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Confronting Supreme Court Fact Finding Allison Orr Larsen William & Mary Law School, [email protected]

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Confronting Supreme Court Fact Finding Allison Orr Larsen William & Mary Law School, Amlarsen@Wm.Edu College of William & Mary Law School William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository Faculty Publications Faculty and Deans 2012 Confronting Supreme Court Fact Finding Allison Orr Larsen William & Mary Law School, [email protected] Repository Citation Larsen, Allison Orr, "Confronting Supreme Court Fact Finding" (2012). Faculty Publications. 1284. https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs/1284 Copyright c 2012 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository. https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs CONFRONTING SUPREME COURT FACT FINDING Allison Orr Larsen* I. PREVALENCE OF IN-HOUSE FACT FINDING AT THE SUPREME COURT ....................................................................... 1264 A. Defining the Terms and the Quest...................................... 1264 B. How Common Is Modern In-House Fact Finding?......... 1271 II. A TAXONOMY OF IN-HOUSE FACT FINDING........................... 1277 A. What Factual Assertions Are Supported By Authorities Found “In House?”............................................................. 1278 1. Subject Matter of Facts Found In House..................... 1278 2. How Do the Justices Use In-House Factual Research? ....................................................................... 1280 B. Where Do the Sources Come From? ................................. 1286 III. WHY THE CURRENT PROCEDURAL APPROACH IS OUTDATED: RISKS OF MODERN IN-HOUSE FACT FINDING ............................................................................ 1290 A. Systematic Introduction of Bias.......................................... 1291 B. Possibility of Mistake .......................................................... 1295 C. Questions of Fairness and Legitimacy............................... 1301 IV. WHAT SHOULD BE DONE? ....................................................... 1305 A. The Minimalist’s Solution: Shut It Down.......................... 1305 B. The Maximalist’s Solution: Open It Up............................. 1309 CONCLUSION ............................................................................... 1312 ANY of the Supreme Court’s most significant decisions turn M on questions of fact. These facts are not of the “whodunit” variety concerning what happened between the parties. They are instead more generalized facts about the world: Is a partial-birth abortion ever medically necessary?1 Can one effectively discharge a * Assistant Professor of Law, The College of William and Mary School of Law. For their helpful comments and insights, I thank Neal Devins, Cara Drinan, Scott Dodson, Brianne Gorod, Linda Greenhouse, Leslie Kendrick, Mike Klarman, Caleb Nelson, Nate Oman, C.J. Peters, Fred Schauer, and Tim Zick. For excellent and tire- less research assistance, I thank Alex Conser, Tiffany Ferris, Ben Keele, and Nick Mueller. As always, I thank Drew. 1 Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 165–66 (2007). 1255 1256 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 98:1255 locked gun in self-defense?2 Are African American children stig- matized by segregated schools?3 Questions like these are not legal—they do not involve the in- terpretation of a text, nor do they involve a choice between com- peting rules that proscribe conduct.4 But they are also not “facts of the case” in the way we generally use that phrase—the who / what / where / why questions that should ultimately go to a jury or fact finder. Instead, these questions implicate what have come to be known as “legislative facts.”5 A legislative fact gets its name not necessarily because it is found by a legislature, but because it re- lates to the “legislative function” or policy-making function of a court.6 The central feature of a legislative fact is that it “tran- 2 District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2818 (2008). 3 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 733 (2007); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493–94 (1954). 4 I disclaim any attempt to define with precision the line between law and fact. To be sure, there are those who say it is impossible to do. John McGinnis & Charles Mu- laney, Judging Facts Like Law, 25 Const. Comment. 69, 71 (2008) (“There is no ana- lytic dichotomy between law and fact.”). That difficult inquiry, however, lies outside the scope of this Article. I do note that even if the law-fact division line is fuzzy, it is still a line we expect courts to draw and one with which we often wrestle. See, e.g., John Monahan & Laurens Walker, Social Authority: Obtaining, Evaluating, and Es- tablishing Social Science in Law, 134 U. Pa. L. Rev. 477, 489–93 (1986) (identifying the division between law and fact and discussing the similarities each has with social science research). 5 “Legislative fact” and “adjudicative fact” are phrases coined by Kenneth Culp Davis in 1942 to distinguish types of fact finding in administrative agencies. See Ken- neth Culp Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Pro- cedures, 55 Harv. L. Rev. 364, 365–66 (1942). More recently, scholars have refined and further categorized legislative facts—perhaps most notably David Faigman, who has classified what he calls “constitutional facts” into several categories depending on the purpose for which the fact is used. See David Faigman, Constitutional Fictions: A Unified Theory of Constitutional Facts, at xiii (2008); see also John McGinnis & Charles Mulaney, Judging Facts Like Law, 25 Const. Comment. 69, 70 (2008) (dis- cussing confusion surrounding what they call “social facts”); Suzanna Sherry, Founda- tional Facts and Doctrinal Change, 2011 U. Ill. L. Rev. 145, 146 (2011) (discussing a form of legislative facts she calls “foundational facts” because they consist of the fac- tual assumptions on which legal doctrine is based). All still pay homage, however, to Davis’s original articulation of the distinction, and it is therefore his terminology on which I will primarily rely. See Kenneth L. Karst, Legislative Facts in Constitutional Litigation, 1960 Sup. Ct. Rev. 75, 77 n.9 (explaining that “the phrase virtually belongs to Professor Kenneth C. Davis” (citing Kenneth C. Davis, Administrative Law Trea- tise § 15.03 (1958))). 6 Brenda C. See, Written in Stone? The Record on Appeal and the Decision- Making Process, 40 Gonz. L. Rev. 157, 191 (2004) (stating that legislative facts are 2012] Confronting Supreme Court Fact Finding 1257 scend[s] the particular dispute,”7 and provides descriptive informa- tion about the world which judges use as foundational “building blocks” to form and apply legal rules.8 To take a controversial example, when the Supreme Court up- held the federal partial-birth abortion statute in 2007, Justice Ken- nedy relied in part on the factual assertion (one he said could not be measured by reliable data but which “seemed unexception- able”) that many women come to regret their abortions later in their lives.9 Justice Kennedy was not speaking about the specific plaintiff in that case, but on the emotional consequences of abor- tions generally—a statement of legislative fact.10 So where do the Justices find information that enables them to decide factual questions about the world? The typical answer in- volves trust in the adversarial system. The basic idea is that “the adversary system is . quite practiced at finding facts.”11 If a fact is important to a case’s resolution, then the parties (and their amici)12 can provide the Court with enough information to address it through testimony (at the trial level) and briefing (on appeal). And if one party presents unreliable or flawed evidence to support his relevant when “the court is in essence ‘making law’ either by filling a gap in the com- mon law by formulating a rule, construing a statute, or framing a constitutional rule”). 7 David L. Faigman, “Normative Constitutional Fact-Finding”: Exploring the Em- pirical Component of Constitutional Interpretation, 139 U. Pa. L. Rev. 541, 552 (1991). 8 Robert E. Keeton, Legislative Facts and Similar Things: Deciding Disputed Prem- ise Facts, 73 Minn. L. Rev. 1, 11 (1988); see also Sherry, supra note 5. 9 Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 159 (2007) (“While we find no reliable data to measure the phenomenon, it seems unexceptionable to conclude some women come to regret their choice to abort the infant life they once created and sustained.”). 10 See Stuart M. Benjamin, Stepping into the Same River Twice: Rapidly Changing Facts and the Appellate Process, 78 Tex. L. Rev. 269, 273 (2000) (“Judicial opinions are filled with assertions about the state of the world . .”); Brianne J. Gorod, The Adversarial Myth: Appellate Court Extra-Record Factfinding, 61 Duke L.J. 1, 52 (2011) (“[L]egislative facts often are—and have been—critical to court decisions.”). 11 Wendy M. Rogovin, The Politics of Facts: “The Illusion of Certainty,” 46 Hastings L.J. 1723, 1758 (1995); see also Amanda Frost, The Limits of Advocacy, 59 Duke L.J. 447, 449 (2009) (noting the “entrenched norm . of party presentation”); Elizabeth G. Thornburg, The Curious Appellate Judge: Ethical Limits on Independent Re- search, 28 Rev. Litig. 131, 185 (2008). 12 I assume in this Article that a party’s amici count as part of the adversarial proc- ess. For discussion of the reasons behind that assumption, see infra note 74 and ac- companying text. 1258 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 98:1255 factual claim, then we can count on the other party to point this out.13 The idea, however, that courts depend only on the adversary sys- tem to inform their decisions—even for fact finding—is “more myth than reality.”14
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