China and Global Energy Governance Under the G20 Framework Alex He
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CIGI PAPERS NO. 98 — MARCH 2016 CHINA AND GLOBAL ENERGY GOVERNANCE UNDER THE G20 FRAMEWORK ALEX HE G20 CHINA AND GLOBAL ENERGY GOVERNANCE UNDER THE G20 FRAMEWORK Alex He Copyright © 2016 by the Centre for International Governance Innovation The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Centre for International Governance Innovation or its Board of Directors. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution — Non-commercial — No Derivatives License. To view this license, visit (www.creativecommons.org/ licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/). For re-use or distribution, please include this copyright notice. Centre for International Governance Innovation, CIGI and the CIGI globe are registered trademarks. 67 Erb Street West Waterloo, Ontario N2L 6C2 Canada tel +1 519 885 2444 fax +1 519 885 5450 www.cigionline.org TABLE OF CONTENTS iv About the Global Economy Program iv About the Author 1 Acronyms 1 Executive Summary 2 Introduction 3 The Current Global Energy Governance System 5 Seeking Limited Goals for Global Energy Governance 6 Achieving Limited Goals of Global Energy Governance through the G20 8 China’s New View on Energy Security: Embracing Global Governance 10 China’s Participation in Global Energy Governance 13 Conclusion and Recommendations 15 Works Cited 20 About CIGI 20 CIGI Masthead CIGI PAPERS NO. 98 — MARCH 2016 ABOUT THE GLOBAL ECONOMY ABOUT THE AUTHOR PROGRAM Addressing limitations in the ways nations tackle shared economic challenges, the Global Economy Program at CIGI strives to inform and guide policy debates through world-leading research and sustained stakeholder engagement. With experts from academia, national agencies, international institutions and the private sector, the Global Economy Program supports research in the following areas: management of severe sovereign debt crises; central banking and international financial regulation; China’s role in the global Xingqiang (“Alex”) He is a CIGI research fellow. economy; governance and policies of the Bretton Prior to joining CIGI, Alex was a research fellow Woods institutions; the Group of Twenty; global, and associate professor at the Institute of American plurilateral and regional trade agreements; and Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences financing sustainable development. Each year, (CASS). At CIGI, he is focusing on China and the the Global Economy Program hosts, co-hosts Group of Twenty, China and global economic and participates in many events worldwide, governance, and domestic politics in China and working with trusted international partners, their impact on China’s foreign economic policy which allows the program to disseminate policy making. recommendations to an international audience of policy makers. In 2009-2010, funded by the Ford Foundation, Alex was a visiting scholar at the Paul H. Nitze School Through its research, collaboration and of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins publications, the Global Economy Program University in Washington, DC. In 2008-2009, he informs decision makers, fosters dialogue and was a guest research fellow at the Research Center debate on policy-relevant ideas and strengthens for Development Strategies of Macau. In 2008, he multilateral responses to the most pressing participated in a short-term study program at the international governance issues. Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation at the University of California at San Diego, which was sponsored by the US Department of State. In 2004, he was a visiting Ph.D. student at the Centre of American Studies at the University of Hong Kong. Alex has co-authored the book A History of China- U.S. Relations and published dozens of academic papers and book chapters both in Chinese and English. He also periodically writes reviews and commentaries for some of China’s mainstream magazines and newspapers on international affairs. Alex has a Ph.D. in international politics from the Graduate School of CASS. Before beginning his Ph.D., he taught international relations at Yuxi Normal University in Yunnan Province, China. Iv • CENTRE FOR INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE INNOVATION CHINA AND GLOBAL ENERGY GOVERNANCE UNDER THE G20 FRAMEWORK ACRONYMS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AIIB Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank Fragmentation of the global energy governance system, aggravated by securitization and politicization, paints a APEC Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation bleak picture for the prospect of global energy governance. However, the basis provided by market forces and rules, CCP Chinese Communist Party reinforced by nation-states’ need for an effective global CEM Clean Energy Ministerial governance mechanism, is encouraging players, including nation-states and international energy organizations, to ECT Energy Charter Treaty pursue effective global energy governance, specifically limited goals in global transparency and data-sharing G7 Group of Seven mechanisms, and to coordinate efforts for clean energy and climate change governance in the near future. G8 Group of Eight The Group of Twenty (G20) provides significant G20 Group of Twenty institutional arrangements to coordinate big powers to GSEP Global Superior Energy Performance govern the international energy markets and address Partnership climate change. It could be the appropriate platform to negotiate and achieve these limited goals. The G20’s IEA International Energy Agency established cooperation with major international energy organizations such as the International Energy IEF International Energy Forum Agency (IEA), International Energy Forum (IEF) and the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries IGOs international governmental organizations (OPEC) would also help it to deliver these goals. IMF International Monetary Fund China participates in the majority of global energy IPEEC International Partnership for Energy governance institutions but is still a non-member outsider Efficiency Cooperation of major institutions such as the IEA and the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT). Its energy security strategy still IRENA International Renewable Energy Agency mainly focuses on geopolitical means to guarantee its energy supply security and it does not have much trust in JODI Joint Organisations Data Initiative the international energy market. China is suspicious of the prospect that international energy governance institutions NDRC National Development and Reform can play a major role in coordinating stable energy Commission production, supply and consumption, and deliver energy NOCs national oil companies security for members in the global energy governance system. China therefore also doubts the benefits it could OPEC Organization of the Petroleum Exporting receive from participation in global energy governance. Countries The significant role China has played in the G20 since the PTAs preferential trade areas 2008 global financial crisis increased China’s confidence in global economic governance. It gradually realized the SCO Shanghai Cooperation Organisation virtues of global governance, and Chinese leaders began to talk of and even offer proposals on global energy SDDS Special Data Dissemination Standards governance under the G20 framework, as well as to pay UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on more attention to climate change and renewable and Climate Change clean energy development. Chinese academic circles paid even more attention to China’s substantial participation WTO World Trade Organization in global energy governance and suggested that China should join major global energy governing institutions as a member country and fully engage with these institutions and promote cooperation with them via the G20 platform. ALEX HE • 1 CIGI PAPERS NO. 98 — MARCH 2016 INTRODUCTION This paper explores China’s perspectives and practices in its quest for overseas energy supply security and its Since the 1990s, China has increasingly relied on imported participation in international energy cooperation since oil and gas. China’s policy makers gradually reached becoming a net oil import country in 1993. It compares consensus on active participation in international energy the traditional approach, in which China mainly focuses cooperation to secure the country’s national energy on bilateral means to pursue its overseas energy supply security. By interpreting “international cooperation” as security, and the new concept of energy security, in which “bilateral cooperation,” China chose to ensure its overseas greater involvement in global energy governance, in energy supply through bilateral energy cooperation, particular in the G20, is highlighted to promote China’s reinforcing its “going out” strategy,1 and building overseas energy security. The paper argues that China still retains oil and gas import routes. This going out strategy was a bilateral and regional cooperation approach, while implemented substantially in Africa, the Middle East making progress in developing closer cooperation with and Latin America, as well as elsewhere. Three strategic existing major global energy governing institutions. The land-based oil and gas pipelines2 have been built and are One Belt, One Road strategy proposed in 2013 is regarded transporting oil and gas back to China. More pipelines as a strengthened version of the bilateral and regional are being planned and built, as the main complement to cooperation approach. One argument for why China is importing oil via sea routes. The new Silk Road Economic embracing global energy governance institutions is that Belt