HIZBALLAH RISING: THE POLITICAL BATTLE FOR THE LOYALTY OF THE SHI'A OF By Rodger Shanahan*

The 2004 municipal highlighted the competition between Amal and Hizballah for the political loyalty of the Shi'a of Lebanon. The decision by to allow both parties to compete against each other on separate electoral tickets, presented an opportunity to test the parties' relative popularity. Hizballah emerged the much stronger party, and while it is likely that a joint ticket between Amal and Hizballah will be put in place for the 2005 parliamentary elections, the local government elections illustrate the potential political power of Hizballah. Although both parties compete for the same communal vote, Hizballah's unity and probity contrast markedly with the , whose reputation amongst the Shi'a community is at its lowest level in years. The growing political popularity of Hizballah poses problems for the United States in its approach to the "War on Terror."

heavily influenced by the broader strategic hile the future political direction taken W desires of the dominant foreign force in by the Shi'a majority in Iraq is of immense Lebanon: Syria. interest to U.S. policy makers, a longer- The contest between Hizballah and running political contest is still being Amal for the position of pre-eminent played out in another part of the Arab world representative of the Shi'a community has, for the political loyalty of the same at times, been a heated one. Although Amal community. Since the re-emergence of had its genesis in the Movement of the elections following the end of the civil war Dispossessed (Harakat al-Mahrumin), in Lebanon, where the Shi'a represent the 1 founded by the charismatic scholar ('alim) largest of the communal groups, both Amal Musa as-Sadr, it turned briefly to the and Hizballah have been forced to run on secular leadership of Husayn Husayni in joint electoral tickets for the national 1979, and since 1980, . elections. Running on joint lists thus Hizballah, on the other hand, has retained allowed the two Shi'a political parties the leadership of the party in the hands of represented in parliament to avoid a direct the scholars, in line with its ideological electoral showdown. In the local linkage with, and jurisprudential loyalty to, government elections held in May and June the Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah 2004, however, candidates ran on separate Khamene'i. Indeed, many of Hizballah's electoral tickets, giving a better indication early founders came from the ranks of of each party's popularity. On the face of it, disaffected Amal members who were the results indicate that Hizballah has disillusioned with the party's embrace of the moved well ahead of Amal as the preferred secular political system. Both Islamic Amal political representative of the Shi'a members and members of the Da'wa who community. However, as is the case with had joined Amal were prominent in the anything related to Lebanese politics, the establishment of Hizballah. Like all groups results not only reflect the local political vying for the political loyalty of the same popularity of the two parties, but were also constituency, however, the two groups

Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 9, No. 1 (March 2005) 1 Rodger Shanahan developed into fierce rivals, and conflict local elections. As a consequence, between the two groups has generally Hizballah was able to display its strength in existed right below the surface. Between the heartlands of the Lebanese Shi'a: the 1985 and 1988, at the height of the intra- Biqa', the southern suburbs (dahiyya) of communal dispute, Hizballah and Amal , and South Lebanon. That is not to militia members fought a series of bloody say that there was no action on the part of engagements in the south of the country. the Syrians to influence the outcomes. In More recently though, any violence the Biqa' for example, Hizballah formed an between the two parties has been small electoral alliance with the pro-Syrian Ba'th scale and very localized, and is normally party, which made it difficult for Amal to centered over local electoral disputes. form an effective, politically popular Because of the complex nature of counter-alliance. Lebanese politics, and the use by Syria of Syria's decision to ultimately allow the Lebanese political process in pursuit of both parties to contest the elections without its own foreign political objectives, it is being forced into an electoral alliance with difficult to draw clear conclusions from each other was motivated in part by external events such as elections. In the case of the considerations. No doubt realizing the level 2004 municipal elections, however, it is of popular support that Hizballah possessed, clear that Hizballah emerged as a much Syria realized that the elections would stronger party than its rival Amal. In the provide the United States, in particular, south of the country, Hizballah emerged with a public example of how genuinely victorious in over 60 percent of popular the party was politically. Following municipalities (compared with 55 percent in the late 2001 proscription of Hizballah as a 1998), while Amal captured only 30 percent terrorist organization by the United States, of municipalities (down from 45 percent in the Syrian government wished to signal to 1998). Hizballah also did very well in Washington the reality of the situation on southern Beirut and the Biqa', particularly the ground in Lebanon. By association, in Ba'albak, where it had taken its support Syria, as the hegemon within Lebanon, was for granted in 1998 and been dealt a heavy also signaling to the United States its own blow, winning only a few of the continuing relevance within the region. This municipalities. With the benefit of a well- was particularly important following the organized campaign in the region, passing of the Syria Accountability Act and Hizballah gained control in 27 of the 30 the Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act municipalities that it contested in the Biqa'.2 in October 2003 by the U.S. House of Hizballah's relative success can be put Representatives. The Syria Accountability down to a number of factors, some of which Act, for example, stated that "...the emanate from purely domestic politics, and Government of Syria should immediately others that are of longer-term strategic and unconditionally halt support for importance. As far as Syria was concerned, terrorism, permanently and openly declare the dynamics of this municipal election its total renunciation of all forms of were different from others, in that terrorism, and close all terrorist offices and was happy for a more realistic facilities in Syria, including the offices of reflection of local political attitudes towards … Hizballah."3 By illustrating to the world Hizballah and Amal to be displayed. the political popularity of Hizballah within Whereas it has been Syria's wish for the two Lebanon, Syria hoped to dilute the impact parties to maintain a balance during of the bill and show the United States that national elections in order to ensure that no Hizballah was a legitimate political reality one communal group becomes dominant within Lebanon. Such was the intent of the enough to challenge Syrian primacy, in the statement by Syrian president Bashar Assad case of the Shi'a parties there was a when he claimed that the elections "defined relatively low-key approach taken to these the true political sizes" in Lebanon. 4

2 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 9, No. 1 (March 2005) Hizballah Rising: The Political Battle for the Loyalty of the Shi'a of Lebanon

Of course, more than just Syrian formed a breakaway group known as the political considerations account for "Revolution of the Hungry" (Thawrat al- Hizballah's success. The party is genuinely Jiya'). Tufayli's support base was largely popular, both as a consequence of its limited to the villages of Brital and resistance activities that prompted the 2000 Tarayya, but it did show that the party was withdrawal of the Israeli Defense Force vulnerable to the same type of leadership (IDF) from the country's south, as well as splits that affect other, secular political its ability to achieve the return of prisoners parties. Of more concern, however, were from Israeli jails in return for the remains of the results of the 1998 municipal elections. IDF soldiers. There were concerns in some Amal made significant gains in the quarters that Hizballah's popularity was traditionally strong Hizballah areas of rooted too deeply in support for its Ba'albak, prompting one observer at the resistance against the Israelis occupying time to state, "Many Shi'ites…view South Lebanon. For Hizballah, the Hizballah as too radical. Amal's largely withdrawal of the Israelis in 2000 provided secular leadership also appeals more to a great fillip to the organization, and gave it many individual members of the the ability to announce both its Lebanese community."5 nationalist credentials, as well as its wider While its success against the IDF authority as the only Arab group to defeat gained it great kudos, the military wing of Israel militarily. In the immediate aftermath Hizballah these days must be managed far of the perceived victory, it has also given more judiciously by Secretary-General the party's machinery the ability to cement than in the pre-2000 its southern support. The party was period. While Israel remains an unpopular instrumental in repairing village housing neighbor amongst the Lebanese and some infrastructure damaged during (particularly amongst those from the south), years of resistance, while at the same time the United Nations' rejection of Lebanon's the creation of the dispute surrounding the (Syrian-inspired) claims to the Sheba'a ownership of the Sheba'a farms area Farms has presented the Islamic Resistance allowed Hizballah to maintain its armed with a conundrum. With no unfulfilled UN militias and to undertake military operations Resolution behind its military operations, against Israel. The refusal of the Lebanese Hizballah's military actions in the south are government to use its military to control the carried out without the full support of the border region also allows Hizballah a free local population, especially given the Israeli hand. Without the resistance, Hizballah reactions which follow. The more that fears becoming a sectarian form of the Hizballah carries out military action in the emasculated Amal. With its military wing Sheba'a farms for its own and others' however, the party has a regional relevance strategic purposes, the more it risks that its opposition is denied. alienating the Lebanese polity, the majority While the party is currently in a of whom lack any affinity with the Sheba'a strong position within the Shi'a community farms issue. politically, this has not always been the Hizballah appears to understand the case, and the party is pragmatic enough to limitations of relying too heavily on its realize this fact. Hizballah has undergone its military component, however, and the party share of political setbacks, but appears to planned for the period following the have grown stronger from these withdrawal of Israel from Lebanon. It has experiences. In the late 1990s for example, always been active within the Lebanese the party experienced its first major split Shi'a community as a significant provider of when a former Secretary-General of the social services, and has been careful in party, Shaykh Subhi Tufayli, was defeated maintaining a reputation for probity that in the contest for the position by the more eludes Amal. Of particular note is its ability moderate Shaykh 'Abbas al-Mussawi and to mobilize its supporters to achieve both its

Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 9, No. 1 (March 2005) 3 Rodger Shanahan strategic and local political purposes. This emergence of internal disputes within the is one aspect that will be of the utmost party. This was illustrated in March 2003, importance to the party in the long term as when Nabih Berri expelled six members it continues to establish itself as a major from the party, including three members of player in the Lebanese political scene. In parliament, two of whom were ministers.7 May 2004, the party was able to stage a Part of the reason for this was the desire of mass rally of over 250,000 people in Beirut the Speaker and President of Amal to to protest at U.S. military incursions into reshape the Cabinet and remove people he the Iraqi holy sites at Karbala and Najaf, considered political rivals. There was also indicating its mass appeal. 6 Illustrative of general reference to the notion of the ability of the party to mobilize its "accountability," which the party had support base at the local level was the fact adopted in 2002 in response to increasing that voter turnout was particularly good in allegations of corruption. In the case of Ali the regions where Hizballah was strong. In Abdallah this appeared to be particularly Ba'albak, for example, over 70 percent of prescient, as he was charged with registered voters participated, while the embezzlement of public funds in September figure for Nabatiyyah in the South was 2003 relating to the misuse of government approximately 65 percent of voters. This agricultural funds, and was held in remand compares with a figure of just over 20 for six months from December 2003. While percent for Beirut, and 30 percent for some commentators have argued that Sunni-dominated Tripoli. Syria's position towards Amal during the While there is little doubt that election represents an altering of the power Hizballah has become a well-organized, relationship, there are indications that Syria unified and multi-faceted organization, its has taken steps to assure Amal that it still rival for the loyalty of the Shi'a community factors in Syria's political plans in Lebanon. has suffered in comparison. The municipal To that end, Assem Qanso, the Shi'a head of election results capped several bad years for the Ba'th Party, proclaimed during a visit to Amal since their performance in the 1998 Nabih Berri that "Hizbullah and municipal elections. Amal's standing as a Amal…represented by our dear friend representative political party has fallen Berri, are our left eye and our right eye," significantly since that time, particularly at while calling Berri a student of the school the local level. Originally founded as a of Hafiz al-Assad.8 party designed to represent the interests of It would be premature to read too the economically and politically much into the results of the municipal disenfranchised Shi'a population, its elections regarding the future of the establishment heralded the emergence of a Lebanese Shi'a. This type of election is, sectarian-led attempt to alter the political after all, decided on very local issues and is status quo that had for centuries deprived not necessarily replicated in national voting the community of a political voice. The patterns. Consequently, one should not early years of the party were full of predict the demise of Amal simply as a promise, but more recently the very same consequence of this election result. They party has lost much of its moral authority as did, after all, retain their support in their its closeness with the government has led to southern base of Tyre and gained more charges of corruption against it. Amal is places in some of the municipalities of the battling to stay level with Hizballah, whose dahiyya of Beirut than they had in 1998, members are meticulous about maintaining even though Hizballah was strongest a public reputation for financial probity and overall. That having been said, the results an active opposition stance within cannot be ignored and certainly illustrate government. the degree to which Amal has become One of the consequences of this fall in removed from its popular base and is reliant popularity of the Amal movement is the on Syrian sponsorship to retain its

4 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 9, No. 1 (March 2005) Hizballah Rising: The Political Battle for the Loyalty of the Shi'a of Lebanon influence. In light of the anti-Syrian feeling providing social services to the community unleashed by the recent assassination of in place of the government is undoubtedly Rafiq Hariri, this sponsorship could become paying dividends. While Hizballah is also counter-productive. The results also showed dependent on both Syria and to varying the ability of the rival parties to mobilize degrees, the party has earned a reputation their supporters and political allies. In not for integrity that eludes Amal. That having imposing an electoral alliance between the been said, neither party attracts many active two major Shi'a parties, Syria allowed a supporters outside the Shi'a community, more transparent view of the Shi'a limiting either's claims to be truly national population's political loyalties to be parties. determined. Hizballah has a long-term political The future for Amal appears strategy regarding its role within Lebanon. uncertain. The party is dominated by Nabih While it long ago acquiesced to the realities Berri, who has proven to be a staunch of multi-confessional Lebanon by rejecting supporter of Syria. Although a dominant its revolutionary strategy for the force, the recent expulsion from the party of achievement of an Islamic state, it has never several high-powered members attests to rejected the desire to see Lebanon ruled in the fact that Berri, not for the first time, accordance with Islamic precepts as its faces challenges to his authority from ultimate objective.9 While this continues to within the party. At the same time, the mean that it is viewed with suspicion by willingness of Amal's Central Council to many Lebanese, the party has saved its fiery unanimously confirm his decision to expel rhetoric for external issues, such as United members attests to the fact that Berri is still States intervention in Iraq and the continued very much in control of the party. While Israeli occupation of Palestinian territory. national parliamentary elections are due to Domestically, it has taken a strategic be held in 2005, the nature of the Lebanese decision to act as the responsible political political system and Syria's place in it opposition, while pushing for electoral should guarantee parity between Amal and reforms that would ensure the Shi'a's Hizballah. Syria has always been careful to numerical power is translated into political maintain a degree of balance between the power. Both Amal and Hizballah have as two parties, and while it was willing to send one of their major aims to cease the a message by allowing Hizballah to flex its sectarian basis of parliamentary muscles during the local government representation that guarantees a political elections, its desire for balance will likely over-representation of the non-Shi'a see it force the two parties into running population. 10 The parties have also sought joint electoral tickets again in 2005. to change the electoral law to lower the Similarly, having seen Hizballah's political voting age from 21 to 18, which would strength demonstrated, Syria is likely to similarly strengthen the hand of the Shi'a, continue backing Berri, both because he has given that this demographic is dominated been a loyal ally and because they fear by the Shi'a. tilting the Shi'a political balance towards Hizballah understands that its political Hizballah. strategy within Lebanon must take into For Hizballah, on the other hand, the account three groups. First and foremost, it municipal elections confirmed the efficacy needs to gain the loyalty of a majority of the of its strategic political direction in Shi'a community, as it is this group that will Lebanon. Its success in all three regions provide it with victory at the ballot box, and where the Shi'a dominate has shifted the ensure its longevity as a political political balance in favor of the party. Its movement. Secondly, it needs to be long-term commitment to occupying the accepted as a legitimate and responsible moral high ground in Lebanese politics by political party by the broader Lebanese eschewing government positions and polity. While the ultimate aims of Hizballah

Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 9, No. 1 (March 2005) 5 Rodger Shanahan in terms of the Islamization of society mean must undergo to navigate the difficult that it will not be politically supported by shoals of Lebanese domestic politics, it many, if any, of the non-Shi'a Lebanese must also deal with Syria. As a party that (particularly the Christian and portrays itself as a champion of Lebanese minorities), it aspires to be regarded as a nationalism, exemplified by its militia's responsible political player so that it can victory over the IDF, it must play a game of eventually achieve major leadership realpolitik with Syria. Support for positions within the Lebanese political Hizballah by Syria is dependent on system that will allow it to achieve its goal. Damascus's own interests. For that reason, This is evident in Hizballah's successful Hizballah maintains good relations with attempts to position itself as the party Syria (a move at odds with its nationalist representing the economically credentials) while building itself up disadvantaged, regardless of communal politically for the day when Hizballah's identity. To that end it has an active resistance is of no use for the advancement involvement in the Lebanese trade union of Syria's regional interests. While these movement, while Hassan Nasrallah's held a three lines of strategy are difficult to meeting with then-Prime Minister Hariri in achieve simultaneously, the 2004 local June 2004 to discuss the socio-economic government success over Amal illustrates impact of Lebanon's $34 billion debt that the strategy is paying dividends within (representing 185 per cent of Lebanon's the community. GDP).11 In addition to the balancing act it

*Dr. Rodger Shanahan is a Visiting Fellow at the Research Institute for Asia and the http://www.economist.com/World/africa/Pri Pacific, University of Sydney, and teaches nterFriendly.cfm?Story_ID=2709426. in the university's Department of 7. These were the Energy and Water and Islamic Studies. Minister Muhammad Abd al-Hamid Baydun, Agriculture Minister Ali Abdullah NOTES and the Western Biqa' MP (and former minister) Mahmud Abu Hamdan. 8. "Visit to home signals boost for Berri," 1. The last census taken in Lebanon was in The Daily Star, May 20, 2004. 1932. At the time, the Shi'a represented 16 9. Interview with Shaykh Hassan Nasrallah, percent of the population. It is estimated Al-Ahd (Beirut), April 10, 1994. that they account for anywhere up to 45 10. Author's interview with Dr. Ali percent of the present population. Mosmar, Chairman of Amal Movement's 2. The Daily Star (Beirut), May 11, 2004. Foreign Affairs Office, Beirut, June 3, 2002 3. Syrian Accountability Act, Section 3. and with Shaykh Hassan Ezzedine, Director http://www.theorator.com/bills108/s982.ht Hizballah Media Relations Department, ml. Beirut, May 30, 2002. 4. "The New Weights," Dar al-Hayat, June 11. "What Happened?" Al-Ahram Weekly 11, 2004. (Cairo), No. 693 (June 3-9, 2004). http://www.daralhayat.net/actions/print2.ph p. 5. Eyal Zisser "Hizballah: New Course or Continued Warfare," MERIA Journal, Vol. 4, No. 3 (September 2000). 6. The Economist, May 27, 2004. Some reports quoted the crowd as large as 500,000.

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