HIZBALLAH RISING: the POLITICAL BATTLE for the LOYALTY of the SHI'a of LEBANON by Rodger Shanahan*
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HIZBALLAH RISING: THE POLITICAL BATTLE FOR THE LOYALTY OF THE SHI'A OF LEBANON By Rodger Shanahan* The 2004 municipal elections in Lebanon highlighted the competition between Amal and Hizballah for the political loyalty of the Shi'a of Lebanon. The decision by Syria to allow both parties to compete against each other on separate electoral tickets, presented an opportunity to test the parties' relative popularity. Hizballah emerged the much stronger party, and while it is likely that a joint ticket between Amal and Hizballah will be put in place for the 2005 parliamentary elections, the local government elections illustrate the potential political power of Hizballah. Although both parties compete for the same communal vote, Hizballah's unity and probity contrast markedly with the Amal Movement, whose reputation amongst the Shi'a community is at its lowest level in years. The growing political popularity of Hizballah poses problems for the United States in its approach to the "War on Terror." heavily influenced by the broader strategic hile the future political direction taken W desires of the dominant foreign force in by the Shi'a majority in Iraq is of immense Lebanon: Syria. interest to U.S. policy makers, a longer- The contest between Hizballah and running political contest is still being Amal for the position of pre-eminent played out in another part of the Arab world representative of the Shi'a community has, for the political loyalty of the same at times, been a heated one. Although Amal community. Since the re-emergence of had its genesis in the Movement of the elections following the end of the civil war Dispossessed (Harakat al-Mahrumin), in Lebanon, where the Shi'a represent the 1 founded by the charismatic scholar ('alim) largest of the communal groups, both Amal Musa as-Sadr, it turned briefly to the and Hizballah have been forced to run on secular leadership of Husayn Husayni in joint electoral tickets for the national 1979, and since 1980, Nabih Berri. elections. Running on joint lists thus Hizballah, on the other hand, has retained allowed the two Shi'a political parties the leadership of the party in the hands of represented in parliament to avoid a direct the scholars, in line with its ideological electoral showdown. In the local linkage with, and jurisprudential loyalty to, government elections held in May and June the Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah 2004, however, candidates ran on separate Khamene'i. Indeed, many of Hizballah's electoral tickets, giving a better indication early founders came from the ranks of of each party's popularity. On the face of it, disaffected Amal members who were the results indicate that Hizballah has disillusioned with the party's embrace of the moved well ahead of Amal as the preferred secular political system. Both Islamic Amal political representative of the Shi'a members and members of the Da'wa who community. However, as is the case with had joined Amal were prominent in the anything related to Lebanese politics, the establishment of Hizballah. Like all groups results not only reflect the local political vying for the political loyalty of the same popularity of the two parties, but were also constituency, however, the two groups Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 9, No. 1 (March 2005) 1 Rodger Shanahan developed into fierce rivals, and conflict local elections. As a consequence, between the two groups has generally Hizballah was able to display its strength in existed right below the surface. Between the heartlands of the Lebanese Shi'a: the 1985 and 1988, at the height of the intra- Biqa', the southern suburbs (dahiyya) of communal dispute, Hizballah and Amal Beirut, and South Lebanon. That is not to militia members fought a series of bloody say that there was no action on the part of engagements in the south of the country. the Syrians to influence the outcomes. In More recently though, any violence the Biqa' for example, Hizballah formed an between the two parties has been small electoral alliance with the pro-Syrian Ba'th scale and very localized, and is normally party, which made it difficult for Amal to centered over local electoral disputes. form an effective, politically popular Because of the complex nature of counter-alliance. Lebanese politics, and the use by Syria of Syria's decision to ultimately allow the Lebanese political process in pursuit of both parties to contest the elections without its own foreign political objectives, it is being forced into an electoral alliance with difficult to draw clear conclusions from each other was motivated in part by external events such as elections. In the case of the considerations. No doubt realizing the level 2004 municipal elections, however, it is of popular support that Hizballah possessed, clear that Hizballah emerged as a much Syria realized that the elections would stronger party than its rival Amal. In the provide the United States, in particular, south of the country, Hizballah emerged with a public example of how genuinely victorious in over 60 percent of popular the party was politically. Following municipalities (compared with 55 percent in the late 2001 proscription of Hizballah as a 1998), while Amal captured only 30 percent terrorist organization by the United States, of municipalities (down from 45 percent in the Syrian government wished to signal to 1998). Hizballah also did very well in Washington the reality of the situation on southern Beirut and the Biqa', particularly the ground in Lebanon. By association, in Ba'albak, where it had taken its support Syria, as the hegemon within Lebanon, was for granted in 1998 and been dealt a heavy also signaling to the United States its own blow, winning only a few of the continuing relevance within the region. This municipalities. With the benefit of a well- was particularly important following the organized campaign in the region, passing of the Syria Accountability Act and Hizballah gained control in 27 of the 30 the Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act municipalities that it contested in the Biqa'.2 in October 2003 by the U.S. House of Hizballah's relative success can be put Representatives. The Syria Accountability down to a number of factors, some of which Act, for example, stated that "...the emanate from purely domestic politics, and Government of Syria should immediately others that are of longer-term strategic and unconditionally halt support for importance. As far as Syria was concerned, terrorism, permanently and openly declare the dynamics of this municipal election its total renunciation of all forms of were different from others, in that terrorism, and close all terrorist offices and Damascus was happy for a more realistic facilities in Syria, including the offices of reflection of local political attitudes towards … Hizballah."3 By illustrating to the world Hizballah and Amal to be displayed. the political popularity of Hizballah within Whereas it has been Syria's wish for the two Lebanon, Syria hoped to dilute the impact parties to maintain a balance during of the bill and show the United States that national elections in order to ensure that no Hizballah was a legitimate political reality one communal group becomes dominant within Lebanon. Such was the intent of the enough to challenge Syrian primacy, in the statement by Syrian president Bashar Assad case of the Shi'a parties there was a when he claimed that the elections "defined relatively low-key approach taken to these the true political sizes" in Lebanon. 4 2 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 9, No. 1 (March 2005) Hizballah Rising: The Political Battle for the Loyalty of the Shi'a of Lebanon Of course, more than just Syrian formed a breakaway group known as the political considerations account for "Revolution of the Hungry" (Thawrat al- Hizballah's success. The party is genuinely Jiya'). Tufayli's support base was largely popular, both as a consequence of its limited to the villages of Brital and resistance activities that prompted the 2000 Tarayya, but it did show that the party was withdrawal of the Israeli Defense Force vulnerable to the same type of leadership (IDF) from the country's south, as well as splits that affect other, secular political its ability to achieve the return of prisoners parties. Of more concern, however, were from Israeli jails in return for the remains of the results of the 1998 municipal elections. IDF soldiers. There were concerns in some Amal made significant gains in the quarters that Hizballah's popularity was traditionally strong Hizballah areas of rooted too deeply in support for its Ba'albak, prompting one observer at the resistance against the Israelis occupying time to state, "Many Shi'ites…view South Lebanon. For Hizballah, the Hizballah as too radical. Amal's largely withdrawal of the Israelis in 2000 provided secular leadership also appeals more to a great fillip to the organization, and gave it many individual members of the the ability to announce both its Lebanese community."5 nationalist credentials, as well as its wider While its success against the IDF authority as the only Arab group to defeat gained it great kudos, the military wing of Israel militarily. In the immediate aftermath Hizballah these days must be managed far of the perceived victory, it has also given more judiciously by Secretary-General the party's machinery the ability to cement Hassan Nasrallah than in the pre-2000 its southern support. The party was period. While Israel remains an unpopular instrumental in repairing village housing neighbor amongst the Lebanese and some infrastructure damaged during (particularly amongst those from the south), years of resistance, while at the same time the United Nations' rejection of Lebanon's the creation of the dispute surrounding the (Syrian-inspired) claims to the Sheba'a ownership of the Sheba'a farms area Farms has presented the Islamic Resistance allowed Hizballah to maintain its armed with a conundrum.