIDS: 160,000 Zimbabwe Net Migration Rate: 0.00 migrants per 1k people Nationality: ZIMBABWEAN Ethnic Groups in Zimbabwe: African 98% (Shona 82%, Ndebele 14%, other 2%), mixed and Asian 1%, white less than 1% Zimbabwe Primary Language: English Zimbabwe Other Languages: English (official), Shona, Sindebele (the language of the Ndebele, sometimes called Ndebele), numerous but minor tribal dialects Primary Religion in Zimbabwe: syncretic Other Religions in Zimbabwe: syncretic (part Christian, part indigenous beliefs) 50%, Christian 25%, indigenous beliefs 24%, Muslim and other 1% ZIMBABWEAN MILITARY Branches: Zimbabwe National Army, Air Force of Zimbabwe, Zimbabwe Republic Police (includes Police Support Unit, Paramilitary Police) Minimum Age: NA Manpower Available: 3,057,381 Manpower Fit to Serve: 1,898,383 Number of Manpower Available each Year: 0 Expenditures: 350,600,000 Expenditures as a Percentage of GDP: 3.80 ESSAYS ZIMBABWE’S ZEZURU SUM GAME The basis for the security dilemma in which the political elite finds itself CHRIS MAROLENG SECURITY GOVERNANCE IN SOUTH AFRICA GAVIN CAWTHRA WAR AND HIV PREVALENCE Evidence from Tigray, Ethiopia TADDESSE BERHE, HAGOS GEMECHU AND ALEX DE WAAL ESSAY ZIMBABWE’S ZEZURU SUM GAME The basis for the security dilemma in which the political elite finds itself CHRIS MAROLENG Reflecting on the crisis in Zimbabwe, one is immediately struck by the preoccupation of most commentators with President Robert Mugabe and the land reform programme. Many have touted the confluence of these two issues as the main drivers of that country’s political, economic and humanitarian woes. This particular perspective, which is most dominant in the media, has cap- tured popular attention. However, while these two factors are certainly important to understand- ing the current problems faced by Zimbabwe, little room has been left for the consideration of a number of underlying dynamics that have also contributed to the current stalemate. This omission encourages the perpetuation of myths and rumour, and leads to serious miscalculations in the various transition scenarios that have been mooted. One of the dynamics that has been largely omitted from the debate is the critical role played by what we have chosen to term the ‘security dilemma’ faced by Zimbabwe’s elite. This essay will also present Zimbabwe’s political crisis as the result of attempts by the ruling elite to block the transition to enhanced democracy. Also central to the article is a conceptual framework that explains how this powerful group has responded to the threat implicit in political transforma- tion, and how the dominant nationalist ideology represented by the Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic Front) (ZANU–PF) has fed into this dynamic. Introduction revealed an opposition party that was not just shell-shocked, but one which had apparently As Zimbabwe commemorated the 25th anni- run out of ideas. It appeared to lack a strategic versary of its independence on 18 April 2005, vision that would guide it in its difficult task the country’s main opposition party, the of unseating the governing party (ZANU–PF), Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), which has been in power under its leader, found itself with little cause to celebrate. The Robert Mugabe, since the country attained its negative mood which engulfed the opposition independence from Britain in 1980. camp was attributable to its resounding defeat Even though Zimbabwe is considered a in the much-disputed parliamentary elections de jure democracy, credible opposition to of 31 March 2005. The outcome of the poll ZANU–PF did not begin to emerge until the CHRIS MAROLENG is a Senior Researcher in the African Security Analysis programme at the Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria. 78 African Security Review 14(3) • 2005 early 1990s, at a time of growing poverty The results of the most recent parliamentary and unemployment. Only one year after its polls in March 2005, however, saw the govern- formation, the MDC won 57 seats in the ing party securing a two-thirds parliamentary 2000 parliamentary election, compared with majority, winning 78 of the 120 elected seats. the 62 seats claimed by ZANU–PF. Interest in The MDC managed to gain only 41 seats, 16 the elections was strong in the urban centres, fewer than in the 2000 elections, when it came although intimidation probably reduced within three seats of winning a parliamentary participation in some rural areas. The most majority.2 The MDC has rejected the credibil- striking feature of the voting pattern was not ity of these results, claiming that the elections so much the overwhelming support shown for were rigged and that the voters’ roll was in a the MDC in the cities, but that ZANU–PF won shambles.3 To make matters worse, the MDC only two seats in the Matabeleland provinces. maintains that the electoral playing field is Furthermore, the MDC gained seven seats skewed to the distinct advantage of the ruling against ZANU–PF’s six in Manicaland. That party. For example, the president is authorised province and Matabeleland, which have in to appoint 30 non-constituency members to the past been the strongholds of opposition parliament (making up a total of 150 seats). As parties, voted for the same opposition party things stand, ZANU–PF finds itself very much for the first time in 2000. This must have been in the ‘pound seats’, because its two-thirds alarming for ZANU–PF, which had made majority in parliament allows it to change the unity and the regional balancing of power constitution as it sees fit. The president and his among its leaders the main platform of its party have been contemplating the prospect of campaign rhetoric. The electoral outcome such a move for some time now.4 in 2000 made the MDC the most successful Tables 1 and 2 represent the national sum- opposition party in Zimbabwe’s history as an maries of votes and seats in the 2005 parlia- independent state.1 mentary elections. Table 1 National summary of votes Votes % Registered voters 5, 658,624 Total votes cast 2, 696,670 47.7 Invalid votes 62,025 02.3 Valid votes cast 2, 634,645 97.7 Source: The Kubatana Trust of Zimbabwe Figure 2 National summary of votes and seats Party Votes % Change Seats Change MDC 1,041,292 39.5 - 08.9 41 - 16 ZANU-PF 1,569,867 59.6 +11.9 78 +16 Others 23,486 0.9 1 Appointed members 30 Total 2,634,645 150 Source: The Kubatana Trust of Zimbabwe Essay 79 The celebratory mood that should have groups and the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade marked Zimbabwe’s silver jubilee has also Unions (ZCTU) to form a political party, the eluded a large proportion of Zimbabwe’s’ MDC, led by Morgan Tsvangirai, in September population, who find themselves in the 1999. Judging by its track record, ZANU–PF throes of the worst social and economic has failed to provide the broad mass of the depression to have hit Zimbabwe since it people with either human security or social became independent. The current economic peace, despite its nationalist rhetoric. This and political crisis has reversed the social and deficiency is examined by Patrick Bond and economic gains that the country experienced Masimba Manyanya in their work Zimbabwe’s under the leadership of President Mugabe in plunge: Exhausted nationalism, neoliberalism, the first decade of his administration. These and the search for social justice. They argue positive developments were brought about that after two decades of independence, the by massive investment in such sectors as country’s voters are experiencing ‘fatigue’ education and primary healthcare. arising from the ruling party’s misgovernment In contrast, Zimbabweans are currently and economic mismanagement.7 faced with an economy that is nearing collapse. Unfortunately the MDC has not been It is characterised by hyperinflation, rampant able to translate the popular discontent over unemployment, food and fuel shortages, and the government’s policies into mobilisation has been rated by some economists as “the in support of the opposition, which might fastest-shrinking economy in the world’.5 ordinarily lead to a transition in its favour. Domestic debt has trebled since February, to This failure stems not only from deficiencies $1.1 billion (about R6.8 billion), and according within the opposition, but also from extreme to the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, foreign structural bias in the electoral process. The currency reserves now meet less than ten per MDC has yet to participate in an election that cent of demand from the productive sector. can objectively be deemed free and fair, and Annual inflows of foreign exchange from to express the will of the people. It is ironic, tobacco, which is Zimbabwe’s main export particularly in the year that marks a quarter- crop, the sales of which began on local auction century of independence, that the early struggle floors in April, are far below average. Experts for liberation from colonial rule was based have attributed this decline to poor crop on extending the vote to all, regardless of quality and reduced output. The relative price ethnicity, race or affiliation (whether political stability of essential commodities maintained or religious). The ZANU–PF-led government over the last year has ended, and reductions through its conduct, especially during the last in inflation have bottomed out. Prices are three elections, seems to have disregarded this said to have increased by 100 per cent since aspect of the nationalist struggle for liberation the election. The inflation figures released by in which it took part. the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe at the end of But this argument may be challenged. April calculate inflation at less than 130 per Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle may have cent6 but economists from the private sector had the unintended effect of adding certain believe a more accurate estimate is somewhere tendencies or ideologies to the whole between 300 per cent and 400 per cent. nationalist movement that may account for the ruling party’s apparently revisionist and counter-revolutionary stance. It can be argued Zimbabwe’s political culture and legacy that African nationalism, seen as a social movement, was “basically hegemonic and The steady decline in living standards for intolerant of diversity, internal and external most Zimbabweans throughout the 1990s criticism and dissent. As a movement it was was generally identified as one of the main basically sweeping in what it claimed and reasons for the growing dissatisfaction with the annihilatory in what it rejected.” Ngwabi government felt in society. This prompted civic Bhebe and Terence Ranger observe:8 80 African Security Review 14(3) • 2005 But perhaps there was something inherent political elite regards political competition in nationalism itself even before the wars with suspicion and open hostility, as can be and the adoption of socialism, which seen in the behaviour of ZANU–PF in the face gave rise to authoritarianism. Maybe of any political opposition, past and present. nationalism’s emphasis on unity at all The other operative principle of pre-colonial costs - its subordination of trade unions Zimbabwean political authority mentioned by and churches and all other African Ndlovu-Gatsheni is the idea of “life kingship organisations to its imperatives - gave rise or chieftaincy, an idea and practice that to an intolerance of pluralism. Maybe easily translates itself into the notion of ‘life nationalism’s glorification of the leader gave presidency’”.14 “Colonialism that succeeded rise to a post-colonial cult of personality. pre-colonial rule was, by definition and design, Maybe nationalism’s commitment an autocratic system of governance … It to modernisation, whether socialist or was undemocratic to the core.”15 The settler not, inevitably implied a ‘commandist’ colonial government made no attempt to state. Indeed the post-colonial state create democratic institutions that embraced authoritarianism cannot be explained only the Africans. Political participation was on the basis of its being a successor to an severely limited and political competition equally authoritarian settler colonial state. was neither allowed nor tolerated. Ndlovu- Rather, the legacy of African nationalism Gatsheni notes: itself tainted the post-colonial state with authoritarian tendencies.9 Colonial authoritarianism, far from deepening a commitment to democratic This negative aspect of the legacy of liberation norms and practices on the African is particularly evident in the electoral politics nationalist elite, merely consolidated of Zimbabwe. Robert Mugabe illustrated this an incipient authoritarian psyche in the phenomenon when he said in 1976: nationalist leadership. The authoritarianism of the colonial era reproduced itself within Our votes must go together with our guns; the nationalist political movements. The after all, any vote we shall have, shall war of liberation, too, reinforced rather have been the product of the gun. The than undermined this authoritarian gun, which produces the votes, should culture.16 remain its security officer, its guarantor. The people’s vote and the people’s guns A more recent influence that has shaped are always inseparable twins.10 political culture in Zimbabwe is the nationalist liberation struggle. According to Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni Zimbabwe’s political culture is largely a Every African was expected to embrace the product of four main influences: pre-colonial, liberation war and every one had to toe colonial, the armed liberation struggle, and the line. This, more than anything else, ZANU–PF rule.11 This same author goes on to generated and institutionalised a culture note that the contemporary political culture of of fear, conformity and unquestioning Zimbabwe “represents an articulation of these support. The guerrilla armies and four streams. The four influences that gave the nationalist parties were never birth to the Zimbabwean political culture were democratically structured and did not all undemocratic.”12 For instance, pre-colonial operate in a democratic fashion. They were societies were characterised by non-competitive highly commandist and authoritarian.17 politics. “Competition for power was not only illegitimate, but also fatal, and often those While the liberation struggle was instrumental who sought power had to found their own in the country’s gaining independence, the polity elsewhere”.13 It can be argued that this style of rule has scarcely evolved in institutional explains why, to this day, the Zimbabwean terms. It is still characterised by intolerance, Essay 81 intimidation and violence. The liberation • The structural adjustment policies struggle instilled in many political leaders and introduced by the International Monetary their supporters a militaristic conception and Fund (IMF) and the World Bank had a very perception of politics and political process. weak human development component, These elements in Zimbabwe’s political and exacerbated poverty in Zimbabwe. culture are the main reasons that many A contradictory situation was created. observers have argued that in the current The model of neo-liberal democracy political context the prospect of holding a propounded by the structural adjustment free and fair election that can result in the policies prescribed a weakening of the peaceful transfer of power is unlikely if not state’s role. But this came at a time impossible. This will probably be the case when the human developmental deficits until the present style of government, which accumulated during the colonial and is predicated on the importance of regime Cold War eras required an interventionist security, is replaced or radically transformed. state. This contributed to the state’s What is needed is a political dispensation inability to redistribute resources in a that embraces a more pluralistic conception coherent and orderly manner. of political competition, based on democracy, • The failure of leadership in independent human security, tolerance, rule of law, consent Zimbabwe has created patronage systems of the governed, and respect for human based on region, ethnicity and political rights. affiliation. These have completely It is no coincidence that Zimbabwe’s undermined both advancement based on multifaceted problems have been caused by merit and market economics. A report a confluence of colonial and post-colonial complied by the author describing the experiences. The most significant contributory discussions that took place at a workshop factors are summarised below. held by the Institute for Security Studies • Since independence, Zimbabwe’s in 2003, contained this comment: leadership has failed to transform the “Zimbabwe has become a nation of repressive colonial state structure into accomplices joined together by ethnicity, a democratic one. A related failure is region, political affiliation and war that ZANU–PF as a former liberation credentials. Government, amongst other movement has been unable to remould vices, specializes in covers and cover-ups. itself into a democratic government, and It is for this reason that a justice system therefore has not fulfilled its promise, manned by kinsmen and party cadres is made when the country achieved as evil as the Rhodesian system which independence, of political freedom for was constructed along racial lines.”18 its citizens. • The lack of accountability demonstrated The crisis in Zimbabwe is essentially structural by the government after independence is and deep-rooted. It cannot be resolved linked to the underdevelopment of the through tinkering with peripheral symptoms concepts of citizenship and participatory or piecemeal measures. Instead it requires democracy. The colonial authorities far-reaching, honest and all-encompassing conditioned the majority of Zimbabweans solutions. to acquiesce in, and comply with, What follows is an attempt to establish decisions and actions taken by politicians, the extent to which the insecurity felt by regardless of their independent opinions the regime helps to explain the manner on the issues. They were compelled to in which Zimbabwe’s political elite has act as mere unquestioning recipients; behaved in response to the political and and the cost of non-compliance was socio-economic challenges that have brought always heavy. This led to an inherited about the country’s present state of near- culture of intolerance and impunity on collapse. This paper argues that the political the part of the government. elite in Zimbabwe is increasingly trapped in 82 African Security Review 14(3) • 2005 an ‘insecurity dilemma’. This formulation not attaining its political objectives. The following only supplies a reason for the uncompromising government statement amply illustrates this: rigidity and resistance to change currently evident in the higher echelons of Zimbabwe’s [The government] is fighting a Third government, but, equally important, it may ‘Chimurenga’. This new ‘war’ is a struggle contribute to a more realistic assessment of to achieve economic justice for the black possible models for transition. Change has, majority. The Second Chimurenga war in and of itself, become anathema to Harare’s was fought to liberate the country from ruling elite, a social evil that must be opposed the yoke of white minority rule. This at all costs. While it is expected as normal armed struggle resulted in the political political behaviour that an elite should attempt emancipation of the black majority, but to control the pace and the nature of political not economic emancipation as after change, the degree to which President Mugabe 1980 a tiny white settler community and his cabinet have directed the political continued to dominate the agricultural process goes beyond the simple perpetuation and commercial economy. In particular, a of ZANU–PF’s regime. small number of whites still owned a huge proportion of the most fertile farmland, with the black majority being relegated to The security dilemma of Zimbabwe’s poor quality land. This gross social and elite economic injustice could not be allowed to continue. Thus when the landless people The process of regime change in Africa, as ‘spontaneously‘ invaded white farmland in most of the world, has typically occurred to register their protest against this gross during periods that are characterised by injustice, Government then felt compelled political and/or economic crisis. While the to act. It thus embarked upon its fast track general expectation is that peaceful, negotiated resettlement programme. The new political regime change will result in more inclusive party, the Movement for Democratic (and, many would hope, more democratic) Change (MDC), was formed as a front political systems, the reality is that political for the whites to resist the moves towards change rarely occurs in a linear manner.19 the redistribution of the economic assets However, what prompts authoritarian of Zimbabwe. Britain and other European regimes to liberalise, to become more powers are sponsoring the MDC because democratic, to accept political competition? they wanted to protect the property rights Traditional political scholarship has often of whites and are vigorously opposed put forward expected-utility theories, and to the expropriation of white-owned in particular used rational-choice models of farmland. These Governments are also decision-making as the conceptual framework waging a vicious propaganda campaign most suitable to explain political behaviour. In this sense, as Nicholson points out, “actors against Zimbabwe. The Government was behave in circumstances of risk as if they were justified in taking all necessary measures maximising the expected value of some defined to prevent the MDC and its Western concept of utility”.20 Applied to Zimbabwe, allies from denying the black majority this would mean that the use of violence or the economic justice they cried out for. It other means of coercion would cease when was perfectly justifiable to use necessary the cost of coercion is estimated as being force to overcome resistance to the higher than the benefits of liberalisation.21 transformation of the economy in favour Yet, even when faced with economic collapse, of the black majority to achieve economic a deteriorating humanitarian situation and justice. After all, the colonial regime had the increasing likelihood of social unrest, violently dispossessed the black majority Zimbabwe’s ruling elite continues to view of their land and had brutally suppressed the use of violence as an acceptable means of them for many decades.22 Essay 83 The implications of universal in the cases of Augusto Pinochet and Charles jurisdiction for the elite Taylor, which are discussed below. According to the developing international legal position Zimbabwe has historically been characterised on crimes against humanity (including other by a culture of impunity that allows those gross human rights violations such as torture), in power to use it without restraint. This has no immunity can be granted for such crimes, continued from colonial times, through the there is no statute of limitations, and any state Smith regime, the Gukurahundi massacres in can try offenders in terms of international Matabeleland and Midlands in the 1980s, to law. the more recent wave of organised violence and torture, particularly since April 2000.23 It has been argued that the impartial application Article 27 of the Rome Statute reads: of justice will convey the message to present Irrelevance of official capacity and future generations that perpetrators of politically motivated acts of torture and assault 1 This Statute shall apply equally to will be held accountable and punished. Such all persons without any distinction a message could presage an end to the cycles based on official capacity. In particular, of political repression and violence that have official capacity as a Head of State or afflicted Zimbabwe for decades.24 Government, a member of a Government Very few countries have constitutional or parliament, an elected representative provisions that allow for the prosecution or a government official shall in no of sitting presidents. Furthermore, the case exempt a person from criminal international norm has tended to protect responsibility under this Statute, nor a head of state and, in certain instances, shall it, in and of itself, constitute a government officials, giving them immunity ground for reduction of sentence. from prosecution while in office. The modern 2 Immunities or special procedural trend seems to run contrary to this, especially rules which may attach to the official when the state takes the dual principles of capacity of a person, whether under accountability and transparency seriously. national or international law, shall There is also the possibility that a head of not bar the Court from exercising its state may face two kinds of prosecution. jurisdiction over such a person. While an agreement may be made to grant amnesty to perpetrators of gross human rights Crimes against humanity violations (notably Mugabe himself) in order The concept of crimes against humanity is well to smooth the political transition and act in established in international law, even though the spirit of reconciliation, national amnesties it is rarely enforced in practice. From the 1946 do not protect individuals from international Nuremberg trials onwards, the definition has prosecution. Charges can be brought either by been expanded and formalised in a number of other states, using the principle of universal international instruments. These include the jurisdiction, or by the recently established UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights International Criminal Court. This prospect, (1948); Common Article 3 of the Geneva in and of itself, has contributed to a heightened Convention (1949); the UN Convention on sense of vulnerability in Harare’s inner circles. the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime Undoubtedly this has been the reason for of Genocide (1951); the UN International their increasingly inflexible attitude towards Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966); negotiation with the MDC. the UN Convention Against Torture and Other The now internationally accepted trend Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or to hold heads of state and other government Punishment (1984); and finally, Article 7 officials accountable for their actions after their of the Rome Statute of the International term in office has ended has been most evident Criminal Court (1998). 84 African Security Review 14(3) • 2005 According to the Rome Statute, crimes is universal, they cannot run.27 against humanity are inferred when any of But even when hiding in foreign countries, the following acts, carried out in peacetime, tyrants and torturers can be assured of safety are “committed as part of a widespread or only while their host governments remain in systematic attack directed against any civilian power. A pragmatic reason that international population, with knowledge of the attack”:25 law provides for universal jurisdiction is to ensure that there is no safe haven for those • murder; responsible for the most serious crimes. • extermination; Article 27 of the Statute of the International • enslavement; Criminal Court states that no government • deportation or forcible transfer of official, elected or otherwise, shall be immune population; • imprisonment or other severe deprivation or exempt from “criminal responsibility under 28 of physical liberty in violation of this Statute”. Furthermore, article 29 stipulates fundamental rules of international law; that “the crimes within the jurisdiction of • torture; the court shall not be subject to any statute 29 • rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, of limitation”. While Zimbabwe has not forced pregnancy, enforced sterilisation, ratified the statute and is therefore not bound or any other form of sexual violence of by it, ratification by a future government in comparable gravity; Zimbabwe or jurisdiction granted through a • persecution against any identifiable UN Security Council resolution could mean group or collectivity on political, racial, that those responsible for directing, inflicting national, ethnic, cultural, religious, or condoning torture and like crimes might well gender as defined in paragraph 3, or other find themselves before a court. Alternatively grounds that are universally recognised as the perpetrators will have to spend the rest of impermissible under international law; their lives under threat of prosecution. • enforced disappearance of persons; The Pinochet case established, as a historic • the crime of apartheid; and precedent, that former heads of state and • other inhumane acts of a similar character their officials are no longer immune from intentionally causing great suffering, or international prosecution for crimes against serious injury to body or to mental or humanity committed while in power.30 The physical health. most striking feature of the Pinochet case was that under the rule of universal jurisdiction a Spanish judge had the authority to order Universal jurisdiction Pinochet’s arrest for crimes committed mostly Normally, jurisdiction over a crime depends in Chile, and mostly against Chileans. In terms on a link, usually territorial, between the of universal jurisdiction, every state has an prosecuting state and the crime itself. But, as interest in bringing to justice the perpetrators one leading jurist said, “in the case of crimes of particular crimes of international concern, against humanity that link may be found in the no matter where they were committed, and simple fact that we are all human beings”26. To regardless of the nationality of the perpetrators quote the words of Geoffrey Robertson, QC: or their victims. This is primarily because, in international law, the perpetrators become The concept of universal jurisdiction for hostis humanis generis, or ‘enemies of all crimes against humanity is the solution mankind’.31 that international law offers to the In the last ten years there have been spectacle of impunity for tyrants and remarkable developments in international torturers who cover themselves with justice, particularly in the application of domestic immunities and amnesties and international, conventional and customary pardons. They can still hide, but in a laws regarding genocide, war crimes and crimes world where jurisdiction over their crimes against humanity. The latter include torture Essay 85 and other crimes committed against civilians In Zimbabwe, negotiators or would-be as part of a widespread or systematic process negotiators are faced with the added pressure introduced by a state or government. The that a transition is urgently required to bring following events are particularly significant in the country out of its political and economic the international human rights regime: quagmire. Yet, is it possible to grant exemption when there are strong prima facie grounds for • the establishment in quick succession charging the Mugabe regime with gross human of international criminal tribunals rights violations? These have involved “the for the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, concerted conduct of many and [are] liable East Timor and Sierra Leone and the to involve the complicity of the officials of subsequent stream of indictments, trials the state in which they occur, if not of the and convictions under these tribunals;32 state itself”.33 How is it possible to bring the • the arrest of General Pinochet in regime to the negotiating table without making 1998 under the principle of universal concessions that compromise justice? On the jurisdiction; and other hand, how can those managing the • the establishment of the International negotiations prevent justice itself from holding Criminal Court in April 2002. Zimbabwe’s political change to ransom? Is it simply a matter of a clash between principle The indictment in June 2003 of Charles Taylor and expediency?34 Another consideration is for war crimes by a Sierra Leonean court and that, while political pragmatism may lead the subsequent request for his extradition those who will negotiate Zimbabwe’s political from Ghana are not good omens for President future to reach an internal compromise by Mugabe and several of his senior officials. granting amnesty and immunity to members of the regime, there can be no guarantees that crimes committed by them will not be Justice versus political expediency? prosecuted outside the borders of Zimbabwe. One solution to the problems of balancing As a result of the above, a dilemma arises, the principle of justice against that of political particularly for authoritarian and undemocratic expediency is to separate the issues of transition political cabals confronted with the possibility and accountability. For Zimbabwe, the current of change. This centres on whether they economic and political crisis requires solution should reach an accommodation with without delay. This does not and should not opposition forces when there can be no mean that investigations should not take guarantee of immunity from prosecution. In place, or that crimes against humanity should Zimbabwe, the spectre of the prosecution not be examined. While there should never of ZANU–PF’s most prominent members be a trade-off between addressing the regime’s for gross human rights abuses has created a history of gross human rights violations and feeling of insecurity in their minds, particularly finding a political and economic solution President Mugabe’s. To a certain extent this to the country’s crisis, actions to redress may help to explain the unwillingness of the human rights violations should wait until political elite to share power, contemplate the transition has been negotiated. At this the possibility of a government of unity and stage, accountability should not be made a national reconciliation, or negotiate a peaceful matter for negotiation, but be left to the (as change. This phenomenon is referred to in yet hypothetical) new democratic regime to this article as “the insecurity dilemma of the decide. elite”. If progress is to be made in moving Transitions of the kind Zimbabwe is Zimbabwe on from its current stalemate, facing present negotiators with the problem negotiations will have to take place between the of balancing the need for justice for the two main political parties. To most observers, victims with the needs of the perpetrators for a negotiated settlement between these parties amnesty and/or immunity from prosecution. offers the best way forward. According to a 86 African Security Review 14(3) • 2005 report by the International Crisis Group, “the that only some players will benefit. In such overwhelming priority must be to get talks situations political decisions will be made started in order to avert a further meltdown on the basis of trade-offs between competing in Zimbabwe”.34 Indeed, negotiations would interests. appear to be the only way out of the impasse. It is argued that the situation in Zimbabwe Moreover, recent conciliatory comments by is not just a zero sum game, but also one in President Mugabe seem to indicate that he which the gains of Mugabe’s Zezuru faction may be ready for talks with the MDC, whose and their allies (to be discussed in greater leaders he referred to as “fellow sons of the detail below) must be matched by the losses soil”.35 to their intra- and inter-party rivals in order However, the possibility of successful to address their security dilemma, resulting negotiations is being jeopardised by in a ‘Zezuru sum game’. In this context the factionalism within the ruling party. The net change in total gains by society and many internal divisions within ZANU–PF are related key political actors is zero. Instead, political to the unresolved questions of presidential and economic gains are just shifted from one succession and the leadership of the party after political group to another. Mugabe’s term expires. These stand in the way of any progress towards talks. Until these internal issues are addressed, the likelihood The Zezuru sum game of the party’s accepting real change through negotiation is, at best, slim. Therefore, if the Even though ZANU–PF emerged from the leaders of ZANU–PF are truly concerned 2005 elections with a two-thirds majority in about extricating their country from its present the legislature, this party is still far from feeling decline, they must act to resolve the leadership secure. Internal faction fighting has opened question swiftly. up serious cleavages within it that are based mainly on ethno-linguistic considerations. This became apparent in December 2004 at Zezuru sum game, or zero sum game? the ZANU–PF congress, in what has been dubbed ‘the night of the long knives’, when The parliamentary poll, far from providing a predominantly Zezuru faction, led by a an all-encompassing solution to Zimbabwe’s prominent party figure, Solomon Mujuru, multifaceted crisis, has simply emphasised put pressure on the party to elect a woman the unconstructive nature of this country’s (Joyce Mujuru) as one of Mugabe’s two vice- adversarial and typically intolerant political presidents. This move was intended to block culture. The two main political parties have the candidacy of his party rival, Emmerson emerged on the other side of the electoral Mnangagwa, for the same position.38 tunnel more unstable than they were when Acting on behalf of Mnangagwa, Jonathan they first entered the electoral contest. Moyo, formerly the party’s information Unfortunately there still seems to be no minister, supported by six other leading obvious solution. party officials, led a campaign to prevent the Using games theory, we learn that “a appointment of Joyce Mujuru. At a meeting situation in which the winning of some players in Tsholotsho Moyo’s group and younger must equal the losses of the other is described members of the party framed what became as a ‘zero sum game’.36 In a zero-sum game known as the Tsholotsho Declaration. This “the total benefit to all players in the game, for expressed their implied criticism of Mugabe’s every combination of strategies always adds choice by demanding that a younger candidate up to zero”.37 Within a political context, zero replace Vice-President Msika.39 Observers were sum games are mentioned when it is believed of the opinion that the Tsholotsho meeting that resources are limited and every decision was nothing less than an attempted palace will produce both winners and losers, that is, coup, which, if successful, would mean that all Essay 87 positions in the presidium would be filled by citizens are unlikely to benefit from it. Emmerson Mnangagwa or his supporters. (The A notable illustration of the Zezuru sum Karanga faction, led by Mnangagwa, have game being played by Mugabe is the deliberate long “felt that it is their tribe’s ‘time to eat’, allocation of key positions in government and since the Zezurus have since independence the ruling party to members of this faction. controlled most of the national cake”.40 Most It can be assumed that the rationale has been of the prominent members of Mugabe’s inner to create an unchallengeable position for the circle and of his allies, the Mujuru faction, Zezuru faction. It will also bring it a step closer hail from the Zezuru sub-group, while the to acquiring absolute control of the ruling more populous Karanga ethno-linguistic party and all the other important institutions group, led by Mnangagwa’s faction, has been of the state (the executive, the legislature, the marginalised.) In fact, the Zezuru Mujuru judiciary and all the security agencies). The faction has consolidated its advantage over Zezuru sum game can therefore be seen as the Mnangagwa camp by forging alliances a move by Mugabe and his close associates with influential Ndebele politicians such as the within this faction to address their security current parliamentary speaker and ZANU-PF dilemma by gaining total dominance. Placing chairman, John Nkomo. trusted faction members in strategic positions The campaign against corruption launched would provide protection from political rivals by the Mugabe government must also be seen and from the threat of prosecution in the as a political move against certain factions future. This would also enable them to manage in his own party. Most of those who have the pace of political transformation and avert been implicated in corruption scandals have any unforeseen transfer of authority. In other indirect links with Mnangagwa. They include words, a situation has been engineered in terms three directors tied to ZANU–PF companies, of which the Zezuru and its allied factions at Dipak Padya, Jayant Joshi and Manharlal the core of the government and ZANU–PF Joshi, who have fled to the UK.41 In August will ultimately decide who gets what, when 2004, the government seized a mining empire and how. The danger is that the dominance of owned by Mutumwa Mawere, a businessman the Zezuru in government and in the ruling who built his empire on Mnangagwa’s party may exacerbate inter-ethnic tensions, political patronage. It should also be noted as various other factions (which are also that Solomon Mujuru is a key member of the sometimes aligned along ethnic affiliations) committee probing ZANU–PF companies. challenge the dominance of the Zezuru claque. The marginalisation of other factions in Such struggles for power within the party may the ruling party has opened the way to a further hamper efforts to find a negotiated post-election realignment within ZANU–PF, solution to the crisis in Zimbabwe. which has seen the balance of power shifting On a more positive note, and developing further in favour of the Zezuru faction. This an argument diametrically opposed to that has occurred at a time that the fortunes of given above, some analysts have speculated the political opposition in Zimbabwe have that ZANU–PF’s parliamentary majority declined. The result has been that this elite cabal and the Zezuru faction’s dominance will has acquired almost hegemonic dominance of allow President Mugabe and his party to Zimbabwe’s political economy, which is why overcome their insecurity. ZANU–PF now has the author describes governance in Zimbabwe a sufficient majority in parliament to amend as a ‘Zezuru sum game’. This term indicates the the constitution without hindrance from the dominance of the Zezuru faction in a political opposition. (The MDC opposed amendments environment that lacks political force, either to the constitution after they entered the within or outside ZANU–PF, that can act as a legislature after the 2000 parliamentary counter-balance. The most negative feature of elections.) Observers anticipate that when this situation is that, given the general political parliament reconvenes on 9 June 2005, the and economic environment in Zimbabwe, its ruling party will amend the constitution to 88 African Security Review 14(3) • 2005 create a senate and possibly a new post (of of the Zezuru faction at intra-party level and executive prime minister), which will allow the dominance of ZANU–PF in parliament at Mugabe to retire to a largely ceremonial inter-party level as a platform from which to presidency and serve out his term, which strike a favourable deal with the opposition. expires in 2008, in this role. The idea of ZANU–PF could extend an olive branch his reverting to a largely symbolic role has to the MDC, thereby proving that it too is long been mooted, even in discussions with capable of reconciliation. In this way, the the MDC. This, and the appointment of ruling party could mollify its critics under the an executive prime minister to handle the rubric of ‘the national interest’, though what important affairs of government would open an effect such a move would have on the MDC’s avenue that would accommodate a continuing future as a political party is moot.43 role for Mugabe as ‘Father of the Nation’ while It is almost a given that Mugabe, being permitting shifts in policy that would respond the astute politician that he is, would have to some of the most pressing concerns of calculated that a settlement between a re- the international community.42 This would committed and united leadership with a provide the sort of security guarantees that two-thirds majority and a greatly weakened would allow the ageing president to make a opposition party would result in some sort of graceful exit from the political scene in 2008. power-sharing. Such a solution could have the Some observers have pointed out that even added effect of addressing the government’s if Mugabe has no intention of giving up his perceived lack of political legitimacy, which power to an executive prime minister, pressure in turn would allow the president to present from powerful members of his faction such as a more acceptable face to both the region Solomon Mujuru may force him to comply. and the international community. Again, this Even more important, the alleviation of would open up the possibility of re-engaging its insecurity dilemma in this fashion would with the West and applying for badly needed result in the ruling party’s becoming more overseas development assistance from Western- confident about engaging in a robust dialogue controlled institutions such as the World Bank with the opposition on the way forward for and International Monetary Fund (IMF). Zimbabwe. Previously, talks between the two main political parties failed because ZANU– PF wanted to enter them from a dominant The zero sum game position, and because the party’s leaders were too preoccupied with internal power struggles The Zezuru sum game may yet turn into a zero to be focus in any meaningful way on inter- sum game, as the president and ZANU–PF party dialogue. have not yet extended the olive branch to Returning to an earlier point, it is the the MDC. The anticipated rapprochement opinion of a number of analysts that President between Zimbabwe’s main parties might have Mugabe and ZANU–PF were unwilling to been indicated by an invitation to senior make the sort of concessions that the MDC members of the MDC to take up positions were calling for if the two parties entered into in the cabinet, and the creation of some sort talks from an almost equal footing. It is also of power-sharing arrangement. This has not generally agreed that the political context occurred. Another sign of conciliation would following the 2002 presidential elections placed have been indicated by an announcement that both parties on such a level. It can therefore be formal talks with the MDC were imminent, assumed that at that time Mugabe and his but this has not happened either. Instead we party officials did not have any guarantee of have seen a triumphant president and ruling continued security in the event of a negotiated party who have used the commemoration of transition, whereas the situation in 2005 is Zimbabwe’s independence to thumb their very different. Speculations are that Mugabe noses at the opposition and the international might use the newly consolidated position community. Essay 89 Even worse, the MDC has announced rights abuse from the previous administration, that it is cutting all links with the South came to power on a platform that promised to African government (whose representatives uphold democratic principles. However, most have acted as would-be interlocutors or media- political observers would agree that Zambia tors between the two parties), claiming that the has not lived up to these undertakings in the South Africans were not honest brokers. This last decade, even if a progressive path towards has created a situation that further reduces the democratic transition has been laid down. The possibility of a regionally led initiative to solve reason appears to be that political liberalisa- the crisis. tion in Zambia came about as the product However, all is not yet lost. This situation of domestic and international pressure for may open up the possibility of an internally political reform. Yet the internal political envi- driven solution. The appointment of John ronment lacked truly committed leaders and Nkomo as the new Speaker of Parliament is political parties with either the vision or the seen by some analysts as an indication that capability to carry out the necessary political President Mugabe may be considering creat- and economic restructuring. The flawed elec- ing an executive prime ministerial position tions held in 1996 had contradictory implica- that could be filled by the moderate Nkomo. tions for democracy: they undercut consensus, Speaking at the opening of parliament, Nkomo reinforced apathy in voters, and raised con- demonstrated his awareness of the dire state of cerns about the abuses committed by elected the country when he said, “This is the most leaders. These developments seem to confirm difficult period in Zimbabwe’s history.”44 He that Zambia is a conventional example of a went on to underline the need for national country where a period of political liberalisa- unity, and above all for parliament to “focus tion has been followed by a narrowing rather on the economy and development.”45 than an opening up of political options. Zimbabwe should learn from the experi- ences of countries that have gone though Lessons to be learnt from Zambia’s a process of political transition. The argu- political transition ment here is not that any particular foreign experiment will be particularly applicable to In many situations of transition, like that in Zimbabwe, but that the Zimbabwe could Zambia in the early 1990s, the opening up of profit from an analysis of the successes and political space is supposed to empower the mistakes of other countries. At the same time masses by removing the monopoly of political negotiators hoping to craft Zimbabwe’s transi- power hitherto enjoyed only by the elite. In tion will have to develop models that address Zambia the primary motivation for change was the insecurities of the elite while ensuring the introduction of political pluralism to what justice for those who have been wronged. The had previously a one-party state. The change two need not be mutually exclusive. The onus to a multi-party political system was seen as is on negotiators, interlocutors and policymak- the most important indicator of sustainable ers to come up with more creative models of political change that would be based on the transition that will make progress possible. rule of law and respect for human rights. Zambia was heralded as a model for democracy after the peaceful transfer of power Avoiding a transition that is flawed in November 1991, when the Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD) and its leader, First and foremost, Zimbabwe’s political Frederick Chiluba, gained a landslide vic- transition must succeed. It should be centred tory over President Kenneth Kaunda and his on the creation of a more viable democratic United National Independence Party (UNIP). political system through the introduction and The MMD government, which inherited weak successful implementation of political reforms. state institutions and a history of human Many analysts have argued that reconciliation 90 African Security Review 14(3) • 2005 and national unity should be the means people on the ground. To accomplish that, through which a country stabilises its political any form of transitional process adopted in situation. The central vehicle through which Zimbabwe must break down the structural this could be achieved would be a government barriers preventing the economic and political of unity and national reconciliation (GUNR), participation of ordinary citizens. The most comprising members of ZANU–PF and vital issues that must be addressed to resolve the MDC. The logic behind this form of the country’s ills must therefore go beyond government is that equitable participation will a discussion of power sharing. Any process diminish the risk of conflict and improve the initiated to solve the multi-layered national prospects for national stability, integration crisis should include a participatory and and development, because it is assumed that a comprehensive review of the constitution and major source of instability is the exclusion of of the country’s electoral laws and institutions. prominent political players from the structures These reviews should involve the full and processes of governance. participation of civil society, political parties, This position does not take into account the business community and faith-based other dynamics such as ideological differences organisations, and their recommendations and the easing of inter-party relations. should include provision for a comprehensive Zimbabwe has had several experiences of and equitable redistribution of resources. coalition governments that were intended to Afterwards preparations for fresh national bring about national unity. These include: elections should begin, and a truth, justice and reconciliation body that interrogates • the 1978 Muzorewa/Smith Zimbabwe– Zimbabwe’s past and present injustices should Rhodesia coalition; be established. • the 1980 independence government; and • the 1987 ZANU/PF–ZAPU unity government. Conclusion The shared feature of these three examples is that they followed periods of severe conflict, The current dilemma facing the Zimbabwean and were thus aimed at buying peace at any cost. elite has arisen out of uncertainty and fear All three ultimately failed to meet the objectives of prosecution. This group’s need to secure they espoused. The 1978 arrangement faltered itself and the state against change has worked because it was state- and not people-driven, and both ways. It has, attempted to preserve itself was therefore unable to address the concerns by excluding alternative political and social of the majority of Zimbabwe’s population. influences but it has created a protective iron The 1980 government did not address some cage that imprisons its members. of the key structural issues that had led to The dangers faced by the political elite in the liberation struggle (including the land Zimbabwe can be expressed in another way. question and the economic marginalisation As Ayoob puts it: “[I]n most Third World of the black majority). The 1987 coalition states there are competing forces of author- simply integrated the ‘vanquished’ into the ity, usually weaker than the state in terms of ruling party without in any way attending to coercive capacity, but equal or stronger in the causes of the conflict between ZANU and terms of legitimacy.”46 This greater credibility ZAPU. of political forces outside government leads to These examples are instructive in that they greater domestic insecurity for the ruler, creat- demonstrate the dangers and limitations of a ing “vulnerabilities that threaten to, or have parochially-defined government of national [the] potential to, bring down or significantly unity. Fundamentally, all of these shared weaken state structure, both territorial and arrangements were unable to build durable institutional[,] and regimes”.47 One implica- peace, because for unity to become a reality tion of this theory is that transitional times it must grow from the bottom up: from the in authoritarian states such as Zimbabwe are Essay 91 especially difficult for the governing regime, cratic deficits preclude a free and fair election.” as they become exposed to domestic chal- The MDC claimed that it would have won lenges. If this is true, then one can expect that 90 seats if the election had been conducted correctly. See Zimbabwe parliamentary elec- in such periods as the one that Zimbabwe is tions, 2005, defeated in the referendum held in February March 2000. Human Rights Watch, Rwanda, arrested in Britain in 2000 and extra- peace to MDC, 13 April 2005. The ZANU–PF dited to face charges of crimes against human- party chairman, John Nkomo, took up the ity; and more lowly militia leaders such as the parliamentary speaker’s chair with a call on the Bosnian Serb Dusko Tadic, who was sentenced government and the opposition to co-operate in 2000 to 20 years’ imprisonment. and focus their energies on national issues. “I 33 A P Reeler, Crimes against humanity and the take over during the most challenging time of Zimbabwe transition, Pretoria, 6 May 2003. turning around the economy. We will seek to 34 ICG Africa Briefing, Decision time in consolidate efforts made to transform the insti- Zimbabwe, 8 July 2003. tution from a colonial to a modern democratic 35 As cited in C. Maroleng, “Zimbabwe’s institution.” Political analysts say the loss of Movement for Demomractic Change: Briefing influence by radicals like the former state notes’. Situation Report. Institute for Security propaganda chief, Jonathan Moyo, and the Studie. 3 May 2004. former Justice Minister, Patrick Chinamasa, 36 Ibid. to doves like Nkomo and Joyce Mujuru could 37 See, in this regard, R A McCain, Game theory: pave the way towards a negotiated political An introductory sketch - Zero-sum games, settlement between the government and the Drexel University, ESSAY SECURITY GOVERNANCE IN SOUTH AFRICA GAVIN CAWTHRA In the ten years since the establishment of South Africa’s first inclusive democratic government, an ambitious, extensive and systematic process of reform has been carried out in the governance of security. The process is widely regarded as having been successful and a model for other processes of ‘security sector reform’ in the context of transitions from authoritarian forms of governance to democratic ones. That this been achieved with hardly a shot fired in anger is a remarkable achievement and a credit to visionary political leadership as well as organisational capacity, in other words to effective security governance. At the same time, progress has been uneven and sometimes fragmentary, policy intentions and commitments have not always been translated into practice, the end results have not been to everyone’s liking, and transformation has engendered its own pathologies. Thus several challenges remain in improving security governance. This article provides a broad overview of the roles played by the various actors in the governance of the security sector, including the executive, parliament and civil society. It examines the main policy frameworks and touches on organisational transformation, because it is impossible to deal with governance in isolation from these issues. Policy processes and the frameworks they give rise to - in particular - are critical for effective governance. This article deals with the defence, safety and security and intelligence fields. A comprehensive overview would need to include the govern- ance of criminal justice and foreign policy. The article does not seek to make an overall evaluation of governance, but to identify achievements, shortfalls and challenges. National security governance during the transition to democracy as a result of a ‘pacted’ agreement between the major actors Policy – chiefly the African National Congress (ANC) A broad framework for improving national secu- and the outgoing apartheid regime – in which rity and ending civil conflict was put in place normative principles relating to human rights, GAVIN CAWTHRA is Director of the Centre for Defence Security Management at the University of Witwatersrand. 96 African Security Review 14(3) • 2005 political conduct and the ‘rules of the game’ gence, policy and foreign affairs capacities. The for the transition were agreed. These included somewhat ad hoc decision-making processes a National Peace Accord, which set out norms of the early post-apartheid period (which gave for the conduct of political parties as well as the rise to some ill-prepared actions, such as the police; joint executive control in the lead-up intervention in Lesotho in 1998) have been to the election through the establishment of replaced by a much more coordinated system a transitional government; an early agreement for national security management. that all combatants and soldiers answering Mbeki’s government has introduced a more to political parties who were involved in the integrated process for executive decision-mak- negotiations would be integrated into a single ing through ‘clustering’ various ministries into national defence force; and agreement on the cabinet committees. The two key clusters for (limited but critical) role of external actors and security governance are International Relations, the active involvement of civil society. Many Peace and Security (IRPS) and Justice, Crime of these principles were incorporated into an Prevention and Security (JCPS). The basic divi- interim constitution that received wide support. sion of labour is that the IRPS is responsible At the same time the transitional government for external security and the JCPS for internal sought to demilitarise relations with neighbour- security, although there is some overlap of ing states. membership and issues. Day-to-day manage- During the Mandela presidency, security ment of security is also carried out by the policy, including its foreign policy dimensions, Inter-Ministerial Security Committee (IMSC), was highly normative. Principles of democratic involving the relevant ministers. governance, human rights and constitutional- In addition, a National Security Council, ism dominated policy discourses in all areas, consisting of senior ministers and officials, although this was strongly inflected with the has been set up to make key decisions on overriding requirements for ‘transformation’. high-impact security issues, be they internal or Under the Mbeki presidency, realpolitik has external. However, it meets irregularly to deal become a more dominant trend in foreign as with specific crises: it is essentially a crisis man- well as domestic security policy and the empha- agement tool and is not involved in day-to-day sis has been on implementation. Promotion management or policy. of human rights and democratisation agendas None of these structures has threatened internationally have given way to a concentra- the normal processes of government or under- tion on conflict-resolution, peacekeeping, good mined the systems of accountability and (some- governance and the promotion of national times limited) transparency built into South interests. Domestically, the focus has been Africa’s democratic system. However, some on the ‘war against crime’. Transformation, concerns have been raised about the centralisa- however, has remained an overriding concern, tion of decision-making in the presidency, and democratic governance has been consolidated, these appear to have led to tensions between and none of the normative intentions have the presidency and ministerial or departmental been abandoned, even if they have sometimes functions (for example on key foreign affairs been difficult to put into practice. issues, or commitments to deploy peacekeep- Since 11 September 2001 and the resultant ing forces). ‘war against terror’, South Africa’s security poli- The ‘cluster’ system is replicated at the level cies have had to be realigned to deal with these of senior officials, promoting coordination new global realities. Government is currently on security issues, and some dedicated inter- undertaking a review of national security policy, departmental offices have been set up to further in part in response to these developments. promote coordination and enhance effective Control and oversight decision-making, such as the National Office for the Coordination of Peace Missions (NOCPM) Security decision-making has become increas- and the Counter-Intelligence Forum, which ingly centralised in the Office of the President, deals with threat analysis. which has been provided with dedicated intelli- All the security functions (including intel- Essay 97 ligence, although with some limitations) are keeping, border protection and support to the subject to normal government auditing proce- police were provided for. The paper was con- dures and to scrutiny from the Parliamentary sciously normative and principled and sought Standing Committee on Public Accounts to ensure that the defence function was gov- (SCOPA). In addition, they are subject to erned in a by-the-book democratic manner. At oversight by the human rights monitoring the same time, many of these principles were agencies set up in terms of Chapter 9 of the being debated in the Constitutional Assembly South African constitution, such as the gender and were eventually incorporated into the con- and human rights commissions. stitution. The White Paper thus remains the guiding policy framework for the DoD. With this policy framework in place, the Defence governance DoD embarked on a defence review, the aim of which was to suggest more concrete policies Policy initiatives regarding force design, budget frameworks, main armament requirements, human resource During the negotiations that preceded the policies, defence structures, and land-use and political transition, a broad set of principles environmental policies. By this stage, the relating to defence and security had been department had the capacity to run the proc- agreed by the various parties, relating in par- ess itself, but nevertheless it made a conscious ticular to democratic political control, human effort to involve parliament, other government rights issues, peaceful relations with neigh- departments, civil society and academics, and bours, professional non-partisan and properly ran a process that is possibly globally unsur- equipped security forces, and the principles passed in its transparency and consultative governing the integration of forces and the nature. One result of the broad consultations, treatment of previous human rights abuses. particularly the involvement of issue-based Some of these principles were also entrenched non-governmental organisations (NGOs), was in the interim constitution. the adoption of progressive policies on human However, it was clear that these were insuf- resource issues such as the rights of homosexu- ficient as policy guidelines for the Department als and women in the armed forces. However, of Defence (DoD) and the new minister, Joe the ‘technical’ debates around issues such as Modise, almost immediately implemented a structure, budget and armaments were domi- process to produce a White Paper on Defence. nated, as would be expected, by departmental Because of lack of capacity in the department, experts. As a result some of the civil society this was written largely by a civil society advisor organisations rejected the final product, argu- and involved a protracted consultative process, ing that it would lead to military rearma- in which parliament played a prominent role ment inconsistent with the spirit of the White (see below). Paper. The White Paper, pointedly entitled The review left out two key issues: peace- ‘Defence in a Democracy’, was adopted unani- keeping and defence industries. These were mously by parliament in 1996. Much of it was the subject of two further policy processes, taken up with elaborating principles of demo- but in both cases these were less consulta- cratic control and specifying the roles and func- tive and much more focused in nature. The tions of the various actors. It also established a White Paper on South Africa’s Participation set of principles governing the overall approach in International Peace Missions was produced of the state to security, which could be summed by the Department of Foreign Affairs in 1998 up as a human security approach domestically and sought to align South African princi- and a collaborative security approach exter- ples and practices with those of the United nally. It specified the roles and functions of the Nations. The White Paper on Defence-Related defence force – formulated in classic terms as Industries, as it came to be called, adopted a defence against external aggression, although largely non-interventionist approach to the ‘secondary roles’ such as international peace- defence industry, which had been allowed to 98 African Security Review 14(3) • 2005 wither, arguing that it should no longer be sup- been patchy. ported (or even identified) as a specific strategic Integration has been followed by demo- sector, but that government should provide bilisation to reduce the SANDF to planned some policy guidance and seek to protect and levels. In practice many former guerrillas were support important technology development. excluded because of health or age, and demo- bilisation has been poorly organised through Institutional transformation cash hand-outs and a badly executed Service Corps. Further demobilisation is required, and The new South African National Defence Force this may have consequences for social and (SANDF) formally came into being at mid- political stability. night on the day before the national elections. The SANDF has had to transform itself In reality, there was a high level of continuity from a largely conscript-based force to a mostly between the SANDF and the old apartheid full-time one and from a strategic offensive armed force, and many have argued that the posture to a defensive one. It has had to pre- process of amalgamating the seven armed for- pare itself for new roles such as international mations amounted more to the absorption of peacekeeping. It is not clear whether it has guerrilla forces into the existing defence force been able to devote sufficient attention to than integration. Perhaps this was inevitable, these challenges, given its preoccupation with given that the old defence force (including integration and affirmative action, although it the ‘homeland’ armies and civilian adminis- has developed an integrated ‘Human Resource trators) outnumbered the guerrilla forces by 2010’ programme aimed at dealing with these approximately three to one, and it was largely issues in a visionary and holistic way. incumbent on the guerrillas to accommodate themselves to a conventional army. As a result, Control, oversight and accountability the integration process was fraught with dif- ficulty and a number of mutinies took place, Executive control of defence is reasonably although it was largely accomplished without effective, although - as always in these cases violence. - much depends on the power and character The SANDF is still grappling with the of the minister, especially since the ministerial problems of transformation and there are signs staff itself is very small. As well as a minister, of ‘transformation fatigue’, even though trans- deputy ministers have been appointed. For the formation is far from complete. A key concern sake of stability an apartheid-era commander, has naturally been to address the race and gen- General George Meiring, was left in command der inequities. Substantial progress has been of the SANDF at first, and it took a political achieved at the most senior levels, through fall-out over his misuse of intelligence informa- political appointments, and at the most junior tion for him to be dismissed in 1998. Since levels, but it remains a major problem at the then the minister, deputy minister, secretary NCO and officer level, especially at the key and chief of defence have all come from the level of colonel, where almost 80 per cent of same political party and liberation movement officers are still from the old regime. Racial background. This might have led to too cosy tensions have persisted and sometimes led to a relationship; on the other hand it probably isolated acts of violence, despite a strong pro- contributes to stability. The current minister, gramme of equal opportunities and affirmative Mosiu Lekota, is also chair of the ANC. While action. this gives him considerable clout, it means that To address political transformation, a civic he has many other responsibilities. education programme has been introduced The constitution provides for a powerful to ensure that officers and soldiers under- Joint Standing Committee on Defence (JSCD) stand democratic politics, constitutionalism, (joint in the sense that it involves the National democratic civil-military relations, military Assembly and the Council of Provinces), professional obligations and international and parliament has also set up other com- humanitarian law, but its implementation has mittees for defence and security oversight. Essay 99 Because a great deal of replication took place, the major procurement initiative, the Strategic the Portfolio Committee on Defence in the Arms Package, which emerged from the National Assembly has now taken on much of Defence Review, where it was ascertained that the work of the JSCD. The committee system the SANDF needed to be almost totally re- has proved very effective, thanks in part to equipped with major weapons systems for its strong leadership, and parliament has adopted primary role of conventional defence. The a proactive and interventionist role in relation planning process for this was carried out in to crafting defence policy and legislation, and a systematic and transparent way and at the has held generals to account for performance time received wide public support, largely and the implementation of policy. because it was claimed that it would lead to job creation and massive offset benefits. Planning, budgeting and procurement It resulted in a decision, taken at cabinet level (although not without considerable initial Given that the new government inherited a dissent), to purchase, inter alia, 28 Gripen jet situation where there was in effect no ministry fighters, 24 Hawk lead-in jet trainers, four naval of defence, considerable progress has been corvettes, three submarines and 30 light utility made in establishing a functioning secretariat helicopters. capable of policy development and interpreta- However, massive cost escalations, ques- tion, planning and budgeting. Procurement, tions over the offsets and, above all, the previously the responsibility mostly of the state unravelling of many prima facie incidents of armaments manufacturer, Armscor, has also corruption and kickbacks involving some of the been transferred to the secretariat. most powerful political figures in the country Initially thought of as a civilian body have led to a media and political backlash. – and specified as such in the constitution Question marks now hang over the integrity of – the secretariat involves many military officers the whole exercise, although only a few cases and now forms part of an integrated military of corruption have been proven in court. This headquarters with the SANDF. The chief of has reignited the public debate over whether the SANDF is basically responsible for force the state is spending more than it should on preparation and operations, while the policy- defence rather than social or human security. planning-budgeting-procurement cycle is the At the same time, there is a growing perception responsibility of the secretary, who is also the among policymakers and leading military accounting officer. This arrangement, while practitioners that the policy, planning and it has served to consolidate civil control, has budgeting process emerging from the Defence been fraught with difficulties, with inexperi- Review, although technically proficient, was enced civilians struggling to win the confi- based on a fundamentally wrong assumption: dence of hardened military officers and an that the SANDF should be designed, equipped increasing bureaucratisation sitting uncomfort- and trained mainly for conventional defence. It ably alongside traditional military concepts of is pointed out that the White Paper was carried command and control. Most of the secretariat out in the ‘post-apartheid honeymoon’ period staff are involved in financial administration and misjudged the gravity of the challenges and ‘turf wars’ have regularly erupted between facing the SANDF in Africa. Many argue the secretary and the chief. that it might be time to ‘review the review’, The formal processes for planning, in particular with regard to configuring the budgeting and procurement clearly set out SANDF for what it actually does, and is likely and follow international best practice and to do: African peacekeeping, border protection require structured interactions between the and support to the police. However, since the executive, parliament, civil servants and mili- Strategic Arms Package flows from the review tary officers. A high degree of transparency and and the White Paper, a fundamental revision accountability is evident. of policy is likely to be resisted as it would However, considerable public unease and probably add further weight to those opposing allegations of sleaze have been attached to the arms deal. 100 African Security Review 14(3) • 2005 Role of civil society A policy paper dealing with many of the above issues was introduced for discussion in During the transition and immediate post-elec- 1994; at the same time new legislation was tion period a wide range of civil society organi- introduced to effect the move from a ‘force’ to a sations, the media and the public at large were ‘service’ and to institutionalise principles of com- energetically engaged in policy argument over munity policing. At this point policy capacity defence. This waned as broad consensus was within government was limited, and consider- reached through the Defence Review. It has able reliance was placed on private consultants been reinvigorated by the arms package contro- with anti-apartheid activist backgrounds. versies. At the same time, a few NGOs specialis- In 1996, in response to growing public con- ing in defence and security issues – notably the cern about crime, six government departments Institute for Security Studies and the Centre (Correctional Services, Defence, Intelligence, for Violence and Reconciliation – have grown Justice, Safety and Security, and Welfare) set up substantially in terms of their policy-research a joint policy task force, which resulted in agree- capacity. It is unclear, however, to what extent ment on a National Crime Prevention Strategy. they influence government policy. This seems has faded away in favour of a more The executive, parliament and the DoD hard-line police-driven response aimed at com- itself all went out of their way to consult with bating rather than preventing crime (see below). civil society organisations and the general public It was only in 1998 that a White Paper during the major policy development processes on Safety and Security was finalised, drafted around defence. In part, this was occasioned mainly by the Safety and Security Secretariat by an acknowledged lack of expertise, and civil (see below) and based on extensive public society was seen as being able to plug some of and political consultations, which included (as the gaps. But the principal reason was the per- ceived need to legitimise the defence function, with the Defence Review) provincial and par- which had been associated with repression and liamentary public hearings. The White Paper apartheid. Since then, it is notable that the level focused on four issues: law enforcement, social of consultation with civil society has declined crime prevention, institutional reform, and – although this may be a reflection of wider the enhancement of policing at provincial and governance trends and increased institutional local levels. The White Paper sought to move capacity within government. beyond the issues of control and community policing that had been the focus hitherto to concentrate on crime prevention and improv- Safety and security governance ing police effectiveness. This policy shift has become even more Policy initiatives evident in recent years. Issues of accountabil- The principal policy concerns in relation to ity, democratic governance and human rights, policing during the transition period and although still upheld, seem have become less immediately afterwards can be summed up as important than the exigencies of the ‘war establishing political control and overseeing a against crime’ and political engagements with move from a militarised/repressive ‘force’ to opposition parties around this issue. Policy a community policing ‘service’. This entailed now revolves around the National Crime demilitarising the police; introducing less-con- Combating Strategy, leading to actions such frontational public order policing; establishing as ‘Operation Crackdown’ involving cordon- mechanisms for accountability to communities and-search operations and roadblocks, usually and for civil control and oversight; integration with assistance from the defence force. Levels and restructuring; and ending human rights of police repression and human rights abuses violations and torture. As with the defence appear to have levelled out at approximately force, transformation – understood largely as those of major US cities: while far from perfect, addressing racial and gender inequities – has this is a far cry from the situation ten years ago been a principal concern. and better than in most developing countries. Essay 101 Control, oversight and accountability served to have weakened the policy function rather than strengthen it. After the 1999 gen- The new government was naturally concerned eral elections, when crime became a political to establish firm control over the police, which football, the secretariat was increasingly seen had been at the front line of apartheid repres- as an impediment to ‘getting the job done’. sion. For this reason, it resisted decentralisation The power and influence of the secretariat proposals, instead amalgamating the eleven has subsequently declined sharply, and with it nominally separate police forces (the South some important aspects of civil oversight and African Police (SAP), the forces of the ‘inde- monitoring. The police commissioner – now pendent homelands’ and the forces of six ‘self- essentially a political appointment – and not governing homelands’, which had police forces the secretary is now seen as the main mecha- but not armies) into a single national South nism for government control. African Police Service (SAPS), which was made At provincial level, the picture is less clear, accountable to the Minister of Safety and with some provincial secretariats still playing Security. The nature of ministerial oversight an important role in monitoring policy imple- has varied according to the character of the mentation and dealing with police account- ministers, as discussed below. However, in gen- ability issues, if not in the actual formulation eral all the ministers have had other political of policy. Their powers are limited, however, as priorities that may have distracted them from they have to operate within the framework of their departmental leadership responsibilities. national policies and initiatives. However, policing is constitutionally a pro- A further level of accountability is pro- vincial responsibility, and although there is one vided through the Independent Complaints national service, policy, oversight and (with Directorate (ICD), a separately budgeted state some exceptions) operational deployment are institution independent of the police, which carried out at provincial level. Members of was specifically set up to investigate and deter the Executive Committee (MECs) for Safety human rights abuses on the basis of complaints and Security thus play an important executive submitted by the public. Most of the com- role, and provincial parliaments are actively plaints are now about service delivery, how- involved in oversight. ever. The ICD has proven to be fairly effective, A civilian Secretariat for Safety and Security although it is not clear whether the reduction was provided for in the constitution and estab- in the number of complaints relating to human lished in 1994 at national headquarters to deal rights abuses is a result of its work. with policy, budgeting and political account- While there is no ‘joint standing com- ability issues. Its functions were defined as mittee’ in parliament for safety and security, promoting democratic accountability and multi-party committees exist in both houses transparency in the service, monitoring policy and have played an active role in drawing up implementation, conducting policy-oriented legislation, and also in formulating policy, research and offering legal services, communi- monitoring compliance and discussing issues of cation, and providing advice to the minister. public concern. The extent to which they have This system was replicated at provincial level. actively exercised their powers has depended The Safety and Security Secretariat has to a large extent on the strength of the leading been much less successful than the Defence personalities involved and their relationships Secretariat, however. Reasons for this include with the minister. institutional resistance within the police serv- The Safety and Security Department carries ice, a failure to bridge the divide between out its planning, budgeting and procurement policy and operations and between civilians cycles much like any other government depart- and uniformed members, lack of knowledge ment. At the higher level, this requires active and experience of civilian members, and per- interactions between parliament, the executive sonality factors. Initially a sharp distinction was and the department, although, as noted above, made between policy (the secretariat’s responsi- the role of the secretariat has not been as effec- bility) and implementation, but this may have tive as it might have been. 102 African Security Review 14(3) • 2005 There seem to be signs of growing frustra- police station, in which community representa- tion by the political leaders at the failure of the tives are involved daily, and in a structured police to make a significant impact on crime. way provided by law, in oversight of policing As the issue has become politicised (it is one of in their area. In practice, they tend to work the main issues that opposition parties use to best in wealthy white areas, where in cases they bash the ruling party) a certain defensiveness have also been actively involved in supporting seems to have crept in, perhaps indicated most the police and garnering additional resources. clearly by an unwillingness to publish crime Implementation across the country has been statistics. patchy at best, and they have failed to get off the ground in many of the areas where they are Professionalism and institutional most needed. transformation Institutional transformation initially involved Intelligence governance the integration of eleven forces and the sub- sequent rearticulation of the service into eight Policy initiatives and institutional new provincial services. Key functions such as transformation public order policing remained under national Government moved swiftly to establish a pol- command. icy framework for intelligence, through the Unlike the SANDF, SAPS did not integrate White Paper on Intelligence of 1994, which any significant number of former guerrillas sought to place the intelligence function firmly (except into the VIP Protection Unit), but it under constitutional and democratic control. did have to incorporate the ten former ‘home- This was followed by the enactment of new leg- land’ forces. This had the effect, however, of islation reorganising the intelligence agencies, radically changing the racial demographics of defining their functions, and providing for the the force at all levels, although whites continue amalgamation of the various ‘homeland’ agen- to predominate at senior management levels. cies and the integration of around 1,000 former Police training has been systematically ANC and Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) intel- demilitarised and the police are now also ligence operatives. trained in human rights issues and the use of Military intelligence, the dominant agency non-lethal force. The extent to which this has in the dying years of apartheid, was down- been successful is debateable, as SAPS is still graded and prevented from carrying out non- under scrutiny for human rights abuses. military covert operations, while the SAPS’s intelligence function was restricted to criminal Role of civil society investigations. Two principal civilian intelli- Civil society organisations and academics gence agencies were set up, the South African played an important role in the early period Secret Service (SASS) for foreign intelligence, of post-apartheid policy formation, in part and the National Intelligence Agency (NIA) because of lack of governmental capacity. for domestic intelligence. Information gath- Their influence seems to have waned over the ered by all the agencies should be passed on last few years, even as their research capabili- to the National Intelligence Co-ordinating ties have grown (witnessed by the substantial Committee (NICOC), which analyses and research output from the ISS and the Centre interprets intelligence on behalf of the min- for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation istry, which is responsible for distributing it to (CSVR). Government now appears less willing the appropriate government structures. In addi- to engage the public on policy issues relating to tion, in November 2001 a Presidential Support safety and security, possibly because it is on the Unit (PSU) was set up to support the presi- political defensive over crime. dent on issues related to conflict and conflict The most important elements of civil soci- resolution, especially in Africa (it has been very ety oversight are community police forums, involved in the Democratic Republic of the which are meant to be established at every Congo and the Burundi peace processes). Essay 103 Four new acts were introduced in 2002 and democratic practice has been put in place. were aimed at further aligning the intelligence However, a Review Committee on agencies with democratic governance norms Classification and Declassification, consisting and other national legislation, and dealing entirely of academics was set up in 2002 and with new threats such as cyber-intelligence. was due to report before the end of 2003.[S3] Government is currently undertaking a review Public input was invited into the process and it of intelligence in the context of the National was likely to recommend that pre-1994 records Security Review, which will lead to a new (those that remain) should be audited with a White Paper on Intelligence. It is expected view to being made public and that the restric- that this will involve a considerable degree tive Protection of Information Act of 1982 of civil society participation. As with other should be replaced with a new law. policy reviews, it is likely that it will take a less idealistic view of things, concentrating on Role of civil society effectiveness and national interest. Intelligence is not an area in which civil society can be expected to be extensively involved. Control and oversight However, the intelligence ministry has recently Formerly under a deputy minister, intelligence shown greater signs of openness towards civil was upgraded to full ministerial and depart- society and academia, especially with regards mental status in President Mbeki’s government to the declassification issue and the upcoming in 2001. The minister has proved to be proac- White Paper. tive and has actively sought to increase interac- In addition, the new National Intelligence tions between the intelligence community and Academy has actively sought to recruit aca- civil society. demics to its staff and is establishing (which is A multi-party Joint Standing Committee required by law) an advisory board from civil on Intelligence has been active in carrying out society, chaired by an individual who has to go legislative, oversight and monitoring activities. through a process of public nomination. Although it meets in secret, it is required to send an annual report to parliament. Additional controls are provided by the Challenges Auditor General, and an Inspector General for Intelligence has been established with wide South Africa is often held up as an exemplar of powers of oversight, although the inability of ‘security sector reform’. Measured against the government to find an appropriate individual past, remarkable progress has been made, and to take on this role must be a cause of concern. it has generally been achieved since 1994 with An audit committee, including outsiders, has minimal violence. The security agencies have been appointed as well as a presidential budget- remained functional throughout, despite the ary advisory committee. enormous pressures of transformation and the Remarkably, there was very little public challenges of dealing with apartheid legacies. demand for intelligence functions to be opened This is not to say that transformation has to public scrutiny, as happened for example been without its stresses, or that it has been when the German Democratic Republic col- complete and effective. After all, measurement lapsed. Instead, there seems to have been a of success should not be made against a patho- high level of continuity, with files remaining logical past, but in terms of a future vision. closed or (mostly) being destroyed – no less There is not, of course, a perfect solution to the than 44 tons of government security-related multifaceted challenges of governing security documentation was shredded during the transi- in a democracy. There will always be a tension, tion. It is thus unclear to what extent a break even a contradiction, because democratic states with past covert and intrusive practices has ultimately rely on undemocratic institutions been made, even though a legislative and (which at times must carry out undemocratic administrative framework consistent with best practices) in order to protect democracy. If 104 African Security Review 14(3) • 2005 the security institutions of a state cannot be national security policy exists. Government democratic, however, they can at least be gov- has indicated that it intends to review erned in a democratic way. Even here, though, national security and intelligence policy, there are necessary limits to the principles of particularly in the context of security envi- transparency and accountability required for ronment changes since 9/11. Is it possible democratic governance that need to be care- to operationalise the normative framework fully managed. of democratic governance and human Governance, like democracy, is always as security and at the same time ensure effec- much a process as an ideal, and in any country tive day-to-day security management? evolution of structures and practices will reflect • Defence policy: With regard to defence political cultures and take idiosyncratic and policy it becoming evident that in order to context-specific turns. pay for the Strategic Arms Package other In general terms it is evident that – at least areas are being made to suffer. Is it neces- on the formal level – South Africa has con- sary to carry out a policy review to ensure sciously and fairly successfully sought to apply that an appropriate balance between vari- best democratic practices to the governance ous capabilities (conventional, peacekeep- of security. In some ways it has found more ing, etc) is achieved? Does the Strategic transparent and accountable ways of doing this Arms Package need reviewing? than exist even in established democracies. It • Safety and security policy: Within safety has also sought to take into account the spe- and security policy it is evident that there cific requirements of the transition, specifically has been a move away from normative in relation to the need to redress past inequi- concerns towards effective crime combat- ties. However, the process of transformation ing. But is there policy coherence to this? itself has engendered some organisational and Implementation: Policies are not always perhaps political fault-lines, and the focus on effectively implemented and do not neces- redressing inequities has perhaps resulted in sarily achieve their envisaged goals. Are the other pressing institutional challenges being resources available (human, capital, tech- left unaddressed. nological, organisational) or, put another way, are the policies appropriately tailored Some key issues for discussion include the fol- to the resource constraints current in lowing: South Africa (are we importing ‘first world policies’ for ‘third world conditions’)? Are • Policy overload and transformation fatigue: appropriate strategies and priorities being It is evident that an enormous number developed for policy implementation of policy changes have taken place in a through the policy-planning-budgeting short period of time, coupled with fairly frameworks? radical institutional transformations, even • Centralisation and coordination: though these are far from complete. Can Considerable progress has been made in the security institutions be expected to coordination of security policy and gov- continue to respond effectively to ongoing ernance, and the Office of the Presidency policy and transformation pressures and has been strengthened. Is this improving requirements? Are appropriate prioritisa- effectiveness? And if so, is it doing so at tion and integration of policy initiatives the possible expense of the pluralism and taking place or are institutions expected system of checks and balances essential to to do too much at the same time? Is there democratic governance? sufficient continuity of policy and insti- • Control and oversight: This study has tutional transformation or are short-term indicated that neither the defence nor political interventions holding sway? safety and security secretariats are achieving • Policy reviews: While a national security in full their objectives as provided for management system is in place, it is not in the constitution. How can this be clear whether a coherent and integrated addressed? While the parliamentary Essay 105 committees function reasonably well, posts of ANC supporters, have negative could their role be enhanced? Are they implications for governance? Could the appropriately resourced? With regard to separation of powers so key to democracy safety and security, it is also clear that be threatened, and the system of checks urgent attention needs to be given to and balances so carefully instituted through community policing and the CPFs in legislation and policy, as seen in this article, particular as a form of civil oversight. be weakened? And down to what level • One-party dominance: This carries with should political appointments be made it both positive and negative features in the civil service and, more particularly, for a developing country like South within the security institutions? Africa emerging from a conflictual past. • Leadership: As in any organisational A dominant party provides the gel that context, much depends on the character holds together state, political society, civil and quality of senior leaders. This becomes society and to some extent the private particularly important in periods of change sector, and establishes a national vision. and in contexts of organisational challenges However, could the intention of the ANC and weaknesses. Is sufficient attention to gain control over state and society in the being given to the process of developing interests of transformation, achieved in the and appointing appropriate leaders and first instance through appointments to key developing succession strategies? ESSAY WAR AND HIV PREVALENCE Evidence from Tigray, Ethiopia TADDESSE BERHE, HAGOS GEMECHU AND ALEX DE WAAL In this article we examine the hypothesis that armed conflict increases HIV prevalence, using the case study of the Ethiopian Defence Forces and the civilian population of Tigray region of Ethiopia during the Ethio-Eritrean war of 1998–2000. The study utilises data sets for HIV prevalence in the region, before, during and after the conflict. These include HIV screening conducted among the military during mobilisation and demobilisa- tion, ANC surveillance data, blood donor screening data, and voluntary counselling and testing (VCT) data. The datasets are severely limited in both quality and quantity. They do not show clear evidence of an increase in HIV prevalence associated with the war. Data from the screening of conscripts and demobilising soldiers indicate a 76% increase in HIV prevalence during the war period, but this increase does not appear to be larger than would have occurred among a similar cohort of young men in civilian life. The ante-natal clinic (ANC) and blood donor data show a decline in HIV prevalence since the end of the war. The robustness of this finding is uncertain. It can be concluded that there is no evidence of a general increase in HIV prevalence associated with the war in either civilian or military populations. There are indications of a post-conflict decline in prevalence. Better quality HIV surveillance is needed in Tigray to ascertain the trajec- tory of the HIV/AIDS epidemic in the region. Introduction1 by interesting and useful hypotheses and conjectures, but a paucity of data. The field The inter-relation between HIV/AIDS and of HIV/AIDS epidemiology in developing conflict has been a concern for policymakers countries, limited by poor data sets at the best over recent years. The debate has been marked of times, is further hindered by the difficulties in TADDESSE BERHE, HAGOS GEMECHU AND ALEX DE WAAL are retired Brigadier-General in the Ethiopian Defence Force: Tigray Branch Secretary at the Ethiopian Red Cross Society; Director, Justice Africa, and fellow, Global Equity Initiative, Faculty of Arts and Sciences, Harvard, respectively. 108 African Security Review 14(3) • 2005 obtaining reliable data in situations of conflict institutional priorities of the army, until over- and the habitual secretiveness of armed forces taken by the immediate demands of the war. concerning sensitive information such as the HIV/AIDS programmes were continued during prevalence of HIV among their soldiers. the conflict, but could not remain such a high This article represents the results from a priority for the army command. systematic study of all sources of HIV preva- After the outbreak of war in May 1998, lence data from Tigray region, Ethiopia, before, the Ethiopian army increased its size sixfold during and after the war of 1998–2000 with to approximately 350,000 men, who were sta- neighbouring Eritrea. While these data sets are tioned along the border between the two scanty, they provide interesting clues to the countries, but chiefly in Tigray. The army was pattern and trajectory of the epidemic in the disciplined and ordered, and although indi- region. Our main conclusion is that a substan- vidual incidents of rape doubtless occurred, tial increase in the quality and quantity of data sexual violence was not a major characteristic of will be required to adequately test hypotheses the conflict. The large inflow of soldiers occa- concerning the relationship between conflict sioned an influx of commercial sex workers, and HIV/AIDS. who followed the troops. More than 316,000 The study set out to investigate whether the people were displaced by the conflict, many eruption of the Ethio-Eritrean war in 1998 had of them losing their livelihoods in the process. an impact on the prevalence of HIV among the Both countries expelled nationals of the other affected populations in Ethiopia. The authors side during the war. Casualty figures have not had access to data from civilian populations in been released, but tens of thousands of soldiers Tigray, the northernmost region of Ethiopia, are estimated to have died during combat which was the principal theatre of operations operations. In contrast to most contemporary for the war, and to data from the Ethiopian African wars, mortality among the civilian defence forces. These data were analysed to population was very low. see if it is possible to identify clear trends in Prior to the outbreak of war, Tigray had HIV prevalence over time, and according to a largely rural population, with only one sig- geographical location (for example proximity to nificant urban centre, the regional capital of the front line and military garrisons). Mekelle. Other towns were small. The total The working hypothesis that motivated the population of the region is approximately 3.8 study was that the advent of the war in 1998 million people. would witness a marked increase in HIV preva- The war was concluded in June 2000 with an lence and that this would be sustained after the Ethiopian military offensive that defeated the war ended in 2000. Furthermore, it was assumed main forces of the Eritrean army and resulted in that the main vector for increased transmis- the reoccupation of disputed territories and the sion would be unprotected sexual encounters occupation of additional areas inside Eritrea, between soldiers stationed in Tigray and com- subsequently evacuated to form a demilitarised mercial sex workers (CSWs) who congregated zone. A United Nations (UN) peacekeeping in large numbers in major garrison towns and force was dispatched to patrol the demilitarised peri-urban drinking and recreational spots near zone between the two armies. At the time of the front line, and that such increases in HIV writing, the failure of the two governments to prevalence would rapidly affect the general agree on a border demarcation has left them in civilian population. In the event, the data do a situation of no-war, no-peace, with both sides not clearly show such effects. maintaining substantial forces on the border. Starting in late 2000, Ethiopia demobilised The Ethio-Eritrean war and its impact most of the men it had mobilised in 1998/99. on Tigray Of these, approximately 64,000 demobilised veterans returned to live in Tigray in 2002. Shortly before the war, the Ethiopian defence The Ethio-Eritrean conflict was unusual in force instituted an HIV/AIDS policy that has contemporary Africa in that it was a conven- been widely admired.2 This was one of the tional war fought between two disciplined and Essay 109 mechanised armies. It was not accompanied In addition to this mass recruitment, 15,000 by significant guerrilla operations, banditry former fighters from the Ethiopian People’s or violence against civilians. Any increases in Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) and HIV prevalence associated with the war can be 30,000 militia were (re-)mobilised. They were attributed to the very large military mobilisa- not tested for HIV, so their prevalence rates are tion and the accompanying commercial sex unknown. The final group that was mobilised industry, rather than to hordes of armed men consisted of retired soldiers from the army rampaging through civilian populations. of the former government. All of this group, totalling 12,553, were tested for HIV, and a Data sources and analysis prevalence of 23 per cent seropositivity was found (a fact of interest in itself). The soldiers HIV prevalence in the Ethiopian who tested positive were not admitted to the Defence Force army and were sent home, having been told they were not physically fit for service. They The first indications of HIV prevalence at rates were not told of their HIV status. of concern in the army came from serological The overall HIV prevalence in the army in tests of inpatients at the Armed Forces General 1998/99 cannot be known accurately. However, Hospital (AFGH). Of 2,704 medical cases given that the remobilised veterans provided tested from 1996 to 1998, 1,828 (67.6 per only a minority of the total force, let us assume cent) were HIV positive. While this is not that the prevalence among the 60,000 existing indicative of the general level of infection in soldiers was 6.2 per cent and the prevalence the army, it illustrates the burden placed on the among the 290,000 recruits, new and remobi- medical services by the HIV/AIDS caseload. lised, was 2.8–3.0 per cent, giving an estimated According to unpublished data from the overall prevalence of 3.5per cent. AFGH in 1997/98 (that is, immediately before Between the end of the war (in June 2000) the war and including its first few months), and June 2001, 135,000 soldiers were demobi- deaths related to HIV constituted 60 per cent lised. Of these, 26,496 were tested in a VCT of all medical causes (excluding surgery cases programme. These consisted of recent con- hospitalised because of wounds). scripts and pre-1998 serving soldiers, approxi- A survey in the army found a prevalence of mately in proportion. The rate of HIV was 6.2 per cent in 1996.3 The details have not been 6.1 per cent, which implies an increase of 76 released, but it has been reported that rates were per cent compared with 2–3 years earlier. We higher among the officer class than the rank and should compare this with the expected increase file. At that time, the army was 60,000 strong. in HIV prevalence in a comparable cohort During mobilisation in 1999–2000, mass of young men in civilian life. Data for this mandatory screening of recruits for HIV was can be obtained from screening the conscript undertaken. A total of 71,626 recruits, young population.5 Among those tested, there was a men aged about 18-29, were tested. The rate of steep increase in prevalence from 18–19 year HIV was 7.2 per cent among the nearly 10,000 olds (urban 2.2 per cent, rural 1.5 per cent), urban recruits and 3.8 per cent among the to 20–24 year olds (9.4 and 4.4 per cent) and 62,000 rural recruits.4 Only those who tested 25–29 year olds (15.3 and 6.0 per cent). These negative were admitted to the army. Because gradients of increase are comparable with those of a shortage of testing kits, this screening among the demobilising soldiers. There is no programme was abandoned, and the additional evidence for increased HIV susceptibility as a recruits, numbering about 160,000, were not result of military service. tested. However, given that their demographic A marker of the depth of stigma is that a and geographical profile was similar to the programme of cash assistance to demobilised previous batch, we can assume that they had an soldiers living with HIV in Tigray found just HIV prevalence of about 4.3 per cent, giving 17 ready to come forward. Of the demobi- an overall prevalence among new recruits of lised soldiers, 64,144 were Tigrayans. If they 2.8 per cent. had a 6.1 per cent HIV prevalence level, it 110 African Security Review 14(3) • 2005 would imply that 3,900 were living with HIV. inflow of soldiers and contractors. Maichew is The programme offered 150 Ethiopian birr further from the front line, but is located on per month plus counselling for those who the main supply route. After the war, a fourth wished to participate. Given that most soldiers ANC sentinel site was established at Abi Adi, a resumed life as unskilled labourers, earning small town in central Tigray zone, not close to perhaps 10 birr per day, a supplement of 150 the front line and not on any major road. Table birr per month represents a significant increase 1 shows data from these four sites. in income. This makes the low turnout even The figures for 2001 are about 30–40% more remarkable. higher than the TRHB survey findings from before the war, and the 2003 figures are about ANC surveillance 30% lower. However, the methodological cave- At the outbreak of the war there were no at about the earlier survey means that we must sentinel sites for HIV surveillance in Tigray, be cautious about this comparison. making it impossible to obtain reliable popula- These data show unexpected results. In tion-based figures for HIV. Our sole data are three of four sites, the prevalence of HIV fell estimates for HIV prevalence published by after the end of the war. Tigray Regional Health Bureau (TRHB) for the These data need to be interpreted in the eastern zone of Tigray 1997/98. The figures are light of the high level of variability in HIV urban 12.4 per cent and rural 6.4 per cent. No prevalence in Ethiopia’s sentinel sites (of which documentation on the sample size or sampling there were just 17 in 2000).6 The large year-on- techniques is available within the TRHB so year fluctuations in HIV prevalence in specific these data need to be treated with caution, sites cannot be an accurate representation and and cannot be rigorously compared with other must result from sampling bias or rapid shifts surveillance data. in population in the small towns. These find- In 2001 three sentinel surveillance sites were ings indicate the need for a more representative established at antenatal clinics in the regional and comprehensive surveillance programme in capital, Mekele, and the towns of Adigrat and Ethiopia. However, the drop in HIV prevalence Maichew. These three towns all lie on the main between 2001 and 2003 is replicated in blood north-south highway, which until the war bank screening data. This gives us confidence served as the main road connecting Ethiopia in supposing that the ANC figures indicate a and Eritrea. These locational factors are all real decrease in the group tested. clear risk factors for HIV prevalence. During the war, one of the major front lines was locat- It is possible that the Abi Adi data show the ed north of the town of Adigrat, which served beginning of the hypothesised demobilisation as a major supply centre. Soldiers from the effect, namely an increase in positive tests front line visited temporary villages set up by among soldiers demobilised after the war hoteliers and bar-keepers outside the town, and and their partners. Almost one third of the also came to the town for rest and recreation. demobilising veterans in Tigray in 2001/02 During the conflict the town swelled from its were from the central zone, which includes pre-war population of 44,000 to about 120,000. Abi Adi. Such conclusions must be extremely The city of Mekele was also swollen by an tentative, however. Table 1 ANC surveillance data from Tigray Mekelle Maichew Adigrat Abi Adi No HIV % No HIV % No HIV % No HIV % 01 400 72 18.0 349 58 16.6 396 65 16.4 0 02 400 67 16.7 0 0 299 24 8.0 03 429 40 9.3 258 17 6.5 351 27 7.6 208 20 9.6 Essay 111 Blood donor screening would have increased during the war years and remained high afterwards. What these data An additional source of data on HIV preva- show is no significant increase during the war, lence is the screening of blood donations. but a significant drop afterwards. Most donations of blood are from close rela- The data need to be interpreted with refer- tives of individuals hospitalised for medical ence to the ages, genders and occupations of emergencies or surgery, who require transfu- the blood donors, and whether they were vol- sions (‘replacement’ donors). There is a clear untary donors (responding to public appeals) gender bias in blood donors (more than 90% or relatives of a person in hospital, providing are male), but their occupational breakdown is matched replacement blood. If we split our broadly indicative of the general population. time series data into three periods, namely pre- While there are problems with taking such war, war, and post-war, we can see some impor- blood donors as representative of the general tant shifts in these key characteristics. (male) population, the trends in HIV preva- This additional information might help lence in donated blood, subject to caveats relat- to explain why the HIV rate failed to rise in ing to the changing profile of blood donors, 1998/99. In 1999, a major call for blood from can provide us with evidence for trends in HIV civilians led to large numbers of civil servants prevalence. providing voluntary donations. It is possible In line with the ANC surveillance data, this that self-selection among volunteer donors led shows a counter-intuitive set of results. Our those who had reason to suspect that they initial hypothesis was that the HIV prevalence were at higher risk to decide not to give blood. Table 2 Mekelle regional blood bank screening data Year Number HIV + % HIV + 1993 381 26 6.8 1994 425 50 11.8 1995 451 36 8.0 1996 359 28 7.8 1997 342 26 7.6 1998 437 32 7.3 1993-1998 8.3 1999 1 261 104 8.2 2000 529 57 10.8 1999-2000 9.0 2001 428 9 2.1 2002 605 22 3.6 2003 559 20 3.6 2001-2003 3.2 Table 3 Origins of blood donations (%) Voluntary Replacement M F Pre-war 17.7 82.3 95.2 4.7 War 90.6 90.6 96.3 3.7 Post-war 10.9 89.1 99.9 0.1 112 African Security Review 14(3) • 2005 Table 4 Occupations of blood donors Day Unem- Civil House- Bar- Army Student Trader Farmer Driver labour- ploy- Servant wife lady er ment Pre-war 1.7 11.4 20.9 4.6 0.9 1.2 9.3 4.4 35.3 10.3 War 52.3 6.4 11.7 2.4 0 0 1.2 0.3 20.2 5.3 Post-war 6.6 7.6 17.1 6.1 0.6 0 8.3 1.5 51.4 0.9 Note that the proportion of soldiers donating scenario, the major risks to the general popula- blood at the civilian hospital fell during the tion would arise when demobilised soldiers war. Subsequently, the profile of blood donors returned home after the end of the war. reverted to approximately the pre-war pattern (with a marked drop in ‘unemployed’ donors). VCT data Another possible explanation for the constant/ Prevalence data from VCT screening cannot falling HIV rate is that the blood donors were be taken as a basis for ascertaining prevalence overwhelmingly male civilians. If we assume levels in the general population. For our purpos- that the main new transmission vortex associat- es, however, VCT data possess the important ed with the war was between soldiers and CSWs, advantage that they are available for an array and in addition that the majority of the at-risk of sites and time periods. On the assumption CSWs were patronised exclusively by soldiers, that the socio-economic profile of individuals then the risk factors for civilian males in Tigray coming forward for VCT is not substantially would not necessarily have risen during the different across place and time, differences in conflict and its immediate aftermath. Moreover, HIV rates may provide clues to variations and if increased HIV transmission during the war changes in HIV prevalence in the general popu- were largely confined to this soldier-CSW link, lation. and most of the CSWs left the region after the The longest time series data for VCT is from end of the war, the male population would have the town of Adigrat. This is of particular inter- remained shielded from this risk factor. In this est because Adigrat was close to the front line, Table 5 VCT data, Adigrat Hospital Year Number HIV + % HIV + 1992/93 11 6 54.6 1993/94 40 30 75.0 1994/95 83 59 71.1 1995/96 193 146 75.6 1996/97 240 149 62.1 1997/98 199 84 42.2 1993-1998 61.9 1998/99 439 242 55.0 1999/2000 255 150 58.8 1999-2000 56.5 2000/01 172 105 61.1 2001/02 374 205 54.8 2002/03 191 55 29.0 2001-2003 49.5 Essay 113 serving as the rear base for rest and recreation by Conclusions soldiers, and because its population expanded almost threefold during the war, including an This investigation has demonstrated the influx of displaced people. difficulty of reaching clear conclusions about The data from 1998/99 could be read either HIV prevalence in a region that has poor way. The increase (approximately doubling) of data sources. The ANC sentinel surveillance the numbers of people being tested positive data show an encouraging trend of declining might be an indication of an increasing preva- prevalence, but this must be interpreted with lence. Or, the similar proportion of positive extreme caution in the light of the small sample tests could be said to indicate an unchang- sizes and the high year-on-year variability of ing prevalence. The most recent data point Ethiopian surveillance statistics. The blood (2002/03) would seem to confirm the declining bank screening data have lower variance than trend manifest in other datasets. However, as a the ANC data for the period up to 2000, and single data point, it is far too weak a basis for also show a comparable level of prevalence reaching conclusions. among the (almost entirely male) sample. The Data from the overall VCT statistics of the VCT data are highly variable and, more than TRHB show an encouraging increase in the any other, are prone to shifts associated with the uptake of VCT services, especially among men, changing composition of the population coming and no clear shifts in the pattern of infection forward for testing. The most comprehensive over the time period 2000–2003. and reliable data are from the military screening Data sets from VCT are also available from programmes, which indicate that the war other hospitals in the region. The number of period witnessed a significant increase in HIV individuals coming forward for VCT varied prevalence among conscripts. However, this hugely by site and by year, from 27 to 1,180. increase is comparable to that expected among The numbers of individuals testing positive are a cohort of young men in civilian life. considerably lower than the Adigrat data and do The main conclusion from these data sets not show clear trends. is that more data are needed. The number of It is striking that VCT centres in these other surveillance sites in Tigray needs to be increased towns had much lower rates of seropositivity and the consistency of testing methods needs than Adigrat. Given that the social and eco- to be established. Only with substantially better nomic profile of individuals coming forward data will it be possible to come to clear conclu- for testing is likely to be similar in the various sions about the trajectory of the HIV/AIDS towns, this is prima facie evidence for consid- epidemic in Tigray, in war and in peacetime. erably higher rates of HIV in Adigrat, before, An important finding of the data sets is the during and after the war. modest evidence that HIV prevalence among Table 6 TRHB VCT data 2000 2003 Age Age VCT screened Tested HIV + VCT screened Tested HIV % + Group Group M F Total M F Total % + M F Total M F Total % + >14 141 214 355 4 25 29 8.2 >14 19 56 75 4 3 7 9.3 15-19 254 315 569 25 31 56 9.8 15-19 492 822 1 314 9 35 44 3.4 20-39 570 332 902 82 59 141 15.6 20-39 2 882 1 206 4 088 376 245 621 15.0 40+ 103 66 169 15 9 24 14.2 40+ 331 66 397 81 21 102 26.0 Total 1 068 927 1 995 126 124 250 12.5 Total 3 724 2 150 5 874 470 304 774 13.0 % 53.5 46.5 100 50.4 49.6 100 % 63.4 36.6 100 60.7 39.3 100 114 African Security Review 14(3) • 2005 Table 7 VCT data from other hospitals: % HIV positive Year Shire Axum Maichew Adigrat 2000/01 16.0 61.1 2001/02 16.2 8.8 54.8 2002/03 12.3 14.4 10.7 29.0 2003/04 8.0 15.3 soldiers and civilians in Tigray appears to have on Tigray during the war, including an increase risen during the war. This is a case of ‘the dog in the number of CSWs and a change in the that did not bark’. Everything that is known patterns of commercial sex work, a growing about the epidemiology of HIV/AIDS would problem of orphans and street children, and point to a much heightened risk of HIV trans- the near-complete closure of trade routes with mission during the Ethio-Eritrean war, associ- Eritrea, will have an impact on the future of ated particularly with the convergence of a very the region. In this context it is important to large army and an influx of CSWs. Whether underline that the Ethio-Eritrean war was not this is a genuine finding, or whether the sam- typical of recent conflicts in Africa, in that it was pling methodologies failed to capture the at-risk a conventional war fought between disciplined groups, cannot be clearly identified. armies, and did not witness social disintegration An intriguing finding is that HIV prevalence and widespread sexual violence. Generalising appears to have fallen after the war. As stated, from this experience to other conflicts in Africa this finding needs to be treated with caution. should be undertaken with caution. However, because the ANC surveillance data and the blood bank screening data show the Notes same trend, this may be a real phenomenon and not a methodological artefact. The most plausible interpretation of this 1 This article was written with the support of the trend – if indeed it is real – is that after the end Justice Africa Governance and AIDS Initiative, whose assistance is gratefully acknowledged. Alex of the war, the highest-risk population dispersed de Waal assisted with analysis and editing. The from the towns in Tigray. Two high-risk groups, authors wish to thank Lieutenant General Tsadkan namely CSWs and displaced people, would Gebretensae and Stephen Jensen for useful com- have had reason to leave the towns. Following ments. the demobilisation of much of the army, CSWs 2 Tsadkan Gebre Tensae, HIV/AIDS in the Ethiopian may have moved elsewhere. After the army’s Military: Perceptions, strategies and impacts, unpub- lished paper, 2002. reoccupation of areas that had formerly been 3 Tsadkan Gebre-Tensae, op cit. the locus of fighting or had been occupied by 4 Yigeremu Abebe, Ab Schaap, Girmatchew Mamo, the Eritrean army, displaced people would have Asheber Negussie, Birke Darimo, Dawit Wolday and been able to return home. Eduard J Sanders, HIV prevalence in 72,000 urban The most significant impact of the Ethio- and rural army recruits, Ethiopia, AIDS 17(12), Eritrean war on HIV/AIDS in Tigray is proba- 2003, pp 1835-1840. 5 Abebe et al, op cit, p 1838. bly the indirect and long-term effect of changing 6 UNAIDS, Epidemiological fact sheets on HIV/ the social and economic situation of the region. AIDS and sexually-transmitted infections: Ethiopia, The social and economic disruptions visited 2002 update, pp 2,5. COMMENTARY ZIMBABWE: GOVERNANCE THROUGH MILITARY OPERATIONS MARTIN RUPIYA ZIMBABWE: BEYOND THE DEMOCRATIC IMPASSE CHERYL HENDRICKS AID, GLENEAGLES AND THE RUN-UP TO THE MILLENNIUM + 5 SUMMIT PRINCE MASHELE AND JAKKIE CILLIERS COMMENTARY ZIMBABWE: GOVERNANCE THROUGH MILITARY OPERATIONS MARTIN RUPIYA The military-style Operation Murambatsvina age-old trade in human flesh survived the efforts (Restore Order), which was launched on 19 May of the operation. 2005 to curb urban-based ‘informal trade and set- Relying on military-style operations as a tool tlement’, confirms a characteristic that continues to respond to civil society and governance issues to severely undermine Zimbabwe’s democratic has its obvious advantages for policymakers. governance. However, this message appears to However, it has severe limitations for policy- be lost on the government because, even after makers and citizens alike. This commentary Murambatsvina drew widespread international will briefly highlight elements of militarism and condemnation, the state established another military operations that make the tool unsuitable operation – Operation Garikai/Hlalani Kuhle for use as a governance instrument by elected – on 9 July 2005. Current evidence has shown officials in a democracy. colonels of regiments trying to again take the Universally, a military-style operation is a lead in motivating local government councils short and blunt instrument that prioritises a to embark upon the construction of housing higher goal at the expense of local tactical units to meet an apparently impossible deadline sensibilities. Furthermore, a military operation is – 2,000 units in 40 days. subject to orders issued by its own hierarchy and In the short history of independent Zimbabwe therefore responds exclusively to this internal since 1980, operations that have failed to provide chain of command. A distinct language, posture, lasting solutions to socio-economic and political expectation and methodology of operation are difficulties include Operation Ghukurahundi associated with a military operation. A military and Operation Chinyavada. Operation operation adheres to strict timelines or limits: Ghukurahundi concerned the near-civil-war in it has a clear start and completion period, Matabeleland in 1981–1986, whose effect was sometimes worked out to hours and minutes. to perpetrate atrocities, decimating an estimated A military operation implies the participation 20,000 lives - an event that has since elicited of armed elements whose actions are normally an apology from the presidency. Meanwhile, exempt from normal laws and by-laws. A Operation Chinyavada, which was launched military operation also views those who impede in 1983 and was intended to rid the capital, its implementation or progress as ‘enemies’ and Harare, of its prostitutes, also proved disastrous. therefore are to be summarily dealt with in order Horrendous human rights abuses were com- to achieve the set objective(s). Finally, resort to a mitted as hundreds of (mainly black) women military operation signifies the failure of ‘normal’ were unceremoniously hauled off the streets methods and the collapse of preventative to prisons and detention centres. However, the diplomacy options, therefore it may be argued result was almost inevitable in that the wily and that it represents an instrument of last resort. In MARTHA RUPIYA is a Senior Researcher at the Institute for Security Studies. 118 African Security Review 14(3) • 2005 addition, a military operation is a high-energy in line with all military operations, which exploit and expensive tool that produces concentrated the element of surprise. impact as well as highly visible evidence. However, to meet the requirements of the However, it is generally unsuitable for sustained civil governance charter, during the destruction a and long-term deployment, during which there is 30-day notice appeared in the national daily news- a rapid deterioration of its utility. Resorting to a paper, The Herald, on 24 May, as required by the military operation probably provides satisfaction Regional Town and Country Planning Act of 1976 only for those leading the process. (Chapter 29:12); the Housing Standards Control To summarise, a military operation functions Act of 1972 (Chapter 29:08) and the Urban according to distinct policy and decision-making Councils Act (Chapter 29:15) of 1995, requiring processes. During its execution a military opera- an immediate stop to the illegal activities. The tion is immune from outside interference, except order was legally effective only from 20 June. that communicated through its command struc- However, even after this date continued transgres- ture. Once launched, it strives to complete its sions would require local government officials to given task within the shortest possible time approach the courts for remedial action. and perceives and treats any impediments as This example provides an important lesson hostile. Finally, when the operation is complete, about a civil style of governance as opposed to a participants are immune from legal challenge(s), military approach. except through its political leadership and civil- The impact of the operation was shattering. ian administrative structures. Within a week, according to the ‘Report of the A military operation is therefore blunt, indis- Fact-Finding Mission to Zimbabwe to Assess the criminate, and self-contained, is almost insulated Scope and Impact of Operation Murambatsvina’ from normal responsibility, and delivers invidi- by the UN Special Envoy on Human Settlements ous results. This makes it unsuitable for employ- Issues in Zimbabwe, Mrs Anna Kajumulo ment as a civil and democratic governance Tibaijuka, which was undertaken between 26 tool. The impact of Operation Murambatsvina June and 8 July 2005, Murambatsvina had spread substantiates this. to “more than 52 sites … with practically no area In retrospect, it is clear that Zimbabwean gov- designated as ‘urban’ being spared”. This had a ernment circles believed that economic recovery devastating effect on poor areas in the cities and was being undermined and the ongoing political towns of Harare, Bulawayo, Chinhoyi, Gweru, crisis was being exacerbated by activities in the Kadoma, Kwe-Kwe, Marondera, Mutare, Rusape informal sector, and largely in urban settlements. and Victoria Falls. At a conservative estimate The state, through the governor of the Reserve 700,000 people were left homeless. If one added Bank, Dr Gideon Gono, in his ‘Post election and dependants, 2.4 million people are thought to drought mitigation monetary policy statement’, have been adversely affected. Bulldozers, pro- intimated that “markets, flea markets, other tected by armed police and army units, smashed, informal market premises and ‘illegal’ housing burned and razed structures that had housed structures were undermining the economy”. This poor urban dwellers. This was happening in a statement was issued on 17 May 2005. The fol- country that is experiencing serious drought (a lowing day, the government-appointed City of fact admitted in a Reserve Bank policy state- Harare commissioner, Ms Sekesai Makwavarara, ment), a development that had already reduced announced that the government intended to nearly four million peasants to joining food “enforce local government by-laws and elimi- handout queues. nate all forms of illegal activity” and that strong Governance through military operations action would be taken by 20 June. such as Operation Gukurahundi, Chinyavada, Based on these official policy announce- Murambatsvina and now Garikai/Hlalani Kuhle ments, Operation Murambatsvina had a defined has consistently resulted in human abuses and objective – the elimination of informal settle- brief but spectacular gains, followed by endur- ments operating as trade, market or settlement ing anger, denials and eventually abject apolo- structures. gies. The time may have come for Zimbabwe On 19 May 2005, the day after the official to confine its governance methodologies to announcements, the blitz was launched, catch- exclude the militarised alternative as part of its ing many citizens completely unprepared. This is wider political stabilisation. COMMENTARY ZIMBABWE: BEYOND THE DEMOCRATIC IMPASSE CHERYL HENDRICKS Few countries in Africa attract sustained ment and are incorporated into their policy international media coverage without the frameworks. One of the major moves in the presence of a civil war. Countries beyond discourse on peace and security is the adop- the Limpopo rarely attract close scrutiny by tion of a human security perspective. This the South African citizenry either, and their implies a fundamental shift from focus solely policies and practices seldom evoke domestic on the security of the state to the security outbursts or mobilisation. Zimbabwe, since and/or wellbeing of its citizens. This ideological its 2000 general elections, has achieved alteration results from the changed nature of this feat. Unfortunately, this particularity is conflict from inter-state to intra-state, conflict derived from many of the factors that led generators being located in the policies and to the disintegration of other post-colonial practices of governments, citizens being the African states. The Zimbabwean government’s victims of conflict and domestic conflicts hav- resistance to democratisation, its reassertion of ing geographically widespread effects. However, a narrow African nationalism, the government’s although the new paradigm is human security, repressive tactics, and the country’s economic until now practices by states and multilateral decline have catapulted it into that category of institutions have been essentially state-cen- states whose names are always followed by the tric. This is clearly evidenced in the Southern word ‘crisis’. But the inability of the opposition African Development Community (SADC), movement to oust the ruling party through particularly in relation to Zimbabwe. elections and a host of ineffective bilateral and The SADC Protocol on Politics, Defence and multilateral state and civil society interventions Security Cooperation reaffirms the “principle of have prolonged the crisis. There is general strict respect for sovereignty, sovereign equality, familiarity with (even if there is no consensus territorial integrity, political independence, on) the historical and contemporary factors good neighbourlinees, interdependence, non- that produced the stalemate so there is little aggression and non-interference in internal added value in reproducing them here. Instead, affairs of other States”, though it also enables this commentary will focus on the need for an the organ to ”seek to resolve any significant alternative strategy in order to move beyond inter-state conflict between State Parties or Zimbabwe’s democratic impasse. between a State Party and non-State Party”. Peace and security are recognised by Africa’s The principle of sovereignty has often been continental and sub-regional organisations as a stumbling block for outside intervention key to socio-political and economic develop- because most African states assert this right CHERYL HENDRICKS is Head of the Southern African Human Security Programme at the Institute for Security Studies. 120 African Security Review 14(3) • 2005 when accused of breach of norms and standards a strong admiration for, and indebtedness of good governance. The principle is there to, a person and country largely perceived as primarily to protect governments, not citizens. simply having gone astray. Zimbabwe, before The ‘significant inter-state conflict’ clause the arrival of post-apartheid South Africa, was conditioning intervention was a step in the a key player in SADC (the organisation was right direction, but the strategies employed formed 25 years ago when Zimbabwe received to give effect to this clause, especially in its independence). It was charged with sectoral Zimbabwe, have yielded few positive results. responsibility for peace and security prior to Zimbabwe has been on the SADC agenda SADC’s restructuring. Zimbabwe’s decision since 2001. The main forms of intervention to to send troops to the Congo in 1998 - against resolve the multi-faceted crisis in the country the wishes of the South African government have largely been limited to persuasion and but with the backing of Namibia and Angola mediation. South Africa, employing a strategy - signalled a rift in SADC, as the old and of ‘quiet diplomacy,’ has been a key interlocu- new powerhouses struggled to set the regional tor in attempts to bring ZANU-PF and the agenda. Sensitivity to this history and tensions MDC to the negotiating table. Negotiations within SADC limit the organisational approach were to centre on the modalities for a gov- to ‘lowest common denominator’ interventions ernment of national unity. South Africa has in Zimbabwe. experienced many frustrations in executing this The Zimbabwean crisis cannot be reduced task as ZANU–PF refused to talk to the MDC. to that of an undemocratic government. The The ruling party’s position on negotiations unresolved national question (continued land became more dogmatic after it secured vic- ownership inequalities) played a major role in tory in the 2005 general elections. In response, the form of state practices that ensued, admit- South Africa recently backtracked on trying tedly only forcefully engaged when ZANU-PF to facilitate negotiations. Deputy Minister of felt the pressure of opposition politics. The Foreign Affairs Aziz Pahad stated that ”we are state justified its actions through a discourse negotiating in the broad context that we need that reached to the heart of the quest for lib- fundamental economic changes and how we eration in the region, namely anti-imperialism, minimize the political tensions of Zimbabwe racism, and land alienation. Regional support without necessarily talking about Government for change created the difficulties in forming of National Unity”. Meanwhile the African a common platform against the human rights Union has intervened, appointing President abuses that were transpiring and reaching an Joachim Chissano of Mozambique as mediator agreement on the necessary forms of interven- between the major political actors in Zimbabwe. tion. Although the credibility and experience of the Although the MDC showed great potential mediator are always important in negotiations, in 2000 and 2002, it has been weakened by introducing this change alone is unlikely to be repression and its own organisational deficien- more productive, as this is not the source of cies. Its inability to gain sufficient support in the main hindrances to moving the process for- the 2005 elections confirmed this. The MDC ward. The dismissal by ZANU-PF of President has largely been reduced to a barking dog with Chissano’s overtures is indicative of this. no bite, making it harder to pressurise ZANU- This tiptoeing round the Zimbabwean gov- PF into negotiating with it. ernment can be traced to the role it has played South Africa’s approach to Zimbabwe of in SADC, to common perceptions on issues of ‘quiet diplomacy’ has generated impatience in race and land, to the perceived lack of a cred- MDC cadres and civil society organisations ible alternative, and to insufficient agreement in the region. They wanted a more forceful on the type of intervention that is needed. Post- engagement, for instance sanctions to secure colonial Zimbabwe, with President Mugabe at President Mugabe’s departure, which were pos- the helm, was a steadfast supporter of libera- ited as non-negotiable. Both these approaches tion movements in the region and had to bear were concerned primarily with changing the untold costs for this loyalty. There is therefore composition of the power base in the belief Commentary 121 that this would create stability and develop- to effect this change. Zimbabweans are not only ment. In the interim, Zimbabwe’s citizens the office-bearers of ZANU-PF and the MDC. bore the brunt of the power struggle, forced to Strategies aimed at effecting change must there- choose between living in poverty or becoming fore be broad based. part of the growing African diaspora. The recent move away from emphasising a Democratisation and reconciliation at the government of national unity to concentrating level of the state are key for peace and security. on rescuing the Zimbabwean economy is pru- However, these processes often take years to dent. Optimal functioning of SADC is condi- yield results. A human security perspective does tioned by the strength of its member economies. not negate these processes. It complements The Zimbabwean economy declined from the them with interventions at lower levels and second largest in the region to sixth or seventh assistance to the victims of power struggles. place.6 This slide has wider regional implica- Far too much emphasis was placed on getting tions for peace and security. Arguments that the MDC and ZANU-PF to negotiate, to the assert that helping to re-build the Zimbabwean exclusion of dialogue, reconciliation and devel- economy only sustains the current power hold- opment at other levels of governance. ers are shortsighted. A strong economy is a Re-building Zimbabwe requires far more necessary condition for democratic consolida- than elite pacting. It involves building the tion and fits into the advocated human security institutions and the capacity that sustain perspective. SADC must make a greater effort democratisation and avoiding the slippery to implement its human security policy frame- slope between democracy and autocracy so work and draw on the resources in the region common in the ‘virtual democracies’5 on the for this. Here, too, non-state institutions can African continent. If there is general agree- play an effective complementary role to state ment that the Zimbabweans themselves must processes. When states, multilateral organisa- resolve the Zimbabwean crisis, then the onus tions and civil society work together to ensure is on the regional community to ensure that the security of all in the region, the democratic Zimbabweans have the environment and tools impasse in Zimbabwe will be ended. COMMENTARY AID, GLENEAGLES AND THE RUN-UP TO THE MILLENNIUM + 5 SUMMIT PRINCE MASHELE AND JAKKIE CILLIERS The Millennium + 5 Summit of the United Africa, potentially the major beneficiary Nations General Assembly to be held from 14 of these developments, has never seen such to 16 September in New York will be a mile- momentum towards poverty alleviation and stone for the UN and will also determine the restructuring of the global system to its benefit. legacy of Kofi Annan. The reforms approved at The transformation of the African Union (AU), that meeting are set to determine the relevance the New Partnership for African Development of an organisation that is struggling to define a (NEPAD) and the report of the Commission for role for itself in the post-Cold War period and Africa leading to the G8 Summit in Gleneagles after 11 September. In the developed world, have all added to the momentum. The impasse where the United States has led a concerted in Europe that followed the rejection by French campaign to tarnish Kofi Annan’s reputation, and Dutch voters of the European Union (EU) this is also about the history books, and amidst constitution and the assumption by the United a sea of hostility and hatred directed at him, Kingdom of both the presidency of the EU Kofi Annan is set on leaving a legacy no less and leadership of the G8 have even placed EU than a reformed international system. And key agricultural subsidy reform within the grasp of to that vision is helping Africa. rational debate. While the willingness by Tony A tremendous number of studies, Blair to trade the UK budget rebate for reform preparations and paper have been consumed of the EU budget may have French farmers up in this process. Critical among these are the in arms, reform of EU agricultural subsidies are report by Jeffrey Sachs that assessed progress critical for Africa if it is to have any prospect of towards the attainment of the Millennium trading its way out of poverty. Without changes Development Goals (MDGs), the Cardozo to EU subsidies, changes to US subsidies and report, which looked at the role of civil those of other countries will not happen. society in the UN system, and the High Level As is well known, progress towards the Panel report on threats and challenges, which achievement of the MDGs in this part of the dealt with new security challenges for the world has fallen far short of Africa’s hopes and international community. Building on these of the promises of the Millennium Summit in recommendations the UN Secretary-General 2000. The world is talking a lot about ending submitted a synthesis report earlier this year, poverty, but it has taken a tremendous amount ‘In larger freedom’, which summarised the key of pressure to make key leaders respond to recommendations to restore the credibility and the commitments they made five years earlier. relevance of the UN. Africans have an unlikely hero to thank in the PRINCE MASHELE AND JAKKIE CILLIERS are senior researcher and executive director respectively at the Institute for Security Studies. 124 African Security Review 14(3) • 2005 process. Pop star Bob Geldof is succinct in his to the havoc wrought by other diseases such view when he urges politicians that the cam- as malaria and tuberculosis. Against this back- paign to “make poverty history rightly focuses ground Jeffrey Sachs notes that: “We have seen on aid, trade and debt relief because these are people preserving their spirit, integrity, com- the things that we can contribute. But without mitment, and hope for the future even when peace and stability, good governance and eco- they have little else.” nomic development we are not going to be able While ‘In larger freedom’ captures many to achieve that goal.” For this reason the recent of the things that Africa should do for itself, announcement by the G8 that they would can- the international aid system is in as much need cel the debt of 18 poor countries (14 of which of reform as anything else. A recent report by are in Africa) is welcome as a first meaningful ActionAid International focused attention on and positive step. what many aid recipients know, but dare not Africa has literally fallen off the global speak of too loudly - that the world’s richest economy and needs a serious hand-up through nations greatly exaggerate the amount they debt relief and development assistance if inter- spend on aid to poor countries and that most national trade reform is to succeed. Africa is of it - between 60 per cent and 90 per cent - is not looking for handouts - it is looking for lost to waste, internal recycling within donor help in nurturing the human capital, physical countries, misdirection, and high fees for con- infrastructure and governmental capacity that sultants. are indispensable to development. In the proc- The ActionAid report ‘Real aid’ calls for ess, the battle to keep Africa’s leaders to their going beyond the hype and reforming the promises of good governance and peace and official aid system to decrease the propor- stability is going to be a difficult one. tion of ‘phantom aid’. This can be done, the It is particularly true that Africa needs report says, only if the funds given as ‘aid’ are to do more itself. Many African leaders are recognised as obligations to fulfil basic human good at talking the talk, but when it comes rights rather than as charity, and if there is real to walking the walk there is often little practi- mutual accountability rather than one-sided cal commitment to the fine rhetoric used to conditionality. While perhaps itself resorting impress the developed world. Hence Ethiopian to hyperbole, the report does demonstrate the president Meles Zenawi, a key member of the extent to which the official aid figures exagger- Commission for Africa, has yet to undertake ate rich countries’ generosity. It claims that: the most basic reform to attract foreign direct investment in a country where government • In 2003, real aid was only $27 billion, or policy - such as a ban on foreign private own- just 0.1 per cent of the donor countries’ ership of land and stifling bureaucracy - lie at combined national income, as against a UN the heart of much of that country’s poverty. target of 0.7 per cent of their gross national There are many other examples of the failure of income for developed countries - the over- African leadership beyond the unwillingness to seas development assistance targets for 2015 confront the excesses in Zimbabwe. recently set again by the Organisation of Some of the statistics make for sobering Economic Cooperation and Development reading. In Africa, the number of people living (OECD) and signatories to the Monterrey on less than US$1 a day rose from 227 million Consensus. in 1990 to 313 million in 2001. More than 160 • Almost 90 per cent of the contributions million people on the continent live in slums of the US and France - two of the world’s and have no access to basic services such as largest aid donors - are what ActionAid calls healthcare, clean running water, sanitation, ‘phantom aid’. electricity and so on. The scourge of HIV/ • The G7 countries (excluding Russia whose AIDS is hitting this continent hardest. About economy is the size of Switzerland’s) are 25 million Africans were estimated to be living the worst performers when it comes to real with HIV/AIDS in 2003. Three quarters of the aid. On average, the world’s seven larg- world’s AIDS deaths occur in Africa. This adds est economies give just 0.07 per cent of Commentary 125 national income in real aid. In other words, • In nominal dollars, of the $1.365 billion they would have to increase real aid tenfold overall increase, $728.9 million, or 53 per to reach the UN target of 0.7 per cent. cent, consists of emergency food aid rather than overseas development assistance that The gulf between the Scandinavian countries contributes to sustainable development. and the rest is awesome. In real aid terms, for The remainder of the increase consists example, the Norwegians are 40 times more primarily of funding for President Bush’s generous per person than the Americans and HIV/AIDS initiative as well as emergency four times more generous than the average and post-conflict assistance to Liberia and Briton. Sudan. In preparation for the inevitable hammer- • Actual development assistance, excluding ing that it could expect from concerned civil food aid and security assistance, increased society, the US administration embarked on only 33 per cent from FY 2000 to FY 2004 a frantic media campaign to highlight its role in real dollar terms, or 43 per cent in nomi- as ‘Africa’s greatest friend’ in the run-up to the nal dollars. In nominal dollars, less than Gleneagles meeting. The purpose of the flood $450 million of the increased foreign aid to of statements in the days before the meeting in Africa is official development assistance. Scotland was to challenge “too much emphasis • Official development assistance to Africa on the level of spending and too little on the (aid programmes directed at sustainable need by Africans to implement democratic development) increased by 43 per cent from and economic reforms”, as argued by Secretary FY 2000 to FY 2004. of the Treasury John Snow in remarks to the • The only programmes that existed in FY Council on Foreign Relations in New York 2000 and had more than doubled by FY on 28 June 2005. Snow referred to increased 2004 were foreign military financing, which development assistance for Africa as ‘vitally increased by 109 per cent, and emergency important’ and peddled the near tripling of US food aid, which increased by 159 per cent. assistance to sub-Saharan Africa, accounting While particularly low when compared with for nearly a quarter of all official aid for the the levels of assistance that the US directs at region. countries such as Afghanistan and Iraq, Fortress Hence the importance of the almost simul- America is ramping up assistance to Africa, if taneous report released by the Brookings more modestly than the Bush administration Institution in Washington with the title: ‘US may claim. But America’s total worldwide foreign assistance to Africa: Claims vs reality’. spending on all forms of foreign aid still At most, the report shows, US official assistance amounts to a stingy 0.16 per cent of its gross increased by 56% from fiscal year (FY) 2000 to national income, placing it near the bottom FY 2004 – effectively debunking Snow’s (and for developed countries. The Brookings report President George Bush’s) repeated claims to found that: have ‘tripled’ aid to sub-Saharan Africa. To his • From FY 2000 to FY 2005 (estimated), US credit, Bush has been more attentive to the aid to Africa will have increased by 78 per problems of Africa than his recent predecessors, cent in real dollar terms or 93 per cent but most of his aid increase consists of emer- in nominal dollars: not quite a doubling, gency food aid rather than assistance for sus- much less a tripling of aid. Of this increase, tainable development of the sort Africa needs 50 per cent consists of emergency food aid. to achieve lasting poverty reduction. Among • Actual development assistance, excluding the key findings of the Brookings reports are food aid and security assistance, will have the following: increased an estimated 74 per cent from FY 2000 to FY 2005 in real dollar terms, or 89 • In nominal dollars, the total US aid to sub- per cent in nominal dollar terms. Saharan Africa increased from $2.034 billion in FY 2000 to $3.399 billion in FY 2004. Taken together, the two reports help to separate 126 African Security Review 14(3) • 2005 myth from reality as the leaders of the rich Giving aid to civil society organisations means countries scramble to claim credit for signifi- that government is bypassed and similarly this cant, but modest action. As one commentator weakens any incentive to hold government has argued: “Aid is simply money. Real reform accountable. At the same time, Africa has costs votes.” fallen so far behind that there can be no real Giving money away intelligently is one of movement (allowing Africa the ability to trade the most difficult things to do and there is its way out of its current situation) without every danger that the momentum that is lead- substantive external material support - building ing to the modest increases in development some level of infrastructure, for instance, to assistance in 2005 and thereafter will soon be allow Africa to export its agricultural and natu- reversed. The challenge will inevitably be that ral resources and to add value to them with- after a relatively short period of modest ‘ramp- out incurring associated additional taxes. The ing up’ of aid levels, Washington and its allies dilemma is perhaps best illustrated in Uganda in the World Bank, the IMF and elsewhere will under President Museveni. Despite its lack of claim, if not next year then the year thereaf- multi-party democracy, Uganda has only been ter, that more aid does not work and what is able to register its major achievements in pover- required is more focus on how it is used, that ty reduction through the direct help of donors. is, a return to greater conditionality and more Sixty per cent of Uganda’s budget consists of modest levels of development assistance. overseas development assistance. At the same It is in this broader context of getting time, some would argue that these high levels off the roundabout that the UN Secretary of aid have allowed the president room to seek General’s report must be viewed - as part of an a third, unconstitutional term, to undermine effort to take a structural leap off the recurrent democracy and disregard basic human rights. cycles of modest debt relief and increases in Using their own calculations, only five development assistance on the one hand and countries from the developed world have Afro-pessimism on the other. The world has reached the 0.7 per cent GNP aid target. What been there before, witnessed by the fact that we Africa needs is not another short spurt and then are, in real terms, roughly back to the levels of a slackening off as attention shifts elsewhere. development assistance that Africa received in The reform of international development assist- the early eighties. Even after the much talked ance needs to go beyond the UK presidency about increases in development assistance, aid of the G8 and of the EU. What is needed is per capita remains below levels seen some dec- to move towards a system where there is a true ades previously. commitment to assisting the continent over the In this process, Africa and its development long term. One measure of that commitment partners (the new term for donors) are in a would be a clear resolution at the UN General bind. Aid, like massive streams of income from Assembly meeting that sets timetables for meet- natural resources, presents a structural problem ing donor commitments in real, not phantom in countries with poor governance. Free money terms. While there are many components to provides no incentive to build systems of the reform of the international system that will accountability between the governed and those determine the legacy of Kofi Annan, his con- governing - the natural product of tax regimes tribution to changes to the way in which the and local governance elsewhere. Giving aid to world views its support to Africa are perhaps governments where democracy and account- as important as the focus on the reform of the ability are weak means that government does UN Security Council that demands so much not implement activities that benefit its people. energy and paper. BOOK REVIEWS WAR AND THE NEW DISORDER 21ST CENTURY JEREMY BLACK YOU, THE PEOPLE - THE UNITED NATIONS, TRANSIONAL ADMINISTRATION AND STATE-BUILDING SIMON CHESTERMAN SECURITY SECTOR GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA: A Handbook NICOLE BALL AND KAYODE FAYEMI BOOK REVIEWS WAR AND THE NEW disorder. He sketches these developments against DISORDER the deeper background of changes in popular 21ST CENTURY Western thinking about the role and possible shape of future wars. Some of this thinking JEREMY BLACK had been conditioned by the implausibility of Continuum, New York, 2004 waging interstate wars in circumstances where nuclear Armageddon would be a logical out- come. Economic and social advances in the richer countries of the world had also led to changes in popular consciousness in which the claims of the state to compel its citizens to do military service under dangerous cir- cumstances were regarded with suspicion and even revulsion. This led to the comforting but premature assumption that conflict situations could in future be shaped to suit Western tech- nological solutions. In addition, there was a chain of thought that held that since the US now possessed an overwhelming preponderance of military power, based on its economic and techno- logical hegemony, it was foolish to consider security in terms of the lessons of the major wars experienced in Europe and the Far East in the 20th century. Such thoughts came to be encapsulated in what became known as the revolution in military affairs (RMA), which This excellent little book manages in its 180 added the dimension of information warfare pages to raise a variety of disquieting questions to the range of military capabilities in which about some of the West’s assumptions (often the USA was deemed unchallengeable. unconsciously held) about the nature of the Black believes that the emphasis on post-Cold War ‘peace’ and the type of military American pre-eminence is misplaced, not preparedness required to preserve it. because he thinks that its technological supe- Black argues that the end of the Cold War riority can be challenged in the foreseeable led to attempts to redefine an international future, but because he doubts the wisdom of order in which superpower conflict and the treating the leading military power as a para- ultimate threat of mutual nuclear annihila- digm force. Instead he sees the USA as essen- tion were replaced only briefly by concerns tially atypical, and its assumed dominance for a human security more broadly defined as based on Americo-Eurocentric preconcep- and guaranteed by multinational policing. tions, which take the Western state as the norm Such musings were interrupted by the events and focus on technological triumphalism. of 11 September 2001, which re-aroused If nothing else, he argues, the events in American militarism in the face of what sud- post-intervention Iraq and Afghanistan should denly appeared to be poorly controlled global have given us pause for deeper thought. In 130 African Security Review 14(3) • 2005 short, has the obsession with Western types of untrammelled cultural, political and economic warfare led us to overlook the global diversity influence masquerading as globalisation. of conflicts? ‘Smart’ weapons and technologi- From here he speculates on the future cal advances in military systems, he claims, shape of conflict and the means with which it have failed to incorporate the multiple con- will be waged, emphasising the shortcomings texts of war, and especially the idea of what of a narrowly technological approach. ‘victory’ might mean in such circumstances The author is only too aware that so bold and from varying perspectives. and broad a study, a series of linked essays, Even the building blocks of what was once occasionally will leave the specialist reader described as the international order are no uncomfortable about certain generalisations. longer as sturdy as they once seemed. Not But he is right to question the neat only has there been an increase in domestic categorisations and classifications that have conflict, but the state’s loss of the monopoly tended to lock thinking into an inflexibility of lethal force has had a remarkable effect on that scarcely does justice to the fluid reality of the conduct of foreign relations. Black goes international, and military, affairs. on to analyse the difficulty of maintaining If ever there was a book by this prolific systems of international agreement and media- historian that deserved a wide audience, this tion, and notes the irony inherent in the West’s is it. premature self-confidence that the end of the Cold War would herald a period of virtually Richard Cornwell Book reviews 131 YOU, THE PEOPLE attempted to develop the institutions of govern- The United Nations, Transional ment by temporarily assuming some, or all, of Administration and State-Building those sovereign powers – but with very different SIMON CHESTERMAN levels of success. Oxford University Press, New York, 2004 Chesterman eschews the dead-end street of many analysts who use the framework of first-, second- and third-generation peacekeeping as the lens through which to understand UN missions. His view is that unpredictable events demanded new forms of missions with practice running well ahead of theory and that this will continue to happen. For him the focus must be on the local political context within which the various operations function – that is, the core function or purpose of the peace mission rather than its technical mandate in terms of Chapter VI or VII of the UN Charter. This is akin to approaches adopted by other noted scholars such as Michael Doyle and Jarat Chopra, who have proposed categories of transitional author- ity, and indeed of peacekeeping. The first two chapters survey the brief history of transitional administrations, starting with the League of Nations and touching on colonialism and military occupation, then moving on to This excellent book by Simon Chesterman, discuss the evolution of UN Security Council executive director of the Institute for Law and practice since World War II. Chesterman Justice at New York University, School of Law, takes a refreshingly candid look at colonialism is essential reading for any serious student or and the Trusteeship System – the former now practitioner of peacekeeping, peace-building condemned as an international crime and the and current debates around post-conflict recon- latter untenable in today’s politically correct struction. The book was completed in late 2004 world – by arguing that: “An age less attuned when peacekeeping practice in Afghanistan to political sensitivities also provides a clearer- (2002–) had departed from the expansive politi- eyed assessment of the requirements of such cal functions in Kosovo (1999–) and East administration, challenging the conventional Timor (1999–2002), presenting a philosophi- wisdom that ‘ownership’ on the part of the cal challenge to the increasing aggregation of local population is essential to the process” sovereign powers exercised in United Nations (p 6). He returns to this theme in a separate (UN) peace operations since the 1990s. This chapter, arguing that contemporary transitional became known as the ‘light footprint’, in which administrations might benefit from being more, Lakhdar Brahimi sought to rely on as limited not less, ‘colonial’ at the outset of their mission. an international presence and as many Afghan Other key and forceful arguments are presented staff as possible. eloquently but similarly provocatively and with Transitional administrations represent the irrefutable logic. For example, he takes a prag- most complex operations attempted by the matic view, based on his interpretation that the UN. The missions in Kosovo and East Timor UN Security Council traditionally “provides are commonly seen as unique in the history of legal authorization only for those enforcement the UN. But they may also be seen as the latest actions that coincide with the willingness of in a series of operations that have involved the certain key states to lead a military operation” UN in ‘state-building’ activities. Here the UN (p 49). Hence his view that the reality of how 132 African Security Review 14(3) • 2005 UN peace operations happen is the reverse of with his assessment that “[h]umanitarian and prescribed theory: “[M]ember states determine development assistance remains, therefore, a what resources they are prepared to commit to voluntary and essentially ad hoc enterprise” a problem and a mandate is cobbled together (p 203) where there is astonishingly little inter- around those resource – often in the hope that est in assessing whether aid achieves what it is a political solution will be forthcoming at some intended to do. later date” (p 98). Beyond the requirement for civilian protec- Much of his argument on this issue refers tion, Chapter 4 looks at the nature of govern- to the fact that the UN Security Council had ance (provocatively entitled ‘Consultation and not explicitly authorised transitional admin- Accountability: Building Democracy Through istration-like powers in the three most com- Benevolent Autocracy’) where Chesterman plex and challenging instances, namely Congo presents his view that local ownership may (1960–1964), Somalia (1992–1995) and Sierra be the desired end state – indeed part of the Leone (1999–). exit strategy – of a transitional authority, but Chapters 3 to 7 examine five key issues that that it cannot be the means. Much of what have posed the greatest political and practi- Chesterman argues is base logic – hence it cal challenges to transitional administrations: is difficult to fault his blunt view that the peace and security, the role of the UN as international community is too reluctant to government, judicial reconstruction, economic accept that the legitimacy of a transitional reconstruction, and exit strategies. On the first, administration stems, in large part, from mili- he argues, persuasively, that the “single most tary occupation and that the emphasis is too important aim of any peace operation is to often on form (such as the technical prowess establish the conditions for sustainable security in running electionsinstead of measuring what for the civilian population” (p 112) – a task that elections are meant to achieve in themselves inevitably falls upon the military in the absence (local legitimacy and process). “More often of a readily deployable UN civilian police than not,” he argues, “elections may simply force and one that will have to be accepted be a short-term tactic that is used to encourage by military peacekeepers for years to come. actors to buy into a peace process – or they But Chesterman goes beyond the provision of are staged because they are part of an accepted protection. In an immediate post-conflict envi- template of what typically happens towards the ronment lacking a functioning law enforcement end of a peace operation” (p 206). Inevitably and judicial system, rule of law functions may the question of the proposed elections in Iraq have to be temporarily entrusted to the military. (in October 2005) and the Democratic Republic Furthermore, when it comes to the administra- of Congo (in 2006) comes to mind – although tion and enforcement of the rule of law and law Chesterman does not deal with the prospects and order, he argues that sustainability (that is, for either. local support and relevance) should generally Some themes stand out in this book. One is take precedence over its international ‘quality’. the issue of political clarity about the purpose Basically then, “… an appropriate balance of and end-state of any transitional administrative short-term measures to assert the (re-)establish- system – and realism about what is practically ment of the rule of law, and longer-term institu- achievable. A second is the responsibility that tion-building that will last beyond the life of the inevitably accrues to military peacekeepers to mission and the fickle interest of international protect civilians and provide law and order and actors” (p 182). how important this is to make an early impact. While peacemakers often speak of get- A third is the utility of elections, not as is often ting combatants to buy into a peace process, seen as an end in itself, but merely as an impor- Chesterman argues (Chapter 6) that the domi- tant step in a process where the ultimate criteria nant factor affecting how assistance is allocated of success may not be to transpose democracy and spent is the politics of the donor countries and impose international human rights stand- themselves. This is music to the ears of critics ards, but to set a country off on a different path of donor politics, who would generally agree and break a cycle of conflict. A fourth is simply Book reviews 133 that of practicality – that the judgement of a his view that local elections should precede new constitution is not in the ‘objective’ (or national elections, and his disdain of the impact Western) quality of its human and international of ‘gender-mainstreaming’ in peace operations. rights standards, but in its improvement on a Yet throughout Chesterman buttresses his argu- previous situation and the genuine ownership ments and views with a razor-sharp analysis of of new laws and institutions by an oppressed the characteristics of past and current peace mis- and abused public. It is both inaccurate and sions – reflecting a profound understanding of counter-productive, he argues, to assert that peacekeeping in all its permutations and forms. transitional administration depends upon the At a time that the US (the unaware imperial consent or ownership of local populations. “It power, in his view) is contemplating not an is inaccurate because if genuine local control insurgency, but civil war in Iraq in the run-up to were possible than a transitional administration the October elections, one cannot but conclude would not be necessary. It is counter-produc- with the logic that “[s]tate-building after a war tive because insincere claims of local ownership will always take years, perhaps decades, and it is lead to frustration and suspicion on the part disingenuous to suggest otherwise to domestic of local actors” (p 239). A final theme is the publics … Elections may prove evidence of this requirement for predictability, relevance and transformation, but they are only a small part of what is required to realize it” (p 235). local control (either by the mission or through engagement with the affected population) of This is a gem of a book. relief and reconstruction funds. This being said, some of Chesterman’s prescrip- Jakkie Cilliers tions may themselves be too dirigiste, such as 134 African Security Review 14(3) • 2005 sustainable human security. The human security SECURITY SECTOR paradigm makes development and security two GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA: sides of the same coin. Within this paradigm, A Handbook ,2004 how should the security sector be governed to NICOLE BALL AND KAYODE FAYEMI ensure appropriate, adequate, accountable and affordable security services that will contribute to human security and development? This question is of particular importance in Africa, where the need for human security and sustainable development is paramount. Security sector governance in Africa, a collaborative effort between the Centre for Democracy and Development in Lagos, the Centre for International Policy in Washington DC, and the Institute for Security Studies in Pretoria, is possibly the first attempt at developing a practical guide to the issues in security sector governance. It is heavily influenced by African experiences and thinking, and as such is of particular usefulness to Africa’s developing democracies and post-conflict states. The book defines the security sector as com- prising all institutions of state responsible for securing the state and its population from fear The issue of security is as old as civilisation. of violence. It is unique in that, according to this As civilisations evolved, human beings had to definition, it discusses not only defence (as often build collective security structures to protect happens), but also governance issues related to themselves from other human beings and beasts. the armed forces, the police, intelligence services, In the early civilisations of the Middle East, paramilitary forces, related ministries and depart- pastoral peoples formed the first city-states to ments and governmental oversight organisations, provide defence and protection against nomadic as well as non-state security bodies and civil soci- marauding tribes. And so security services were ety. It stresses the importance of civil oversight, born. Over the ages these security services have transparency and accountability, and recognises evolved and expanded their roles in the overall that in good security sector governance all the governance of the state. Unfortunately, owing actors must cooperate in a spirit of mutual trust to the power vested in them – the monopoly of and understanding as well as acceptance of their force and violence – these security services often responsibilities. became powers unto themselves and threats to The book is premised on the existence of a the state and the people. Coups d’état and mili- functioning democracy, the rule of law, and a tary regimes were prevalent in much of Africa, system of checks and balances as conditions for Latin America and the Far East in the 20th cen- good, democratic security sector governance. tury. There were also instances of governments The security services do not exist in a vacuum misusing their security forces to protect the secu- and the issue of good governance is applicable rity of the regime rather than that of the people. to the state on the whole. Good security sec- In the post-Cold War era, with a new focus tor governance requires functional democratic on human security and democracy, there is an governance structures such as the executive, evolving understanding of the linkages between parliament, parliamentary committees and other security and development in the under-developed oversight bodies such as an auditor-general and world. Nobody disputes that security is a requisite public complaints commissions. The essence of for development, just as nobody can ignore good security sector governance is ensuring that the essentiality of development for ensuring the security services are aligned with the core Book reviews 135 values, principles and practices of democratic the corresponding protocols and mechanisms. governance. The most important of these are It positions security sector governance in the transparency, accountability, a legal basis for the regional contexts and argues that the governance security services, and civil oversight. of the security sector requires a regional approach The book offers practical guidance on the because of the common security needs of states, important function of policy development and the cross-border nature of many security chal- implementation. Lack of a coherent policy lenges, the need for collective responses and for framework often results in inappropriate and coordination and harmonisation of the policies unaffordable security services. Policy provides and actions of all actors. It argues that the main clear guidelines for developing strategies and issues that have to be addressed by regional and plans, enhances discipline in the utilisation of sub-regional organisations are the harmonisa- resources, provides predictability, and promotes tion of policies and principles of security sector performance measurement and accountability. governance and monitoring the implementation Policy formulation is essentially a political proc- of such policies. The underlying imperative is a ess and security policies must be approved by commitment to democracy, human security and parliament. The quality will be improved if good governance. policy formulation is an open and consultative The concluding chapter summarises the process with all actors contributing equally. The major challenges facing security sector govern- chapter on policy development and implementa- ance in Africa. These include the lack of a tradi- tion provides many diagrams and checklists to guide security sector practitioners. tion of democratic norms and practices in some Africa faces many challenges for sustainable countries; balancing the need for confidentiality development. In this light, responsible public with transparency, accountability and control; expenditure management is crucial for ‘a better overcoming vested interests; ensuring a broad- future for all’. The security sector, like all other based security sector approach; enhancing the sectors of government, should thus be subject knowledge base of all actors; and situating the to the principles and practices of good public transformation of security sector governance in expenditure management. The book discusses the correct political context. These challenges these in detail and provides guidance on plan- are not unique to Africa. But in the African con- ning, programming and budgeting processes as text, the challenge is to find African solutions to well as expenditure control. It does not attempt African problems. to prescribe an ideal model but focuses on Security sector governance in Africa makes universal principles and procedural guidelines. an important contribution to the literature on It stresses the importance of transparency and this subject. Its most valuable attribute is its prac- accountability in public expenditure manage- tical nature. Because it is based on African case ment, but admits to the need for some degree studies particularly the work of African security of confidentiality in matters of national security. sector researchers and practitioners, this adds to It argues that this does not justify a lower level its relevance for the continent. In the foreword, of oversight or lack of adherence to the stated Professor Alpha Oumar Konaré,chairperson of principles but a different form of oversight for the African Union Commission, comments: specific areas of national security. The decision “The practical tools and lessons presented here to deviate from standard practice should be from a variety of experiences will inspire, support subject to parliamentary approval. The chapter and assist our security institutions, military acad- on managing financial resources provides step- emies, research institutions, civil society organi- by-step guidance for the execution of public sations and international actors in the critical expenditure management processes. task of security sector governance in Africa.” The book takes cognisance of the develop- ments towards regional and sub-regional security Len le Roux cooperation in Africa and the establishment of Subscription to African Security Review If you would like to subscribe to African Security Review, please complete the form below and return it to the ISS with a cheque, or a postal/money order for the correct amount, made payable to the Institute for Security Studies (marked not transferable). Please note that credit card payments are also welcome. You can also deposit your payment into the following bank account, quoting the invoice number and the following reference: PUBSPAY. 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