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A MACRO-FINANCIAL MODEL of the EUROZONE ARCHITECTURE EMBEDDED in the GLOBAL OFFSHORE US-DOLLAR SYSTEM Steffen Murau

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A MACRO-FINANCIAL MODEL of the EUROZONE ARCHITECTURE EMBEDDED in the GLOBAL OFFSHORE US-DOLLAR SYSTEM Steffen Murau Global Economic Governance Initiative GEGI STUDY | July 2020 A MACRO-FINANCIAL MODEL OF THE EUROZONE ARCHITECTURE EMBEDDED IN THE GLOBAL OFFSHORE US-DOLLAR SYSTEM Steffen Murau Global Economic Governance Initiative GEGI STUDY | July 2020 A MACRO-FINANCIAL MODEL OF THE EUROZONE ARCHITECTURE EMBEDDED IN THE GLOBAL OFFSHORE US-DOLLAR SYSTEM Steffen Murau Funded by German Research Foundation Table of Contents Abbreviations v Executive Summary vi Acknowledgments vii 1. Introduction 01 2. Conceptualizing a Monetary Architecture 06 Outline 06 Monetary Jurisdictions 06 Segments 07 Institutions 07 Instruments 08 Elasticity Space 09 Summary 11 3. Central Banking 12 Outline 12 Institutions 13 Instruments 13 Elasticity Space 15 Summary 16 4. Commercial Banking 17 Outline 17 Institutions 17 Instruments 18 Elasticity Space 18 Summary 20 5. Non-Bank Financial Institutions and Shadow Banking 21 Outline 21 Institutions 21 Instruments 23 Elasticity Space 24 Summary 24 6. Fiscal Ecosystem 25 Outline 25 Institutions 25 Instruments 29 Elasticity Space 31 Summary 32 7. Conclusion 33 References 35 About the Author 42 iii List of Figures Figure 1 — The Eurozone architecture embedded in the global Offshore US-Dollar System 04 Figure 2 — Template balance sheet with contingent and actual instruments 10 Figure 3 — The central banking segment in the Eurozone architecture 12 Figure 4 — The central banking segment in the Eurozone architecture 12 Figure 5 — Central bank money before and after the Euro introduction 14 Figure 6 — The central banking segment in the Eurozone architecture 17 Figure 7 — Shadow banking in the Eurozone architecture 22 Figure 8 — The Eurozone fiscal ecosystem 26 Figure 9 — The US fiscal ecosystem 27 Figure 10 — The transition towards the European Stability Mechanism 30 iv Abbreviations ABCP asset-backed commercial paper FRF French Franc ABSs asset-backed securities F-RRP Foreign Reverse Repo AFD Agence Française du Développement FSB Financial Stabilty Board BdF Banque de France FX foreign exchange BdI Banca d’Italia GBP British pound BIS Bank for International Settlement GSEs Government-Sponsored Enterprises BMF Bundesministerium für Finanzen IADB Inter-American Development Bank BMWi Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and BoP Balance of Payments Development / World Bank Buba Deutsche Bundesbank IMF International Monetary Fund CD credit default IOU Credit instrument (as in I owe you) CDP Cassa Depositi e Prestiti IPE International Political Economy CEPS Center for European Policy Studies IR interest rate DE deutsch/German IT Italian DFG Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft ITL Italian Lira DM Deutsche Mark KfW Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau DSGE Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium MBS mortgage-backed security EBdB Einlagensicherungsfonds des MFA Macro-Financial Assistance Bundesverbandes deutscher Banken MMF money market fund EBRD European Bank for Reconstruction and MMT Modern Monetary Theory Development NBFIs non-bank financial institutions ECB European Central Bank NCB national central bank ECOFIN Economic and Financial Affairs Council OBFAs off-balance-sheet fiscal agencies ECU European Currency Unit OCA Optimum Currency Area EdB Entschädigungseinrichtung deutscher OLA Orderly Liquidation Authority Banken GmbH OLF Orderly Liquidation Fund EIB European Investment Bank PEPP Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme EIF European Investment Fund QE Quantitative Easing EMF European Monetary Fund RRP Reverse Repos EMU-19 European Monetary Union SDR Special Drawing Right (incl. 19 EU member states) SGP Stability and Growth Pact ESCB European System of Central Banks SRF Single Resolution Fund ESF Exchange Stabilization Fund SPV Special Purpose Vehicle ERM Exchange Rate Mechanism STS Simple, transparent, and standardized ESRB European Systemic Risk Board TARGET Trans-European Automated Real-time Gross ESM European Stability Mechanism Settlement Express Transfer System Euratom European Atomic Energy Community TARP Troubled Asset Relief Program EU-27 European Union TFEU Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (incl. all 27 member states) US United States FDIC Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation USD US-Dollar FGD Fondo di garanzia dei depositanti FGDR Fonds de Garantie des Dépôts et de Résolution $ US-Dollar FoF Flow of Funds € Euro FR French ¤ other units of account v Executive Summary onetary union has been a centerpiece of the The model portrays two monetary jurisdictions— European integration project. The design of the US and the Eurozone—which have a hierarchical Mthe Eurozone 1.0 (1999-2009) subordinated relationship. Each monetary jurisdiction is subdivided national central banks to the supranational ECB but into four segments of central banks, commercial it neither introduced a supranational fiscal institution banks, non-bank financial institutions and a fiscal nor did it harmonize Eurozone banking systems. The ecosystem. Different institutions are located within historically unprecedented monetary reform was these segments, represented as balance sheets. met with widespread skepticism from the start. The These have a hierarchical relationship with each other Eurocrisis (2009-12) seemed to prove critics right. as well, and interlock through the instruments they Despite profound changes in the Eurozone 2.0 (since hold as assets and liabilities. This adds up to a fully 2012), it is a commonplace to describe the Eurozone self-referential credit system. Each institution has architecture as ill-constructed and unfinished. its own respective elasticity space for balance sheet Monetary architecture, however, is not a well- expansion that depends on available counterparties, defined term, and there is no consensus what the stipulations for allowed on-balance-sheet activities Eurozone architecture is beyond being a metaphor. and available contingent assets and liabilities which Credit money systems are often analyzed with inapt are provided by higher-ranking institutions and categories based on simplified fiat or commodity only become real once a crisis hits. A monetary money theories. Criteria for what makes a monetary architecture is thus a historically specific hierarchical architecture functional and complete resort to setup of segments, institutions, instruments and 1950s-style national monetary systems as normative elasticity space within a monetary jurisdiction. benchmarks that are at odds with the realities of The study advances three main arguments. First, financial globalization and miss out on shadow it stresses the centrality of the TARGET2 system for banking and offshore money as facts of our age. the Eurozone architecture to overcome challenges Against this backdrop, this study comprehensively of European monetary integration. Second, it defines monetary architecture and presents a macro- shows that despite the national fragmentation of financial model of the Eurozone architecture. Eurozone banking systems, the integration in the The study makes four conceptual choices. First, global Offshore US-Dollar System offers alternative it thinks of the Eurozone architecture as a web of cross-border lending channels such as the Eurodollar interlocking balance sheets in which every asset is market or the shadow banking system. These should another institution's liability. Some of these liabilities be understood as part of the Eurozone architecture. function as money for other balance sheets that Third, it suggests that notions of a 'finished' hold them as assets. Second, it treats the Eurozone monetary architecture are misleading as institutions, as a peripheral monetary jurisdiction in the US- instruments and elasticity space are in constant flux. dominated international monetary system, termed The model serves as starting point for follow-up "Offshore US-Dollar System". This is a systemic research. For instance, it can be used for descriptive view on globalized finance which stands in contrast and theoretical analyses of institutional change, to traditional bottom-up views on the Eurozone as the creation and maintenance of hierarchy, or crisis formerly independent national monetary systems. dynamics and systemic risk. In terms of prescriptive Third, it perceives the Eurozone as having a 'fiscal work, it offers a framework for developing and ecosystem' of national and supranational treasuries comparing policy proposals or building scenarios and 'off-balance-sheet fiscal agencies'. Fourth, it for the systemic implications of policy interventions defines the fiscal ecosystem's role in a monetary or endogenous transformations. This is particularly architecture as issuing bonds to close treasuries’ relevant as the year 2020, given the Covid-19 crisis budget deficits, create public goods, supply safe and the political responses to it, likely marks the assets, and provide capital insurance of last resort. transition to a Eurozone 3.0. vi Acknowledgments his study is part of the research project “Hierarchical and Hybrid Money on a Fractured Continent: Europe’s Monetary Architecture after the Eurocrisis” (2019-21), funded by Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft T(DFG). It is the first in a series of successive studies that adopt an institutionalist view on the Eurozone and use the conceptual framework of interlocking balance sheets on the global Offshore US-Dollar System. The analytical interest of the project is to understand the Eurozone architecture as a genuine credit money system. This study develops a methodology that provides the necessary “grammar” to carry out future research which
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