TITLE : TAJIKISTAN'S RELATIONS WITH IRAN AND AFGHANISTAN
AUTHOR : Muriel Atkin George Washington Universit y
THE NATIONAL COUNCI L FOR SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEA N RESEARC H
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PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR : Muriel Atki n
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DATE : November 9, 199 2
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The work leading to this report was supported by contract funds provided by the National Council fo r Soviet and East European Research . The analysis and interpretations contained in the report are those of th e author . Executive Summary :
Tajikistan's Relations with Iran and Afghanista n
Today, many Tajiks living in the former Soviet Union ar e keenly aware that they are part of a larger Persian cultura l world . Those who are active in politics in Tajikistan, whethe r
the Communist old guard still trying to preserve its dominance o r
the various opposition groups, think that connections with tha t wider Persian world, especially in Iran and Afghanistan, can b e useful to them . However, the kinds of links they emphasize an d
their purposes in doing so vary considerably .
The facet of this cross-border connection which is mos t
discussed in the news media is religious, specifically that Ta-
jiks in Tajikistan want to establish an Islamic state modeled o n
Iran with aid both from that country and from Afghanistan's muja-
hidin . However, that view relies excessively on garbled informa-
tion and a certain amount of hostile propaganda . There is a
certain amount of respect for Iran as a state which has, accord-
ing to its own propaganda, gone from subordination to a foreig n
power to full independence and full freedom to live according t o
Islamic teachings . At the same time, most Tajiks, even advocate s
of Islamicizing politics, do not consider Iran's kind of Islami c
state an appropriate example for Tajikistan to emulate . Storie s
that the current political turmoil in Tajikistan is the result o f
a plot to establish an Islamic "fundamentalist" state there fo-
mented by Afghanistan's radical Islamicizers, the Hizb-i Islami ,
and supported by Hizb guerrillas fighting in Tajikistan are wild -
ly exaggerated . These stories owe much to the propaganda of the
Communist hard-liners, which tries to deny any legitimate domes -
tic basis for opposition to the old order .
Much of what interests Tajiks about the Persian-speakin g
world beyond their borders involves economics : investment, trade ,
and development projects for the poorest of the former Sovie t
republics . Another important part of the attraction is cultural .
After decades of having their heritage reinterpreted and deni-
grated under the Soviet system and still fearful of dominance b y
their Turkic neighbors, Tajiks seek help from abroad in reinvig-
orating their language, literature, history, and arts .
In the context of a domestic political power struggle, whic h
the hard-line government's own actions did much to turn violent ,
various condending groups have armed themselves, including b y
obtaining weapons from Afghanistan . This is true for supporter s
of the Communist old guard as well as some of the opposition .
Their contacts in Afghanistan are not simply or even primaril y
members of the Hizb-i Islami but any one who has weapons to sel l
or barter ; that applies to most of the adult males in a countr y bristling with weapons .
Tajikistan now faces immense problems . To deal with them ,
it is seeking cooperation and aid not only from Iran and Afghani-
stan but from as many countries as possible . Therefore, an im-
portant factor in determining which countries Tajikistan wil l
deal with the most will be which countries give it the most as-
sistance in deed, not just in lectures on what to do differentl y
and unfulfilled promises . After prolonged domination by others ,
the Tajiks are not eager now to be dominated by a new foreig n
master . The cultural similarities among Tajikistan, Iran, and Afghanistan do not foreordain that Tajikistan must become a pup - pet or even an integral part of the other two . The competing political groups in Tajikistan would prefer to diversify thei r
foreign relations . That is feasible, as long as other countrie s do not mishandle their dealings with or simply ignore Tajikistan .
Tajikistan's Relations with Iran and Afghanista n
by Muriel Atki n
Tajikistan and Iran have shown increased interest in eac h other since the last years of the Soviet Union's existence .
However, that does not mean that the reasons for this interest ar e the same in both countries or that either sees the other as th e linchpin of its foreign policy . Culture, economics, religion, an d politics all play a role in relations between these two countries .
Tajikistan's interest in Iran has broad support but is tempered b y wariness of subordination to Iran . Iranian interest in Tajikista n has a narrower base of support, being largely a function o f government ambitions, but is broader ranging in its objectives .
Some of the same factors which link Tajikistan to Iran link i t to Afghanistan as well . However, this relationship is complicate d by the fact that one virtually has to speak of "Afghanistans " rather than a single entity, since the country is divided on man y lines, including the political gulf between the supporters of th e now-defunct Communist government in Kabul and the opposition to it , which is itself divided along ideological, religious, and ethni c lines . Ethnicity divides not only the mujahedin but also th e population as a whole between the traditionally dominant Pashtun s and all others, who are divided among themselves and include Tajik s and other Persian-speakers .
The Tajiks of the former Soviet Union and the dominan t nationality in Iran, the Persians, as well as the various Persian - speakers in Afghanistan, are similar--though not identical--i n
1 language and other aspects of culture . That fact has bee n important to educated Tajiks in Central Asia as they maneuvered fo r advantage in the context of Soviet nationality relations and bega n the process of building a viable independent state in the post -
Soviet period .
Although the term "Tajik" has a centuries-long tradition o f use, not only in Central Asia, to differentiate Persian-speaker s from Turkic peoples, the use of that name to designate a nationali -
ty in a political sense is a twentieth-century creation of th e
Soviet regime . The subdivision of Soviet Central Asia during th e
1920s and 1930s into republics defined in terms of nationality gav e ethnicity greater weight in the politics as well as the social , cultural, and economic concerns of the region than it had had i n
the past .
Elites of all the major Central Asian nationalities had t o deal with the way the Soviets defined their national identity fo r
them . This included categorizing all of them as "formerly backwar d peoples," who owed their progress not only to Communist rule bu t also to the guidance of the more advanced Russians . In addition ,
the Soviet way of defining nationalities in Central Asia could b e more inclusive in some cases than what had existed traditionally , as in the subsuming of tribal, local, or even ethnic identitie s
into larger national categories, but divisive in others, emphasiz -
ing the separateness of officially-defined nationalities fro m kindred peoples inside or outside the Soviet Union . At the sam e
time that Central Asian nationalities had to deal with th e
2 3
Kremlin's policy toward them, they also competed among themselve s on many points, including political power, access to natura l resources, and educational opportunities . This competition ha s persisted and in many ways intensified in the post-Soviet era . I n coping with nationality relations on both all-Union and regiona l levels, educated Tajiks have made significant political use o f their kinship to other Persian-speakers since the 1940s .
One of the most important ways many educated Tajiks in genera l as well as Tajikistan's Communist officials have sought to counte r denigrating interpretations of their identity by either the centra l authorities or their Turkic neighbors has been to stress thei r links to the Persian past and present . 1 As a practical matter , before the political reforms of the closing years of the Sovie t era, they often had to label as Tajik anything Persian from beyon d
Central Asia to avoid provoking Moscow's wrath . 2 Less importan t than the accuracy of this designation is the way in which it ha s enabled Tajiks to evade, at least to some extent, Moscow's effort s to regulate the content of their culture . The crux of thi s interpretation is that Tajik-Persian culture is not "formerl y
I "Ustav i programma organizatsii 'Rastokhez' (Vozrozhdenie ) Tadzhikskoi SSR," Rastokhez, 1990, no . 5, p . 3 ; "Az rui aql i solim," Adabiyot va san"at, August 16, 1990, p . 1 ; "Izhorot i ishtirokkunandagoni konferentsiyai ta"sisi sozmoni umumimilli i tojikon 'Mehr'," Sogdiana, 1990, no . 3 ., p . 1 ; " Pora obnovleniia, " Sogdiana, 1990, no . 1 (February), p . 1 ; "Obshchestvo v 1989 godu, " Sogdiana, 1990, no . 1, p . 1 ; "Na ruinakh ambitsii," Sogdiana, 1990 , no . 1, p . 3 .
2 M . Atkin, "Religious, National, and Other Identities i n Central Asia," in Muslims in Central Asia, J .-A . Gross, ed . (Durham, NC : Duke University Press, 1992), pp . 55-56 . 4
backward" or a mere addendum to the Turkic character of Centra l
Asia but is highly developed and ancient in origin . In 1989 ,
Tajikistan openly recognized the importance of Persian culture t o
its own when it enacted a law making Tajik the state language ; th e
wording of the law equated Tajik and Persian . 3 Non-Communist Taji k
organizations have taken the same view of the kinship between th e
two . 4 By Tajikistan's first year of independence, it has becom e
commonplace to refer to Persian and Tajik simultaneously, as on e
language, and often to use only the name "Persian" where "Tajik " would have been used in the past .
During the late Soviet and early post-Soviet periods, i n
Tajikistan as in many republics, nationalism has gained strengt h
while simultaneously people see a need to develop new foreig n
contacts to supplement or replace the old center-periphery
relationship with Moscow . Thus, it is logical for Tajikistanis t o pay particular attention to Iran since they see a variety of way s in which Iran might be useful to them .
Much of the interest is cultural . Tajik nationalist s perceived their people as having been deprived of much of thei r heritage, linguistic and otherwise, by the Soviet decision in 192 9 to abandon the modified Arabic alphabet in which Persian i s written . The result has been, as Moscow intended and contemporar y
Tajik nationalists regret, to impede communication between Tajik s
3 "Qonuni zaboni Respublikai Sovetii Sotsialistii Tojikiston, " Tojikistoni soveti, July 30, 1989, p . 1 .
4 "Pora obnovleniia" ; "Na ruinakh ambitsii ;" "Izhoroti" ; "Ustav ."
5
and fellow-Persian speakers outside the Soviet Union . The onl y
Persian-language writings to which Tajiks have subsequently ha d
access are the few that the Soviets chose to publish in the ne w
alphabet (briefly Latin, subsequently modified Cyrillic .) This has
been blamed for what is said to be the decline in the state of th e
Tajik language and culture . 5 The solution proposed to end thi s is artificial isolation/a return to the use of the Arabic alphabet, a s
called for by the 1989 language law and endorsed by non-Communis t
nationalists . 6 Iran has tried to play a major role in this chang e
by providing teachers, printing materials, and publications .
The ultimate effects of the new language policy remain to b e
seen but it will not necessarily provide the solution its propo-
nents seek . Whatever the wisdom of the 1929 alphabet change, i t
occurred at a time when a majority of Tajik-speakers were illiter -
ate ; the current attempt to revive the use of the Arabic alphabe t
is directed at a population that is almost entirely literate--i n
the Cyrillic alphabet . Three years after the enactment of the ne w
language law, a proponent of the use of the Arabic alphabet ha s
estimated that only one per cent of Tajikistan's population i s
5 G . Faizullozoda, "Nohamvorihoi roh," 0muzgor, Aug . 15, 1989 , p . 5 ; S . Halimsho, "Darakhti jovidonkhirad," Adabiyot va san"at , August 24, 1989, p . 5 ; A . Istad, "Ba ki ta"na mezanem? " . Tojiki- stoni soveti, July 1, 1989, p . 3 ; "Muzokira az rui ma"ruzai 'Da r borai loihai qonuni zaboni respublikai sovetii sotsialisti i Tojikiston', " Tojikistoni soveti, July 26, 1989, p . 1 ; S . Assadulloev, "Zarurati alifboi niyogon," 0muzgor, May 6, 1992, pp . 5-6 .
6 "Qonuni zaboni" ; "Pora obnovleniia" ; "Na ruinakh ambitsii" ; "Izhoroti" ; "Ustav ." 6 literate in it . 7 The vast majority of Tajik-language publication s is still in the Cyrillic alphabet . In the current alphabet refor m efforts, Tajiks are trying to avoid exclusive dependence on Iran .
For example, Tajikistan has sought Arabic-alphabet printin g materials from Pakistan . 8
Moreover, the change of alphabet and reliance on aid from Iran in accomplishing it poses particular problems for Tajik speakers .
Vocabulary change has become a point of controversy as a conse- quence of the increased emulation of Iranian usage . Taji k nationalists look forward to dropping Russian loanwords an d replacing them with words drawn from Persian-speakers in Iran an d
Afghanistan . 9 However, the choice of replacements is not clea r cut . Some of the vocabulary differences between Tajik and th e
Persian spoken elsewhere are not the consequence of borrowings fro m
Russian but the survival of older Persian terminology and th e incorporation of words from eastern Iranian or other regiona l languages . It remains to be seen whether Tajiks will be willing t o discard these under the influence of Iranian Persian . There was some controversy over this initially . 1 0
In addition to Iranian-Tajikistani relations in languag e
7 Assadulloev, "Zarurati alifboi niyogon . "
8 Interfax (Moscow), November 11, 1991, FBIS, Daily Report . Soviet Union, November 13, 1991, p . 86 .
9 M . Qurbon and S . Ayub, "Tehron, Kobul, Dushanbe," Adabiyo t va san"at, August 10, 1989, p . 2 ; "Muzokira, " p . 3 .
10 L . Sherali, "Pora kunem yo chora khunem?", Adabiyot va san"at, May 28, 1992, p . 5 .
7
matters, the two countries have been cooperating in various othe r
cultural spheres since 1989 . For example, the Tajikistan Cultura l
Foundation made agreements in 1990 with several Iranian publisher s
to sell books and magazines in Tajikistan, including literary an d
political works, textbooks, and the Koran (with a Persian transla -
tion .) 11 Such materials have indeed begun to reach Tajikistan .
An Iranian film festival and a book fair were held in Dushanb e
(Tajikistan i s capital) late in 1990 . Iranian officials visite d
Tajikistan in connection with both events . 12 Subsequently, ther e
have been additional visits in both directions by cultural figure s
and athletes as well as exhibits . A few Tajikistanis have bee n
sent to Iran for specialized education and there are plans to sen d
more . Iranian programs are broadcast on Tajikistan's stat e
television network . 1 3
Although Iran's religious ideology is reflected in it s
11 M . Olimpur, "Tehronu Dushanbe baradarshahr meshavand, " Adabiyot va san"at, August 30, 1990, p . 12 ; idem, " 'Paivand'," p . 12 ; K . Nasrullo, " Muhabbati Eron," ibid ., November 8, 1990, p . 3 ; "Tajikistan, jazirah-yi zaban-i parsi dar miyan-i tork hast, " Kayhan-i hava'i, January 23, 1991 (Bahman 3, 1369), p . 14 . The author wishes to thank Dr . Patrick Clawson for bringing thi s article to her attention .
12 "Jashnovorai filmhoi eroni," Adabiyot va san"at, Novembe r 22, 1990, p . 6 ; Olimpur, " Namoishi kitobhoi Eron," ibid ., Decembe r 13, 1990, p . 11 .
13 A . Nizom, "Panj soli purtalosh," Javononi Tojikiston, March 26, 1992, p . 2 ; Chtoby vozrodit' kul'turu," Narodnaia gazeta, Apri l 18, 1992 ; Sherali, " Pora kunem yo chora khunem?", p . 4 ; B . Timurov , "Iz turne po Iranu," Narodnaia gazeta, July 9, 1992, p . 4 ; TIA Khovar, "Za ukreplenie mezhdunarodnykh pozitsii Tadzhikistana, " Narodnaia gazeta, July 18, 1992, p . 1 ; Namoishi nashriyahoi Eroni, " Jumhuriyat, August 19, 1992, p . 1 ; " Tojikiston ba qadom sohi l mebaroyad?", Jumhuriyat, August 19, 1992, p . 1 . 8
publications, not all of those sent to Tajikistan are primaril y
about Islam . For example, two of the magazines sent to an Augus t
1992 press exhibit in Dushanbe were Symbols and Meaning in Cinem a
Photography [Nishanehha va ma"na dar sinema] and Photographers and
['Akasan va 'akasi] . Iran has launched a monthly magazine, Oshno
[acquaintance], aimed at Persian-speakers in Central Asia . The
first issue opened with a discussion of how much Iran has in commo n
with the republics of Central Asia, including language, literature ,
the arts, and history, as well as religion . That issue and the
next contained articles on ancient (and therefore pre-Islamic) an d
medieval Persian and Arabic literature and on the writings of 'Al i
Shariati (1933-1977),14whose whose views were echoed in the ideology o f
Iran's Mojahedin-e Khalq, which was defeated in a violent powe r struggle with the Islamic Republican Party in the early 1980s .
Relations between Tajikistan and Iran involve economic matter s
in addition to cultural ones . The two countries have discusse d
joint ventures, particularly in spinning and weaving cotton ,
Tajikistan's main crop . 15 This is especially significant fo r
Tajikistan because, under the Soviet system, almost all of it s cotton output was turned into finished goods by other republics o f the former Union .
14 M . Shakuri, "Payomi oshnoyon," Adabiyot va san"at, June 4 , 1992, p . 14 .
15 Nasrullo, "Muhabbati Eron" ; TadzhikTA, "Mehmoni eroni da r Tojikiston," Tojikistoni soveti, October 20, 1989, p . 2 ; Dushanb e domestic radio, April 21, 1991, Foreign Broadcast Informatio n Service [FBIS], Daily Report . Soviet Union, April 25, 1991, p . 75 ; "Bozargononi Iron dar Tojikiston," Tojikistoni shuravi, August 27 , 1991, p . 3 .
9
With the passage of time and Tajikistan's emergence as a n
independent state, Iran has shown a willingness to increase th e
scale of its economic involvement in Tajikistan . It has offered
the Dushanbe government $50 million in credits to buy Iranian-mad e
equipment for use in light industry . Officials of the tw o
countries have also signed agreements on banking and commercia l
cooperation . 1 6
As Tajikistan grapples with economic reform, at least a fe w
nationalists look to Iran as an alternative economic model, on th e
grounds that it offered a relevant example of a country which ha d
formerly been dependent economically but had achieved self-reliance
and prosperity . 17 However, other Tajikistanis seek economi c
relations with a broader range of countries, including Pakistan ,
Turkey, Saudia Arabia, the United States, Germany, and China, a s
well as former Soviet republics . 1 8
The governments in both Dushanbe and Tehran have encourage d
increased political-diplomatic contacts . The turning point came i n
June 1990, when Tajikistan's vice-chairman of the Council o f
16 "Zavershilsia ofitsial'nyi vizit," Narodnaia gazeta, Jul y 1, 1992, p . 1 .
17 Nasrullo, "Muhabbati Eron," p . 14 .
18 U . Soleh, "Ham tijorat, ham kori khair," Jumhuriyat, Apri l 3, 1992, p . 2 ; N . Asadullo, "Dudi khonaro ravzan dedonad," Adabiyo t va san"at, June 21, 1990, p . 3 ; "Oshkhonai chekhi dar Farkhor, " Tojikistoni Shuravi, August 29, 1991, p . 3 ; Moscow domestic radio , September 22, 1990, FBIS, Daily Report . Soviet Union, September 24 , 1990, p . 103 ; Dushanbe domestic radio, September 23, 1990, FBIS , Daily Report . Soviet Union, September 27, 1990 p . 98 ; Moscow television, July 16, 1990, FBIS, Daily Report . Soviet Union, Jul y 18, 1990, p . 106 . 1 0
Ministers, Otakhon Latifi, headed a delegation from his country t o
the Tehran observances of the first anniversary of Ayatolla h
Ruhollah Khomeini's death . Two years later, Tajikistan participat -
ed more emphatically in similar observances by sending a delegatio n
of 150 to Tehran . The occasion was not only ceremonial but wa s
also used for negotiations with Iranian officials on the expansio n
of relations between the two countries . Iran signaled its desir e
to capitalize on the opportunity by paying the travel expenses o f
the entire delegation . 1 9
An exchange at a still higher level was planned to start o n
August 25, 1991, when Qahhor Mahkamov, simultaneously head of th e
republic's government and first secretary of its Communist Party , was scheduled to visit Iran . That trip was canceled because of the attempted overthrow of Gorbachev a few days earlier and Mahkamov' s
subsequent fall from power . Undeterred by the missed opportunity ,
Iran's foreign minister stopped briefly in Dushanbe in Decembe r
1991, as part of his visit to several Soviet republics . He me t with Tajikistan's new president, Rahmon Nabiev, a member of th e
Communist old guard, as well as various other officials . 20 Th e presidential visit to Iran finally occurred in mid-1992 (June 28 -
30 .) At that time, the two countries concluded agreements o n cooperation in the spheres of economics, culture, and scholarship ; they also planned to establish a governmental commission to promot e
19 MIT Khovar, "Ravobit vus"at meboyad," Jumhuriyat, June 2 , 1992, p . 1 .
20 Dushanbe domestic radio, December 2, 1991, FBIS, Daily Report . Soviet Union, December 4, 1991, p . 83 .
1 1
further cooperation . An important part of the lesson Nabiev wante d
Tajiks to draw from the visit, as he explained after his return ,
was how much they and the Iranians have in common . "We and th e
Iranians," he said, "have a single language, a single faith, w e
have a single science and culture . Moreover, right up to the 15t h
century we and they lived in a single state . "2 1
Despite the enthusiasm for the Iranian connection, Tajikista n
has maintained its practice of trying to maximize its options .
Thus, the Nabiev delegation proceeded directly from Iran t o
Pakistan and there concluded similar agreements .
After the demise of the Soviet Union, Iran became the firs t
country to establish an embassy in Dushanbe, on January 9, 1992 .
On that occasion, the two countries declared their intention t o
establish airplane links between Dushanbe and Tehran, Mashhad, an d
Tabriz . 22 In recognition of Iran's timeliness in opening it s
embassy, the street in Dushanbe on which it is located, formerl y
named for Maxim Gor'kii, was renamed Tehran Street . (In a sense ,
the new name has comparatively neutral connotations, associate d
with Iran in a generic sense rather than the Islamic Republic i n
particular . In contrast, the street on which the Soviet embassy i n
Tehran was located was long known as Stalin Street .) Remarks by
members of the Iranian delegation sent to Tajikistan for th e
occasion reflected some of the Tehran regime's thoughts on th e
21 TIA Khovar, "Za ukreplenie mezhdunarodnykh pozitsi i Tadzhikistana," Narodnaia gazeta, July 18, 1992, p . 1 .
22 TadzhikTA, "Iranskaia delegatsiia v Tadzhikistane, " Narodnaia gazeta, January 11, 1992, p . 1 .
1 2
significance of relations between the two countries . Among the
points highlighted by the Iranians were economic benefits an d
cultural cooperation . The latter included joint research project s
on what an official described as their shared language, literature ,
and history as well as Iran's provision of teaching materials t o
Tajikistan for instruction in the Arabic alphabet . A member of th e
Iranian delegation also stated that his country planned to open a
bookstore, to be called al-Huda (the path to salvation), to sel l
Iranian works on literature, history, and culture . 2 3
The second country to establish an embassy in Dushanbe was the
United States . Although many countries recognized Tajikistan' s
independence soon after the break up of the Soviet Union, few sen t
their own diplomatic representatives to Dushanbe in the first yea r
of its independence .
For all Tajikistan's attention to developing its relation s
with Iran, neither its government nor its intelligentsia want th e
republic simply to fall into Iran's orbit . It is one thing fo r
Tajiks to try to use contacts with Iran to strengthen their ow n
position and quite another for them, at a time when nationalism i s
strong, to accept subordination to anyone else .
One of the ways educated Tajiks deal with this is by treatin g
their heritage as deriving not only from the western Irania n
Persians but also from the eastern Iranians indigenous to Centra l
Asia . Initially, this owed much to the Kremlin's objective o f
23 "Saforati Jumhurii Islomii Eron dar Dushanbe," Omuzgor , January 15, 1992, pp . 1, 4 . 1 3 maximizing the differences between peoples living within the Sovie t
Union and without . However, Tajik nationalists have taken up th e
point for their own reasons . This gives them another type o f
Iranian heritage in which to take pride, especially in its Soghdia n
form . 24 (The Soghdians of ancient Central Asia were active i n
commerce along the silk route and had a highly developed culture . )
When a group of reformist Tajik intellectuals in Moscow bega n
publishing a newspaper in 1990, they called it "Sogdiana ." Taji k nationalists' use of the eastern Iranian heritage serves three political aims : to counter the Soviet line about their forme r backwardness ; refute the arguments of some of their Turki c
neighbors that the Turkic peoples are the original Central Asian s while the Tajiks arrived only after the Arab conquest ; and counter
the tendency of many Persian-speakers in Iran to regard Tajiks (t o
the extent that they notice them at all) as mere provincials on the
periphery of the Perso-Iranian world . This attention to th e
Tajiks' eastern Iranian links extend to recent gestures by th e
government in Dushanbe to allow speakers of eastern Irania n
languages living in contemporary Tajikistan greater latitude to us e
their own languages . 25 (For decades these peoples were allowe d
access to education and the mass media only in Russian or Tajik .)
24 "Tojikon,", Entsiklopediyai Sovetii Tojik, vol . 7 (Dushanbe : Sarredaktsiyai ilmii Entsiklopediyai Sovetii Tojik, 1987), pp . 428 - 29 ; S . Aini, "Ma"noi kalimai tojik," Sadoi Sharq, 1986, no . 8, p . 85 ; B .Gh . Ghafurov, Tojikon(Dushanbe : Irfon, 1983), vol . I, pp . 494-96 .
25 T .K . Varki, "Iazyk--est' ispoved' naroda," Komsomolet s Tadzhikistana, June 30, 1989, p . 2 ; "Muzokira," p . 1 ; " Mas " uliyat i buzurg meboyad," Tojikistoni soveti, July 25, 1989, p . 2 . 1 4
The Tajiks' concern not to be relegated to the margins als o
appears in the way they look at the Persian component of thei r
heritage . The accepted Tajik view of the revival of Persian as a
literary language after the disruption caused by the Arab conques t
is that it took place not in what inhabitants of the contemporar y
Iranian state think of as the Persian heartland--the Irania n
plateau--but was focused in Central Asia and adjoining parts o f
Iran and Afghanistan ; only after this revival was well underway di d
26 literary Persian spread southwest across the Iranian plateau .
Some of the ways Tajiks now look at their Persian heritag e
does not coincide with the views of the more militant Islamicizer s
in Iran . One aspect of this is the interest in pre-Islamic Persia n
civilization . For example, Tajik nationalists praise the Zoroas-
trian religion as a Tajik contribution to world civilization an d
praise Zoroastrian texts for a variety of reasons, including as a n
embodiment of Tajik civilization and an ethical guide . 27 The
Tajiks' attention to their Persian heritage certainly include s ample discussion of cultural figures who lived in Islamic times bu t not all of them represent views of which the Tehran governmen t would approve . Among these figures was Ahmad Kasravi, a historia n noted for his criticsm of religion in general and Shi'ism i n particular, who was assassinated by a Shi'ite militant in 1946 .
26 Atkin, "Religious," pp . 56-57 .
27 Halimsho, "Darakhti jovidonkhirad" ; E . Subhon, "Az ajdo d chi burda ba avlod chi dodem?", 0muzgor, July 11, 1989, p . 4 ; R . Sharofzoda, "Kitob va farhang," Adabiyot va san"at, June 14, 1990 , p . 11 .
1 5
(Ayatollah Khomeini also disapproved of Kasravi .) A particularl y
striking example of this Tajik enthusiasm for dissident Persia n
voices is the attention paid to Nasir-i Khusrow (1004 - c . 1072) ,
a Persian-speaker from Central Asia who was both an accomplishe d
writer and a major propagandist for Isma'ili Islam, which is quit e
different from the Imami Shi'ism which predominates in the Islami c
Republic of Iran . In addition to the increased public discussio n
of his intellectual contributions, the pedagogical institute in th e
city of Qurghonteppa was renamed in his honor in 1992 . 2 8
Even though the majority of Tajikistan's population is Musli m
and aware of its Iranian heritage, that does not guarantee tha t
they will emulate the Islamic politics of Iran . In addition to th e
fact that the Tajiks distinguish between Persian cultural pride an d
Iranian hegemony, the Tajiks' de facto reclamation of Persia n
culture and history began roughly half a century ago, long befor e
politically militant Islam came to power in Iran . There is n o
reliable evidence about the views of the vast majority of ordinar y
inhabitants of Tajikistan about Islamic politics, whether alon g
Iranian, Afghanistani, Saudi, Pakistani, or other lines . In th e
absense of truly free elections or reliable public opinion surveys ,
or even a successful coup with broad-based support, there can b e
only speculation based on select anecdotes and rumors . Many
Tajiks, Uzbeks, and other indigenous inhabitants of the republi c
28 N . Arabzoda, "Gumanizmi Nosiri Khusrav," Adabiyot va san"at , September 14, 1989, p . 6 ; Kh . Dodkhudoev, Ismoiliya va ozodandeshi i sharq (Dushanbe : Irfon, 1989) ; MIT Khovar, " Dar devoni vaziron i jumhurii Tojikiston," Jumhuriyat, April 3, 1992, p . 1 . 1 6 consider Islam valuable in a cultural or religious sense or both .
However, the tendency of some Western observers to equate being a
Muslim with being an Islamic "fundamentalist" demonstrates only th e observers' confusion . Similarly, the stories in the Soviet an d post-Soviet media about Islamic conspiracies to establish a n
Islamic state are, by themselves, proof mainly of the fears an d propaganda methods of the authors of those stories .
Some Tajiks think that the fact that Iran's Islamic regime wa s
Shi l l while most Tajiks are Sunni minimizes their susceptibility t o
Iranian religious influence . At least some Tajiks admire Iran i n a general sense, as a country where Islam is practiced freely (i n contrast to conditions in Tajikistan until quite recently) withou t wanting to emulate the specific Islamicizing politics of th e
Iranian government . One vocal Tajik nationalist who is als o something of an Islamicizer has used an Iranian precedent t o legitimate the form of government he advocates fora post-Communis t
Tajikistan but draws his example from pre-revolutionary Iran . H e wants the country to be governed by an executive and a majli s
(legislature) but with a president rather than a shah filling the role of the executive . 29 Tajikistan's most powerful religiou s figure, Qidi Akbar Turajonzoda, has stated repeatedly that mos t inhabitants of the republic do not want to emulate Iran's Islami c republic . For example, in an interview with a German newspaper, h e contended that Iran could not possibly be a paradigm for Tajiki -
29 A . Istad, "Davlati milli chi guna boyad?" Adabiyotva san"at, June 4, 1992, p . 6 .
1 7 stan :
The conditions are completely different . In Iran ther e
was never a Communist Party in power . The 70-yea r
predominance of atheism has had an effect on our coun -
try . . Today the people are afraid of an Islami c
regime, and why should one make the people afraid? .
The people understand religion in their way : They do no t
want the women to wear the chador [veil] again and to si t
at the hearth, they reject polygamy, and they are afrai d
that human rights will be restricted if Islam comes t o
power . This at least is what they have been taught .
Psychologically, they are not ready to support an Islami c
state . 3 0
He has made this point not only for foreign consumption but also t o
a domestic audience of critics of the Nabiev regime, as in hi s
remarks to demonstrators in Dushanbe during the spring 199 2 political crisis there . 3 1
Similarly, one the the leaders of Tajikistan's Islamic Reviva l
Party has asserted that the republic would find its own gradua l
30 Berliner Zeitung, November 22, 1991, FBIS, Daily Report . Soviet Union, November 27, 1991, p . 74 ; he made the same point i n interviews with a Soviet newspaper and a Western journalist : U . Babakhanov and A . Mursaliev, "Pust' govoriat ob islamskom Tadzhiki - stane . A kazi protiv , " Komsomolskaia Pravda, October 4, 1991, p . 1 ; R . Wright, "Report from Turkestan," The New Yorker, April 6, 1992, p . 75 .
31 Istad, "Davlati milli . " 1 8 path to an Islamic state rather than follow the Iranian example . 3 2
Although the concern of the United States about the destabilizin g potential of Islamic "fundamentalism" is known in Tajikistan, on e of the founders of the Islamic Rebirth Party there, Davlat Usmon , deputy prime minister in the republic's coalition government, ha s publicly expressed good wishes toward the United States an d advocated the growth of mutually beneficial relations between th e
two countries . 3 3 While Islamicizers in Tajikistan have often talked moderation ,
then-President Rahmon Nabiev, who had no intention of letting a n
Islamic state supplant Communist rule, played on religious links t o
Iran for reasons of his own . In the face of growing opposition t o
him among his predominantly Muslim fellow countrymen, Nabiev trie d
to associate himself with Iran's Islamic republic . For example, h e
sought to impress Tajikistanis with the fact that Iran was the
first foreign country he visited as president, that he was received
by high-ranking Iranian officials, that he visited the "blesse d
grave of Imam Khomeini," and that he recognized the existence of a n
Islamic bond between the two countries . 34 On May 10, 1992, whe n
demonstrators in Dushanbe seemed on the verge of toppling hi s
government, Nabiev was the first of the republic's politica l
32 S . Erlanger, "Politics in Central Asia Being Shaped b y Islam, " New York Times, June 9, 1992, p . AI6 .
33 "Priem v posol'stve , " Narodnaia gazeta, July 7, 1992, p . 1 .
34 "Novyi shag na puti k sotrudnichestvu," Narodnaia gazeta , July 7, 1992, p . 1 .
1 9
figures to call Iran's President Rafsanjani to ask for help . 35
In contrast, when officials in Iran look toward Central Asia ,
including Tajikistan, they see a region which they think should no t
only to be oriented toward Iran but also to defer to its leader -
ship . This is not an issue of particular concern to large section s
of the Iranian public but is the policy of the political leader -
ship . Such an approach reflects both ideological ambitions and the
more conventional diplomatic and economic interests of the Irania n
state . On one level, the Islamic Republic of Iran has broadcas t
its message by radio to Central Asia since the early years of th e
republic's existence . On another level, the Tehran regime has als o
increased its efforts to develop relations through state-to-stat e
channels since the late 1980s .
Underlying Tehran's activity in this area is the presumptio n
of a right to lead expressed in both religious and cultural terms .
The foremost example of the religious justification found expres -
sion in Khomeini's letter (January 1, 1989) to Gorbachev . Khomein i
praised Gorbachev for making reforms and urged him to carry th e
process much further . The Ayatollah's fundamental message was tha t
Islam held the solution to the Soviet Union's problems . Now tha t
the bankruptcy of Marxism had been demonstrated, he argued ,
Gorbachev ought not turn to the West for answers for it coul d
provide none . Instead, he ought to learn about Islam because it s
"sublime and world encompassing values . . can be a means for the
35 S . Shihab, "Asie centrale : l'Iran se pose en mediateur," L e Monde, May 12, 1992, p . 3 . 2 0 well-being and salvation of all nations ." 36 Khomeini counseled th e
Soviet Union to look to Iran for guidance because Iran, "as th e greatest and most powerful base of the Islamic world, can easil y help fill-up [sic] the ideological vacuum of your system ." 37 As regards those citizens of the Soviet Union who are already Muslims ,
Khomeini praised Gorbachev for allowing them religious freedom an d depicted Iran as the fitting advocate of their interests, for "W e regard the Muslims of the world as the Muslims of our own country , and we always regard ourselves as partners in their fate . " 38 Thus ,
Khomeini's message was not only the primacy of Islamic values i n worldly affairs but also Iran's role as the arbiter of what Isla m is and as the leader of Muslims everywhere . Obviously, this vie w of Iran's importance is not shared by all Muslims in all countries , including those of the former Soviet Union .
The Iranian leadership has continued to voice similar opinion s since Khomeini's death in June 1989 . For example, President 'Al i
Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, when meeting with the Tajikistan i delegation to the June 1990 memorial for Khomeini, highlighte d
Iran's interest in dealings with Tajikistan and other Sovie t republics with Muslim populations . 39 He spoke again of th e importance of the Islamic link between such former Soviet republic s
36 Tehran domestic radio in Persian, January 8, 1989, FBIS , Daily Report . Near East and South Asia, January 9, 1989, pp . 57-59 .
37 Ibid ., p . 59 .
38 Ibid .
39 "Eron--Ittihodi Shuravi--Tojikiston," Adabiyot va san"at , June 14, 1990, p . 1 . 2 1 and Iran in February 1992, when representatives of the five Centra l
Asian republics and Azerbaijan met in Tehran with officials fro m
Iran, Turkey, and Pakistan to discuss economic cooperation . 4 0
Rafsanjani and Iran's foreign minister, 'Ali Akbar Velayati, hav e also emphasized the cultural similarities between Iran and th e republics to the north as grounds for closer relations . 4 1
Iran has openly involved itself in Tajikistan's religiou s affairs . For example, it funds mosque construction there an d supported Tajikistanis traveling via Iran to Saudi Arabia to mak e the hajj in 1992 . Its perennial rival, Saudi Arabia, has provide d similar aid . 42 Iran's ambassador in Dushanbe, 'Ali Ashraf Mujtahid i
Shabistari, has declared that the Tajiks' Iranian culture was onl y perfected under the influence of Islam and that Tajiks and Iranian s are linked by the "single title of Muslim Iranian," having th e
"same race, same culture, same history, same language, and same reli - gion ." 43 The foreword to the first issue of a magazine Ira n recently began publishing for Tajiks in formerly Soviet Centra l
Asia ranked Islam prominently among the things Iran had in commo n
40 "Muslim Regional Group Welcomes Ex-Soviet Central Asians, " New York Times, February 17, 1992, p . A9 .
41 "Eron ;" Tehran television, December 8, 1991, FBIS, Dail y Report . Near East and South Asia, December 9, 1991, p . 76 .
42 "Yordami Eron," Adabiyot va san"at, June 4, 1992, p . 3 ; M . Olimi, "Oghozi id az namozgoh," ibid ., p . 12 ; "Tojikiston ba qado m sohil mebaroyad?" .
43 A . Shabistari, "Payomi safiri Jumhurii Islomii Eron da r Dushanbe ba munosibati barguzorii kungrai bainalmilalii tojikon v a hamzabononi burunmarzi," Jumhuriyat, September 8, 1992, p . 2 . 2 2 with that region . 4 4
For all Iran's use of religious rhetoric, much of its interes t
in Tajikistan and other republics to the north concerns worldl y
matters such as diplomacy and trade . For example, Iran's objec-
tives at the February 1992 meeting in Tehran were to obtain th e
support from other Muslim countries, including the former Sovie t
republics, for Iran's stance on various diplomatic issues and t o
promote economic relations with the Central Asian republics, wit h
an eye to direct competition with Saudi Arabia's activitie s
there . 45 Even when Iranian officials discuss their special interes t
in the Muslim republics of the former Soviet Union, what they se e
in them is not only co-religionists but also factories, chea p labor, and railway lines . 4 6
Despite Iran's cultural and economic undertakings in Tajiki -
stan and the speed with which it established an embassy there, muc h
of Tehran's attention north of the border is directed to othe r
republics . In recent years, Iran has sought a modus vivendi wit h
the government in Moscow, whether that of the Soviet Union or th e
Russian Republic . Iranian concerns are related to such issues a s
the pursuit of diplomatic support for Iran's foreign polic y
objectives, especially as regards Iraq and Afghanistan, economi c
cooperation, and the purchase of military hardware . Tehran has
44 Shakuri, "Payomi oshnoyon . "
45 "Muslim Regional Group . "
46 IRNA (Tehran), January 24, 1992, FBIS, Daily Report . Nea r East and South Asia, January 28, 1992, p . 49 . 2 3
also concluded agreements with some of the successor republics tha t
are not predominantly Muslim . For example, it has made agreement s
.47 with Ukraine and Moldova for the sale of oil and natura l gas
.48 Moscow has showed a similar interest in relations wit h Tehran
Tajikistan is not Iran's highest priority among the southern -
tier republics . Azerbaijan is particularly important to Tehran .
Turkmenistan, with its long common border with Iran, is also a
special object of Tehran's attentions, especially with regard t o
cross-border trade and the use of Turkmenistan's port facilities by
Iran's Caspian merchant shipping . One ambitious and costly Centra l
Asian undertaking about which Iran is enthusiastic is the construc -
tion of rail links among existing Chinese, Russian, Central Asian ,
and Iranian lines in the hope of establishing a lucrative commer-
cial route across Iran to world markets . Turkmenistan an d
Qazaqistan are crucial to the development of this route ; Tajikista n
d7 Izvestiia, June 20, 1990, FBIS, Daily Report . Soviet Union , July 10, 1990, p . 19 ; Interfax (Moscow), June 11, 1991, ibid ., Jun e 13, 1991, p . 12 ; IRNA (Tehran), July 11, 1991, ibid ., July 12 , 1991, p . 12 ; Tehran radio, January 3, 1989, FBIS, Daily Report . NearEastand South Asia, January 4, 1989, p . 51 ; IRNA, July 7 , 1991, FBIS, Daily Report . Near East and South Asia, July 8, 1991 , p . 36 ; Tehran radio, August 28, 1991, FBIS, Daily Report . Near Eas t and South Asia, August 30, 1991, p . 36 ; Tehran television, Decembe r 25, 1991, FBIS, Daily Report . Near East and South Asia, Decembe r 27, 1991, p . 27 ; IRNA, January 22, 1992, FBIS, Daily Report . Nea r East and South Asia, January 24, 1992, p . 51 ; RFE/RL Daily Report , no . 82 (April 30, 1992), p . 2 ; RFE/RL Daily Report, no . 157 (Augus t 18, 1992), p . 3 .
48 Tehran domestic radio, February 26, 1989, FBIS, Dail y Report . Near East and South Asia, February 27, 1989, pp . 54-56 ; Tehran radio, February 12, 1991, ibid ., February 12, 1991, p . 75 ; IRNA, September 18, 1991, ibid ., September 19, 1991, p . 40 ; Tehran radio, December 19, 1991, ibid ., December 19, 1991, p . 38 . 2 4
is peripheral to it . 49 (Furthermore, the feasibility of the entir e
project is questionable since Iran's railroads themselves are no t
built sturdily enough to withstand a heavy volume of cargo . 50 )
The terms in which Iran sees itself as being the natura l
leader for largely Muslim republics north of the border could limi t
those republics' willingness to follow Iran . The Tehran view i s
Iranocentric and risk alienating those who are supposed to heed it s
appeal . For example, the international coalition of Muslim state s which Iran tried to persuade the Central Asian republics an d
Azerbaijan to join at the February 1992 meeting in Tehran wa s predicated on Tehran's assumption that Iran's interests i n
international affairs were identical to all Muslims' interests . 5 1
Similarly, Foreign Minister Velayati said, regarding the national -
ist upsurge in the Central Asian republics in general, tha t
"illustrious figures of the history of Islam, Iran, and civiliza-
tion are the symbols of the revival of the national identity o f
these republics . " 52 To describe the situation in those particula r terms sends a message that Iran, as the self-designated spokesma n for Islam and embodiment of Iranian culture, ought to define th e content of other people's nationalist movements .
49 Tehran television, December 8, 1991, ibid ., December 9 , 1991, p . 66 .
50 The author is indebted to Dr . Patrick Clawson for thi s information .
51 "Muslim Regional Group . "
52 Tehran television, December 8, 1991, FBIS, Daily Report . Near East and SouthAsia, December 9, 1991, p . 76 .
2 5
This is not an isolated slip of the tongue but part of a
habitual attitude toward Central Asia . The same assumption ha s
been manifest on other occasions . For example, when Iran' s
ambassador to Tajikistan said that forty to sixty per cent of th e
vocabulary of the Turkic languages of Central Asia was Persian h e
revealed an impolitic indifference to the strength of nationa l
pride among various Turkic peoples of the region . 53 The issue i s
not what is accurate philologically . After years of being told ho w
much the Turkic peoples of Central Asia were beholden to on e
outside power, they are not now eager to be instructed in thei r
debt to another .
Soviet Tajiks' attitudes toward Afghanistan are similar i n
many ways to their attitudes toward Iran but are complicated by th e
war the Soviet army fought in support of the Communist regime i n
Kabul . During the war years, the proximity of and the cultura l
similarities between Tajikistan and Afghanistan made the forme r
useful to Moscow as it strove to solidify Communist rule in th e
latter . Moscow sent Soviet Tajiks (and other Central Asia n
peoples) to work in Afghanistan's government, educational, an d
scholarly systems . It sent publications from Tajikistan t o
Afghanistan . It used Tajikistan as an example of the benefits o f
Communist rule to show delegations from Afghanistan and as a plac e
to educate young Afghanistanis . Cultural exchanges between thes e
two republics continued throughout the war years . Tajiks from
Tajikistan served in the Soviet military in Afghanistan from th e
53 Shabistari, "Payomi safirii Jumhurii Islomii Eron ."
2 6
invasion to the Soviet withdrawal . 5 4
This last point is an extremely sensitive one for some Tajiks .
In the period following the August 1991 coup attempt in Moscow ,
when various people in Tajikistan expressed their opinions mor e
openly in public than before, a few Tajiks criticized Taji k
participation in the Soviet war effort for the ethnic, no t
religious, reason that for their people the war amounted t o
fratricide . 55 Political conditions have not yet changed enough i n
Tajikistan, to permit a full and free public discussion of thi s
issue or a reliable sampling of public opinion on the subject .
Tajik nationalists also see Afghanistan as important to the m
culturally, for much the same reason as they do Iran : as a sourc e
of examples of good usage of literary Persian to counterbalance th e
harmful effects of Soviet language policy and as a source o f literature in the Persian language . 5 6
Since the Soviet military withdrawal from Afghanistan ,
Tajikistan has maintained direct and indirect dealings wit h
Afghanistan's Communist and post-Communist governments on coopera - tion in various spheres . In consequence of the increasing
54 TadzhikTA, "Dar safi pesh," Tojikistoni soveti, December 9 , 1989, p . 3 ; Atkin, "Religious," p . 58 . 55 H . Kiromov, A . Ruziev, and S . Iskandarov, "Nadidam mehrubo n dilhoi az insof kholiro," Tojikistoni shuravi, September 14, 1991 , p . 4 ; M . Shukurzoda, "Haqiqat zahr ham boshad, niyush!", Tojiki- stoni shuravi, September 14, 1991, p . 4 ; J . Said, " Mevae nest be h zi ozodi," Javononi Tojikiston, October 12, 1991, p . 2 ; R . Wright , " Report from Turkestan," The New Yorker, April 6, 1992, p . 72 .
56 A . Siyarov, "Sukhane chand be idoma 'Har sukhan . . . ' , Adabiyot va san"at, January 15, 1987, p . 15 ; Qurbon and Ayub , "Tehron, Kobul, Dushanbe" ; Faizullozoda, "Nohamvorihoi roh ." 2 7
decentralization of Soviet power in the Gorbachev era and concomi -
tant rise in the importance of the republican governments, the
Communist government in Kabul opened a consulate in Dushanbe . Tajikistani officials signed economic agreements with representa-
tives of that government and a private Afghanistani company fo r
such things as trade, development projects, and joint ventures . 5 7
Exchanges of students and publications as well as increase d scholarly contacts were also planned before the fall of th e Najibullah regime in Kabul . Representatives of one of Afghani- stan's northern border provinces offered to allow Tajikistanis t o study in madrasahs there . 58 For years, small numbers of Sovie t
Muslim religious figures were sent abroad to study, with Moscow' s approval . Opportunities for foreign study became particularl y important at the end of the Soviet era because the substantia l
increase in religious freedom in Central Asia brought with it a n increased demand for Islamic instruction, which could not b e satisfied in full by the madrasahs in the region .
The extent and nature of Afghanistan's disruptive influence o n
Tajikistan, in the form of Islamic "fundamentalist" propaganda , arms smuggling, and ethnic ties, are controversial subjects o n which there is more propaganda than reliable information . Various
Soviet sources, including V .V . Petkel', head of the KGB i n
57 Kh . Qodir, "Mekhohem masdari khidmat ba mardumi du kishva r boshem," Tolikistoni shuravi, August 27, 1991, p . 4 ; FBIS, Dail y Report . Soviet Union, November 1, 1990, p . 106 .
58 Dushanbe domestic radio, May 7, 1991, FBIS, Daily Report . Soviet Union, May 9, 1991, p . 76 .
2 8
Tajikistan from 1985 until 1991, have depicted Islam in wholl y
negative terms and linked it to anti-Soviet subversion from abroad ,
especially via Afghanistan . 59 Such assertions owe so much to the
ideological biases and self-interest of those who make them that i t
is difficult to discern what their basis is in fact .
The KGB and other elements of the old Soviet order have bee n
accustomed to deny that there could be any legitimate domesti c
causes of discontent and to shift the blame to foreign subversion .
Some hard--liners have even resorted to the much-used Sovie t
propaganda line which exploited the trauma of World War II in orde r
to warn against an external threat to newly independent Tajiki-
stan . 60 Another recent example of this hoary tradition of stirrin g
up fears of an external threat could be found in a place wher e
Afghanistan and Islamic "fundamentalism" cannot possibly be a t
issue--Belarus . The head of the KGB there told the press tha t
hundreds of agents of the CIA, various European countries, and
former Soviet republics have infiltrated Belarus and are trying t o
recruit its inhabitants by offering them hard currency . 61 Even th e
border guards in Tajikistan have branded as false a Pravda repor t
of a foray into Tajikistan by Afghanistani mujahidin . 62 In fact ,
59 Kommunist Tadzhikistana, December 5, 1989, FBIS, Dail y Report . Soviet Union, January 3, 1990, p . 34 ; TASS, April 11, 1991 , ibid ., April 12, 1991, pp . 74-75 .
60 A . Sekretov, "A pamiat' sviashchenna .. ." Narodnaia gazeta , Marcy 27, 1992, p . 2 .
61 RFE/RL Daily Report, no . 21 (January 31, 1992), p . 3 .
62 Ibid ., no . 225 (November 27, 1991), p . 1 . 2 9
according to Tajikistan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, during th e
Najibullah era in Afghanistan (1986-1992), government force s
occasionally dropped bombs on Tajikistani soil when fighting th e
mujahidin but Tajikistan's government portrayed the incidents a s mujahidin attacks . 5 3
Claims by some Afghanistani mujahidin to have supporters i n
Soviet Central Asia cannot be confirmed independently . Althoug h
the battle by Afghanistani mujahidin against the Soviet invaders
and the Communist regime in Kabul has won admiration from people i n
Tajikistan and elsewhere in Central Asia, that does not by itsel f
prove that Tajiks feel a particular loyalty to or draw their idea s
from any mujahidingroup . The assumption that mujahidininfluenc e play a crucial role implies that Tajiks have no perception of thei r
own interests and grievances but are merely passive objects to b e manipulated by others .
Furthermore, the mujahidin, while agreeing that Islam is a part of their way of life, disagree among themselves on what kin d of Islamic country Afghanistan ought to be . There is a bi g difference between a state which is Islamic, in the sense tha t
Islam is practiced freely in accordance with local traditions, an d an "Islamic state" which seeks a radical transformation of societ y to purge it of the injustices, deviations from proper Islami c practice, and non-Islamic influences--all as defined differently b y different groups of Islamicizers . Afghanistan's mujahidinorgani -
53 J . Steele, "The Tajiks next door watch Massoud's Kabul," The Guardian, May 5, 1992, p . 9 . 3 0 zations are divided along these and other lines ; several of the organizations are also associated predominantly with a particula r ethnic group . Thus, one of the groups that is more radical in it s approach to Islam, the Hizb-i Islami, is largely Pushtun and was a t odds with the Jami'at-i Islami, which sees Islamicization differ- ently and is predominantly Tajik . 64 These two groups fought eac h other while also fighting Communist rule in their land and hav e continued that fight since the accession of a mujahidin coalitio n government Afghanistan's Tajik population lives primarily in th e northeast, across the border from the republic of Tajikistan, whil e the Pashtuns live predominantly in southern and southeaster n
Afghanistan (and across the border in Pakistan . )
During 1992, when the political power struggle in Tajikista n escalated into civil war, the Najibullah regime in Kabul fell, an d the groups arrayed against it fought among themselves for power , rumors increased of Afghanistani involvement in Tajikistan' s upheaval . When word reached Tajikistan of the fall of Afghani- stan's Communist government in April 1992, demonstrators i n
Dushanbe who opposed the Communist government at home welcomed thi s news and found it encouraging in a general sense . However , opposition spokesmen have expressly denied that there was an y
64 O . Roy, "The Mujahidin and the Future of Afghanistan," i n The Iranian Revolution : Its Global Impact , J .L . Esposito, ed . (Miami : Florida International University Press, 1990), p . 184 ; M .N . Shahrani, "Introduction : Marxist 'Revolution' and Islamic Resis- tance in Afghanistan," in Revolutions and Rebellions in Afghani- stan, Research Series no . 57, M .N . Shahrani and R .L . Canfield, eds . (Berkeley, Institute of International Studies, University o f California, 1984), pp . 45-49 . 3 1 specific linkage between the developments in Afghanistan and th e anti-government demonstrations underway in Dushanbe in April an d
May 1992 . 6 5
One particularly common rumor about connections between th e
Tajikistani opposition and the Afghanistani mujahidin is that the
Hizb-i Islami, the most worrisome of the Afghanistani groups, wit h its radical Islamicizing policies and its readiness to use violenc e against fellow Afghanistanis, whether civilians or members of riva l organizations, is the principal meddler in Tajikistan's affairs .
The Hizb is alleged to be arming Islamic militants in Tajikistan , especially members of the Islamic Rebirth Party . This is th e version of events that the Nabiev regime certainly wanted people t o believe . 56 The allegation is part of the propaganda Nabiev and hi s supporters have used for months in the face of mounting opposition .
The message is that they offer the only alternative to rule b y
Islamic extremists ; that line also tries to obscure the extent t o which Nabiev's own heavy-handed rule has intensified the oppositio n to him . The emphasis on the Hizbi-i Islami's role has been denied b y the head of Tajikistan's legislature (and subsequently actin g president), Akbarshoh Iskandarov, one of the younger generation o f
Communist politicians who is more adaptable to changing condition s
65 Steele, "The Tajiks next door" ; "Peregovory na granitse, " Narodnaia gazeta, May 5, 1992, p . 2 ; RFE/RL Daily Report, no . 8 8 (May 8, 1992), p . 1 .
66 "Sarvari mujohidon dastahoi islomii Tojikistonro musalla h megardonad, " Jumhuriyat, August 19, 1992, p . 1 . 3 2
and willing to cooperate with opposition groups . The presence i n
Tajikistan of Afghanistani mujahidin of any party has also bee n
denied by Lieutenant-Colonel A . Jalilov of the border guards
. There is one way in which the Tajikistani opposition undeni -
ably has looked to Afghanistan for help, for they have done s o
openly . However, this involves no cross-border subversion . In May
1992, as the confrontation between pro- and anti-Nabiev forces i n
Dushanbe threatened to turn into a bloodbath, spokesmen for tw o
opposition parties held a press conference to call for outside
assistance to halt the violence . They asked for such help not onl y
from Afghanistan but also from Iran and the United Nations . Th e
parties involved were the Islamic Rebirth Party and the Democrati c
Party of Tajikistan, which advocates full religious freedom fo r
Muslims and others but does not endorse the creation of an Islami c state . 5 8
If the Hizb-i Islami has indeed been an active participant i n
the turmoil in Tajikistan, that would undercut the assumption i n some quarters that ethnicity is the main basis for cross-borde r contacts, given the enmity between the Pushtun-led Hizb-i Islam i and the Tajik-led Jami'at-i Islami . The Nabiev camp, in it s efforts to magnify the specter of an external threat, has argue d that the Jami'at is emulating the Hizb's involvement in th e activities Tajikistan's opposition despite the continuing battle s
67 RFE/RL Daily Report, no . 161 (August 24, 1992), p . 3 ; G . Kleinman, "Trevozhnyi budni zastavy," Narodnaia gazeta, July 3 , 1992, p . 1 .
68 Shihab, "Asie centrale ." 3 3 between the two groups because the issue is one of aiding fellow
Muslims in their struggle against Communists.69 A New York Time s reporter filed a story that "several hundred Afghan Tajiks [were ] slipping across the border to fight for the opposition" in th e weeks before Nabiev was forced to resign but did not identify th e source or reliability of this information . 7 0
A different kind of speculation about the political implica - tions of the presence of Tajiks on both sides of the border focuse s on whether a new state might be created to unite them . At the time of the May 1992 crisis in Dushanbe, that prospect was discounted b y political figures there . The perception in Dushanbe was that Ahma d
Shah Mas'ud, the guerrilla leader of the Jami'at-i Islami wh o became a hero during the war in Afghanistan and Minister of Defens e in its first post-Communist government, is not interested becaus e the power struggle within Afghanistan is a far higher priority .
In the opinion of Tajikistan's, qadi, Akbar Turajonzoda, who i s associated with the anti-Nabiev camp in the republic's politics ,
Mas'ud's reputation was not widespread in Tajikistan by the tim e the mujahidincoalition came to power in Afghanistan and fe w outside the intelligentsia realized that he was a fellow Tajik . '
(Reportedly he is better known in Samarkand, Uzbekistan, from whic h
" "Sarvari mujohidon . "
7 ° S . Erlanger, "After Week of Turmoil, Tajikistan Chief i s Forced Out," New York Times, September 8, 1992, p . A3 .
71 Shihab, "Fausse sortie au Tadjikistan," Le Monde, May 10-11 , 1992, p . 3 ; Steele, "The Tajiks next door . "
72 Steele, "The Tajiks next door ." 3 4 his forebears moved to Afghanistan.)73 Turajonzoda does not see th e creation of a new state uniting Tajikistan with Afghanistan an d
Iran as a necessary consequence of the cultural and religiou s kinship of the inhabitants of those lands .74
According to an official Tajikistani source, there ar e
Afghanistanis who crossed into Tajikistan in the spring of 1992, o r attempted to do so, not because they are mujahidin intent o n fomenting revolt but because they were soldiers who had served th e
Communist regime in Kabul and, after its fall, sought safety fo r themselves and their families across the border . 75 Similarly , unofficial anecdotes indicated that some people (the total numbe r is unknown), presumably associated in some way with Afghanistan' s
Communist regime, crossed into Tajikistan to escape the upheaval a t home but then went on to settle in Moscow .
Even if there is no elaborate conspiracy by elements i n
Afghanistan to topple the Nabiev regime, without a doubt the borde r between Afghanistan and Tajikistan is no longer well patroled i n
1992 and had been only slightly more controlled in the immediatel y preceding years . For the first five months of 1992, an officia l source put the known number of border violations above 250, roughl y
73 The author is indebted to Dr . Boris Rumer for thi tion. s informa
74 Wright, "Report," p . 75 .
75 "Peregovory na granitse," Narodnaia gazeta, May 5, 1992, p . 2 . 3 5
twice as many as in the first half of 1991 . 76 Border guards unit s
are severly undermanned, especially in positions that require som e
expertise ; they are also undersupplied ; and inhabitants of th e
Tajikistan side of the border are hostile to the guards' efforts .
According to official estimates, the border guards were at 28 to 4 0
per cent of their intended strength by the summer of 1992 . 7 7
However, not all of the border violations are political ;
smuggling and raiding for plunder have also increased . The
significance of these economically motivated border crossings wa s
reflected in the fact that Tajikistan's Cabinet of Ministers listed
smuggling first among the kinds of border violations in it s
declaration on the troubles in that zone . The Cabinet als o
promised to try to ease the problem by increasing the means fo r
people who live along the border to conduct legal cross-borde r
trade . 78 The contraband travels in both directions and includes ,
according to Colonel P . I . Kuniakov of the border guards, watches ,
athletic shoes, drugs, gold dust, firewood, currency, and stole n
property . 79 Two incidents reported in the Soviet press in 199 1
76 G . Kleinman, "Snova tuchi khodiat khmuro," Narodnaia qazeta , May 28, 1992, p . 4 .
77 Cabinet of Ministers, Tajikistan, "Obrashchenie," Narodnai a qazeta, July 4, 1992, p . 1 ; Kleinman, "Snova tuchi khodiat khmuro ; " "Ruzhoi purtashvishi sarhad," Adabiyot va san " at, May 14, 1992, p . 3 ; TIA Khovar, "Za ukreplenie," p . 2 .
78 Ibid .
79 Kleinman, "Snova tuchi khodiat khmuro ." 3 6
involved attempted cattle rustling . Along the eastern part o f
the border, in the Badakhshan area, Tajikistan negotiated a n
agreement with local Afghanistani leaders in the summer of 199 2
which provides, in part, for the latter to curb the smuggling o f
drugs and arms into Tajikistan ; in return Tajikistan will, amon g
other things, permit inhabitants of the area to enter Tajikista n
for.81 medica l treatment
Some of the border violators do indeed carry weapons . The
border guards have identified a few of these people as Afghani-
stanis . 82 However, other reports, including from the borde r
guards, indicate that many of those trying to bring weapon s
northward are Tajiks from Tajikistan who have gone to Afghanista n
during one of the crisis periods during 1992 and then tried t o
return home . 83 It is important to note that not all the weapon s
that have traveled this route are intended for opposition groups .
Former President Nabiev's supporters in the southern province o f
Kulob are also alleged to have obtained arms from Afghanistan ,
80 Krasnaia zvezda, September 6, 1992, in Foreign Broadcas t Information Service, Daily Report . Soviet Union , Sseptember 13 , 1992, p . 22 .
81 "Peregovory na granitse" ; "Safar anjom yoft," Jumhuriyat , September 8, 1992, p . 1 .
82 MIT Khovar, "Ruzhoi tashvishovari sarhad," Jumhuriyat , August 19, 1992, p . 3 ; idem, "Vas"i sarhad , " ibid ., September 8 , 1992, p . 2 .
83 RFE/RL Daily Report, no . 151 (August 10, 1992, p . 3 ; ibid ., no . 156 (August 17, 1992), p . 3 ; MIT Khovar, "Ruzhoi tashvishovar i sarhad" ; Kleinman, "Trevozhnyi budni zastavy ;" Kleinman, "Snov a tuchi khodiat khmuro ." 3 7 seemingly without interference from the border guards .84 At leas t some of the cross-border arms acquisitions are business transac-
tions not based primarily on ideological or ethnic solidarity . Fo r
example, in October 1992, a group of people were alleged to hav e
stolen a helicopter in southern Tajikistan for an arms-buying tri p
to Afghanistan ; they brought carpets with them to trade for th e weapons.85 Rumor has it that some of the weapons acquired by
factions in Tajikistan's civil war come not from across the borde r
but from regular army units stationed in the republic .
Not all dealings are acrimonious between Tajikistan under th e
fragile coalition government which took power after the May 199 2
crisis, and Afghanistan under its uneasy coalition government whic h
came to office in April 1992 . In July 1992, the then-head o f
Tajikistan's legislature, Akbarshoh Iskandarov, made an officia l
visit to Afghanistan's new president, Burhanuddin Rabbani, head o f
the Jami'at-i Islami . The two agreed to the establishment o f diplomatic relations between their countries and Afghanistan
undertook to combat the smuggling of drugs and weapons int o
Tajikistan . 86 Tajikistan is also interested in developing contacts wit h
Persian-speakers abroad, in whatever country they live, not just i n
Afghanistan or Iran . One important means towards this end has bee n
84 J . Krauze, "Démission forcée du president tadjik," Le Mond e September 9, 1992, p . 5 .
85 RFE/RL Daily Report, no . 205 (October 23, 1992), p . 3 .
86 RFE/RL Daily Report, no . 136 (July 20, 1992), p . 3 .
3 8
to hold international conferences in Dushanbe that are aimed a t
such people . The first of these, in 1990, was devoted to on e
specific, cultural subject : the achievements of the pre-Islami c
Persian poet-musician Barbad (sixth-seventh centuries A .D . )
Participants came from various countries, including Iran and th e
United States . The message of this focus on Barbad was not solel y
the man's artistic achievements but also that this was a Tajikwho
had made this notable contribution to the world of Persian cultur e
in general ; the fact that the name "Tajik" and the distinction i t
implied did not yet exist in Barbad's time were not part of th e
message . 8 7
A second international conference (September 9-16, 1992) wa s
scheduled for a more dramatic time than the planners intended, no t
only the first anniversary of Tajikistan's declaration of inde-
pendence but also the political confrontation in Dushanbe that le d
to the resignation of President Nabiev . The focus of thi s
gathering was not the achievements of an individual but the commo n
ties among Tajiks wherever they live . The largest contingent o f
invited participants was from Afghanistan (150), the next larges t
was from Iran (60) ; other Central Asian republics and Russia wer e
also to be represented in strength (a total of 100 invited) ;
smaller numbers were also invited from the United States, Saud i
Arabia, and China . Some of the planned sessions dealt wit h
cultural matters but, significantly, others dealt with economi c
87 A . Abdullo, "Bar sari sarv zanad 'Pardai ushshoq' tazarv, " Adabiyot va san"at, April 19, 1990, p . 5 .
3 9 matters . Businessmen as well as scholars were among thos e invited . 8 8 In 1992, Tajikistan faces a host of challenges, both domesti c and external . Although many advocates of change in the republi c wanted it to have much more autonomy within the former Sovie t Union, few of the politically active people at any point on th e
political spectrum expected Tajikistan to become a separate stat e so soon . They hoped, over-optimistically, that Moscow would hel p them address a variety of needs, in economic, environmental , security, and other spheres . With the collapse of the Sovie t state, Tajikistan had to look abroad to fill that void . Political and economic groups in Iran, Afghanistan, and many othe r countries have their own ambitiions to play a role in Tajikistan . That does not guarantee that Tajikistanis would respond positivel y to all such efforts . The kinds of practical assistance, no t rhetoric, offered them by foreign countries will surely affec t their orientation . Given the growing polarization caused by th e conflict between the public's dissatisfaction with the old orde r left over from the Soviet era and the Communist old guard' s determination to preserve its power and privileges by any means , support may decline for political figures--of various ideologies- - who advocate moderation and compromise and who therefore are eage r to develop relations with the widest possible range of foreig n
countries . Tajikistan's social and economic problems are s o
88 "Barnomai anjuman az 9 to 16 sentiabr," Jumhurivat , September 8, 1992, p . 1 ; B . Bobomurod, "Nuri dida, toji sar, " ibid ., pp . 1, 3 . 4 0 serious that whoever wins the power struggle will have to seek hel p from some outside . However, it is an oversimplification to assum e that Tajikistan must necessarily fall into another country's orbi t because of the cultural and religious similarities between them .