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European C4ISR Capabilities and Transatlantic Interoperability

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European C4ISR Capabilities and Transatlantic Interoperability BBrriiddggiinngg tt hhee GGaapp EEuurrooppeeaann CC44IISSRR CC aappaabbiilliittiieess aanndd TTrraannssaattllaannttiicc IInntt eerrooppeerraabbiilliittyy Gordon Adams, Guy Ben-Ari, John Logsdon, Ray Williamson The George Washington University Carried out under a grant from the Center for Technology and National Security Policy National Defense University October 2004 The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not reflect the official policy or position of The National Defense University, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. All information and sources for this paper were drawn from unclassified materials. Gordon Adams is a Professor of the Practice of International Affairs and Director of Security Policy Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs, The George Washington University. He was Deputy Director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies and Associate Director for National Security and International Affairs at the White House Office of Management Budget. He has written extensively on U.S. and European defense budgeting and planning and on transatlantic defense policy. Guy Ben-Ari is a consultant with the Defense Industrial Initiatives Group at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, where he specializes in U.S. and European defense technology policies. Prior to joining CSIS he was a research associate at the George Washington University's Center for International Science and Technology Policy and a consultant for the European Commission and the World Bank focusing on innovation policy and evaluation. John M. Logsdon is Director of the Space Policy Institute of The George Washington University's Elliott School of International Affairs, where he is a Professor of Political Science and International Affairs. He has written and published widely on US and international space policy and history. Ray A. Williamson is Research Professor of Space Policy and International Affairs at the Space Policy Institute of The George Washington University. He has published widely on space and satellite programs and edited Dual-Purpose Space Technologies: Opportunities and Challenges for U.S. Policymaking (Space Policy Institute). Previously, he was Senior Associate in the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment. The authors would like to acknowledge the support and assistance of the many official and private sector sources in the United States, Britain, France, and at NATO and the European Union with whom we discussed this study. Many of them must remain anonymous, but their assistance is greatly appreciated and was essential to our research. We would also like to thank several specific individuals for their help: Christine Bernot, Adm. Jean Betermier, Henri Conze, Christophe Cornu, Michel Iagolnitzer, Erol Levy, Xavier Pasco, Diego Ruiz Palmer, and Burkard Schmitt, among many others. The authors take full responsibility for the information and arguments in the paper. Our thanks also to the Center for Technology and National Security for its support of this project. Defense & Technology Papers are published by the National Defense University Center for Technology and National Security Policy, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, DC. CTNSP publications are available online at http://www.ndu.edu/ctnsp/publications.html. Contents List of Tables .................................................................................................................................. ii Executive Summary....................................................................................................................... iii Introduction......................................................................................................................................1 European C4ISR Capabilities ..........................................................................................................9 France.................................................................................................................................14 United Kingdom.................................................................................................................32 Germany.............................................................................................................................48 Italy ....................................................................................................................................61 The Netherlands.................................................................................................................67 Spain ..................................................................................................................................73 Sweden...............................................................................................................................78 C4ISR and NATO..........................................................................................................................83 NATO Role and Capabilities.............................................................................................84 Recent NATO C4ISR-Related Commitments ...................................................................99 Conclusions......................................................................................................................107 C4ISR at the European Level ........................................................................109 Emerging Strategic and Defense Planning ......................................................................109 Focusing on Capabilities..................................................................................................114 Defense Industrial and Technology Base Planning .........................................................115 European Defense Research and Technology Programs European Security Space Capabilities .........................................................................................121 Changing Attitudes Toward European Military Space Systems......................................131 The Long Road to Integrated C4ISR Space Systems ......................................................137 Conclusions......................................................................................................................141 Conclusions..................................................................................................................................142 Recommendations........................................................................................................................146 Appendix I: C4ISR in European Defense Industries ...................................................................162 Appendix II: The Multinational Interoperability Council ...........................................................174 Glossary of Terms........................................................................................................................178 Selected Bibliography..................................................................................................................185 Tables Table 1 Main European National C4ISR Strategies and Capabilities ................................13 Table 2 French C4ISR Capabilities ....................................................................................27 Table 3 United Kingdom C4ISR Capabilities.....................................................................43 Table 4 German C4ISR Capabilities...................................................................................57 Table 5 Italian C4ISR Capabilities .....................................................................................65 Table 6 Dutch C4ISR Capabilities......................................................................................71 Table 7 Spanish C4ISR Capabilities...................................................................................76 Table 8 Swedish C4ISR Capabilities..................................................................................81 Table 9 EU Defense Expenditures by Member ................................................................122 ii Executive Summary This study is the result of a two-year examination of the presumed defense technology gap between the United States and Europe that focused on information and communications technologies and their integration into military systems, which allow military forces to be networked from sensor to shooter and back in what has come to be called network centric warfare. These command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) technologies are at the heart of modern warfighting. They act not only as force multipliers for the military platforms into which they are integrated, but also as the means to better link different types of forces (air, sea, land). Moreover, they can connect forces of different nationalities, enabling interoperability and the efficient use of military resources. The study analyzes the deployed and planned C4ISR capabilities of seven European countries: France, the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, and Sweden. Capabilities discussions are divided into command and control (C2), communications and computers, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). We examine the extent to which advanced C4ISR and network doctrines figure in the defense planning of these nations and explore the extent of interoperability within and between these national forces and between these
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