Master’s Thesis

Euroscepticism: A result of too much European

Integration?

A process-analysis of Euroscepticism in times of crisis.

Author: Marcus Glimsholt Supervisor: Brigitte Pircher

Examiner: Emil Uddhammar Term: VT21 Subject: International Affairs

Level: Advanced

Course code: 5SK30E

Abstract

During the last decade, the European Union has had to overcome several types of crises, for example, the economic crisis, the Eurozone crisis, the migration crisis, and Brexit. Currently, the EU is facing the Covid-19 pandemic. It is well known that there is a strong relationship between the multifaceted crises and the EU’s responses to them and increased Euroscepticism in the EU countries as a result. Therefore, this study aims to investigate the reasons why such crises result in increasing Euroscepticism. More specifically, the study explores the mechanisms that can be identified as causes for Euroscepticism.

To test the hypothesis that the crises’ responses made by the EU created an opportunity for Eurosceptic actors to thrive, a process-analysis of the responses was conducted. Three legislative acts as main responses to the economic crisis and the migration crisis were chosen, to analyze a mechanism between the crises and increased Euroscepticism in the EU member states. The responses were then combined with data on the EU citizens’ trust for the EU to identify if the EU’s responses to these crises have been a major cause for increased Eurosceptic tendencies. The results show that even though some of the EU’s responses to the crises resulted in increased Euroscepticism, EU citizens do not seem to lose their trust in the EU or their institutions in the long run.

Key words

Euroscepticism, European Integration, Migration Crisis, Economic Crisis, Process- Analysis, Historical Institutionalism.

Table of contents

1 Introduction 1 1.1 Purpose 2 1.2 Research Questions 2 2 Theoretical framework 3 2.1 Euroscepticism 3 2.1.1 Varieties of Euroscepticism 4 2.2 Previous Research 6 2.3 Historical Institutionalism 9 2.3.1 Path Dependency 10 2.3.2 Critical Junctures 11 2.3.3 Historical Institutionalism in practice 12 2.4 Hypotheses 14 3 Method 14 3.1 Mechanisms 15 3.2 Criticism of Case-Centric Process-Analyzing 16 3.3 Material 17 3.3.1 The Economic Crisis 17 3.3.2 The Migration Crisis 19 3.3.3 Eurobarometer 20 4 Analysis 21 4.1 Europe 2020 21 4.1.1 The European Citizens view of the EU in 2010. 21 4.1.2 Europe 2020 - a strategy to strengthen the European economy. 23 4.1.3 Europe 2020 and an increase in Euroscepticism. 26 4.1.4 Summary Europe 2020 29 4.2 The Banking Union 34 4.2.1 The European Citizen view of the economic situation 2012 35 4.2.2 The mechanism which could explain an outcome in Euroscepticism regarding the Banking Union 37 4.2.3 Summary of The Banking Union 41 4.3 The EU Migrant Relocation and Resettlement Scheme 45 4.3.1 The European citizens’ trust in the EU in 2015 46 4.3.2 Identifying a mechanism for Euroscepticism in the case of the Resettlement Scheme. 47 4.3.3 Summary of the Resettlement Scheme 51 5 Conclusion 55 6 Bibliography 58

List of Tables and Figures

List of Tables:

Table 1: Mechanism explaining Euroscepticism in Europe 2020...... 31 Table 2. Citizens response to “Tend to Trust” their national government and the EU in percentage in 2012...... 37 Table 3. Mechanism explaining Euroscepticism in The Banking Union...... 42 Table 4. EU citizens response to “Tend to trust” the EU in percentage across the EU in 2012 and 2015...... 44 Table 5: EU citizens response to “The EU economy is good” in percentage across the EU in 2012 and 2015...... 44 Table 6. Mechanism explaining Euroscepticism in the Resettlement Scheme...... 51 Table 7. Citizens of Hungary, Poland, Czechia, Slovakia, and Greece responds to “Tend to Trust” the EU in percentage in 2015...... 54 Table 8. Citizens of Hungary, Poland, Czechia, Slovakia, and Greece responds to “Tend to Trust” the EU in percentage in 2017...... 54

List of Figures:

Figure 1: EU citizens response to “Tend to trust” the EU in percentage across the EU member states in 2010...... 22 Figure 2. EU citizens response to “Tend to trust” the EU in percentage across the EU member states in 2010...... 32 Figure 3. EU citizens response to “Tend to trust” the EU in percentage across the EU member states in 2015...... 32 Figure 4. EU citizens response to “Tend to trust” the EU in percentage across the EU member states in 2015...... 47 Figure 5. EU citizens response to “Tend to trust” the EU in percentage across the EU member states in 2015...... 53 Figure 6. EU citizens response to “Tend to trust” the EU in percentage across the EU member states in 2017...... 54

1 Introduction

Throughout the last decade, the European Union (EU) has had to withstand several crises. The Great Recession, the Eurozone crisis, the migration crisis, Brexit and most recently the Covid-19 pandemic. The different crises with their different focal points forced the EU to adapt and overcome them. For so long it has gone well, so well in fact that some claim that the crises have the potential to increase European integration. Davis Cross (2017:4) states that every time the EU has found itself in a crisis, it has been portrayed as the end of the EU, but the EU has persevered, and the forced change has strengthened the EU instead.

However, during the crises another issue grows larger, Euroscepticism. Euroscepticism has continually been mentioned as a product of the crises, arguing that for every crisis the EU has to endure, political actors find ways to fortunate on the EU citizens misfortune, and by creating a narrative which deems the EU as the fault, increasing Eurosceptic tendencies (Pirro & van Kessel 2017, Caiani & Graziano 2017).

The rise of populism has been a common answer from scholars to the question of what is responsible for the increase in Euroscepticism. However, what has also been shocking, is that many populistic actors who have been identified carrying Eurosceptic tendencies, more often than not have been positive for European integration (Pirro & van Kessel 2017:405). In fact, neither of the member states with populistic parties has advocated for their state to exit out of the EU (ibid.), except for The United Kingdom (UK). Moreover, populist political parties have never had as much political power as they do now. For example, the last European Parliament’s election increased the populist seats from 118 in 2014 to 161 in 2019 (Ivaldi 2020:72). This against the background that the most recent Standard Eurobarometer shows that 49% of the European citizens tend to trust the European Union (Eurobarometer 2021:38), which is a relatively high number compared to previous polls during the last decade. Thus, this creates the interpretation that the discussion of increasing Euroscepticism does not entirely align with populism, as the rise of populism does not correlate with a decrease in trust for the EU. The

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question then is, what is it that drives the assumption that the crisis has led to an increase in Euroscepticism? This is the question which this study aims to take a closer look at.

With a seemingly ever continuation of crises in many various shapes, the issue is severe. If more crises will come, as the now active Covid-19 pandemic, one can also make the rational assumption that Euroscepticism will rise along, which leaves one to wonder what result that will have on the EU in the long run. Will more member states leave the EU as the UK did, or was it an isolated incident? Nevertheless, the aim of this study is to investigate closer to the presumed assumption that crises within the EU lead to an increase in Euroscepticism. Even though it is a common correlation made by many scholars (Hobolt & de Vries 2016, Bârgăoanu et.al 2015, Stockemer et.al 2020), this thesis aims to look closer at the relationships between these two. What is the mechanism that makes this assumption viable? To do so, the focus will lie on the responses made by the EU towards the economic crisis and the migration crisis. What are the underlying mechanisms within the responses made by the EU which can explain the assumption that the crises increase Euroscepticism?

1.1 Purpose The aim of the study is to identify mechanisms in the EU’s response towards the economic crisis as well as the migration crisis and investigate if these mechanisms explain an increase in Euroscepticism.

1.2 Research Questions To what extent has the EU’s response to the economic crisis and migration crisis changed citizens’ support for the EU in the member states?

Have the EU governance measures introduced as a response to the crises had enabling or constraining effects on the level of Euroscepticism in the different countries?

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2 Theoretical framework

2.1 Euroscepticism Euroscepticism is a central concept throughout this thesis, therefore, a general definition of how the concept will be used in this thesis will be presented. Since different interpretations and explanations regarding Euroscepticism varies in different contexts, Euroscepticism will be described in a general definition, as well as defined from the context of the economic crisis and the migration crisis. This is to give such a wide definition of the concept as possible, without leaving the framework of the aim and research questions stated in this paper.

In its simplest description, Euroscepticism is a concept that describes party opposition towards the EU, as well as EU citizens who have a negative position to EU institutions (Di Mauro & Serricchio 2015:46). Euroscepticism has certainly on one level always existed since the start of the EU, even though the coined term Euroscepticism is a relatively new concept. However, since the last decade, Euroscepticism has increased throughout the EU member states. Figures showing that during the economic crisis, the trust in EU institutions had a dramatic decline, from 60 to 37 per cent between 2007 and 2013 (Di Mauro & Serricchio 2015:42). The numbers tell an intriguing development as a result of the economic crisis. Nevertheless, scholars have had some different theories and ideas as to why Euroscepticism rose in such drastic numbers. Meanwhile some look into the perspective on nationalism and identity, others investigate economic factors to find an answer to the increase of skepticism towards the EU. The nationalist and identity perspective mostly focus on the supranational governance within the EU. Where some citizens have found themselves with a dual identity, accepting both their identity as EU citizen and as a national citizen of their state. Meanwhile, some found themselves more connected in their national sovereign identity, thus having a negative attitude towards the EU, feeling that EU institutions are a direct threat towards their culture and national identity (Di Mauro & Serricchio 2015:47). The economic perspective focuses more directly on the economic crisis itself, showing that EU integration comes with an increase in income inequality across the member states. Hence, EU integration opens a window of opportunity for EU opposition to

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put blame on the EU and its institutions, along with the possibility for the opposition to blame the EU for limiting national economics (Di Mauro & Serricchio 2015:48). Income equality and Euroscepticism is a relationship that has been accompanied for a long time, increased income equality has resulted in higher levels of Euroscepticism in Western Europe (Di Mauro & Serricchio 2015:48).

Ever since the economic crisis, Euroscepticism has continued to grow throughout Europe, seeing many parties with Eurosceptic tendencies all over EU member states who have reached 20% of the votes in their national elections (Stockemer et.al 2018:329). However, the vast majority of the parties with Eurosceptic tendencies thrives from the migration crisis, where they blame the EU for “uncontrollable immigration” and use immigration as an explanation to Europe’s problems (Stockemer et.al 2018:329). Many parties have not only been given national political power but in return created situations that cannot be described only as catastrophic for the EU, where Brexit can be seen as the ultimate peak. The shocking and disturbing results of the EU referendum in the UK can be seen as the pinnacle of Euroscepticism in place. Since the citizens of the UK voted to leave the EU despite the majority of political experts and economists led the narrative that UK’s best interest was to stay in the EU (De Vries 2018:3).

2.1.1 Varieties of Euroscepticism Within the discussion of Euroscepticism, it can be hard to differentiate the type of agenda or motive of an EU opposition. It often varies, some opposition is against the whole ideology of an integrated Europe, against the idea that member states should be working collectively with each other. Meanwhile, some are not against the idea of the EU but disagree with certain policies or direction in which the EU is heading. To gain some perspective on the two sides of the opposition, Taggart & Szczerbiak (2004) presents a definition of “soft” Euroscepticism and “hard” Euroscepticism.

“Hard” Euroscepticism involves a total disagreement with the idea of European integration. It is often seen in political actors within member states which have a strong stance about their country’s membership within the EU, or their countries intention to join the EU (Taggart & Szczerbiak 2004:3). Hard Euroscepticism often comes from ideological differences or values, where the opposition thinks that the

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EU is too prone to capitalism, or too socialistic, or liberal (Taggart & Szczerbiak 2004:3). Hard Eurosceptic actors are often political parties with a clear anti-EU stance, who sees the EU as a vital political issue, therefore often being identified as a single-issue political party (ibid.). However, there is a grey area, where political parties might have anti-EU rhetoric and focus on specific issues for which they blame the EU, but at the same time recognizes that there is no other option than to stay in the EU. These parties are still considered to be hard Eurosceptic but do not have a stand-alone position as anti-EU (Taggart & Szczerbiak 2004:3-4).

“Soft” Euroscepticism is often taken form in “policy” Euroscepticism and “national interest” Euroscepticism. In the means of policies, it is Euroscepticism where the opposition disagrees with a certain policy which the EU presents and revoke their support for the EU in that policy (Taggart & Szczerbiak 2004:4). It could for instance be a member state which is generally for the idea of the EU but does not want to give up its sovereign currency for the Euro (ibid.). Taggart & Szczerbiak (2004:4) gives the example of Sweden and Denmark, which are often more active in the process of enhancing European integration than many of the other member states but show Euroscepticism by being opposed to the Euro. “National interest” is Euroscepticism in the form of taking the stance for national priorities rather than taking a stance for European integration (Taggart & Szczerbiak 2004:4). This is a common action taken by member states, often with good reasons, since a lot of practical actions are done by the member states themselves. They therefore often use their position as a factor when debating European integration (Taggart & Szczerbiak 2004:4). However, more often than not “policy” and “national interest “Euroscepticism goes in conjunction with one another (ibid.).

In general, soft Euroscepticism is highly circumstantial. It is seen in cases where specific questions affect some member states more than others, which often differs between the member states depending on which stage the integration has gotten to within the context of the policy. And is sometimes used as a tool by member states to negotiate better terms, thus they may not be Eurosceptic in a pure way but use soft Eurosceptic tendencies to get a more appealing deal for their domestic purposes (Taggart & Szczerbiak 2004:4).

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To sum up Euroscepticism, there is a clear consensus of what Euroscepticism is, and there are a lot of data to show that Euroscepticism indeed has increased. A lot speaks for the rhetoric driven by EU opposition, which in turn has been fueled by different contexts, where two major ones are the economic crisis and the migration crisis. Nevertheless, a lot of the explanations made on why Euroscepticism is increasing is indeed explanatory. Leaving a lot of questions on why it actually happened. However, this thesis will try to take a step forward on trying to identify the mechanisms, therefore hoping to get closer to why it has happened, which mechanism led to an increase in Euroscepticism.

2.2 Previous Research Euroscepticism is a well-researched subject. The concept is seen in many various works, ranging from Euroscepticism in itself and how it has evolved over the years, to more case centric topics and movements identifying the connection between Euroscepticism and the rise of populism. When looking through academic works concerning Euroscepticism, it has gotten a revival during the last years, with works focusing on the reasons why the UK exited the EU. As the UK is the first member state to ever exit out of the EU, it is the only case where Euroscepticism has reached its pinnacle result. However, when looking into the causes of the rise of Euroscepticism, previous research is scanter. There are a lot of connections between Euroscepticism and crises done by scholars (Hobolt & de Vries 2016, Bârgăoanu et.al 2015, Stockemer et.al 2020), but less on why the two are connected.

Nevertheless, the book United by or Against Euroscepticism? An Assessment of Public Attitudes towards Europe in the Context of the Crisis, edited by Alina Bârgăoanu, Loredana Radu, and Diego Varela sets the aim to study the correlation between the economic crisis and Euroscepticism within the EU (Bârgăoanu et.al 2015). It is done so by looking into different member states and how the public in these countries perceive their trust in EU institutions. The book provides an in-depth look into how different member states and their citizens pose Euroscepticism, to later cross-reference with each other to get a look from where Euroscepticism comes from (Bârgăoanu et.al 2015). The results provide evidence that there are clear differences in Euroscepticism depending on which member state one focus on.

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Euroscepticism can be found in almost every member state, but there exist different levels of Euroscepticism, with the more extreme version in some places and less in others.

All in all, the result of the study is that Euroscepticism does not provide a general worry since there are few interconnected instances where there is a consensus on why the public perceives mistrust towards the EU (Bârgăoanu et.al 2015). Thus, Alina Bârgăoanu, Loredana Radu, and Diego Varela (2015) book show similarities in the purpose of this study. However, there are some clear differences. Meanwhile, the book provides similarities in studying Euroscepticism in the context of the economic crisis, the book does not provide a clear answer to why the crisis led to an increase in Euroscepticism, which is the overall goal of this study. Nevertheless, this previous research provides a good foundation to build upon and contributes a vital overall look at how Euroscepticism differs from various parts around the member states.

Another previous research of interest is Hobolt and de Vries article Public Support for European Integration. In this article, Hobolt & de Vries (2016) conducts research to investigate more into the differences and level of public support within the EU. Where one of the cornerstones of the study is to investigate the variations of Euroscepticism within the European member states. Hobolt & de Vries (2016) investigate different regions of the EU and separate the support for European integration by dividing the EU into the south, east and north. They also take a separate look into member states within the Eurozone, where they compare the level of trust for the EU from the member states which were heavily faced by the Eurozone crisis and the ones that were not.

The result shows some clear variations of Euroscepticism within the EU. The Eurozone crisis is viewed as a factor for increasing opposition towards EU policies. Hobolt & de Vries (2016) found that the public support for European integration varied between the northern and the southern member states. Different priorities in policy were seen as an explanation, whereas the northern member states who came out from the Eurozone crisis a lot easier than the southern member states was also reflected in the public opinion in these member states. Thus, the southern public

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support is seeking more economic policy changes, while the northern public focuses on policy areas such as open borders (Hobolt & de Vries 2016). What Hobolt & de Vries (2016) finally conclude after showing their result of public support for European Integration is that a lot of the public support varies, either pro-EU or opposed EU, has to do with a national perspective. Seeing that the support varies around the EU depending on geographical location strengthen this, showing that support for European integration cannot be viewed without various contexts, such as the contexts of crises and how member states were hit by them. Thus, Hobolt & de Vries (2016) article provides vital data on trust from different areas around the EU, as well as the notion of the importance of the national perspective. There are clear varieties in soft Euroscepticism, which means that the countries oppose certain EU policies or programs depending on which issues are raised and what priorities the given country has. Which is a vital result and will be taken into consideration in this study.

Previous research with more regard towards the migration crisis has also been done. Stockemer, Niemann, Unger and Speyer (2020) published an article called the “Refugee Crisis,” Immigration Attitudes, and Euroscepticism. In their article, they investigate the relationship of the migration crisis leading towards more Euroscepticism. Their main cause of study comes from the idea that the migration crisis led towards more anti-immigration attitudes within the EU, thus resulting in more Euroscepticism. However, the most interesting fact with this study is that the result did not show any increase in anti-immigration during the migration crisis. In fact, European citizens were rather neutral in this aspect (Stockemer et.al 2020). Thus, showing that the anti-immigration attitudes were already set before the migration crisis, and the crisis itself did not change how people within the EU viewed migration. However, the study leaves interesting notions to build upon. The authors mention that although it might sound rational that the migration crisis would lead towards more anti-immigration attitudes and that Euroscepticism would rise due to it, they were proven wrong. One explanation for the authors’ outcome is the national view of the migration crisis. They argue that the attitudes for the EU did not change because people did not deem the EU at fault, but other factors instead (Stockemer et.al 2020). However, this particular study is useful when looking into

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further research on this theme. Stockemer et.al (2020) argue that although their results do not show a direct correlation between Euroscepticism and anti-immigrant attitudes, the notion of political actors drawing people's attraction because of the migration crisis is still there. This leaves room for interesting research on the question of how populist parties gain so much attraction for people when Euroscepticism cannot be linked to the migration crisis (Stockemer et.al 2020). This can however be looked at from the other way around too, that the migration crisis did attract people towards populist parties, who themselves often have Eurosceptic tendencies. Thus, the migration crisis could have increased Euroscepticism in an indirect way. However, the article provides interesting and useful thoughts about Euroscepticism and the migration crisis. This leaves the focus on more in-depth legislation presented by the EU due to the migration crisis insightful, to see if the results differ or go in the same direction.

However, as this study aims to explain the changes in Euroscepticism over time, it is vital to apply a theory that explains policy continuity and policy changes over time. Therefore, Historical Institutionalism will be applied to identify these changes and possible critical junctures that led to these policy changes.

2.3 Historical Institutionalism Historical Institutionalism is a theoretical tradition that has a relatively long presence in modern social science, having shown prominent uses in different contexts and perspectives. A vital mark of Historical Institutionalism is the attention towards the timing and chain of events that shape political processes. This, against the background that institutions shape human interaction, and depending on the constraints and opportunity for institutions, the ‘political game’ will change over time (Fioretos 2011:371). Historical Institutionalism can therefore be characterized by focusing on questions that involve structures and the development of institutions over time (Fioretos 2011:372). Fioretos (2011:372-373) states that what makes Historical Institutionalism a clear identity is its focus on second-order questions, which underlines the understanding of actors, human action, and behavior. Thus, having a large interest in the relationship between interest and institutions, as well as the mechanisms of institutional development.

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Moreover, Historical Institutionalism emphasizes not only the history itself but rather when and how a particular outcome came to exist. Therefore, identifying history as a point of interest in the sense of understanding a theoretical turn, history becomes more of a process that creates political outcomes rather than just an event in a timeline (Fioretos 2011:369).

What is most interesting in this theory though, are the vital building blocks within Historical Institutionalism. Two of these are critical junctures and path dependency, which often comes in conjunction. Path dependency is an important mechanism within historical institutionalism, which often comes from critical junctures (Capoccia & Kelemen 2007:342). Both mechanisms are crucial in understanding the link between the crises and an increase in Euroscepticism.

2.3.1 Path Dependency The utmost general definition of path dependency refers to the idea that events occurring at one point of time will later affect events at a later time (Djelic & Quack 2007:161). A more in-depth definition of path dependency in conjunction with critical junctures is provided by Capoccia and Kelemen (2007):

Path dependence refers to a process in which the structure that prevails after a specific moment in time (often a critical juncture) shapes the subsequent trajectory in ways that make alternative institutional designs substantially less likely to triumph, including those that would be more efficient according to a standard expected utility model (Capoccia and Kelemen 2007:376)

What path dependency ultimately suggests is that steps taken by institutions, organizations or practices do not follow the most rational steps towards efficiency (Djelic & Quack 2007:163). This means that because of the critical juncture, such as a crisis, institutions and organizations must react to what is happening. Therefore, creating a path dependency is necessary, but might not be in the framework of the initial plan. As a result, it opens up situations where actors can react to the results provided. Here is where Euroscepticism can be identified as a product of path dependency. The critical juncture (the economic crisis for example) created a path dependency that allowed for Eurosceptical actors to react with their disappointment towards the actions taken by institutions as a response towards the critical juncture.

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When seeing path dependencies from a political perspective, rather than an economic perspective, for example, it becomes very complex. Mainly because path dependencies create political developments which are close to impossible to reverse when once in place (Pierson 2000:251). Path dependencies thus become vital in understanding political development as a process that evolves through time (Pierson 2000:264). Why political development is a complex process is plenty fold, however, a crucial point is that political processes are done collectively, this means that the actions made by one political actor effects other actors. And the consequences of one actor’s actions are dependent on actions done by others (Pierson 2000:258). Political change thus creates a chain of events that inevitably all actors involved must adapt to. This results in a situation where political actors try to protect themselves, they become change resistant. Therefore, political arrangements that have been settled are hard to change further down the line (Pierson 2000:262). Thus, when a path dependency occurs and creates political change, it is a crucial point in time within the framework of political development. And the change created within the path dependency will create a new political path which in turn will be hard to change, thus the situation that the event of the path dependency creates a cycle where it will affect other events further down the line occurs (Pierson 2000:265).

2.3.2 Critical Junctures In the simplest of terms, a critical juncture is an abnormal change in the sphere of institutions, relative to the normal historical development of interest (Capoccia & Kelemen 2007:342). Capoccia and Kelemen (2007) define critical junctures as such:

[...] we define critical junctures as relatively short periods of time during which there is a substantially heightened probability that agents’ choices will affect the outcome of interest (Capoccia & Kelemen 2007:348).

From this definition, critical junctures are what sets out an abnormal period where actors have a higher probability of affecting interest, indicating that the probability will go down after the period is over. In accordance with Historical Institutionalism, when critical junctures occur, actors within an institutional setting get freer decision making (Capoccia & Kelemen 2007:349). The institutions and their actors can be plenty fold, from political parties, party systems, public policies to whole regimes

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themselves (ibid.). However, important to note is that during a time of critical juncture different institutions are affected differently, meaning that some institutions are more affected than others, a situation of a critical juncture for one institution does not mean that all its counterparts are automatically affected (Capoccia & Kelemen 2007:349). Therefore, the definition and explanation of critical juncture are vital.

In this case, the economic crisis, also known as The Great Recession, is defined as the critical juncture as a point of interest along with the migration crisis. Although one might not be able to refer to these critical junctures as a universal effect on all institutions in existence, it had enough direct and indirect outcomes in institutional processes to be defined as a critical juncture.

2.3.3 Historical Institutionalism in practice In short summary from the explanation of Historical Institutionalism provided above, Historical Institutionalism focuses on historical events which can be identified as a process of political change. Importantly, this is done by the foundation of path dependency and critical junctures. To use this thesis as an example, the economic crisis (the critical juncture) for example created a path dependency. The response (the path dependency) for the crisis (the critical juncture), from this thesis hypotheses, then created a window of opportunity for actors to advocate their interest and push certain politics through. Thus, this helps us also to examine whether the policy change related to the crises led to an increase in Euroscepticism. Although Historical Institutionalism is fitting as a mean to answer the set questions stated in this thesis, there are some critical notions that ought to be addressed. One crucial notion is seeing beyond critical junctures and path dependencies as a window of opportunity for actors to bargain (Mabee 2011:36). It is easy to see the institutional change from a perspective of Historical Institutionalism as an “easy” explanation. For example, situation X created an opportunity for actors to bargain, outcome Y would not be possible without situation X, therefore the institution evolved. Thus, describing the situation rather than explaining it (Mabee 2011:37). One of the steps Mabee (2011:36) gives to not fall into the trap of just describing, is the relationship between the critical juncture

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and path dependency. The critical juncture often creates actions that are non- reversible when well in place and the actions that were taken are always dependable on the timing in which they were created (ibid.). This means that the evolution of an institution taken within a critical juncture will always be imprinted in the context of the critical juncture itself.

Moreover, Mabee (2011:37) talks about the importance of following the mechanisms providing institutional change. This becomes even more vital when trying to follow actions taken in a particular setting and following them through time. Thus, giving the ability to follow reproduction. This thesis in particular, following how Euroscepticism is increasing in times of crisis. Nevertheless, without identifying mechanisms, the outcome will only be descriptive (Mabee 2011:37). Moreover, Mabee (2011) states that Historical Institutionalism tends to focus more on radical change from the foundation of identifying critical junctures, rather than on change over time. This becomes problematic since the evolution of the institution and actions taken during the critical juncture is followed through forwards to the next critical juncture.

However, these critical enlightenments on Historical Institutionalism have been addressed in this thesis. First, process-tracing will be the analytic tool used, meaning that the mechanisms will be in focus in this thesis, therefore Historical Institutionalism will not be used as a tool of getting descriptive answers to the research questions. Historical Institutionalism is used as it provides in detail information about policy continuity and policy change, thus making it the ideal theory to test policy changes. Second, the empirical foundation will come from two different critical junctures, the economic crisis and the migration crisis which can be seen as exogenous shocks for the EU initiating policy changes. Thus, the approach helps us to identify the specific policy changes and policy outcome over time. Using two different critical junctures in this manner will hopefully give more width to the understanding of how, or how not mechanisms in the actions taken during the critical junctures have been affected over time.

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2.4 Hypotheses

1. Responses made by the EU during times of crisis created a window of opportunity for Eurosceptic actors to thrive. 2. Providing that Eurosceptic actors rose in popularity during time of crisis, Eurosceptic actors can be identified as using the crisis as a critical juncture themselves, thus being dependable on perceived crises.

3 Method To answer the research questions stated in this thesis, process-tracing will be applied. Process-tracing is a relatively new revised method within the social sciences. Being a prominent method within psychology and medicine for a longer time, process-tracing has shown to have a vital use within social sciences as well. Showing that using process-tracing within single-case studies gives the analyst the possibility to gain an understanding of mechanisms that few if any other method can provide (Beach & Brun Pedersen 2013:1-2).

Process-tracings essence is to provide a greater understanding of the relationship between a cause and an outcome (ibid.). Beach & Brun Pedersen (2013:2) provides an example of democracy and peace, where there is a strong statistical correlation between the two concepts. However, even though the statistical correlation is strong, it does not tell us more than that. Process-tracing goes into the questions raised about the outgoing correlation, in this case, how does democracy result in peaceful relations (ibid.)? According to Beach & Brun Pedersen (2013:2), to answer that question one must study the relationships and mechanisms which links the two concepts together. Ultimately, tracing the mechanisms provides a better understanding of how the cause produces the outcome (Beach 2016:463). Process tracing is a qualitative method, but as Beach and Brun Pedersen’s particular example shows, it sometimes relies on quantitative information and/or is ‘helped’ by statistical data (Collier 2011:825). Moreover, a lot of the terminology used in Process tracing resembles the terms and concepts most commonly used in quantitative research, which adds to the importance to make clear that Process- tracing is a qualitative method.

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Furthermore, Beach & Brun Pedersen (2013) has divided Process-tracing into three different branches, Theory-Testing Process-Tracing, Theory-Building Process- Tracing and Explaining-Outcome Process Tracing. What branch one should opt for depends on the aim of the particular study to which Process-tracing is applied.

The Process-tracing branch which will be used in this particular study is the so- called ‘Explaining-Outcome Process-Tracing’. This branch is ‘case-centric’ instead of ‘theory-centric’ as the other branches, as well as the aim of this method is to provide a mechanism/s that accounts for the explanation of the outcome (Beach & Brun Pedersen 2013:12). The aim of using the explaining-outcome process-tracing is to provide a minimally sufficient explanation of an outcome (Beach & Brun Pedersen 2013:18).

3.1 Mechanisms The mechanism in explaining-outcome process-tracing can most simply be described as events that lead to the outcome (Beach & Brun Pedersen 2013:22). Understanding the mechanisms and identifying the mechanisms in a particular case is the very point of using this branch of process tracing. Thus, understanding the mechanisms gives a deeper knowledge of the cause and outcome within the chosen case (Beach & Brun Pedersen 2013:22-26). This means that the cause and the outcome can be drawn from either a known correlation or an assumption, for example:

The Cause The Outcome

Economic Crisis Increase in Euroscepticism

Understanding the mechanism between the cause and outcome and breaking these mechanisms down provides a better understanding of how the cause and outcome are related, and why the cause led to the outcome. Enabling a chain of events, a timeline of what happened in that specific case between the cause and the outcome (Beach & Brun Pedersen 2013, Beach 2016, Collier 2011).

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For example:

The Cause Mechanism The Outcome

Economic Crisis ⇒ Event ⇒ Increase in Euroscepticism

Process-tracing allows following the link between the cause and outcome, by identifying and following the mechanism which eventually led to the outcome gives an in-depth picture of why it happened. Thus, mechanisms are what links causes and outcomes together, which in practice means to unpack these mechanisms and follow the activities produced by the mechanisms as a series of interlocking parts, one part to the next (Beach 2016:473). Until a minimum sufficient series of parts can be shown as an explanation of the outcome (Beach & Brun Pedersen 2013:18).

The operationalization with this specific study will however be a bit different from the figures shown above. Mostly due to the case centric focus in this study. Since limitations must be made to make this study feasible, the mechanism already has a critical part, the event. A mechanism is an interlocking part of activities and entities, the entities are the factors that engage in the activities themselves (Beach & Brun Pedersen 2013:29). Thus, entities can be seen as actors, such as groups, countries, politicians and so on (Beach & Brun Pedersen 2013:178). Since the limitations in this study are the activities themselves, the responses made by the EU, the focus will lie on the entities. The actors and what they do within the response made by the EU. So, the responses within this study framework and focus of analysis are already a crucial part of the mechanism.

3.2 Criticism of Case-Centric Process-Analyzing Process-tracing is not a perfect method, it has pros and cons which are equally important to note. The most crucial con to highlight is in the sense of case centric process analysis. Since the focus of analysis is within the mechanism of a specific activity, the result given from the analysis is therefore specific for the case itself (Beach & Brun Pedersen 2013:12-13). Therefore, explanations of an effect and

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outcome cannot be completely detached from the case (ibid.). That means that the mechanism with the minimal sufficient explanation of why the economic crisis led to Euroscepticism cannot automatically be transferred or generalized in another situation, for example why the migration crisis led to Euroscepticism. The mechanism is explained in relation to the entities and activities in any given case. However, even though it is important to note and take into consideration when making general remarks about the explanation between a cause and outcome, the explanations can be useful when going forward. Although the explanation has a relationship to the specific case, the mechanism in one case can be used as an indicator in another case. Thus, providing useful information of what to look for next time a mechanism leading to Euroscepticism is the focus of analysis.

3.3 Material To get the contexts of the empirics in the analysis, a short description of the crises themselves is due. The crises will therefore be presented in a basic manner, enough to understand the situation of why they are considered a crisis and why the EU had to give responses to the crises.

3.3.1 The Economic Crisis The economic crisis is perhaps more known as “the economic crisis in 2008” for most people but the formal name is The Great Recession, which started in 2007 and continued until 2009 (Sherman 2010:6). It is the largest economic disaster since the Great Depression in the 1930s. Not quite as severe in purely economic terms as the Great Depression, but arguably as bad. Even though the Great Recession did not quite reach the Depression term, which is based more on the levels of unemployment, the characteristics of the Great Recession had equally, if not more, devastating results as it involved more than just unemployment (Sherman 2010:5-6). The characteristics of The Great Recession and the devastating results of it, was a combination of market and housing crashes. The stock market crashed and with it 50% of the invested capital made by investors. Along with that, the market value on housing plummeted (Grusky et.al 2011:4). Which meant not only that many people lost their savings on the stock market, but also that many people lost their investment they had made in their house. The stock market crash also resulted in

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increased unemployment as many firms went bankrupt or were in need of cutting people off. This meant that many people could not pay their mortgages on their houses. The banks who provided their mortgages were in great value loss since the housing crash meant that the houses used as leverage for the loan were suddenly worth less than the initial loan itself. Leading to many foreclosures, people then lost both their jobs and homes, meanwhile many banks filed for bankruptcy since they were left with houses that had lost great value in accord with no buying market (Grusky et.al 2011:4).

The brief conclusion of the Great Recession provided here is mainly from an American context. However, the stock market crash in the USA had a snowball effect which caused turmoil in the global economy itself, creating an economic crisis worldwide (Sherman 2010:3). Of course, the situation and the effects of the crisis affected countries differently, there is no clear detailed universal explanation of how the crisis affected all countries, some were affected more than others. In a European context, the financial crisis struck hard, even though the Great Recession itself ended in 2009, the aftermath of the recession continued years after. While the USA recovered and saw an end to the crisis, another crisis just started for Europe, the Eurozone crisis. The Eurozone crisis is a direct aftermath of the Great Recession (Ari 2014:5). Prior to the Great Recession, the national debt was at a low level across the Eurozone countries except for Italy and Greece. However, after the Great Recession, the national debt was at a very high level amongst most Eurozone countries (ibid.). The Eurozone countries became separated from each other, having large varieties of economic backlash where some countries needed more support than others. The European Union’s economic governance of the situation was ineffective since policy changes in response to the crisis were done separately by the member states (Ari 2014:5-6). The high national debts along with severe unemployment with no sense of collaborative action within the Eurozone created a crisis of its own. Showing that the European Union needed to make vital steps in a structural way to make the Eurozone countries work together if the crisis were to be averted (Ari 2014:6).

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3.3.2 The Migration Crisis The migration crisis refers to the increasing flow of refugees in Europe in 2015. The crisis was a result of the war in Syria, where the UN estimated that over 12 million people were in immediate danger in 2015, and millions had already fled the war (Metcalfe-Hough 2015:2). Many of those who fled were looking towards Europe across the Mediterranean. For comparison, in October 2015, it was estimated that 590,000 refugees had come into Europe, which is more than double compared to 2014 (Metcalfe-Hough 2015:2). The migration crisis led to many problems around Europe, for example, the high flow of refugees made it impossible for many states to handle the asylum process in a bureaucratic manner, especially the states in Europe which already had lower economic resources, resulting in the asylum systems to overflow (Metcalfe-Hough 2015:4).

A lot of the discussions surrounding the migration crisis were technical deviances, such as who was a migrant, refugee, and asylum seeker. Even though the European human right law applies to all migrants, whatever their status might be (Metcalfe- Hough 2015:4-5). The debate did cause more problems than imaginable. The policies involving asylum deviate from the member states, making the asylum- seeking process unfair in many ways, as member states have the decision to favor or not favor asylum seekers, thus making the asylum seeker choose countries with the best policies (Metcalfe-Hough 2015:4-5). The definition of who was a migrant and who was an asylum seeker was also a problem since the definition started to become an argument. For example, Orban, the Prime Minister of Hungary claimed that most migrants are not refugees but people who seek a better life (Crawley & Skleparis 2018:49). This was a common argument by some member states to not let people seek asylum. Along with the argument that the slow recovery from the economic crisis made it financially unbearable to keep up with. This made some countries claim that they could not afford the flow of refugees, as the refugees needed support from the state (Metcalfe-Hough 2015:4).

This did not only cause a strong debate amongst the member states but also caused a debate amongst the citizens of the member states, showing national and sovereign narratives which resulted in racial and cultural tensions. So, in conclusion, the migration crisis started a lot of turmoil around Europe. Member states were in a

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clash of arguments since some, such as Greece, had to deal with more refugees and asylum seekers than the rest of the member states (Metcalfe-Hough 2015:5). Moreover, the crisis which started as a humanitarian crisis of aiding people in need turned into a large debate that often followed the narrative of racial and cultural tensions. The EU had clear governance problems, because of the member states' final say in asylum policies, and because of the different geopolitical outcome of the crisis. Making member states which had borders surrounding the Mediterranean the migration crisis a severe problem, whereas some member states did not have the same acute problem since their borders were further away.

3.3.3 Eurobarometer The Eurobarometer will be used to gather information about the EU citizens satisfaction towards the EU. When referring to the Eurobarometer, what is meant is the Standard Eurobarometer of Public Opinion. The Standard Eurobarometer of Public Opinion is a statistical foundation of the public’s perception of the EU, issued by the European Commission two times every year. However, throughout the study, it will mostly be called Eurobarometer for short. In the Eurobarometer, some questions are asked which can be used as a guideline to get an overview of trust in EU institutions.

The statistical information in the level of trust for the EU amongst the member states will be used in getting the context of how the public view is before the act of the response and after. The questions stated in the Eurobarometer cannot be seen as a direct indicator of Euroscepticism but can be used as a tool for seeing Eurosceptic tendencies. Moreover, the Eurobarometer often differentiates the answers from the citizens depending on their nationality. Which also provides vital information on the differences of trust between the different member states. Not only does it show which member states trust the EU institutions more than others but can be used as an indicator of which member states the Eurosceptic mechanism can be more related to than others. Thus, allowing for a comparison of the crises themselves (which crisis affected the trust levels of the member state the most).

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4 Analysis The analysis will include three different stages during every response to the crises. First, a short look at how the European citizens view the EU before the response. This provides a crucial perspective of how some values which can be seen as Eurosceptic differs from the start of the response until a time after the response was taken into action. Thereafter, a short presentation of the responses themselves will take place, to get an overview before conducting the process analysis. The process analysis will then follow, ending in a look at the Eurobarometer to compare Eurosceptic tendencies before and after the response. Each response will be presented from the earliest to the latest, followed by a concluding summary.

4.1 Europe 2020

4.1.1 The European Citizens view of the EU in 2010.

Before looking deeper into the mechanism which can be identifiable as part of rising Euroscepticism, a short look into some general questions asked to the European citizens is relevant. General being the keyword, as there are no direct questions that give a black on white answer regarding Euroscepticism in the Eurobarometer. The first one being:

“Generally speaking, do you think that (the country of the participant) membership of the European Union is/would be a good thing?” (Eurobarometer 2010a:134). Although it might be a vague question regarding being able to account for Euroscepticism, referring to Di Mauro & Serricchio (2015:46) definition of Euroscepticism, the European Citizens mistrust in European institutions is a form of Euroscepticism. Nevertheless, 49% of the people answered yes (Eurobarometer 2010a:134). A relatively low number, 29% answered neither good nor bad, meanwhile, 18% think that the EU is bad for their country (ibid.). Between the member states, there are however some notable differences. The United Kingdom is the only country that has a more negative opinion about the EU than a positive one, which means that the rest of the member states have more positive views of the EU than negative. However, there are some clear down spiraling effects compared to earlier Eurobarometer’s, notably Greece, Germany, and Estonia, where the negative

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opinions have increased so much as double digits (Eurobarometer 2010a). It is stated in the Eurobarometer that it probably has to do with the economic crisis (ibid.). To make it more in direct connection with EU institution’s, 45% of the citizens state that they trust the European Parliament, 41% trusts the European Central Bank, 39% trusts the Council of the European Union and in general, 42% tends to trust in the European institutions (Eurobarometer 2010a:134). Also, a decreasing percentage compared to the last two years of this period (2008 and 2009). So, in context, the same year in which the Europe 2020 strategy gets introduced there is a decline in trust for the EU and its institutions.

To get a picture of how the trust is disputed over the member states, the figure below shows the level of trust in the various member states, with a percentage showing how many tend to trust the EU:

Figure 1: EU citizens response to “Tend to trust” the EU in percentage across the EU member states in 2010.

Tend to Trust the EU (%) 80 68 65 61 61 57 56 55 54 54 53 52 52 60 50 50 47 45 44 43 43 42 42 42 41 40 39 37 40 20 20

0

FI SI

IE IT

PL PT SE ES

EL EE LT FR

SK BE CZ

NL LU AT LV DE

BG RO CY

DK HU UK MT

(Eurobarometer 2010b:185)

As one can see in the figure, Estonia, Slovakia, Bulgaria, and Denmark’s citizens have the highest level of trust, being the only member states with a percentage over 60% (Eurobarometer 2010b:185). France and Germany on the other side only having a percentage under 40%, and the UK have the lowest percentage of trust, thus being the outlier, having a catastrophic low trust in the EU, with only 20% who tends to trust the EU (ibid.).

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4.1.2 Europe 2020 - a strategy to strengthen the European economy. Europe 2020 is chosen because of its more general nature, as it is a strategy that came as a direct response to the economic crisis and provides an overall agenda that covers the whole decade from 2010-2020, focused on all the member states and EU’s institutions. The strategy, Europe 2020, set out three core priorities: Smart growth, sustainable growth, and inclusive growth (European Commission 2010:3). However, before going forward, a critical point must be addressed towards Europe 2020. Since it has no direct focus to be followed as it is a general strategy, the results presented in the analysis regards to Europe 2020 must be seen on a general level as well. This means that identifying mechanisms within Europe 2020 would be impossible to trace with perfection since it is affecting all the member states and all the EU institutions. Nevertheless, identifying general mechanisms of Eurosceptic tendencies would be a good starting point for the rest of the thesis.

At the time when Europe 2020 was introduced in 2010, it was described as a ‘moment of transformation’ for Europe, the strategy was issued to address several key issues and challenges. Issues and challenges such as globalization, resources, and the ageing of the population to name a few (European Commission 2010:3). The point of Europe 2020 was to address these challenges ahead of time, providing a common strategy that enables the member states and the EU to collectively meet these challenges, where the ultimate result would be a fixed market and a smart, inclusive, and sustainable European economy (ibid.).

The strategy is presented with a clear set of priorities and headlines. The priorities presented are smart growth, sustainable growth, and inclusive growth, defined by the strategy as:

Smart growth: developing an economy based on knowledge and innovation. Sustainable growth: promoting a more resource efficient, greener and more competitive economy. Inclusive growth: fostering a high-employment economy delivering social and territorial cohesion (European Commission 2010:3). The priorities then include additional in-depth priorities within each headline. Smart growth for example is further broken down into three categories; innovation, education, and digital society (European Commission 2010:10). Innovation is presented as a vital point, showing comparable numbers where Europe is behind the

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likes of Japan and the USA. Where the issue is described as a lack of private investments as well as a lack of spending in research and development, which the strategy aims to address (ibid.).

Education is presented as another vital point within the frame of smart growth. The highlighted problem with education is the level of education in comparison with the USA and Japan, where the EU is currently lacking. Along with a problem of pupils who tend to leave their education too early (European Commission 2010:10). Moreover, smart growth focus on the fact that the overall education level in the EU does not match the labor market’s needs (ibid.).

Digital society lifts the issues of Europe falling behind in internet speed, which is seen as pivotal in knowledge, distributions of goods, and various services (European Commission 2010:10). Furthermore, it includes the demand for information and communication technologies, a market that has a large economic forefront, where Europe should be more active in seeking success (ibid).

Sustainable growth is also divided into three sub-sections, including competitiveness, combating climate change, and clean and efficient energy. Competitiveness gives remarks about the high levels of trade within the EU and the lead EU currently has in the market for green technologies. Also adding that the EU should ensure its lead with resource efficiency and competitiveness within the EU as well as outside the EU to increase productivity to stay on top (European Commission 2010:12).

Combating climate change points to the challenge where Europe needs to reduce its emissions in a faster fashion in the 2010-2020 period than the decade before to reach the environmental goals set. To reach this, it is suggested that the EU should continue to improve the use of resources and to use technological advancements to improve emissions in all sectors of the economy (European Commission 2010:13). Another vital point is clean and sufficient energy, which includes the goal to increase reusable energy solutions, thereby reducing the use of oil. Not only in the sense of the environment per se but also to ensure energy security by introducing more renewable energy. At the same time, it will also boost the economy as

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renewable energy solutions are estimated to create more jobs (European Commission 2010:13).

Inclusive growth is categorized in three headlines as well: employment, skills and fighting poverty. Employment addresses the issue of the current high unemployment rate due to the crisis, but also the notion of a shrinking workforce, raising the problem of the low employment of women and older workers (European Commission 2010:16).

Skills highlight the future shift in the job market, where it is estimated that high qualification jobs will increase by the end of 2020, meanwhile low skilled jobs will decrease (European Commission 2010:16).

Fighting poverty marks that 80 million is at risk of poverty before the crisis began, giving the indirect notion that the number of people in poverty probably increased during and after the economic crisis. Which makes it an issue which needs immediate attention. Furthermore, unemployment is again a focal point in this section, as poverty and unemployment go in conjunction in many ways (European Commission 2010:16).

With the set priorities, smart growth, sustainable growth and inclusive growth, Europe 2020 also includes ‘headline targets’ which addressed the goals these priorities should be striving for. These are:

75 % of the population aged 20-64 should be employed. 3% of the EU's GDP should be invested in R&D. The "20/20/20" climate/energy targets should be met (including an increase to 30% of emissions reduction if the conditions are right). The share of early school leavers should be under 10% and at least 40% of the younger generation should have a tertiary degree. 20 million less people should be at risk of poverty (European Commission 2010:3). The Commission suggests that these headlines should be included in the member states national targets. Marking that necessary commitments must be done by both the EU as well as the member states (European Commission 2010:3-4). Thus, the Commission suggests dividing the responsibility for the strategy amongst different EU institutions, giving the ownership to the European Council, having the Commission the responsibility of monitoring the strategy and facilitating policy exchange, and the European Parliament to have the role of getting the EU citizens

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on board and co-legislative initiatives towards the goals (European Commission 2010:4).

As shown, what Europe 2020 strategy involves is a wide spread of different actors. This comes naturally, because of the international and supranational guidance and decision making of the EU (Silander 2019:8). This could be of concern in this thesis since the broad topics and wide position of the different actors cannot all be included. However, as noted earlier, this can be used in a positive manner. Noting that there cannot be an in-detail analysis of Europe 2020, at least using process- tracing, it leaves Europe 2020 as an exceptional response to highlight general mechanisms of Eurosceptic tendencies. Thus, following the priorities taken in Europe 2020, allows for a broader overview of the mechanism resulting in Euroscepticism due to the response. Not only in a broader sense of concrete actions taken by the EU or the member states but also as a starting summary of what to expect during the 2010-2020 period.

4.1.3 Europe 2020 and an increase in Euroscepticism.

First, it is important to note that because of the broad spectrum of Europe 2020, there is no possible way to cover all ten years of the active strategy. Although it was a response to the economic crisis, it also acts as a pinpoint of interest for the rest of the decade. Therefore, following Beach & Brun Pedersen (2013:18), identifying interlockings parts and processes will be brought down to minimal sufficient evidence for the cause and outcome. In this case, a minimal sufficient mechanism that can explain why the economic crisis led to increasing Euroscepticism within the frame of Europe 2020. Thus, due to the broad timeline of Europe 2020, processes and entities can jump back and forth.

It seems fitting to start the processing tracing by focusing on entities that cover most of Europe 2020. That means processes that can be applied to all three priorities, smart growth, inclusive growth, and sustainable growth.

Starting with sustainable growth, which includes the focus on a greener and more energy-efficient Europe (European Commission 2010:14), a possible problem occurs immediately when looking into the statements done by the Commission. The

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problem being the intervening actors, the outgoing mission of the EU institutions and member states to work with each other to reach the same goals.

In Europe 2020 the Commission sets demands on both the EU’s effort as well as the effort needed from the member states to reach the set goals of becoming a greener EU (European Commission 2010:14). A problem with this, as Nilsson (2019:225- 229) lifts, is the sheer intervening parts that must work together, being the supranational goal and the initiatives taken by the EU that must work with the member states socioeconomic status as well as international infrastructure. Furthermore, the practical part which the supranational legislation controls are only up to 50%, the rest is controlled by the member states themselves (Nilsson 2019:228).

This makes a peculiar situation since supranational policies are issued as a unit within the EU. For example, the Paris agreement, which is a global agreement concerning the environment. The problem however is that a large responsibility is left for member states to issue their own policies to reach the collective goal. The result is a supranational goal set by the EU where the EU is dependent on the member states internal success, thus decreasing member states own authority and decision making meanwhile leaving accountability to the member states to issue policy changes to reach the goals (Nilsson 2019:228). What it inevitably ends up to is that member states, because of the differences in priorities and economical stance, separates from one another. Where some member states are more active in the climate issue than others, resulting in a position where it is relatively easy for the EU to set up common goals, but leaves it to the member states to take concrete action (Nilsson 2019:238). Thus, creating a chain of events just by the supranational nature of the EU. A chain of events that begins with Europe 2020, with a reasonable environmental goal to achieve, but quickly snowball to more commitments such as the Paris agreement. Even though most member states have accepted the challenge, it does create a situation where some of the member states are forced to adapt to EU policy changes taken within the set strategy of Europe 2020 (Nilsson 2019:228).

Therefore, this can be identifiable as a strong advocator for Euroscepticism. As it makes it easy to point fingers towards the EU for having too harsh commitments

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towards the member states. Which in a political national arena can undoubtedly create a fracture towards the EU and the national interest in the given member state.

Similar challenges and results can be seen in the smart growth priority from Europe 2020. Especially concerning research and development, wherein the strategy, spending on research and development is a strong focal point. The narrative that is driven is that Europe needs to invest more in innovation to create a competition with the USA and Japan (European Commission 2010:10). In the context that Europe 2020 is a response to an economic crisis, more investments were perhaps not the most viable cause of action. As Haglund-Morrissey (2019:166) points out, barely any investments came through at all. The initial goal set for the Lisbon strategy, which Europe 2020 advocated forward, was that 3% of the GDP should be going towards research and development (ibid.). In context, the USA had 2.6% and Japan 3.4% in 2010 (European Commission 2010:10). However, in Europe, the investment was at 2.04% in 2014, therefore showing a clear miss of the target (Haglund- Morrissey 2019:166). The answer to why the investment did not come through was due to the divergence between the member states, where the Western states who came clear of the economic crisis a bit easier had followed through, but the east and south countries within the EU had enormous effects on their research and development investments because of the crisis (ibid.).

Investments were not the only things that were deemed as a problem. The Commission took further steps to improve the research and development situation by encouraging and pushing member states to improve policies within the frame of innovation. Not with great success though, and the EU was receiving a lot of critique on pushing the issue further, being claimed on putting too much pressure on the member states which did not fulfil the desired level of improvement (Haglund- Morrissey 2019:173).

The research and development situation are like the situation with sustainable growth. The economical backlash created by the economic crisis which the Europe 2020 strategy in its core is an answer to, instead put the member states in a situation where some could not take appropriate action towards the common goal. Therefore, dividing member states due to their financial capability. Creating a snowball effect

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where some member states improve more and more, meanwhile, the catch-up becomes greater for those left behind. As a result, dividing the entities and actors, creating a gap easy for those with the political interest to increase Eurosceptic tendencies to thrive.

Inclusive growth might be the one focus in Europe 2020 which, at least with the results in hand, was the hardest one to include. Having to deal with the problem of the future labor market which will involve a higher demand on education, along with fighting poverty, especially during an economic crisis (European Commission 2010:16). To deal with the problem of having a workforce with a lower level of education than optimal, Europe 2020 sets out to attract labor migrants. The aim is to attract high skilled workers and researchers in an attempt to decrease the gap between the current workforce and the labor markets demands in the near future (Parkhouse 2019:221). However, this aim quickly changed focus when the migration crisis later showed up, as the discussion changed attention to asylum and refugee policies. Nevertheless, one of the hardest parts when discussing unemployment and labor migration is that a lot of real political power from the EU is taken away, leaving the member states fully responsible for taking concrete action (Parkhouse 2019:217). Another problem that occurred is the intra-EU situation where it becomes hard to get a clear picture of how the labor migrants are being divided. Mostly because of the various differences between the member states, where some member states become more attractive for highly skilled labor migrants than others. Creating a situation where migrants laborer’s might be increasing within the EU borders, but only increasing in some member states (Parkhouse 2019:216). Thus, the solution creates a gap between the member states again.

4.1.4 Summary Europe 2020

When presenting the empirics surrounding Europe 2020, there are identifiable processes that can be traced for gaining a mechanism that holds a minimal explanation for the increase of Euroscepticism. Going from Beach & Brun Pedersen (2013:176) requirement of what defines a mechanism, a mechanism is created by parts that by themselves are not dependable of causing the outcome, but together

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creates a relationship between the cause and the outcome. The parts are made of actors who are engaged in activities, so in the case of Europe 2020, the main actors investigated are the EU institutions and member states. The activity is Europe 2020 itself, as its theoretical standpoint is the path dependency, and the economic crisis is the critical juncture.

What separates Europe 2020 against other cases, is the length which it includes. Grasping only on the surface on the processes and interlocking parts between the different actors. Not only does Europe 2020 include a whole decade, but it also changes from a theoretical standpoint. Europe 2020 was issued due to the path dependency created by the economic crisis. The EU got the opportunity to put forward the strategy because of the need for an action to overcome the economic crisis and see that there is a future for prosperous economics in Europe. The EU needed a strategy that collectively gathered the member states to work as a unit towards the same goal. The irregular situation thus gave a path dependency, as a result of the critical juncture which was the economic crisis. However, taking Europe 2020 as a whole, various parts of the Europe 2020 strategy developed from other path dependencies, due to other critical junctures. Some of the goals set in Europe 2020 gained a lot of success strategy-wise because of the Eurozone crisis and the Migration crisis for example. Thus, Europe 2020 is also in effect with other critical junctures, which themselves creates new path dependencies where Europe 2020 as a strategy can evolve and work towards the goals set. Thus, based on the fact that a path dependency is an event that affects outcomes in future events (Djelic & Quack 2007:161). Europe 2020 can be seen as the “ultimate” path dependency, as it continually progresses from one critical juncture to another. Therefore, from a Historical Institutionalist perspective, Europe 2020 can be seen as a result of a path dependency that evolves continuously throughout the whole decade. However, the goal was to identify a general mechanism because of its broad empirical depth, focusing mostly on the aftermath of the economic crisis.

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Table 1: Mechanism explaining Euroscepticism in Europe 2020.

The Cause Mechanism ⇒ The Outcome

1. Member States having different economical capabilities. 2. Pressure from the supranational level putting pressure on member states. Economic 3. Accountability falling on member Euroscepticism Crisis ⇒ states. 4. The Snowball effect of extending policies creates a gap between the member states. 5. Inevitably leading to national differences in priority in member states and the EU collective goal.

What the mechanism creates is a platform that can be used by political interest groups of blaming the EU for interfering with national interests. This is further strengthened when looking at the trust of the EU in 2015. In 2010, 42% of the people said they trusted the EU institutions (Eurobarometer 2010a). In 2015, 40% said they trust the EU, a decrease from 2010, but still, a positive factor since between 2010 and 2015 the trust was in the 30% category (Eurobarometer 2015). Also showing that the countries who were hit the most during the economic crisis, Greece, Spain, and Italy for example still showing a lack of trust, although slightly increasing in Italy (Eurobarometer 2015). Numbers also show that there is a strong diversion between member states in support of EU membership. Here, countries in the north have steady support of being a member of the EU, over 50%. Meanwhile in the south of Europe member states have decreasing support, below 50% (Hobolt & de Vries 2016:417). Also confirmed is the divergence between the member states, as the northern countries which could more easily follow the set goals by Europe 2020 because of their easier outcome in the economic crisis reflect the figures shown. It would seem that the citizens trust their state’s membership in the EU when their governments have the means to follow the collective goals. Meanwhile, those in the south do not seem to trust the EU as their governments could not follow through as easily.

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However, a short comparison of trust five years after the introduction of Europe 2020 is shown in the figure below. To see how the EU citizens level of trust has changed from the introduction of Europe 2020. The comparison is taken from a Eurobarometer issued in 2015, halfway through the strategy. All member states are shown, to see what has happened halfway throughout Europe 2020:

Figure 2. EU citizens response to “Tend to trust” the EU in percentage across the EU member states in 2010.

Tend to Trust the EU (%) 80 68 65 61 61 57 56 55 54 54 53 52 52 60 50 50 47 45 44 43 43 42 42 42 41 40 39 37 40 20 20

0

FI SI

IE IT

ES PL PT SE

EE LT EL FR

CZ SK BE

LV NL LU AT DE

BG RO CY

DK HU UK MT (Eurobarometer 2010b:185)

Figure 3. EU citizens response to “Tend to trust” the EU in percentage across the EU member states in 2015.

Tend to Trust the EU (%)

80 68 68 70 62 58 57 56 56 60 55 51 51 49 48 48 48 48 47 47 50 44 43 41 39 36 40 35 32 32 29 26 30 23 20 10

0

FI SI

IE IT

PT PL SE ES

LT EE FR EL

SK BE CZ

LV LU NL DE AT

RO BG HR CY

DK HU UK MT (Eurobarometer 2015:108). As one can see, the level of trust has varied since the poll was taken in 2010. Most notably, every member state which was in the top four most trusting in 2010, has all dropped from the top four in the 2015 Eurobarometer. Slovakia in particular dropped a lot, having a trust percentage of 65% in 2010, dropping to 48% in 2015 (Eurobarometer 2015:108).

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In the top four lowest, there have also been some dramatic changes. France and the UK are still at the bottom but have been accompanied by other member states, such as Greece, Austria, and Cyprus. In general, the trust has dropped when looking at the right side of the figure, as many of the countries such as Italy, Greece, Spain who all is below 40% got hit hard by the Eurozone crisis (Eurobarometer 2015:108).

As the mechanism shows entities that can account for Euroscepticism, and the statistics provided in the Eurobarometer can confirm a general increase in distrust for the EU, it seems relevant to investigate in which sort of Euroscepticism that can be identified from the empirics. We know that the level of trust is different between the member states, which would indicate that there are different types of Euroscepticism within these member states as well, or at least indicators of stronger or lesser levels of Euroscepticism.

Some indicators that show both hard and soft types of Euroscepticism. For instance, in the discussion of sustainable growth, where the environmental perspective was highlighted, it was shown that some member states found themselves in the troublesome position of keeping up with the ongoing cycle of policies and agendas set by the EU (Nilsson 2019:238). This pressure from the EU was identified as a vital part of the mechanism which explains the rise in Euroscepticism, and it goes in line with creating soft Euroscepticism. Soft Euroscepticism in the sense that member states, or actors within member states, do not agree or prioritize the policies the EU sets (Taggart & Szczerbiak 2004:4). Which mostly fits within the frame of the member states which were hit the hardest by the economic crisis, being foremost the southern member states (Bârgăoanu et.al 2015:4), such as Spain, Greece, and Italy. Although one might think that these member states might have the strongest reason to remain a member of the EU because of the hit they took during the economic crisis, they do show indications of soft Euroscepticism. As it is also rational that these countries would rather focus on other priorities than environmental focused policies for example. Naturally, these southern member states want to focus mostly on economic policies (Hobolt & de Vries 2016:419). Thus, not being against the EU as an idea, but against or lacking interest in certain policies (Taggart & Szczerbiak 2004:4), thus showing soft Eurosceptic tendencies. The same situation could be an indicator of hard Euroscepticism as well, being that

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Eurosceptic actors within member states may not have the economic stance to leave the EU, thus being forced to stay. Creating a situation where the Eurosceptic actor may not have a stand-alone position to leave the EU, but advocates strongly against the EU policies, thus enforcing hard Euroscepticism (Taggart & Szczerbiak 2004:3- 4).

4.2 The Banking Union

The Banking Union is an initiative made to increase the EU supervision in banks within the Eurozone and stands as a large leap towards economic governance. The Banking Union was a direct response towards the Eurozone crisis, but it was planned long before then, to finish the economic and monetary union (European Commission 2015). The Banking Union was formed in 2012 when the economic crisis revealed some obvious faults within the Eurozone, showing that the member states with shared currency had more problems than expected (European Commission 2015). The implementation of the response was done because of various reasons, however, arguably the most crucial focal point of the response is to prevent an economic crisis to ever happen again. Common rules for the member states within the Banking Union has the aim to prevent crises, as well as a more systematic way to manage an economic crisis if it were to happen again (European Commission 2015). In 2014 the Banking Union was in full effect, introducing a Single Supervisory Mechanism, controlled by the European Central Bank (ibid.). Thus, the European Central Bank supervises all the 6000 banks within the Eurozone. Furthermore, a Single Resolution Mechanism was implemented. This means that if a bank is under stress and needs more supervision, the Single Resolution Mechanism provides clear rules from a larger economic governance perspective (European Commission 2015). Giving clearer rules and actions more swiftly than if national resolution authorities were to be involved (ibid.). This then results in a, hopefully, better situation for the citizen. Member states from the Eurozone will then not need to let their own citizens bail out banks with tax money, as the economic governance will be from the EU itself (European Commission 2015). If the worst-case scenario happens, the EU can borrow money collectively to

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bail out banks (European Commission 2015). Thus, decreasing the risk of having member states in the Eurozone with severe financial differences.

The European Central Bank can therefore, because of the Banking Union, help to prevent another economic crisis, as well as aid it if it happens. The Commission mentions four key factors which the Banking Union provides:

Banks will be more stronger and immune to shocks [...] Failing banks will be resolved without taxpayers money, limiting negative effects on governments’ fiscal positions. [...] Banks will no longer be “European in life but national in death” [...] Depositors would ensure the same level of protection across the whole banking union [...] (European Commission 2015). However, the implementation of the Banking Union took longer time than expected, and has no guarantee of working, we will not know until/if the next economic crisis occurs. The European Central Bank said themselves that there are still some weaknesses in this aspect (Carboni et. al 2017:122). However, the most significant action with this response is that the EU now controls the whole stability of the banking industry within Europe, since only 130 of the largest banks in 19 different countries control 22 trillion Euro, 82% of the whole Eurozone, which all goes under the European Central Bank control (Carboni et. al 2017:122).

All in all, what this particular response gives interest in is that it is one of the most significant steps taken towards homogenous economic governance. As the EU in crisis further can overrule national banking authority. Thus, creating a situation where not only has the member states given up their sovereign currency, but also a lot of their economic governance power. As a result, it can be seen as an abuse of power during the crisis in the eyes of the European citizen located in a Eurozone state.

4.2.1 The European Citizen view of the economic situation 2012

Again, a small presentation of the context at the time seems vital, to see how EU citizens viewed the economic situation at the same time as the response was put into action.

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In the standard Eurobarometer, people were asked to judge the current economic situation from three different perspectives. The situation of their own economy, the situation of the European economy and from a global perspective on the economy. The question asked were as follows:

How would you judge the current situation in each of the following (the perspectives)? (Eurobarometer 2012:20)

In the view of their own economy, 27% answered “good”. Meanwhile, 72% answered “bad”. The difference between countries within the Eurozone and the member states with a sovereign currency was only 4%. 4% more in the Eurozone thought their economy was good compared to those with national currency (Eurobarometer 2012:20). The greater difference is seen concerning the view of the European economy, where 19% answered “good” and 75% “bad”. Here, people in the Eurozone had a more negative view than the ones with a sovereign currency. 80% in the Eurozone answered “bad”, compared to 66% who answered “bad” outside the Eurozone (Eurobarometer 2012:20). The same goes with the global economic perspective, where 74% of people within the Eurozone thought it was “bad” compared with 61% outside the zone (ibid).

What the situation implies is that people inside the Eurozone area viewed the situation within Europe and globally to be worse than those with their sovereign currency. Interestingly enough, is that those inside the Eurozone viewed their own national economy to be better than those with their own currency. It leaves with the interpretation that people within the Eurozone thought that their own economy went a lot better than anyone else's within the Eurozone. However, inside the Eurozone or not, the figures do not show a good overall result. Giving the context that a clear majority of the European citizens are negative to the economic situation at the same time as the Banking Union was introduced.

When it comes to “Tend to Trust” in the Standard Eurobarometer in 2012, they unfortunately do not include isolated results from the member states (as it was provided for Europe 2020 and will be provided for the Resettlement Scheme). In both the spring edition and the autumn edition they ask the trust of the institutions separately when including isolated member states. However, to get some context of

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trust toward the EU, all accounted results for the whole of the EU will have to do. It does include a comparison of the national government, which will be included to give some more context into the situation, in lack of insight on the member states. So, in the question: do you tend to trust the EU and your national government? The percentage of European citizens who replied “Tend to Trust” was:

Table 2. Citizens response to “Tend to Trust” their national government and the EU in percentage in 2012.

National Government The EU

27% 33%

(Eurobarometer 2012:75). In sum, 33% answered that they tend to trust the EU, while 27% tend to trust their national government. Interesting to note that the trust in the EU exceeds the trust for the participants' own government. Trust is however on a very low level. To compare with the numbers in 2010, the general trust of the EU was at 43% (Eurobarometer 2012:75). Showing the devastating results, the Economic crisis had on the public perception of trust in the EU.

4.2.2 The mechanism which could explain an outcome in Euroscepticism regarding the Banking Union

Going over the empirical foundation regarding the response of the Banking Union, there are some indicators which could together identify as a mechanism that as a result can be increasing Eurosceptic tendencies. These are both regarding those within the Eurozone, which is obliged to be a part of the Banking Union, but also member states within the EU who can choose whether they want to be a part of the Banking Union (Méro & Piroska 2016). The indicators which can be identified as factors of Euroscepticism is cultural differences, economic interest, and nationality.

When going through these indicators it is important to note that the aim of analyzing the European Banking Union as a response to the economic crisis is not necessarily due to economic reasons and facts (which of course are prominent in financial activities such as the Banking Union), but to analyze the remarks that come with the

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response that could be deemed as not-wanting, increasing doubt and trust towards the EU. Ultimately, follow processes and perspectives which make joining the Banking Union unwanted by some member states.

Cultural Differences

Early in the processes of implementing the Banking Union, some structural and critical points were discussed. Mainly which cultural type of supervisory action should take place. Why this is a vital part is because of the different types of supervisory culture taken by different European banking authorities (Carretta et.al 2014:181). Which of course becomes of interest when different cultures are to become one under supranational supervision. As well as banks outside the Banking Union will have their set of national banking authorities still active, which the European Central Bank will have to take into consideration (Carretta et.al 2014:187).

Culture in this sense implies the governing behavior in an organization, which historically has significant relations to how successful the organization is (ibid). In this case, how stable and well-working the banking is. Caretta et.al (2014:181) identifies that there are six different national cultures that affect the national banking authority culture itself. Moreover, it also shows that several different banking authorities within Europe use different types of supervisory cultures. This leaves the European Central Bank to take the necessary steps to find out which supervisory culture that would have the most effect on the whole Banking Union (Carretta et.al 2014:187). However, even though that might seem like a specific problem for the European Central Bank, it leaves a question of stability for those banks who are used to working with a certain type of supervisory culture. Although it is arguable that it will be a natural conversion cycle where the bank must adapt, it does on the other hand work as a viable argument to raise a concern about supranational supervision since the culture itself can fracture the stability of the banks (Carretta et.al 2014:187).

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Economic Interest

The question of whether a country actually gains anything from joining a banking union is under constant discussion. Mostly because it is incredibly hard to predetermine if it is profitable until the step into a union is taken. It stands under a trial-and-error case. Although there is evidence pointing to that joining a banking union is always increasing welfare (Näther & Vollmer 2019). However, in the discussion about whether it is profitable or not, some research has been done to come with an answer to that question. Näther & Vollmer (2019) has provided a model where they investigate the differences of a country run by a national banking supervisory authority contra a supranational banking authority. Where the European Banking Union is used to underline and test if the model is correct. The interesting point they raise is the effect of some regulators, being the difference between national regulators and supranational ones. Just like the cultural paragraph, the culture and structure in which some countries' national regulators have contra a supernational one could be seen as too different from each other. They provide one example of the differences between Denmark and Sweden. Sweden has for a longer time taken into consideration in joining the European Banking Union, despite not having the Euro as their currency (Näther & Vollmer 2019:13). However, Sweden is still on the fence about joining the European Bank Union since there is some concern if it would be profitable (ibid.). Näther & Vollmer (2019:13) gives an example from their model where one factor to take into consideration into why that is, has to do with regulation. Sweden in particular has a culture and structure of loose regulation. Which in a general sense would be to loosen in a supranational regulatory perspective, therefore making a supranational system unattractive (Näther & Vollmer 2019:13-14). Outside of the model, there are some national differences that come into perspective, such as how the banking system is built, small or larger banks for example, and views of insurance and other external factors (Näther & Vollmer 2019, Doumpus et.al 2015). Denmark will however join the European Banking Union although they have a sovereign currency. This is largely due to the already existing banking structure in Denmark. Where the largest bank already has external international ties in Finland, which already is in the European Banking Union. Therefore, in the sense of Denmark, it makes sense, as their largest

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bank is already under the supervision of The European Bank Union (Näther & Vollmer 2019:14). Other examples such as Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic have also put economic reasons to why they will not join the Banking Union. On the basis that they think they can provide the same sort of stability themselves as if they would join the Banking Union. Which in their argument saves them more money in the process (Méro & Piroska 2016:216).

However, what this shows is whether a national supervisory authority or a supranational one is more effective than the other. It is more often than not controlled by external factors within the country itself. According to Näther & Vollmer (2019:14), they are so circumstantial that if the European Banking Union were not to be mandatory for the member states within the Eurozone, some countries would opt to leave the Banking Union. Nevertheless, the main argument with presenting the economic interest is the economic sense to be within the European Banking Union or not. Which could be identifiable as being something negative if it does not make sense from an economic perspective. Especially if they are countries within the Eurozone that are forced to be in the European Banking Union because of its mandatory nature. It can therefore be identifiable to be seen as an advocator for Euroscepticism in some member states.

National Interest

Méro & Piroska (2016:221) presents an argument where they claim that in some cases, countries would not opt for supranational supervision such as the Banking Union because of national interests. That is based on financial nationalism, which has a heavy presence in Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary (Méro & Piroska 2016:221). It is also called “Banking nationalism”, which is a government policy that values national interest in who owns the banks, the supervision of the banks, regulatory actions towards the banks and the banking policy in general (Méro & Piroska 2016:221). What characterizes banking nationalism is the government's own interest and movements within the banking sector, but also resentment against international organizations and foreign banks (ibid.). Whereas the European Banking Unions goal strives for a single European regulation, European supervision and open market ownership in the banking sector, banking nationalism is the

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opposite. Where the bank should be owned by a national actor, conduct national supervision and own regulation (Méro & Piroska 2016:222). In other words, the two different views go directly against one another.

However, what identifies and characterizes the strive for banking nationalism can be outdone by purely economic reasons. Méro & Piroska (2016:225) gives the example of Romania and Bulgaria, where banking nationalism can be identified, but due to the government's low capacity of handling efficient supervision, the logical choice for them would be to join the European Banking Union. However, the interesting point of Méro & Piroska (2016) argument is that banking nationalism in this sense would by itself, as a government policy, turn certain countries against supranational solutions such as The European Banking Union.

4.2.3 Summary of The Banking Union

The view of identifying a mechanism concerning The Banking Union becomes clearer compared to Europe 2020. The mechanism already includes The Banking Union as an activity, a response to the outgoing cause of the critical juncture. The path dependency being the Banking Union. However, by following the processes some identifiable entities can be found to make the mechanism broad enough to go in line with the outgoing hypothesis that Eurosceptic actors thrive in response to the crisis. Nevertheless, what the case in the Banking Union showed were different views which in a structural way can prove to be counterproductive for European integration. Using the Banking Union as an underlying case to find a mechanism to explain how the crisis and the response can be a factor for Euroscepticism, it shows as follows:

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Table 3. Mechanism explaining Euroscepticism in The Banking Union.

The Cause Mechanism ⇒ The Outcome

1. Cultural differences can affect organizational The economic crisis structure. and/or The Eurozone 2. Structural differences crisis ⇒ within the banking sector Euroscepticism in member states. 3. Governmental policy ideas in certain member states that goes against the EU.

The figure above shows a summary of the mechanism which includes many different perspectives which can hold the Banking Union against being applicable towards member states. The results showed several perspectives by following the process and implementation of the Banking Union. Where some of them can be applied towards the member states who are outside the Eurozone but still have the ability to join the union. However, some of the perspectives shed light towards member states who are in the Eurozone and by default are a member of the Banking Union. This leaves the possibility for narratives and empirically founded arguments as to why membership in the Banking Union would be less than ideal for some member states. Thus, creating a window of opportunity for actors to point fingers towards the EU, therefore risking increasing Euroscepticism as result. However, the Banking Union is only one of many responses to the economic crisis and provided a deep continuation of European integration (Méro & Piroska 2016:225). But an interesting point the result shows is that those outside the Eurozone might use the perspective shown to turn against the economic governance which the EU strives for. Not only in the sense of giving up their sovereign currency, but by being forced to join the Banking Union itself if they choose to do so.

To what type or extent of Euroscepticism it could be, differs somewhat from Europe 2020. Mostly because there are two factors going into national sovereignty in this case. For a member state with sovereign currency there becomes two “obstacles”,

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they have no choice but to give up both the national banking supervision and the currency itself. Giving an interesting circumstance if a member state would consider having the Euro, the member state also automatically gives up most of the national economic authority at once. This does however go right into the economic governance the EU strives for, but also gives multiple windows of opportunity for actors to go against the EU from a soft Eurosceptic tendency as well as a hard Eurosceptic tendency. This from the background that having a sovereign currency is seen as soft Euroscepticism in itself, as it fits within the parameter of being pro-EU, but against some of its policies and integration processes (Taggart & Szczerbiak 2004:4). Hard Euroscepticism in the sense that a political actor could use the fact of the EU limiting national authority as a “threat” towards the national state. Economics as a large foundation in politics could potentially use this to create an anti-EU stance with this as an underlying factor (Taggart & Szczerbiak 2004:4). The result also showed this by giving examples of member states where they simply do not take any part in the Euro nor the Banking Union because it is seen to decrease national authority.

Moreover, the Banking Union shows some interesting perspectives from a Historical Institutionalist point of view. Not only seeing the Banking Union as a product of the path dependency the economic crisis created, but also the clear political process and change in institutions (Mabee 2011:37). In this case, giving the European Central Bank a larger authority within the economic governance. The processes and the events of path dependencies can also be traced as a working interconnecting part. In this sense from Europe 2020. Both the Banking Union and Europe 2020 are path dependencies from the one critical juncture, the economic crisis. However, in Europe 2020, the Single Monetary Mechanism was already set to be a goal for increasing economic governance. However, it took until the “new” path dependency of the Banking Union to really implement it. Thus, seeing a clear process in which one path dependency changes within political turmoil until the next (Djelic & Quack 2007:161). Creating a chain of events and improvements which might never have been successfully implemented otherwise.

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When it comes to the comparison of trust from the Banking Union, these figures show a comparison from 2012 when implemented, and 2015, a year after the Banking Union was in full effect:

Table 4. EU citizens response to “Tend to trust” the EU in percentage across the EU in 2012 and 2015.

Tend to Trust 2012 Tend to Trust 2015

33% 32%

(Eurobarometer 2012:75, 2015b:55). The general trust of the EU has thereby decreased by one percentage point. However, this does not tell very much since the level of trust is horrific. It does however tell that there was a clear decline in trust for the EU in a rather long time, giving an indication that the European citizens did not see the best in the EU during this time, giving a window of opportunity for Eurosceptic actors. However, economic figures were also presented at the beginning of this section, this has on the other hand improved:

Table 5: EU citizens response to “The EU economy is good” in percentage across the EU in 2012 and 2015.

The European Economy is good 2012 The European Economy is good 2015

19% 38% (Eurobarometer 2012:19, 2015b:10). From an economic standpoint, the European citizens seem to believe that the economy of the EU has become better, which could have something to do with the implementation of the Banking Union. It could also be argued that these numbers are what they are since the economic crisis was at an end in 2015. However, unemployment was still at a high in 2015 (Eurobarometer 2015b:10). This leaves the indication that the Banking Union at least gave a somewhat of an economic effect.

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4.3 The EU Migrant Relocation and Resettlement Scheme

The EU migrant relocation and resettlement scheme was a direct response to the migration crisis. The scheme was meant as a plan to relocate the incoming migrants, which the vast majority came to Greece, Malta, and Italy (Duszczyk et.al 2020:470). Before the scheme, it was said that the ones seeking asylum should do so by seeking asylum in their country of entry. However, this became too much for Greece, Malta, and Italy to handle, so they sought out to the EU for help (Duszczyk et.al 2020:470- 471). In doing so, creating one of the largest discussions and political disagreements in the EU’s history. The response divided the member states into two blocks, where on the one side stood Sweden, Germany, and the Netherlands, accepting, and urging other member states to help the countries in need. On the other side stood The Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia (V4 group), who were not willing to accept asylum seekers (Duszczyk et.al 2020:470-471).

The underlying idea with the response can be seen as both political and humanitarian. As one foot stood for political aid to support the countries with the closest borders to the main flow of refugees. As well as one foot on the humanitarian, because the less than secure ways of transport resulted in deaths of many people trying to cross the Mediterranean (European Parliament 2021:1). The relocation of asylum seekers in order to aid the southern borders was set in action in 2015 and had the set date to end in 2017, but the legal obligation to accept asylum seekers did not end fully in 2017 (ibid.). However, to decide in which member states the asylum seekers were to be relocated, the decision was based on some core factors. There are four factors deemed to be key, the national GDP of the country the asylum seekers were to be distributed to, population, unemployment and numbers of asylum seekers already existing in that member state (European Parliament 2021:1). Moreover, the EU created a budgetary fund, aiding each member state financially for every relocation made (ibid.). However, just 98.000 people were registered to have been relocated between 2015-2017 (European Commission 2017). Relatively small number considering there were 1,2 million asylum seekers registered in Europe in 2016 and 650,000 in 2017 (Duszczyk et.al 2020:470).

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The one, if not the most interesting about this scheme is the political clash it created. As mentioned earlier the member states had strong disagreements with each other. Even though the European Parliament voted it to pass with a relatively large majority both times, in the 1st act and the second one just two months after (European Parliament 2021:1), the clashes made created a large uprising among member states, which undoubtedly affected the European citizens as well. In fact, in 2020 the Court of Justice of the European Union deemed Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic as they failed their obligations by refusing to follow the scheme under European Union law (CVRIA 2020).

Thus, this response provides another example where the whole EU was affected, such as Europe 2020, but in a more direct way which led to immediate action.

4.3.1 The European citizens’ trust in the EU in 2015

To gain context of the support of the EU from the public view, a short presentation of the level of trust amongst the European citizens will be presented. The resettlement scheme was introduced in full effect in July 2015 (European Parliament 2021:1). Therefore, a look at the Eurobarometer issued in autumn 2015 will be the basis.

The general overall trust for the EU in the autumn of 2015 was at a low. An overall 32% saying that they tend to trust the EU, leaving 55% to say that they tend not to trust the EU (Eurobarometer 2015b:55). Going from member states to member states, there are some clear differences between them. Having geographical differences where northern European member states have a higher level of trust than the south. To give an overall clear picture, the graph presented shows an overview of all the member states, where the percentage shows how many of the citizens tend to trust the EU:

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Figure 4. EU citizens response to “Tend to trust” the EU in percentage across the EU member states in 2015.

Tend to Trust the EU (%) 70 59 58 60 47 46 46 45 50 44 44 44 42 42 41 40 39 39 37 37 40 33 31 30 28 27 30 26 26 25 23 18 17 20 10

0

FI SI

IE IT

SE PT PL ES

LT EE FR EL

BE SK CZ

LU NL LV DE AT

RO BG HR CY

DK HU UK MT

(Eurobarometer 2015b:55) As the figure shows, there are a lot of differences between the citizens of the member states and their trust in the EU. Romania and Lithuania being the only member states with a value of over 50% saying that they trust the EU. Cyprus and Greece showing a remarkably low percentage of people who trust the EU, under 20%. Accompanied by many member states which show a trust below 30%.

Thus, providing an interesting geographical profile of the context shortly after the introduction of the Resettlement Scheme. Especially concerning Romania and Greece. Romania, as a strong advocator for not accepting refugees to be at such a high trust towards the EU, meanwhile the percentage is more in line with Greece since they were at the forefront of the crisis itself, the low percentage of trust has more reasoning behind it (Duszczyk et.al 2020:470-471).

4.3.2 Identifying a mechanism for Euroscepticism in the case of the Resettlement Scheme.

To start with the most obvious indicator and arguably the strongest focal point of the migration crisis, is the different perspectives on migrants and refugees by the member states. As the introductory part of the Resettlement scheme covered, there was a situation of clear opposite views between the member states. The Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia were openly against taking in refugees.

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And on the other side was Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden who had a strong stance on helping the refugees on EU territory (Duszczyk et.al 2020:470-471).

Why the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia did not vote for and opposed the Resettlement scheme comes from different various narratives. In the case of Hungary, it was because of the increasing flow of refugees into their borders. In 2015, Hungary got the penultimate amount of asylum applications in the whole of the EU (Duszczyk et.al 2020:474). However, if the case of too many refugees was the real problem, one would think that the rational choice would be to accept the resettlement scheme, as it would work in their favor to resettle some of the asylum seekers. That would not seem to be the case. Orban, the prime minister of Hungary started with a rather aggressive anti-immigration rhetoric. Claiming that none of the refugees entering Hungary wanted to stay, but to go through Hungary. As well as rhetoric that the “invasion of refugees” only led to human trafficking victims and humanitarian activist, which would weaken the national state (Duszczyk et.al 2020:474). The Czech Republic's answer to why they did not want to vote for the Settlement scheme was because of the risk to split Europe into two halves (ibid.). Likely a reference towards the already splitting camps within Europe since the economic crisis, which created a wedge between states who could manage it relatively well and for those who could not. In response to the introduction of the Resettlement Scheme, however, Czechia changed its internal laws, strengthening its asylum policies (Duszczyk et.al 2020:475). Thus, making it harder for asylum seekers to gain asylum. Furthermore, a vast number of the ones who gained asylum in Czechia left by their own means (ibid.). Slovakia had the same type of reasoning as Hungary, mainly complaining that the Resettlement Scheme was an intrusion from the EU, weakening the national state. Thus, using the EU as an actor to blame within this situation. The real reason though seemed to be the fear of Muslims, as a result of recent terror attacks at the time. Even restraining harder laws, one law was implemented so that it should be more clear which religion one may practice (Duszczyk et.al 2020:475). Poland answered with the same coin as Slovakia. Furthering the discourse about the fear from the terror attacks previously seen. Poland was however clear on separating the politics and the humanitarian narratives separate from each other. Claiming that they accepted a response from the EU

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regarding the migration crisis but did not want to accept asylum seekers within their own borders, they were rather advocating for humanitarian aid on the scene of the crisis (Duszczyk et.al 2020:476). The economic narrative was also a common factor within all the mentioned member states. Claiming that the migration and hosting of asylum seekers went beyond their economic capability (ibid.).

So, the background from the countries which were directly in opposition towards the resettlement scheme had some differences and many similarities on why they did not want asylum seekers into their national borders. This does however make a clear understanding of a potential mechanism for Euroscepticism. The hard facts themselves being the clear evidence, the member states in the v4 group stating clear reasons why they opposed the response. But also the countries which were very opted for the scheme, mainly Sweden, Germany, and the Netherlands. Resulting in a direct wedge between the member states as a result of the response.

Another factor that is easy to identify is the cultural wedge created naturally with the migration crisis. In the case of Greece for example, which had a very low trust towards the EU, there are some core cultural questions at hand. However, one must remember the paradox which the Resettlement Scheme comes with. When discussing cultural differences, it is easy to see it as a part of the xenophobic discourse which came along with the migration crisis. The paradox being that countries have the ability to vote for the scheme, thus seeming humanitarian, but at the same time also vote to relocate refugees from their own borders. Thus, getting the opportunity to aid but at the same time get the refugees out of their own borders, therefore inviting the xenophobic discourse. Nevertheless, the situation becomes even more difficult when discussing it from the perspective of Greece, since the Resettlement Scheme had a large part in helping Greece from an economic perspective.

However, in the sense of Greece, it is hard to look either way since they had the majority of refugees coming into Europe, thus having economic legitimacy to ask for aid. There was however a cultural narrative within the migration crisis which could be a clear indicator of Euroscepticism. In the center of the migration crisis, the majority of the Greek population had a positive attitude towards the refugees

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(Kirtsoglou & Tsimouris 2018:1880). However, like the other countries discussed at this point, there was a concern amongst the population against the “Muslim culture” (ibid.). In the case of Greece, compared to a lot of other member states within the EU, they do not in any way indulge in a secular culture. Thus, the Orthodox Church gained a lot of popularity amongst the Greek population, creating a wedge between many of the Greek citizens and the refugees within the borders (Kirtsoglou & Tsimouris 2018:1881). There were also instances where the migrants were not accepted into the Greek culture. One strong point was from a national perspective. In many cases seeing an economic hierarchy difference between the natives and the migrants. Thus, creating a stance and perception of how a migrant should behave or not behave (Kirtsoglou & Tsimouris 2018:1884-85).

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4.3.3 Summary of the Resettlement Scheme

So, how does all this bottle down as a mechanic for Euroscepticism? The strongest focal point is the fraction between the member states. In the v4 groups perspective, an indicator of discontent was found because of forced migration. And in Greece, the situation of internal dividing groups of migrants and native Greeks. It all gives a strong indication that the EU might been too late to put the resettlement scheme into action. Moreover, the unsuccessful result of the response could also be an indicator of discontent, since only 19200 asylum seekers were actually relocated (European Commission 2017).

Even though the indicators of the mechanism come from mostly the same perspective, it is clear that it is following the minimal sufficient explanation of the outcome. So, what has been identifiable here in the Resettlement Scheme is:

Table 6. Mechanism explaining Euroscepticism in the Resettlement Scheme.

The Cause Mechanism Outcome

1. Economic differences between

member states. The Migration 2. Cultural clashes. Euroscepticism Crisis 3. Different views of action. 4. Geographical differences in the impact of the crisis.

What might be the most interesting part when looking at the result from the Resettlement Scheme is the many processes of path dependencies, both for the EU and Eurosceptic actors. As we know, a path dependency is strongly identified as an event that will affect other events at a later time (Djelic & Quack 2007:161). From all the path dependencies looked upon in this study, the Resettlement Scheme seems to have the longest chain event of goals achieved from both the goals of the EU and Eurosceptic actors.

As in the perspective of the EU, the migration crisis and the Resettlement Scheme coincide with their strategy presented in Europe 2020. One factor the European

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Commission pointed out in Europe 2020 was that the ageing population in Europe could be troublesome in the near future since there would be a generation gap within the labor market (European Commission 2010:16-17). Thus, creating a situation where there could be too few people within the labor market. To issue this, labor immigration was a target, with a goal of making more attractive policy changes to increase the view of Europe as an interesting destination for labor migrants (European Commission 2010:16-17). Although the migration crisis was firstly a humanitarian act, one cannot disregard the fact that the path dependency created by the migration crisis worked in favor of the EU within this perspective.

However, the Relocation Scheme also worked in favor of Eurosceptic actors. As seen in the example of Hungary and Slovakia, who used the Resettlement Scheme as a rhetoric tool to claim that the EU intruded on their national interest, weakening their national state. So, there is an argument that the path dependency being the Resettlement Scheme, created a uniquely visible opportunity for both the EU to gain their own goals, as well as the Eurosceptic actors to use the Resettlement scheme as fuel for Eurosceptic tendencies. Thus, strengthening the argument as to why the migrant crisis resulted in more Euroscepticism as well as going in line with the outgoing hypothesis stated in this thesis. As Stockemer et.al (2020) found that the migration crisis did not create an increase in anti-immigration attitude, which is often linked to Euroscepticism, it leaves the indication from the result that the migration crisis increased Euroscepticism in other factors than the anti-immigration narrative.

Overall, what makes the migration crisis and the Resettlement scheme unique in the sense of being seen as a critical juncture and path dependency from a Historical Institutionalism perspective, is the involvement of the whole EU. More often than not, institutions are not affected in the same matter of a critical juncture (Capoccia & Kelemen 2007:349). However, the migration crisis in this sense actually did with the combination of the Resettlement Scheme. In the beginning, the migration crisis did not affect the whole EU, it was mostly the countries with borders closest to the refugees. However, by installing the Resettlement Scheme, the EU automatically made the migration crisis an effect on all member states. In fact, Trauner (2016:322) argues that the northern member states got hit harder by the consequences of the

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crisis than the southern member states since the refugees only settled in few particular member states in the north. Thus, making the migration crisis a critical juncture that is rather different from the economic crisis.

The type of Euroscepticism found with the Resettlement Scheme would be more linked in policy Euroscepticism and national interest Euroscepticism, which coincide with soft Euroscepticism (Taggart & Szczerbiak 2004:4). The result showed this is in the view of the v4 group for example. Where it could be seen that the member states within this group did not accept the legislation itself, which created a clash within the member states. They did not, however, show any indication of being totally opposed towards the EU itself, thus not being identified as hard Euroscepticism, but Eurosceptic, nonetheless.

So, what did the Resettlement Scheme do for the trust in the EU? To compare with the percentage of trust 2015, the numbers presented will be taken from the Eurobarometer 2017, when the Resettlement Scheme was set to be at its end. The member states shown are the same member states used in the contextual numbers shown in 2015:

Figure 5. EU citizens response to “Tend to trust” the EU in percentage across the EU member states in 2015.

Tend to Trust the EU (%) 70 59 58 60 47 46 46 45 50 44 44 44 42 42 41 40 39 39 37 37 40 33 31 30 28 27 30 26 26 25 23 18 17 20 10

0

FI SI

IE IT

SE PT PL ES

LT EE FR EL

BE SK CZ

LU NL LV DE AT

RO BG HR CY

DK HU UK MT (Eurobarometer 2015b:55)

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Figure 6. EU citizens response to “Tend to trust” the EU in percentage across the EU member states in 2017.

Tend to Trust the EU (%) 70 64 57 56 60 53 53 52 52 51 51 51 50 50 49 49 48 47 50 45 44 43 39 38 38 36 35 34 33 40 29 30 23 20 10

0

FI SI

IE IT

SE PT ES PL

LT EE EL

FR

BE SK CZ

LU NL DE LV AT

BG RO HR CY

DK HU UK MT (Eurobarometer 2017:13) As one can see, the percentage of people who tends to trust the EU has increased in every member state except Romania, where the percentage has dropped a bit since 2015. Since the overview of the Resettlement Scheme had a focus on Hungary, Poland, Czechia, Slovakia, and Greece, it seems only relevant to highlight them particularly to see how the percentage in these particular member states differs from 2015 to 2017:

Table 7. Citizens of Hungary, Poland, Czechia, Slovakia, and Greece responds to “Tend to Trust” the EU in percentage in 2015.

HU PL CZ SK EL

41% 37% 27% 39% 18%

(Eurobarometer 2015b:55)

Table 8. Citizens of Hungary, Poland, Czechia, Slovakia, and Greece responds to “Tend to Trust” the EU in percentage in 2017.

HU PL CZ SK EL

49% 43% 35% 48% 23%

(Eurobarometer 2017:13) Aligned with the rest of the member states, except for Romania, the specific member states focused on these figures have also gained an increase in trust towards the EU. Also, like Stockemer et.al (2020), the statistics provided from the Eurobarometer showed no tendencies in increased Euroscepticism, based on the

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notion that the level of trust in the EU is seen as an indicator of Euroscepticism. This is odd considering that there is an increase in Euroscepticism overall (Stockemer et.al 2020). However, maybe the argument Stockemer et.al (2020) mentioned is correct, that the migration crisis had a more domestic debate, which turned the focus away from the EU. Nevertheless, as a mechanism for minimal sufficient explanation has been presented, the argument that even though the trust levels for the EU has gone up, the crisis itself can be viewed as a platform that provided Eurosceptic actors to thrive. Thus, an explanation could be that the migration crisis increased Euroscepticism in an indirect way, without the EU at the center of attention.

5 Conclusion The association of crises being responsible for Euroscepticism is a common one. While providing explanatory perspectives to how the relationship works, there has been no concrete explanation as to why the crises would lead to an increase in Euroscepticism. In this study, Euroscepticism has once again been the focus of analysis to provide an additional perspective of the relationship between the crises and Euroscepticism. By using process-tracing, the result has provided an in-depth look at what the mechanisms that create the relationship consists of. By using three of the responses issued by the EU towards the crises as a foundation. The processes and reactions done by the entities allowed for an overall view and understanding of what the mechanisms could be understood as.

The outgoing questions for the study were how the citizen’s support for the EU shifted regarding the EU’s response, as well as if the level of Euroscepticism increased as a result of the responses. The results show that the level of Euroscepticism and support for the EU varied regarding the various responses. Regarding Europe 2020, the level of trust towards the EU had gone down significantly during the five initial years of the response, trending slightly upwards in 2015. It also saw a diversion among the member states, creating two blocks between the northern member states and the southern member states. Seeing critical differences between the trust in the EU, where the citizens in the northern member states had a higher tendency to trust the EU than the southern citizens. This could

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also be identified in the levels in Euroscepticism, where the collective goals set in Europe 2020 was met with more discrepancy from the southern member states. Thus, leaving the interpretation by the mechanism and the level of trust from the citizens that the southern member states had generally a higher Eurosceptic tendency than the northern member states. Moreover, the case of Europe 2020 went in line with the outgoing hypothesis that the responses made by the EU could be identified as path dependencies for Eurosceptic actors. This was confirmed by seeing the gap between the member states. Where the inequality of possibility for member states to gain progress for EU’s collective goal could be used by actors to pinpoint EU’s goal going against the national goal for the member state.

The same general result could be seen in the Banking Union. Where the citizen’s trust towards the EU had decreased since the introduction of the response and three years after. Thus, showing a tendency in increasing Euroscepticism by the decline in trust, but also with the reactions by the entities against the response. Showing structural and national differences between the member states, which raise a concern about a change towards supranational governance. The mechanism could be identified as including both cultural and economic factors which could explain an increase in Euroscepticism. The hypothesis was also confirmed, where the introduction of the Banking Union could be used as an advocator for member states to turn away from joining the union. This was however found to be highly circumstantial depending on the culture and structure of the member state in question.

The EU Migrant Relocation Scheme and Resettlement Scheme showed a different result compared to the other responses. Here, the level of trust had gone up since the introduction of the response. Showing that the EU response gained trust from the European Citizens. Moreover, the outgoing hypothesis was therefore proven wrong, as the result showed that there was no increase in Euroscepticism due to the response. There was however enough to show a minimal explanation of how the crisis could lead to Euroscepticism, thus an identifiable mechanism. An alternative explanation was presented, that the response led to an increase of popularity for political actors who have Eurosceptic tendencies, which would show within the political sphere of the member states, not the EU. Thus, not being clearly connected

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to the EU in the same way as Europe 2020 and the Banking Union. That is however speculation from the result itself.

In general, this study where able to investigate the relationship between the crises in the EU and Euroscepticism. Thus, showing mechanisms that gives an explanation to why the cause and the outcome are connected. Furthermore, the results gave an overview of how the responses changed citizens support for the EU, as well as how the responses could lead, or not lead to increasing Euroscepticism and what type of Euroscepticism. The citizen’s support went down from 2010 to 2015 but was increasing in 2017. Showing that the support and trust for the EU shift with the crises and the responses made by the EU, but the level of trust in the EU does not decline in the long run. The outgoing hypotheses were confirmed that a crisis can be used as a window of opportunity for Eurosceptic actors, as well as being identifiable as path dependencies of their own. The most interesting notion though being the case with the migration crisis. Which showed that a crisis does not directly show a relationship of decreasing trust of the European Citizens. Thus, leaving the question of what led to increasing Euroscepticism if not the crisis itself. The mechanism did, however, show tendencies for Euroscepticism which could be investigated further in future research, to get a clearer answer to why the migration crisis showed a higher level of trust in the EU when the economic crisis did not.

The study also showed that using process tracing in specific cases when studying the relationship between crises and an increase in Euroscepticism depends on the critical juncture. This leaves the indication that future research on other crises such as Brexit or the Covid-19 could provide a further understanding of the relationship.

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