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Orient III 2015 Omar Shaban From exchange of rockets to exchange of messages Analysing the relations between Hamas and Israel In the aftermath of the 2014 war in Gaza, both governance at the helm of the Palestinian Au- Israel and Hamas seem to be looking for ways thority (PA). Consequently, the electoral suc- to sustain a long-term truce. The war, which cess compelled Hamas to adjust itself into has had a devastating impact on the lives of what can best be described as a dual-pur- Palestinians living in Gaza, is the third of its posed faction that mediated its role as gov- kind in less than a decade and has taken the ernment alongside its celebrated status as an lives of more than 2,000 Palestinians and 71 armed resistance.2 But seeing as Hamas still Israelis.1 But despite the continuous tensions refused to renounce its armed struggle while between Israel and Hamas – the latter refuses refusing Israel’s right to exist, key regional to recognise Israel as a state and Israel re- powers and international stakeholders re- mains persistent in labelling Hamas a terrorist frained from accepting the outcome of the organisation – both parties have been in- elections, despite it being declared free and creasingly in contact through indirect ex- fair by European Union election monitors. At change of messages. There have also been the same time, the ruling Fatah refused to en- signs of increased political will, on both sides, gage with Hamas’ call for a unity government. to pursue a more enduring ceasefire that can Consequently, the Gaza Strip devolved into a last for many years. Is this increased contact deadly civil war that resulted in Hamas neu- and the slight ease of the Gaza blockade a tralising an attempted Fatah-led coup (en- real sign of a more sustainable truce between couraged by the US) while it consolidated its Israel and Hamas? Or will it once again be a authority over the coastal Palestinian en- temporary bandage on a wound that needs clave.3 Hamas set up a rival government in more extensive care and a longer time to Gaza, meanwhile Fatah ruled the Palestinian heal? This article aims to examine the possi- Authority (PA) in parts of the West Bank. bility of direct negotiations between the two conflicting parties. I.1 Post-election conflict I. Hamas and Israel, ‘the past and the status Following the overwhelming victory of Hamas quo’ in the PLC elections and the escalation of the conflict between Hamas and Fatah, resulting The Islamic Resistance Movement, or in the split of the Palestinian authority, Israel ‘Hamas’, originated in 1987 in the midst of the and Egypt imposed an intensive blockade First Intifada (uprising) against the Israeli oc- over the Gaza Strip – a blockade currently still cupation. By the time of the onset of the Sec- intact, although recently signs of relief have ond Intifada in 2000, the organisation had gar- been seen.4 The closure resulted in a state of nered immense legitimacy as a Palestinian imprisonment for the more than 1.8 million in- resistance organisation. In 2006, Hamas re- habitants of Gaza, with the likes of Noam markably and, for many, unexpectedly won Chomsky characterising the coastal enclave the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) as “the world’s largest open-air prison”.5 More- elections, resulting in its first experience in over, the socio-economic trials that resulted 1 Barakat and Shaban, Back to Gaza, 2015. 2 Sen, Bringing Back the Palestinian State, 2015. 3 Rose, The Gaza Bombshell, 2008. 4 Caspit, Israel eases Gaza blockade, hopes for Hamas stability, 2015. 5 Chomsky, Gaza, the World’s Largest Open-Air Prison, 2012. ORIENT III / 2015 21 Omar Shaban from the blockade have been further expe- ceased the offensive on January 21, 2009, dited by the three successive Israeli wars declaring a unilateral ceasefire arguing that its against the Hamas-ruled Strip and ensured goals were “more than fully achieved”.9 the persistence of what Sara Roy once called a condition of ‘de-development’.6 I.3 2012: Operation Pillar of Defence The skirmishes in the immediate aftermath of On November 14, 2012, Israel launched the the elections ended on June 19, 2008, with Is- second military offensive against the Hamas- rael agreeing to an Egyptian brokered six- ruled Gaza Strip – calling it Operation Pillar of month ceasefire with Hamas. Until then the Defence – which began with an air strike that conflict had killed seven Israelis and more killed Ahmed Jabari, the commander of than 400 Palestinians over the 12-month pe- Hamas’ military wing. Many wondered riod after Hamas’ take-over of Gaza.7 The whether the operation was intended to under- framework of the temporary truce included an line Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Ne- agreement that Hamas would put an end to tanyahu’s credentials as a ‘provider’ of secu- its rocket attacks on southern Israel. In return rity to Israel, especially since elections were Israel would ease the blockade, making it pos- only nine weeks away. Others have argued sible for necessary supplies to enter Gaza that the operation was intended as a strategic without having to smuggle them through ille- move aimed at undermining Palestinian ef- gal tunnels. While both Israel and Hamas forts to acquire non-member observer status committed to the temporary truce, the Pales- in the UN. This theory was buttressed by Is- tinian Islamist faction warned that it should in raeli diplomats who warned the international no way be perceived as a “free gift to the oc- community that Israel’s government would “go cupiers”. The Islamic Resistance further em- crazy” if Palestine was to receive such a sta- phasised that if Israelis did not live up to their tus.10 But with the official aim of stopping promise, the truce would not last. While the rocket fire and crippling Hamas’ military ca- violence decreased significantly during the pabilities, the operation ended after eight days ceasefire, the ease of the blockade was too with a ceasefire, once again brokered by insignificant to provide any significant level of Egypt. 162 Palestinians and six Israelis were respite in the everyday lives of Gazans.8 killed in the operation. I.2 2008-2009: Operation Cast Lead I.4 2014: Operation Protective Edge Immediately after the end of the truce, on De- For 50 days in the summer of 2014, the Gaza cember 27, 2008, Israel launched the Opera- Strip witnessed the third and deadliest Israeli tion Cast Lead military offensive against offensive. Operation Protective Edge was of- Hamas in the Gaza Strip, which lasted for ficially launched with the aim of stopping three weeks. The official motivation of the of- rocket fire from Gaza into Israel. But, to a fensive was to stop the smuggling of weapons large extent, it appeared to be a revenge op- into Gaza and prevent rocket attacks on Is- eration for the kidnapping and killing of three rael. An estimated 1,300 Palestinians, mostly Israeli teenagers, supposedly perpetrated by civilians, lost their lives. 13 Israelis also per- two Hamas members on June 12. During the ished, including four soldiers who died as a war approximately 2,220 Palestinians, includ- result of ‘friendly fire’. Gaza’s civilian infra- ing 1,492 civilians, were killed and another structure was ravaged during the war. Israel 11,231 were injured in Gaza. It is estimated 6 Roy, The Gaza Strip, 1995; Roy, De-development revisited, 1999. 7 Walker, Gaza militants and Israel begin fragile truce, 2008. 8 Maqbool, Truce barely eases Gaza embargo, 2008. 9 BBC, Gaza-Israel Conflict, 2014. 10 Chomsky, Gaza, the World’s Largest Open-Air Prison, 2012. 22 ORIENT III / 2015 Analysing the relations between Hamas and Israel that approximately 18,000 Palestinian hous- the international community. On December ing units where destroyed during the attack. 17, 2014, the European Court of Justice Israel lost 71 of its citizens, of whom 66 were claimed to remove Hamas from the EU’s ter- military personnel killed during the offensive.11 rorist organisations list (due to procedural er- The war ended with a ceasefire agreement rors when Hamas had been included), and that was agreed upon on August 26, 2014 and Hamas has demonstrated the potential for a brokered by Egypt. profound transformation ever since its 2006 electoral victory, transitioning into a dual role II. New signs of a long-term truce as resistance and government. This dual-pur- posed role has led to a profound change in In spite of the perpetual confrontations be- the organisation’s behaviour. Demonstrating tween Hamas and Israel over the last decade, an urge to moderate its political stance, recent developments indicate that both parties Hamas has welcomed European delegations are now trying to adjust their efforts in order to to the Gaza Strip. Prominent visitors within the accommodate a more long-term agreement. last six months have included, among others, While motivated by different goals, there the UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon, seems to be an implicit understanding devel- Quartet envoy Tony Blair, President of the oping in Israel and in Gaza that a sustainable Qatari National Committee for the Recon- solution is necessary, as the patience of key struction of the Gaza Strip, Mohammed Al- international stakeholders has been waning Emadi, and a German diplomatic delegation. through each successive war on Gaza. This has been especially evident in the frayed pub- Bassem Naim, a foreign affairs consultant for lic relationship between US President Barack the Hamas led-government and former Prime Obama and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Minister Ismail Haniyeh, confirmed that
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