Australia and Canada – Different Boats for Different Folks

CDA L'Institut Institute de la CAD

~ 1987 ~

THE CONFERENCE OF DEFENCE ASSOCIATIONS INSTITUTE L’INSTITUT DE LA CONFÉRENCE DES ASSOCIATIONS DE LA DÉFENSE

AUSTRALIA AND CANADA – DIFFERENT BOATS FOR DIFFERENT FOLKS

ALSO IN THIS ISSUE WHAT PAKISTAN’S POLICY IN AFGHANISTAN CAN TELL US SEVEN IMPORTANT FACTS TO KNOW ABOUT MILITARY REQUIREMENTS PLANNING SPACE AND THE THIRD OFFSET IN THE POST-POST-COLD WAR PERIOD

WINTER 2016/17 | VOLUME 21, NUMBER 2 HIVER 2016/17 | VOLUME 21, NUMÉRO 2 VOLUME 21 NUMBER 2: WINTER / HIVER 2016/17

CHAIR OF THE BOARD / PRÉSIDENT DU CONSEIL Major-General Daniel Gosselin, CMM, CD (Ret’d)

CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER / PRÉSIDENT- DIRECTEUR-GÉNÉRAL Tony Battista

EDITOR / RÉDACTEUR Dr. David S. McDonough, PhD

CDA Institute / L’Institut de la CAD 151 Slater Street, Suite 412A 151, rue Slater, Suite 412A Ottawa ON K1P 5H3

Phone / Téléphone: (613) 236 9903 Email / Courriel: [email protected] Website / Site Web: www.cdainstitute.ca

ON TRACK is published by the CDA Institute.

Mission Statement. It is the goal of the CDA Institute to promote informed public debate on security and defence issues and the vital role played by the Canadian Armed Forces in society. It is intended that ON TRACK facilitate this educational mandate by featuring articles that explore security, defence, and strategic issues that may have an impact on Canadian interests and on the safety of its citizens. The views expressed in ON TRACK are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the CDA Institute.

ON TRACK est publié par l’Institut de la CAD.

Énoncé de mission. L’Institut de la CAD a pour but de non seulement encourager un débat public éclairé à propos des problématiques concernant la sécurité et de défense canadienne, mais aussi de promouvoir le rôle vital joué par les Forces armées canadiennes dans la société. Nous souhaitons que « ON TRACK » facilite ce mandat éducatif en mettant en vedette une gamme d'articles qui explorent la sécurité, la défense et le domaine stratégique pouvant avoir un impact sur les intérêts du Canada et sur la sécurité de ses citoyens. Les points de vues exprimés dans « ON TRACK » reflètent les vues des auteurs et pas nécessairement ceux de l’Institut de la CAD.

COVER PHOTO: HMAS Warramunga, Canadian Navy Ship, HMCS Vancouver and Republic of Singapore Navy ships, RSS Vigour and RSS Valiant conducting firings in the Northern Australian Exercise Area during Exercise KAKADU 2016. (Image credit: Commonwealth of Australia.)

PHOTO DE LA PAGE COUVERTURE: HMAS Warramunga, un navire de la Marine canadienne, NCSM Vancouver et des navires de la République de Singapour, RSS Vigour et RSS Valiant effectuent des tirs dans la zone d’exercice militaire de l’Australie du Nord pendant l’exercice KAKADU 2016. (Crédit image : Commonwealth of Australia.)

Permission is granted to reproduce, in whole or in part, articles from ON TRACK. A credit line is desired. For inquiries contact the Editor, David McDonough at: david. [email protected].

Permission est accordée de reproduire en tout ou en partie des articles de « ON TRACK ». Nous souhaitons que la source soit mentionnée. Pour demander des renseignements, contactez David McDonough au [email protected]. CONTENTS

FROM THE EDITOR 2 LE MOT DU RÉDACTEUR 3 Dr. David McDonough

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR 4 15 EDITORIAL: CANADA IS BACK - THE DEFENCE BUDGET MUST GROW…SIGNIFICANTLY Tony Battista and Dr. David McDonough 5

DEFENDING CANADA IN THE 2020s? Vice-Admiral Drew Robertson (Ret’d) 7

VÉRITÉ, DEVOIR, VAILLANCE : LE CMR SAINT-JEAN RETROUVE 38 SON STATUT UNIVERSITAIRE Oksana Drozdova 9 CDA INSTITUTE BOARD OF LES STRATÉGIES ARMÉNIENNES POUR GARDER LE CONTRÔLE DIRECTORS / LE CONSEIL D’ADMINISTRATION DU HAUT-KARABAKH DE L’INSTITUT DE LA CAD Michael Lambert 12 Dr. Ian Brodie | Mr. Jamie Carroll | Mr. Richard Cohen | Mr. David Collins | PARANOID OR PRAGMATIC? WHAT PAKISTAN’S POLICY IN Major-General David Fraser (Ret’d) | Lieutenant-général Michel Gauthier (ret) AFGHANISTAN CAN TELL US ABOUT INTERNATIONAL RIVALRY | Major-General Daniel Gosselin (Ret'd) | John Mitton 15 Honorary Colonel Paul Hindo | M. Ferry de Kerckhove | Mme. Louise Mercier | Honorary Colonel Hanif (Chiko) Nanji | L’HIVER YÉMÉNITE Colonel George Petrolekas (Ret'd) | The Alexandra Dufour 21 Hon. David Pratt | Vice-Admiral Drew Robertson (Ret’d) CHEMICAL WEAPONS USE IN SYRIA AND IRAQ: IMPLICATIONS Dr. Jez Littlewood 25 COUNCIL OF ADVISORS / LE CONSEIL D’AVISEURS 2016 VIMY AWARD – ACCEPTANCE SPEECH BY RECIPIENT Major-General John Adams (Ret’d) | DR. JAMES BOUTILIER 29 Colonel Brett Boudreau (Ret’d) | Honorary Colonel Darrell Bricker | Mr. Richard EVALUATING CHINA AS A GREAT POWER: THE PARADOX OF Cohen | Mr. Terry Colfer | Dr. (Honorary Colonel) John Scott Cowan | Lieutenant- THE ‘RESPONSIBLE POWER’ NARRATIVE général Richard Evraire (ret) | Mr. Richard Adam MacDonald 33 Fadden | Honorary Lieutenant-Colonel Justin Fogarty | Brigadier-General Bernd A. Goetze, PhD (Ret’d) | Honorary Colonel SUPPORTING AN INFORMED PUBLIC DEBATE: SEVEN IMPORTANT Blake C. Goldring | Général Raymond FACTS TO KNOW ABOUT MILITARY REQUIREMENTS PLANNING Henault (ret) | Honorary Colonel Tim Hogarth | Dr. George A. Lampropoulos | Colonel Chuck Davies (Ret’d) 38 Lieutenant-général Marc Lessard (ret) | M. Pierre Lortie | Lieutenant-General George AUSTRALIA AND CANADA – DIFFERENT BOATS FOR DIFFERENT Macdonald (Ret’d) | Brigadier-General W. Don Macnamara (Ret’d) | Gen Paul FOLKS Manson | Vice-Admiral Dean McFadden Dr. Andrew Davies and Christopher Cowan 42 (Ret’d) | Mr. Sean Murray | Colonel Alain Pellerin (ret) | Honorary Captain (N) Colin Robertson | Mr. Jeffery Simpson | M. André SPACE AND THE THIRD OFFSET IN THE POST-POST-COLD WAR Sincennes | Mr. Bob Walker | Commodore PERIOD – LESSONS FOR CANADA AND AUSTRALIA Kelly Williams (Ret’d) Dr. Malcolm Davis 47 Independent and Informed CDA Institute Autonomne et renseigné FROM THE EDITOR

Dr. David McDonough

his issue of ON TRACK has a selection of articles covering Few things are more strategically salient than the rise of China as TCanadian defence policy and international security. a contemporary great power. Yet much remains unknown about the consequences of China’s rise, and whether other great powers The issue begins with an Editorial by CDA and CDA Institute (especially the United States) would be willing to accept the CEO Tony Battista and Research Manager and Senior Editor Dr. Middle Kingdom as a “responsible stakeholder” – issues further David McDonough on the pressing need for the government explored in an article by independent scholar Adam MacDonald. under Justin Trudeau to grow the Canadian defence budget. A number of concerns have been raised about the Government The next article is by Vice-Admiral Drew Robertson (Ret’d), of Canada’s approach to defence procurement, especially in CDA Institute Board of Directors, on the future direction of light of its plan to acquire 18 interim Super Hornets. Military Canadian defence policy. This article is based on his prepared requirements remain an often misunderstood criteria for defence remarks to the House Committee on National Defence and the planning. With that in mind, we are especially fortunate to have Senate Standing Committee on National Security and Defence. CDA Institute Research Fellow Chuck Davies here to discuss these issues. The government had announced the return of RMC Saint-Jean’s return to full university status in the summer. We are pleased to The Canadian government expects to complete its Defence Policy showcase an article by CDA Institute Analyst Oksana Drozdova Review (DPR) by early next year. In light of this fact, defence on the history of the college, which was originally published on analyst Francis Furtado offers advice on the broad outlines of our Blog: The Forum. Canadian defence policy.

The conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan is the subject Dr. John Blaxland once labelled Canada and Australia strategic of the next article by Michael Lambert, who recently launched cousins, and for good reasons – given their shared culture, the Caucasus Initiative. Another long-standing rivalry, between history, and international outlook, although with some important India and Pakistan, is examined by PhD candidate John Mitton geo-strategic differences based on their respective locations. from Dalhousie University. As he goes on to show, this rivalry has To explore defence relations between both countries, this issue had an impact on how both countries engage with Afghanistan. concludes with articles by experts from the Australian Strategic Policy Institute. The first, authored by Dr. Andrew Davies and We are always happy to showcase the work of promising students. Chris Cowan, explores the future of each countries naval forces. In this issue, we have an article by Alexandra Dufour – who The second is written by Dr. Malcolm Davis, and looks at the recently completed her BA at the University of Ottawa – on the potential of emerging defence technologies to both countries. conflict in Yemen. Sincerely yours, Chemical weapons have once again become an important David McDonough, PhD international issue, due not least to the chemical weapon use in Syria – and the Obama administration’s failure to follow through on its so-called “red line.” To shed light on the future of the Chemical Weapons Convention, we have an article by Dr. Jez Littlewood, Carleton University.

We are delighted to publish the acceptance speech of Dr. James Boutilier, recipient of the CDA Institute 2016 Vimy Award, who commented on the challenges facing the Asia-Pacific region in light of China’s strategic rise during the 2016 Vimy Award Gala Dinner held on 4 November 2016.

2 ON TRACK WINTER 2016/17 Independent and Informed L'Institut de la CAD Autonomne et renseigné LE MOT DU RÉDACTEUR

David McDonough, Ph. D.

e numéro de la revue ON TRACK offre au lecteur des articles l’année 2016. Dans son discours, qui a été donné lors du Dîner de Cportant sur la politique de défense canadienne et sur la Gala du Prix Vimy 2016 le 4 novembre 2016, M. James Boutilier sécurité internationale. a parlé des défis qui se posent dans la région Asie-Pacifique à la lumière de la progression stratégique de la Chine. Ce numéro débute par un éditorial du président-directeur général, Tony Battista, et du directeur de la recherche et rédacteur en Peu de sujets sont aussi stratégiquement saillants de nos jours chef, David McDonough, de la CAD et de l’Institut de la CAD que ne l’est la montée de la Chine au statut de ‘grande puissance’. concernant le besoin urgent du gouvernement de Justin Trudeau Quelles en seront les conséquences? Les États-Unis et certains d’augmenter le budget de défense du Canada. autres joueurs sur l’échiquier international accepteront-ils la Chine à titre d’acteur responsable’? Voilà sur quoi se penche Le prochain article est du Vice-amiral à la retraite, Drew Adam MacDonald, chercheur indépendant. Robertson, membre du Conseil d’administration de l’Institut de la CAD, qui nous invite à considérer l’avenir de la politique de La façon que le Gouvernement du Canada entreprend l’achat défense du Canada. Ses commentaires reprennent ceux qu’il du matériel militaire a, depuis longtemps, suscité beaucoup de a adressés récemment au Comité de la défense nationale de la commentaires. Ce fut très récemment le cas à l’annonce de l’achat Chambre des communes et au Comité sénatorial permanent de la de dix-huit (18) avions du type ‘Super Hornet’. Élément essentiel sécurité nationale et de la défense. dans la planification pour la défense du pays et en réponse aux missions que leurs donne le Gouvernement, les militaires ont la En mai dernier, le Gouvernement a annoncé le retour du Collège responsabilité d’énoncer les capacités opérationnelles dont ils militaire royal de Saint-Jean à son ancien statut universitaire. auront besoin afin de pouvoir remplir les missions données. Nous Nous vous présentons un article de Oksana Drozdova, analyste à nous réjouissons de la contribution de Chuck Davies, recherchiste l’Institut de la CAD; article paru dans le Blog ‘Forum’ de l’Institut, à l’Institut de la CAD, qui saura nous éclairer sur ces sujets. qui met de l’avant l’histoire du Collège, de ses débuts en 1952 à aujourd’hui. Le Gouvernement du Canada prévoit terminer sa Revue de la politique de défense (RPD) au début de l’an prochain. Francis Le conflit entre l’Arménie et l’Azerbaïdjan est le sujet des remarques Furtado, analyste de défense, fait part de sa pensée concernant les de Michael Lambert. Elles sont suivies d’un article signé John grands enjeux de cette politique. Mitton, candidat au doctorat à l’Université Dalhousie, qui suggère que le très long conflit entre l’Inde et le Pakistan influence la Le professeur John Blaxland de l’Australian National University a relation qu’entretiennent ces ceux pays avec l’Afghanistan. déjà avancé l’idée d’un cousinage stratégique Australie-Canada, Nous sommes heureux de vous présenter, dans nos revues On compte tenu, selon lui, d’un partage culturel, historique et de Track, le travail d’étudiants qui ont su se démarquer. C’est donc vision internationale, ceci malgré une divergence géo stratégique Alexandra Dufour, titulaire d’un baccalauréat de l’Université importante. Pour conclure ce numéro de la revue On Track et afin d’Ottawa, qui nous offrira le fruit de sa pensée sur le conflit au d’explorer les liens de défense entre ces deux pays, deux experts Yémen. de l’Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Andrew Davies et Chris Cowan, se pencheront sur l’avenir des forces navales des deux Les armes chimiques ont encore fait la une de l’actualité au niveau pays. Le mot de la fin revient à Malcolm Davis qui jette un regard international suite à leur emploi en Syrie et l’échec du Président sur le potentiel des technologies émergentes dans le domaine de la Obama à tenir promesse concernant la soi-disant ‘ligne rouge’. Jaz défense dans ces mêmes deux pays. Littlewood, professeur à l’Université Carleton d’Ottawa, nous livre sa pensée sur l’avenir de la Convention sur les armes chimiques, Cordialement suite à ces événements. David McDonough, Ph.D.

Nous sommes ravis de publier le discours d’acceptation de M. James Boutilier, lauréat du Prix Vimy de l’Institut de la CAD de

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LETTERS TO THE EDITOR end of the stick when it came to funds really do need to sort out the fundamental for training, equipment and readiness philosophy of what we want from our Sir sustainability, the part-time, “gifted Reserve forces. I have already suggested amateur” model worked well enough. elsewhere that perhaps it is time we tear Dr. Howard Coombs discussion (“What down what we have and rebuild it brick is Wrong with Canada’s Reserves?” Well about twenty years ago this all by brick, but we have to have a vision Summer 2016) focuses at a relatively started to change. Community foot-print for that. I am not confident the Defence high level of strategic and operational seemed to matter less. What the Regulars Policy Review will provide one.  awareness. He does not mention one wanted were augmentation forces for important factor and that is what I would on-going operations. Reservists did well Your sincerely term our inability to develop and state a when called upon - MCDV manning, philosophy of what we really want our Afghanistan etc., but many stopped David Collins Reserve Forces to be. being part-timers and were expected to (CDA Institute Board Member and become full-timers in order to gain the retired Reserve officer) The original concept for our Reservists training and experience to be useful on 22 September 2016 foresaw part-time soldiers, sailors and the battlefield. As a result many reserve air personnel who provided a foot-print units have been left as little more than in small and large communities across administrative holding pens for a never the nation flying the flag as best they ending revolving door of unit members could. By and large they never attained who come and go from active duty. the operational prowess of Regulars, but were not expected to. And given that the The two models could co-exist, in my Reserves have been always on the short view, but to support Dr Coombs, we Commissionaires AD CDA_Layout 1 2016-10-17 5:16 PM Page 1

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4 ON TRACK WINTER 2016/17 Independent and Informed L'Institut de la CAD Autonomne et renseigné

EDITORIAL CANADA IS BACK – THE DEFENCE BUDGET MUST GROW…SIGNIFICANTLY by Tony Battista and Dr. David McDonough

he Canadian government triggered a draconian measure is certainly at odds (DRDC) report that has (coincidentally?) Tsome controversy with its most recent over the government’s stated position on disappeared from the DND/DRDC defence policy announcement – that it transparency and openness, and raises website. now plans to delay the open competition questions about the underlying intent for the CF-18 replacement by five years, of such a policy. Is it really only about And is the interim Super Hornet fleet and instead opt to procure an interim fleet protecting sensitive information or trade to be a permanent fixture of the RCAF of 18 Super Hornets as a stopgap measure secrets? Or is it simply a way to prevent force structure? Or is it merely a bridging to fill what it says is a capability gap. officials from criticizing the government’s fleet that will be retired soon after the handling of this file after they leave office? permanent CF-18 replacement are The subsequent news stories following this delivered? Of note, Australia had planned announcement have only raised further Of course, much remains unknown about for a bridging fleet with its own Super questions. It now appears this capability how the government will ultimately Hornet purchase, which quickly emerged gap only arose following a policy shift in proceed with its plan. What fighter aircraft as a permanent mixed arrangement, the government’s approach (and increase) will realistically be available to compete in with all its attendant additional costs. in commitments, especially to its NATO the CF-18 replacement competition in Then there is the matter of what is the and NORAD commitments. Without five years’ time? With the exception of the requisite size our fighter fleet in light of further information on the rationale, it is F-35, most of the other possible aircraft the government’s increased commitments difficult to make any definite assessment will already be at their mid-life point by to NORAD and NATO – and whether the about this decision. that time. And will the US government permanent CF-18 replacement will take even agree to sell interim Super Hornets? that number into consideration? Clearly, it is the government’s prerogative Lest it be forgotten, Lockheed Martin to set policy, although the timing of it, remains the single largest contractor for Is Canada’s defence budget large enough when the government was trying to the American government, and there is to handle the governments reported justify a plan for interim Super Hornets, little doubt that Washington has a vested and impending defence decisions? is certainly curious. One must then ask interest in the future of the F-35 – and What conclusions can be made from the about the extent to which subject matter much less so with the Super Hornet, which many procurements, as well as current experts were consulted on this decision, is becoming a legacy aircraft for them. and emerging military commitments and whether such a decision should more (procurement of an interim fleet of fighter properly be part of the Defence Policy Yet the most worrisome aspects of this aircraft, a major building of new naval Review (DPR) – and the value of the DPR decision is on the question of cost. How ships, increasing the CAF operational when such key decisions are taken outside much will it cost to purchase an interim tempo with new deployments to Latvia of it? Super Hornet fleet? What is the additional and to a still unknown locale in Africa cost of operating a mixed fleet? A possible (possibly Mali), current anti-ISIL mission Another equally troubling story is that answer to the former can be seen in in the Mideast, and likely more money for the government has forced over 200 civil Australia’s purchase of 24 Super Hornets recruiting, training, education, readiness, servants involved in the CF-18 replacement for 6.1-billion (Australian $). A roughly retention and transition)? project to sign lifetime non-disclosure similar amount could be expected. On the agreements. Given that there are already latter, it will undoubtedly be an expensive Moreover, what will the budgetary situation existing stringent measures to protect proposition – as noted in a Defence be like in five years, when Canada expects classified government information, such Research and Development Canada to choose a permanent CF-18 replacement

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central legacy of the current government with both a large deficit and an ill-equipped Canadian Armed Forces.

As a result, the next budget in 2017 may be the most feasible opportunity for the government to increase the baseline of the defence budget – and to put National Defence in a better position to deal with the expected military requirements of the foreseeable future. It also coincides with the arrival of the Trump administration in the United States, which many expect will make burden-sharing a centrepiece of its engagement with key allies.

A decision by the Trudeau government to increase (L-R): CDS General Jonathan Vance, Minister of National Defence Harjit Sajjan, Minister of Public Services and Procurement Judy Foote, and defence spending starting Minister of Innovation, Science, and Economic Development Navdeep Bains at a press conference on the government’s CF-18 Replacement project. (Image credit: Department of National Defence) with the next Federal Budget could go a long way fleet? Then, it will have to address other deployments. But much depends on to establish its credibility competing spending priorities in other whether there will be sufficient funds to when it comes to security and defence areas of security and defence, but also on allow for such growth. policies, to look after Canada’s short and social programs, health, dealing with the long-term security and defence needs, effects of climate change and its challenges It seems clear: The Defence Budget Has and to reassuring our American ally on on the environment, a direr financial to Go Up! Canada’s defence budget this issue.  situation for many western countries, and needs to grow starting with this next social upheaval (extremism, nationalism, Federal Budget. As the recent Senate Tony Battista is the Chief Executive Officer protectionism, etc), not to mention the Standing Committee on National Security of the CDA and CDA Institute. resurgence of China and Russia? and Defence report on UN peacekeeping notes, the government needs to “ensure Dr. David McDonough is Research As the PBO and others have pointed out, adequate funding is available to meet the Manager and Senior Editor at the the existing budget is simply too small operational priorities of the Canadian Conference of Defence Associations for the existing force structure. And the Armed Forces” – and this is as true with Institute (CDA Institute), and a Research government has shown little interest in the government’s plan for peace support Fellow at the Centre for the Study of decreasing either personnel numbers or missions as it is with national priorities Security and Development (formerly CFPS) basing infrastructure to make things more and commitments to NORAD and NATO. at Dalhousie University. manageable. Indeed, as its decision on the interim Super Hornets seems to indicate, And the window of opportunity for such it may have set itself on the road to growth may be limited. After all, the acquiring more fighter aircraft than even government plans on running deficits, its predecessor. That is not necessarily a but will likely need to start curtailing bad outcome, and may indeed be a silver spending prior to the next election in three lining of sorts – as having more aircraft years. Otherwise, what will likely grow will allow the CAF greater flexibility is a substantive commitment-capability in terms of readiness and operational gap, leaving behind an unpalatable

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DEFENDING CANADA IN THE 2020s

prepared by Vice-Admiral Drew Robertson

he Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) Notwithstanding this unbroken record policy. The effect is that this G7 nation, Tresponds to and deters other of success, the RCN’s capabilities and with all its maritime interests at home powers in our home waters, working capacities have eroded steadily over and abroad, has seen its replenishment with the Royal Canadian Air Force. But the past 20 years, incrementally but ships and its destroyers age into their all governments have also repeatedly increasingly compromising its ability to mid-forties before being forced out of deployed the RCN to respond wherever defend Canada or to act as a force for commission—not merely without relief, our national interests are challenged, good abroad. but without governments having even rather than wait for entered into contracts to build challenges to arrive off our their replacements. coasts. "But the ability of this government and those that follow to live off these legacy The RCN’s successes of the last Indeed such deployments 20 years were due to investments to undertake peace support investments is rapidly coming to a close, in the fighting fleets that defend operations, whether even as the strategic risks it has had to Canada made decades before, conducted under United from the 1960s onward. Here Nations Security Council assume deepen." I include our submarines, authorized missions, frigates, destroyers, maritime resolutions, fundamental patrol aircraft and helicopters. global treaties like the UN Conventions on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) , or the Strategic Risks Today But the ability of this government and UN Charter, have been the core business those that follow to live off these legacy on which our governments have There has been progress. The frigates, investments is rapidly coming to a close, dispatched the RCN abroad, amounting now well past mid-life, have been even as the strategic risks it has had to to dozens of deployments globally by successfully modernized, and our assume deepen. our ships, submarines and aircraft, and submarines are operational. task groups in the last 25 years, even As a result, beyond having lost capacity, while the fleet at home secured our Further, the National Shipbuilding Canada no longer has the ability to sovereignty. Strategy is an important undertaking independently control events at sea due of considerable promise. The question to the loss of its task group air defence Governments have repeatedly deployed isn’t whether Canada will successfully capability, and Canada no longer has naval forces on such operations because build warships: we always have. The the ability to independently sustain supporting the international rules- question is whether their numbers and deployed task group operations and based order – anchored by the UN capabilities will be adequate to the rising must rely on others for at-sea refuelling Charter, treaties and conventions – has challenges. and logistics support, even in home produced the peace and security on waters. which our trade and prosperity depend. The key issue is that, over the last 20 Governments do so since acting as a years, a succession of previous prime Consequently, Canada is unlikely to force for good is in Canada’s abiding ministers and eight parliaments have be able to conduct a prolonged multinational interest. been unable to sustainably resource rotation response to international the Defence outcomes they set out in events of the kind it has done repeatedly,

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nor is it likely to be offered the two separate theatres, that would no capable maritime force. significant international leadership longer be sustainable with a smaller fleet opportunities at sea that such a response But most importantly, such a force This DPR presents a moment of strategic enables, particularly in complex multi- would not be suitable or adequate for opportunity—an opportunity to not only national operations, as has also been the vast challenge of defending our bring defence outcomes and resources done repeatedly, including after 9/11 three-ocean home waters. This much into an urgently needed balance but to supporting our American allies for smaller and unbalanced future force allow the CAF to be restructured for several years. would consequently not be adequate the challenges of this century. The force to national need, especially given the structure of the 20th century that several Looking Ahead rapid changes underway in the global reviews of defence policy reconciled maritime order: themselves to needs reshaping for the Looking ahead, on the present course, challenges of the decades ahead. future governments face greater • As nations throughout the world, reductions and rising risks. but especially Russia and China, Such strategy-driven measures will continue to narrow or close the take vision, commitment, and effort Today’s RCN fighting fleet of technological gaps that western over many years. But the result will be a submarines and surface combatants navies have enjoyed for decades CAF better prepared to defend Canada is already smaller than research has and make significant investments in at home and act as a force for good shown required to meet enduring policy maritime forces, particularly in the abroad.  outcomes. Asia-Pacific; • As great state cooperation continues This is an edited version of remarks Yet, as the Parliamentary Budget Officer to give way to competition and delivered to the House Committee and others have noted, the Canadian confrontation at the expense of the on National Defence and the Senate Armed Forces (CAF) is unsustainable rules-based international order, Standing Committee on National over the coming decade, likely to an especially at sea and most notably Security and Defence by VAdm amount in the tens of billions of dollars. in the South and East China Seas, Robertson (retired) on behalf of the Naval So, plans aimed at restoring the fighting and finally; Association of Canada. fleet’s capacity, including to extend the • As Canada’s third and largest, but life of Canada’s four highly capable least accessible and most fragile, Vice-Admiral Drew Robertson (Ret’d) Victoria-class submarines into the mid- ocean space, opens to commercial is a former commander of the Royal 2030s, and replace them with a new shipping and resource extraction, Canadian Navy and is member of the submarine capability as well to replace and as the RCN secures our CDA Institute Board of Directors. as our Aurora Maritime Patrol aircraft, sovereignty in a time of significant are not just in jeopardy, they are headed nation-building in the Arctic. hard aground. Conclusions At current budget levels, one can & Recommendations anticipate the RCN’s fighting fleet being further reduced over the coming 15 years. The success of the Government’s Reduced eventually toward speculation Defence Policy Review (DPR) depends in the press of just 9 surface combatants on bringing spending levels into balance (a 40 percent cut from the 15 of just two over the medium – to – long term with years ago), while the submarines and the the defence outcomes governments RCAF’s maritime patrol aircraft will not expect. Defending Canada in the new likely be affordable or replaced. strategic environment will require increased investment in defence if the Such changes would compound the risks CAF is to achieve what governments I cited earlier by significantly eroding expect, rather than less. the maritime capabilities and capacities required to contribute meaningfully to In making such investments, there is no continental or international operations. better insurance against strategic risk While for decades the government has and unforeseen global shocks than a often had major warships deployed in balanced, multi-purpose and combat-

8 ON TRACK WINTER 2016/17 Independent and Informed L'Institut de la CAD Autonomne et renseigné

VÉRITÉ, DEVOIR, VAILLANCE : LE CMR SAINT-JEAN RETROUVE SON STATUT UNIVERSITAIRE by Oksana Drozdova

e ministre de la Défense nationale des officiers, dont environ 15,3 pour cent l’admission aux collèges à l’extérieur de la LHarjit Sajjan a annoncé le 17 mai des officiers de l’infanterie canadienne. province. Ces considérations ont été au 2016 que le Collège militaire royal de Ces chiffres ont été particulièrement cœur de l’argument pour créer un collège Saint-Jean (CMR Saint-Jean) allait révélateurs puisque les Canadiens militaire francophone au Québec. de nouveau accorder des diplômes français représentaient 29 pour cent de la de niveau universitaire. Avant cela, population canadienne à ce moment-là. L’Université Laval à Québec avait le Collège militaire royal du Canada initialement présenté un plan pour (CMRC), à Kingston, en Ontario, était En 1951, un comité spécial dirigé par établir un programme de premier la seule université militaire au Canada le brigadier-général Paul Bernatchez, cycle de trois ans dans les sciences qui conférait des diplômes universitaires. le seul officier francophone de haut militaires qui comprendrait également Une deuxième université est donc un rang à Ottawa à l’époque, a été mis en une formation approfondie en anglais. heureux ajout pour les raisons exposées place pour étudier et corriger la sous- Toutefois, selon la tradition au Québec, ci-dessous. Cependant, ce qui ressortait représentation des francophones au sein l’éducation était également influencée par le plus dans l’annonce du ministre Sajjan, des FAC. Les résultats de cette enquête l’Église catholique romaine. Ainsi, deux à part la question de l’éducation militaire, ont été publiés dans deux documents ecclésiastiques, l’abbé Jacques Garneau et était ses commentaires sur le patrimoine aujourd’hui connus sous les noms de Mgr Maurice Roy, étaient supposés être bilingue du Canada. Rapport Bernatchez et Rapport Jetté. largement impliqués dans le nouveau Ces rapports ont ensuite été présentés à programme. Toutefois, le ministre En effet, le CMR Saint-Jean (désigné Brooke Claxton, le ministre de la Défense Claxton considérait l’engagement Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean de nationale de l’époque, pour aider sa prise religieux dans les affaires de l’éducation 1952 à 1995) est maintenant prêt à faire de décision. militaire comme indésirable et le plan a à nouveau une contribution académique, été mis de côté. culturelle et bilingue importante pour le À l’époque, l’éducation militaire développement professionnel du corps des spécialisée était fournie par le CMRC à L’idée de créer un collège militaire officiers des Forces armées canadiennes Kingston et le Canadian Services College, francophone a graduellement mobilisé (FAC). La principale raison de la création Royal Roads (rebaptisé plus tard Royal l’opinion publique et a créé un lobby du collège en 1952 était la nécessité Roads Military College), à Victoria, fort qui a convaincu le gouvernement d’accroître la présence francophone dans Colombie-Britannique. Les élèves fédéral d’agir. La campagne a été menée les FAC qui, pour des raisons historiques, francophones avaient peu ou pas d’accès par Léon Balcer, un député conservateur avaient été largement linguistiquement et à ces institutions. Tout d’abord, la barrière de Trois-Rivières. Cependant, plusieurs culturellement anglophone. Le collège a linguistique était importante, car les deux points principaux devaient être pris en offert une opportunité à des Canadiens collèges offraient une éducation en anglais considération pour avancer le plan. Le français de faire leurs premiers pas seulement. Deuxièmement, compte tenu nouveau programme devait être adaptée vers le développement professionnel et que l’éducation relève des compétences aux spécificités du système d’éducation du académique militaire dans leur langue provinciales, il y avait des différences Québec et se conformer aux normes déjà maternelle et dans un environnement ente le système d’éducation du Québec et établies par les deux collèges, à Kingston culturel francophone. En 1951, un an ceux des autres provinces. Par exemple, et à Victoria, comblant ainsi l’écart entre avant que le CMR Saint-Jean a ouvert pour un diplômé d’une école secondaire les deux systèmes d’éducation. Enfin, ses portes, les francophones de la FAC du Québec, une année supplémentaire il devait être un programme complet, représentaient 6,9 pour cent du corps était nécessaire pour se qualifier pour autonome fonctionnant sur le territoire

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Cadets marching at CMR Saint-Jean. (Image credit: Corporation du Fort St-Jean.)

du Québec et, surtout, répondre aux universitaire à l’année pré-universitaire L’Université de Sherbrooke est devenue besoins des FAC. existante. Le collège a injecté un grand le partenaire officiel du collège dès avril nombre d’officiers bilingues au sein 1971. Brooke Claxton a annoncé le 12 juin des forces armées, mais, en 1966, le 1952 la création d’un collège militaire bilinguisme restait toujours un défi Ce partenariat a donné au CMR Saint- au Québec. Trois emplacements ont été majeur. Telles étaient les conclusions de Jean un coup de pouce important. examinés : la ville de Québec, Trois- la Commission royale sur le bilinguisme En 1980, les premières étudiantes du Rivières et Saint-Jean. Ce dernier et le biculturalisme, dont les résultats Programme de formation des officiers de emplacement avait l’avantage d’être un ont été repris par le chef d’état-major la Force régulière (PFOR) ont franchi les point de repère dans l’histoire militaire de la Défense, le général Jean-Victor portes du collège. Pourtant, le premier du Canada. Situé à une quarantaine de Allard. La discussion du bilinguisme groupe d’élèves-officiers féminins faisait kilomètres au sud-est de Montréal, sur atteint son sommet en 1969, lorsque le son entrée au collège en 1979 dans le la rivière Richelieu, Saint-Jean a vu sa Parlement a adopté la Loi sur les langues cadre du Programme de formation première forteresse érigée au XVII siècle. officielles (1969), la loi fédérale qui élevé universitaire pour les anciens militaires Les cours ont commencé à Saint-Jean le français et l’anglais au rang de langues du rang (PFUMR). Six ans plus tard, en le 22 septembre 1952 et la cérémonie officielles dans la fonction publique 1985, quand l’Assemblée nationale du d’ouverture officielle du Collège fédérale. Pour accroître la présence de Québec a adopté le projet de loi 222, le militaire royal de Saint-Jean a pris place la langue française dans le corps des collège est devenu une université dotée le 13 novembre sous la présidence du officiers de la FAC, le général Allard a du pouvoir de décerner ses propres gouverneur général du Canada, Vincent annoncé qu’une formation complète de diplômes de premier cycle. Au début Massey. premier cycle en sciences physiques et des années 1990, le CMR Saint-Jean en sciences de l’administration serait avait décerné environ 1.400 diplômes de Les premiers étudiants à franchir les offerte dès l’automne 1970 à Saint-Jean. premier cycle. portes du collège étaient au nombre Cette initiative audacieuse a nécessité de 125. Par la suite, la population un partenariat avec une université qui En 1995, le gouvernement libéral de étudiante s’éleva progressivement, en serait disposée à accorder les certificats Jean Chrétien annonçait dans son raison de l’addition de deux ans d’études appropriés aux diplômés du collège. budget des coupures draconiennes qui

10 ON TRACK WINTER 2016/17 Independent and Informed L'Institut de la CAD Autonomne et renseigné touchaient particulièrement le ministère du collège militaire ont été modifiés, importante, cherche à remplir la mission de la Défense nationale. Au début, le contribuant à la baisse des candidats qui lui a été initialement accordée dans les gouvernement a proposé des réductions du Québec. Finalement, les activités années 1950 : rendre le corps des officiers du nombre de bases militaires et de de promotion et de recrutement des forces armées canadiennes bilingues centres de recherché. Cependant, ces étaient désorganisées et incohérentes, en théorie et en pratique.  coupures draconiennes ont aussi affecté affaiblissant ainsi la visibilité du le CMR Saint-Jean et le Royal Roads programme d’année préparatoire au Cet article repose principalement sur les Military College, qui ont été fermés par Québec. ouvrages suivants de Jacques Castonguay la suite. La fermeture a non seulement : Le Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean affecté les 600 étudiants inscrits au CMR Pourtant, le ministère de la Défense (Montréal, Éditions du Méridien, 1989) Saint-Jean à l’époque, mais a aussi menacé nationale a continué de promouvoir et Pourquoi a-t-on fermé le Collège l’avenir de la représentation francophone le programme d’année préparatoire et militaire de Saint-Jean ? (Montréal, dans les FAC. d’utiliser sa pleine capacité. Au début de Art global, 2005). Il a été publié pour la 2007, il est devenu clair que le programme première fois le 8 septembre 2016 dans le Par ailleurs, la sempiternelle question de avait rempli son mandat, ouvrant ainsi Blog de l’Institut de la CAD: The Forum. l’écart d’un an entre le régime québécois de nouvelles possibilités d’expansion. Le d’études secondaires et le système CMR Saint-Jean a rouvert ses portes le Oksana Drozdova est une analyste à universitaire ontarien refit surface. Il 19 juillet 2007 en tant qu’unité distincte l’Institut de la CAD et une étudiante de était clair qu’une année préparatoire était des FAC, relevant directement du maîtrise à l’École supérieure d’affaires nécessaire pour que les élèves du Québec commandant de l’Académie canadienne publiques et internationales (ÉSAPI). Ses puissent appliquer à CMRC. La solution de la Défense. Il avait aussi le nouveau intérêts de recherché portent sur la sécurité est venue d’une source inattendue mandat d’offrir une formation collégiale internationale, les études est-européennes lorsque le Conseil économique du reconnue par le ministère de l’Éducation et les questions d’État dans la théorie Haut-Richelieu, un organisme local, a du Québec, en sciences humaines ou en politique. proposé d’offrir des cours universitaires sciences de la nature, d’une durée de deux préparatoires au CMR Saint-Jean en ans. De plus, les élèves ayant déjà obtenu partenariat avec le Cégep de Saint-Jean- une formation collégiale pouvaient sur-Richelieu. Cette solution a créé un suivre un programme universitaire d’une accès pour les étudiants du Québec et a année, équivalant à la première année encore une fois offert aux élèves-officiers universitaire du Collège militaire royal anglophones l’opportunité d’améliorer de Kingston. Équipé avec les ressources leur compétence dans leur langue nécessaires, des installations, un demi- seconde dans un environnement culturel siècle d’expérience dans le domaine francophone. militaire et de l’éducation scolaire et un fort désir de contribuer à la nature Le programme de l’Année préparatoire a bilingue des Forces armées canadiennes, été bien accueilli. Les élèves anglophones, le CMR Saint-Jean était sur le point en particulier ceux de l’Ontario, ont vu le de redevenir une institution de niveau programme comme un moyen idéal pour universitaire. améliorer leur français et pour bénéficier d’une préparation supplémentaire avant Mai 2016 a marqué le début d’une d’être admis à Kingston. Ainsi, le nombre nouvelle ère pour le collège lorsque le de candidats de l’Ontario à Saint-Jean gouvernement libéral a annoncé que plus que triplé entre août 2001 et mai des études postsecondaires seraient 2006 passant de 41 à 134 personnes. réintégrées au CMR Saint-Jean. Dans Néanmoins, le nombre de francophones son annonce faite à la Chambre des et les étudiants du Québec ont continué communes et réitérée dans un message de baisser pour plusieurs raisons. Tout Twitter subséquent, ministre Sajjan a d’abord, la fermeture initiale du collège souligné que « le retour du CMR Saint- et la controverse qui lui est associée Jean au statut universitaire a été un ont continué à nourrir une perception reflet du Canada et de notre patrimoine publique négative, en particulier dans les bilingue ». Le nouveau CMR Saint Jean milieux francophones. Deuxièmement, qui, de concert avec le CMRC Kingston, les normes d’admission et de sélection constitue une institution nationale

ON TRACK HIVER 2016/17 11 Independent and Informed CDA Institute Autonomne et renseigné LES STRATÉGIES ARMÉNIENNES POUR GARDER LE CONTRÔLE DU HAUT- KARABAKH

par Michael Lambert

a résurgence du conflit dans le Haut- cette approche, Staline pouvait jouer le conflit du Karabakh pose problème LKarabakh, territoire séparatiste de sur les sensibilités identitaires de ces en raison de la présence des troupes du l’Azerbaïdjan et sous contrôle de facto régions pour créer des tensions au sein Karabakh qui occupent des territoires de l’Arménie, interroge sur la légitimité des États, les menacent d’une potentielle peuplés d’azéris - les “territoires occupés” de la Communauté internationale à guerre civile si ces derniers n’acceptaient - afin de créer une zone tampon entre prendre position dans les conflits qui pas de mettre en œuvre les directives du l’enclave et l’armée azerbaïdjanaise. animent l’espace post-soviétique.1 Pour Kremlin. Cette occupation arbitraire pose les membres de l’ONU, notamment pour plusieurs problèmes allant du domaine les États-Unis, la France et la Grande Après la fin de la Guerre froide, et humanitaire avec les difficultés que Bretagne, le Karabakh est une partie de l’effondrement de la puissance de Moscou, connaissent les azéris pour reloger les l’Azerbaïdjan en raison de la transition du les régions rattachées arbitrairement déplacés internes / réfugiés, au dialogue droit soviétique qui plaçait cette région souhaitent une plus large autonomie et diplomatique complexe pour la mise sous l’influence de Baku.2 entrent souvent en confrontation avec en place d’un processus de paix car ne les pays dont ils dépendaient pendant la concernant plus désormais le Karabakh Le territoire est peuplé d’habitants période soviétique, et ce pour des motifs historique, mais également l’affiliation d’origine arménienne, l’influence de allant de la préservation de leur identité des territoires occupés. Dans un dernier la culture chrétienne y est palpable, au refus de partager leurs richesses. temps, les occidentaux considèrent que le par opposition à l’Islam pratiqué en Karabakh est une partie de l’Azerbaïdjan Azerbaijan, et on retrouve dans cette Dans le cas du Haut-Karabakh, un conformément au droit international enclave un héritage culinaire, artistique conflit sanglant éclate entre les azéris, qui hérite du droit soviétique, niant la et architectural indéniablement proche qui considèrent que le territoire doit être réalité du terrain par crainte de voir de celui de l’Arménie.3 Le choix de Staline sous leur supervision comme pendant naitre chez eux des revendications de rattacher à l’Azerbaïdjan pourrait dès la période soviétique, et d’autre part les identitaires à l’image de l’indépendance lors s’apparenter à un paradoxe ou à un habitants du Karabakh qui souhaitent un de la Catalogne, de l’Écosse ou bien manque de connaissance de cette partie rattachement au reste de l’Arménie car des Flandres. La Russie, pour sa part, du monde plutôt qu’à un choix murement ils en sont proche culturellement. Cette préfère laisser la situation dans cet état de réfléchit, ce qui n’était pas le cas. En effet, confrontation violente qui prendra fin manière à inciter l’Arménie à dépendre le rattachement de minorités antagonistes en 1994 donnera naissance à ce que l’on totalement d’elle pour assurer sa sécurité se retrouve à travers l’ensemble de l’Union appel un “conflit gelé” et pose plusieurs dans une région ou l’Azerbaïdjan connait soviétique, ce processus constituant problèmes à l’époque contemporaine. un regain de puissance conséquent.4 la pierre angulaire d’une méthode permettant d’assoir le contrôle de Moscou La premier n’est autre que les Pour la Russie, le Karabakh est une sur les pays en périphérie de l’URSS. Le relations bilatérales entre l’Arménie et source de problèmes et un moyen d’assoir choix de mettre ensemble le Karabakh l’Azerbaïdjan dans le contexte post- sa puissance dans le Caucase du Sud.5 et l’Azerbaijan ne constitue dès lors soviétique, ou ces deux États rompent le Le conflit affaiblit économiquement qu’un cas parmi tant d’autres, à l’image dialogue, enterrant toute possibilité de l’Arménie, qui est la principale alliée du de l’Abkhazie et de l’Ossétie du Sud lancer un projet d’Union du Caucase du Kremlin face à la Turquie qui est membre rattachées à la Géorgie, la Transnistrie Sud, et donc d’autonomie vis-à-vis des de l’OTAN. Qui plus est, l’attitude en Moldavie, ou encore les minorités grandes puissances telles que la Russie ambiguë sur l’affiliation de la région laisse russophones dans les pays Baltes. Avec et la Turquie. Dans un deuxième temps, toujours planer un doute sur l’intention

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stratégie temporaire pour s’assurer le soutien de la Russie pour accroitre son influence dans le Haut-Karabakh. Les arméniens espéraient que celle-ci reconnaisse la région comme une partie de l’Union eurasiatique, et donc du pays, mais ce ne fut pas le cas. Implicitement, ces derniers espéraient également qu’en cas d’attaque de la part des azéris, la Russie interviendrait militairement pour défendre le Une carte de la région du Caucase du Sud. (Crédit image : Caucasus Initiative.) Karabakh, avec un possible envoi de Moscou de solutionner le conflit de qu’une attaque contre le pays enclenchera de ‘‘peacekeepers’’ manière définitive, ce qui la discrédite aux une réponse immédiate de la part du comme en Abkhazie. Au contraire, les yeux de la Communauté internationale Kremlin. L’Arménie se retrouve dès azéris qui ont lancé une attaque en avril mais aussi des pays du Caucase. lors dans l’obligatoire de laisser le 2016 n’ont rencontré aucun russe sur leur Kremlin s’ingérer dans sa vie militaire passage, et Moscou s’est imposé comme Parallèlement à ces problèmes, l’ambiguïté afin d’endiguer toute possible attaque médiateur dans le conflit, ne soutenant confère également plusieurs avantages. des azéris, constituant un avantage aucun parti plus que l’autre.7 Comme mentionné précédemment il stratégique certain pour Moscou qui est impossible d’envisager une Union place ses troupes au centre du Caucase et Dès lors, le Karabakh continue d’être du Caucase du Sud sans résoudre les à proximité de la Turquie.6 isolé, à attendre un mouvement de conflits, ce qui laisse la porte ouverte la Communauté internationale qui pour une ingérence totale du Kremlin La stratégie arménienne pour garder n’arrivera pas, et de compter sur ses dans une région qui dispose pourtant le contrôle du Haut-Karabakh est donc soldats et leur connaissance du terrain de tous les avantages pour prospérer de privilégier à tout prix la relation pour garantir la sécurité des habitants. économiquement. À cela s’ajoute la singulière et amicale avec la Russie, au Le Gouvernement de la République dépendance totale de l’Arménie qui se risque d’écarter définitivement toute du Karabakh n’hésite pas également retrouve dans la nécessité de laisser la perspective d’adhésion au sein de l’OTAN à installer dans les territoires occupés Russie disposer d’une base militaire et de l’Union européenne, ou simplement les réfugiés d’origine arménienne qui russe sur son territoire. En effet, depuis d’indépendance. Un exemple de ce choix viennent de Syrie, et ce afin de légitimer la fin de la Guerre froide, l’Arménie doit stratégique risqué se retrouve dans le leur occupation d’un territoire plus vaste faire face à de nombreuses difficultés souhait d’intégrer le projet d’Union que le Karabakh historique. Avec cette économiques tandis que l’Azerbaïdjan eurasiatique (Union Économique approche qui vise à instrumentaliser dispose de ressources en gaz et pétrole Eurasiatique) en 2015. Ce format les réfugiés, il apparait comme évident qui en font le pays le plus prospère de de coopération renforcé exclut tout qu’aucune solution diplomatique et la région. Cette manne énergétique rapprochement avec l’Alliance et l’UE et pacifique ne saurait émerger dans cette permet aux azéris de moderniser leur enterre définitivement la possibilité de se partie du monde, qui pourtant bénéficie armée avec des équipements supérieurs détacher de l’influence de la Russie tant de tous les avantages pour devenir une à ceux des arméniens. En conséquence, sur un plan économique que culturel puissance autonome si elle envisageait les arméniens doivent demander l’aide en raison des institutions régionales de mettre en place une coopération de Moscou pour assurer leur sécurité, dont le pays devient membre. L’Arménie régionale similaire à celle de l’Union avec des accords bilatéraux qui stipulent est cependant sortie perdante de cette européenne.

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Les habitants du Karabakh, arméniens et 4. Anna Maria Dyner, azéris attendent dès lors des États-Unis Zasztowt Konrad, ou de la Turquie une intervention pour “The Escalation of the débloquer la situation, une impossibilité Conflict in Nagorno- dans la mesure ou le conflit sert les Karabakh: Causes intérêts de la Russie qui vend des armes and Probable Course,” à l’ensemble des protagonistes, et laisse PISM Bulletin (2016), donc reposer son influence sur l’héritage https://www.pism.pl/ de la diplomatie stalinienne.  publications/bulletin/ no-26-876. Doctorant en Histoire des Relations internationale à Sorbonne Universités 5. P. Kolsto, H. (Paris-Sorbonne, France) et en Relations Blackkisrud, “Living internationales à l’Université de Tampere with non-recognition: (Finlande), ses recherches portent les State and Nation- relations entre l’Union européenne et building in south l’OTAN avec la Russie dans l’espace post- Caucasian,” Europe-Asia soviétique. Après une expérience à l’IRSEM Studies 60, (2008): pp. - Ministère de la Défense française et un 483–509. séjour de recherche à l’Université d’Ottawa en tant que chercheur invité, il lance le 6. Konrad Zasztowt, projet Caucasus Initiative en avril 2016. ‘Russia in the South Caucasus: Conflict Caucasus Initiative a été lancé Management and en avril 2016 et rassemble Business with plusieurs chercheurs en Europe Oligarchs,” PISM et à l’international. Le projet Bulletin (2015), se propose d’analyser les mutations http://www.pism.pl/ géopolitiques, juridiques et migratoires publications/bulletin/ dans le Caucase Sud (Géorgie, Arménie, no-76-808. Azerbaïdjan, Abkhazie, Ossétie du Sud et Haut-Karabakh). 7. Deyon, “Conflit du Haut-Karabagh.”

Notes

1. Sophie Deyon, “Conflit du Haut- Karabagh : le ressenti des acteurs locaux,” IRIS Analyses (2016), http:// www.iris-france.org/78664-conflit- du-haut-karabagh-le-ressenti-des- acteurs-locaux/.

2. Tobias Schumacher, “Armenia, Azerbaijan and the Nagorno- Karabakh conflict: why the ‘black garden’ will not blossom any time soon,” Egmont (2016), http://www. egmontinstitute.be/wp-content/ uploads/2016/04/PB71.pdf.

3. Ibid.

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PARANOID OR PRAGMATIC? WHAT PAKISTAN’S POLICY IN AFGHANISTAN CAN TELL US ABOUT INTERNATIONAL RIVALRY by John Mitton

ith world attention focused on politics, both as a means of better dismemberment of the Pakistani state) Wconflict in Syria and Iraq, the war understanding Islamabad’s behaviour are particularly plausible.2 The United in Afghanistan lurches along, seemingly and as a potentially edifying example of States, along with other members of further and further from resolution even a phenomenon which can be expected the international community, have as the United States attempts to extricate to occur elsewhere in the future (and is undoubtedly expended much energy and itself from the country. Canada, along already occurring by many accounts in effort in making this point to officials in with many NATO allies and members places like Syria). Islamabad, to seemingly little avail. And of the now-terminated International so, the refrain goes, Pakistan’s perceptions Security Assistance Force (ISAF), have The Pakistani Dimension vis à vis Indian influence in Afghanistan already left. The Taliban itself is resurgent, are unreasonable, irrational, and, eo claiming significant gains – including While the rationale for Pakistan’s ipso, paranoid or delusional. As Special control of territory – in both the South continued support for elements of US Representative for Afghanistan and (Helmand Province) and North (Kunduz the Taliban is now generally accepted Pakistan Richard Olson recently noted, Province) of the country.1 as opposition to Indian influence in albeit diplomatically: “I sometime feel Afghanistan, assessments of this calculus that the degree of Indian influence on The recognition – slow at first, but now typically dismiss such perceptions and Afghanistan may be overestimated in widespread – that Pakistan has served as priorities as ‘out-dated’ or ‘paranoid’; Pa k i s t an .” 3 a destabilizing influence via its continued hardline elements in the Pakistani support for elements of the Taliban military and intelligence apparatus There is very little that can be practically insurgency has effectively soured and (most prominently the Inter-Services done or analytically said in the face undermined ostensible cooperation Intelligence [ISI]) are blamed for carrying of this conclusion, absent continued between Washington and Islamabad. an unrealistic and largely self-serving (in exhortations that the Pakistanis Despite years of diplomatic pressure and the sense of bureaucratic self-interest) reassess and adopt a view more in- extensive foreign and military aid, the animosity towards India, undermining line with that held by Western analysts US has been unable to alter Pakistan’s the real and viable interests Pakistan and policy-makers. At the same time, behaviour in this regard. While not the has in creating a prosperous and stable the US has turned to New Delhi, sole or determining cause, Pakistan’s Afghanistan along its northern border. actively encouraging increased Indian intransigence is generally recognized involvement, particularly as it lays the as having significantly contributed to Much of this is undoubtedly true, groundwork for a post-withdrawal the essential failure of the Afghanistan particularly as regards the benefits Afghanistan – once the Americans leave mission. that a stable Afghanistan would offer, (or reduce their presence even further), it and even with respect to how much is hoped that India may be a productive The purpose of this paper is not an overall Pakistan should realistically fear Indian partner in maintaining stability and assessment of the war in Afghanistan, influence in the country. As will be supporting the government in Kabul nor even a more limited exercise in discussed below, Indian interests in (even if, as mentioned above, it looks less policy prescription or projections Afghanistan are not primarily, if at and less likely that there will be much if moving forward. Rather, I foreground all, antagonistic toward Pakistan, and any ‘stability’ to maintain). the perplexing ‘Pakistani dimension’ of there is little evidence that the more the Afghanistan conflict as an example nefarious interpretations (encirclement, In late September 2016, for example, of ‘rivalry intervention’ in international destabilization, and eventually even the US initiated trilateral talks with the

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Indians and Afghans in New York, re- result, the Afghanistan theatre is assessed largest bilateral donor to Afghanistan.10 affirming a shared interest in Afghan with respect to its potential implications This spending has included significant security moving forward, and looking for for a hypothetical future confrontation infrastructure projects, including health, ways to “coordinate and align [Indian and with India – an eventuality that outside education, energy and communication, American] assistance with the priorities observers might recognize as improbable as well as smaller but symbolically of the Afghan government.”4 Similarly, or unlikely (and therefore unsound as significant contributions such as the in late August 2016, US General John a basis for making policy) but which building of the Afghan parliament.11 Nicholson (current commander of the weighs heavily in the minds of leaders American mission in Afghanistan) (both within the military and without) in More controversially, New Delhi has publicly called on New Delhi to increase Islamabad. over the last several years pursued its military aid to Kabul.5 Needless to say, increased security ties with Kabul. India these overtures have irked the Pakistanis; There exists, in other words, a ‘rivalry was the first country to sign a bilateral yet if the perception is that Islamabad dilemma’8 in which perceptions of “strategic partnership agreement” with is unreasonable in this regard, then like present behaviour (for example increased Afghanistan, and has provided military a child’s tantrum in a supermarket its Indian involvement in Afghanistan) are equipment and training to Afghan reaction will likely be ignored – as any shaped in the context of an expectation of security forces.12 While initial military parent can council, no amount of logic future confrontation. As a consequence, transfers included predominately can dissuade the emotionally over- Pakistan attempts to block, undermine, defensive equipment, such as armoured charged.6 or counteract any and all Indian interests check-points and watch towers,13 more in Afghanistan, not because it is paranoid recently Afghanistan has received If Pakistan’s protestations are not or delusional per se, but rather because it 105mm howitzer artillery pieces as well ‘objectively’ sound (from the West’s views Indian involvement as part of the as several Mi-25 gunships.14 point of view), however, we might do broader ongoing rivalry between the two well to consider them subjectively. countries. The scope of Indian interests in More specifically, the recognition that Afghanistan is wide, and includes Pakistan and India are engaged in an India in Afghanistan economic (particularly access to Central enduring international rivalry suggests Asian energy), security (preventing that Pakistan’s perceptions of Indian Before pursuing this argument further, it the spread of Islamic extremism), and influence in Afghanistan are conditioned is worth taking stock of Indian interests strategic (establishing its status as a by the broader relationship and ongoing and activities in Afghanistan in order regional, and ultimately, global power). history between the two South Asian to better assess the Pakistani point of Each of these interests implicates nations. This ‘lens’ of rivalry colours view. As intimated above, the argument Pakistan to a greater or lesser degree. their assessment of the stakes at hand. is not that India’s true designs are in fact Most obviously, continued Pakistani The Afghanistan issue is not viewed aggressive, or that Pakistan is ultimately support for Islamists in Afghanistan fuels independently either of ongoing points justified in its policy choices. Rather, Indian concerns regarding extremism in of contention (such as the territorial it is suggested that the dynamics of the region more broadly. More narrowly, dispute over the region of Jammu and international rivalry drive Pakistan to this behaviour precludes India’s economic Kashmir) or of the behavioural indices ‘balance’ against Indian involvement, opportunities. Finally, from a regional and inferences derived from a history of as even seemingly well-intentioned perspective, India’s desire to assert and repeated conflict, crisis, and war. development aid can be threatening in establish its power implicitly requires a the context of the rivalry dilemma. maintenance (or even extension) of its It is this second dimension that is most status quo dominance over Pakistan. often overlooked. In the context of a shared Following the American intervention in bloody past (which includes four wars), 2001, Indian involvement in Afghanistan The Pakistani Response decision-makers in Islamabad (as well as, was modest,9 likely because many it must be said, in New Delhi) consider recognized that significant overt activity Back in 2010, reporter Steve Coll the prospect of renewed confrontation would draw Pakistani resistance (at a described a meeting that put the quite likely. This is true even following the time when Islamabad was still considered Pakistani position with respect to Indian introduction of nuclear weapons, which a potentially helpful ally). Over time, activity in Afghanistan in stark terms: has essentially precluded major war but however, the scope of the Indian presence “In March [of 2010], two Pakistani has equally encouraged low-level and has expanded. In terms of investment and generals—Ashfaq Kayani, the Army non-conventional competition as a result developmental aid, New Delhi has offered chief, and Ahmed Pasha, the head of of the stability-instability paradox.7 As a over US$2 billion, making it the fifth- ISI—met with [Afghan President Hamid]

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Pakistan Army Brig. Inam Haider Malik briefs Afghan National Army Maj. Gen. Mohammad Zaman Waziri on border activities. (Image courtesy of Capt. Jarrod Morris, US Army.)

Karzai in Islamabad, and signalled that Ultimately, as Christine Fair concludes, treasure in places like Vietnam, Laos, they could help cool down the Taliban “Pakistan will oppose India’s engagement and Angola (among others) in the often- insurgency. In exchange, Kayani said, [in Afghanistan] at all costs.”20 tenuous belief that Soviet involvement the Karzai government must ‘end’ India’s and advancement in such countries had presence in Afghanistan. According to Space constraints preclude a more to be resisted at all costs. In the 1970s, the a senior Afghan intelligence official, he exhaustive discussion of Pakistan’s Israelis opted to allow more or less free said, ‘There cannot be any type of Indian activities in Afghanistan here, but the reign for Palestinian terrorists in southern presence in Afghanistan—any type.’”15 general consensus is that Pakistan Lebanon rather than countenance a Frederic Grare summarizes the scope of remains involved with the Taliban, and significant Syrian military presence in this point of view: “According to Pakistan, that Indian interests have been and are the region, even though in private both whatever India does in Afghanistan is specifically targeted in many attacks.21 It Israel and Syria wanted nothing more a ploy against Pakistan, be it economic can reasonably be inferred, therefore, that than to avoid direct conflict.22 investment, infrastructure, or any related Islamabad’s main priority in Afghanistan m att e r.” 16 is counteracting India, and not stabilizing In 2015, following the release of classified the country, leaving it at odds with US Saudi documents by WikiLeaks, reporters As has been widely documented, Pakistan (and NATO) goals over the last 15 years. for the New York Times were “surprised” to continues to support elements of the observe that “the documents…illustrate a Afghan Taliban (particularly the Haqqani A Rivalry Explanation near obsession with Iran, with diplomats network), with Indian interests often in Africa, Asia and Europe monitoring the direct targets of insurgent attacks.17 The ubiquity of rivalry dynamics Iranian activities in minute detail and The Indian consulate in Jalalabad has across history severely undermines the top government agencies plotting moves been attacked four times since 2007, idiosyncratic explanations of Pakistani to limit the spread of Shiite Islam.”23 most recently in March 2016,18 while behaviour based on irrational fear of, Again, mutatis mutandis, this description the 2008 attack on the Indian embassy and emotional hatred toward, India. The could apply wholesale to American in Kabul (which killed 54 and wounded Pakistanis are not uniquely incompetent attitudes vis à vis the Soviet Union and 141) was alleged to have been “directed in this regard. The United States, for communism during the Cold War. The by Pakistan’s intelligence service.”19 example, expended significant blood and point is that rivalry dynamics exert a

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significant influence on the perceptions of decision-makers, to the point where the specific emotional histories and animosities, as well as the domestic political configurations and personal psychologies of particular leaders are, if not irrelevant, at least unnecessary as explanations for behaviour.

We should therefore not be surprised that Islamabad has resisted US demands to alter its policies in Afghanistan, nor should we expect this orientation to significantly change moving forward. It also becomes relatively clear that encouraging increased Indian 25 involvement, whether alone. Emphasizing the common threat in Afghanistan – such as with the through arms transfers or more broadly of Islamic extremism (the Pakistani state Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan- as part of the official peace process, is is also, after all, a target of such groups) India (TAPI) pipeline – has done little to likely to entrench rather than soften the is one potential avenue for cultivating temper Islamabad’s intransigence. Pakistani position (while this might seem some kind of re-evaluation in Islamabad, obvious, some have suggested that US though this threat has been growing for Pakistan’s policies in Afghanistan mirror and Afghan overtures to India have been several years, and the dynamics described rivalry behaviour in other historical cases. intended as a “signal” to Pakistan in yet in this paper have not been attenuated; in Concerns about the future are amplified another attempt to induce cooperation24). fact seemingly the opposite. between states who have experienced The US may calculate that India’s conflict and tension in the past, and who cooperation and engagement is worth the Conclusion therefore anticipate renewed conflict price in this regard; fair enough, but at in the future. Whatever occurs in the the very least it must be recognized that While there seems little that might interregnum – which is to say the present such an orientation effectively precludes be done with respect to solving this – cannot be understood outside of this Pakistani acquiescence, let alone support. issue in Afghanistan, policy-makers continuity. From the perspective of can draw meaningful lessons for other outside observers, Pakistan’s leaders may The most obvious solution to this cases moving forward, particularly with well display outsized hostility toward, problem is for India and Pakistan to respect to the intensity and intractability and unreasonable suspicion of, Indian cease being rivals. Unfortunately, the of rivalry concerns. These are not activities; for those involved, however, scholarly literature on rivalry suggests delusional or erratic priorities that can these concerns are real, rational, and that terminating such endemically hostile be expected to either (a) not be present perhaps most importantly (from the point relationships is exceedingly difficulty, in more ‘rational’ countries or leaders or of view of third-party policy-makers particularly for third-party mediators. (b) wither in the face of logical argument navigating the environments in which Most often they end as the result of some regarding substantial economic, material such rivalries are present) predictable. kind of political shock (war, revolution, or even long-term strategic benefit. For etc.), and not through negotiation instance, emphasizing the potential Proxy conflicts between rivals Iran and economic opportunities of cooperation Saudi Arabia are currently underway in

18 ON TRACK WINTER 2016/17 Independent and Informed L'Institut de la CAD Autonomne et renseigné places like Yemen and Syria. Recognizing “would allow an encircling India to stability-instability-paradox-south- the root of this behaviour does not offer create a backdoor military threat to asia.pdf. any obvious means for mitigating it, Pakistan.” See Barnett R. Rubin and particularly given the complexity of such Ahmed Rashid, “From great game 8. Similar in a sense to the famed cases. Yet it does suggest that encouraging to grand bargain,” Foreign Affairs 87, ‘security dilemma’ of international the increased involvement of one side, as 6 (2008): p. 36. As mentioned, these relations theory, in which defensive the US has done with respect to Saudi perceptions are typically dismissed measures – designed to enhance Arabia in Syria,26 risks exacerbating as inaccurate and even delusional. security – can be interpreted as already volatile situations.  aggressive, prompting counter- 3. Quoted in Anwar Iqbal, “Indian measures and a consequent John Mitton is a PhD Candidate in Political role in Afghanistan overestimated diminishment of security. In the Science at Dalhousie University and a in Pakistan: Olson,” Dawn, 22 rivalry dilemma, past experiences Doctoral Fellow at Dalhousie’s Centre for June 2016, http://www.dawn.com/ in the relationship ensure that most Foreign Policy Studies. He has published in news/1266465. if not all behaviour is interpreted as a variety of outlets on international rivalry, aggressive, necessitating defensive coercive diplomacy and American foreign 4. United States, Department of or balancing behaviour, which can and security policy. State, “Afghanistan-India-US lead to confrontation between two Consultations,” 21 September 2016, defensive or status quo states. Notes http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ ps/2016/09/262266.htm. 9. Of course, Indian involvement 1. Scott Borgerson, “Arctic Meltdown: sensu lato precedes Operation The Economic and Security 5. Shawn Snow, “US Speeds Enduring Freedom, going back at Implications of Global Warming,” Afghanistan’s Pivot to India,” The least to its support for the Northern Foreign Affairs 87, 2 (2008): pp. Diplomat, 3 September 2016, http:// Alliance against the Taliban in the 63-77. Brookings Institution, thediplomat.com/2016/09/us- 1990s. Any complete assessment of “Forging an enduring partnership speeds-afghanistans-pivot-to-india/. the proxy battle between India and with Afghanistan,” 6 October Pakistan in Afghanistan requires a 2016 https://www.brookings.edu/ 6. An extension of this metaphor discussion of this history. For the research/forging-an-enduring- would be the US attempting to purposes of this article, however, partnership-with-afghanistan/. placate the Pakistanis with toys and we can concern ourselves with candy (foreign and military aid) or only the post-2001 era. Because the 2. Many analysts are dismissive of force compliance with threats of United States decisively overthrew the purported Pakistani belief that punishment or the suspension of the existing power structure in the Afghanistan is a crucial venue allowance (such as the decision in country (the Taliban government), through which to achieve “strategic August 2016 to withhold US$300 Indian support for the Kabul depth” vis-à-vis India. In case of million in military aid). Neither government established by the Bonn conventional conflict with India, tactic has worked. See Missy Ryan, Agreement constitutes a distinct the logic goes, Pakistan may need to “Pentagon withholds $300 million intervention with respect to its retreat into Afghan territory to wait in military aid to Pakistan,” The earlier involvement. out attacks and reorganize militarily. Washington Post, 3 August 2016, See for example Centre for Land https://www.washingtonpost. 10. Alyssa Ayres, “Why the United Warfare Studies, “Pakistan’s com/world/national-security/ States Should Work With India Concept of Strategic Depth,” http:// pentagon-withholds-300- to Stabilize Afghanistan,” Council www.claws.in/publication-detail. million-in-military-aid-to- on Foreign Relations, April 2015, php?pID=60. Even more extreme pakistan/2016/08/03/25845d54- http://www.cfr.org/afghanistan/ scenarios are said to occupy the 5986-11e6-9aee-8075993d73a2_ why-united-states-should-work- minds of Pakistani decision- story.html. india-stabilize-afghanistan/p36414. makers, such as the existence of a “US-Indian-Afghan alliance… 7. Michael Krepon, “The stability- 11. Shashank Joshi, “India’s Af-Pak aimed at undermining Pakistani instability paradox, misperception, strategy,” RUSI Journal 155, 1 influence in Afghanistan and and escalation control in South (2010): p. 22. even dismembering the Pakistani Asia,” The Stimson Center, 2003, state.” According to this belief, an http://www.stimson.org/sites/ 12. Charles Tiefer, “A Proxy War Indian-influenced Afghan regime default/files/file-attachments/ Between India and Pakistan is

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Under Way in Afghanistan,” Afghanistan.” Pennsylvania Press, 2014). Forbes.com, 13 August 2016 http://www.forbes.com/sites/ 18. Suhasini Haidar, “9 killed in attack 26. Michael S. Schmidt, “Defense charlestiefer/2016/08/13/war- on Indian mission in Afghanistan; Secretary says Anti-ISIS coalition between-india-with-the-us-and- Karzai blames Pakistan,” The has agreed to ‘step up’,” New York pakistan-started-this-week-in- Hindu, 3 March 2016, http://www. Times, 12 February 2016 http:// afghanistan-proxy-war-that-is/. thehindu.com/news/national/9- www.nytimes.com/2016/02/12/ killed-in-attack-on-indian-mission- world/middleeast/defense- 13. Harsh V. Pant, India’s Changing in-afghanistan-karzai-blames- secretary-says-anti-isis-coalition- Afghanistan Policy: Regional and pakistan/article8306057.ece. has-agreed-to-step-up.html Global Implications (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College 19. Lisa Curtis, “The reorientation of Strategic Studies Institute, 2012). Pakistan’s foreign policy toward its region,” Contemporary South 14. Snow, “US Speeds Afghanistan’s Asia 20, 2 (2012): p. 264; see also Pivot to India.” Mark Mazetti and Eric Schmitt, “Pakistanis Aided Attack in Kabul, 15. Steve Coll, “War by other means: US Officials Say,” The New York Is it possible to negotiate with the Times, 1 August 2016, http://www. Taliban?” The New Yorker, 24 May nytimes.com/2008/08/01/world/ 2010, p. 51. asia/01pstan.html.

16. Frédéric Grare, “Pakistan,” in 20. Fair, “The US-Pakistan relations Ashley Tellis and Aroop Mukharji, after a decade of the war on terror,” eds, Is a Regional Strategy Viable p. 251. in Afghanistan? (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for 21. For a compilation of such incidents, International Peace, 2010), p. 21. see South Asia Terrorism Portal, “Terrorism Attacks and Threats 17. One of the more significant on Indians in Afghanistan since revelations of the 2010 “Afghanistan 2003,” http://www.satp.org/ war logs” release by WikiLeaks satporgtp/countries/india/database/ was the ample documentation afganistanindianattack.htm. detailing ISI involvement in attacks in Afghanistan targeting Indian 22. Reuven Avi-Ran, The Syrian interests. For instance, an entry Involvement in Lebanon since 1975 on 18 December 2007 describes (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), p. attempts by an ISI agent (identified 98. as “SARKATEEP”) to establish relations with Afghans for the 23. Ben Hubbard and Mayy el Sheikh, purpose of conducting attacks on “WikiLeaks shows a Saudi obsession Indian consulships in Jalalabad, with Iran,” New York Times, 16 Kabul, Heart, Kandahar, and July 2015, http://www.nytimes. Mezar-e Sharif. Another report com/2015/07/17/world/middleeast/ from 22 March 2008 details an ISI wikileaks-saudi-arabia-iran.html. plot to offer between US$15,000 and $30,000 as reward for killing Indian 24. Snow, “US Speeds Afghanistan’s nationals working in Afghanistan. Pivot to India.” See “Afghanistan: The war logs,” http://www.theguardian.com/ 25. On rivalry termination, see Karen world/the-war-logs+tone/news Rasler, William Thompson, and and Tiefer, “A Proxy War Between Sumit Ganguly, How Rivalries India and Pakistan is Under Way in End (Philadelphia: University of

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L’HIVER YÉMÉNITE

par Alexandra Dufour

e renversement de Ben Ali en Tunisie Orient et se trouve sur la liste des Nations l’intention de Saleh d’asseoir son fils au Len 2011 résonna comme une onde de Unies des États les moins développés, pouvoir.3 La réponse gouvernementale choc à travers l’ensemble du Moyen-Orient. bien que sa population, la deuxième face à ces manifestations fut loin d’être Les différents peuples se sont révoltés face plus nombreuse dans la région, soit conciliante. L’incident du “vendredi à des dictatures répressives établies depuis d’environ 25 millions d’habitants. Il se de la dignité,”4 en démontre d’ailleurs l’ère coloniale. Tous ces soulèvements ont divise en trois zones distinctes : le nord, bien l’ampleur. Cette violence entraina eu des effets extrêmement divers selon les de Sada’a jusqu’à Ta’iz; le sud, englobant inévitablement une opposition du Sud régimes affectés. Le Yémen, influencé par les zones côtières du Tahima et les plaines contre le Nord, et la résurgence de l’idée ses voisins, suivit la vague révolutionnaire du golfe d’Aden allant d’Aden à Al- d’une division du Yémen entre ces deux qui, contrairement à la Tunisie, l’emporta Ghayda; puis, le désert du Hadhramawt. régions.5 bien au large de la paix. En effet, le sort Au niveau environnemental, le pays, de Sanaa, similaire à celui de Beyrouth, comparativement à ses voisins, détient des Si la démission du président, en 2012, sous se dirige vers un destin nébuleux. Afin ressources très limitées en pétrole, en gaz les pressions internationales et régionales de comprendre la crise actuelle au Yémen et en terres fertiles dues à la rareté de l’eau. apaisa initialement la population, les et de répondre à la question à savoir Enfin, la population est à 60-75% sunnites mesures, difficilement mises en place, si l’Occident a sa place dans le conflit, chaféites et à 25-40% chiites zaydites. prises par le vice-président al-Hadi nous en ferons une analyse approfondie. Historiquement, le pouvoir économique n’améliorèrent pas la situation. Nous sommes d’avis que Washington et revenait aux chaféites, puis le pouvoir les Européens ont un rôle strictement politique aux zaydites.2 En revanche, Pour ce qui est du conflit qui occupe humanitaire et non politique, dans cette à partir de l’unification Nord-Sud du principalement l’espace politique actuel, il guerre. Dans cet ordre d’idée, nous nous Yémen et de la guerre civile qui s’en suivie, débuta en juin 2004 dans la région de Sada’a, pencherons sur les diverses oppositions à plusieurs pôles conflictuels émergèrent au lorsqu’éclata la première guerre de six ans l’intérieur du pays, l’internationalisation sein de la population. entre les Hûthis et le gouvernement, suite du conflit par, entre autres, l’Arabie- aux tensions croissantes entre les zaydites Saoudite et l’Iran et finalement, Tout d’abord, depuis 1994, l’oppression et les salafistes et wahhabites émigrés au discuterons des perspectives d’avenir avec dont est victime le Sud Yémen par le Nord Yémen d’Arabie-Saoudite. Cette révolte les États-Unis et les différents acteurs s’intensifia au point de faire émerger, en religieuse appelée le mouvement des régionaux, notamment en accordant un 2007, un mouvement pacifique alliant des “jeunes croyants” cherchait à raviver le rôle plus particulier à l’Oman. jeunes et retraités militaires manifestant zaydisme et l’imamat, disparus du pouvoir contre le régime d’Ali Abdullah Saleh, en politique depuis 1962. Elle était dirigée L’histoire du Yémen est dense, place depuis l’unification du pays. Leur par Husayn Badr al-Din al-Huthi membre mouvementée et comme la plupart des mécontentement s’étendait sur plusieurs éminent du GCP et du parlement,6 puis pays de cette région du monde, souvent domaines, notamment l’augmentation fut reprise par ses frères dans la suite des incomprise et mystérieuse. Sans faire de la pauvreté; la dégradation du niveau affrontements. La détérioration entre les une analyse exhaustive des événements de vie et de l’environnement; le chômage zaydites et le régime se poursuivit jusqu’au historiques, il faut tout de même prendre chez les jeunes; le système de patronage cessez-le-feu de 2010, avant de reprendre en considération certains éléments qui du gouvernement avec les tribus; le report de plus bel, malgré la démission de Saleh distinguent le pays yéménite de ses voisins. des élections; la montée en puissance d’Al- et son remplacement par le vice-président Le Yémen, originellement appelé Yaman,1 Qaïda; la répression; les limites à la liberté al-Hadi. est le pays le plus pauvre du Moyen- d’expression des journalistes; puis, enfin,

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Il est également important de préciser des facteurs les plus menaçants pour la La position stratégique du Yémen que les affrontements armés entre le population yéménite. surveillé par l’Arabie-Saoudite est loin gouvernement et Ansar Allah, soit les d’être aussi importante que celle du Liban, Hûthis, impliquaient également d’autres De façon générale, l’ONU a participé situé au centre du Levant et bordé par tribus, notamment les Hâchid, dont le chef comme médiateur entre les acteurs Israël. Le Yémen étant difficile d’accès, de l’armée al-Ahmar est issu. internes, principalement entre le un déploiement de marchandises et de gouvernement de transition et les Hûthis. soldats serait assez complexe dans les Les soulèvements de 2011, la démission De plus, elle a aidé à sortir Saleh du pouvoir. circonstances actuelles, notamment de Saleh et les échecs du gouvernement La communauté internationale avait plus depuis le blocage naval de mars 2015 par de transition, notamment au niveau des d‘intérêts humanitaires que politiques la communauté internationale. divisions du pouvoir pour les futures dans ce cas et voulait mettre un terme à élections, donnèrent un avantage décisif l’instabilité et la violence dans la région Le chiisme yéménite zaydite et le chiisme aux Hûthis afin de consolider leur de la péninsule arabique. En revanche, les iranien ne sont pas issus de la même école. influence au Yémen. Ils prirent la capitale tentatives d’accords pacifiques en Suisse en En effet, le zaydisme est propre au Yémen et en septembre 2014, soutenu par les alliés décembre 2015 furent un échec et celles au s’inspire du cinquième Imam après la mort du CGP de Saleh et signèrent un accord Kuwait d’avril 2016 sur la proposition du du Prophète, tandis que celui de l’Iran suit de paix avec le gouvernement transitoire, plan pacifique des Nations Unies sont sur le douzième et infaillible Imam, Hussein. mais en vain. S’en suivit alors le début le point de tomber à l’eau suite au rejet des Par ailleurs, les Hûthis sont loin d’avoir de l’intervention aérienne du royaume rebelles de compromettre leur mainmise le pouvoir politique et économique que saoudien en soutien au gouvernement sur le pouvoir yéménite. détient le Hezbollah; leurs perspectives de d’al-Hadi, accompagné d’un blocage survie et d’avenir sont plutôt réduites, faute naval coupant la population de toute Si l’opposition de la famille hoûti de moyens et en raison des confrontations aide médicale et humanitaire, dans le but peut sembler irraisonnable dans les avec la dynamique tribale yéménite.10 d’empêcher l’Iran d’envoyer du renfort aux négociations, notons qu’elle n’est pas Hûthis. être seule à s’opposer à un règlement Enfin, dans le contexte politique iranien humanitaire. En effet, la coalition actuel, Téhéran semble avoir d’autres Enfin, le développement des pôles militaire saoudienne a forcé l’organisation préoccupations politiques, notamment terroristes au Yémen n’aida en rien à calmer internationale Médecins Sans Frontière avec les États-Unis, soit au niveau la situation explosive dont est victime le (MSF), en août 2016, a quitté le Yémen dû à nucléaire. Selon le professeur Qadir Nasri, pays. Une branche d’Al-Qaïda, l’AQAP,7 ses bombardements aériens indiscriminés l’implication de la capitale islamique au s’est établie dans la péninsule arabique sur la population, notamment sur Yémen ne ferait que l’affaiblir. Ainsi, le au début 2000 et organise depuis des plusieurs hôpitaux. support de l’Iran pour Ansar Allah est attaques dont la violence s’intensifie avec beaucoup plus politique et financier que les années. Profitant du retrait des troupes Ensuite, bien que Téhéran offre son appui militaire et stratégique. Téhéran supporte dans certaines zones liées aux diverses financier au niveau des armes, et politique le réveil islamique chiite au Yémen, mais affrontements internes, l’AQAP consolide aux chiites et à l’unification du Yémen, nie toute implication de nature militaire. son influence dans la région, tout comme l’Iran n’a pas nécessairement intérêt à D’ailleurs, les Hûthis eux-mêmes nient le le fait Daesh depuis les derniers mois, et intervenir militairement dans le conflit, support de l’Iran au niveau militaire et se ce, malgré l’alliance entre le gouvernement comparativement à ce qu’affirment Riyad contentent du rôle distant de Téhéran.11 yéménite et américain établie depuis 2001 et Washington. D’ailleurs, malgré le concernant un programme de contre- renouvellement des tensions Iran-Arabie- Si certains acteurs sont considérés comme terrorisme. Saoudite depuis l’assassinat du Sheikh moins influents, d’autres ont un rôle plus Nimr Al-Nirm par le royaume saoudien, concret et agressif dans les affrontements. En somme, compte tenu des conflits entre le rôle de l’Iran au Yémen reste encore Premièrement, le royaume saoudien a le gouvernement, les tribus, l’armée, et la contesté quant à son ampleur.8 Ainsi, plusieurs préoccupations au Yémen et division de la population entre le Nord l’Iran n’apporte pas un support total et pour cette raison maintient sa campagne et le Sud, le Yémen ne semble pas près inconditionnel aux Hûthis. En effet, selon militaire active depuis plus d’un an. d’atteindre une certaine stabilité politique Al-monitor,9 la collaboration entre la Notons que le Yémen partage sa frontière à court terme. À cela s’ajoute le rôle des famille hûthi et Téhéran est loin d’être aussi du Nord avec l’Arabie-Saoudite, que cette puissances régionales et internationales. forte et établie que celle que la capitale région est principalement chiite zaydite islamique entretient avec le Hezbollah, et et qu’elle est très mouvementée depuis le L’internationalisation du conflit dans ce pour plusieurs raisons. début des années 2000 avec les six guerres la dernière année est probablement un opposant le régime de Saleh à Ansar Allah.

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D’ailleurs, Riyad a déjà commencé son la plupart des responsables étaient issus. supportées militairement et politiquement projet de construire une clôture de sécurité En effet, la présence de mouvements par Washington. de 1800km le long de la frontière.12 islamiques radicaux au Yémen remonte à l’unification du pays dans les années 90 Après avoir exposé les nombreux acteurs Selon la famille royale, les chiites seraient où le gouvernement, afin d’affaiblir le Parti internes et externes en donnant une supportés par l’Iran, attisant la haine et la Socialiste du Yémen (PSY), s’associa avec perspective historique au conflit, qu’en est- crainte des Saoudiens. De plus, considérons tous les groupes possibles, y compris les il de l’avenir? L’une des solutions proposées le fait que la population yéménite, pendant organisations radicales.14 Le régime de par la communauté internationale et les la révolution, demandait l’instauration Saleh tolérait leur présence du moment pays voisins du Yémen est de donner le d’un régime démocratique, concept où leurs attaques étaient dirigées contre rôle de médiateur non plus à l’ONU, mais poison pour Riyad. Ainsi, un Yémen fort, le PSY. En revanche, ces mouvements à l’Oman. L’histoire de l’Oman est celle uni et démocratique, où le pouvoir des islamistes en vinrent vite à attaquer d’un pays d’une neutralité exemplaire femmes et des jeunes serait supporté et quiconque ils considéraient comme pro- dans la péninsule arabique. Il entretient appuyé, n’enchante pas particulièrement la occidental. Al-Qaïda représente le plus de bonnes relations avec tous ses voisins. famille saoudienne.13 extrême et militant de ces groupes. La politique étrangère de l’Oman, tout comme celle des États-Unis, se focalise En revanche, un Yémen dirigé par Après l’attaque du Cole au port d’Aden sur la lutte contre Al-Qaïda et les autres les Hûthis chiites n’est pas préférable. en 2000, puis celles du 11 septembre organisations extrémistes ainsi que sur De ce fait, l’Arabie-Saoudite soutient 2001, Saleh s’associa officiellement avec l’exportation de leur idéologie radicale. De le Président al-Hadi et tient à garder Washington dans la guerre contre le plus, puisque le pays partage sa frontière son influence traditionnelle dans cette terrorisme. D’ailleurs, notons que l’objectif ouest avec le Yémen, il a tout avantage à région, notamment par un régime de déclaré de l’organisation terroriste AQAP tenter d’apaiser le conflit, d’autant plus patronage des acteurs politiques. Par est de mettre fin à la présence militaire que son territoire constitue une excellente ailleurs, Riyad, en coopération avec américaine sur la péninsule arabique. De base pour surveiller son voisin.17 Notons, Washington, a mis en place, depuis 2001, ce fait, leur intérêt géographique pour également, l’importance du détroit de un programme de contre-terrorisme au un foyer extrémiste au Yémen s’explique Bab-el-Mandeb au sud-ouest du Yémen Yémen où l’AQAP s’est installée. Ainsi, en raison de sa proximité avec l’Arabie- qui constitue un passage majeur et pour les deux gouvernements supportaient et Saoudite, fier allié des États-Unis. la péninsule arabique et pour Washington. travaillaient conjointement avec Saleh et Par ailleurs, l’Oman a affirmé ne pas avoir aujourd’hui avec al-Hadi, afin de mettre Al-Qaïda dans la péninsule arabique est de préférence quant à un Yémen unifié fin aux avancées du groupe terroriste. un mouvement en expansion qui connut ou séparé, confirmant, ainsi, sa neutralité plusieurs périodes de résurgence, malgré dans le conflit.18 Le rôle des États-Unis est plus paradoxal. En les efforts des Américains, des Saoudiens effet, si les Américains se portent comme et des Yéménites. Dans la situation En somme, il semble clair que dans la vaillants protecteurs de la démocratie, actuelle, le groupe en profite pour prendre situation actuelle, avec une présence plus quand il est question du Yémen, la le contrôle des zones non occupées par accrue au niveau des négociations de situation semble moins évidente. En effet, le gouvernement ou Ansar Allah. Ainsi, l’Oman, ni la communauté internationale pendant les soulèvements de 2011, la l’intérêt pour le Yémen de la part des États- ni les États-Unis n’ont de rôle politique population yéménite prônait l’instauration Unis est essentiellement sécuritaire. Ils à jouer. L’assistance humanitaire est d’un régime démocratique et égalitaire. En tentent d’affaiblir Al-Qaïda et d’empêcher néanmoins nécessaire, avec plus de vingt revanche, sachant que les États-Unis sont Daesh de s’établir au Yémen, notamment millions d’habitants vivant dans des de très proches alliés de l’Arabie-Saoudite, afin de s’assurer que le conflit ne déborde conditions extrêmement difficiles depuis la question démocratique en est une qui pas au-delà de la frontière saoudienne. le début des affrontements. dérange. Tel que précisé ci-dessus, Riyad En effet, tel que précisé ci-dessus, Daesh, ne tient pas à ce que son voisin devienne connu sous le nom d’Ansar al-Charia au Ainsi, selon Bruce Riedel, journaliste un pays démocratique, puisque cela Yémen, a émergé d’Al-Qaïda depuis déjà pour Al-Monitor,19 plusieurs mesures risquerait de déstabiliser l’ordre politique avril 2011. Il se réclame, notamment, peuvent être mises en place. Tout d’abord, actuel sur son territoire. de plusieurs attaques suicides récentes sortir définitivement Saleh de l’équation à Sanaa.15 Le groupe tente même de politique. Bien qu’il ne soit plus au pouvoir, De plus, suite aux attentats terroristes remplir un rôle social en fournissant des il exerce une influence néfaste dans le aux États-Unis en 2001, la guerre contre biens et services à la population présente conflit. Ensuite, les Hûthis doivent faire le terrorisme, déclarée par le Président sur les territoires qu’il occupe.16 Enfin, partie d’un processus de réconciliation Bush, prit énormément d’ampleur et pour toutes ces raisons, la coalition et les sans être la force politique dominante. s’étendit dans la péninsule arabique, dont attaques aériennes menées par Riyad sont En effet, tout porte à croire qu’ils seraient

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incapables de faire face aux nombreux Notes www.theguardian.com/world/2015/ défis qui attendent le Yémen.20 Il en va mar/22/yemen-sunnis-al-qaida-isis- de même pour le président al-Hadi qui 1. Uzi Rabi, Yemen: Revolution, Civil islamic-state-shia-houthis-sanaa. s’est avéré d’un leadership très faible. De War and Unification (New York: plus, l’Iran et particulièrement l’Arabie- I.B.Tauris & Co, 2015), p. XII 11. Glenn Cameron, “Who Are Yemen’s Saoudite doivent réduire leurs effectifs et Houthis,” United States Institute of leur soutien aux divers acteurs en conflit. 2. Ibid. p.16 Peace, The Iran Primer (29 Avril Cette guerre mandataire au Yémen ne fait 2015). qu’infliger des souffrances à la population 3. Helen Lackner, Why Yemen Matters: et aucun parti ne s’en trouve réellement A Society in Transition (London: 12. Lackner, Why Yemen Matters, p. 46 gagnant. Enfin, un gouvernement fort Soas Middle East Issues, 2014), p. 31 au Yémen permettrait de prendre en 13. Ibid. p. 45 considération les préoccupations des 4. Le vendredi la dignité est un États-Unis quant à Al-Qaïda et Daesh, événement où 52 révolutionnaires 14. Rabi, Yemen: Revolution, Civil War ainsi que la question des frontières trouvèrent la mort suite à des and Unification, p. 173 avec l’Arabie-Saoudite. Pour se faire, en attaques du régime. Suite à cela, revanche, il faut redonner aux Yéménites plusieurs alliés du président 15. Kareem Shaheen, “Jihadis Likely le pouvoir sur leur territoire et leur avenir. joignirent la révolte. C’est le cas Winners of Saudi Arabia’s Futile C’est dans cet ordre d’idée que Riedel d’Ali Muhsin al-Ahmar, le chef de War on Yemen’s Houthi Rebels,” suggère d’accorder à Sana’a une place dans la première division blindée, qui fit The Guardian, 7 July 2015, https:// le Conseil de Coopération du Golfe. en sorte qu’une partie de l’armée www.theguardian.com/world/2015/ s’associa avec la révolution dite jul/07/jihadis-likely-winners- En somme, la notion d’un seul Yémen, pacifique jusqu’alors. Presqu’en of-saudi-arabias-futile-war-on- bien qu’unifié dans les années 90, est même temps, son frère cadet, yemens-houthi-rebels. loin de faire l’unanimité. Le pays a Sâdiq al-Ahmar, chef de la plus d’innombrables défis auxquels il devra importante tribu au Yémen, les 16. Isabelle Mandraud, “Les nouveaux faire face, autant à court qu’à long terme. Hâchid, rejoignit les rangs de la djihadistes,” Le monde, Novembre Nous ne sommes pas à même d’espérer population également. 2015. qu’un règlement de conflit puisse se faire dans un avenir rapproché. Par contre, 5. Lackner, Why Yemen Matters, p.9 17. Pierre Razoux, Oman : future pièce l’internationalisation du conflit n’aide en maîtresse de la stratégie américaine rien les perspectives futures du Yémen 6. Rabi, Yemen: Revolution, Civil War dans le Golfe et l’océan Indien, Note et de ce fait, la réponse à la question and Unification, p. 154 de recherche stratégique n. 15 initiale quant à savoir si les occidentaux (Institut de Recherche Stratégique ont une place dans le conflit au Yémen, 7. Al-Qaïda dans la péninsule arabique de l’Ecole Militaire, Janvier 2015), est négative, sauf au niveau de l’assistance p. 4 humanitaire afin, à tout le moins, 8. Jared Malsin, “Yemen Is the Latest d’apaiser les souffrances de la population Victim of the Increase in Iran-Saudi 18. Ibid. p. 11 en pleine crise humanitaire, en attendant Arabia Tension,” Time, 11 Janvier le règlement de la situation, par et pour les 2016, http://time.com/4174837/ 19. Bruce Riedel, “How to end the war Yéménites.  yemen-analysis/. in Yemen,” Al-monitor, Octobre 2015, http://www.al-monitor.com/ Alexandra Dufour, diplômée Summa 9. Saeid Jafari, “Why Iran doesn’t pulse/originals/2015/10/yemeni- Cum Laude de l’Université d’Ottawa en want to stay in Yemen,” Al- endgame.html. Conflits et droits humains, a depuis sa monitor, Octobre 2015, http:// première année de baccalauréat concentré www.al-monitor.com/pulse/ 20. Peter Salisbury, MEED Middle East ses efforts sur la région du Moyen-Orient. originals/2015/10/iran-yemen- Economic Digest, 28 Janvier 2015, Son cheminement scolaire et sa passion à ce involvement.html. 59, 4, p.23 (1). sujet l’ont amenée à se pencher la situation difficile et oubliée du Yémen. 10. Ghaith Abdul-Ahad, “Yemeni Implosion Pushes Southern Sunnis into Arms of Al-Qaida and Isis,” The Guardian, 22 Mars 2015, https://

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CHEMICAL WEAPONS USE IN SYRIA AND IRAQ: IMPLICATIONS

By Dr. Jez Littlewood

he Preamble to the Chemical weapons in Syria and Iraq indicate that the use of chemicals to cause death, TWeapons Convention (CWC) disarmament has failed? And third, incapacitation, or harm is prohibited and notes that state parties are, inter alia what are the implications of continued unequivocal. Furthermore, it is not solely “determined for the sake of all mankind, chemical weapons use for the Canadian the use of chemicals in this way which is to exclude completely the possibility of Armed Forces, national security, and banned. The prohibitions extend to their the use of chemical weapons.”1 With well public safety? development, production, stockpiling, over 100 chemical weapons incidents acquisition, retention, transfer, military reported since 2012 in Syria and Iraq, Chemical Weapons preparations for their use, as well as by both state and non-state actors, a assisting, encouraging, or inducing in world free of chemical weapons remains Chemical weapons are primarily any way anyone to engage in activity an objective rather than a reality. The associated with the military programs prohibited to a state party.4 history of chemical weapons reveals very of major states and regional powers, limited use in conflict overall. The most although recent interest and sporadic Post-1945 verified uses of chemical widespread use remains that of World use by a range of terrorist groups is also weapons include: incidents in Yemen War I, where up to 100,000 deaths and evident over the last three decades.3 between 1963 and 1967; use in Vietnam over one million casualties have been Classic chemical warfare agents such as by US forces, predominantly as a defoliant ascribed to chemical weapons.2 Use in sarin and VX (nerve agents), Hydrogen (for example Agent Orange) but also riot the 1914-18 war resulted in the Geneva cyanide (a blood agent), Sulfur mustard control agents against enemy forces at Protocol (1925) which prohibited the (a blister agent), and Chlorine and certain points; use by Iraq during the use of chemical and biological weapons Phosgene (choking agents) tend to be Iran-Iraq war (1980-88) and against its and is now understood to represent the focus of non-specialist reporting. own Kurdish population in the Anfal customary international law, binding However, international law under the campaign, which included the attack on parties and non-parties alike and CWC prohibits no specific agents, Halabja; use by the Japanese cult Aum prohibiting the use of such weapons or chemicals; instead it extends the Shinrikyo in 1994 and 1995, which under any circumstances by any state. prohibition to all chemicals unless their was the first large-scale terrorist use of Despite this positive backdrop of a use is intended for peaceful purposes. chemical weapons;5 and more recently in norm against poisonous weapons and a Moreover, the concept of ‘toxicity’ is the the Syrian conflict by Government forces chemical disarmament treaty, the use of heart of the disarmament and prohibition and by the Islamic State of Iraq and the chemical weapons in Syria and Iraq has regime. In law and practice, the use Levant (ISIL) in Iraq.6 Although terrorist occurred multiple times and persists to of any chemical where the intent is to use of chemical, biological, radiological, this day. All is not well in the world of exploit its toxic properties to cause death, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons has chemical disarmament. temporary incapacitation, or permanent been a staple of post-Cold War threat harm is a violation of the CWC. The assessments, actual use of such weapons As a consequence, a number of big only exceptions are for purposes not has been limited.7 questions arise from the alleged (and prohibited by the Convention: chemical proven) chemical weapons use by defence (protective purposes), law In the nineteen years since the CWC actors in the Syrian and Iraqi theatres enforcement use of riot control agents, entered into force (April 1997) the of conflict. First, is the norm against and other legitimate uses of chemicals Convention has in many respects been a chemical weapons collapsing? Second, (industrial, agricultural, research, remarkable success. Membership stands at does the repeated use of chemical medical, pharmaceutical). Otherwise, 192 states parties, which the Organisation

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for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons by the Government of Canada. their obligation not “to assist, encourage (OPCW) proudly notes covers 98 percent or induce, in any way, anyone to engage of the global population. Only the Norm erosion in any activity prohibited to a State Party Democratic People’s Republic of Korea under this Convention.” Legally this (DPRK), Egypt, Israel, and South Sudan The Syrian conflict has altered may be contested; it is also unlikely to remain outside the legal embodiment of perceptions about chemical weapons. As emerge as an avenue to pressure Russia the normative constraint and revulsion a result, the idea that the norm against or Iran to withdraw support for the Assad to chemical weapons. Moreover, to date chemical weapons is eroding is beginning regime. But both states are also actively the OPCW has overseen the destruction to surface.15 While it is correct to note involved in protecting the Syrian regime of 93 percent of the declared stockpile that the response of the international from sanctions imposed by the OPCW (72,304 metric tonnes of chemical agent) community to chemical weapons use and with additional measures being from the eight states that have declared has neither been as fast nor as effective developed in the UN Security Council. stockpiles: Albania, India, Iraq, Libya, the – in terms of preventing use, confirming As such, both Russia and Iran are at least Republic of Korea, Russia, Syria, and the incidents of use, identifying perpetrators, complicit in Syrian chemical weapons use United States. and holding every actor involved in such and therefore in non-compliance with use to account – as many would expect, Article I (1) (d) of the CWC and its broad The world is, therefore, undoubtedly the OPCW, the United Nations Security in any way formulation of a prohibition safer from chemical weapons in 2016 Council, and others have responded to on assistance. than it was two decades ago. But all chemical weapons allegations.16 The is not well in the world of chemical possession and use of such weapons has Like the normative constraint, the disarmament. Since December 2012, been continually challenged not only Convention is thus under some pressure. repeated allegations of chemical weapons by states but also by non-state actors The Executive Council of the OPCW use in the Syrian conflict have been made and civil society, with the allegations of has formally adopted a decision on this and newer allegations have surfaced use widely documented. Thus, while the issue, calling for Syria and ISIL “to desist in Sudan.8 The latter, from Amnesty norm has been ignored the response immediately”17 even though four states International, have yet to be investigated, from multiple actors indicates use will (Russia, China, Iran, and Sudan) voted but in the Syrian conflict the OPCW has not go unchallenged or be accepted as against the resolution and a further been at the forefront of investigations legitimate. Indeed the strenuous efforts nine abstained within the 41-member of alleged use since early 2013.9 Since by the Syrian regime, Russia, and Iran Executive Council. Yet the resolution the first allegations emerged in 2012, to blame rebels and terrorists for such was itself a compromise that removed chemical weapons use has been reported attacks suggests a recognition that the implication of sanctions against “at least 161 times through the end of violation of normative constraints affect Syria.18 However, the regular reports last year [2015], causing 1,491 deaths.”10 public and international opinions: hence, of the OPCW to the Security Council Incidents involving chemical weapons the need to shift blame to other actors. underline ongoing problems with the have continued through 2016, with an This suggests the norm is under pressure process of destruction of Syrian chemical average of three reported incidents per rather than collapsing, although there is weapons production facilities, its account month up to October when a marked much to be done to reinforce the norm in of its past program, and the accuracy increase occurred with IHS Conflict the coming months and years. of its declaration of chemical weapons Monitor noting 15 incidents in October.11 to the OPCW in 2013. There are clear Both Russian and Iranian media sources Does the repeated use of chemical discrepancies in Syrian reporting and also note use of chemical weapons but weapons mean the CWC has actual past and present activity; although allege anti-Government forces and failed? these difficulties do not detract from terrorists are responsible for their use.12 the swift and successful removal and The Syrian government is certainly not No amount of positive spin or destruction of Syria’s declared chemical the sole perpetrator of chemical weapons interpretation can ignore or deny that a weapons, which was a remarkable use in the region.13 In many cases the state party to the CWC has now violated achievement by the OPCW and the perpetrators are unknown. Analysis from the Convention and done so without international community. various sources points to a wide array any real consequences. Moreover, given of non-state groups possibly involved in that the Syrian regime has the active All-in-all the CWC is not an unequivocal sporadic and isolated chemical weapons political and military support of Russia success, but its pre-Syria achievements use;14 but the two main identified and Iran, including members of the and flexible and professional response to perpetrators are the Syrian government armed forces of both countries, both the Syrian chemical weapons stockpile and ISIL, or Daesh as it is now referred to states may be in non-compliance with are neither minor nor indicative of a

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Third, the ability to investigate, detect, and confirm chemical weapons use remains at the heart of any credible response in military and diplomatic terms. This places new emphasis on Canada maintaining robust and advanced capabilities to deploy units abroad and domestically, or individuals to multinational teams such as the OCPW-UN Joint Investigation Mission (JIM), in military deployments, or to assist civil agencies within Canada. An additional implication beyond CAF is the role of intelligence in support of decision- makers. Intelligence in all forms – technical, human, and scientific – underpins the ability to determine fact from fiction and propaganda. The number of actors offering real-time or near real-time reporting or assessment of chemical incidents increases the depth and breadth of sources, but open source reporting is no substitute for rigorous all-source analysis of intelligence that governments and CAF rely upon to make informed decisions.

Headquarters of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in the Hague. (Image credit: Szilas, Wikimedia Commons.) Finally, it is evident that collectively, Canada and other like-minded states disarmament regime that has failed. Implications for Canada and will have to continue to shore up the Rather, what is emerging is a recognition Canadian Armed Forces normative barriers against chemical of the difficulties of treaty implementation weapons, the legal prohibitions against 19 when non-compliance it evident. For The implications of chemical weapons them, and the international and national instance, Syria has limited access to use demonstrate that a world free of capabilities to detect, respond, and sites, withheld documentation, failed to chemical weapons remains a vision rather investigate chemical weapons use.  provide credible scientific and technical than a reality. From a CAF perspective, explanations for known activities or the situation has three implications. Jez Littlewood is Assistant Professor at the findings, questioned the evidence from First, CAF should continue to anticipate Norman Paterson School of International international inspections, shifted blame and plan for operations in a chemical Affairs (NPSIA), Carleton University. to other actors, notably terrorist groups environment in future deployments. and other violent non-state groups Second, the ability to detect, respond, Notes 20 opposing Assad. The regime has defend against, and investigate chemical been assisted by Russia and Iran in the incidents and allegations of chemical 1. Convention on the Prohibition OPCW and the United Nations, where weapons remains of paramount of the Development, Production, they have also questioned the veracity importance. As a consequence, the Stockpiling and Use of Chemical of the evidence, the interpretation of the Canadian Joint Incident Response Unit Weapons and on their Destruction, available data, and the findings of the (CIJRU) is likely to be a more important 1993, https://www.opcw.org/ international inspection teams through resource for CAF in future missions and chemical-weapons-convention/ political manoeuvering and active in support of public safety in domestic (hereinafter Chemical Weapons 21 propaganda. environments in coming years. Convention).

2. Ian R. Kenyon. “Chemical Weapons

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in the twentieth century their use wp-content/uploads/2016/07/ and control,” The CBW Conventions Syrian-CW-investigation-fact-sheet- Bulletin 48 (June 2000): pp. 2-3. July2016.pdf.

3. For an excellent survey of incidents 10. Syrian Observatory for Human and program to end 2006, see Rights, Chemical weapons used at Jonathan B. Tucker, War of Nerves: least 161 times throughout Syrian Chemical Warfare from World War conflict (15 March 2016), http:// I to al-Qaeda (New York: Pantheon www.syriahr.com/en/?p=45079 Books, 2006). 11. “Syrian government compensates 4. Chemical Weapons Convention. See for suspension of Russian air Article I (1) for the actual text. support over Aleppo by increased use of chemical weapons,” Jane’s 5. See Tucker, War of Nerves. Country Risk Daily Report, 10 November 2016. See also: Syrian 6. United Nations Security Council, American Medical Society, Letter dated 24 August 2016 from “Press Release: 167th Chemical the Secretary-General addressed Weapons Use in Syria Reported to the President of the Security in Besieged Eastern Aleppo Council, S/2016/738. City,” 6 September 2016, https:// www.sams-usa.net/foundation/ 7. See The National Consortium index.php/press-releases/334- for the Study of Terrorism and press-release-167th-chemical- Responses to Terrorism, CBRN weapons-use-in-syria-reported- Activity and Attacks by Insurgent in-besieged-eastern-aleppo-city; Organizations (October 2015), Syrian American Medical Society, https://www.start.umd.edu/ “A New Normal: Ongoing Chemical pubs/START_BAAD_CBRN_ Weapons Attacks in Syria,” February ResearchBrief_Oct2015.pdf. 2016, https://www.sams-usa.net/ foundation/images/A%20New%20 8. “Sudan government accused of Normal_Ongoing%20Chemical%20 using chemical weapons in Darfur,” Weapons%20Attacks%20in%20 BBC, 29 September 2016, http:// Syria.compressed.pdf. www.bbc.com/news/world- africa-37497025; Organisation 12. Vladimir Isachenkov, “Russia, for the Prohibition of Chemical Syria’s rebels clash on chemical Weapons (OPCW), “OPCW’s Initial weapons use claims November 11,” Assessment of NGO Report on The Associated Press, 11 November Allegations of Chemical Weapons 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/ Use in Sudan” (29 September 2016), aponline/2016/11/11/world/ https://www.opcw.org/news/article/ middleeast/ap-syria.html?_r=0. opcws-initial-assessment-of-ngo- report-on-allegations-of-chemical- weapons-use-in-sudan/.

9. United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs, “Fact Sheet: United Nations Mission to investigate allegations of the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic” (July 2016), https:// s3.amazonaws.com/unoda-web/

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2016 VIMY AWARD – ACCEPTANCE SPEECH BY RECIPIENT DR. JAMES BOUTILIER

Dr. James Boutilier received the CDA Institute’s 2016 Vimy Award at the Vimy Award Gala Dinner on 4 November 2016. We are pleased to publish his acceptance speech.

he Right Honourable TBeverly McLachlin, my and old and dear friend, General Jon Vance, Members of Parliament Karen McCrimmon and Jean Rioux, Senator Joe Day, The Honourable David Pratt, Former Chiefs of Defence Staff, Previous Vimy Award recipients, Vice Admiral Mark Norman and Commanders of Services, VAdm Denis Roleau (L-R): General Jonathan Vance, Chief of the Defence Staff; Major-General Daniel Gosselin (Ret’d), Chair of the Board, CDA Institute; The Right Honourable Beverley McLachlin, Chief Justice of Canada; Dr. James Boutilier, Vimy Award Winner 2016; Vice-Admiral Denis Rouleau, Chair, and CDA Council, MGen CDA. (Image credit: Lauren Larmour.) Daniel Gosselin and members award. In accepting the Vimy Award, stratigraphic layer marked “CDA” I came of the Board of Directors of the CDA I join an illustrious Nelsonian “band of across a copy of a handsomely crafted Institute, my old and dear friend, Tony brothers”; I only hope that I am worthy acceptance speech by an earlier Vimy Battista, distinguished guests, ladies and of their trust. Award winner. I have no idea who the gentlemen. author was but it was a fascinating This honour would not have been possible document. As I read it, I found myself I would be remiss, of course, if I did not without the support of my professional reflecting – fleetingly – about who might also acknowledge and thank all of those peers. Further, it would not have been be this year’s nominee. That thought came great companies, large and small, that possible without the patient and steadfast and went, evanescently, and I moved on support Canadian security and defence, support of my beautiful wife, Ping, and to other things. and the superb ‘big tent’ work of the our darling, talented and headstrong Conference of Defence Associations and daughter, Janou. I thank them warmly Eighty years ago, in 1936, Walter Allward’s the supremely vital research and analysis and deeply on your behalf. strikingly impressive Vimy monument work of its sister organization, the CDA was unveiled by King Edward VIII. At institute – the organization responsible I have to confess that there is an element the time, Prime Minister Mackenzie for this signature event. of serendipity, even mental telepathy, King observed fittingly that Vimy Ridge, about receiving this award. Some time on which the monument stood, was At the outset, let me say how flattered and ago I was engaged in domestic archeology “Canada’s altar on European soil”. humbled I am to receive this prestigious in my study. When I got down to the

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(L-R): Honorary Colonel Frederick Mannix, Vimy Award Winner 2012; General Raymond Henault (Ret’d), Vimy Award Winner 2007; General Paul Manson (Ret’d), Vimy Award Winner 2003; The Right Honourable Beverley McLachlin, Chief Justice of Canada; Dr. James Boutilier, Vimy Award Winner 2016; Major-General Daniel Gosselin (Ret’d), Chair of the Board, CDA Institute; General Jonathan Vance, Chief of the Defence Staff; Major-General David Fraser (Ret’d), Vimy Award Winner 2006; Brigadier-General W. Don Macnamara (Ret’d). Vimy Award Winner 2013. (Image credit: Lauren Larmour.) The monument commemorates the diarists of the Second World War. planned well, advanced resolutely, and victory of four Canadian divisions, led overwhelmed their opponents. by a Canadian general, in April 1917 Creeping barrages were expressions of the over German forces holding this great industrialization of destruction. Colossal Far more important was the fact that limestone shoal on the French plains near amounts of explosive that shattered their achievement, long ago and far away, Arras. the land, rent the sky, and delivered contributed to an indelible narrative; the indescribable death to hapless soldiers. reassuring and timely belief that Canada Allward’s work is an exercise in stark had come of age as a consequence of their verticality, with two giant pylons reaching Near Allwards’ monument are military valour. for the sky. Standing alone before them cemeteries where many young Canadians is Canada Bereft, the narrow, shrouded lie. These resting grounds capture the Vimy Ridge, of course, was one of many statue of a woman looking downcast. delicate geometry of death: white on sanguine and violent battles that marked Is she mourning the thousands who green, white on green, as the crosses lead the course of the First World War in died storming the summit, or is she away. Europe. reproaching the world for embracing the folly of war? Vimy was neither an Austerlitz, nor an Another war was unfolding at sea. There, El Alamein. Every metre was sewn with grey, salt-stained Royal Navy battle She gazes at a cannibalistic landscape; French dead, who had been sacrificed to cruisers and destroyers were slowly terrain that consumed friend and foe set the stage. They were the victims of the squeezing the life out of the German alike, leaving them splayed on the barbed bankruptcy of strategic and operational economy and putting paid to vainglorious wire like scarecrows, or drowned in the thought displayed by the generals of the Wilhemine naval ambitions. mud. day. The First World War had witnessed a rising The attack took place under the umbrella Nonetheless, the seizure of Vimy Ridge hegemon, Imperial Germany, challenging of a creeping barrage orchestrated by a during three bloody days in April was the existing maritime hegemon, Great young British major, Alan Brooke, who incontestably a victory for the Canadian Britain, at sea. The intractable dictates of would go on to become one of the greatest divisions thrown into battle. They geography doomed the High Seas Fleet

30 ON TRACK WINTER 2016/17 Independent and Informed L'Institut de la CAD Autonomne et renseigné to defeat. The contest was long, hard-fought, unpredictable, and magisterial, but the outcome was seldom in doubt.

I would suggest, ladies and gentlemen, that we are in the midst of a new oceanic era. Not since the great age of exploration in the 16th century have oceans played such an important role in global affairs. Unprecedented levels of commerce move (L-R): The Right Honourable Beverley McLachlin, Chief Justice of Canada; Dr. James Boutilier, Vimy Award Winner 2016; Major-General Daniel Gosselin (Ret’d), Chair of the Board, CDA Institute; General Jonathan Vance, Chief of the Defence Staff. (Image credit: Lauren Larmour.) across the world’s oceans, great all this at a time when the old, frontline power politics are being played out at sea, This realization constituted a cerebral navies are declining in size at an alarming and oceans are central to the health of revolution of the most profound sort. rate. the global organism in an age of dramatic Within half a lifetime, the Chinese climate change. Moreover, we are in became unquestioned converts to the When I was a young navigating officer, the process, for the first time in human tenets of Alfred Mahan. At its simplest, attached to the Royal Navy Reserve in history, of acquiring a new Ocean – the Mahan, the great American prophet of the early 1960s, the Royal Navy had 152 Arctic. seapower in the 1890s, argued that great frigates and destroyers. It now has 19. nations have great navies. Furthermore, Thirty years ago, during the presidency Three inter-related phenomena marked one could add a 20th-century gloss: that of Ronald Reagan, the United States Navy the end of the 20 century: the end of the great navies have aircraft carriers. aspired to have a 600-ship fleet. Currently, Cold War; the meteoric rise of China; the USN, despite oft-quoted plans for a and China’s discovery of seapower. What does all this mean in terms of the larger fleet, has only about 275 vessels. Traditionally, the Chinese looked to architecture of global naval power? It Thus, the most powerful navy in the the interior of Eurasia as a source of means that, like Wilhemine Germany, world has been cut in two, numerically, existential threats. The sea, if anything, China is a rising hegemon bent on as a result of budgetary disarmament. was seen as a barrier. The rapid growth contesting dominance in the Indo-Pacific of the Chinese economy in the last two region from the existing hegemon, At the same time, the awkwardly-named decades of the century changed all that. the United States, which has exercised People’s Liberation Army Navy has The Chinese came to realize that their worldwide power over the past 70 years grown in size and sophistication. Direct continued well-being was critically by way of the United States Navy. numerical comparisons between the dependent on the predictable and USN and the PLAN have the making of a untrammeled movement of maritime Like Germany, on the eve of the First cartoon. Yes, the Chinese have surpassed commerce. Still further, Beijing came World War, China is employing a classic the Americans in the numbers of hulls, to appreciate – as never before – the weaker-navy strategy of sea denial. Its but they have only one aircraft carrier flexibility, the mobility, and the authority aim is to hold American seapower at bay; and they lack the enormous experiential inherent in far-ranging seapower.

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background of American carrier Asian nations, deeply disturbed by commanders. China’s assertive maritime policies in the East and South China Seas and Beijing’s In short, the debate among navalists failure to honour international law, are (and some would argue that the Indo- aligning themselves with the United Pacific region is in the midst of a naval States. arms race marked by a deeply disturbing proliferation of submarines) reminds one Over the last few minutes, we have come of the “We want eight and we won’t wait” a long way from the horrors of trench debate that took place on the eve of the warfare in France a century ago. But First World War when, urged on by the the planning, courage, and execution First Sea Lord, Jacky Fisher, the popular that ensured the Canadian victory in press in England stimulated a nationwide April 1917 remain emblematic. It is campaign for more dreadnaughts. commonplace today to say that we live in a complex, confusing, and challenging We now know that the naval building world when it comes to national security. program in Germany would have been This is certainly true, but when the a formula for bankruptcy if it had been Islamic State or the Crimea are long pursued much longer, but China’s forgotten, a global contest at sea will industrial capacity is far greater, and we still be in play. While the similarities to should be suitably sobered – despite the the period prior to 1914 are tantalizing caveats cited – by the breathtaking speed intellectually, they should not blind us to with which the Chinese are constructing an array of different outcomes. Whatever not only 60 frigates but their first the case, we need to pay close attention indigenous carrier. Indeed within the to those days in April 1917. We should professional lives of those present this not delude ourselves, we should plan, evening, China has created fleet of over and we should operate from a position of 330 surface combatants characterized by strength. Perhaps those are the legacies of increasing levels of lethality. our courageous forefathers.

We should also be sobered by the way in Once again, I thank each and every one which President Xi has taken a page out of you for vesting your faith in me, and of President Putin’s Crimean playbook. for bestowing this great honour upon me. It was the Hungarian dictator, Rakosi, Merci et bon soir!  who described the communist takeover of Eastern Europe in the mid 1940s, Dr. James Boutilier is the Special Advisor, as “salami tactics.” These are the same International Engagement, at Canada’s tactics that Xi has employed; carefully Maritime Forces Pacific Headquarters calibrating the Chinese consolidation of in Esquimalt, British Columbia. He is power in the South China Sea. The levels currently responsible for advising the of provocation involved are such that Commander of Maritime Forces Pacific they are just below the point where they on matters of security, defence and foreign might trigger a major response. Both policy, and his in-depth expertise of the Putin and Xi have correctly assessed the Asia-Pacific region has been highly sought degree of passivity prevailing in the West, after for over half century. an assessment reminiscent of Hitler’s calculations in the 1930s.

Europe was criss-crossed by interlocking alliances and ententes on the eve of the First World War, and contemporary Asia has begun to exhibit the makings of similar battle lines, as more and more

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EVALUATING CHINA AS A GREAT POWER: THE PARADOX OF THE ‘RESPONSIBLE POWER’ NARRATIVE by Adam MacDonald

he ‘Assertive China’ discourse has during a period of assessed weakness on including many liberal institutionalists, Tbecome a dominate paradigm the part of the United States to challenge believe that changing power dynamics regarding the change in style and tone or oppose. Beijing, therefore, may be between the United States and China in China’s foreign policy over the past positioning itself to obstruct regional are unfolding in an arena in which decade. These narratives, while suffering and international norms and rules not stabilizing factors – such as nuclear from a number of shortcomings,1 with the aim of entirely challenging deterrence, institutionalism, and complex highlight the growing level of hostility them globally but rather nullifying their interdependence – can mitigate great and apparent non-negotiability in applications to Chinese ‘core interests.’ power conflict and ultimately uphold Beijing’s diplomatic stances over ‘core international order despite changes in the national interests,’2 a term relatively These investigations are informed by a relative distribution of power.4 new to Chinese foreign policy and may number of frameworks from International now include territorial and maritime Relations (IR) theory, especially There are those, however, who argue the claims within the South China Sea. Any structurally-informed models of power current power reconfigurations between inclusion of these as a ‘core national transition postulating the relationship China and the United States are not interest’ would propel them into a small between states as being largely a function a classic example of power transition. category of issues inextricably linked of the distribution of power between While Beijing and other emerging states to ‘national rejuvenation,’ which as them. The ‘Thucydides Trap’ – an adage are climbing the ladder by most metrics articulated by President Xi Jinping is referring to the Greek scholar Thucydides’ of power resources – specifically military a comprehensive strategy for China to assessment of the fundamental cause of spending and economic wealth– the deploy its growing power capabilities in the Peloponnesian War between Sparta gap between them and Washington order to reclaim its position as one of the and Athens, based on the shrinking (and the West in general) is substantial world’s leading powers after the ‘Century power differential between them and the and will remain so for decades to come. of Humiliation.’ fear and uncertainty this generated – has China’s continued growth in power and become a popular characterization of the influence, therefore, must be tempered Despite general agreement of the broad challenge that faces leaders in Beijing and with the fact that the United States will contours of China’s assertiveness, there Washington. This is especially true given remain the world’s only true global are a number of competing explanations the converging (albeit unequal) power superpower, albeit existing in a world of as to its origins and ultimate aims. Some resources between rising and established more capable and powerful states which speculate this is the beginning of a more powers is seen as a historically routine limit Washington’s unrivaled superiority overt revisionist challenge toward the condition usually resulting in war and as compared to the past two decades.5 United States and the current international conflict.3 order. However, whether this is a global Despite the growing emergence of such hegemonic struggle or a more localized As a result, and particularly among debates in the public domain, policy- attempt to reconfigure geopolitical offensive realists, some argue the makers seem reluctant to subscribe (at arrangements toward Beijing’s advantage deterministic effects of power transition least publicly) to structural theories is uncertain. Such actions, on the other cannot be overcome and thus promote of power transition for explaining hand, may not be a well thought out strategies for established states (the behaviour, predicting future actions, and deliberate strategy, but rather an United States chief among them) to and prescribing America’s policies with opportunistic move to secure a discrete stunt rising powers (of which China Beijing. To assure Beijing (and others) number of narrowly defined interests is the most threatening). Others, that Washington’s policies are not

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underpinned by such conceptualizations, successive US administrations since President Bill Clinton have employed the ‘Responsible Power/ stakeholder’ narrative,6 conditioning greater inclusion of decision- making authority and bestowing great power status on Beijing on its support to the international order. Adherence to the rules and norms defining the international order, however, is not the only evaluation criteria: meaningful and reliable contributions by

Beijing toward global Chinese missile frigate Yuncheng at a port call in Hong Kong, 2012. (Image credit: Kin Cheung/AP.) stability and prosperity is also required. the ownership of disputed islands and and reclamation projects or not) will be According to such an evaluation, rocks – rejected Beijing’s historically- a litmus test as to their genuineness in America’s acceptance of or opposition based claims to the entire South China being a Responsible Power which abides to China as a greater power is not based Sea from a legal basis. It also declared by international law and legal rulings.8 on the relative changes in power and that transforming low tide features into influence between the two but the ways high tide ones (the purpose of China’s Apprehensions of the coercive capabilities in which Beijing employs its burgeoning reclamation work) does not confer upon deployed within the South China Sea power assets, specifically militarily. them maritime zoning rights such as a stem from China’s larger project of territorial sea or an Exclusive Economic augmenting military power focused on China’s territorial and maritime disputes Zone. anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) with many of its neighbours in the South assets and tactics, even if Beijing eschews China Sea is seen as a defining test case of Maintaining their objection to the such terminology. These initiatives are whether Beijing will become a responsible legitimacy of the Court to rule on such directed toward neutralizing the influence stakeholder in the international order – matters, Beijing has nonetheless subtly of American forces in East Asia by being in this instance most importantly support shifted focus by emphasizing its claims able to target them at increasingly greater for the United Nations Law of the Sea as territorial in nature (the islands and distances from China’s coast (though (UNCLOS) as one of the foundational rocks), from which maritime zones are it is important to note that these efforts global legal regimes– or obstruct, legitimized, rather than proclaiming its by and large do not include utilizing a undermine, and challenge its existence. ill-defined Nine-Dash Line to claim the traditional sea control force of its own Beijing’s persistent legal and strategic entirety of this body of water.7 Even small to replace American sea power). Such a ambiguity on the extent of its claims clarifications in Beijing’s legal positions, result could possibly erode confidence has not inhibited the use of military and however, have been overshadowed by amongst regional partners and allies of constabulary forces in patrolling these Beijing’s strong rhetoric on its continuing Washington’s defence commitments, waters and reclamation projects which reclamation work, to say nothing about allowing Beijing greater freedom to are changing the facts of the ground, its possible imposition of an Air Defence strong arm neighbours toward their despite the increased tensions and risks Identification Zone and augmented preferred resolution of regional issues. of violence with other claimants. The military dills and exercises in the region. The impact of these changing military Permanent Court of Arbitration’s July The United States has publicly stated the realities on the political landscape in East ruling – though not weighing in on way in which Beijing responds to the Asia, however, has resulted in greater, not ruling (e.g., whether it curtails military lesser, regional support for Washington’s

34 ON TRACK WINTER 2016/17 Independent and Informed L'Institut de la CAD Autonomne et renseigné continued presence, amongst traditional number of UN Peacekeeping Operations maintenance of trade and movement allies as well as new partners though there (PKO) and the evacuation of Chinese of peoples in these regions. However, is an understanding that negotiation and foreign nationals from Yemen in a number of Western commentators on some level with Beijing in terms of 2014 during the height of its civil conflict. argue China’s adamant opposition to greater decision-making and status is Despite these contributions, the growing core aspects of the international order, necessary. In constructing a new regional geographic reach of the Chinese navy – most notably democracy promotion and configuration of power, however, refusal including the spotting of a Chinese task human rights, detracts from regional by Beijing to change its activities in the force off the coast of Alaska in the fall stability. Beijing’s long-held opposition South China Sea will continue to be of 2015 – have raised suspicions as to to interventions is not absolutist or interpreted by many as a revisionist Beijing’s employment of military power completely ideologically-based; they intent to forfeit international law and in these regions without stipulating the have moved towards conditional levels regional stability in order to undermine specific interests at play. of support dependent on the mission American power and introduce a new, (and in particularly the use of military Beijing-centric regional order. China’s augmenting military footprint power). But China remains opposed to internationally is motivated by a number any regime change measures regardless The regional and global implications of emergent interests. These include of rationales. Although such opposition pertaining to an Assertive China are well keeping Sea Lines of Communications draws the ire of Western powers, covered academic terrain, but would (SLOCS) open; protection of citizens particularly due to Beijing’s veto power a ‘Responsible China’ – one willing to working and travelling abroad, at the UN Security Council, whether the contribute more to public security goods – especially in conflict prone regions; liberal internationalist agenda fixated on be a more palatable and less apprehensive and contributions to security missions such norms has assisted or undermined option to the West? Simply put, if China’s such as PKOs for pragmatic purposes as the international order is debatable. One military power shifted away from A2/ well as to promote China’s image as an only needs to look at US foreign policy AD technologies and tactics and towards engaged great power. China’s growing over the past two decades, which resulted emulating US power projection in the involvement in global security dynamics in questionable regime change campaigns form of aircraft carrier battlegroups has coincided with a subtle shift of its in Iraq and Libya and a weakening of and a capability for sustained overseas adherence to its core foreign policy international rules (like UN Security operations, which would in turn be principles for respect for state sovereignty Council approval) meant to authorize focused on global stability and security and non-interference in internal affairs. military interventions. The expansion, rather than its current regional fixation This is particularly evident in the in particular, of the UN-sanctioned no- on altering the balance of power in East resource-rich but conflict-prone regions fly zone in Libya into a regime change Asia, would this confer great power status of Africa and the Middle East, where campaign has soured intervention and greater decision-making on Beijing there are significant Chinese investments discussions at the UN with China. as per the Responsible Power narrative? at risk from kleptocratic governments, Indeed, both China and Russia have civil wars, regional conflicts, and Western been reluctant to support UN Security China’s military remains regionally interventions. In the Middle East, as Council resolutions pertaining to the focused on constructing forces and well, China is being lobbied by some Syrian civil war without assurances that strategies to place American power of the region’s main actors (e.g., Saudi Assad’s regime would not be targeted. projection at risk, specifically as it Arabia, Iran) to play a greater regional pertains to the maritime domain, thus role. Yet Beijing remains reluctant to China’s growing participation in global eroding Washington’s long-standing be so engaged, due to the lack of global security dynamics, also, is occurring at military primacy in East Asia. Over the leadership experience; concerns of falling a time when there is deep resentment past decade, however, there have been victim to foreign interventions, not least from a large portion of the American important changes to the structure and with the West’s experience over the past public regarding the leadership roles, organization of the Chinese armed forces two decades; and the suspected negative security burdens, and trade and political in preparation to deploy and operate reaction from the United States of any arrangements which define their overseas in a variety of contexts. Unlike greater and overt Chinese presence. superpower position in the international its confrontational tactics and posture system. In particular, the newly elected in East Asia, however, China’s military China’s social and development plans US President Donald Trump had run a deployments globally are by and large are closely tied to its economic activities populist campaign based in part on the in support of United Nations Security the Middle East and Africa. Given notion that America is overcommitted Council (UNSC) mandated missions. this fact, few countries should be as globally. As such, he has gone so far These have included anti-piracy patrols interested in maintaining freedom of as to suggest a rethinking of NATO in the Arabian Gulf, contributions to a navigation, regional stability, and the commitments to collective defence,

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pulling soldiers out of East Asia, appears pillared on an appreciation urban development and over 100 million renegotiating virtually all trade deals, and that the unprecedented nature of the people still in abject poverty – which defaulting on the national debt. international order it confronts has many in the West, including political obviated the success of warlike rises leaders, could hardly comprehend. Leaving aside the anxieties of allies and defining other aspirants to great power In negotiating and ensuring Beijing, major partners arising from this jumble status.10 Such a strategy does not entail therefore, contributes its fair share to of ideas, it appears Americans are looking Beijing’s complete and unwavering global security goods, the West must for partners to shoulder greater burdens support to all aspects of the current be mindful that Beijing’s foreign policy and thus a more active China globally global order, nor an unwillingness to principles, practices and willingness to would perhaps be a positive development test the resolve of the system’s principal support international agendas is heavily in this respect. Is the United States, architects to cede power and influence, conditioned by the regime’s obsession however, really willing to allow Beijing but there are few indications Beijing is with domestic stability.12 greater decision-making over security aggressively challenging (militarily or matters? To answer this question, one otherwise) the international order and Determinations of Chinese support or needs to keep in mind China’s distinct advocating the construction of an entirely opposition cannot be arbitrarily linked differences from the West in terms of its new geopolitical alternative. Instead, like with Western foreign policy preferences regime and culture; its prioritization of many emerging powers, the stability on a case by case basis. As Washington, different norms than those underpinning of the current order has facilitated and therefore, looks to shape the choices this the West’s more liberal agenda; and its continues to promote and enable their rising power makes, particularly the use continued efforts to develop a military rise in power and prosperity,11 but Beijing of military power away from regional with global range and capabilities which does appear determined to carve out revisionism and towards maintenance undermines and complicates Western greater freedom of action to achieve their of global stability, it will need to shift its capabilities. core interests in spite of and despite the focus and objective. In particular, the consequences to the international rules United States will have to reinvigorate its The Responsible Power narrative is and norms they are trying to circumvent. commitment to the international order by an important counter-discourse to acknowledging the need for institutional the deterministic predictions and The current state of international stability and relational reconfigurations amongst prescriptions of structural theories of will require both Beijing and Washington established and emerging powers, while power transitions. That said, attempts to make important adjustments, not only tempering and challenging narratives of to construct and employ an objective to their foreign policy principles, but also exceptionalism and ‘exemptionalism’13 evaluation ascertaining Chinese support to perceptions and evaluations of one which justify the circumscribing of or opposition of the international order another in terms of global security roles global rules and mechanisms either by are complicated by the fact that global and responsibilities. For Beijing, there themselves as well as others. The logical politics are changing. As international must be an appreciation of the burdens antithesis of a Responsible China is not decision-making slowly moves away Washington has fulfilled to maintain necessary a revisionist one with ultimate from a system of near total Western an open and stable order which has aims of challenging US leadership dominance toward a new and uncertain enabled China’s rise, as well as a growing and authority globally, but possibly a configuration of relations between requirement to contribute to certain Reluctant China which remains focused and within emerging and established obligations which will necessitate an on achieving core national interests at the powers, there is a growing contestation easing of the non-negotiability of some expense of providing public goods and of the prioritizations and relationships of their core interests. For Washington, adherence to global legal regimes (such between a diverse set of norms and rules the Responsible Power criteria must take as UNCLOS), with detrimental effects on underpinning the current order.9 into consideration that the international global stability and prosperity.  order with which such evaluations are The paradox Washington confronts is that being judged is in a period of change. Adam P. MacDonald is an independent encouraging a more security minded and China, as well, despite its impressive rise academic based in Halifax, Nova Scotia, engaged Beijing in such an environment in power and influence possess only one- Canada. Receiving his Masters in Political will mean it will have to accept a larger fifth the GDP per capita of the United Science from the University of Victoria Chinese military with power projection States and is still addressing a myriad of in 2010, Adam specializes in geopolitical capabilities and the ability to influence domestic challenges – widespread local developments in the Arctic and East global dynamics during this period pollution affecting air and water quality, Asia. He has been published in various of change. Beijing’s grand strategy of an ongoing social security crisis with an Canadian and international journals and Peaceful Rise/Development, however, aging population, immense strains on is a regular contributor to the East Asia

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Forum and Frontline Defence. He is, as Clarify The Nine-Dash Line,” East well, a member of the Nova Scotia Health Asia Forum, 14 July 2016, http:// Research Ethics Board. www.eastasiaforum.org/2016/07/14/ did-china-just-clarify-the-nine- Notes dash-line/.

1. Johnston, Alastair Ian, “How 8. Jane Perlez, “Tribunal Reject’s New and Assertive is China’s New China’s Claims in South China Sea,” Assertiveness?” International New York Times, 12 July 2016, http:// Security 37, 4 (Spring 2013): pp. www.nytimes.com/2016/07/13/ 7-48. world/asia/south-china-sea-hague- ruling-philippines.html?_r=0. 2. Zhaokui Feng, “What Are China’s Core Interests?” China-US Focus, 9. Barry Wolmack, “China and the 21 October 2014, http://www. Future Status-Quo”, The Chinese chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/ Journal of International Politics 8, 2 what-are-chinas-core-interests-2/. (2015): pp. 115-137.

3. Graham Allison, “The Thucydides 10. Barry Buzan, “The Logic and Trap: Are The US and China Contradictions of ‘Peaceful Rise/ Headed For War?” The Atlantic, Development’ as China’s Grand 24 September 2015, http://www. Strategy,” The Chinese Journal of theatlantic.com/international/ International Politics 7, 4 (2014): pp. archive/2015/09/united-states- 381-420. china-war-thucydides-trap/406756/. 11. Miles Kahler, “Rising Powers and 4. It is important to note that not all IR Global Governance: Negotiating theoretical frameworks stem from a Changes in a Resilient Status-Quo”, structural world view. In particular, International Affairs 89, 3 (2013): pp. Social Constructivism focuses on 711-729. how inter-subjective experiences and discourses over ideas such as balance 12. Thomas J. Christensen,The China of power and power transition can Challenge: Shaping the Choices of become self-fulfilling prophecies not a Rising Power (New York: W.W. because they are objectively true but Norton and Company, 2015). because the major actors come to mutually believe they are real and 13. Stewart Patrick, “World Order: objective realities and thus follow What, Exactly, Are the Rules?” The the predictions and prescriptions Washington Quarterly 39, 1 (Spring advocated by structural theories. 2016): pp. 7-27.

5. Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, “The Once and Future Superpower: Why China Won’t Overtake the United States,” Foreign Affairs 95, 3 (May/June 2016): pp. 91-104.

6. Rosemary Foot, “Chinese Power and the Idea of a Responsible State,” The China Journal 45 (January 2001): pp. 1-19.

7. Andrew Chubb, “Did China Just

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SUPPORTING AN INFORMED PUBLIC DEBATE: SEVEN IMPORTANT FACTS TO KNOW ABOUT MILITARY REQUIREMENTS PLANNING

by Colonel Charles Davies (Ret’d)

nformed public debate of issues is a studies, with the latter being distinctly and indeed are expected to, advocate for Icornerstone of any liberal democracy. in the minority. On the other hand, as much money as possible to enable their The real challenge is how to ensure that the advice they receive from officials programs to deliver the best possible it is indeed “informed” and not overly inside the key departments concerned: capabilities for the Canadian Armed clouded by poorly founded opinion. National Defence; Public Services and Forces, this ambition is actively tempered Recent public discourse around military Procurement Canada; Innovation, by mechanisms at the corporate level, equipment projects such as the Canadian Science and Economic Development substantially enhanced over the past Surface Combatant and Future Fighter Canada; and others has to be developed decade, that provide objective and quite Capability (among others) have again under relatively high and consistent hard-eyed scrutiny and will, as needed, thrown this problem into relief, with standards of rigour, discipline, and direct a “watering down of the wine.” some commentary resting on evident oversight. This leads directly to the second fact. gaps in the authors’ understanding of some important realities affecting The context within which officials 2. It is very difficult for anyone to the definition of defence equipment prepare their advice to government is “wire” a Statement of Operational requirements. These gaps can obstruct complex, and many factors and issues Requirement in favour of a particular rational public debate. shape the process and its outcomes. A solution. Since 2005 the Vice-Chief full discussion is not possible here, so of the Defence Staff, who among other The purpose of this article is to try to this article will focus more narrowly on things is the senior resource manager begin to fill in some of them, with a view providing factual insights into seven and capability integrator for National to encouraging a more informed national issues that commonly arise in the public Defence, has been actively building and conversation on these important issues. debate about Statements of Operational maturing the Department’s Capability It does not seek to sway opinions for or Requirement produced by National Based Planning System.3 This rests on a against any specific equipment solution, Defence.1 diverse range of standard force planning but rather offers insights into some of scenarios – developed by academic, the realities of the environment within The Facts scientific, policy and military experts – which defence capability requirements that are used to support objective analysis development occurs. 1. There is an inherent institutional bias of defence capability requirements in National Defence towards the “good (e.g., is Capability A of greater value Context enough” over the “best.” This is because across a range of mission scenarios of the natural dynamics of living within than Capability B?). A growing suite of Canadian governments receive a lot of a fixed and limited budget where it is a advanced Operations Research tools and advice from many external sources on the constant struggle to make the available sophisticated simulation environments defence needs of the nation. That advice funds cover the very wide array of defence are further applied to ensure rigour and reflects various levels of thought and capabilities successive governments have discipline in the process of validating analysis, from uninformed opinion to directed the department to maintain.2 requirements, particularly for major well researched, peer-reviewed academic While individual project sponsors can, platforms.

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The process is overseen by a senior operations to fall short of “good enough.” costs. For requirements that can’t be met level Defence Capability Board, which by readily available products, they need operates within a zero-sum environment 3. Requirements have to be developed good information on the complexity, where any money spent on more than in communication with industry. There difficulty, and costs likely to be involved the minimum need in one area means are periodic calls for a firewall between in developing a new or adapted solution, less money to meet minimum needs in defence capability planners and industry, how it can be expected to perform, and another. In 2014 the former government but the hard lesson dating back to at the ability of suppliers to reliably deliver added a further level of scrutiny for least the Avro Arrow program is that it. larger projects in the form of an external requirements developed in isolation review panel,4 which has been retained from industry – that is, in the absence 4. Requirements have to be looked at by the present administration. A Cabinet of a very good understanding of what from a whole-life perspective. Unlike working group on Defence Procurement capabilities can actually be delivered by many commercial products, major was also created and has since evolved them – inevitably lead to failed, or at defence systems can have service lives into a full Cabinet Committee of eight least very troubled and costly, acquisition intended to extend out three or four ministers. programs. There must be conversations decades or more. These systems have with industry. to be effective over their full planned Getting a “wired” Statement of operating lives, and Canadian capability Operational Requirement through These have to be properly managed to managers especially have to be prepared these processes, controls, and oversight ensure that there is no resulting bias to see them continue operating effectively mechanisms would be difficult. If in the procurement process, but it is beyond that. Systems that may be anything, the risks are somewhat greater absolutely essential that the drafters of perfectly adequate for perhaps the next on the downside of the equation: that the Statements of Operational Requirement ten or twenty years, but which are likely process will produce an outcome that have a clear knowledge of the products to become obsolete well before the end of “waters down the wine” too much and available in the market, or coming into a planned 40-year life span, are not good delivers a solution that proves in certain the market, and a good idea of their investments.

Technicians reinstall the blades of a CH-146 Griffon helicopter on November 19, 2013. (Image credit:Master Corporal Marc-André Gaudreault, RCAF.)

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Some platforms can be designed to be Finally, off-the-shelf products may been deeply involved in the analysis, cost-effectively modernized, either at actually be more expensive to own and the rationale behind the resulting mid-life or on an ongoing basis, and operate. A major thrust of many military recommendations (and the perhaps kept combat capable over a long life. equipment development projects is difficult compromises embedded therein) Others cannot, and in these cases the designing new systems to be much more may not be readily apparent to them. consequences of buying an already very efficient to operate and easier to support This is not to suggest that the resulting mature system to meet a thirty- or forty- and maintain than their predecessors. The recommendations should be immune year requirement can be significant. A up-front development costs are typically from criticism, but critics do need to Matthew Fisher Postmedia column from small compared to the other lifetime costs acknowledge that many factors will have June 20165 and a recent CDA Institute of ownership, so even a project that has gone into their development and they Analysis6 contain good discussions of this substantial early development difficulties may not have full insight into all of them. subject as it applies to Canada’s fighter and cost overruns may ultimately deliver capability, but the principle is equally a cheaper solution when full-life costs are 7. Interoperability is a critical valid for any advanced combat system. considered. requirement for Canada. NATO defines interoperability as “the ability for Allies 5. Off-the-shelf equipment may or may The point here is that while off-the-shelf to act together coherently, effectively and not provide the most cost-effective purchasing is entirely appropriate for efficiently to achieve tactical, operational solution. Buying mature off-the-shelf the vast majority of Canadian defence and strategic objectives.”8 That sounds designs does have the advantage of equipment acquisitions, there will be simple, but in fact the concept includes providing reasonable certainty about requirements that may be more cost- a wide spectrum of conditions ranging the cost and performance of a system. effectively met, and deliver better national from the ability to simply understand and However, it also forces the purchaser to outcomes, through a development cooperate with each other to the ability accept the product as-is, whether it meets program. Each case needs to be looked at to seamlessly function as an integrated all aspects of the requirement or not. If objectively on its own merits. team. modifications are needed to fill critical performance gaps, the procurement is no 6. Requirements planning is a complex At the low end of the spectrum, a longer off-the-shelf and becomes more merger of art and science. A multitude multinational force can be said to be of a development program – with the of considerations go into the analysis interoperable if the various contingents attendant cost, schedule, and technology of capability requirements. A major can communicate and work to a common risks. one is of course affordability, not only plan – one contingent perhaps doing one the acquisition cost but also the whole- task and another doing a different one. Restricting procurements to off-the- life cost of ownership and operation. They may collaborate in some support shelf solutions could also, over time, A second important question is what functions, such as troop feeding and progressively freeze the Canadian Armed is available in the market and how provision of fuel, but not necessarily Forces out of operationally important closely those existing products meet others such as ammunition and spare leading-edge military capabilities. Of the Canadian Armed Forces’ needs: parts resupply where national equipment perhaps equal or greater concern to operational performance in a broad types or quality standards may be governments, it may also freeze the range of climatic and physical conditions; different. This level of interoperability nation’s research organizations and interoperability with existing Canadian works adequately in lower risk, lower defence industries out of key leading- and allied systems; maintainability; threat missions but less so in others. edge technology development and supportability; and so on. Various exploitation. While under the Industrial additional considerations can also come At the high end of the scale, interoperable and Technological Benefits Policy7 into play, including government policy forces create common understanding Canada can and does demand “high- direction, domestic industrial interests, and intent by seamlessly weaving value” offset investments from major and many others. data, information and knowledge procurements, not all “high value” together within a highly interconnected offsets are created equal. The vendor of It is rare to find a single product that collaboration environment; closely a mature product can only offer benefits optimally meets every aspect of a integrate their actions; mutually support within the scope of the programs and complex requirement, so trade-offs and each other; and know and trust each other technologies they currently have. If these compromises are an integral part of as competent, reliable partners. They do do not happen to include significant new the decision process and this can be a not necessarily have identical equipment, leading-edge technology development, source of debate both inside and outside but their systems have comparable and they cannot offer access. government. Unless an individual has often complementing capabilities, can

40 ON TRACK WINTER 2016/17 Independent and Informed L'Institut de la CAD Autonomne et renseigné be mutually supported with relative ease, Statements of Operational Requirements Rempel, “An Overview of the and are designed for seamless exchange by National Defence – gaps that can Canadian Forces’ Second Generation of data to maintain a real-time Common hinder or even obstruct an informed Capability-Based Planning Operating Picture across the force. The public debate. The insights offered here Analytical Process,” Defence R&D higher the threat level in the mission, or don’t cover the complete business of Canada Centre for Operational the greater the consequences of failure, requirements planning, but only a few Research and Analysis Technical the more important it is to be closer to selected points. Even so, it is hoped that Memorandum 2010-198 (2010), this high level of interoperability. they will make some contribution towards http://cradpdf.drdc-rddc.gc.ca/ a better informed public discourse.  PDFS/unc103/p534121_A1b.pdf. Given the small size of the Canadian Armed Forces and the very large land, Colonel Charles Davies (Retired) is a 4. The terms of reference for the panel maritime, and air regions they must CDA Institute Research fellow. His 42-year are available on the DND website at reliably cover in cooperation with career in the Canadian Armed Forces and http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/business- our US neighbours, it is operationally Public Service of Canada included three how-to-do/irpda-terms-of-reference. necessary for certain of Canada’s years leading the DND Materiel Group’s page. military capabilities to be interoperable engagement in the early development of the with US and some other key allies and Department’s Capability Based Planning 5. Matthew Fisher, “Why the Super partners at the higher end of the scale. system, and experience as a sponsor of a Hornets will force Canada out of its Examples include capabilities providing number of capability initiatives. own north,” National Post, 12 June surveillance and protection of North 2016, http://news.nationalpost.com/ American maritime (surface and sub- Notes news/canada/canadian-politics/ surface) and air approaches. A similarly matthew-fisher-why-the-super- high level of interoperability should be 1. For a more comprehensive hornets-will-force-canada-out-of-its- maintained for any forces we may choose discussion of military requirements own-north. to assign to operations under NATO planning, see Charles Davies, command as this is the direction in “Understanding Defence 6. Greg Matte, “A Legacy Decision – which the Alliance is evolving. Procurement,” Canadian Military the Long-Term Strategic Rationale Journal 15, 2 (2015), http:// for the F-35,” CDA Institute Analysis Conclusion www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vol15/ (2016), http://www.cdainstitute.ca/ no2/page5-eng.asp and Charles images/Analysis/Matte_Analysis_ A vigorous public debate about Canada’s Davies, “Competition in Defence October_2016.pdf. defence capability requirements is Procurement: The Popular Choice, an important contribution to our but not Always the Right One” Vimy 7. For an overview of the policy see the democracy, especially now with a major Paper 26 (CDA Institute, 2015), ISTC website at https://www.ic.gc.ca/ recapitalization effort and a defence http://www.cdainstitute.ca/images/ eic/site/086.nsf/eng/h_00005.html. policy review underway. It is important, Vimy_Papers/Vimy_Paper_26.pdf. however, that serious contributions to this 8. See the NATO website at http:// debate reflect a reasonable understanding 2. The Parliamentary Budget Officer www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/ of the context within which the has broadly outlined the problem. topics_84112.htm. government will be making decisions, See “Fiscal Sustainability of Canada’s including key factors influencing how National Defence Program,” departmental officials develop the advice March 2015, http://www.pbo-dpb. they provide to ministers. Only with gc.ca/web/default/files/files/files/ such an understanding will alternative Defence_Analysis_EN.pdf. The views offered by observers and critics rest issue is amplified by the author on credible foundations. in Charles Davies, “Charting the Course Towards a new Canadian The seven points discussed above are Defence Policy: Insights from Other not intended to bolster the case for Nations,” CDA Institute Analysis or against any particular equipment (2016), http://www.cdainstitute.ca/ solution. Rather, they are intended to images/Analysis/Davies_Analysis_ help fill some of the more evident gaps March_2016.pdf. in understanding, in some quarters, of key realities affecting the development of 3. For a good overview, see Mark

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AUSTRALIA AND CANADA – DIFFERENT BOATS FOR DIFFERENT FOLKS

by Dr. Andrew Davies and Christopher Cowan

f a country’s force development defend and must surveil and provide capability across all of the tasks that flow Imechanisms are doing their job, the maritime search and rescue services from them. Not surprisingly, the result is military force structure and posture over more than 10 percent of the Earth’s a fleet that is large for the population that should accurately reflect the nation’s surface. It is the most prosperous and supports it – reflecting the importance assessment of its security circumstances. technologically sophisticated nation in of the sea to the nation’s wellbeing – but In this paper we look at the Royal its immediate region. Many of its near which consists of a number of boutique Australian and Canadian navies, and neighbours have significant economic sub-fleets. Table 1 is drawn from a recent discuss their current and future force and social challenges, as well as being survey of RAN capability1 and shows the structures in terms of their suitability frequent victims of natural disasters. As current RAN order of battle. for the current and future geopolitical a result, Australia is the natural leader environment. of regional High Availability Disaster While we see a substantial number of Recovery (HADR), stabilization, and frigates – increasingly the backbone of The approaches of Australia and Canada peacekeeping missions, as was the case all but the largest navies – in the force, to their respective naval forces makes for in Fiji, Indonesia, Timor Leste and the there are substantial investments in other an interesting comparative study because Solomon Islands over the past decade. areas. The two 27,500 tonne Canberra- the two Commonwealth nations are of class LHDs (Landing Helicopter Docks) similar sizes and demographics, while Australia is dependent on sea lines of are the largest vessels the RAN has ever being situated in very different theatres. communication for both critical imports operated. The newly-delivered LHDs, The resulting naval force structures – (especially refined fuel) and for export with their ability to deliver personnel and especially those planned for the future income. It sits at the confluence of busy materiel ‘across the beach,’ have obvious – reveal quite different approaches to shipping routes through the Indian applicability in Australia’s near region managing maritime security. Canada has Ocean and up into Southeast Asia, where and have already been called upon for long been able to rely on both explicit and great power competition is heating up humanitarian operations. If Australia implicit American security guarantees between China and the United States, its is called upon to perform regional bestowed upon it by contiguous allies, and partners. Australia has always stabilization and peacekeeping missions geography. Australia, while also an relied on support from a major power – as is likely – the capacity of those American ally, feels more exposed, to ensure its security – first the UK and vessels to deploy, support, and resupply and worries more about it strategic today the US. With American primacy embarked forces will be invaluable. circumstances. Simply put, the rise of being increasingly challenged, there is China matters less on the eastern side of growing pressure on US allies to step up At the top end of war fighting capability, the Pacific. and invest more in their own capabilities. Australia is looking out at an increasingly Keeping the US engaged in the western well-armed region and nervously Australia’s strategic environment Pacific is an important part of Australia’s watching the three Aegis-equipped and its navy strategic thinking, and being a more Hobart class air warfare destroyers which capable ally is consistent with that. are significantly larger than either of the The force structure of the Royal frigate classes, and represent a step up in Australian Navy (RAN) reflects Australia has a population of only 24 surface combatant capability. There are Australia’s geographic and geostrategic million from which to raise the resources plans to replace the eight 3,600 tonne circumstances, as well as its military to meet that array of challenges, and Anzac-class FFH (Frigate Helicopter) history. Australia has a continent to the RAN’s fleet must be able to provide ships with nine larger and more capable

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Table 1: Major force elements of the Royal Australian Navy sea states (which has taken its toll on the Armidale’s availability) and much better endurance, which is crucial for persistent surveillance and response over a wide area.

Canada’s strategic environment and its navy

As is the case for Australia, Canada’s geography, geostrategic situation, and military history all influence the force structure of the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN). Canada is the world’s second largest country by area and has the world’s longest coastline, much of it in the Arctic. Canada, like Australia, is therefore responsible for defending and providing search and rescue services over a vast area. Accomplishing these tasks with such geography can be a tall order, but Canada’s security situation is improved greatly by the fact that it is contiguous with the US.

Canada’s relationship with the US is its most important, both economically and strategically. ‘Future Frigates.’2 The type is yet to be American collaborative development Canada and the US have the largest determined, but all the candidates are in effort. Over the next few decades bilateral trade relationship in the world, the 6,000+ tonne range, and the total cost the 3,100 tonne Collins boats will be which means Canada is less dependent of the project will be over A$30 billion. progressively replaced and enlarged to on seaborne trade than countries such There is a high degree of interoperability 12 by a future submarine to be designed as Australia. Canada’s contiguity with between Australian and American naval by the French DCNS firm. The concept the US also insulates it from geopolitical forces, aided by commonality of combat design is termed the Shortfin Barracuda shifts in other regions of the world, and helicopter types and the introduction of – a conventional submarine based on grants it an implicit American security the Aegis combat system in the Hobart- the design principles of the Barracuda- guarantee. While Canada and the US are class. class SSN.3 At an estimated 4,500 tonnes, bound to defend each other through their these will be the largest conventional membership in NATO, their geographic The story is similar underwater. The submarines in the world. The price tag proximity means that the US would six indigenously-built Collins-class is commensurate; current estimates are a have an inherent interest in preventing submarines represent a substantial total cost in excess of A$50 billion. foreign interference in Canada even investment in warfighting capability, in the absence of any formal treaty and there is a strong emphasis on The minor vessel fleet is also growing commitments. Washington expects interoperability with the USN. The in size and unit capability. The 13 300 Canada to do its share, but as the more Collins boats have a modified version tonne Armidale-class patrol boats are to capable partner, the US takes the lead in of the AN/BYG-1 system found in be replaced by 20 offshore patrol vessels continental defence. American submarines, and their major of up to 2,000 tonnes each. While that anti-surface warfare (ASuW) weapon is is likely to increase the cost of the fleet Not having to worry much about the Mk 48 CBASS heavyweight torpedo, substantially, it will also mean that the defending North America proper which was the result of an Australian– RAN will have better sea keeping in high allows Canada to focus on multilateral

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Table 2. Major force elements of the Royal Canadian Navy Supplementing the frigates is the RCN’s sole remaining Iroquois- class destroyer. Originally built in the 1970s, the four Iroquois- class destroyers first served as ASW platforms before being converted to perform air defence and command and control duties in the 1980s. Three of the four have since reached the end of their operational lives and have been retired, with the forth expected to be paid off in 2017. Both the Iroquois-class and Halifax-class are set to be replaced in the mid- 2020s by up to 15 Canadian Surface Combatants (CSC), at an estimated cost of around C$40 billion.6 The exact type and cost of the CSC is still to be determined, but the program is expected to deliver ASW and anti-air variants of a single platform, likely a large frigate, to replace the capabilities of the RCN’s two current surface combatants.

The continued importance of ASW and interoperability in RCN force structure is international security operations operations. That means that the RCN also evident in Canada’s relatively (through either the UN or NATO) that is not nearly as ‘balanced’ in terms of small number of submarines. The seek to maintain the US-led global order. force structure as the RAN, but that’s RCN currently operates four British- Threats to the global order are threats understandable given the very different built Victoria-class submarines, each to Canada’s overall security, although geostrategic circumstances of two displacing around 2,400 tonnes, for Canada tends to focus on threats to countries. Table 2 shows the current RCN maritime surveillance and traditional Europe due to historical ties and its order of battle.4 warfighting operations. As quiet diesel- membership in NATO. In this regard, electric submarines, the Victoria-class Russia’s revisionist actions in Eastern The core of the RCN’s warfighting serve as aggressors in NATO ASW Europe, as well as its increased maritime capability is its fleet of 12 Halifax- exercises, allowing the alliance to hone activity in the Arctic and Atlantic, are of class frigates, which specialize in anti- its ASW capabilities. While there are primary concern for Canada. submarine warfare (ASW) operations. no plans to replace these submarines in The large number of frigates can be the near future, the subs are currently Interoperability with the American traced to the RCN’s taking on of the ASW awaiting a government decision on a military and other NATO allies is role as one of its primary tasks during the multi-billion dollar life extension to take therefore a key consideration for Canada Cold War, aiding the US Navy and other them well into the 2020s.7 when structuring its armed forces. NATO navies in detecting and tracking Knowing that the US will underwrite Soviet submarines in the Atlantic Ocean. Due to the recent retirement of the Canadian security has allowed the RCN These vessels are currently receiving fleet’s two Protecteur-class auxiliary to specialize its force structure to exploit upgrades to their combat systems that oiler replenishment vessels, the RCN economies of scale and most effectively will allow for better interoperability with current at-sea replenishment and sea lift add value to US-Canadian and NATO allied vessels.5

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HMAS Canberra in Sydney. (Image credit: Australian Royal Navy) capability is reliant on leased vessels and when needed. The RCN’s maritime patrol vast area and to be able to support its less a converted cargo ship.8 This is slated to capability will be buttressed in the near capable regional neighbours in a range of change in the early 2020s when the RCN future with the addition of six Harry difficult circumstances. is set to receive two Queenston-class DeWolf-class Arctic Offshore Patrol Joint Support Ships (JSS). These ships Ships (AOPSs). These vessels will each As well, Australia has a strategic are based on the Berlin-class vessels used displace around 6,440 tonnes and will imperative to provide the maximum by the German Navy, and the project is be ice capable, making them ideal for incentive for the United States to remain estimated to cost around C$4.5 billion conducting maritime domain awareness actively engaged in the Asia–Pacific for development and sustainment. The operations in the Canadian Arctic. region. With Washington facing an addition of these vessels will greatly increasing assertive and capable China in aid the RCN in its ability to deploy Conclusion across the Pacific, and with little prospect ships on long missions and contribute to of a big boost in SU defence spending, supplying multilateral naval task forces. With major procurement programs for the expectation will be that its partners destroyers, frigates, patrol vessels, and will step up. For the US, the ability to The remainder of the RCN’s fleet consists submarines concurrently underway at command the sea in Asian waters is of smaller vessels that perform maritime various levels of maturity, Australia is optional. After experiencing its security surveillance, search and rescue, and making a huge investment in its naval guarantor, in the form of the Royal Navy, constabulary duties. The bulk of this capability. Over the next 30 years, it will finding that it had higher priorities capability comes from 12 970 tonne spend over A$100 billion increasing both elsewhere in 1942, Australia is well aware Kingston-class Maritime Coastal Defence the size of its fleet and the unit capability that a major power ally – no matter how Vessels. The Kingston-class vessels of the ships that comprise it. But it has close – will have a more intense interest are extremely valuable and are able to little option, given the external pressures closer to home than it does half a world quickly transition from non-military it is facing, which are only likely to grow away. operations (like search and rescue) to with time. Australia has to simultaneously military operations (like minesweeping) be self-sufficient in being able to police a Canada, however, faces a different set

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of challenges, which are reflected in the another way, but that proposition faces en/business-equipment/halifax- RCN’s ongoing procurement programs. numerous cost and personnel hurdles. frigate.page. The overall fleet size will increase slightly Overall, the RCN’s current slate of as the AOPVs come online, but only if all procurement programs may be ‘more of 6. Government of Canada, “Canadian 16 of the RCN’s frigates and destroyers the same’ but it’s also appropriate given Surface Combatant,” http://www. are replaced one for one by CSCs. Once Canada’s geostrategic situation.  forces.gc.ca/en/business-equipment/ bolstered by the arrival of the AOPSs, canadian-surface-combatant.page. the RCN’s coastal patrol and maritime Dr. Andrew Davies is the Director of surveillance capabilities will be more the Defence and Strategy program at the 7. Lee Berthiaume, “Government will than adequate for Canada’s needs, so no Australian Strategic Policy Institute. He have to decide whether to invest further increase in fleet size would likely previously spent 12 years in the Australian into submarines or cut ships adrift: be needed. Department of Defence in various Navy commander,” National Post, 19 capability analysis and signals intelligence June 2016, http://news.nationalpost. Despite having a larger economy, Canada roles. com/news/canada/liberals-will- spends less on defence than Australia,9 soon-decide-whether-to-invest- and budgetary pressures will be keenly Christopher Cowan is a Research into-navy-submarines-or-to-cut- felt as the RCN develops its proposals for Intern at the Australian Strategic Policy the-ships-adrift. government. Unlike Australia, Canada Institute. He has a Master of Strategic is feeling little direct external pressure Studies (Advanced) from the Australian 8. David Pugliese, “Canada’s navy on its security situation (except to the National University and a Bachelor of isn’t interested in a deal for second north) and does not see a requirement Arts (Honours) in Political Studies from commercial to supply warships,” to significantly increase the amount it Queen’s University. Ottawa Citizen, 15 October 2015, spends, despite a need to recapitalize http://ottawacitizen.com/news/ its armed forces. For example, there Notes national/defence-watch/canadas- seems to be little appetite within the navy-isnt-interested-in-a-deal-for- Canadian polity for a replacement for 1. Andrew Davies, “ADF Capability second-commercial-fuel-tanker-to- the Victoria-class submarines or to Snapshot 2015: Part -2 RAN,” supply-warships. develop an amphibious capability, at a Australian Strategic Policy Institute, time when Australia has greatly boosted 12 November 2015, https:// 9. Andrew Davies, “Recapitalizing its amphibious fleet and is intending to www.aspi.org.au/publications/ a modern military: Canada double the size of its submarine arm. As a adf-capability-snapshot-2015- and Australia,” On Track 20, 1 result, the RCN’s force structure is likely part-2-ran/SI99_ADF_capability_ (Summer 2015), http://www. to continue to be surface combatant snapshot_2015_RAN.pdf. cdainstitute.ca/images/on_track/ centric. On_Track_20.1.pdf. 2. See Commonwealth of Australia, Canada’s more general interest in Integrated Investment Plan, http:// preserving the US-led global order is www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper/ best accomplished by continuing to Docs/2016-Defence-Integrated- participate in multilateral operations Investment-Program.pdf. with its NATO allies or via the UN. Increasing Russian submarine activity 3. DCNS, “The Shortfin Barracuda. in the Atlantic and Arctic is a genuine Block1A,” http://dcnsgroup.com. concern, but it is also one that Canada au/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/ has faced (and structured the RCN DCNS-SEA1000-Insert-FINAL_ around) before. Having the majority of low-res.pdf. the new CSCs focus on ASW operations (and be interoperable with NATO allies) 4. International Institute for Strategic is the most effective way, from both a Studies (IISS), The Military Balance capability and cost perspective, in which 2016 (IISS, February 2016) Canada could contribute to maintaining the current order. Finding a suitable 5. Government of Canada, “Halifax- replacement for the Victoria-class and class Modernization/ Frigate Life expanding the submarine fleet would be Extension,” http://www.forces.gc.ca/

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SPACE AND THE THIRD OFFSET IN THE POST-POST-COLD WAR PERIOD – LESSONS FOR CANADA AND AUSTRALIA by Dr. Malcolm Davis

ast year my colleague Andrew Davies The Liberal Party of Justin Trudeau The four Victoria-class diesel-electric Lanalysed Australia’s and Canada’s suggests that current National Defence submarines may get a life-extension to defence policies and looked at prospects spending levels, including the above keep them operationally viable into the for force modernization and operational planned increases, would be maintained.3 2020s.8 funding for the two militaries in the years Yet this policy does not explicitly ahead.1 Written just before the Canadian guarantee significant spending increases In an article appearing in this issue, federal election, which the Liberal Party necessary to turn around the CAF’s Andrew Davies and Chris Cowan explore led by Justin Trudeau won decisively in decline, instead making vague promises the likely development of the RCN, and October 2015, Davies’ analysis highlights of “reinvesting in building a leaner, more compare it with significant growth the diversionary paths being taken by the agile, better equipped military,” and RAN. They note that Canada’s more two countries. On the one hand, the suggesting the procurement budget for unique operational requirements allow 2016 Defence White Paper (DWP-16) replacing the CF-18s will be reduced,4 it to role specialize to a greater degree released by Australia in February 2016 with a focus on lower-priced options than Australia, which must maintain an suggests that stated defence spending than the F-35. Most recently, a decision5 effective, balanced defence capability. will increase to 2 percent of GDP by was announced that Canada would Like Australia, Canada is focused on FY-2023-24.2 In contrast, the current purchase an interim fleet of 18 Boeing preserving the US-led global order, Canadian defence document, the Canada F/A-18E/F Super Hornets,6 whilst which they note “is best accomplished by First Defence Strategy (CFDS), maintains pushing the F-35 decision further back. continuing to participate in multilateral flat defence spending. As Davies notes, Canada will continue to participate in operations,” either with NATO or with given underlying inflation, this will see the Joint Strike Fighter program and will the United Nations. In this regard, CAF a “rundown in defence capability again, consider the F-35 as well as other aircraft are currently undertaking military action albeit a slower one than seen in the 1990s in a competitive process for a future in Iraq, alongside Australia and the and early 2000s.” permanent fighter capability. United States, under Operation Impact.

The outcome of Canada’s approach is As for the Royal Canadian Navy, the The signals coming out of Canada on a ‘steady decline of buying power’ for thinking is that money saved on buying defence policy therefore represents a the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF). the F-35 now, and instead opting for what ‘steady state’ approach – replacing older Although a budget increase has been the public sees as a cheaper (albeit less platforms with newer platforms, at a flagged for 2017-18, with defence capable) aircraft like the Super Hornet, similar number, to do similar missions. spending expected to rise to 3 percent, would be reinvested in naval capability,7 Canada’s defence policy and its military given that major recapitalisation of its with the aim to develop the RCN into strategy ought to reflect its strategic frontline assets are required, notably a true blue water maritime force based outlook, which is challenged increasingly the replacement for the CF-18 Hornet, around icebreakers, supply ships, by an assertive Russia in the Arctic, and the replacement for the CP-140 Aurora arctic and offshore patrol ships, surface in terms of Russia’s submarine operations maritime patrol aircraft, and a very combatant. Of key importance will be in the Atlantic, as well as growing significant naval modernisation program, the new Canadian Surface Combatants and pervasive global challenges to even the promised 3 percent annual (CSCs), of which the RCN will acquire international order. Yet, with an implicit increase may not be sufficient to keep the up to 15 by the mid-2020s to replace and explicit defence guarantee from the CAF effective. existing Halifax-class frigates and a sole US, Canada can afford to specialize to remaining Iroquois-class destroyer. a greater degree than Australia, where

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Two Russian Borey-class submarines. (Image credit: Russian Defense Policy.)

the “tyranny of distance” suffered by has a clear responsibility towards the in other regions of the world, and Australia from its key partner is matched Alliance’s collective security mission grants it an implicit American security by growing insecurity caused by a rising under Article V. Russia’s activities in the guarantee. While Canada and the China. Canada can focus on supporting Arctic also must be of concern for Canada, US are bound to defend each other collective defence within NATO and on given that it, unlike the United States, has through their membership in NATO, participation in UN-led peacekeeping territorial disputes with Moscow above their geographic proximity means that tasks, as well as the essential requirements the Arctic Circle. Whereas Australia must the US would have an inherent interest for sovereignty defence of Canadian plan against the possibility of a rising and in preventing foreign interference territory. assertive China seeking to challenge its in Canada even in the absence of security interests in Asia, Canada now any formal treaty commitments. This steady state strategic mindset is likely must more directly respond to the risks Washington expects Canada to do its to be increasingly challenged because posed by a re-emergent and aggressive share, but as the more capable partner, Canada’s strategic outlook is becoming Russia that is literally on its doorstep the US takes the lead in continental more challenging. The threat posed by a over the north pole, and against NATO to defence.9 re-emergent Russia to NATO and within which Canada has significant obligations. the Arctic is of primary significance, Despite this apparently comfortable even more so than peace support tasks, So could Canada shift from a ‘steady situation, Canada’s security outlook must humanitarian assistance, and supporting state’ approach to a new defence policy consider an increasingly powerful and counter-terrorism. Simply put, there is no that allows it to significantly punch assertive Russia that threatens not only bigger task than responding to growing above its weight? Canada may also face NATO security interests, but also asserts risks caused by Russia, which seems increasing pressure from the new Trump territorial claims in the high Arctic under intent on reversing losses of territory administration to do more to contribute the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and influence suffered by the then Soviet to global security and stability, or risk (UNCLOS) Commission on Limitation Union in 1991, particularly as Russian being labelled a free-rider in an era of the Continental Shelf. Russia claims actions impinge on NATO security where it’s become clear that the new 1.2 million square kilometres of Arctic interests. Russia’s willingness to challenge Administration will not accept such an sea shelf, which includes some of the international norms of behaviour and a outcome. Davies and Cowan note that: world’s largest untapped reserves of oil rules-based order represents the reality and gas, as well as valuable minerals.10 that Russia is a re-emerging revisionist Canada’s contiguity with the US also The Russian claims, if realised, would power, and Canada as a NATO member insulates it from geopolitical shifts give it access to 4.9 billion tonnes of

48 ON TRACK WINTER 2016/17 Independent and Informed L'Institut de la CAD Autonomne et renseigné hydrocarbons, and would see it extend that the US will have less money to deal a true operational environment of equal its territory to include the North Pole, with these threats in traditional platform- importance to air, sea and land. Without the Mendeleev Rise, and the Lomonosov centric manners by building up a bigger Space, modern information-led military Ridge.11 With climate change leading to navy, air force, and army. operations would be impossible, and US shrinking ice and allowing greater access military power would be emasculated. to previously untapped resources, as The ‘third offset’ follows the ‘first offset’ General William Shelton (US Air Force well as opening up new shipping routes strategy which was Eisenhower’s ‘New [USAF]), Commander USAF Space through the Northwest and Northeast Look’ doctrine of heavy reliance on Command noted in 2014 that: passages, a scramble is on in the Arctic, tactical nuclear forces to offset Soviet with Russia, Denmark, Norway, and conventional superiority in Europe in We are so dependent on Space these Canada all lodging claims to resource the 1950s; and the ‘second offset’ of days. We plug into it like a utility. It is rich territory. Russia is backing up its precision strike combined with advanced always there. Nobody worries about claims with an increasingly sophisticated ISR (intelligence, surveillance, and it…You do not even know sometimes military presence throughout the Arctic, reconnaissance) capabilities to offset that you are touching Space. So, to which will include military bases that can a combination of Soviet conventional lose US Space capabilities it would be support deployed forces. forces and nuclear parity in both Europe almost a reversion back to industrial- and at a strategic level in the 1970s and based warfare.16 So the drift in Canadian defence 1980s. Introduced by then US Secretary spending as noted earlier by Davies of Defense Chuck Hagel on 15 November Space is an area where countries like may not be sustainable into the future. 2014, he suggested areas such as robotics, Canada and Australia can play a much If Canada were to seek a more robust autonomous systems, miniaturisation, more significant role in directly supporting defence capability, which areas of ‘big data’ and advanced manufacturing the Third Offset strategy whilst boosting capability development for the Canadian including 3-D printing.13 their ability to undertake independent Armed Forces (CAF) must it prioritise? military tasks without incurring huge In considering the future direction of its Two key components of the Third cost. Canada currently possesses a single defence modernisation, Canada should Offset strategy within the formal radar satellite (RADARSAT II), to which consider the opportunity to participate Defense Innovation Initiative are the will be added three additional satellites in the US-led ‘Third Offset’ strategy Defense Innovation Unit Experimental in 2018.17 These three new satellites will as a way forward. Canada’s approach (DIUx) and the Long-Range Research be smaller than the current RADARSAT to military modernisation has been a and Development Planning Program II spacecraft, and allow more regular largely traditional ‘platform-centric’ one, (LRRDPP).14 The former seeks to act as revisits of Canada’s far north and the based around ships and submarines in a a bridge between US DoD components, Northwest Passage. That allows new Navy, fighter aircraft and maritime patrol and the private sector, perhaps best applications that allow examination of aircraft in the air force, and light infantry epitomized by Silicon Valley. The latter geographic regions to highlight changes in the army. Rather than do ‘more of the is designed to understand and prioritise over time for both civil and military same,’ the CAF should look at innovative new or unconventional application of observation roles. The RADARSAT II approaches to enable it to punch above its technology to ensure significant military Constellation suggests a future paradigm weight, whilst minimising the financial technological advantage for the US into for Canadian defence space activities, impact of such modernisation. the future, specifically around the 2025- based around small satellites to support 2030 timeframe. The Third Offset strategy communications and earth observation. What is ‘The Third Offset’? has suggested some key communities of interest that include electronic warfare, Looking beyond the next generation The third offset, currently at the heart of space, cyber, ground and sea platforms, RADARSATs, Canada needs to US defence modernisation strategy, seeks air platforms, sensors and autonomy.15 investigate the potential that CubeSats to ensure the US can project power and offer a low-cost option to expand ensure technological overmatch against The Third Offset and Space Canadian space capabilities through rising and returning peer competitors swarms of networked satellites that whilst – specifically China and Russia. The From Canada’s perspective, greater diminutive in size (a typical 1U Cubesat offset strategy has emerged in response investment in space capabilities being only 10cm x 10cm x 11.3cm), can to a recognition that the American seems worthwhile as an approach and be scaled up according to operational dominance in key warfighting domains is harmonises well with the Third Offset’s requirements, are vastly lower in cost, being eroded because of the proliferation goals. Space is a critical enabler for all and can be deployed in clusters as a of disruptive capabilities across the military operations and a vital backbone secondary payload on commercial spectrum of conflict.12 It also recognises of joint military forces. Space has become launch services, riding into orbit for very

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low cost or even zero cost.18 satellites, and a satellite failure with a even Space-based Space Situational CubeSat is not disastrous if ten more are Awareness tasks. Although individual CubeSats herald a revolutionary change waiting and ready to be launched when CubeSats cannot match the operational in space capabilities because they open needed. performance of large satellites equipped the space domain to a much broader with advanced sensors, the potential for range of customers. Borrowing heavily While CubeSats are becoming more networking swarms of CubeSats and the from commercial off the shelf (COTS) prolific, space launch costs are declining sheer number that can be deployed offers technologies, Cubesats suggest that the as new launch technologies emerge. different types of advantages over large, business model is more Silicon Valley Together with the greater adoption of unitary satellites, at much lower cost than Cape Kennedy. The ‘small and the CubeSat paradigm, an inflection and at much more rapid development cheap and many’ approach allows a rapid point in the space sector is becoming timelines.21 innovation cycle akin to smartphone clearer. Reusable rocket systems such as development that contrasts strongly those being developed by commercial A key requirement for Earth Observation with traditional approaches. Rather companies like SpaceX, Blue Origin, and is rapid revisit rate over geographical than spend years building a single Vulcan Aerospace Stratolaunch point locations, such as the high Arctic. A satellite, CubeSats can be mass produced, the way to reduced launch costs over total of three operational Canadian continuously upgraded, and launched traditional fully expendable launchers, RADARSAT satellites will be in orbit cheaply as secondary payloads on a with SpaceX aiming for $1,000 per from 2018. These will provide daily regular basis. Their small size and low pound to low-earth orbit (LEO) on their revisits of Canada’s vast territory and complexity allow dramatically lower partly reusable Falcon Heavy rocket, to maritime approaches - four passes per costs in terms of dollars per pound to be launched on its first flight during the day in the far north and several passes orbit, with prices as low as $50,000 for a first quarter of 2017.20 These and other per day over the Northwest passage.22 single 1u satellite, or up to $250,000 for a proposed launch capabilities are ideal Cubesat swarms could enhance this more complex 3u CubeSat. More complex to support the requirements of CubeSat capability by dramatically increasing designs such as 6u or 12u satellites allow customers who need rapid and responsive the revisit rate, allowing near real time, greater capability, but the cost rises, space access to deliver CubeSats for tasks 24-hour surveillance over areas of key so the paradigm behind the CubeSat on an ‘as needed’ basis. interest, and in a variety of wavelengths. concept is to emphasize simplicity. Nor The RADARSAT II constellation will do they need specialised facilities for Canadian investment into new types be based around Synthetic Aperture construction and testing, given they are of Space capabilities such as CubeSats Radar (SAR) sensors, whereas the use of designed for educational institutions like directly support the US’ Third Offset CubeSats would allow a wider variety of universities, but are open to even private strategy by contributing to burden sensors than just SAR. If a constellation individuals to build.19 They are designed sharing in terms of advanced satellite of thirty CubeSats were deployed at to be less risk tolerant than traditional communications, as well as ISR, and relatively low cost, and regularly updated

Canada’s RADARSAT II satellite. (Image credit: Canadian Space Agency.)

50 ON TRACK WINTER 2016/17 Independent and Informed L'Institut de la CAD Autonomne et renseigné

Canada’s Choices

Canada is never going to have sufficient funding to massively boost the capabilities of their armed forces, or adopt a ‘balanced force’ approach similar to Australia’s. Their geographic proximity to the United States means that they will always have US support because it is not in Washington’s interest to permit threats to emerge in the maritime and air approaches to North America. But it is clear from rhetoric emerging from the next administration that US allies will need to share a greater burden, and a ‘steady state’ approach to Canadian An artist’s conception of two Earth-orbiting CubSats. (Image credit: NASA.) defence modernisation may no longer be sufficient. with new satellites, some satellites could capabilities are considered. In a recent carry optical or infra-red sensors, whilst statement to the US House Armed The answer is not necessarily to expand others might carry SIGINT or ELINT Services Committee, Deputy Assistant the overall size of the CAF in terms payloads. Some CubeSats could also Secretary of Defense (Space Policy), of ships, planes, or ground forces, support communications roles including Douglas Loverro stated in regards to the but to strengthen its approach to role space-‘gateways’ that allow terrestrial Third Offset and space: specialisation, and investing more in CAF forces to ensure stable and secure space capabilities seems a clear path datalinks between air, naval and ground a space offset strategy must employ a forward. Nor does this approach need to forces to support the planned two Polar diverse set of resilience measures that cost Canada billions in Canadian dollars. Communications and Weather (PCW) complicate the technical, political, With an active space program in place missions satellites.23 and force structure calculus of our that contributes to US and other nation’s adversaries, by arraying a complex space activities, Canada has a strong CubeSats also mitigate risk of loss of set of responses, with few overlapping foundation upon which to expand into space capabilities either because of vulnerabilities and a combination of a vibrant new sector of the commercial Space Weather caused by solar flares, known and ambiguous elements. To space community, specifically through the growing risk posed by Space Debris, do this within our expected budget looking at CubeSats as a potential path or deliberate attack from a hostile state limitation, the US response is clear— forward. International collaboration with that is equipped with ASAT capabilities. we must leverage our two natural key partners should be a key facet of this, A large unitary satellite is relatively and sustained space advantages: and Canada needs to engage directly straightforward to target and attack, the U.S. commercial/entrepreniual with key US ‘third offset’ groups within whereas a swarm of CubeSats is much space sector, and our ability to form government and in private industry. more amorphous. The loss of a few coalitions with our space-faring CubeSats in a swarm can be replaced allies.24 The potential for collaboration with relatively quickly if more spares are other partners who are also interested available for launch, unlike a large This is a clear call for greater US in pursuing CubeSats as a logical path satellite that might take years to replace. cooperation between government and the to do more in Space is also clear, and So CubeSats reinforce dissuasion against commercial sector, and between the US Australia is well positioned to do this. an opponent equipped with counter- government and its key allies, including Australia’s 2016 Defence White Paper space capabilities. It becomes harder to Canada. The same approach can be makes clear that the Space Domain attack space capabilities if there are many developed by those allies, to stimulate is vitally important (4.14), and seeks small satellites than few large satellites. their own commercial space sectors and greater access to “allied and commercial Loss of space capability in a conflict is strengthen international collaboration space-based capability” whilst seeking graceful rather than catastrophic, and on space capabilities. to ”further develop our intelligence, can be quickly reconstituted, especially surveillance and reconnaissance when advances in reusable launch capabilities in the longer term, including

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through potential investment in space- Defence White Paper (2016): p. 177. 11. Vladimir Isachenkov, “Russia to based sensors” (i.e., satellites).25 The UN: We are claiming 463,000 2016 Integrated Investment Plan 3. Liberal Party of Canada, Investing square miles of the Arctic,” Business suggests funding for a Satellite Imagery in our Future, https://www.liberal. Insider, 4 August 2015, http://www. Capability project from the early 2020s ca/realchange/investing-in-our- businessinsider.com/russia-to-un- through to the mid-2030s, and notes military/. we-are-claiming-463000-square- that “additional investment is planned in miles-of-the-arctic-2015-8?IR=T space-related capability, including space- 4. Liberal Party of Canada, A New Plan and K. Jayalakshmi, “Russia submits based and ground-based surveillance and for a Strong Middle Class (2015), claim over Arctic and North Pole reconnaissance systems.” (1.21) Australia https://www.liberal.ca/files/2015/10/ to UN citing scientific proof,” has just recently supported the Buccaneer New-plan-for-a-strong-middle- International Business Times, 8 CubeSat missions that will enhance ADF class.pdf. August 2015, http://www.ibtimes. defence capabilities by better calibrating co.uk/russia-submits-claim-over- the Jindalee Over the Horizon Radar 5. Christopher Cowan, “Trudeau’s arctic-north-pole-un-citing- Network (JORN).26 Folly: Canada’s New ‘Interim’ scientific-proof-1514616. Fighters,” The Strategist (24 The policy language within the 2016 November 2016), https://www. 12. United States, Department of White Paper imply a growing interest aspistrategist.org.au/trudeaus-folly- Defence, Memorandum for Deputy in developing space capabilities, but canadas-new-interim-fighters/. Secretary of Defence (15 November doing this in a collaborative approach 2014), http://www.defense.gov/ with a partner already well established 6. Canada, “Canada Announces Portals/1/Documents/pubs/ in the space sector would lead to mutual Plan to Replace Fighter Jet OSD013411-14.pdf. benefits. Both states working with the Fleet,” 22 November 2016, Americans on developing innovative http://news.gc.ca/web/article- 13. Cheryl Pellerin, “Hagel Announces and transformative space capabilities as en.do?mthd=index&crtr. New Defense Innovation, Reform part of the Third Offset strategy fulfils page=1&nid=1158669. Efforts,” US Department of Defence, a requirement to share burden to a http://www.defense.gov/News/ greater degree in coming years whilst 7. Liberal Party, A New Plan for a Article/Article/603658. strengthening independent defence Strong Middle Class. capabilities. Australia and Canada may 14. United States, Defense Innovation have different strategic outlooks, but their 8. Lee Berthiaume, “Government Will Unit Experimental, Accelerating common goal of strengthening relations Have to Decide whether to Invest Innovation to the Warfighter, https:// with the US can progress forward if they into Submarines or Cut Ships Adrift: www.diux.mil/. are bold enough to reach for the stars.  Navy Commander,” The National Post, 18 June 2016, http://news. 15. United States, Department of Dr. Malcolm Davis joined ASPI as nationalpost.com/news/canada/ Defence, Reliance 21 – DoD a Senior Analyst in Defence Strategy liberals-will-soon-decide-whether- Communities of Interest, http://www. and Capability in January 2016. He is to-invest-into-navy-submarines-or- defenseinnovationmarketplace.mil/ undertaking policy analysis and research to-cut-the-ships-adrift. resources/MasterCOIPoster.pdf. on issues such as Australian Defence Policy and Force Structure; Chinese military 9. Andrew Davies and Christopher 16. Quoted in United States, US- modernisation; The future of air and Cowan, “Australia and Canada – China Economic and Security space power; and broadly, future military Different Boats for Different Folks,” Review Commission, Annual technology and future war. ON TRACK 21, 2 (2016). Report to Congress, “Section 2: China’s Military Modernization,” Notes 10. United Nations, Oceans and Law 2014, http://origin.www. of the Sea, Commission on the uscc.gov/sites/default/files/ 1. Andrew Davis, “Recapitalizing Limits of the Continental Shelf Annual_Report/Chapters/ a Modern Military: Canada and (CLCS): Submission by the Russian Chapter%202%3B%20Section%20 Australia,” ON TRACK 20, 1 (2015): Federation, http://www.un.org/ 2%20China%E2%80%99s%20 pp. 41-45. depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_ Military%20Modernization.pdf. files/submission_rus.htm. 2. Australia, Department of Defence, 17. Canada, Canadian Space Agency,

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“Radarsat-2,” http://www.asc-csa. Space Capability,” Australian gc.ca/eng/satellites/radarsat2/ and Defence Magazine, 18 October 2016, Canada, Canadian Space Agency, http://www.australiandefence.com. “Radarsat Constellation,” http:// au/news/buccaneer-cubesat-a- www.asc-csa.gc.ca/eng/satellites/ defence-space-capability radarsat/default.asp.

18. UNSW Australia, “Satellite Formation Flying,” https://www. unsw.adfa.edu.au/space-research/ research-themes/satellite- formation-flying.

19. CubeSat Kit, “Begin your CubeSat Mission with the CubeSat Kit,” http://www.cubesatkit.com.

20. Andrew Chaikin, “Is SpaceX Changing the Rocket Equation?” Air & Space (January 2012), http:// www.airspacemag.com/space/ is-spacex-changing-the-rocket- equation-132285884/?all.

21. Sreeja Nag et al, “Effect of satellite formations and imaging modes on global albedo estimation,” Acta Astronautica 126 (2016): pp. 77-97.

22. Canada, Canadian Space Agency, “Radarsat Constellation.”

23. Canada, Canadian Space Agency, “Polar Communications and Weather Mission (PSW),” http:// www.asc-csa.gc.ca/eng/satellites/ pcw/default.asp.

24. “Statement of Douglas Loverro, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Space Policy) Before the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,” House Armed Services Committee, 15 March 2016, http://docs.house.gov/meetings/ AS/AS29/20160315/104620/ HHRG-114-AS29-Wstate- LoverroD-20160315.pdf.

25. Australia, Department of Defence, Defence White Paper (2016), http:// www.defence.gov.au/WhitePaper/.

26. “Buccaneer Cubesat a Defence

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