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Global Peace or Internal Security:

Democratization from Peacekeeping

Maevyn Davis-Rackerby

International Relations Honors Thesis

New York University

April 17th, 2020

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Abstract

The end of the Cold , the early 1990s, marks a significant turn in the way the United Nations uses its peacekeeping forces—there was an increased emphasis on peacebuilding, and conflict resolution, not just global policing. So, too, did peacekeeping numbers skyrocket, with more states contributing more troops. At the same time, there was a mass wave of , and these new came to be in a changed world. How, then, did these new states contribute to international peacekeeping efforts, and why? This paper posits that in order to promote civilian-military relations and improve international reputation, newer democracies (defined as a 7 or above on the Polity IV scale) have contributed more heavily to international UN peacekeeping operations (PKOs) in the post-Cold War (1990-present) period. After running a variety of models, I find that peacekeeping contributions do decrease as democracies age and that (states that have some democratic features but are not full democracies) behave in similar ways.

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Contents

I. Introduction………………………………………………………………………………4 II. Literature Review………………………………………………………………………...6 III. Theory & Hypotheses…………………………………………………………………...11 IV. Data……………………………………………………………………………...……...16 Controls …………………………………………………………………………….. 18 Descriptive Statistics…………………………………………………………...……19 V. Endogeneity Problems and Estimation Procedure……………………………………...21 VI. Results…………………………………………………………………………………..22 OLS Regressions……………………………………………………………………..25 Generalized Difference-in-Difference…………………………………………….....27 VII. Discussion & Conclusion……………………………………………………………....33 VIII. References……………………………………………………………………………...35 IX. Appendices……………………………………………………………………………..38

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Acknowledgements

This thesis was made possible by the help and guidance of my advisor, Professor Peter

Rosendorff. I am also deeply grateful to our Teaching Assistant Rafa Ch Duran, without whom I could not have run my regressions or completed and who answered my many panicked emails.

Special thanks goes out to my friends, with whom I endured late nights in the library, and family, who put up with my ranting about peacekeeping and .

I. Introduction

On June 26th, 1945, the world took a major step towards global peace and democracy when 46 states signed the United Nations charter. It came into effect later that year as a revolutionary agreement between nations mandated to, as stated in Article 1 of the charter,

“maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace” (United Nations Charter, 1945). Articles

IV and V then gave the United Nations a mandate to keep the peace through the use of peacekeeping troops, military personnel from the armed forces of member states that are volunteered to represent the United Nations in conflict zones and guide the warring parties towards a peaceful agreement. Peacekeeping is complicated—there is a long process before they can be deployed, the differences between invoking article IV and V are subtle but significant, and whether they are successful or not is an entire, hotly-debated body of work by itself. The United Nations has deployed 71 peacekeeping operations (PKOs) since 1948, when 5 the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization was sent to Israel to settle the Arab-Israeli conflict (United Nations Peacekeeping, n.d.). Currently, there are 14 active missions globally, with over 120 states participating and 98,544 active personnel (United Nations Peacekeeping,

2019).

In this paper, I focus on why states contribute to PKOs—particularly, on the relationship between contributing and democracy, on the contributing end. I will be exploring the idea that somehow, contributing to PKOs is helpful for the contributing state as well as the receiving state, and that contributing may actually encourage democracy at home. Following this, I argue that states will contribute more heavily to PKOs close after a democratic transition—that newer democracies contribute more to PKOs than older ones

Interestingly, democracy is not mentioned at all in the original charter (not every state originally signing it endorsed democracy). However, the United Nations is clear that democracy is a guiding principle today, and argues that the language in the Preamble and Article 1 of the charter on “self-determination” and “the will of the people” show that democracy was a core value even then—that this language “reflect[s] the fundamental principle of democracy - that the will of the people is the source of legitimacy of sovereign states and, therefore, of the United

Nations as a whole” (United Nations: Global Issues, n.d.).

As the world moved further into the second half of the 20th century, especially as began to be discussed and talked about in earnest, the ideas of “peace,”

“democracy,” and the purpose of the United Nations became to be seen by many as inextricable.

Today, the United Nations claims that while it doesn’t advocate for a specific form of government, it embraces “democratic governance as a set of values and principles,” and 6 considers democracy the way towards participation, equality, human development, security, human rights, freedoms, and exercising the will of the people (United Nations: Global Issues, n.d.).

The intersection between peace and democracy became especially relevant in the early

1990s, when the ending of the cold war brought both a surge in PKOs and democratization, with many newly-free states seeking to establish themselves in the global democratic order. The UN itself cites a surge in troop numbers and contributions from its member states and in the number of PKOs—20 new operations began between 1989 and 1994, and the total peacekeeper number climbed from 11,000 to 75,000 (United Nations Peacekeeping, n.d.). It describes the shift in uses of peacekeeping from “traditional” or “observational” to “multidimensional” missions, and the tasks put upon peacekeepers also shifted from observing to peacebuilding. (United Nations

Peacekeeping).

Over 120 states currently contribute to the missions, which is over 60% of UN member states. More than this, I am looking into the disparity between contributions. As of September

2019, China, with the largest military in the world, contributes just 2,521 total personnel to

PKOs, or just 0.1% of its 2.5 million total. Even the United States, global superpower and champion of democracy, is only contributing a staggeringly small 31 people to PKOs, or .002% of its 1.3 million total. On the other hand, Ethiopia contributes the most peacekeepers at 7,047, or 4.3% of its total military size. In this paper, I explore the theory that this discrepancy is due to the age of a democracy, and how the contributions of states change as they democratize.

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II. Literature Review

The literature surrounding contributions to PKOs tends to fall under several umbrellas; who contributes, when they contribute, and why they contribute to international PKOs.

The answer to the first question is, overwhelmingly, democracies. Lebovic (2004) shows that contributions increase with democracy—more democratic states contribute more to peacekeeping operations. He also finds that once committed, democracies commit more fully to peace actions overall. Lebovic then dives into why democracies may be more likely to contribute to peacekeeping, and posits that states contribute for both realist and liberal reasons—realist in that states did contribute more in areas where they were closer to the conflict in terms of capabilities and alliances but also liberal in that states seem to support PKOs in altruistic ways as well. This indicates that there must be something about the peace process, and contributing to it, that is beneficial to democracies. Lebovic explains this by pointing to democratic peace theory and that democracies simply “embrace liberal values and perspectives”

(933), although also acknowledging the realist arguments that democracies contribute to increasing regional security in areas of interest.

Gilligan and Stedman (2003) also suggests that national interest influences where states direct their peacekeeping reference; they conclude that states tend to contribute depending on the severity of the conflict, but with a regional bias. That is, within regions, more serious

(defined as the number of casualties) conflicts will receive more attention, but regions of stronger national interest to the donor state get more resources overall. The theory behind this is similar to Lebovic’s—states tend to contribute where there is a humanitarian need due to 8 sharing ideals of democracy, , and spreading peace, but they help regions of national interest more heavily, meaning at least part of the motivation is because contributing to international peace and security is beneficial to individual states.

Once it has been established that states contribute to PKOs out of some national interest, the question becomes why this is this case. Boyer and Bobrow (1997) attempt to fill this gap by looking at what national interest contributing to PKOs fulfills. They make a compelling argument that contributing to peacekeeping helps create system-wide stability, look at peacekeeping as a public good that stabilizes the international system overall, and argue that even the United Nations itself considers a primary goal of peacekeeping to “maintain international peace and security and to enhance the effectiveness of the United Nations” (726).

Maintaining System Stability is a study of whether or not contributing to PKOs is a policy decision states make in order to keep the whole system stable, and they conclude that, after the

Cold War, there was an increase in PKOs being treated as public goods, and in diversity of beneficiaries and actors. They do concede that the sharp US withdrawal in this period influenced the pattern, that other states stepped it up to keep the system stable in its place—but still, the study shows that states may be driven to contribute to PKOs to maintain the stability of the international system—because system stability is beneficial to everyone.

From all of this, we can gather that democracies, more than non-democracies, contribute to PKOs due to international interests and concern; to spread norms of democracy, to help the deadliest of conflicts, and, ultimately, to support national interests—that democracies may contribute more to regions that are security interests combined with the Boyer and Bobrow work on stability suggests that states work to stabilize the regions most beneficial to their own 9 interests. This is also suggested by Lebovic (2004), who sees that states contribute more in areas where they have been more deeply involved—in either the current conflict or in the past.

I would like to theorize that states, and specifically democracies, contribute their own military resources to international peacekeeping operations for national interest domestically, instead of internationally; that there is something about contributing to PKOs that encourage domestic peace and stability.

To begin to theorize about this we must enter a separate realm of literature, one focusing on democratization. There are two main factors that I am concerned with in conjunction with peacekeeping: how it helps civilian-military relations and how it encourages participation in international organizations.

There has been plenty of work done on how civilian-military relations are essential for democracy—specifically, a recovering (or new) democracy must strengthen these ties. Tusalem

(2014) finds that a “civilian-military equilibrium” (494) must be found—that states where the militaries regain significant control over policy hurt democracy consolidation, and generally that during democratization the military should be as far away from the government, economy, bureaucracy, etc. as possible. In other words, it’s essential to civilianize the military.

Following this, there has been work on how contributing to PKOs may help. Kathman and Melin (2017) looks at the impact that contributing to PKOs have on the military specifically. They find that states involved in rivalries send more troops than those who are not, to provide their forces with experience, training, and weapons. They also, significantly, find that states provide more troops directly after a coup and less as time goes on in a theorized attempt to prevent another coup. Both of these results point to states using contributions to PKOs as a 10 way of restabilizing the military after a coup attempt, which is a key part of reaching Tusalem’s equilibrium that’s necessary for democratization.

We also see that involvement in international organizations can help fledgling democracies. Mansfield and Pevehouse (2006) posits that participation in international organizations (IO) helps new democratic leaders peacefully and democratically transition, as well as showing domestic and international actors that there is a credible commitment to peace and democracy. The study finds that democratizing states are likely to join IOs—even more likely than existing democracies. Another paper by Mansfield, Pevehouse and Hafner-Burton

(2015) supported this, finding that involvement in international human rights institutions yields

“substantial benefits” (1) to democratizing states, specifically noting that democratizing states use the costs associated with joining international institutions to lock in liberal policies; essentially, committing to international human rights despite the costs shows a commitment to human rights that gives credibility to the new democracy (and its administration) domestically and internationally. As the United Nations is an international institution committed to peace, with a large emphasis on human rights, it is not a stretch to apply the same logic to contributions to PKOs.

Both the Mansfield and Pevehouse (2006) and Mansfield, Pevehouse and Hafner-Burton papers posit that involvement in IOs shows a credible commitment to improving credibility and international reputation, which is something that Alcañiz (2012) discusses. Alcañiz runs an experiment on the relationship between the age of a democracy and response time to international disarmament, nonproliferation, and arms control treaties. She posits that new democracies sign international treaties faster to promote democracy and improve international 11 reputation—similar to Mansfield and Pevehouse (2006), it shows a dedication to peace and security. Using time as her responding variable, Alcañiz runs a variety of restricted and unrestricted survival models, also controlling for things such as foreign aid and volatility (to control for the “lock-in” hypothesis). Alcañiz does find that new democracies tend to sign such treaties faster than older democracies, and all autocracies. She finds that this holds true even in the unrestricted models, which include all of the control variables—aid, volatility, , and government system.

The results of this paper show that new democracies participate in the international system in ways that old democracies don’t, in order to strengthen their own democracies. In the case of Alcañiz (2012), this participation is signing treaties, and the goal is to promote a positive international reputation. I am more interested in peacekeeping contributions, however, and their use towards promoting internal stability and security through civilian-military relations (as discussed in connection with Kathman and Melin 2017 and Tusalem 2014).

While Alcañiz uses a research design effective for her study of time as a dependent variable, it will not work as well for my purposes—additionally, I think there could be a better way to control for my purposes than just an unrestricted model containing a variety of control variables. Alcañiz does, however, effectively use the Polity IV data to determine the age of democracy, essentially creating dummy variables wherein “New Democracy” is 1 if a country democratized less than 3, 5, or 7 years ago (if it has a 7 or higher in the democracy score and less and 3, 5, or 7 in the durability score), “Old Democracy” if the transition was longer ago than 3, 5, or 7 years, and New/Old anocracy following the same method. I will also be defining

“New” and “Old” democracies in this same way. 12

III. Theory & Hypotheses

For a variety of reasons, we know that democracies contribute more heavily to peacekeeping operations than non-democracies (Lebovic, 2004). Democratic peace theory suggests that democracies are less likely to go to war with one another, as well, and Boyer and

Bobrow (1997) support this by showing that democracies contribute to peacekeeping to maintain stability in the international system. But my theory in this paper rests mainly on the work done by Alcañiz (2012), Kathman and Melin (2017), Mansfield and Pevehouse (2006), and Mansfield, Pevehouse, and Hafner-Burton (2015); why and how contributing to PKOs may be beneficial for a democratizing state.

Both Alcañiz (2012) and Mansfield and Pevehouse (2006) theorize that states interact with the international system to promote democratization—Alcañiz focuses heavily on how signing arms treaties may promote international reputation, which is dearly needed during democratization, and Mansfield and Pevehouse point to a multitude of benefits available to young democracies upon joining international organizations and becoming active in the global system. I would argue that this extends to peacekeeping as well; contributing to PKOs definitely counts as involvement with international organizations (the United Nations) and cooperation with other states. It’s also reasonable that this would improve a state’s international standing, something Alcañiz argues is essential to democracy, peace, and stability.

I would like to add another layer to their arguments by drawing once again to the results of Kathman and Melin (2017) that show that contributing to PKOs may have a positive impact 13 on the military and civilian-military relations. Kathman and Melin theorize that simply clearing your state of troops makes a coup less likely because there is nobody to cause it. I would like to extend this to argue that sending troops to PKOs not only removes their ability to cause a coup, it also re-brands the military as peace-oriented and helps restore civilian-military relations. As a case study, Argentina leaned heavily on peacekeeping contributions during their democratization period in the 1990s and early 2000s, formally reformatting security forces to have a peacekeeping mandate and contributing to multiple PKOs in their first few years as a democracy; as a result, the armed forces gained respect and prestige in the general population

(Huser 2002, 164).

The specific usage of contributions to PKOs to help civilian-military relations may also have significance inside the framework of transitional justice. Transitional justice is widely defined as the processes, mostly legal, that guide a post-conflict or dictatorship into a democracy. These include but are not limited to truth commissions, reparations for state-sponsored violence, trials, reforming of institutions, and restoring civilian trust in a military that may have been used by the state (or may have run the state) for violence and oppression. The International Center for Transitional Justice lists “security system reform” as one of the functions of transitional justice, defining it as “transform[ing] the military, police, judiciary and related state institutions from instruments of repression and corruption into instruments of public service and integrity” (ICTJ 2008, 1). States sending more troops to PKOs can help give them a public perception of integrity, as seen in the Argentina case study—the logic is that if the public sees their troops fighting for peace, they are more likely to trust and respect them. Transitional justice is an important process for a democratizing state, and while 14 contributing to PKOs does not contribute to most of these legal processes, the behavior that

Kathman and Melin (2017) studied in how states contributed to PKOs to restabilize the military may apply to civilian-military relations as well.

Principally, I will be building off of Alcañiz’s work and hypothesis, in which she tested the relationship between age of democracy and the time it took to sign international arms control treaties—supported by work such as Mansfield and Pevehouse (2006) and Mansfield,

Pevehouse, and Hafner-Burton (2015), who saw that new democracies are more likely to join international institutions. However, all of these papers and their conclusion focus heavily on involvement in international organizations in terms of diplomacy and cooperation. Luckily,

Kathman and Melin (2017) looked specifically at peacekeeping and saw that states were more likely to contribute to PKOs directly after a coup. This leads me to my first hypothesis; that states behave in a similar way that Alcañiz (2012), Mansfield and Pevehouse (2006), and

Mansfield, Pevehouse, and Hafner-Burton (2015) found, but also in regards to contributions to

PKOs, for the reasons shown in Kathman and Melin (2017). I am theorizing that states will contribute to PKOs more heavily Or, more simply:

H₁: “New” democracies contribute more personnel to international peacekeeping

operations than “old” democracies.

However, in both Kathman and Melin (2017) and Mansfield and Pevehouse (2006), the correlation changes as the democracies age. Kathman and Melin see that contributions to PKOs increase directly after a coup, and then decrease as time passes after the coup and states recover.

Applying the same logic to new democracies (and those in transition) who are trying to stabilize not unlike states re-stabilizing after a coup leads me to believe that there is something about 15 contributing to peacekeeping that is most helpful in the early stages of democracy. Therefore, I also hypothesize that, as well as “new” democracies showing a heavier contribution to PKOs overall, states will contribute less individually as their democracies age. Therefore:

H₂: Democracies will hit their peak of contributing to PKOs within a few years of

democratization, then reduce their contributions as they age.

Theoretically, we should see the group of new democracies contribute more to PKOs than their older peers, but we should also see trends within that group of decreasing contributions as their democracies age. I would expect to see a decrease because I am theorizing that states use PKO contributions to aid in the democratization process, so the contributions should trail off as states no longer need help democratizing.

Lastly, I am focusing on the transitional phase of democratization; the period right after a transition when it is essential to stabilize a regime, repair relationship and strengthen international reputation. The measure for “democracy” I am using is the Polity IV scale, which describes a “full democracy” as a +7 to +10 on the -10 to +10 scale and autocracy as -10 to 0. However, this leaves 6 points in between, where states are not autocracies but are not yet full democracies; Polity codes these as anocracies or a partial democracy that has not quite made its way to full democracy (Polity IV 2018, 35). Because my theory is that contributing to PKOs helps states stabilize their new democracy, I would also expect to see a similar pattern with anocracies—an increase at the beginning of the anocracy stage, perhaps with a slower buildup as the states adjust to being in a transition state that is no longer a full autocracy (or, in the case of a drop in democracy, attempt to stabilize what little democracy and international reputation is left). In other words; 16

H₃: Anocracies will follow a similar pattern as democracies in an attempt to use contributions to PKOs to stabilize their regime.

When discussing anocracies, it’s also important to note that long-standing literature has noted their intense instability; Mansfield and Snyder (2002) find that states who have transitioned from an autocracy to a partial democracy (anocracy) are especially vulnerable to conflict, both external and civil. More specifically, Regan and Bell (2010) find that the threat of civil war is highest in the first few years of existence as an anocracy. Just as Kathman and Melin

(2017) find that states contribute to PKOs after a coup in part to minimize ongoing coup threat, it would make sense that anocracies contribute to PKOs in the first few years of their existence to similarly offset the civil war risk—as well as just to stabilize the democracy, which would also lower civil war risk.

IV. Data

To construct my result variable of peacekeepers contributed to PKOs, I used peacekeeping contributions at the country/year level, drawn from UN records and compiled by the International Peace Institute (released via the IPI’s Peacekeeping Database). These records date back to 1990, giving me almost 30 years of data. This also lines up with the end of the Cold

War, signaling a rush of new democracies and a fundamental shift in the usage of peacekeeping.

The previous studies also focus on the post-Cold War period—the Lebovic (2004) study focuses on 1993-2001, and Kathman and Melin (2017) also uses data from 1992. I limit my data on 17 peacekeeping contributions to 1990-onwards. This results in a total of 144 states contributing to peacekeeping over the period.

I combined this data with the total military size of the state, on the same country/year level. This data is retrieved from the World Bank Open Data database and originally is from the

International Institute for Strategic Studies. I then created the variable peacekeepers per

100,000 military personnel , which gets rid of the potential issue of larger democracies contributing more in general due to the fact that their militaries are larger. I used military size, and not the general population, as peacekeepers are sent directly from their countries' militaries—some states, such as Argentina, even have institutionalized peacekeeping as a part of their military’s purpose in their codes or constitutions. It’s important to look at how many military resources are being sent to international peacekeeping, and not just the general population, as there are many confounding factors that might make militaries especially large or small in comparison to the rest of the population. Thus, peacekeepers per 100,000 military personnel is my dependent variable. I also include peacekeepers as a percent of all military personnel for robustness.

I compared these to the Polity IV data—specifically focusing on the durability variable of the Polity IV dataset, which measures years since the last regime change. Following Alcañiz,

I created the dummy variables of new democracy, based on a democracy score of 7 or higher and years since democratization. Alcañiz uses the measure of 3, 5 and 7 years since democratization. Based on my distribution of data, I created a dummy variable for 5, 10, 15, 20,

25 and 30 years since democratization, which takes the value of 1 if a state has democratized in the timeframe measured and 0 if they have not. I also included a democracy durability variable 18 specifically measuring the number of years since transitioning to democracy (as in, hitting 7 or above on the Polity IV scale), as polity’s durable variable is not directional and includes states that have backslid into autocracy as well. As I also have an interest in measuring the behavior of

Polity-defined anocracies (between 0 and 6 on the Polity IV scale), I also created new anocracy variables for 3, 5, 7, 10 and 15 years since becoming an anocracy. Similarly, I am including an anocracy durability variable, measuring the age of an anocracy in years. These serve as my independent variables, measuring the time since transition to democracy or anocracy took place.

This variable also only measures states that have transitioned since 1990, which is when my peacekeeping data begins, although my dataset still includes all states. Mansfield,

Pevehouse, and Hafner-Burton (2015) set their “democratization” variable at 5 years since a regime change, so although created variables for and measuring a variety periods, the 5-year democracy variable is of specific interest to me. In the end, I will be looking at the 167 states covered by the Polity IV dataset, from the year 1990-2018.

Controls

Drawing from previous studies, I will use a few other control variables, namely controlling for other determinants of peacekeeping contributions besides the age of democracy

(my treatment). Many of these are also variables used to create synthetic controls. I will be using GDP per Capita and Net official flows from UN agencies (both sourced through the World

Bank) to control for the possible confounding factor that states may contribute to PKOs to receive the reimbursement, equipment, and troop training from the UN. Lebovic (2004) includes the variable of HDI to more robustly account for this possibility, so I will as well. 19

Full summary statistics of the many variables used for my difference-in-difference estimation will be included in the appendices of this paper. These other variables include variables drawn from Lebovic (2004) including population as a general control, to account for the fact that larger states might send more peacekeepers due to size, geography controls, and for

NATO membership to help control for US hegemony or influence. My final regression also includes the means of all these control variables until 1990.

Fig. 1: Descriptive Statistics Variable Mean Min Max Source Std. Dev.

Democracy within 5 .0469 0 1 created (from Polity IV) years .2115

Democracy within 10 .0849 0 1 created (from Polity IV) years .2787

Democracy within 15 .1203 0 1 created (from Polity IV) years .325

Democracy within 20 .1487 0 1 created (from Polity IV) years .3559

Democracy within 25 .1696 0 1 created (from Polity IV) years .3752

Democracy within 30 .1853 0 1 created (from Polity IV) years .3886

Anocracy within 3 years .0464 0 1 created (from Polity IV) .2104

Anocracy within 5 years .0701 0 1 created (from Polity IV) .2553

Anocracy within 7 years .0882 0 1 created (from Polity IV) .2836 20

Anocracy within 10 .1079 0 1 created (from Polity IV) years .3103

Anocracy within 15 .1278 0 1 created (from Polity IV) years .3339

Durability of democracy 34.37 1 59 created (from Polity IV) 16.97

Durability of anocracy 8.122 1 29 created (from Polity IV) 6.782

Peacekeepers 1613 .1429 51604 Created from IPI database and contributed (per 100,000 4510 World Bank military data military personnel)

Peacekeepers .0161 1.43e-06 .51604 Created from IPI database and contributed (percent of .0451 World Bank military data total military)

Total peacekeeper 632.7 1 10710 International Peace Institute contributions 1384.5 Peacekeeping Database (country/year)

Years since 32.74 1 59 Created from Polity IV democratization 16.70

Years since last regime 22.79 0 209 Polity IV change 28.61

Democracy score (out of 4.173 0 10 Polity IV 10) 4.168

The Polity2 (adjusted) 3.991 0 10 Polity IV score 4.231 total population 24.1 .0039 1390 World Bank Development (millions) 101 Indicators

GDP per capita (2018 8165 34.79 189170.9 World Bank Development USD) 16079 Indicators

Number of peacekeepers 4934 1 21198 World Bank Development and observers in a state 6229 Indicators

Human Development .5149 .02 .953 World Bank Development Index .2658 Indicators 21

Total money received 513290.6 0 4090000 World Bank Development from the United Nations 475975.3 Indicators (per year)

V. Endogeneity Problems and Estimation Procedure

In this experiment, my independent variable is the age of a regime (as measured by the durability score of the Polity IV dataset), and the dependent variable is contributions to PKOs, in terms of military personnel sent (in both combat and non-combat roles). My unit of analysis is country-year. The actual results will be measured from 1990-2018. To first test my hypothesis, I ran a simple, time-series cross-section regression, using the basic equation:

P eacekeepers cy = α cy + βDurability cy + γX cy + δ c + θ y + ε cy

Where Peacekeepers is peacekeeper contributions by country and year (my dependent variable), α is the constant—in this case, average peacekeepers contributed for all years. My regime-specific durability score (my independent variable) is the durability at a country/year level, with the coefficient 훽 as the change in peacekeeper contributions for every year change in durability. X represents all the controls listed in the table above and also in the appendices, with

γ as their coefficients, and ε is the error term, which I addressed by making my regressions robust and conducting a difference-in-difference estimation. I also included fixed effects of year and country in this, shown above as 휃 for year fixed effects and δ for country fixed effects. 22

However, this test left endogeneity that is hard to account for in a simple regression, as my panel data (the majority of countries in the international system, across many years, with treatment beginning at different times) makes it hard to find a solid control group or an instrumental variable that would provide a random allocation of treatment.

Because my treatment group is all 144 states that have contributed to PKOs from 1990 to 2018, and fitting to my panel data, I ran a time-period (or generalized) difference-in-difference estimation procedure, with led peacekeeper variables to account for the effect being seen the year after the treatment is applied.

The generalized DID method is detailed in Strezhnev (2018), but boils down to doing a

DID analysis over multiple periods, where the difference is between two different periods of the same data (in my case, peacekeeping data over multiple years). This approach essentially runs a difference-in-difference on each state, comparing it to itself a period (in my case, a year) prior.

To account for as much endogeneity bias as possible, I have a panel of 36 various control variables. To avoid pre-treatment bias I use the mean of these control variables from the creation of the state (or 1800) to 1989. A total list of these variables and their summary statistics is included in the appendix. Additionally, I am running this generalize difference-in-difference on my period variables—5 years since democratization, 10 years, etc. This will allow me to see the general trend isolated into specific periods.

VI. Results

Before progressing to the core of my analysis, figures 2, 3 and 4 show scatter plots using my peacekeeping, durability, and regime age variables to visualize the data. Immediately, the 23 general pattern (fig. 2) seems to support my hypothesis; as durability increases (as regimes age) peacekeeping contributions decrease. However, the PolityIV dataset codes durability as any regime change of 3 polity points in either direction, meaning this graph isn’t restricted to just those states that democratized since 1990. To isolate those states that were democracies or in anocracies, I created two new plots (figs. 3 and 4); one comparing the peacekeeping contributions of anocracies (states that are not autocratic but are still not a full democracy).

From these graphs, we can see that the anocracy measure shows an inverted-U shape I had hypothesized for the general democracy measure and the democracy measure shows an overall negative trend, which supports my H₁, that newer democracies will contribute more to

PKO to democracies.

Fig. 2: Peacekeepers Contributed vs. Years Since Last Transition

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Fig. 3: Peacekeepers Contributed vs. Years as an Anocracy

Fig. 4: Peacekeepers Contributed vs. Years as a Democracy

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I then moved onto the regression analysis. To begin, I standardized all of my data—my controls, peacekeepers, and durability variables—according to a z-distribution, as some of my variables contained very large numbers, and some were very small. In all of the following estimations, my peacekeeper variables (by both percentage of total military personnel and per

100,000 military personnel) are both led by 1 period and logged.

OLS Regression

I first ran OLS regression using peacekeepers per 100,000 military personnel (logged and led by 1 period) and the years since democratization (both standardized). Included in this was the same variable, but squared, adjusting for the general data trending in a non-linear way.

From the table below (fig. 5), we see a negative coefficient with the democratic years squared with both the peacekeepers per 100,000 and the peacekeepers as a percent—there is a -43.3%

(of one standard deviation) in peacekeepers per 100,000 contributed for every 1 SD increase in years as a democracy (squared), and -3.37% of an SD of peacekeepers as a percent. Both these measures are statistically significant to the 0.05 level, with peacekeepers as a percent significant to the 0.01 level. This supports my first hypothesis, that the overall trend is that democracies decrease peacekeeper contributions as they age.

I then repeated this OLS regression with the same controls and peacekeeper variables, instead using my anocracy durability variable. From the results (fig. 6), there is a once again significance with the squared variable, and the sign is negative (-0.103 with peacekeepers per

100,000 and -0.154 for peacekeepers as a percent). However, both are only significant to the

0.10 level, much less than the 0.01 significance seen with democracy durability. This is possibly 26 because there are simply fewer anocracies at this time than democracies. Regardless of significance, the anocracy variable also shows a much smaller effect, with coefficients ¼ to ⅓ that of the democracy durability variable. Based on the stabilizing effects of PKO contributions, a plausible explanation could be that anocracies attempting to fully democratize need the benefits longer, and so will have a more gradual decline than already established democracies.

Fig. 5: Effect of Democracies Durability on Peacekeeping Operations (1) (2) Peacekeepers (per 100,000 Peacekeepers (as a percent of total military personnel) military personnel)

Years as a democracy 0.238 0.174 (0.194) (0.138)

Years as a democracy, -0.433 ** -0.337 *** squared (0.168) (0.116)

Observations 1354 1247 R-squared 0.099 0.115 Country FE YES YES Year FE YES YES Pre-Treatment YES YES Controls t statistics in parentheses * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

27

Fig. 6: Effect of Anocracies Durability on Peacekeeping Contributions (1) (2) Peacekeepers (per 100,000 Peacekeepers (percent of total military military personnel personnel) Years as an anocracy -0.060 -0.137 (0.114) (0.143)

Years as an anocracy, -0.103 * -0.154 * squared (0.054) (0.087)

Observations 914 488 R-squared 0.094 0.127 Country FE YES YES Year FE YES YES Pre-Treatment Controls YES YES t statistics in parentheses, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Generalized Difference-in-Difference

As a second measure, I conducted a generalized difference-in-difference estimation using periods since regime change, in an attempt to show more clearly the curve of decreasing peacekeeper contributions. The periods of time (5, 20, 25 and 30 years for democracy and 3, 5,

7, and 10 years for anocracy) were chosen based on the scatterplots of data in order to more accurately test the observed curve. Similar to the OLS estimations, the peacekeeper variables were both logged and led by 1 period.

The regression using periods since democratization and peacekeepers per 100,000 (fig.

7a) shows a coefficient -0.196 during the 5 year period, meaning that in the first five years of democracy, states contribute 1.96% of an SD fewer peacekeepers for every year of democracy

(significant to the 0.05 level). This is consistent with what we expected to find from the observed scatterplot—that the decrease in contributions starts quickly. However, we see a 28 switch of the sign when the democracies last for longer, with a significant 0.178 coefficient at

20 years and 0.338 at 25 (highly significant, at the 0.01 level). By 30 years, there is no longer a significant effect—which supports my hypothesis that eventually the effect fades. Comparing this to our scatter plot, we do see a bump in contributions around 20-25 years—more research is necessary to determine what happens 25 years after democratization.

I also included the same estimation using peacekeepers as a percent (fig. 7b), similar to the OLS models. While the one significant result of this estimation has a much smaller order of magnitude, at a 0.2% increase in peacekeepers during the first 5 years of democracy, it is significant to the 0.05 level and positive—the opposite of the first estimation. While this is a curious result, the fact that the magnitude is 10 times as small as the first result for the same time period suggests that the first, negative, result is the one to be more closely examined.

Moving into the anocracy measures, in my difference-in-difference using periods of anocracy (fig. 8a), we see negative and significant coefficients fairly quickly: -0.135 with 5 years, -0.187 with 7, and -0.330 with 10. However, the coefficients get progressively larger, and the significance increases from the 0.1 level at 5 years to 0.01 at 10 years. This suggests a negative trend that gets stronger over time, making sense based both on the observations in the scatterplot and my hypothesis. Unlike the democracy variables, it does not seem to dissipate within the time frame studied.

Like my democracy estimation, I also included here the results of the second half of the

DID estimation using peacekeepers as a percent of total military personnel. Similarly to the democracy variables, we see strangely positive results, but still less significant and at a much smaller magnitude than the first measure.

29

Fig. 7a: Effect of Age of Democracies on Peacekeeping Contributions (peacekeepers per 100,000) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) Peacekeepers Peacekeepers Peacekeepers Peacekeepers Peacekeepers Peacekeepers Peacekeepers Peacekeepers (per 100,000 (per 100,000 (per 100,000 (per 100,000 (per 100,000 (per 100,000 (per 100,000 (per 100,000 military military military military military military military military personnel personnel personnel personnel personnel personnel personnel personnel New -0.022 -0.196 ** democracy (0.068) (0.089) (5 yrs)

New 0.122 0.178* democracy (0.096) (0.102) (20 yrs)

New 0.097 0.338 *** democracy (0.114) (0.108) (25 yrs)

New 0.021 0.069 democracy (0.118) (0.255) (30 yrs)

HDI 7.131 -22.581 6.610 -17.151 6.686 -16.964 7.039 -18.357 (10.654) (15.388) (10.742) (16.141) (10.744) (14.878) (10.652) (16.157)

GDP per capita -2.759* 1.748 -2.639* 1.116 -2.476 2.480 -2.747* 1.144 (current US$) (1.496) (1.693) (1.479) (1.704) (1.544) (1.932) (1.505) (1.754) Population, total -1.917* * 0.023 -2.040* * -0.368 -1.990* * -0.248 -1.945* * -0.194 (0.785) (0.563) (0.844) (0.579) (0.819) (0.497) (0.804) (0.568) Net official flows 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 from UN (current (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) US$)

Observations 1233 482 1233 482 1233 482 1233 482 R-squared 0.451 0.567 0.453 0.560 0.452 0.565 0.451 0.557 Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES Pre-Treatment YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES Controls

t statistics in parentheses, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

30

Fig. 7b: Effect of Age of Democracy on Peacekeeping Contributions (peacekeepers as a percent) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) Peacekeepers Peacekeepers Peacekeepers Peacekeepers Peacekeepers Peacekeepers Peacekeepers Peacekeepers (percent of total (percent of (percent of total (percent of total (percent of total (percent of total (percent of (percent of military personnel) total military military military military military total military total military personnel) personnel) personnel) personnel) personnel) personnel) personnel)

New 0.001 0.002 ** democracy (0.001) (0.001) (5 yrs)

New 0.000 -0.001 democracy (0.001) (0.002) (20 yrs)

New -0.001 0.001 democracy (0.001) (0.001) (25 yrs)

New -0.000 0.003 democracy (0.001) (0.002) (30 yrs)

HDI 0.302 * 0.164 0.298 0.075 0.303 * 0.077 0.302 * 0.061 (0.181) (0.180) (0.180) (0.174) (0.181) (0.176) (0.181) (0.178)

GDP per capita -0.077* ** -0.028 -0.077* ** -0.020 -0.079* ** -0.018 -0.078* ** -0.017 (current US$) (0.022) (0.024) (0.022) (0.025) (0.023) (0.026) (0.022) (0.024)

Population, total -0.034* ** -0.008 -0.033* ** -0.003 -0.033* ** -0.004 -0.033* ** -0.004 (0.013) (0.010) (0.013) (0.010) (0.012) (0.010) (0.012) (0.010)

Net official -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 flows from UN (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) agencies (current US$)

Observations 846 344 846 344 846 344 846 344 R-squared 0.155 0.135 0.150 0.082 0.150 0.075 0.150 0.083 Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES Pre-Treatment YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES Controls

31

Fig. 8a: Effect of Age of Anocracies on Peacekeeping Contributions (peacekeepers per 100,000 personnel)

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) Peacekeepers Peacekeepers Peacekeepers Peacekeepers Peacekeepers Peacekeepers Peacekeepers Peacekeepers (per 100,000 (per 100,000 (per 100,000 (per 100,000 (per 100,000 (per 100,000 (per 100,000 (per 100,000 military military military military military military military military personnel personnel personnel personnel personnel personnel personnel personnel

New -0.007 -0.012 anocracy (0.054) (0.067) (within 3 yrs)

New -0.053 -0.135* anocracy (0.061) (0.080) (within 5 yrs)

New -0.057 -0.187* anocracy (0.072) (0.103) (within 7 yrs)

New -0.114 -0.330*** anocracy (0.076) (0.123) (within 10 yrs)

HDI 7.142 -24.413 6.941 -26.017 6.982 -25.293 7.386 -18.332 (10.678) (17.508) (10.697) (16.922) (10.679) (16.311) (10.699) (16.085) GDP per * capita -2.767 -13.615** -2.754* -13.203** -2.771* -13.349** -2.775* -12.679** (US$) (1.497) (5.772) (1.489) (5.478) (1.492) (5.475) (1.497) (5.738)

Populatio ** -1.939 -10.077* -1.944** -10.235** -1.958** -10.367** -2.027** -11.038** n, total (0.801) (5.099) (0.808) (4.956) (0.815) (4.719) (0.848) (4.793)

Net flows 0.000 from UN 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 (0.000) (US$) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)

R-squared 0.451 0.598 0.452 0.604 0.452 0.607 0.453 0.616 Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES Pre-treatment YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES controls

t statistics in parentheses, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 32

Fig. 8b: Effect of Age of Anocracies on Peacekeeping Contributions (peacekeepers as a percent of military personnel) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) Peacekeepers Peacekeepers Peacekeepers Peacekeepers Peacekeepers Peacekeepers Peacekeepers Peacekeepers (as a percent (as a percent (as a percent (as a percent (as a percent (as a percent (as a percent (as a percent of total of total of total of total of total of total of total of total military military military military military military military military personnel) personnel) personnel) personnel) personnel) personnel) personnel) personnel)

New 0.002 0.001 anocracy (0.001) (0.001) (within 3 yrs)

New 0.002* 0.002 anocracy (0.001) (0.001) (within 5 yrs)

New 0.003** 0.004* anocracy (0.001) (0.002) (within 7 yrs)

New 0.002 0.002 anocracy (0.001) (0.002) (within 10 yes)

HDI 0.308* -0.080 0.317* -0.051 0.312* -0.059 0.296 -0.135 (0.178) (0.319) (0.182) (0.309) (0.185) (0.314) (0.183) (0.340)

GDP per -0.076*** -0.123 -0.076*** -0.124* -0.074*** -0.117* -0.076*** -0.134 capita (US$) (0.022) (0.074) (0.022) (0.071) (0.022) (0.067) (0.022) (0.079)

Pop. total -0.033*** -0.083 -0.033*** -0.079 -0.032*** -0.071 -0.031*** -0.075 (0.012) (0.067) (0.012) (0.067) (0.011) (0.074) (0.011) (0.074)

Net flows -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 from UN (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (US$)

Observations 846 254 846 254 846 254 846 254 R-squared 0.160 0.188 0.164 0.207 0.167 0.245 0.159 0.199 Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES

t statistics in parentheses, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

33

VII. Conclusion & Discussion

Reviewing my three hypotheses, there is significant evidence that I can reject the null of my H₁ , that new democracies contribute more than old democracies. I can see that in my linear

OLS regression that shows a strong, negative correlation between durability of a democracy and amount of peacekeepers contributed, and the difference-in-difference ran with intervals of years shows a general downward trend, albeit with a small bump around 25 years after democratization (an effect that requires further research to understand). I can also see the same trend with anocracies, although with less significance—however, this is likely because of the much smaller sample size. There is also the same pattern with the difference-in-difference using the anocracy variable. However, there isn’t strong evidence for any sort of “inverted U” pattern in the results, or enough support to reject the null of my H ₂, that there is a bump in peacekeepers before the drop. This is inconsistent with some of my source material and concerning, as it doesn’t show an increase at all. I had originally stated that I was looking specifically at the

5-year period to be consistent with Hafner-Burton (2015)’s data setting “democratization” at 5 years; interestingly, 5-years is where we see the anticipated negative and significant effect in democracies and anocracies. I believe more research should be done around time periods, as well; it’s possible that I did not measure the correct time frames, or did not go far enough in either direction. Unfortunately, there is a limitation here, as the UN peacekeeping data I used only goes back to 1990.

The most important conclusion to draw from this data is the information gathered on anocracies; those in transition seem to behave similarly to full democracies in terms of 34 peacekeeping contributions. They also seem to have more of the “inverted u” curve expected.

There is less literature on anocracies than democracies, but when discussing transitions into democracies, it’s important to study not just those that count as full, mature democracies according to the Polity IV score. The discovery that anocracies behave closer to full democracies than autocracies (which, as we see in the literature, do not tend to contribute to

PKOs) is significant and should be explored in more depth. It may also point to a stabilizing effect of contributing to PKOs that is helpful to multiple regime types outside of just democracy; anocracies may attempt to stabilize themselves by promoting democracy, with contributing to PKOs a method of doing so. More research is needed in this field, but I believe that my results provide a compelling first step.

35

VIII. References

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38

IX. Appendices

Appendix 1: Variables Included in Controls and Mean Controls

Variable Mean Min Max Source Std. Dev.

Polity2 (adjusted) 3.149 -10 10 Polity IV 6.595

Durability 25.07 0 209 Polity IV 30.82

Adolescent fertility rate 60.78 .283 223.7 World Bank Development Indicators 47.59

Agriculture (percent of 13.22 .0249 79.04 World Bank Development Indicators GDP) 12.62

CO2 emissions 4.792 .0107 70.04 World Bank Development Indicators 6.598

Exports (percent of GDP) 40.65 .0054 433.2 World Bank Development Indicators 29.92

Fertility rate 3.184 .86 8.459 World Bank Development Indicators 1.672

FDI (USD) -5.45e+08 -3.37e+11 1.77e+11 World Bank Development Indicators 1.87e+10

Net FDI 6.91e+09 -2.39e+11 7.34e+11 World Bank Development Indicators 3.02e+10

Forest area 192630.8 0 8151356 World Bank Development Indicators 757039.4

GDP 2.49e+11 8824 2.05e+13 World Bank Development Indicators 1.14e+12

GDP growth 3.576 -64.05 149.97 World Bank Development Indicators 39

6.394

GDP per capita 11900.81 95.19 189170.9 World Bank Development Indicators 19653.02

GNI PPP 13755.55 230 124300 World Bank Development Indicators 16779.03

Gross capital formation 23.43 -2.424 67.91 World Bank Development Indicators (percent of GDP) 8.209

Measles immunization 83.447 8 99 World Bank Development Indicators 16.821

Imports (percent of GDP) 46.86 0 427.58 World Bank Development Indicators 28.28

Industry (percent of GDP) 26.72 .0034 87.80 World Bank Development Indicators 12.52

GDP inflation 34.98 -36.56 26765.9 World Bank Development Indicators 469.1

Consumer prices inflation 27.85 -18.11 23773.1 World Bank Development Indicators 398.3

Life expectancy 68.37 26.17 85.42 World Bank Development Indicators 9.733

Merchandise trade (percent 64.76 4.101 435.22 World Bank Development Indicators of GDP) 41.90

Cell subscriptions 48.28 0 345.32 World Bank Development Indicators 52.56

Mortality rate 49.39 1.7 328.6 World Bank Development Indicators 52.78

Personal remittances 1.45e+09 -5.54e+07 6.85e+10 World Bank Development Indicators 4.95e+09

Population growth 1.463 -10.95515 17.51 World Bank Development Indicators (percent) 1.544 40

Population 2.97e+07 8913 1.39e+09 World Bank Development Indicators 1.21e+08

Surface area 617496.7 2 1.71e+07 World Bank Development Indicators 1834559

Armed forces 166776 0 4135000 World Bank Development Indicators 394797.8

Labor force 1.56e+07 32016 7.87e+08 World Bank Development Indicators 6.41e+07

Asia .1250 0 1 created .3307

Americas .1990 0 1 created .3993

Africa .2450 0 1 created .4301

Europe .1692 0 1 created .3749

MiddleEast .0739 0 1 created .2616

NATO .1034 0 1 created .3045