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Factual Inquiry Into the Airspace Closure Above and Around Eastern Ukraine in Relation to the Downing of Flight MH17 Flight Safety Foundation

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Factual Inquiry Into the Airspace Closure Above and Around Eastern Ukraine in Relation to the Downing of Flight MH17 Flight Safety Foundation Factual inquiry into the airspace closure above and around eastern Ukraine in relation to the downing of Flight MH17 Flight Safety Foundation JANUARY 2021 Table of Contents About Flight Safety Foundation ........................................................................................................................................................ 1 Executive Summary .......................................................................................................................................................................... 2 Purpose ......................................................................................................................................................................................................... 2 Background ................................................................................................................................................................................................... 2 Scope ............................................................................................................................................................................................................. 2 Inquiry Limitations ........................................................................................................................................................................................ 3 Hostile Events Analysis: 1985–2020 .............................................................................................................................................................. 4 Conflict Zones Analysis: 1990–2014 .............................................................................................................................................................. 5 Airspace Restrictions Over and Around Eastern Ukraine ................................................................................................................................. 7 Collecting Information About Ukraine and Russian Federation Threat Awareness ......................................................................................... 8 Ukraine Awareness of Threat to Civil Aircraft ................................................................................................................................................ 10 Russian Federation Awareness of Threat to Civil Aircraft .............................................................................................................................. 12 1. Introduction ............................................................................................................................................................................14 1.1. Purpose ................................................................................................................................................................................................ 14 1.2. Background .......................................................................................................................................................................................... 14 1.3. Scope ................................................................................................................................................................................................... 15 1.4. Inquiry Limitations ............................................................................................................................................................................... 15 1.5. Definitions ........................................................................................................................................................................................... 16 2. Overall Framework ..................................................................................................................................................................17 3. Hostile Events Analysis: 1985–2020 .........................................................................................................................................19 3.1. Purpose of the Hostile Events Analysis ................................................................................................................................................. 19 3.2. Hostile Events Sample .......................................................................................................................................................................... 20 3.3. Airspace Restrictions and Hostile Events .............................................................................................................................................. 20 3.4. Targeted Aircraft .................................................................................................................................................................................. 20 3.5. Capability to Attack .............................................................................................................................................................................. 25 3.6. Risk and Capability Engagement Altitude ............................................................................................................................................ 26 3.7. Intentional vs. Unintentional Attack ..................................................................................................................................................... 27 3.8. Hostile Events and Conflict Zone Flights ............................................................................................................................................... 27 4. Conflict Zones Analysis: 1990–2014 ..........................................................................................................................................28 4.1. Purpose of the Conflict Zones Analysis ................................................................................................................................................. 28 4.2. Conflict Zones Sample .......................................................................................................................................................................... 28 4.3. Conflict Zone Indicators ........................................................................................................................................................................ 28 4.4. Overview of the Conflict Zone Analysis ................................................................................................................................................. 30 4.5. Discussion of the Conflict Zone Analysis ............................................................................................................................................... 32 5. Airspace Restrictions Over and Around Eastern Ukraine .............................................................................................................34 5.1. Objectives of the Airspace Restrictions Analysis ................................................................................................................................... 34 5.2. Scope of the Airspace Restrictions Analysis .......................................................................................................................................... 34 5.3. Technical Background........................................................................................................................................................................... 34 5.3.1. Background .............................................................................................................................................................................. 34 5.3.2. Airspace Sovereignty, FIRs and ATS Routes ............................................................................................................................... 34 FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH17 i | 5.3.3. Airspace Restrictions................................................................................................................................................................. 34 5.3.4. NOTAM ...................................................................................................................................................................................... 35 5.4. Analysis of the NOTAMs ........................................................................................................................................................................ 36 5.5. Adopted Format for NOTAM Description ............................................................................................................................................... 36 5.6. Ukraine Airspace Restrictions Timeline ................................................................................................................................................. 37 5.6.1. NOTAM A0820/14, Issued on 24 April 2014 ............................................................................................................................... 37 5.6.2. NOTAM A0942/14, Issued on 05 May 2014 ............................................................................................................................... 38 5.6.3. NOTAM A1219/14, Issued on 02 June 2014 ..............................................................................................................................
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