Governance and Insecurity in South East Nigeria.Pmd
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GOVERNANCE AND INSECURITYYY IN SOUTH EAST NIGERIA Edited by: Ukoha Ukiwo and Innocent Chukwuma CLEEN Foundation First published in 2012 by: CLEEN Foundation Lagos Office: 21, Akinsanya Street Taiwo Bus-Stop Ojodu Ikeja, 100281 Ikeja, Lagos, Nigeria Tel: 234-1-7612479, 7395498 Abuja Office: 26, Bamenda Street, off Abidjan Street Wuse Zone 3, Abuja, Nigeria Tel: 234-9-7817025, 8708379 Owerri Office: Plot 10, Area M Road 3 World Bank Housing Estate Owerri, Imo State Tel: 083-823104, 08128002962, 08130278469 E-mail: [email protected] Website: www.cleen.org ISBN: 978-978-51062-2-0 © Whole or part of this publication may be republished, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted through electronic, photocopying, mechanical, recording or otheriwe, with proper acknowledgement of the publishers. Typesetting: Blessing Aniche-Nwokolo Cover concept: Gabriel Akinremi The mission of CLEEN Foundation is to promote public safety, security and accessible justice through empirical research, legislative advocacy, demonstration programmes and publications, in partnership with government and civil society. Table of Content List of tables v Acknowledgement vi Preface viii Chapters: 1. Framework for Improving Security and Governance in the Southeast by Ukoha Ukiwo 1 2. Governance and Security in Abia State by Ukoha Ukiwo and Magdalene O Emole 24 3. Governance and Security in Anambra State by Chijoke K. Iwuamadi 58 4. Governance and Security in Ebonyi State by Smart E. Otu 83 5. Governance and Security in Enugu State by Nkwachukwu Orji 114 6. Governance and Security in Imo State by Chukwuneye I. Okereke 148 Appendix: I. Notes on Contributors 183 II. Communiqué of the Strategy Meeting on Democracy and Governance in the Southeast 186 iv List of tables Chapter 1 Table 1.1: Length of federal roads by geopolitical zone, 2006 & 2008 6 Table 1.2: Ownership of health care facilities by geo-political zone, 2004 7 Table 1.3: Rank of South-East States 7 Table 1.4 Location of policemen by geo-political zones 8 Table 1.5 Police formations by geo-political zones, 2006 9 Table 1.6 Prison capacity by geo-political zones 10 Chapter 2 Table 2.1 Selected Social Statistics for Abia State 28 Table 2.2 Abia Human Development Indicators 29 Table 2.4: Study locations 32 Chapter 3 Table 3.1: Governors of Anambra State since 1991 60 Table 3.2 Revenue Allocation to Anambra State 63 Table 3.3: Poverty and livelihood in Anambra state as at 2010 65 Table 3.4: Research locations 66 Table 3.5: Household crimes in Anambra State in 2010 67 Table 3.6: Have you been a victim of any type of crime during the year 2010? 69 Chapter 4 Table 1: Senatorial zones and Local Government Councils with their Headquarters 86 Table 2: Governors of Ebonyi state (1996-date) 87 Table 3: Ebonyi State Revenue Inflow (2004-2012) 90 Table 4: Specified stakeholders sampled 94 Table 5: Specific security challenges and their ranking 99 Chapter 6 Table 1: Media reports on violent crimes in the state 150 Table 2: Senatorial zones in Imo State and their Local Governments 156 Table 3: Senatorial Zones in Imo State and their Development Centres 157 Table 4: Past and Present Leaders of Imo State (1976 – Date) 157 Table 5: Imo State Budget (1976 – 2006) and Name of Governor at given Periods 159 v Acknowledgement The CLEEN Foundation wishes to thank the following organization and individuals for their contributions in the publication of this report. Firstly, we thank the Ford Foundation for its generous support for the security and governance project of the CLEEN Foundation of which this publication is an output. Without the support this report and the follow up intervention activities in the southeast region of Nigeria may have remained in the realms of ideas many of which never come to light. Secondly, we are grateful to the lead consultant, Dr. Ukoha Ukiwo of the Department of Political Science, University of Port Harcourt, for leading the research and editing the final draft of the report for publication. Closely following him in our gratitude are the consultants that conducted the research in the five study states and wrote the chapters on them. They are Drs. Smart Otu, Nkwachukwu Orji, Chukwunenye Okereke, Chijoke Iwuamadi and Magdalene Emole. Their institutional affiliations are highlighted in the note on contributors. Finally, we thank the respondents who participated in the interviews and focus group discussions in the five states in spite of their busy schedules. vi Preface Thirteen years after the restoration of elected civilian government in Nigeria, serious existential challenges persist at the federal, state and local levels. These include persisting low public confidence in the capability of the electoral system to produce truly elected political leaders at various levels. Implementation of economic reform programmes that have neither improved public services nor produced jobs for thousands of young people graduating every year from higher institutions. Pervasive corruption, which has reduced government’s annual budgetary pronouncements and development targets to hollow rituals scuffed at by a cynical public. Above all, an alarming spate of armed violence and terrorism over widening space and territories and apparent inability of the security forces to restore law and order, bring the perpetrators to justice and reassure a traumatised citizenry. The result is that in spite of Nigeria’s impressive macroeconomic growth and stability (thanks to oil income), the country still ranks very low on major global and even sub-Saharan African governance indicators such as infant mortality, maternal mortality, quantity/quality of education, job creation, poverty eradication, security of life and property; and high on corruption profile and cost of doing Business (Chukwuma, 2011). Of all the challenges confronting Nigeria, it is arguable that security challenge is the most acute. From Maiduguri and Bauchi in Northeast to Jos in North-central and down to Aba in Southeast, Nigerians are at a loss about the inability of security authorisers and providers in the country to arrest the increasing drift to a state of lawlessness where almost anybody can get away with the most heinous of violent crimes as long as it involves mass number of victims. An explanation of why this state of affairs has festered for so long in Nigeria requires an understanding of its linkage with poor political governance. In spite of the efforts of the current leadership of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) under Attahiru Jega, which in some ways have brought a modicum of credibility to the electoral process, the truth is that the votes have not really counted in the emergence of political leaders in Nigeria. vii In deed, elections have more or less become an organized crime in various parts of the country. In this criminal enterprise, politicians go into electioneering contests with a fixation not on service but on capturing state power and access to public resources meant for overall development of the people for personal gains. While no region or state in Nigeria is immune from the above grim picture, political and security governance in the southeast has continued to be a source of major concern to many stakeholders in the region. It is indeed an irony of history that a region with the most advanced traditional features of democracy, accountable and transparent governance system exemplified in its amala community governance system has today become a bastion of criminal autocracy, opaque and imperial governance style. Statistics from the 2010 edition of the annual National Crime and Safety Survey (NCSS) conducted by the CLEEN Foundation indicate that Ebonyi, Abia and Imo States have highest levels of kidnapping in Nigeria (CLEEN Foundation, 2010). Similarly, in the 2006 edition of the survey Abia State ranked first in armed robbery (Alemika and Chukwuma, 2007). Between 2009 and 2010, there was hardly a day that passed without cases of violent robbery and kidnapping reported in the area. The villages are no exception as there is increasingly no statistically significant difference between the levels of crime (especially armed robbery and kidnapping) recorded in the cities and those in the villages (Chukwuma, 2009). For the indigenes, going home has become an ordeal and preparations for it require the kind of security arrangements you would expect in war torn places. Consequently, public and private enterprises that operated in the region and provided jobs to the youths in the past are closing down in droves and thus complicating youth unemployment. While private businesses are leaving because of security situation and poor physical infrastructure, their public counterpart are shutting down mainly as a result of mismanagement, corruption and poor corporate governance among other malfeasance. To compound situation, the Federal Government of Nigeria, since the end of the civil war in 1970 has not been fair to the southeast in rebuilding its infrastructure and services destroyed during the war, which would have enabled the region to rebuild its economy and provide jobs for its army of young people. The government has consistently short-changed the region in the citing of major public works programme such as construction of power stations, expansion of road networks, water and irrigation projects and other social investments that would have contributed in turning the economy around. Furthermore, law enforcement agents posted to the region have continued to conduct themselves in manners that suggest that they are an occupation force preying on the people rather than protecting them. Prior to the emergence of Mohammed Abubakar as the Inspector General of the Nigeria Police Force in January 2012 and his subsequent banning of police checkpoints/road blocks, you could hardly drive for more than one kilometre on any major road in the region without being stopped by yet another roadblock/checkpoints mounted by police officers to extort the people in the name of fighting armed robbery and kidnapping.