Fiji's Role in the South Pacific Forum, 1971-198*1

FIJI'S ROLE IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC FORUM, 1971-198*1.

SANDRA TARTE

A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Bachelor of Arts (Honours), in the Department of Political Science University of Melbourne, October 1985.

INTRODUCTION

This thesis aims to examine Fiji's role (that is, policies

and actions) in the South Pacific Forum in the period 1971 -

1984. It is a subject of intrinsic interest and importance.

At the same time, however, it provides a case study of how a ;

small, new state has sought to play a role in regional and

international affairs . There are two broad reasons for

examining Fiji's role in the South Pacific Forum (SPF) and

these serve to define the essential objectives of this thesis.

The first reason relates to the significance of the SPF.I As

an annual meeting of the Heads of Government of independent

and self-governing South Pacific nations (including Australia

and New Zealand), the SPF is the highest regional authority

for dealing with key political, economic and security issues concerning the region. It is widely considered to be the most important political organisation in the South Pacific, and to play a paramount role in the formulation of regional policies . j

For Fiji, the SPF is the "most important forum for discussion p between all Pacific Island leaders" . A key to this importance is the fact that the SPF is at the apex of regional cooperation in the South Pacific, which is a cornerstone of Fiji's foreign policy. In analysing Fiji's policies and actions in the SPF, one objective is to identify how and why the SPF, as a vehicle of regional cooperation, has served an important function in Fiji's foreign policy; and to determine to what extent Fiji's role in the SPF has furthered specific national aspirations and priorities.

' The second, and perhaps more compelling reason why Fiji's role in the SPF is of interest and importance, stems from the widely held view of Fiji as a leader, or at least a prominent actor, in the SPF. Fiji has often been regarded as a "spokesperson" for the SPF, as an initiator of Forum action and as exercising a significant influence over Forum policies. This role is seen to have had important implications for regional cooperation in the South Pacific. {

I Peter Boyce and Richard Herr have argued, for example: Fiji's leadership has played a major role in construct- ing a spirit of regional community in the South Pacific; and her far-sighted and energetic Prime Minister has been a prime architect in the process-,. ) I Fiji's leaders, in particular, uphold the view that Fiji L_. has exercised a prominent role in the SPF and that this has benefited the region as a whole. Fiji's Prime Minister, Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara (hereafter referred to>Ratu Mara ), stated in an address in 1982 that Fiji has played a leading role in "voicing the concerns and aspirations of the people of the Pacific", He continued: / It has been a combination of circumstances,, some historically induced, and our willingness to help wherever possible, that has facilitated Fiji's assumption of a leadership role in the affairs of the South Pacific... We in Fiji have endeavoured to 'pull our weight' commensurate with our resources, in the interests of the people of our region...„. There are those who see Fiji's role in the SPF in less favourable terms however: that Fiji has sought to dominat the SPF and to accrue disproportionate benefits from y regional endeavours. (__Ron Crocombe argues, for example, that Fiji has "exploited" its comparative advantages in the region to further its own interests, but at the expense of other Island countries . [Perceptions of Fiji acting in this way have had, according to some analysts, an adverse effect on regionalism. Greg Fry, a noted specialist on South Pacific regionalism, has observed that "tensions related to Fiji's position in the regional movement have probably had some lasting effects ... Nearly all Pacific countries have moved to more nationalistic positions" . While Mary Low, in her study of Fiji's forei policy, noted that', "the functional aspects of regional cooperation appear to have been affected by underlying Q uncertainties about Fijian intentions" .

The second objective, in analysing Fiji's policies and actions in the SPF, is thus to assess: a) To what extant Fiji has assumed a prominent or leading role in the SPF; b) Whether 'leadership' of the SPF has been consciously pursued by Fiji's leaders or has resulted more from a "combination of circumstances"; c) In what way Fiji may have influenced Forum policies; and d) to what extent Fiji's role in the SPF can be seen to have positively and/ or adversely affected regional cooperation. This thesis will not attempt to consider all possible aspects of these questions since to do this would require looking beyond the SPF to other regional institutions. Attention will focus on certain key issues dealt with in the SPF and will not encompass the whole range of issues and incidences that have concerned the SPF. In addition, this thesis will not examine in detail Fiji's relations with other Island member countries of the SPF and these countries' perceptions of Fiji ; nor will it attempt a rigorous cost-benefit analysis when exploring the extent to which Fiji accrues q disproportionate benefits from regional cooperation .

What this thesis does aim to achieve however, is a clearer understanding of the role of regional cooperation in Fiji's foreign policy and, more importantly, an understanding of Fiji's contribution to and influence on the regional movement, given that this has attracted and inspired some comment and criticism.

Primary research for this thesis was undertaken by the author while visiting Fiji in January and February, 1985. This visit yielded several interviews, including one with Fiji's Permanent Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Mr Jioji Kotobalavu . Key documents researched in Fiji, and referred to in this thesis, are Forum meeting communiques (these meetings are held in camera thus Summary Records are not made public), texts of statements and speeches delivered - 5 -

by Fiji's Prime Minister and other high-level foreign policy personnel, policy reviews and statements issued by the Government, statistical data of Fiji's economy and other South Pacific economies, research carried out by students of Fiji's foreign policy and South Pacific regionalism, and press reports and commentaries. The author was also granted access to some non-public documents for background briefing purposes. Evidence from these documents has been used in this paper and references are provided in the accompanying sealed envelope.

The outline of this thesis is as follows: Chapter one provides an overview of the context or the setting of Fiji's foreign policy, giving particular emphasis to those factors or variables which may influence or determine Fiji 'a role in the SPF. These include geographical, socio-political and economic characteristics, relative size and level of economic development within the region, the impact of colonialism, and the style and qualities of Fiji's leadership. Attention is also given to the relevance of regional cooperation as a strategy for diplomacy and economic development to small, Island states such as Fiji.

Chapter two examines the origins of the SPF and Fiji's role in the establishment of the SPF, as well as in the development of an indigenous Pacific Island regionalism. This Chapter aims to define the factors shaping Fiji's emergence - 6 -

as a prominent actor in regional affairs, the significance of Fiji's role (to the establishment of the SPF), Fiji's underlying motives for supporting regional cooperation and the SPF, and the impact of Fiji's role at the time of the Forum's inauguration and in its early years.

The third Chapter analyses Fiji's policies and actions on some key political issues that have concerned the SPF. This Chapter aims to assess the extent to which Fiji's role in the SPF has enhanced certain national aspirations and priorities; how far Fiji has assumed a prominent or leading role; and whether Fiji has influenced Forum policies on these issues .

Chapter four examines Fiji's policies and actions on some key economic issues that have concerned the SPF. As in the previous Chapter, this Chapter aims to assess the utility of regional cooperation for Fiji. However it also attempts to assess the extent to which Fiji accrues disproportionate benefits from regional cooperation in the economic sphere; to determine whether Fiji's role in the SPF on these issues has tended to accentuate disparities or inequities within the region (as far as the benefits of regional cooperation are distributed) and whether Fiji's role has had an impact on the "functional aspects of regional cooperation". This chapter will be followed by a conclusion. The remainder of this introduction will outline the structure, method of functioning and scope of activity of the SPF."j As noted earlier, the SPF i.3 an annual meeting, usually of the Heads of Government of independent and self- governing South Pacific countries, and includes Australia and New Zealand. The inaugural meeting was held in Wellington, New Zealand in August 1971 and was attended by the leaders of Fiji, Tonga, Western Samoa, the Cook Islands and Nauru . Australia and New Zealand were present as observers, however they were later admitted as full members.

The following countries, which are either independent or self-governing, applied for and were granted membership: Papua New Guinea (1974), Niue (1975), Kiribati (1977), the Solomon Islands (1978), Tuvalu (1978) and Vanuatu (1980). The Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) was granted observer status in 1980.

/ The SPF is essentially self-regulating. It has no formal charter or rules. There is no voting system and decisions are reached by consensus. Meetings are informal and held in camera. They are hosted by a different member country each year and usually last about two to three days.^]

(See Appendix One\,

In 1972 the SPF established the South Pacific Bureau for Economic Cooperation (SPEC) as its research arm and trade secretariat. In 1975 however it was decided to confer full - 8 -

1 2 secretarial functions of the Forum upon SPEC' . The SPEC headquarters are situated in Suva, Fiji.

As a subject has become of interest to the SPF and required further investigation, it has been referred to SPEC, which either undertakes research itself or coordinates studies carried out by consultants provided by international agencies or donor countries. SPEC'S most important tasks in its first years of operation were coordinating the negotiation of the terms of association of Western Samoa, Fiji and Tonga with the European Community, promoting regional trade and examining the feasibility of a regional shipping line. It subsequently began to oversee research programmes concerned with such matters as telecommunications and fisheries development 1 ".3

As Greg Fry observed: "the broadening of the Forum's field of interest has been reflected in a corresponding expansion 1 U of the Forum/SPEC institutional network" . This has taken two forms. One has been to create Ministerial Councils, with advisory boards composed of officials, to make recommendations to the SPF in certain areas of cooperation, such as civil aviation, trade and shipping. The other has been to establish semi-autonomous regional organisations to manage specific areas of cooperative activity in which a higher level of integration is being attempted. The Pacific Forum Line, Telecommunioations Training Centre, and Forum Fisheries Agency are examples of this type. ^See Appendix Two). - 9 -

The Agreement establishing SPEC specified that Australia and New Zealand would each contribute one third of the SPEC budget, with the remainder being contributed jointly by the Island members. However since 1984, a new system of payment has been introduced whereby the four smallest Forum Island countries (Tuvalu, Kiribati, Niue and the Cook Islands) pay less than the other eight Forum Island countries 1 5

It is important to note, at this point, the significance of Australia and New Zealand as members of the SPF. The inclusion of these two developed and Industrialised nations distinguishes the SPF from other regional organisations in the developing world. Australia and New Zealand are, however, generally recognised as being regional countries and having legitimate interests in the welfare of the region. More importantly, Pacific Island leaders have held the view that regional cooperation is more likely to succeed if the two metropolitan countries (as inter alia, the key trading partners of the region) are involved in the organi- sation16.

Nevertheless the disproportionate wealth and power of these two countries has tended to arouse suspicions amongst observers that Australia and New Zealand 'control' the SPF. This is mainly in view of the fact that they provide most - 7 of the funding for regional projects and institutions . It is not for this thesis to enter into the debate on this question. What is important to emphasise is that Australia - 10 -

and New Zealand are powerful and influential members of the SPF. Although Fiji may be shown in this thesis to exercise a prominent and leading role in the SPF, this is not to suggest that Fiji is a more influential member of the SPF than Australia or New Zealand.

The author is aware that this thesis is considerably longer than is recommended. However, it was the view of the author and the advice of her supervisor that, having deleted port- ions from the text, to further reduce it would significantly detract from the analysis. It was thought important to indicate this at the outset.

MOTES

1. See G. Gris, "Ten Years of Regional Cooperation: The Forum Way", Pacific Perspective, Vol. II, No, 1, p.28.

2. Mr. Jioji Kotobalavu, Fiji^ Permanent Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Interview with the author, Suva, January 1985.

3. Boyce, P. and Herr , R. "Microstate Diplomacy in the South Pacific", Australian Outlook, (28) 1974 pp. 24-35, p.25.

4. 'Ratu1 is a title signifying chiefly status in traditional Fijian society.

5. Ratu Mara, "Fiji's Role in the South Pacific11, Speech to the Asian Affairs Council, Hawaii, January 1982.

6. Professor Ron Crooombe, Director of the Institute of Pacific Studies, University of the South Pacific, Suva. Interview with the author, January 1982. Also Crocombe, The South Pacific: An Introduction, 1983 Longman Paul, New Zealand. p. 149.

- 12 -

16. This is particularly evident in statements by Ratu Mara. In 1973 he said: We were happy to be joined by Australia and New Zealand in the Forum... .Indeed , we wanted them for a special reason. For part of the ambitious plan of the Forum...was no less than to alter the whole balance of the terms of trade. (Grail Address, Corpus Christi College, Suva January 1973) . Speaking to the United Nations General Assembly in October 1976 Ratu Mara asserted: The Forum has achieved worthwhile results because it includes representatives of developed and developing nations working together side by side. ....Very different seem to me the activities of some other groups which confine their membership to those of like philosopies, politics and per- suasion and at like stages of development. From such bodies we are apt to hear numbers of pronouncements on world problems and issues and yet such declarations tend not to result in successful execution. I wonder if it is not because the very people who are expected to pay for the execution of the policies are either very much in the minority or excluded altogether...

(Both excerpts from Selected Speeches , Rt. Hon. Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara, KBE 1977) . '

17. It appears that Australia and New Zealand are sensitive to this perception. According to Ken Brassel (Australian Deputy High Commissioner to Fiji): "(We) have to be careful to ensure we are not too dominant". He sees the budget allocation as an "equitable formula: the Islands being equal to us on the basis that they contribute one third of the budget". Interview. - 13 -

CHAPTER ONE.

THE CONTEXT OF FIJI'S REGIONAL POLICIES.

1.1) LOCATION, GEOGRAPHY AND STRATEGIC FACTORS.

Fiji is situated in the mid-South Pacific between 15 and 22 degrees South latitude and 177 degrees West and 175 degrees East longitude. (See Appendix Three). It consists of about 320 islands which vary in size from 10,000 square kilometres to very small islets. About 100 islands are permanently inhabited. The capital, Suva, is located on the largest island, Viti Levu. The total land area of Fiji is 18,272 square kilometres. Since declaring a 200- nautical-miles Exclusive Economic Zone in December 1981, Fiji also has jurisdiction over about 1,290,000 square kilometres of ocean. The estimated population of Fiji in mid 1981 was 6'46 ,5001 .

Since the end of World War Two, the South Pacific region has been under Western influence and generally free of great power rivalry. The United States, Australia, New Zealand, France and - until the advent of decolonisation - the United Kingdom, have exercised political, military and economic dominance over most of the Island states. - lif -

The decolonisation process, which began in the region in the 1960 '3 and continued through the 1970's, has, howe'ver , attracted non Western powers such as the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China to take a more active interest in the affairs of the individual Island states and this has enhanced the strategic importance of the region.

This importance is further enhanced by the region's marine resources (fish and seabed minerals) which may soon become commercially exploitable on a vast scale.

Fiji gained its political independence from the United

Kingdom in October 1970. Since then Fiji has retained close links with the Commonwealth of Nations. Fiji's position in world affairs is considered by its Government to be "non-aligned and independent11 . However, Fiji is not part of the Non-Aligned Movement and its foreign policy has tended to reflect a strong pro-West orientation.

In recent years, the Fiji Government has moved towards closer ties with the United States, while signalling its firm opposition to the Soviet Union's entry into the region^.

1 .2) IMPACT OF SIZE.

According to the criterion recommended by the United

Nations Institute of Training and Research (UNITAR) - which sets a population ceiling at one million - Fiji can be h defined as a microstate . All the Island states of the South Pacific, with the exception of Papua New Guinea, qualify as microstates according to this criteria

Being a microstate, there are a number of constraints acting upon Fiji's foreign policy activities. These derive principally from elements of capability of which physical size (human and material) is the most significant variable. According to David Vital: , . . .material size is the factor which is least of all given to modification through the deliberate efforts of governments. It sets the limits of what can be attained and fixes the international role and status of the nation more securely than any other g.

An important constraint of being physically small is limited bargaining or coercive power in the international community. This derives largely from the overwhelming sense of, and fact of, national weakness. In addition, however, small new states tend to have limited machinery for conducting their foreign policy due to restrictions on finance, human resources and experience. As Boyce and Herr have observed: "Diseconomies of scale in the management of a very small state's foreign relations are not easily (i\. 7 obviated or elimated".

As a South Pacific microstate, Fiji also faces problems of limited natural resources and vast distances from its neighbours and markets. The Fiji Government has sought to emphasize regional cooperation as a way of overcoming (at least to some degree) these constraints of small size. Ratu Mara, in a speech in 1982, stated that: - 16 -

...when we were considering our constitutional evolution from our colonial status through to self-government and eventual independence, we realised that with our size and relative isolation, independence could not be entirely viable without some form of association with our neighbouring Pacific Island territoriesg.

Regional cooperation in the South Pacific takes many different forms9. The SPF essentially facilitates two main forms of cooperation. One is a kind of multilateral diplomacy, where the South Pacific microstates join together and present a common view to the outside world. This has occured on a number of varied issues including negotiations with the EEC under the Lom'e Convention, the Law of the Sea Conferences and French nuclear testing in the South Pacific. For Fiji, collective and coordinated action with other microstates strengthens its bargaining power and can be a more effective way of contributing to, and influencing, decisions or affairs beyond its shores. Furthermore, such action or diplomacy can serve to augment Fiji's overall position in the international community.

A second form of cooperation facilitated by the SPF is a pooling and rationalisation of resources. In order to achieve economies of scale and minimise the drain on the meagre resources of South Pacific nations, the SPF has initiated joint ventures and , through SPEC, coordinated regional development programmes. These have covered such areas as shipping, telecommunications, civil aviation and bulk purchasing. Such endeavours are designed essentially - 17 -

as an adjunct to national development strategies . In addition, the SPF obviates the need for separate diplomatic posts to be established by the Island states in their neighbours' capitals (as well as in Australia and New Zealand), since Island leaders can meet regularly each year on an informal and personal basis.

1.3) IMPACT OF SOCIO-POLITICAL CHARACTERISTICS.

Fiji is an ethnically plural society, a factor which distinguishes it from most' of the other South Pacific Island states. There are two main racial groups in Fiji: ethnic Fijians who make up about 46 per cent of the population and Indians who comprise about 50 per cent of the population. Outside these two groups, other races include Chinese, Rotumans, other Pacific Islanders, Europeans and persons of mixed race 11

Ethnic divisions form the basis for important social, political and economic cleavages. This has complicated the process of creating a national identity, as reflected by the lack of a common name for the people of Fiji . Race remains the basic focus of identity. According to one social scientist: "Each (race) has preserved its cultural ways and, for the most part, desires their perpetuation" 1 2. Voting patterns in general elections, which are held every five years, have tended to follow established ethnic loyal- ties, and racial issues have dominated election campaigns. - 18 -

This is underscored by the fact that the two major political parties, although supporting multiracial principles, are heavily reliant on electoral support from one racial group. The ruling Alliance party is mainly identified with Fijian Interests, while the opposition National Federation Party with Indian interests.

Institutionally, Fiji's system of Government is based on the British Westminister model, but with special constitutional and electoral adaptations to accommodate the peculier and sensitive racial mix. This is known as the Communal System. It aims to distribute political power such that a governing majority cannot result with the representatives of any one • 1 O racial group operating only on a communal basis .

As well as being culturally and politically divergent, the racial groups in Fiji occupy different economic roles and have different degrees of access to various kinds of economic activity. Broadly speaking the Europeans, part/ Europeans and Chinese manage the large foreign-owned cor- porations and other institutions, the Indians own and operate most of the medium to small-scale enterprises which includes most of the commercial farming, while the Fijians own most of the land but are still very much involved in the non-monetary though still relatively affluent subsist- ence sector. - 19 -

As Mary Low has noted, in her study of Fiji's foreign policy, the complex racial situation in Fiji has implications for the formulation of foreign policy. In particular the Fiji Government has had to pay close attention to the internal effects of its external policies . In an interview in 1982, Ratu Mara said that Fiji's support of regional cooperation was in part aimed at finding "ways and means of living in i 5 harmony" with the various non-Fijian races in Fiji . As will be shown in Chapter Two, Ratu Mara has been an active proponent of a Pacific-wide identity - 'The Pacific Way'; an identity that seeks to encompass all the various cultures of the region and forge a regional unity. The notion of a Pacific identity can be seen to have important domestic objectives as well, by projecting an identity that would transcend racial division and thus enohance national cohesion. As Ron Crocombe observed: "Ratu Mara has spoken of the Pacific Way as accommodating and accepting all these people (Asians and Europeans) within a harmonious, multiracial context". According to Croeombe, however, this notion 1 f\ has not gained wide acceptance in Fiji

1.4) THE IMPACT OF THE ECONOMY.

Largely as a result of almost a century of colonial contact, Fiji has developed a highly sophistioated money economy dependent on overseas trade, foreign investment, imported technology and expertise. It is also an extremely fragile economy, being highly dependent on a main export commodity: sugar. In 1981 raw sugar exports worth $110 million account- 1 7 etf for 55.7 per cent of total domestic exports '. Other main domestic export items include gold, coconut oil and fisheries products. In addition the rapid growth in recent years of small-scale manufacturing industries in Fiji has opened up prospects for diversifying Fiji's exports into areas of manufactured products.

The major markets for Fiji's exports are Britain (which accounted for 37.3 per cent of domestic exports in 1984), Australia (17 per cent), the United States (13.3 per cent) and Malaysia (12 per cent). The main suppliers of Fiji's imports are Australia (34.6 percent in 1984), Japan (16.2 per cent) and New Zealand (16.1 per cent). In 1984 Fiji's visible trade deficit stood at $207.7 million, with imports amounting to $487.1 million and exports (including re- 1 R exports) amounting to $279.4 million . It is important to note, however, that these trade figures do not inolude receipts from 'invisibles', mainly tourism. The tourist industry is, in fact, Fiji's second main source of revenue, {after sugar exports).

Fiji receives official development assistance or aid primarily from Australia, New Zealand, the EEC and Japan. Aid is used essentially to cover Fiji rs balance of payments deficit and to generate development in the primary industry sector. Australia is the principal aid donor with about $12 million a year allocated to Fiji, or one fifth of all - 21 -

Australian bilateral aid to the region. In addition, Australian interests account for the highest proportion of foreign investment in Fiji .

Economic considerations are a salient variable in the foreign policy of any nation, and no less in the foreign policy of Fiji. According to Mr. Jioji Kotobalavu, Fiji's Permanent Secretary for Foreign Affairs, "the most important priority in our foreign policy is to promote and protect our economic interests abroad" . These interests include securing overseas markets,an assured source of energy and flows of aid and investment into the country, which are tailored to meet the needs of Fiji's economic development programmes. Current development priorities are the improvement of the agricultural sector, exploitation of minerals, import substitution and promotion of exports.

There are a number of economic motivations for regional cooperation. One of these is to achieve economies of scale, as noted earlier. This is a key consideration in Fiji's regional policies. As Mr. Kotobalavu stated: "We're small; the other Island states are small - it makes sense to be pooling our resources" . Related to this, is the objective of altering the unfavourable trade balance between the Pacific Island nations and developed countries, through collective and coordinated action by the Island nations. This trade pattern was one whereby the Island countries exported their primary produce to the metropolitan countries -/

while importing all their manufactured and processed goods. According to Ratu Mara, "part of the ambitious plan of the 22 Forum" was to alter this pattern of trade relations Emphasis has thus been given by the Forum to such questions as trade promotion between the Pacific Island countries and Australia and New Zealand and between the Island countries themselves, bulk purchasing, coordination of aid and investment and regional transport.

How Fiji's economic interests and priorities have shaped as well as motivated Fiji 's role in the SPF will be analysed in the following chapters. One consideration will be whether Fiji's particular economic vulnerability has been a significant factor in its behaviour on both political and economic issues. It has been suggested, for example, that Fiji's heavy dependence on sugar "exposes Fiji to pressure from its buyers on the type of foreign policy actions it can afford to engage in" .

* 1.5) FIJI IN THE REGIONAL CONTEXT.

I As Table 1 shows, Fiji is the third largest Pacific Island nation in terms of land area and it is the second most populous nation after Papua New Guinea. Geographically, Fiji is the most centrally located South Pacific nation. Largely for this reason it is the crossroads of air and sea services traversing the Pacific. Fiji has thus developed

into a communication centre for the region, which has also facilitated its role as the main transhipment point for exports destin ^ed to other Pacific Island countries.

In economic terms, Fiji is the most developed Island nation and it has the most sophisticated and diverse economy. Its Gross Domestic Product is second only to that of Papua New Guinea and it has the highest per capita income of all the independent Island nations. (See Table 2jL Fiji is also the least dependent on overseas aid. Tables 1 and 2 highlight the extreme dispari ties between the Forum Island countries in population and size , GDP and per capita income . As will be shown in later chapters, these disparities have important implications for regional cooperation in the South Pacific since they define different needs and priorities among the Island nations, as well as an unequal distribution of benefits from regional endeavours.

Fiji's comparative economic strengths derive largely from its physical resources (human and material), but also from the level of infrastructure developed by the colonial government which facilitated the growth of a manufacturing sector in Fiji. This gave Fiji a head start in industrial- isation in the region, as well as providing the means for inducing overseas investment to the country. As one observer noted in 1972:

Fiji is slowly becoming the Hong Kong or Singapore of the South West Pacific and there is concern that In the future it will prove difficult to attract small- scale manufacturing industry to other countries in the region because of the very strong advantages to businessmen of locating these in Fiji...24. - 26 -

To some extent this remains an appropriate assessment and it is to be expected that Fiji's role in the SPF will be shaped by its economic status (and advantages) in the region.

In particular, it is to be expected that Fiji's needs and perceived interests will differ from those of Its smaller, weaker Island neighbours.

In many respects, Fiji can be viewed as a regional centre in the South Pacific. Once again, this is largely because of its central location and the colonial policies of the

British Government. In the colonial period, Fiji was the

'hub' of the British empire in the Islands; the centre for trade, higher education and administration. As a result many of the major institutions, such as the regional university, 25 were located in Fiji . Since independence, a number of regional programmes have been set up in Fiji, including the

South Pacific Telecommunications College. In addition, numerous diplomatic missions and international agencies

(for example, the United Nations Development Programme) have established their regional headquarters in Suva.

British colonial practice (of centrering administration of the

Pacific colonies in Fiji) had important advantages for Fiji.

Perhaps of most significance was the effect this had of creating a modern, indigenous political elite in Fiji.

According to Ron Crocombe:

This gave Fiji a great advantage in regional politics after independence because its leaders - having been educated earlier and much further - had no competition in becoming the leaders of the Pacific , . . ,,g . 1

While some may want to contest this view, it is nevertheless apparent that Fiji's leaders, unlike other Island leaders, enjoyed a regional (if not international) status prior to independence which has prevailed in the post- independence period. This has largely been due to the personality and presence of Fiji's Prime Minister, Ratu Mara .2

A high chief in traditional Fijian society, Ratu Mara was educated in New Zealand and then at Oxford University. *| He served in the colonial government in Fiji and became Chief Minister in 1967. Ratu Mara led Fiji to independence in j 1970 as leader of the Alliance Party and he has remained pQ Prime Minister ever since . Ratu Mara's active involvement in regional affairs since the mid-196O's has led many to refer to him as the "elder statesman" of the region, a view often equated with Fiji's leadership of the region. This has important implications for Fiji's role in the 3PF.

According to the Deputy Australian High Commissioner to Fiji: Australia accepts that Ratu Mara has this position of elder statesman and we accept his view and what he says about the region*! He's a fairly conservative politician and also one of the more pro-Western of the leaders there. We're happy to support hiiDpq. (Emphasis added). y This statement implies that there are obviously factors other than Ratu Mara's own personality that govern Australia's support for him (eg. strategic considerations). However the fact remains that such support from influential countries like Australia, elevates Ratu Mara's, and hence'Fiji's, standing and Influence in the region above that of other Island nations. Ratu Mara's dominance of Fiji's foreign policy (since before independence) has meant that Fiji's role in the SPP is very closely identified with Ratu Mara's personal role. He has significantly determined the content and style of Fiji's regional policies and, some would argue, those of the Forum itself. It remains to be seen, in the ensuing chapters, how t far Ratu Mara has in fact exercised a leading and influential role in the SPF.

i A final factor to consider in this section is Fiji's status *, with regard to the sub-regions of the South Pacific: Melanesia and Polynesia. These sub-regions roughly corre- spond to the areas West and East of the 180th Meridian. There is some cultural basis to the division, but given the degree of cultural diversity which exists throughout the South Pacific, it is not possible to distinguish the sub-regions entirely on this basis.

There is, perhaps, greater political relevance to the use of the labels, Polynesia and Melanesia. Those countries regarded as Polynesian: Tonga, Western Samoa, the Cook Islands and Niue - tended to gain independence or self-government at an earlier stage than those countries regarded as Melanesian: Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands and Vanuatu. This factor has in part shaped the perceptions of Island leaders, particularly on such issues as metropolitan involvement in the region. The Melanesian countries have tended to be more radical in opposing such involvement than the Polynesian

countries .

Fiji is marginal to both sub-regions. Although ethnographers generally identify Fiji as part of Melanesia, it has strong cultural affinity with Polynesia. Fiji's early regional activities (which tended to be in concert with the Polynesian countries who had attained self-government or independence) served to identify Fiji as part of Polynesia. However Fiji's actions in the Forum have generally reflected the inherent ambi VQJ.& nee of its sub-regional status. As a result, Fiji is seen by some commentators as having a "pivotal" role in the SPF, particularly on issues which have caused sub-regional divisions to form .

Despite the apparent wide-usage of the labels, Melanesia and Polynesia, especially in referring to the political alignments of the Forum Island countries, it is important not to overstate their significance as determining patterns of behaviour within the Forum. Fiji, for its part, does not Identify strongly with either group. The main point to be made here is that perceptions of Fiji's place in the region and its relations with other Island countries, are to some extent shaped by the Polynesian-Melanesian distinction.

1.6) CONCLUSION.

This chapter has suggested that there are a range of factors which may shape, if not determine, Fiji's role in the SPF. \J - 30 -

On the one hand there are various Internal or national characteristics related to size, the socio-political makeup and the economy. These charaoterifriit-i create specific national needs and priorities that regional cooperation can accommodate, and which motivate Fiji's role in the SPF. \

On the other hand, Fiji's special status within the region has significant implications for its role and level of influence in the SPF. Fiji's comparative advantages in terms of size, population, resources and level of economic development, as well as its strategic location and colonial heritage, have placed Fiji in the position to play a significant role in the SPF. This role is essentially interpreted and expressed by Fiji's leader, Ratu Mara.

NOTES

1. South Pacific Economies: 1981 Statistical Summary, South Pacific Commission, Noumea, April 1984 . Table 2.

2. The Fiji Government does not view the Non-Aligned Movement as "non-aligned". For this reason, it sees its independence as better served by remaining outside the movement. See Henry Kines, "Fiji's Tourism Mission" in Islands Business, February 1983 p. 29.

3. Fiji has consistently refused to allow a Soviet embassy to be established in Fiji and since 1982 it has banned Soviet ships from entering its ports. On the other hand, in 1984 Ratu Mara was invited to Washington to meet President Reagan, the first Island leader to be invited. The meeting in November that year affirmed the close ties between the two countries. *" 6 1 *"

J4 . Mo clear and universally accepted definition of a microstate has yet emerged, but it is agreed by most writers on the subject that population size should be the primary determinant of classification. Suggest- ed ceiling populations, however, range from 150,000 to one million. Fiji would not, therefore, under some definitions, qualify as a microstate. Other relevant criteria include territorial area, GNP, volume of trade , as well as non-quantifiable elements of national power such as strategic location, quality of leadership etc. See: P. J. Boyce and R. Herr, "Microstate Diplomacy in the South Pacific", Australian Outlook, (28) 1974 p. 24, P. J. Boyce, "Microstates and their Role in Inter- \ national Affairs", Australian Foreign Affairs Record, January 1977 pp. 22-23; J. Rapopport et al, Small States and Territories: Status and Problems, a UNITAR study, New York, Arno Press, 1971 pp. 29-33.

5. For the purposes of this study, the South Pacific region is defined as the nineteen Island states which fall within the scope of the South Pacific Commission. They include the independent states of Western Samoa, Nauru, Tonga, Fiji, the Solomon Islands, Kiribati, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, Papua New Guinea; the self-governing states of the Cook Islands and Niue; and the territories of Guam, American Samoa, New Caledonia, Norfolk Islands, Pitcain Island, Wallis and Futuna and the Trust Territories of the South Pacific. See Appendix Three.

6. David Vital, The Inequality of States, 1967, pp. 3-^.

7. Boyce and Herr, Op.cit. p. 25.

8. Ratu Mara, Address to the Asian and Pacific Affairs Council, Hawaii, 1982.

9. There are at present about 200 regional institutions in the South Pacific. These involve governments, commercial interests, religious bodies, sports bodies, union organisations. See Ron Crocombe, "Regional Cooperation: Overcoming the Counter-pulls", in Crocombe and Ali (Ed) Foreign Forces in Pacific Politics, USP 1983 Suva.

10. R. Herr, "Crosscutting Pressures in Contemporary South Pacific Regionalism", World Review, Vol. 18, (2) p. 15. 11. Indians, mainly from the south of India, were brought to Fiji by the British colonial government in the late nineteenth century as indentured labourers to work on the sugar plantations. Many stayed and were joined by others. For a composite breakdown of the population in terms of racial groups see Pacific Islands Yearbook, 1982 p. 83..

12, Ahmed All, "Fiji: The Politics of a Plural Society" , in S. Pokawin et al. (Ed). Politics in Melanesia, 1982 Institute of Pacific Studies Suva p. 13b.

13. There are 52 seats in the elected House of Represent- atives. Indians and Fijians are each allocated 22 seats while other races (General Electors) are allocated eight seats. Of these, 22 are elected on a communal franchise - 12 Indians, 12 Fijians and three General, and 27 on a common franchise, with reserve communal allocation.

14. Mary Low, The Foreign Policy of a South Pacific Microstate: Fiji 1970 -1980, MA Sub-thesis, ANU 1983 p. 41.

15. Ratu Mara, Interview by Greg Knudsen, Pacific Magazine, March/April 1982 p. 65.

16. Ron Crocombe, The Pacific Way: An Emerging Identity, 1976, Suva, p. 9.

17. Fiji Bureau of Statistics figures for 1984, published in the Fiji Times, 15/2/1985 p. 2. In addition to domestic exports, Fiji earned $ 82 million in 1984 from re-exports (mainly petroleum products) to the other Pacific Island countries.

18. 'Ibid.

19- Margot Simington, "Australian Relations with the Pacific Islands" World Review, Vol. 18, (3) August 1976 p. 53.

20. Jioji Kotobalavu, Interview with the author, Suva .January 1985 .

21 Ibid.

CHAPTER TWO

THE ORGINS OF THE SOUTH PACIFIC FORUM.

This chapter aims to examine Fiji 's role in the establishment of the SPF. It will begin by analysing the orgins

of the SPF and then the part that Fiji (or rather Ratu

Mara) played in these developments. The main questions

to be addressed in this chapter are: How important was

Fiji's role in the creation of the SPF and in the development of an indigenous Island regionalism? To what extent ' ]. did Ratu Mara assume a leading role in the regional movement at this time and is there evidence that this role caused tension in the SPF? What were the, key motives under-

lying Fiji 's actions in the regional movement prior to and following the inauguration of the SPF?

2.1) ORIGINS OF THE SPF.

The SPF can be viewed as directly related to, or descended from, two regional organisations: the South Pacific

Conference and the Pacific Islands Producers' Association

(PIPA). The first of these was an arm of the metropolitan controlled South Pacific Commission (SPC) , while the second was essentially an Islander controlled body. Both of these organisations facilitated the development of an

- ••-/ i indigenous Island regionalism. - 35 -

In aaseasing the; relation of the Conference to the SPF , attention focus es on three aspects of the Conference: p its ban on political discussion, Islander moves to reform ;' i the Conference, and the opportunity that the Conference • • provided Pacific Island leaders to meet and discuss issues jv, of concern . > " • i

:| The Conference was designed essentially to be an advisory !| |l body to the SPC and it had no powers of decision-making. f ft! It thus had limited power and a limited role. [j!n addition, because the SPC was purposely intended to deal only with , economic and social issues concerning the region, the Conference was constrained in what issues it could •' discuss and advise on; that is, there was not scope for ' political discussion. ',

[These limits fuelled demands by Island representatives in the 1960's for change within the SPC and Conference. These demands were first expressed in a united voice at the 1965 Conference Meeting in Lae, Papua New Guinea. The actions i of the Island leaders present at this Conference precipit- i ated a series of reforms in the organisation, resulting in the Conference being granted decision-making powers and, eventually, full collegiality with the merger of the SPC p and Conference in 1974 •3

While the Island countries gained greater power and control within the SPC as a result of reforms instituted, mainly in response to their demands, the rule barring political discussion from the Conference remained in effect. This constraint was perhaps the most important factor motivating the establishment of the SPF.' As Ratu Mara later explained

• It was felt that a body which was restricted to discussing only social and economic welfare could not deal effectively with the multitude of problems involved in independence. Conviction grew that there must be another organisation to fill the gaps left in the Commission's framework. 3- The frustration generated by the 'no politics1 rule was most likely aired by the Island leaders amongst themselves at 'out-of-Conferencer meetings that took place during the formal Conferences in the late 1960 's. It was, according to Ratu Mara, at these informal meetings that the idea of establishing a political forum was first discussed .

The Conference was important in that it provided the leaders of newly independent and self-governing Island countries, as well as those approaching independence, the opportunity to meet regularly, to exchange ideas and to coordinate their efforts in gaining wider powers from the metropolitan-controlled SPC. Their success in gaining greater control over their own affairs in the SPC no doubt demonstrated the efficacy of adopting a collective approach in order to achieve the common objective of self-determinat ion .

PIPA's relationship to the SPF was characterised by similar influences, but it was perhaps more closely linked to the SPF than was the Conference. PIPA was formed in 1965 by

Fiji, Tonga and Western Samoa, essentially to be a commer-

cial pressure group. Its main objective was to achieve

better terms for produce exports to New Zealand . PIPA

functioned as an autonomous organisation until 1973 when

it was absorbed by SPEC. Unlike the Conference, PIPA was

a wholly indigenous organisation and it was therefore

unique. According to Greg Fry:

The creation of PIPA was particularly important because it was an action which involved moving outside the established organisational frame- /- work which identified with colonial power interests .

An important distinguishing feature of PIPA was that it

allowed any issue of concern to be discussed by the Island

leaders, including political issues. PIPA was ostensibly n* I an economic body, but as Margaret Ball observed:

That considerable importance is attached to the non-economic side of PIPA by the member governments is evident from the fact that their delegations to the PIPA conferences tend to be led not txy economic ministers but by heads of government.7.

There is evidence that issues such as French nuclear

testing in the Pacific were raised and discussed at PIPA meetings. It was also at a PIPA meeting in April 1971 o that the decision to hold the first SPF meeting was made .

In many respects PIPA was the forerunner of the SPF. This is reflected in the way PIPA provided a model for the SPF's own structure and method of functioning. PIPA was an annual informal meeting of Island leaders, free of rules and regulations, and operated by consensus. According to Jioji Kotobalvu, "The Forum just carried on the same o approach" .

It is arguable that PIPA's most important influence, however, was in demonstrating to the Pacific Island leaders [ the advantages of coordinated action in their dealings with f» the outside world. PIPA proved that bargaining power could be strengthened and economic interests enhanced by cooperating in collective action . This had the effect of generat- § ing greater interest in, and support for, regional f cooperation among the Island leaders. As Mary Low noted: Cooperation in banana production and marketing created a spontaneous desire on the part of the member countries for regional cooperation in other areas of economic activities. 11. PIPA contributed towards building a regional spirit of cooperation and an awareness of common interests and a common identity. Like the changes initiated in the Conference, PIPA "was an expression of Islander desire to assert indigenous control over regional decision-making and activity"12.

2.2) FIJI'S ROLE.

The part played by Fiji's leaders in these developments illustrates to a significant extent, Fiji's role in the establishment of the SPF. This role also serves to define Fiji's emergence as a prominent actor in regional affairs. - 39 -

Despite the fact that Fiji was not yet independent, Ratu Mara (in his capacity as Fiji's Chief Minister and a Commiss- ioner on the British delegation to the SPC from 1966) adopted a high profile at Conference meetings. He was, perhaps, the

most outspoken advocate for change in the SPC. This was ( evident at the 1965 Conference in Lae when Ratu Mara threat- | ened to lead an Island 'walkout' unless certain demands for reform were met. Ratu Mara later described this as a "rebellion" stating that he made "no apology" for the part he played "in leading that rebellion" . At subsequent Confer- ence meetings, Ratu Mara proposed various changes to the organisation 1 4. In so doing, he reportedly had the "soli'so: d

backing" of . . other Island leaders 15 Ratu Mara's prominence in the Conference facilitated the view of Fiji as a leader in the region. \

Fiji's association with PIPA was even more pronounced. It was, in fact, at Ratu Mara's initiative that the first PIPA meeting took place in 1965. Ratu Mara had conceived the idea of forming a commercial pressure group of Island countries while negotiating a sensitive banana contract for Fiji with New Zealand in 196416.

Ratu Mara's initiative in establishing PIPA underscored his growing commitment to regional cooperation and it was

4 I _ If) -

an important contribution to the development of an indigenous Island regionalism, given PIPA's significance as a forerunner of the SPF. Ratu Mara actions in PIPA, as in the Conference, did serve to promote the appearance of Fiji as a leader in the region and the main force behind regional cooperation. ]But Ratu Mara was not the only leader in the region advocating change in the Conference or the creation of a political forum for consultation. Nor can his actions be viewed in isolation Cforo the overall context of change occuring in the region in the 1960's.

Two Island leaders who played significant roles in the establishment of the SPF were the Premier of the Cook Islands, Albert Henry and the Prime Minister of Western Samoa, Tamasese Lealofi. Both leaders shared a frustration with the 'no politics' rule of the SPC and advocated the creation of a forum which would facilitate consultation and cooperation on political as well as economic issues 1 7

Australia and New Zealand were also clearly in favour of the establishment of a political consultative body in the region. This was reflected, for example, in a statement by the New Zealand Minister for External Affairs^ Mr. Duncan Maclntyre, in 1970: What many leaders want, and what we should encourage, is a political forum where island countries can meet on equal terms with Australia and New Zealand....We in New Zealand would be happy to join the island leaders in such a venture 18. It has been suggested that Australia and New Zealand were, in fact, very much involved in the stimulating of the SPF

1 Q ' "from behind the scenes" . The evidence indicates however, that the initiative to establish the SPF came predominantly I

from the Pacific Island countries. In May 1971, Ratu Mara, [( acting at the request of the PIPA member countries, • approached the New Zealand Prime Minister on the question of providing a venue for the proposed meeting of Island ! heads of Government. What was significant, as one observ- I -j er noted, was "the speed with which the Forum was convened", i r This suggested that the two metropolitan powers involved were f| 20 I" "receptive to the Islanders' overtures" . [

It can be argued that Ratu Mara adopted a prominent, at

By the time the first Forum meeting took place in August 1971, speculation about Fiji's role and intentions in the region was being public^ly aired by observers in the media. It was apparent that this influenced Ratu Mara's actions at the first Forum meeting. According to one observer, Ratu Mara was careful not to appear to dominate the proceedings Ratu Mara later claimed that one of the reasons for holding the first two Forum meetings outside the region (in New

Zealand and Australia) was in order to "scotch" reports that Fiji was trying to usurp leadership of the region25

Ratu Mara, it appears, was extremely sensitive to the implications of acting, or being seen to act, in a dominant manner in the SPF. At the same time, however, he was not prepared to adopt a low profile in the SPF, especially on those issues which involved questions of regional self determination .

One such issue was the siting • of the SPEC headquarters, when it was decided to establish a permanent body to be a trade secretariat for the SPF. Press reports highlighted division and conflict within the Forum, fuelled by leadership jealous- ies and rivalry. Fiji's Prime Minister, it was claimed, wanted the Secretariat sited in Suva while the Cook Islands Premier wanted it in New Zealand . However, according to informed sources, Ratu Mara did not advocate Fiji as a site for the SPEC headquarters. He did, in fact, suggest that Western Samoa could be an appropriate venue, while firmly opposing Australia or New Zealand as possible sites. ! - y

This opposition was based on the view that the work of the Secretariat {in modifying the trade pattern between the Islands and Australia and New Zealand) would be subject to strong pressure from the Australian and New Zealand business interests involved in this trade, if the Secretariat was situated in either of these two countries27

Suva was eventually chosen as the site for the SPEC headquarters but this was not the result of Ratu Mara's lobbying. Ratu Mara was determined to have the Secretariat situated in the region. This does not appear to reflect an attempt to assert Fiji's leadership over the Forum. Rather it tends to reflect a determination to not compromise the independence of the Island nations and their control over their affairs. This commitment to regional self-determination can be seen to constitute a more powerful motivating factor than leadership aspirations.

i H Another issue which prompted a similar stand to be taken i I by Fiji was that of Forum membership. In 1972 Papua New j Guinea requested that it be admitted as a member of the Forum ] on attaining self-government. This was discussed at the third i Forum meeting in September 1972. Australia in particular supported this request on the grounds that it would be advisable to assist in the development of a Pacific orientation for Papua New Guinea. Fiji was in favour of granting Papua New Guinea observer status in the SPF but it was firmly against any suggestion that Papua New Guinea be admitted as a full member before it became fully independent . This reflected Ratu Mara's concern (demonstrated on subsequent occasions) that the SPF remain a "meeting of decision-makers that is, a meeting of leaders of fully independent and self- 2 9 ~~1 governing nations . j

1 Ratu Mara's opposition to Papua New Guinea's full membership of the SPF (until it became independent) was interpreted by some observers (and some PNG officials) as another cittempt by Fiji to assert ifcs dominance over the SPF. It was suggested that Fiji perceived Papua New Guinea as a rival to its position of leadership in the region and thus sought to exclude Papua New Guinea from the Forum .

It is not clear, however, that Ratu Mara saw Papua New Guinea as a rival and sought to exclude it from the Forum •3 1 for this reason . Nevertheless , such perceptions did cause some tension, prompting Ratu Mara to refute, in quite definite terms , any suggestion that Fiji was attempt- ing to usurp leadership of the region. In an address delivered in Suva in 1972 he said he could not and would not presume to speak for all the people of the South Pacific Only the leader of each country is entitled to speak for his people. For anyone else to attempt to do so would be presumptious. This is a particularly sensitive point, for the South Pacific territories do not acknowledge any leader or spokesman who can speak for them all. Therefore though some kindly allude to me as a leader in South Pacific affairs and others, such as Papua New Guinea, describe me in less friendly terms - simply because I disagree with their admission to the South Pacific Forum until they became independent - I would not for one moment assume to be2leader or the Spokesman for these territories . There is some evidence to suggest that Fiji's leaders did, on occasion, assume a spokesperson role (such as in the United Nations) and that Ratu Mara did adopt a prominent', at times assertive role in the SPF. However, this does not lead to the conclusion that at the time of the Forum's establishment, Fiji sought to exercise a dominant or '- leading role in the regional movement. The key motivation \ 11 underlying Fiji's actions in the Forum at this time can be •;, identified as the promotion of regional self-determination. This was an objective Fiji perceived as consistent with the aims of other Island nations.

In 1982, Ratu Mara recalled Fiji's promine.nt role in the region in the late 1960's and early 1970's as "an obligation and duty in aid of regional cooperation and in order to foster a regional affinity and common identity" . This was closely linked to the process of asserting self-determination. Ratu Mara not only fostered, but can be seen as the 'architect' of this common identity, what became known as 'The Pacific Way1. This was perhaps Fiji's most important contribution to the development of an indigenous j regionalism, as expressed in the establishment of the SPF. j

2.4) "THE PACIFIC WAY"

Ratu Mara was the first Island leader to public .ly use this phrase (when addressing the United Nations General Assembly in 1970), and he became the Island leader moat •' I closely identified with its meaning and use. The Pacific Way has no single, precise meaning, but carries a oore of basic ideas. These ideas can be seen as embodying what Greg Fry has termed a "Pan-Pacific idelogy"J . These ideas include opposition to remaining colonial intrusion, control of neo-colonial influences, control of regional organisations and programmes, the assertion of Pacific cultural values, and the assertion that cultural affinity always existed in the South Pacific. According to Ron Crocombe, The Pacific Way also defined a certain way of behaving: "talking things over rather than taking rigid stands, preparedness to negotiate, flexibility, adaptation and compromise" .

•The Pacific Way' represented an indigenous Island identity and regional cooperation was a vechicle for promoting this identity, as demonstrated by the SPF's frequent expressions of regional solidarity and shared interest . Conversely 'The Pacific Way1 served as a unifying concept, that could facilitate regional cooperation by transcending the diversity of cultures and geography within the region. A common identity, Ron Crocombe argued, can in turn "reduce the extent and intensity of neo-colonial dependency of the Island countries on the richer Pacific borderlands" .

Ratu Mara actively promoted the concept of a Pacific-wide unity, basing this primarily on historical precedent. He frequently spoke of an "underlying affinity throughout the Pacific" which was "only interrupted by metropolitan colonial expansion and rivalry". The creation of intra- Paeific linkages through the South Pacific Conference, PTPA and SPP was described by Ratu Mara as "returning to

the ways and friendships of our forefathers"37

There is little objective evidence to support these assert- ions of pre-colonial regionalism in the South Pacific. On the contrary, the history of the region has been one of "no significant contact" between the Island groups. But as Mary Low observed:

Such claims or 'myth-making' form an integral part of the process of promoting an ideology whose aim is to assert the values of indigenous culture™ .

By developing some feelings of Pacific-wide unity (even if this was at times tenous), 'The Pacific Way1 served to promote collaboration and overcome deep and divisive rivalries which tended to characterise parts of the region. Ratu Mara was, in many respects, the Island leader most responsible for articulating the ideas and values of 'The Pacific Way1, thus forging some degree of regional unity. In this way, he also acted as spokesperson for the region. 2.5) CONCLUSION

It can be argued that Ratu Mara did play a prominent and assertive role in the Conference and PIPA , advocating greater Islander control over regional affairs and promoting cooperation in economic as well as political matters. While these were important to the creation of the SPF, the SPF needs to viewed primarily as the product of the political change that was transforming the region in the 1960's and early 1970*3.

Ratu Mara's role was construed by some observers as an assumption of leadership or dominance of the region. Efforts to dispell these notions (which were in part fuelled by some statements made by Fiji's leaders, but which were also exaggerated) appeared to influence Ratu Mara's actions in the SPF during its initial phase. He sought to demonstrate that he was not intent on acting as leader of the region, although he maintained a high profile in the SPF. What can be seen as the key factor motivating Ratu Mara's actions prior to the Forum's creation, and in its formative years, was a commitment to self-determination for Fiji and the region. Reflecting this, commitment was the promotion of an indigenous Pacific-wide identity. This was perhaps unique to Ratu Mara's role, and served to foster, if not legitimise, regional cooperation. NOTES

The SPC was established in 19^7 by six metropolitan powers: The United States, Australia, France, the Netherlands, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. The expressed purpose of this regional body was the promotion of economic and social welfare of the indigenous people of the Pacific. The Conference was created in 1950 as an auxilory, triennial body to provide for Island representation in the SPC. It became an annual meeting in 1967- See Greg Pry, South Pacific; Regionalism, MA Thesis 1979 ANU.

See Ibid. pp . 79-90; also R. Herr, "Crosscutting Pressures in Contemporary South Pacific Regionalism", World Review Volume 18, 2, August 1979. pp. 16-17.

Ratu Mara, "The South Pacific Forum", Address to the University of the South Pacific, August 25, 1972. Cyclostyled,

Ibid. Frustration with the limits of the Conference undoubtedly fuelled the initiative to set up the SPF. Yet as Greg Fry argued, this move can also be seen as resulting from a desire to preserve the SPC as a body "providing an opportunity to meet with territories not yet independent". Op. cit , p. 167-

Concern initially centred on banana exports but this was later widened to include other products exported to New Zealand. By 1968, PIPA's membership also included Niue and the Cook Islands.

6. Fry, Op. cit.

7. Margaret Ball, "Regionalism and the South Pacific Commonwealth", Pacific Affairs, XLVI Summer, 1973 (pp. 232-253) P- 212.

Sione Kite, "The Pacific Nations and International Organisations", Paoifio Perspective, Vol. 6, 1, 1976 p. 14. ' : 9. Mr. Jioji Kotobalavu, Fiji's Permanent Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Interview, with the author, Suva January 1985.

10. It oan also be argued that PIPA was significant in .highlighting the need for Australian and New Zealand involvement in regional economic cooperation, leading to the Inclusion of these two countries in the SPF. PIPA was entirely funded by contributions from its members resulting in severe budgetary restrictions which hampered its activities. Partly for this reason it failed to secure any price increase for its members bananas.

11. Mary Low, The Foreign Policy of a South Pacific Microstate: Fiji T970-19H0. MA Sub-thesis, 1983 ANU. p. 118.

12. Fry. Op. cit. p, 103.

13. Ratu Mara, Op. cit.

14. For example, at the 1968 Conference meeting in Noumea, Ratu Mara proposed that delegates be given more direct say in projects which affected their welfare. Low, Op. cit. p. .114.

15. Kite, Op. pit, p. 14 also PIM May 1971 -

16. According to.Kite (Ibid, p. 13), Fiji's initiative in forging the partnership to improve bargaining power was greatly welcomed by Tonga and Western Samoa.

17. According to W. Forsyth, Albert Henry was "the Island leader probably most entitled to the credit of initiat- ing public: ly the idea of an Islands political forum". Tamasese Leolofi public ly took up the idea of a forum and in 1971 issued a statement calling for a meeting of Island leaders. Forsyth,."South Pacific ' Regional Organisation", Y New Guinea and Australia, the Pacific and South East It Asia. Vol. 6, September/October 1971, p~I T9~. 18. Cited in Ball, Op. pit, pp. 243-4.

19. Ron Crocornbe, Interview with the author, February 1985.

20. Kite, Op. cit. p. 14.

21. According to Ron Crocombe (Interview): "Politically there had to be a consultative body of Heads of Government of the region".

22. Ratu Sir Edward Cakobau, Address to the 27th Regular Session of the United Nations General Assembly, NY 1972.

23. Ratu Mara, address to the 25th Session of the United Nations General Assembly NY. September 1970.

24. Stuart Inder, PIM September 1971 p. 26. f, II 25. Ratu Mara, "Regional Cooperation in the South Pacific", 1 Address to the University of PNG, May 1974, p. 10. (Cycloatyled). | i 26. John Carter, PIM March 1972, p. 21.

• 27. Confidential Source A. I i i 28. Confidential Source B. . I 29. This concern was again demonstrated when Kiribati (then the Gilbert Islands) applied for membership of the SPF in 1977- Its application was opposed by Fiji on the grounds that no fixed date had been set • for Kiribati's independence. According to the Deputy Prime Minister, Ratu Sir Panaia Ganilau: '

r 1 1; 1 1

- 55-

CHAPTER.THREE

POLITICAL ISSUES IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC FORUM.

This Chapter analyses Fiji 's policies and actions in three :' key political issues (or issue areas) that have concerned the SPF. These are: nuclear issues, decolonisation, and the Law of the Sea and Fisheries. These issues are identified here as 'political1 because that is how' the SPF has 1! generally defined them. However it is important to note that these issues also have security and economic ramifi- cations .

The purpose of this Chapter is to determine Fiji's policies and actions in these areas and the perceptions and motives that have shaped these policies. The central questions to be addressed in this Chapter are: Has Fiji's role in the SPF served to enhance certain national aspirations and priorities (in these areas) thereby reflecting the utility of regional cooperation in Fiji's foreign policy? How far has Fiji assumed a prominent or leading role in the SPF? And finally, to what extent, if any, can Fiji be shown to have had an influence on Forum policies in these three areas? 3.1) NUCLEAR ISSUES

Fiji's Hole: 1971-1975.

The salient nuclear issue in Forum discussion has, since 1971, been French nuclear testing in the South Pacific1. Indeed, it is arguable that this issue provided the impetus for the Pacific Island leaders to form their own political organisation (the SPF) when persistent efforts to discuss the question in the Conference were blocked by France on the grounds that it was 'political' .

At the first Forum meeting in 1971, a policy strongly criticising nuclear tests in the Pacific was adopted by the Island leaders, Australia and New Zealand. This was restated in subsequent communiques culminating in 1975 with Forum endorsement of a New Zealand proposal in favour of declaring the South Pacific a Nuclear Weapons- Free Zone. New Zealand had mooted the zone idea at the Forum meeting in 197^1 - With Forum endorsement, New Zealand sought to gain support for the idea at the United Nations .

Fiji firmly opposed the French nuclear testing in the jj region and fully supported the statements of concern *J issued by the SPF. At the United Nations, Fiji main- »•$ ii| tained a partioularly vocal stand. Statements by Fiji's leaders to the United Nations General Assembly repeatedly i 4

' 3 emphasized Fiji's opposition to the nuclear tests in the Pacific. To a certain extent, Fiji's opposition to the testing in the region was presented or conveyed to the United Nations as the common view of the South Pacific Island nations. Being the only Pacific Island country represented at the United Nations (until 1975) Fiji thus assumed the role of 'spokesperson' for the SPF on this issue.

In 1973, Fiji joined with Australia and New Zealand in filing legal briefs with the International Court of Justice contesting the legality and morality of the nuclear tests. This action had been discussed and endorsed by the SPF which met in April that year . The Court rendered the opinion that "the French Government should avoid nuclear tests that caused the deposit of radioactive fallout on Australian and New Zealand territory". It stated that radioactive pollution across international boundaries was a health matter and issued an interim injunction ordering France to cease all nuclear testing .

Fiji again played a key role in 1975 when it co-sponsored New Zealand's resolution in the United Nations General Assembly calling for international support for the 'idea' of establishing a Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone in the South Pacific. Fiji had fully supported New Zealand's initiative in the SPF for a Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone in the region and had joined with New Zealand in sending a letter to the United Nations requesting, on behalf of the South Pacific Island countries, that the Nuclear-Free Zone item be included on the General Assembly agenda.

In December 1975 the United Nations General Assembly endorsed the New Zealand/Fiji sponsored resolution by a vote of 110-0, with 20 abstentions . Despite this endorsement, however, no action was taken by the SPF to carry forth the resolution. According to Greg Fry, this was largely because both Labor Governments in Australia and New Zealand lost office in late 1975 and the new conservative Governments of Malcolm Fraser and Robert Muldoon "moved to halt any further development of the Nuclear-Free Zone concept"> .

Perceptions and Motives.

It is clear that Fiji played an active and prominent role in international fora, in the early and mid 1970'a, that was directed against the nuclear tests in the South Pacific. This role can be seen as contributing to the international pressure that was put upon France, and which caused the French Government to cease atmospheric testing in 197*t and commence underground nuclear tests. In many respects, Fiji saw itself acting on behalf of the SPF, in voicing the concerns of the Forum Island countries not represented at international fora such as the United Nations. There appears to be a combination of factors that motivated Fiji's actions on this issue. The faotor frequently cited by the Government as underlying its opposition to the French nuclear tests was concern about the "risks to health 7 and environment in the region" . This concern about the "potential hazards" of the nuclear tests was what the Forum communiques stressed regularly in calling for an end to the tests in the region and can be seen to reflect a common regional concern.

Yet Fiji's prominent role in opposing the nuclear tests, particularly in international fora, must be viewed as also motivated by broader political considerations. In part Fiji's role can be seen as reflecting an act of self- determination; an assertion of its independence and the independence of growing numbers of Pacific Island nations. This is evident by the way Ratu Mara often linked the nuclear tests with colonialism in the region. For example, addressing the Fiji Parliament in 1973, Ratu Mara said that the most effective action Fiji could take against the French nuclear "explosions" was to "persuade the United Nations Committee of 2k on Decolonisation to hasten the liberation of the Islands which are at present regarded as French territory" .

It can further be argued that Fiji's vocal stance in the United Nations, saw Fiji advocate a cause which was, in effect, anti-colonial. It is likely that this had significant implications for Fiji in establishing its identity as an independent nation and as an actor in international affairs. Fiji's status in the United Nations was to some extent enhanced by the fact that, as the only Pacific Island country represented in the General Assembly, it could be seen to be speaking on behalf of the region, and in particular the SPF.

A factor that should also be taken into account here , was the strong domestic anti-nuclear lobby in Fiji at this

time. This influence was apparent when, in 19723 the Fiji Government ordered a ban on French ships and aircraft connected with-the tests. This action had been urged by representatives of Fiji's anti-nuolear movement 9„ This movement also called for a Nuclear-Free Zone to be declared in the South Pacific10.

The Australian Proposal.

Nuclear issues featured less prominently in the SPF for a period after 1975. While not totally ignored, there was nevertheless a decline in the level of criticism voiced by the SPF on the issue of French nuclear tests. This can be partly seen as a response to the French decision to take the test programme underground, which was believed to alleviate some of the environmental risks. However the attitudes of the Conservative Australian and New Zealand Governments must also be taken into account as a factor influencing the low level of Forum criticism.

The late 1970's and early 198O's, however, witnessed a gradual re-emphasis on anti-nuclear policies in the SPF. These policies condemned plans to dump nuclear waste in the Pacific Ocean as well as the continued French nuclear tests at Moruroa Atoll. The growth of the Forum's membership, to include a number of newly independent states strongly opposed to the use of the Pacific for nuclear purposes must be viewed as an important factor underlying this rea3sertion of anti-nuclear policy.

In 1983 the new Australian Labor Government submitted to the SPF a new South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Initiative. This was the first time since 1975 that the Forum had considered the idea of a Nuclear-Free Zone for the region. Australia's proposed zone called for, inter alia, a ban on nuclear weapons testing, dumping of nuclear waste in the ocean and storage or nuclear weapons in the countries of the region. At the same time, it upheld the principles of freedom of navigation and recognised the sovereign right of Governments to make their own decisions on their alliance and defence requirements, including access to their ports and airfields by the vessels and aircraft of other countries ~. At the 1985 Forum meeting in the Cook Islands, the Australian Nuclear-Free Zone proposal was adc>ptc«. when eight Forum members signed a treaty declaring the South Pacific a Nuclear-Free Zone. Fiji was among those who signed the treaty. This underscored its firm support for the Australian initiative and its commitment to seeking an end to the nuclear activities banned by the treaty. Those countries that did not sign the treaty: Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, Vanuatu and Nauru have voiced some dissent over the actual scope of the treaty. These countries have either called for, or are sympathetic to, the establishment of a more comprehensive nuclear-free zone, banning all forms of nuclear activity in the region including transit and port calls of nuclear armed and powered vessels and overflight of nuclear-armed aircraft . It appears, though, that despite some reservations, these countries will sign the treaty at the 1986 Forum meeting, once legislative changes have been made in their respective parliaments 1 H

Fiji's Nuclear Policies Since 1975: Continuity and Change.

It has been suggested by a number of analysts and observers that Fiji's position on nuclear issues in the SPF has moderated significantly since the early 1970's. Two propositions are a) that Fiji has become less outspoken in its criticism of France; and b) that Fiji is now much more conservative in its policy on a Nuclear-Free Zone for the region and what the scope of that zone should be. This is seen to reflect shifts in Fiji's national policies and perceptions of national interest.

According to one report, Fiji's support for a Nuclear- Free Zone in the Pacific appeared to moderate after the signing of the first Lome Convention in 1975 . France's influence in the EEC, where Fiji sold most of its sugar under the Lonre Convention, was seen as an important consideration shaping Fiji's stand on the French nuclear tests in the region. This question - of whether Fiji has tempered its criticism of France because of its economic interests in the EEC-arises also on the issue of decolonisation for New Caledonia (which will be examined in the next section). It needs to be considered however within the context of what threat France can actually pose to Fiji's sugar sales to the EEC,

Since the Lome Convention is an agreement between Fiji (and other African, Caribbean and Pacific countries) and the EEC as a whole, (not just with France) theoret- ically there is scope for economic pressure to be applied to Fiji if relations between France and Fiji became strained. However, it is likely to be to Fiji's advantage (eg. for future negotiations with the EEC) if relations with France remained friendly, given that France is a powerful partner in the EEC. The need to maintain good relations with France, and to avoid allowing the nuclear testing issue to damage those relations has clearly been recognised by Fiji. This was demonstrated at the United Nations in 1977 when Fiji's delegate stated that: Differences on this issue (of nuclear testing), which is to us a matter of principle amongst other things, should not be a constraint on the-development of mutual cooperation on matters of common interest., g .

There is no evidence, however, to suggest that Fiji compromised its opposition to the French testing in the Pacific. Fijian criticism was sustained throughout the late 1970's and early 1980's in theSPF, the United Nations and other fora. In an interview in 1982, Ratu Mara showed no sign of moderation when he stated: The message I would like to tell France is: "as long as you continue to say that you will use the islands of the Pacific to explode nuclear devices, then our wishes and the aspirations of everyone in the Pacific will be 'Get France out of the Pacific' if this is the only way we can stop you exploding nuclear devices in our environment ..„...„.

This opposition to French nuclear testing was expressed by Fiji's support for the Australian Nuclear-Free Zone concept and represented a basic consistency in Fiji's nuclear policies. There are two further consistencies underlying Fiji's policies. These define its support for a more limited Nuclear-Free Zone rather than a zone banning all forms of nuclear activity in the region. The first is the Fiji Government's view that to ban transit of nuclear armed and powered vessels would be contrary 1 fl to international law . In 1975, when co-sponsoring the New Zealand Nuclear-Free Zone proposal in the United Nations, Fiji's Deputy Prime Minister emphasized that Fiji did not intend to "deprive any state against its will of the right to free and unimpeded passage in the high seas or the right of innocent i q passage in other waters" . A Fiji Government statement issued in March 1982 affirmed this policy. This stressed that while Fiji had strongly advocated the concept of a Nuclear-Free Zone for the South Pacific, it also recognised the "protracted difficulties in its implementation because of the international right of passage for all types of vessels through the oceans"20

Closely related to this is what can be identified as a second consistency In Fiji's position on the Nuclear-Free Zone concept: that is, a pragmatic assessment of what could realistically be achieved and implemented. In 1976, Mr. Kotobalavu, as Permanent Secretary for Foreign Affairs, stated that "there would be no guarantee that the nuclear powers would respect a zone, especially if it deprived

them of the right to free and unimpeded passage in the high seas"21

Fiji's view that a more comprehensive nuclear-free zone could not be implemented, and that to attempt to do so would breach international law, essentially motivated its support for Australia's proposed zone, rather than for a more comprehensive zone as advocated by some Forum Island - 66 -

countries, and reflected general consistencies in Fiji's policies on this issue. However there was an important change in Fiji's position on the zone question in 1983 compared to 1975. This was reflected in the more emphatic stand adopted by Fiji in seeking to exclude bans on ship transit and port calls from the Nuclear-Free Zone proposal. According to informed sources, Ratu Mara went so far as to declare that Fiji would not sign a Nuclear-Free Zone treaty

if it called for bans on nuclear armed and powered vessels 22 transiting the ocean and calling at regional ports

This was a much more inflexible and definitive position than that adopted in 1975 and must be viewed within the context of policy changes carried out by the Fiji Govern- ment in the intervening period. Most significant was the Cabinet decision in 1983 to reverse a policy that had

banned nuclear powered anct armed vessels from visiting |( I. Fiji's ports. According to the new policy, announced in | July 1983, "ships would be allowed to enter Fiji's waters and ports on the basis of individual application" . ') This in effect, means that Fiji now welcomes American and '•

ti British nuclear armed and powered vessels but not Soviet, French or Chinese vessels.

i In reversing its policy on nuclear ship visits, the ' Government stated that it took into account political, ' defence, security and economic considerations, including •' the policies of ANZUS neighbours, limitations of Fiji's ,j, size and resources in meeting its security needs (in isolation from Australia, New Zealand and the US), the growing interest in the Pacific Basin as a new centre for global political and economic activities, the fact that foreign nuclear-powered submarines may already be using Fiji's waters undetected, and the lack of any known Oil accidents from such visits

Although it is possible that 'friendly pressure1 was put on Fiji by the ANZUS partners to review its policy 25 , it appears that Fiji's policy reversal was based upon new assessments of national needs and interests. The stated reasons for the policy change reflect the increasing importance to Fiji of its relations with Australia, the United States and, perhaps to a lesstrextent, New Zealand; and a shift away from the more 'non-aligned' position it held in the 1970's. Apart from perceptions of enhanced national security, Fiji's policy reversal can be seen to be motivated by political and economic considerations. Closer relations with the United States, for instance, is likely to yield important and tangible benefits. Ratu Mara's visit to Washington in November 198M to meet President Reagan not only secured increased aid and trade commitments from the United States, but also significantly enhanced Fiji's international stature. This visit was seen as directly linked to Fiji's policy reversal, allowing American nuclear ships into its ports It also underscored Fiji's growing strategic importance to the United States, - 67 -

size and resources in meeting its security needs (in isolation from Australia, New Zealand and the US), the / growing interest in the Pacific Basin as a new centre for global political and economic activities, the fact that foreign nuclear-powered submarines may already be using Fiji's waters undetected, and the lack of any known accidents from such visits

Although it is possible that 'friendly pressure1 was put on Fiji by the ANZUS partners to review its policy 25 , it appears that Fiji's policy reversal was based upon new assessments of national needs and interests. The stated reasons for the policy change reflect the increasing importance to Fiji of its relations with Australia, the United States and, perhaps to a lessitrextent, New Zealand; and a shift away from the more 'non-aligned' position it held in the 1970'a. Apart from perceptions of enhanced national security, Fiji's * policy reversal can be seen to be motivated by political \ and economic considerations. Closer relations with the United States, for instance, is likely to yield important and tangible benefits. Ratu Mara's visit to Washington in November 198*1 to meet President Reagan not only secured increased aid and trade commitments from the United States, but also significantly enhanced Fiji's international stature. This visit was seen1 as directly linked to Fiji's policy I reversal, allowing American nuclear ships into its ports It also underscored Fiji's growing strategic importance to the

United States, particularly in light of Mew Zealand's ban on nuclear armed and powered vessels. / i

Fiji's Impact on Forum Policy.

It has been suggested that Fiji, in welcoming American (and British) nuclear vessels to its ports was "breaking ranks11 in the SPF, with the effect of weakening the policies, and resolve, of other Pacific Island nations on their own anti-nuclear stands 27 . However the fact that a number of Forum Island countries explicitly welcomed nuclear ship visits at .the time Fiji reversed its policy, tends to indicate that this was not entirely true. Western Samoa, Tonga and the Cook Islands do welcome nuclear ship visits. Only Vanuatu and the Solomon Islands specifically ban transit and port calls of nuclear armed and powered vessels. Papua New Guinea has somewhat ambiguous policies: supportive of a more comprehensive Nuclear-Free Zone but without the actual legislation banning nuclear activities in its territorial waters . (Papua New Guinea does ban overflight of nuclear-armed B52 bombers). The other smaller Island countries tend not to have policies on this issue since there are few prospects of nuclear armed and powered t vessels visiting their ports. , I i , Nevertheless the evidence does suggest that there was i disagreement in the SPF over the scope of the treaty. Although Fiji was not necessarily "breaking ranks" on the - 69 -

issue, it did adopt a particularly firm and assertive position in the Forum, as reflected by Ratu Mara's refusal / to sign a Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty if it banned all nuclear activity in the region. This position, which was strongly influenced by Fiji's own national policies, can be seen to have: had some impact on the Forum. Perhaps most significant were Ratu Mara's efforts to forge consensus in the SPF on the scope of the treaty. Ratu Mara reportedly played a key role at the 1985 Forum meeting in persuading Papua New Guinea's Prime Minister, Michael Somare, to support the treaty 2Q and his actions perhaps influenced other Island leaders to also support the Treaty .

It can be concluded that in the area of nuclear issues Fiji has played a prominent role particularly in the early and mid-1970's. During this period, Fiji assumed the role of speaking and acting on behalf of the SPF (or rather the Forum Island countries). Not only did this lend weight to Fiji's own protests, but it can be seen as enhancing Fiji's status in international fora, and helping to establish its identity as an actor in international affairs. This was one significant advantage of being a member of the regional organisation . There have clearly been a number of consistencies underlying Fiji's nuclear policies, perhaps more than are often recogn- / ised. However an important change was made in 1983 with the reversal of Fiji's nuclear ship-visit ban. This can be seen as motivated largely by new perceptions of national security, and political and economic interests, which significantly shaped Fiji's position in the SPF on the Australian Nuclear- Free Zone proposal. The evidence suggests that Fiji was not prepared to countenance a more comprehensive treaty that would affect its own policies.- Ratu Mara played a key role in forging Forum consensus on this issue (over which there was some disagreement in the Forum). In this way Fiji had an impact on Forum policy. That the Forum has ratified the Australian proposed Nuclear-Free Zone can be seen as important for Fiji in that the treaty now sanctions or legitimises nuclear activity in the region (such as transit of nuclear- powered vessel) which Fiji holdj-as integral to its national interests and policies.

V-3-.2) DECOLONISATION.

It was not until the end of the 1970's that the subject of decolonisation began to appear on the Forum agenda. Up tf until then, it is likely that the relatively smooth and peaceful transitions to independence that oocured in most of the Pacific Island states precluded the need for action t by the Forum. However events in two colonies, • j

I - 7l -

the now independent Vanuatu (formally the British/French ruled condominium of the New Hebrides) and the French / territory of New Caledonia, have caused the Forum to deal directly with decolonisation issues. For the purposes of this chapter, attention will focus on issues related to New Caledonia.

The question of independence for New Caledonia has perhaps proved the most intractable (if not divisive) issue to be addressed by the Forum. Indeed, Fiji's former Minister for Foreign Affairs stated in 1983 that "difference of opinion regarding political developments in New Caledonia, is the only real danger of conflict within the Forum" . While this statement may tend to overlook some other areas of i potential and/or real conflict within the Forum, it never- i theless underlines the degree to which the New Caledonian issue (and more generally that of decolonisation) remains a highly emotive issue that has provoked strong stands within j" t the Forum by individual members. i J

Pro-independence Melanesians (Kanaks) from New Caledonia i 1 have petitioned the SPF since 1979. The Kanaks main t \ i request has been for the SPF to ask the United Nations Committeaof 24 on Deeolonisation to have New Caledonia listed as a "non-autonomous" territory and therefore eligible, ultimately, to be decolonised 32 . The Kanak cause I has been backed strongly by Vanuatu with support also provided by Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands^ . 1 - 7 2-

A number of other Forum members, however, have opposed this move. Fiji, Australia and (at least while Robert Muldoon was Prime Minister) Mew Zealand have been particularly adamqnt that France should be allowed time to implement reforms in the territory and that to Involve the UN would amount to external interference in the affairs of New

Caledonia and prove counter-productive to the decolonisation •>li process there .

It is this position that has emerged as the official Forum line on the issue of decolonisation in New Caledonia, and has been restated in subsequent communiques since 1979.

Fiji's Role. 1

Fiji has played a key role in the Forum in this issue. In 1981, the Forum decided to send a delegation to Paris to i meet with President Mitterand "and discuss with him the * i question of the evolution of French Government policies with regard to the progress towards decolonisation11 in New Caledonia . Ratu Mara was asked by the Forum to lead the delegation, which would also include a representative 1 1 from Tonga and one from Papua New Guinea. While this may 1 be seen in part as recognition of Fiji's (or at least Ratthaut Mara'she was )aske prominencd to heae di n ththe e delegatioForum, int becausis alseo olikelf hiys personal friendship with the then French Foreign Minister Claude Cheysson, in the hope that this would facilitate a

I] more receptive response from the French Government. The fact that the Forum did decide to send a delegation to Paris reflected the growing concern amongst all the Forum members about the situation in the troubled territory.

At the Forum Meeting in 1982 Ratu Mara submitted a report of his meeting with President Mitterand. He declared that "important changes were taking place in New Caledonia" and that these were "designed to meet the aspirations of the Kanak people". fiatu Mara expressed the view that the French Government should continue to encourage the process "in order to achieve the objectives of decolonisation with the least possible bloodshed and distunbance" . In effect, Ratu Mara advocated a 'wait and see' approach; to observe how the reforms implemented by France worked out. Signifi- I cantly the communique issued by the Forum in 1982 essentially endorsed Ratu Mara's views and recommendations. This to some extent underscored Ratu Mara's own influence in the Forum and the degree of support he had from Australia and New Zealand. Certainly the leaders of these two countries praised Ratu Mara's report and his role in leading the delegation to Paris.

Since 1982, Fiji has continued to caution moderation in responding to developments in New Caledonia. This position has conflicted increasingly with the position advocated by Vanuatu's Prime Minister, Father Walter Linl, who has called I for a stronger and more urgent statement from the Forum. - ?k -

In particular Father Lini advocated that the Forum should move to have New Caledonia reinscribed on the UN Decolon- { isation list and to recognise the Kanak Independence Front as representative of the people of New Caledonia. In line with this view, Father Lini has supported the request by the FLNKS (the main political party of the Kanak Independ- ence Front) for Observer Status in the SPF^7. Father Lini is joined in his call for a stronger Forum position on this issue by the Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea. However Mr. Michael Somare , Papua New Guinea's Prime1Minister, has tended to opt for a more moderate position - in line with that of Ratu Mara . Other Forum Island members have voiced varying degrees of support for the pro-independence movement in New Caledonia.

Perceptions and Motives.

In analysing the motives underlying Fiji's policy on this issue it is important to first note that Fiji supports, in i principle, the eventual deoolonisation of New Caledonia V and has voiced the hope, in the UN General Assembly, "that all those who are under any form of foreign domination be given every opportunity to exercise their inalienable right -JO to self-determination"J . Fiji's moderate stand on the question in the Forum has been frequently linked to Fiji's sugar sales to the EEC and concern about not causing tension in its relations with France, that may jeopardise these markets. There is some evidence to suggest that pressure

U» • - 75"

may have been brought to bear on Fiji by France. In 1981, for example, the French Ambassador to Fiji reportedly suggested to Ratu Mara that France would regard Fiji's support (for Kanak independence in the Forum) as an "unfriendly act". This warning was tacitly backed by an understanding that as Fiji sells $ 52 million worth of sugar annually to the EEC, it was vulnerable to political HO pressure

However suggestions that Ratu Mara advocated a 'wait and see1 approach, after meeting with President Mitterand in 1982 because of "fear of economic reprisals", were angrily denied by Ratu Mara. He maintained that there was no scope for the application of pressure through the Lome in Agreement by France . It can be argued that;as with the issue of nuclear testing in the Pacific, Fiji's policies 1 reflect some concern at maintaining friendly and cooperative relations with France, though not to the extent that Fiji has significantly tailored its policies (on decolonisation in New Caledonia) to these' concerns.

A far more salient factor motivating Fiji's position relates to domestic consideration^. While endorsing the principle of \ self-determination for New Caledonia, Fiji has carefully | tempered its support for independence by stressing the need i to recognise the rights of both Kanaks and other races living J ho in New Caledonia . In July 1985, Ratu Mara detailed his ' reasons for this stand. He stated that: New Caledonia, like Fiji, has a multiracial population. When we in Fiji sought independence for our country from Britain, the status we wanted and were given was an independent Fiji with a secure and equal place in it for everyone in our multiracial and multicultural society. No other country was asked to intercede and this is essentially the same approach that the government takes in its position on New Caledonia. New Caledonia will get what theyf*want in direct talks with France and without external interference. If Fiji is asked to support independence for New Caledonia, but only for the Kanak people, the Government clearly cannot lend it a support to such a position ...n. .

This stand can be interpreted as aimed, in part, at appeasing the different races in Fiji, in particular the Indian majority. It is possible that a more pro-Kanak posture, such as that adopted by Vanuatu, the Solomons or Papua New Guinea, would have antagonized the Indian community in Fiji and proved politically costly for the Government.

The Fiji Government is perceived somewhat bitterly, by the Melanesians of New Caledonia, to have betrayed their interests in the Forum. Significantly, the prevailing view among Kanak leaders is that Ratu Mara is essentially a "puppet" of the Indian business community which, it is believed, virtually runs the economy of Fiji . The position taken by Ratu Mara on the issue of decolonisation for New Caledonia is viewed by Kanaks as motivated primarily by domestic political and economic concerns.

Fiji's Impact on Forum Policy.

In assessing the different positions of Forum members on this issue, it is possible to discern a broad Polynesian/ Melanesian distinction, with the former favouring a more moderate approach and the latter a more assertive approach. To some extent, this was evident vis a vis the nuclear issues dealt with in the Forum. In both instances, Fiji can be seen to be part of the Polynesian grouping (including Tonga, Western Samoa, and the Cook Islands).

However, it is not clear that Fiji has consciously indenti- fied with any Polynesian approach on this issue, although to some extent a Melanesian solidarity is apparent. The evidence suggests that Fiji has adopted clearly defined national policies on this question of independence for New Caledonia - formulated in consideration of perceived political and economic interests (primarily of a domestic nature). Ratu Mara has not hesitated to assert these interests, and the policies that are designed to further them, in the Forum.

It is noticeable that the Forum has tended to adopt, in its communiques , a position which closely conforms to^the Fiji Government. This is despite the differences that prevail among Forum members on the issue. While it can be argued that 'consensus' has determined Forum policy, it is nevertheless apparent that the countries which have most strongly advocated this policy are those countries with relatively more weight in the Forum, politically and economically. These are Australia, New Zealand and Fiji; though since the Labor Government came to power in New Zealand in 1984, the New Zealand stand has become more sympathetic to the Kanak cause. This suggests that both Australia and Fiji may have exercised their influence in the Forum in order to promote a policy in line with their own national policies and priorities.

V To conclude this section, it appears that Fiji's role in the SPF on the decolonisation of New Caledonia has been primarily aimed at, and influenced by, specific national considerations and concerns. Fiji can also be seen to have benefited from its prominent role in the Forum on this question. In particular Ratu Mara's leadership of the Forum delegation to Paris in 1982 was a significant political success, which served to enhance Ratu Mara's personal stature as an international statesman. In addition, the moderate image projected by Ratu Mara, especially following the meeting with President Mitterand, no doubt pleased, not only France, but also Australia and possibly America. This can only serve to strengthen its relations and enhance its interests with these countries. However Fiji's role on this question may have served to undermine relations with some Melanesian neighbours, particularly Vanuatu and the Kanaka of New Caledonia. ~7

[3.3) LAW OF THE SEA AND FISHERIES.

This section will first examine Fiji's role in the Law of the Sea (LOS) negotiations up until the mid-1970's. It will then examine issues related to fisheries: the Forum Fisheries Agency and the negotiations for an 'Access Agreement1 between ^orum isiand countries and the United States.

^'he Law of the Sea Convention

The 5PF shov;ed an early interest in the United Nations negotiations for an international LOS Convention. For all the Island nations in the FOrurn, the ratification of a LOS Convention: held important implications for their development prospects and '. security.. For many, future economic viability, if not survival, depended upon their ability to exploit the resources in -Vhe ocean surrounding their islands .

Fiji assumed a particularly prominent role in the LOS negotiations On joining the United Nations, Fiji was elected to the UN Seabed Committee and was present at all the Committee's meetings leadlnig up to the first substantive session of the Third UN LOS Convention in Caracas in. 197^. At this session an<2 the meetings preceding it, Fiji was the only Pacific Island country represented. For this reason it came to be regarded as "unofficial spokesperson" of the South Pacific^

Fiji's main efforts in the LOS Conference were aimed at gaining acceptance and recognition of the "archipelagic principle".. Along with Indonesia, the Philippines and, later, Papua New Guinea, Fij,± took a leading role in advocating this principle or concept. Its claims were eventually recognised by the international community and in 1977 Fiji's parliament passed the Marine Spaces Act declaring the establishment of an archipelagic regime, and claiming sovereignty over all the sea area between its islands 47

The SPF backed Fij's campaign for acceptance of the archipelagic principle with statements of support, and Fiji reported to the SPF on progress in the negotiations. How- ever Fiji did not act on behalf of the Forum on this specific issue. In statements to the UN, for example, Fiji essentially emphasized its own concern that the archipelagic principle be accepted .In 1973 , for instance, Fiji'3 Ambassador to the UN stated:

With 300 scattered islands*with limited land resources, Fiji regards the sea and its resources as matters of vital importance in its efforts to improve the quality and standard of life of its people. It is for this reason...Fiji is seeking... recognition by the international community of (the) special needs and interests of mid-ocean archi- pelagio states^o. Significantly, the criterion subsequently agreed upon by the LOS Conference, as to what constituted an archipelago, effectively excluded most of the Forum Island countries. Only those larger Island countries-Papua New Guinea, Fiji and the Solomon Islands-could declare 'archipelagic regimes1 and claim sovereignty over all the sea area between their islands^. This fact, however, is seldom admitted by the Fiji Government, which has . fostered the view that Fiji, in helping to gain recognition of the archipelagic principle, was acting in the interests of the region as a whole. This was evident, for example, in a speech given by Ratu Mara in 1982. He stated that: We in Fiji have tried to express the concerns of the small Islands of the Pacific, as evidenced in our promotion of the archipelagic concept which gives Island nations an opportunity to benefit from the exploitation of the resources of the seabed adjacent to their coastlines^. / It can be concluded that Fiji voiced the interests and concerns of the Forum Island countries In the early stages of the LOS Conference. By acting a3 "unofficial spokesperson" of the South Pacific, Fiji's status in international fora was en hanced. Fiji did not, however, act on behalf of the Forum on the issue of archipelagic status. Nevertheless, it can be argued that Forum support for Fiji's campaign possibly strengthened Fiji's case in the LOS Conference. Most of the Forum Island countries derived no benefit from recognition of the archipelagic concept. Despite this, the Fiji Government has tended (particularly in recent times) to portray its role in gaining acceptance of the principle, as furthering the interests of the Forum (and the region) as a whole. \

Forum Fisheries Policies.

By 1976, the concept of 200 miles Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) had been generally accepted by the international community, although some matters relating to the zones had not been agreed upon. The Forum Island countries, moving to declare their zones, confronted problems of zone surveillance and policing and the "rational utilisation" of marine resources. In October 1976 the SPF decided in principle to establish an organisation to facilitate regional cooperation in these areas. Fiji firmly supported this decision. At the Forum meeting in

1977, members decided to declare their economic zones and to 5 1 establish a South Pacific Regional Fisheries Agency

Conflict arose within the Forum, however, over whether this organisation or agency should include, as members, countries which did not recognise coastal state sovereignty over highly migratory species of fish (in the case of the South Pacific, this referred particularly to tuna). What this conflict essentially amounted to was whether or not the United States, which does not recognise coastal state sovereignty over tuna, would be granted membership of the organisation.

Western Samoa, in particular , held that it would be better for the United States to be involved in the agency's delib- erations so that differences could be more amicably settled. Papua New Guinea, however, was strongly against the inclusion of the United States. Fiji's view, at least initially, was that it would be preferable to have the United States in the agency if possible. However, when it became clear by the Forum meeting in 1978 that the United States would not accept coastal state jurisdiction over tuna, Fiji firmly opposed United States membership, along with Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands and Kiribati. Fiji's stand appeared based on the view that American membership of the agency would obstruct the agency's endeavours to derive, for the Island nations, maximum benefit from the exploitation of the marine resources around them 52.

An Australian compromise proposal was eventually adopted by the Forum, whereby an interim agency, the South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency, would be established and restricted to Forum members. Further consideration was to be given to the broadly - based fisheries agency 53 . There was evidence of some bitterness on the part of Western Samoa at this outcome. According to one report, Western Samoa accused Fiji and Papua New Guinea of having exerted their superior influence in the Forum to keep the United States out of the Agency „

This conflict over American membership of the agency in part led to suggestions that regional groupings would emerge, based on Polynesian and Melanesian alignments. This was hinted at by Ratu Mara shortly after the 1978 Forum meeting; he went so far as to say that Fiji "may join with Papua New Guinea and 55 the Solomon Islands" .. This contrasts with the apparent Polynesian alignment which was later evident on the issue of decolonisation for New Caledonia, and reflects the ambival- ence of Fiji's sub-regional status. United States fishing policies in the South Pacific were strongly criticised by Fiji at the United Nations. In a statement to the General Assembly in 1978, Fiji's delegate claimed that the formation of a South Pacific Fisheries Agency was being threatened: He asserted: The reason for this sorry state of affairs is the wishes of a dominant power foreign to the region to join the agency on its own terms. We view this attempt of a foreign power to join the South Pacific Fisheries Agency as yet another attempt to dominate our region and to dictate to us the terms and conditions in which we should run our affairs,-,-.

In its endeavours to win recognition of coastal state jurisdiction over tuna, Fiji can be seen to have assumed a prominent and vocal stand which was directed at wider regional interests. As Fiji often pointed out to the United Nations, fish (and in particular tuna) was one of the most important resources in the economies of the Island countries. Tuna was especially vital for the smaller Island countries with few natural resources (such as Kiribati and Tuvalu) and for the leas developed countries such as the

Solomon Islands. Fiji's dependence on fish was not as acute 57,

In more recent years, Fiji appears to have moderated its critis^m of the United States. For example, while it firmly supported the Papua New Guinea Government's seizure of an purse American^seiner, caught fishing without a licence in PNG's 200-mile zone in 1981, Fiji refrained from expressing support for the Solomon Islands Government in its seizure of an American ^seiner in 198*r . Perhaps more si .gnificant though, Fiji has assumed a leading role in Forum efforts to negotiate a multilateral agreement which would set terms or licens- ing fees for American vessels to fish in the economic zones of Forum Island countries.

/ When Ratu Mara met President Reagan in Washington in November, 1981, he reportedly explained to the President the need for an agreement which would licence US fishing vessels, and avoid any further incidences such as with the Solomon Islands. Speaking to the Fijian Parliament on his return, Ratu Mara said: We would like to see an equitable level of fees for access to' our fisheries resources, employment for our people through processing and provision of facilities to repair and service fishing vessels operating in our waters and in the region-^. The agreement envisaged by Fiji would ensure American policing of its tuna boats and provision by the US of vessel movements in the region. According to the Director of the Forum Fisheries Agency, the Prime Minister's statement "accurately summed up the Forum countries' position" .

At least three Forum Island countries however, (Vanuatu, the Solomon Islands and Kiribati), are considering (or have undertaken) separate bilateral agreements with distant water- fishing nations. This can largely be seen as a consequence of America's continued refusal to recognise coastal sovereignty over tuna, or at least to compensate the Island countries for the tuna oaught by US fishing boats in their economic zones. The decision by Kiribati to sign a fishing agreement with the Soviet Union (that permits Soviet fishing boats to operate in Kiribati's 200-mile zone) and Vanuatu's stated intention to provide port facilities to Soviet fishing vessels, have particularly concerned Fiji . This concern appears to underline Fiji's efforts to conclude an Access Agreement with the United States as soon as possible.

It can be argued that the recent shift in Fiji's policies - \o closer relations with the United States and a stronger anti- Soviet stance-has influenced its position on the tuna issue. The fact that Fiji is alarmed at the prospect of further Soviet intrusion into the region, and sees the need for greater American cooperation in order to counter this development, reflects the increasing prevalence within the Fiji Government of the view that its security and economic interests (and those of the region) lie in strengthening relations with the United States. fit can be concluded that Fiji has sought to play several roles in the Forum in this area of fisheries. It actively and firmly opposed United States membership of the regional Fisheries Agency. Along with Papua New Guinea, Fiji was instrumental, it seems, in excluding the United States from the agency. Fiji also loudly criticised United States fishing policies, particularly at the United Nations. Here Fiji advocated the interests of the small Pacific Island nations, which are largely dependent upon fish and marine resources for

their economic viability. It is possible that Fiji's political stature in the region and in the United Nations\ was enhanced by this role since concern about American fishing policies, and more generally America's refusal to sign the Law of the Sea Convention, is widely shared throughout the developing world. J

Fiji's more recent role has been to promote a multilateral Access Agreement between Forum Island countries and the United States. Fiji appears to be at the forefront of this Forum initiative. While no less motivated by the goal of securing for the region, adequate returns f P om its fisheries resources, it is nevertheless apparent that heightened concern about Soviet activities in the region and a desire to strengthen ties with the United States , have significantly influenced this role. This reflects the primacy of national security perceptions, as well as political and economic interests, in Fiji's Forum policies.. It remains to be seen whether this agreement will be concluded and to the benefit of the Forum Island countries.

3.4) CONCLUSION.

Fiji has assumed a prominent and vocal role in the SPF in the political issues examined above. It-has officially acted on behalf of the SPF (when leading the Forum delegation to Paris to meet President Miterand) and has unofficially spoken on behalf of the SPF (at the United Nations LOS Conference). This 'unofficial' role was especially evident in the early and mid-1970's and can be seen as part of a process whereby Fiji was able to - 88 -

establish its identity as an independent nation and an advocate of self-determination for the region. This can be seen underlying Fiji's opposition to French nuclear testing as well as American membership of the regional fisheries agency. The SPF facilitated the formulation of a regional approach to these issues, (which are of primary concern to Fiji), and it is likely that this was a more effective diplomatic strategy for Fiji to pursue. It can also be argued that the SPF's initiatives in these areas provided an opportunity for Ratu Mara to demonstrate his international statesmanship, enhancing his influence in the region as well as his stature in domestic politics.

In the late 1970's and early 1980's there have been increasing divisions within the SPF over political issues, especially the scope of a Nuclear-Free Zone treaty and policy on New Caledonia. Fiji has played an instrumental role, at times, in forging consensus in the SPF on these issues. This can be seen as having a positive impact on the SPF, since consensus has facilitated the adoption and implementation of a common approach by the SPF. However it appears that Fiji's concerns and priorities have centred increasingly on national needs and interests, perceptions of which have shifted in recent years- This has seen a new emphasis on promoting relations with extra-regional powers, particularly the United States. Fiji has strongly advocated policies in the SPF which conform to its own policies and perceptions and, significantly, Forum policy has tended

Greg Fry argued that although the zone was primarily aimed at French nuclear tests, the position that might be adopted on transit and port calls remained unclear I since the specific terms of 'nuclear weapons free zone1 and 'South Pacific1 were only loosely defined. This spelt a potential threat to ANZUS and to US strategic interests in the South Pacific. See G. Fry, A Nuclear-Free Zone for the South West Pacific: Prospects and Significance, The Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, ANLF, Working Paper No. 75, p. 26. See also PIM_ April 1976 p. 2.,

7. Statement1to the 30th Session of the UN General Assembly, 1975 by Fiji's Deputy Prime Minister, Ratu Sir Penaia Ganilau. See Report on the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and Tourism, Jan. 1975-December 1982, Parliament of Fiji Paper No. 63 of 1983.

8. Cited in PJtM, October 1973 p. 11.

9. In April 1972, representatives of ATOM, the Fiji anti-nuclear movement,/A an interview with Ratu Mara . urged bans on UTA and French warships. Fiji Times, April 10, 1972.

10. ATOM Ten-Point Programme To End Testing, Public Affairs Newsletter of 1972.

11. Japan announced plansin1979 to dump radioactive waste in the high seas of the North Pacific. This was strongly condemned by the Forum. See Communiques 1979-198M.

12. Forum Communique 1983- i 13. See Islands Business, September 1984, PIM October ' I 198*1 and PIM August 1985.

•\H. PTM September 1985 p. 12. |i

15. A. Yabaki in the Fiji Report in Nuclear Free Pacific and Independence Movements Conference Reports, Suva, t PPAF/PCC Joint Conference Committee, August 1979. j See also Fry, Op. cit. p. 31. ' '

28. See Islands Business October 1984 and PIM August 1985. /

'29. Earlier, Papua New Guinea's Foreign Minister had stated that Papua New Guinea was "most unlikely" to to sign the Treaty and might seek to extend the Treaty's terms to include a ban on nuclear ships. PIM August 1985 p. 37.

30. In May 1980, three months before the New Hebrides was to gain independence from France and Britain, a group of secessionists took control of the New Hebrides Island of Espiritu Santo. They were supported (the extent to which is uncertain) by French business interests and a private American organisation, the Phoenix Foundation. The 'rebellion' last&lfour months and ended when Papua New Guinea sent 400 troops to the Island, at the request of the new Prime Minister of Vanuatu, Walter Lini. The troops quickly regained control of the Island, arresting about 100 'rebels'. Fiji refused to send any troops, despite being requested, declaring that it would only participate in a properly mounted international peace-keeping operation 1 approved by the UN. See PIM November 1980, p 33. *f J For further background on the Espiritu Santo 'rebell- [ If ion' see Richard Shears, The Coconut War, (Cassell ' Australia 1980).

31. Henry Kines,' "Fiji's Tourism Mission", Islands Business, February 1983 p. 29. i .1 32. New Caledonia had been among 74 territories listed as h non-autonomous by the UN in 1946, according to "' Resolution 66(1) of the UN General Assembly. The following year, however, unilaterally and without the prior agreement of the General Assembly, France withdrew it from the list using as a pretext the fact that New Caledonia, Saint-Pierre and Mlquelon, and the the French territories in the South Seas, whose territories "already enjoyed extensive political j rights, had been endowed with a form of administration J which, on the whole, was very similar to that of the * departments of France itself as far as the status of * the inhabitants and their system of political repre- ^ sentation are concerned". For this reason the French ceased to give information to the UN about New * Caledonia...See PIM September 1979, P. 13. f i 33. In June 1985 the Foreign Ministers of Papua New Guinea, 1 > the Solomon Islands and Vanuatu met with a leader of f the FLNKS, Yann Uregei. This resulted in a strongly- | 'f * x I - 9.3 -

worded communique which, inter alia, expressed full support for the independence movement and for the reinscription of New Caledonia on the UN list. PIM August 1985 p. 27.

34 . Australia and Fiji held that since France was undertaking reform in the territory, any attorrtpt to involve the Ull would only embarrass the French Government in international fora, and possibly weaken its commitment to the reform efforts. Confidential Source D.

35. Forum Communique 1981.

36. Reported in PIM, October 1982, p. 14.

37. This request was put to the Forum meeting in 1985. It was rejected on the grounds that the FLNKS did not qualify for Observer Status, not being representative of the majority of people of New Caledonia. This was especially argued by Fiji and Australia.

38. It has been suggested that the close friendship between Ratu Mara and Michael Somare has resulted in the latter generally supporting Ratu Mara's views on different issues, sometimes in conflict with the views of other senior PNG leaders. For example, the PNG Foreign Minister fully supported a stronger | position on New Caledonia at the June 1985 meeting. See. Footnote 33. Mr. Somare, however, backed down on this position at the Forum meeting.

39. Address to the 33rd Session of the UN General Assembly by Berenado Vunibobo, October 9, 1978. In Report on the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and Tourism, January 1, 1984-December 31, 1982, Parlimentary Paper No. 63 of 1983. ~

l f

40. PIT* October 1 981 p. 14 .

41 . Confidential Source E . 42. MelanesianS (Kanaks) represent 42.65 per cent of the population of New Caledonia and most favour independence from France. The remainder of the population f is made up of Europeans (37.85 per cent), Indonesians (3.7 per cent) and Vietnamese (1.6 per cent). These ' mainly favour continued association with France. Dr. John Dalton, "Australia, France and the New / Caledonian Issue", Paper presented at the Australian t Political Science Association Conference. Adelaide, / August 1985.

43- Islands Business, August 1985 p. 18.

44. From discussions with FLNKS representatives visiting Melbourne, August/September 1965.

45. PJCM August 1974 p. 7.

46. According to this principle or concept, a state may draw base-lines connecting the outer most constituent islands and dry reefs and may use these lines for extending territorial area (to a distance of twelve miles). Waters inside this baseline belong to the state, which would have exclusive rights to exploit marine resources and control security and pollution. Innocent passage of foreign vessels would be allowed according to national law and in fixed sea lanes. \ Unlike the 200-mile EEZ principle, the archipelagic +. principle had no precedent in international law. See PIH July 1973, p. 4; also Geoffrey Dabb, 'The Law of the Sea in the South Pacific', Pacific Islands Yearbook, 1981, p. 28.

47. Prior to this, sovereignty reached only 12 miles from the coast of each island. See PIM February 1978 p 6. s 48. S. K. Sikivou, Statement to the 28th Regular Session of the UN General Assembly, 1973, in Ratu Mara, Report on Foreign Affairs for the Period October 10 1970 to December 31 1973, Parliamentary Paper 19, 1974. Appendix Hid, p. 31 .

49. Archipelagos are those groups of islands which, when enclosed within a boundary line joining the outermost j islands and reefs, have no more than nine times more ( | sea than land. This ratio means that only those ' | larger, less scattered groups can claim the special ! ' status of an archipelago. It would appear that this \\\ criterion was the outcome of concern among some major \ i distant-water fishing nations, in particular Japan, that reasonable proportions be maintained about the outer limits of an archipelago. It was in fact Britain that proposed that the area under the sovereignty of an archipelago be limited to a specific ratio. See' PIM, November 1974 p. 81; Dabb Op. cit. Ron Crocombe Interview. - 9-5-

50. Ratu Mara, "Fiji's Role in the South Pacific", Address to the Asian Affairs Council, Hawaii, January 1982.

51. Forum Communique, 1977.

52. See Richard Herr , "Crosscutting Pressures in Contem- porary South Pacific Regionalism", World Review, Vol. 18, 2, August 1979, p. 181.

53. At the 1979 Forum meeting, the Convention fromally establishing the South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency was signed. It set out the functions of the Agency, to include; the collection, analysis and evaluation of information with respect to living marine resources of the region and in particular the highly migratory species; to provide advice and information to members in the development of fishing policies and negotiations. See Gabriel Gris, "Ten Years of Regional Cooperation The Forum Way", in Pacific Perspective, Vol.11, No. 1 , p. 31 . For more details on the Agency see J. Van Dyke, Tuna Management in the Pacific: an Analysis of the South pacific Forum Fisheries Agency, Orginally published in the University of Hawaii Law Review, Vol. 3, No. 1 19^T.

54. PIM November 1978, p 17.

55. Ibid.

56. Berenado Vunibobo, Statement to the Session of the UN General Assembly, October 9, 1978 in Report on the Ministry of the Foreign Affairs and Tourism for the Period January 1 197it-December 31 1'9.82, Parliamentary Paper 63 for 19B3.

57. See Statements to the United Nations 1977-1982 in Ibid .

58. Following the seizure of the boat, the Jeanette Diana, the US Government retaliated against the Solomon Islands Government by banning imports of tuna from the Solomon Islands. At the Forum Meeting in August 1984, the Prime Minister of the Solomon Islands asked for Forum support in the form of counter bans on the t admission of US fishing vessels to Forum Island ports if and the cancellation of current US fishing licenses 'j for as long as the US-imposed embargo continued. \i The SPF voiced its concern about the Solomons dispute, , but refused to take any action in support of the / Solomon Islands1 Government. According to one report, / Fiji's reluctance to take a strong stand can be linked to the building of a $4 million slipway in Fiji, which hopes to attract a $40 million a year business repairing US fishing vessels. See Robert Keith-Reid, "A Squeeze on Honiara", Islands Business, October 1984, p. 32. •

59. Fiji Times, December 8, 1984 p. 3.

60. Ibid ,

61• Fiji Times August 10, 1985, August 11, 1985.

i - 97 -

CHAPTER FOUR /

ECONOMIC ISSUES IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC FORUM.

Despite being essentially a political grouping, the SPF has spent most of its time dealing with economic issues and concerns. This partly reflects the fact that all things economic are to some extent political, but also that regional cooperation is, perhaps above all, aimed at promoting ' economic interests and objectives.

The economic issues of central importance to the SPF have been those associated with trade. These include Island \ trade with Australia and New Zealand, trade between the Forum Island countries, and Island trade with the EEC (under [ , the LonVe Convention). The SPF has also directed considerable attention to developing measures which facilitate trade, in particular shipping and air services for the region .

This Chapter will examine Fiji's actions and policies in two key trade issues: Island trade with Australia and New Zealand and inter-Island trade. In addition, this Chapter will examine Fiji's role in the regional airline and shipping line ventures. As with the previous Chapter, this analysis will aim to establish the extent to which Fiji has f assumed a prominent or leading role in the Forum, and how far this role has served specific national interests and priorities. The central purpose of this Chapter, however, I

is to determine to what extent Fiji accrues more benefits ,/ from regional cooperation than other Forum Island countries; ' whether it can be shown that disparities are promoted or enhanced by Fiji's role in the SPF, and whether Fiji's role has had an impact on the "functional aspects" of regional cooperation, specifically on joint ventures.

4.1) ISLAND TRADE WITH AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND.

One of the principal economic objectives of the SPF was to alter the unfavourable balance of trade between the Island states and developed countries, ...whereby the territories previously dependent had ' *. supplied raw materials to metropolitan countries but | were unable to manufacture many of the goods they required.. .

The promotion of closer trade and economic relations with Australia and New Zealand was among four proposals, submitted to the second Forum meeting in 1972, aimed at modifying the "pattern of trade inherited from the colonial period" . *"' According to Fiatu Mara, closer relations with Australia and New Zealand were important because "any change or modification of the trade pattern could best occur if the people who controlled it (Australia and New Zealand) could I be influenced" . Trade barriers affecting Island goods in j the Australian and New Zealand markets were seen as the key | obstacles to developing more favourable trade relations with these two countries. ^-99 -

Until the late 1970's, little progress was made by the SPF towards improving trade and economic relations with Australia and New Zealand. To some extent, this was because the Forum (and hence SPEC) paid more attention to other issues such as association with the EEC, shipping, telecommunications and civil aviation. But it also appears that Australia and New Zealand were reluctant to liberalise trade relations with the Forum Island countries, concerned that this may set a precedent which would have to be extended to ASEAN, or would violate the terms of GATT ,

The evidence suggests that Ratu Mara was particularly pressing on this issue in the Forum, and was more vocal than most other Island leaders. According to informed sources, Ratu Mara argued that if the EEC could give those Pacific countries associated with it (under Lome) favourable access to its markets, so could Australia and New Zealand . Partly as a result of Ratu Mara's urging, the Forum agreed at the 1978 meeting to call on SPEC to convene a meeting of senior trade officials "to prepare recommendations on a possible preferential, non-reciprocal trade arrangement between Australia/New Zealand and the Forum Island countries" .

A series of meetings ensued and at the Forum meeting in Kiribati in July 1980, the South Pacific Regional Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement (SPARTECA) was established'7. Fiji had been at the forefront of the SPARTECA negotiations. Significantly however, it was not among those countries which signed the agreement in Kiribati. This was because iff : -TOO -

certain products which Fiji wanted to export were excluded from the Australian and New Zealand schedules. It appears | i J these products were excluded in order to protect the ., traditional trade that existed between Australia and Papua New Guinea, and between New Zealand and the Cook Islands, i Niue and Western Samoa. According to informed sources, New Zealand did in fact argue that unrestricted access for citrus fruit juice from Fiji could create serious economic difficulties for the Cook Islands which, along with Niue and Western Samoa, would receive little direct benefit from such an agreement .

Nevertheless, following talks between New Zealand and Fiji ''< later in the year, New Zealand agreed to review its SPARTECA arrangements when Fiji's products came "on stream" in 1982, q and Fiji announced its intention to join SPARTECA . Fiji's attitude here tends to indicate a priority concern to max-

imise its own needs and interests through the trade agreement 1 and demonstrates less concern for the interests of other Forurn Island countries, at least when those interests appeared in conflict with its own.

Since joining SPARTECA, there has been some progress in Fiji's exports to Australia and New Zealand. (See Table 1). But according to Fiji's High Commissioner to Australia, Dr. James Maraj, "the expectations which were held for the agreement at its inception, despite the political goodwill expressed, have not been realised in actual progress"10. ti"

- 102 -

for this reason Fiji is pressing for reviews of SPARTECA, to • / remove prevailing constraints on its exports to Australia and New Zealand. One constraint is the Rules of Origin clause which Fiji wants derogated from the present 50 per cent to 30 per cent 1 1. Another is the continued restrictions on exports to Australia of Fiji's garments and textiles.

A further factor concerning Fiji is the Closer Economic Relations agreement (CER) between Australia and New Zealand, which Fiji sees as posing a future threat to Island exports 1 2 to these countries . These concerns have been raised by Fiji with the Australian and New Zealand Governments and this has achieved some significant results. At the 1985 'if, i Forum Meeting it was agreed that a committee be appointed to explore ways of including Pacific Island countries in the CER. This was reportedly "at the instigation of Ratu 1 ^ Mara" . Australia and New Zealand also announced new trade concessions, with Australia lifting duty on all but five \ Pacific Island product items. According to one report, Fiji's exporters stand to gain "millions of dollars of 1 4 business from these concessions"

In negotiating with Australia and New Zealand for improve- ments in SPARTECA conditions, Fiji sees itself acting in the Interests of all Forum Island countries. According to Dr. Maraj , this is because "any progress achieved within SPARTECA's schedules is automatically made available to the i other Forum Island countries" . While in theory this may I - 103 -

hold, in practice however some Forum Island countries gain very little, if anything, from the agreement in its origin- al or reviewed form. In fact, the evidence tends to indicate that some of the smaller Island countries , in particular Kiribati, Tuvalu and the Cook Islands, maySbe disadvantaged by SPARTECA as their levels of trade with Australia and New Zealand have drastically fallen since the agreement was established

These countries, known as Smaller Island Countries (SICs) have few human or natural resources, limited capacity for agricultural development, little or no manufacturing industry and inadequate infrastructure and technology. Thus, while SPARTECA creates the opportunities for trade expansion and economic development, it is clear SIC's do not have the 'wherewithall ' to exploit these opportunities. Improvement in the terms of SPARTECA in effect benefits only the larger Island countries with a manufacturing base - such as Fiji and Papua New Guinea, and those with more products to export. Fiji, in fact, has benefited from the inability of other Forum Island countries to fully exploit SPARTECA. For example at the 1985 Forum meeting it was agreed that the unused parts of garment quotas for other Island countries be reallocated to Fiji17.

The Fiji Government does acknowledge that it has been the "main beneficiary of SPARTECA", viewing this as the inevit- able outcome of Fiji's relative level of economic develop- menti8 m, The Government also supports the need for special - 10/+-

assistance to be given to the smallest and poorest nations of the Forum. At the same time, however, Fiji has insisted that any special treatment for SICs (which formally include Tuvalu, Kiribati, Niue and the Cook Islands) also be accorded to the small islands within its own group. These outer islands of Fiji, according to the Fiji Government, share the same problems as SICs (such as inadequate water supplies, high energy and transportation costs) and thus have the same needs for special assistance . Significantly when the 1985 Forum Meeting accepted a report recommending special help be given to SICs, the small outer islands of Fiji also qualified for special assistance.

This stand can be viewed in part, as reflecting a reluctance by Fiji to grant concessions, and accord special treatment, to some Island nations in the SPF. This reluctance is evident, also, in Fiji's continued criticism of the special treatment which Australia and New Zealand grant to those countries which they previously administered 20 . The view of the Fiji Government is that all Forum Island countries should be accorded the same treatment. Furthermore, it is held by the Government that Fiji is at a "great disadvantage" because it does not enjoy a special relationship with either 21 Australia or New Zealand

According to Ron Crocombe, this view of being disadvantaged is more a "defence" for the many benefits which Fiji accrues from SPARTECA that other Island countries do not22. There is, in fact, little evidence to support the claim that Fiji / is disadvanbaged by these special relations. The countries concerned, with the exception of Papua New Guinea, are particularly small and do not compete with many of Fiji's exports. At the same time, Fiji enjoys extensive economic

relations with Australia and New Zealand, on a bilateral 23 basis, which have grown markedly in recent years f It can be concluded that Fiji played an important role in pressing for a non-reciprocal trade agreement between the Forum Island countries and Australia and New Zealand. Fiji has also been at the forefront of efforts to widen the terms of the agreement and make them more favourable to Island exports. In so doing, Fiji has considerably enhanced its own Oil trade and development prospects and arguably tho

in As noted above, the Forum sought to alter the pattern of trade in the region inherited from the colonial period, whereby the Island countries traded mainly with metropolitan countries: exporting their primary products and importing manufactured and processed goods. A consequence of this trade pattern was that the volume of trade between the Island countries was minimal. In 1971, the year the Forum was established, Inter-Island trade accounted for only one per cent on the

region's total foreign exports, and one per cent of total 25 imports

Increasing intra-regional trade was generally seen as necessary to creating a more favourable balance of trade between Island countries and the developed nations, as well as essential to facilitating the economic growth and independence of Pacific Island countries. As one, economist noted in 197^: For member countries of the South Pacific Forum, an ! expansion in intraregional trade is seen as a vital ; element in current economic development efforts, } capable of creating new sources of employment, \ national income and foreign exchange and, in general, | achieving more productive utilisation of available i human and physical resources. In addition such trade ] will possibly build up a certain measure of cooperation I and cohesion in the region and thereby reduce its dependxg \ ence on the larger, more distant metropolitan markets... .I

The idea of establishing an "economic union" for the region j was mooted at the first Forum meeting and at the second \ meeting, the Forum considered a proposal to form "some sort ? of free trade area" as well as to seek rationalisation |

iI - 10? -

of industrial development and marketing. Both measures were viewed as necessary to modifying the existing trade pattern2^.

Apart from frequently endorsing these proposals in principle however at subsequent Forum meetings , the Forum has made little tangible progress towards implementing them. Signi- ficantly in 1981, ten years after the first Forum meeting, inter-Island trade still accounted for one per cent of the region's total foreign trade ie. imports and exports.

Furthermore, according to most estimates, it is unlikely to 29 grow beyond five per cent . Reasons for the limited potential of inter-Island trade include the similarity of production among Island states, small markets within the region, poor communications (in particular shipping) and the persistence of traditional trading patterns. One major impediment, however, to realising even this limited potential has been national policies of import substitution and protection for local industry. Greater political will to cooperate is therefore perceived as vital to achieving any increase in the trading levels within the region*1 .

Fiji's position on this question of inter-Island trade must be viewed within the context of its dominant role in regional trade; a dominance that has applied specifically•to exports. (See Table 2). In 1970, Fiji accounted for 41 per cent of all domestic exports within the region, or 69 per cent if the

....,._.. --- ••- - • -sr z^r.i ii --1--.=;"- rt£;.^r.-_- i TT. ^ - r--s. - .

Fiji's dominance of inter-Island exports (and re-exports) has been sustained. In 198'I it still accounted for ^^ per 22 cent of domestic exports : due to the growth of its own manufacturing sector as well as increased demand for its products from other Island countries undertaking their own industrial and economic development. At the same time, Fiji's imports from its Island neighbours remained small^. (See Table3).

Fiji has generally supported initiatives to increase the level of inter-Island trade: tending more towards promoting ad hoc trade arrangements with Forum Island countries than to establishing a free trade area in the region. The Regional Long Term' Sugar Agreement, in operation since 1976>is perhaps the most important trade arrangement negotiated under the auspices of the Forum by SPEC. Through this agreement, Fiji supplies sugar on a regular basis to Western Samoa, Tonga, the Solomon Islands, Tuvalu and Kiribati, at a guaranteed price .

However, while supporting some moves to increase trade levels within the region, Fiji has not encouraged any change in the overall pattern of trade between itself and the Island nations of the Forum. National policies of import substitution and protectionism have, to a large extent, ensured Fiji's continued dominance of regional exports and low level of imports. In the 1970's, Fiji's tariff levels were among the highest in the

region and its quarantine regulations were among the most ••*-:'•";.• strictly applied. These served to penalise imports, parti- • :;\ cularly from Tonga, Western Samoa and the Cook Islands31*. ,'": Ratu Mara, however, has defended these measures, stating in ; ' 1981 that: %\

There is a need to distinguish between protectionism ':-|^' that is justifiable and helps in the establishment \-'$x of new industries, and that which is designed purely i^$Z- as a hindrance to the free flow of trade or for the ;.?•;;: protection of inefficient industries .... If we do not 1:';iV' give protection to new industry, we will never be-.able to establish any manufacturing industry at all... .

Nevertheless, these are essentially "inward looking" policies, which look to the utilisation of national resources and to the building of viable industries to supply the domestic market, as well as export markets. Such measures have not proved "hospitable" to developing economic cooperation with Fiji's Island neighbours .

It can be argued that Fiji's dominant role in inter-Island trade (as a leading exporter) places it in the position to influence, to some extent, the pattern of trade within the region; at least to redressing the marked trade imbalance in its favour. There does not appear, however, to be the political will in the Government to encourage or promote any change in the prevailing pattern of trade.

This was evident, for example, in 1984. The Forum meeting that year agreed in principle "to promote duty-free and unrestricted access for handorafts traded between Forum Island

J I countries, to be implemented on a bilateral basis'1^. The Fiji Parliament later in the year passed a bill drastically reducing import duties on handcrafts from Kiribati and Tuvalu. However this relaxation of trade barriers was tied to an Increase in exports from Fiji to these countries^8. This will likely result in some increase in trade between Fiji and Kiribati and Tuvalu, but no real change in the overall trade imbalance .

According to one leading Island economist, it may be necessary to implement a "SPARTECA-type arrangement, with non-reciprocal provisions applying to larger countries" in order to protect and assist smaller Island countries . Such an arrangement, however , would require some sacrifice of national interest by Fiji. Present policies and priorities indicate that Fiji is unwilling and unlikely to make such a sacrifice in the wider interest of regional cooperation.

It can be concluded that the SPF has not achieved its stated goal of increasing the level of intra-regional trade. The potential for such trade is limited by, inter alia, the nature of current production, ' structure of shipping routes and costs. However the lack of political will to cooperate has impeded realisation of even this limited potential. -Fiji's dominant role as a regional exporter has shaped to some extent the pattern, and level, of inter-Island trade. Fiji's pursuit of policies which are designed, above all, to promote national economic interests, has done little to enhance the prospects of more balanced, if not more extensive, intra- regional trade and may have facilitated the persistanoe of inherent economic disparities.

4.3) CIVIL AVIATION: THE SINGLE REGIONAL AIRLINE CONCEPT.

This issue is often viewed as epitomising the failure of regional cooperation in the face of nationalism, as well as highlighting the conflict of interest between Fiji and the other Island members of the SPF. According to Greg Fry, it was resentment of Fiji's dominant role in this venture, com- bined with the belief that the venture favoured Fijian interests, which caused several Pacific Island countries to establish their own national airlines, rather than participate in the regionally-owned airline40

It has also been suggested, by Ron Crocombe and others, that Fiji "exploited" its Island partners in the regional venture by using the regional airline as a de facto national carrier This section will thus examine Fiji's role in this issue and assess the extent to which this role led to the moves to set up national airlines by some Forum Island countries.

The concept of a single airline serving the Island countries of the South Pacific was not one initiated by the Forum.. There was, in fact, a regional airline already in operation in 1971 known as Air Pacific. This airline had its roots in a small domestic air service operating in Fiji, (which until 1971 was known as Fiji Airways). Fiji Airways had been developed into a regional airline, based in Fiji, be a consortium of Australian, New Zealand and British airlines. The main purpose of Fiji Airways was essentially to be a regional 'feeder service1 for the trunk routes operated by these metropolitan airlines .

Despite the change of name in 1971, Air Pacific's character remained essentially the same as that of Fiji Airways1. Fiji was the base of the airline's operations; its central location in the region being ar^ important consideration . Furthermore the metropolitan airlines continued to control and manage the airline, despite bringing in a number of Island countries as minority shareholders in the late 1960's. These were Tonga, Fiji, the British Solomon Islands, the Gilbert and Ellice Islands, Nauru and Western Samoa.

Largely as a result of the policies and practices established by the overseas airlines, Fiji was in a position (in 1971) to enjoy more services and accrue more benefits from the airline than its Island neighbours. The fact that all services started and terminated In Fiji (which was also serviced by all the trunk route carriers) and that almost all employment created by the airline was at the airline headquarters in Suva, were among the most tangible benefits enjoyed by Fiji (and not by the other Island partners)

It appears that Fiji was the Forum Island country most firmly committed to the development of a single regional airline, with Air Pacific as the basis. While it is possible that Fiji's commitment was to some extent influenced by the many benefits it accrued from the airline , there appeared to be more pressing concerns underlying this commitment. One consideration was that it would not be viable to have more than one airline operating in the region. For example, at independence Ratu Mara spoke against the idea of a national airline for Fiji because it would be a "status symbol the country could not afford", adding that the region could also only afford one airline . Another consideration was that it would only be to the advantage of the established trunk route carriers operating across the Pacific to have Island states competing against each other, rather than cooperating in a single regional carrier 46

These views, however, were not supported by some of Fiji's partners in Air Pacific. By 1971 Western Samoa was developing its national airline, Polynesian Airlines, into a regional airline serving several Island countries 47 . Then in 1972, at the second Forum meeting, Nauru announced that it had withdrawn from the Air Pacific consortium and would be promoting its own national carrier . Two years later Tonga announced its intention to establish a national airline, (although this has not yet eventuated) and by the mid-1970 's Papua New Guinea's national airline was established and operating regional and international services.

These Island nations established their own airlines for a

t combination of reasons. Perhaps the most -116-

overriding motivation was the perceived failure of Air Pacific to cater to the individual needs of these countries . This was largely because Air Pacific had been established by the metropolitan airlines in order to feed their trunk route services. For this reason many of the Island countries remained isolated and poorly catered for by air services, and a national airline was seen as the only way to obtain necessary services. As the Western Samoan Prime Minister stated in 1974: (We) are not convinced of the willingness of the management of Air Pacific to even try to give the service to the travelling public, government and economy of Western Samoa that we now derive from Polynesian Air...,.-,.

For Nauru, a particularly isolated Island state, "reasons of trade, foreign policy and a wish to act independently to secure a future in the region not dependent upon the services of other nations" have been identified as under- 51 lying its decison to set up a national airline . Unlike most of the other Island states, Nauru's wealth, derived from its phosphate reserves, enabled it to maintain an international carrier even though it was not economically viable.

When Tonga mooted plans to establish a national airline, the King of Tonga stated that "it would be very useful to have an alternative to Nadi (Fiji's international airport) as a hedge against the continuing union and industrial troubles in 52 Fiji " . There was also the feeling, shared by the other countries, that unless they developed their own national carriers, they would not be able to benefit from the increasing numbers of tourists visiting the region. What must also be considered, as a factor underlying the moves by all these countries, was a certain sense of prestige inherent in the ownership of a national airline, which would serve to enhance 53 their newly acquired statehood .

It i3 not clear that resentment of Fiji's dominance of Air Pacific (and the many benefits that accrued to Fiji from the regional airline) was among the main reasons for the establishment of national airlines by these countries. There were some suspicions, largely unconfirmed, that revenues from the international services of Air Pacific were being used to subsidise Fijian domestic routes . This fuelled speculation, particularly in the media, that Fiji was exploit- ing its position in Air Pacific to further its own interests at the expense of the other Island countries. Suspicion of this kind may have influenced the Island governments to establish their own national airlines. But the evidence suggests that the primary motives lay in the perceived failure of Air Pacific to adequately serve the different needs of these countries: failure born out of the airline's structural limitations and the fact that it was largely operated and influenced by overseas interests.

Fiji remained firmly committed, both in and out of the Forum, to the single regional airline concept and was critical of its Island partners for not supporting Air Pacific. As one

Government Minister stated in 197-4- Tonga and Western Samoa have both benefited from the Air Pacific consortium and have an influence over Air Pacific plans. But Fiji receives no corresponding benefit from these countries,.,.. It appears that Fiji's leaders held the view that if the single regional airline concept failed, Fiji stood to lose most. This was partly because Fiji had invested more capital in the venture than any of the other Island countries, but also because Air Pacific was not designed to be a national

carrier (the likely alternative to operating Air Pacific as a regional carrier). Fiji would inherit obligations and technology largely unsuited to a national flag carrier in a strongly competitive environment56

Largely for these reasons, Fiji continued to advocate the single.regional airline concept. However, when Nauru and 57 British Airways declined to increase their shareholding in 1975, Fiji acquired control of Air Pacific. It is clear that the Fiji Government was not pleased with this development, as Ratu Mara indicated in a press conference in November that year. Referring to the future of Air Pacific, he stated : We have done everything to try and encourage regional cooperation, but I think we may have overreached and done so at the expense of our national interests,^. 5o

By 1977 Fiji had acquired 66 per cent shareholding of Air Pacific, and the airline became the Fijian flag carrier. Since then Fiji has "definitely move away from the concept of a regionally-owned carrier". According to Mr. Kotobalavu ,

"Air Pacific is Fiji's carrier, but in the spirit of regional

cooperation*we are ready to cooperate bilaterally with

individual countries"^.

Fiji's position on this issue has shifted significantly

since the early 1970's when Ratu Mara held that the fate

of the regional airline was the "acid test11 of the Forum

and of regional cooperation . Fiji's policy now reflects

a recognition of the practical difficulties of successfully"

operating joint ventures, and of the limitations of such

ventures in adequately serving the interests of all con-

cerned. This was demonstrated by Ratu Mara in a speech in

1979. Referring to the single regional airline concept, he

said :

It may be that inherently such ventures are doomed to failure because of the competing interests and requirements of the various countries. Nor is it any easier because such needs are quite justifiable and legitimate . . .g.. .

To conclude this section, it is not clear that Fiji

'exploited' its position of advantage in Air Pacific to

further its own interests. Fiji was the main beneficary of

the regional airline, but this can largely be viewed as an

"accident of colonial history". In addition its policies were shaped to a significant extent by those of the overseas airlines and their control of the airline's management. Fiji was firmly committed to the concept of a single regional airline, owned by the Forum Island countries, which it saw - 130 -

to be in the interests of the region as a whole, as well as in its own interests. Air Pacific became Fiji's flag carrier only when other Island states failed to support Air Pacific, and moved to establish their own airlines. These moves were motivated partly in order to provide more air services than Air Pacific could provide; partly by nationalist aspirations to own and operate separate flag carriers. Fiji's role, while having some implications, was not the overriding factor in the failure of the regional venture

4.4) REGIONAL SHIPPING.

It has been suggested that Fiji's experience with Air Pacific^ (that is, the lack of support for the venture from some Island countries) considerably weakened Fiji's commitment to the regional shipping line established by the SPF . It has further been suggested that, being already well served by shipping lines, Fiji was less interested in participating in a regional shipping line and was not particularly supportive of the venture . This section will, in part, examine the extent to which these are valid assessements of Fiji's role on this issue.

Although Fiji was well-served by shipping lines (being centrally locatad in the region and provided with extensive port facilities), the evidence indicates that Fiji was strongly in favour of the idea of a regional shipping line - 12.1 -

when it was mooted in the late 196O's and early 1970's. Fiji voiced its support for the concept both in PIPA meetings and at the early Forum meetings, endorsing the "long-held ambition" of South Pacific countries "to have control of their shipping needs" . Island control of shipping was viewed as necessary in order to change the traditional trade patterns in the region, since these trade patterns were shaped significantly by the metropolitan controlled shipping services which were largely "unreliable and deficient". It appears that Fiji's more immediate concern, however, lay in the effects of the continually rising freight rates, which translated to the costs of imported c'qmodities, causing inflation in the Fiji economy.

Fiji assumed a vocal position on this issue, advocating that existing Island services operated by Tonga and Nauru be expanded into a regional line, rather than establishing a wholly new line. (This 'pooling' arrangement was similar # in concept to Fiji's policy on the regional airline). This system was eventually adopted, despite disagreement within the Forum over the issue . In addition, Fiji argued against • K'i the notion that commercial viability be guaranteed before the line was made operational. It was Fiji's view that such ',',! j, a precondition would be difficult, if not impossible, to meet and would almost certainly "doom" the venture from the start . It was subsequently agreed at the 1976 Forum ' ' meeting that the shipping line should operate "so far as I 69 possible on a viable basis" - 122 -

The Pacific Forum Line (PFL) commenced trading in 1978, using three chartered vessels provided by Tonga, Western Samoa and New Zealand. It became apparent almost immediat- ely, however, that the line faced severe financial problems

and in the first two years of operation it incurred consider- i ' I ; : i able losses. For this reason Forum member countries associated with the PFL were called upon in 1980 to increase their contributions to the line. It was on this issue that Fiji held back, refusing to contribute further funds to the PFL, over and above its minimum $10,000 shareholding .

Fiji's decision was viewed by some observers as reflecting .7r 1 a withdrawal of support by Fiji for the regional venture . - r : However it is not clear that this was the case. The evidence suggests that Fiji's refusal to invest further funds in the line was based on dissatisfaction with the management of the line, and the fact that it was not serving the needs of the Island countries but was in fact mainly benefiting a non- Island member of the consortium: New Zealand. In an article published in the Fiji Times, Ratu Mara stated that "Fiji and i other Island countries were being told to subsidise New 72 ( Zealand's exports to the Pacific Islands" . Ratu Mara in ,i particular objected to the New Zealand proposal that Australian bilateral aid funds be diverted to the PFL. He j stated that: The Government of Fiji could never and has never agreed to such a proposition. It is not the function nor the responsibility of the people of Fiji to promote by subsidy the export trade of another nation ... -7-3 . - 123 - •

While it can be argued that Fiji was not prepared to sacri- .;; fice other national priorities (such as Australian aid j. projects) in order to support the PFL, it appears that Fiji's overriding concern was with New Zealand's role in the venture. Fiji's refusal to contribute further to the PFL was |\j a way of expressing its criticism of New Zealand, and its '.j dissatisfaction at the way the line was being managed. This ?;j action does not demonstrate that Fiji was any less ooramited |; to the venture. '1

Significantly, one year later at the 1981 Forum meeting, Fiji was at the forefront of efforts to resolve the PFL's continuing financial crisis. Fiji proposed that funds from the EEC Lome' II regional allocation be used to purchase containers for the line. The ownership of containers had been identified in a report on the PFL as the most crucial factor to achieving profitability'7 4 . The Forum agreed to this suggestion, which was subsequently implemented. At the Forum meeting in Canberra in 1983, Fiji again took the initiative in calling a meeting of the Pacific Island countries associated with the EEC to consider diverting their unused Lorrfe aid to the shipping line. This move was in part a response to Australia's refusal to direct further 7"S aid to the PFL on the grounds that It was "uneconomic11' . These initiatives suggest that Fiji's support for the regional shipping line had not diminished. Instead, "restructured and new management", resulting in reduced costs and greater 7 ft efficiency,' had motivated Fiji to restate its commitment to the venture. Ratu Mara has described Fiji's support for the PFL as consistent with Fiji's support for "practical regional cooperation" which was "mutually beneficial to all"7 7 , It may appear that Fiji - as the leading Island trader in the region - has benefited most from the PFL and that the venture has not been "mutually beneficial". However, tangible benefits are difficult to measure precisely and previously isolated Island countries now served by the PFL may have perhaps gained as much from the line as Fiji , which was already provided with essential shipping services.

What can be argued though, is that basic patterns of trade in the region remain unchanged: Fiji remains the dominant Island Exporter. The PFL has thus not succeeded in altering those patterns that continue to disadvantage the smaller Island countries. Furthermore, it appears fchat new services being introduced are essentially reinforcing the disparites between the Island countries of the SPF .

In conclusion, Fiji has generally been a strong supporter of the PFL. This support has not been predicated entirely upon self interest, as Fiji has demonstrated some concern for promoting the economic and political independence of the region as a whole (through the venture) and for providing services to those countries not served by shipping lines. The PFL has led to some reductions in freight rates and bills for the smaller Island countries 7 Q . At the same time though, there has been little change in the overall levels - 1 2'5 - l/

and direction of trade, and there remains the problem of inadequate shipping between the Island countries of the region as well as between the smaller Island countries and Australia and New Zealand. However these failings can be attributed more to inherent disparities in the region and to management and financial difficulties (eg. the fact that the PFL was grossly undercapitalised from the outset) than to national policies of any particular member country. The evidence does not suggest the Fiji's experience with Air Pacific significantly influenced its policies on the regional •shipping line, and undermined its support for the venture.

4.5) CONCLUSION.

Fiji's leading role in the SPF has been most apparent on those economic issues where key national interests and priorities are at stake. Perhaps the primary example in this section is the trade agreement between Forum Island countries and Australia and New Zealand. It oan be argued that the Forum, through facilitating a process of collective bargaining with Australia and New Zealand, significantly enhanced Fiji's trade prospects. In addition the SPARTECA Agreement and other trade arrangements negotiated through the Forum have been important for Fiji's economic development and growth. Of particular importance is the prospect that Forum Island countries may be included in the CER Agreement between Australia and New Zealand. - 126 -

It is evident that Fiji accrue3 more benefits from the Forum trade initiatives, as well as joint ventures (in civil aviation and shipping), than do most other Forum Island countries. While it is difficult to measure precise benefits and gains quantitatively, Fiji is clearly able to most fully utilise and exploit opportunities provided by regional cooperation: whether these be in the expansion of duty-free exports to Australia and New Zealand, or cheaper freight rates in inter- Island trade.

Fiji is in a position to do this by virtue of its comparative size, population, resources and level of economic development, which determine to a great extent levels and patterns of trade- However, analysis of Fiji's role in the Forum on some key economic issues highlights an apparent lack of political will to distribute benefits of regional programmes more equitably. Fiji's policies and actions in the SPF particularly in trade related issues, are understandably directed towards furthering Fiji's national interests. But these policies have tended to accentuate rather than reduce Fiji's economic advantages, if not dominance, in the region. Moreover, it appears that there is a reluctance to embrace policies and pursue initiatives aimed at redressing inherent inequalities between the member countries of the SPF. Presum- ably for reasons of self-interest, Fiji has not endeavoured to redress the marked trade imbalance between itself and other Forum Island countries; nor has it encouraged, in any significant way, programmes providing for the special needs and - 12.7 - V

handicaps of the smaller Island countries. It is possible that this will have implications for > ' regional cooperation in the future, since persistent inequities may weaken the commitment of other I3land countries to cooperate in .regional ventures.

In assessing Fiji's role in joint ventures undertaken by the Forum (in shipping and civil aviation) it appears that this role has not been as much a factor determining the fate of these ventures as is sometimes suggested . Fiji has been genuinely committed to and supportive of regional cooperation in shipping and civil aviation, in the wider regional interest as well as narrow self interest. However the conflict of needs and aspirations, arising out of disparities between the Forum Island countries, has made "mutually beneficial" cooperation difficult to achieve and it can be argued that Fiji's commitment to regional cooperation extends only as far as national interests and priorities are served . NOTES

1. Forum Communique, February 1972. VI 2. These proposals were submitted by senior trade offic- "! ials who had met in November 1971 following"the first Forum meeting. The four proposals were: some form of free trade area among the Forum Island countries; increased cooperation with regard to rationalisation of industrial development and marketing; closer economic and trade relations with Australia and New Zealand; and a secretariat to carry out trade matters. Gabriel Gris, "Ten Years of Cooperation: The Forum Way", Pacific Perspective, Vol II, 1, p 29.

3. PIM September 1971, p. 12 Australia and New Zealand were the two main trading partners for the Island countries of the SPF. ij. Confidential Source F.

5. Confidential Source G.

6. Forum Communique, September 1978.

7. SPARTECA aims, inter alia, to "achieve progressively in favour of Forum Island countries, duty free and unrestricted access to the markets of Australia and New Zealand over as wide a range of products as possible". It is a' non-reciprocal trade agreement under which Australia and New Zealand offer duty- free and unrestricted access or concession access for specified products originating from the developing Island member countries of the Forum. Australia offers "positive schedules" that list products which can enter Australia provided they meet the Rules of Origin Requirements: ie . products must have a 50 per cent Forum Island content or Australian/New Zealand plus Forum Island content. New Zealand has a "negative schedule" and all products except those listed can enter New Zealand duty free, providing they meet the same Rules of Origin requirement .

8. Confidential Source H.

9. PIM January 198,1 p 6. - 129 ~

10. PIM_ August 1985 p 52.

11. See Footnote 7. Fiji has also sought to develop SPARTECA into an agreement similar to the Lome* Convention. The Convention allows Fiji and 60 other developing countries not just free access for their goods to the EEC, but also special high prices for suchjconimodities as sugar and compensation, under the STABEX system, for losses of export earnings caused by prioe slumps or hurricane and other damage . Fiji Times. 6 August, 1985 p. 9.

12. The CER plans for all duty on trade across the Tasman to be eliminated by 1988 and all import licence restrictions to be abolished by 1995. This may mean that exports from the tropical regions of Australia to New Zealand will compete with (and negate) the exports of Island countries to New Zealand, and negate any benefits derived from SPARTECA.

13. Fiji Times, 8 August, 1985, p. 1.

1H. Ibid.

15. Dr. Maraj, Opcit.

16. Report of the Fourth Meeting of the Regional Committee on Trade, Kiribati July 1984; Islands Business September 1984 p 43 also PIM November 19UH p m.

1?. Fiji Times, 8 August, 1 985. P .1..

18. Mr. Jioji Kotobalavu, Interview, Suva, January 1985 (Fiji's Permanent Secretary for Foreign Affairs).

19. Confidential Source H.

20. Australia has a special aid and trade agreement with Papua New Guinea, while New Zealand maintains special relations (trade and aid, as well as political) with Western Samoa, Niue and the Cook Islands.

21. Kotobalavu Interview. - 130 -

22. Professor Ron Crocombe,Interview, Suva,January 1985.

23. Fiji and Australia have held regular high level meetings to discuss economic and other issues of concern since 1976. Fi.ii is hn» largest recipient of Australian aid in the region (apart from PNu) and reCcivec the greatest level of Australian investment, as well as trade in the region. On Australian aid. levels see PIM October 1977 p 8; on business and investment in Fiji see PIM October 1979 P *I5, nu nautical relations see PIM October 1980 p 39 and on Australian tourist levels to Fiji see PIM February 1983 P 53. Relations with New Zealand are also extensive and have expanded since the inception of the Pacific Islands Industrial Development Scheme (PUDS) which provides various types of assistance in setting up joint venture enterprises in the Pacific. More projects set up under PUDS are located in Fiji than in any other Pacific Island country. Report of the PUD Unit, Department of Trade and Industry, Wellington, New Zealand, June 30 1981.

2*J . According to one report, SPARTECA "has given local :: j-j manufacturers the opportunities to develop the enter- \ prises which have produced goods suitable for exports". Confidential source I.

25. South Pacific Economies 1981: Statistical Summary, Ed. 7 South Pacific Commission, Noumea April 19b4. p. 14.

26. T. J. Fairbairn, "Fiji as a Regional Trader", Paoific Viewpoint, Vol. 15, May 197^ p. 19.

27. Forum Communique, February 1972. ::.

28. In 1980, it was proposed that SPEC commission a feasi- .$; bility study into the scope for a free-trade area '{. among Island countries and in 1983 the Forum "endorsed :l the desirability of taking concrete steps to promote •: closer economic relations between Forum Island coun- I:; tries" and endorsed in principle the lowering of tariff g: barriers to promote regional trade. Communique, |h August 1983.

29. F. Sevele, "Regional Trade: Limited Potential", 'Pacific Perspective Vol. II, 1. P. 26. >, I, - 131 -

30. Ibid p. 27. ;

31. As a trader in the region, Fiji is perhaps more significant:- as a re-exporter, with the value of re-exports tending . to exceed exports of domestic origin. In some oases | Fiji's role is essentially that of a transhipment : point. Re-exports are heavily dominated by petroleum and petroleum products. Domestic exports are dominated by sugar and locally manufactured products. Although ; the region Is, on the whole, a small market for Fiji's ; domestically produced exports, it is nevertheless vifca.1 for many individual exports. Certain categories of industrial raw materials, manufactured foodstuffs and certain metal products rely exclusively on local Pacific markets. Fairbairn, Op. cit.

32. Three countries in faot account for 8H per cent of all intra-regional exports. These are Fiji, Papua "e« Guinea and the Solomon Islands. The remaining countries, while accounting for only 16 per cent of intra- regional exports, account for 80 per cent of all intra- regional imports. South Pacific Economies, Op. cit. ; p. 14. . •!

33. Fiji Trade Reports, 1979-1983- Bureau of Statistics, Suva .

34. Fairbairn, Op. cit. p. 31.

35. Speaking at the CHOGM Meeting, Melbourne 1981. PIM, November 1981 P- 1^.

36. A. Jorgensen-Dahl made these observations of regional cooperation in South East Asia. They can be seen to apply also to the South Pacific. Regional Organisation and Order in South East Asia, Macmillan , London 19&2 . p. 155.

37. Forum Communique, Kiribati July 1984.

38. From talks with SPEC officials, Suva, February 1985.

39. Sevele, Op. oit, p. 26.

40. Greg Fry, "International Politics of the South Pacific", Pacific Affairs, Fall 1981, Vol. 54: 3, pp M55-484.

Fiji was also unhappy with the decision by the PFL management to move the financial operations of the line from Western Samoa to Aukland, a move designed to minimise further losses. Fiji and other Forum island countries saw the "nett affect of this arrangement" to be the "de facto transfer of control of the PFL out of the Island region". Communique of SPF 1980.

PIM June 1981 pp. 49-51 . According to Ratu Mara, Fiji was being asked to divert to the PFL $A850,00O in bilateral aid funds which Australia has allocated to Fiji in 1980 and which the Government had already oommited to various projects.

The Touche-Ross Report, Commissioned by the Forum in 1980 and completed in 1981.

PIM October, 1983 p. 13-

PIM February 1983, p. 6. The Fiji Government decided, in early 1983, to acquire a shareholding of 27 per cent of the PFL, making it the second largest shareholder after Papua New Guinea.

PIM June 1981 p. 51 .

In early 1985, it was announced that the PFL would commence a new service linking Fiji with the South Island of New Zealand. The main objective of this service, it was stated, was to open up markets for Fiji's products in the South Island. It would also give Fiji'3 importers an opportunity to purchase extensive manufactured products and produce. Fiji Times . 6 February 1985. p. 10.

Island Business September 1984. CONCLUSION

This study began with two broad objectives: to examine the importance and utility to Fiji of the SPF, as a vehicle of regional cooperation; and to assess Fiji's contribution to, and influence on, the SPF. The foregoing analysis has indicated that the SPF is considerably useful to Fiji and that Fiji has gained important benefits from its role in the regional organisation. This analysis has also shown that Fiji has played a prominent role in the SPF and influenced , to some extent, the content of Forum actions and policies. But what this analysis has indicated, perhaps above all, is that the Forum's importance to Fiji, and utility in furthering national aspirations and priorities, derives essentially from Fiji's level of prominence, initiative and influence in the regional organisation, that is also projected domestically and internationally.

As detailed in previous Chapters, the benefits Fiji gains from its role in the SPF tend to be more of an intangible , political kind, although concrete economic gains can certainly be discerned. Fiji assumed an active role in regional affairs prior to its independence and promoted, if not initiated, regional cooperation between Pacific Island countries emerging from colonial rule. Regionalism was an essential part of the process of acquiring and asserting self-determination. It was a means whereby Fiji could subsequently establish its identity as an aetor in regional and international affairs, and as an independent nation. The formulating of common regional policies on matters of concern to Fiji (nuclear testing in the Pacific, decolonisation, Law of the Sea) has served as an effective approach to dealing with the outside world, since it can make for greater impact in the international arena. The common opposition to French nuclear testing, demonstrated in the Nuclear-Free Zone treaty, is a significant example. Ratu Mara's perceived "elder statesman" role can largely be attributed to his actions in the SPF. This has not only enhanced his personal status, domestic, ly and abroad, but also augmented Fiji's influence in regional and international affairs. Fiji's economic interests have also benefited through utilising the collective bargaining process the Forum facilitates, as exemplified -in the trade agreement with Australia and New Zealand. There are prospects for extending trade much further if the Forum Island countries are included in the CER Agreement.

In identifying these as perhaps obvious advantages of regional cooperation for a small Island state, it nevertheless can be argued that for Fiji, these benefits derive largely from the nature of its role in the SPF. In being seen to speak on behalf of the Forum, or to otherwise adopt a vocal and prominent stand in the SPF, Fiji can appear more influential or more significant in international fora. By taking the initiative in such areas as a regional trade agreement with Australia and New Zealand, Fiji is able to greatly improve its economic development prospects. By exercising some influence on Forum policy, whether it be by adopting an assertive position or by forging consensus on a divisive issue, Fiji is able to benefit, from a common regional policy which conforms, generally, to its national policies and perceptions.

It has been shown in this study that on most areas of Forum concern, Fiji has exercised a prominant and, at times, assertive role. This can be seen to be partly a consequence of its wider international representation, size and level of economic development relative to the region. However of most significance has been the personal role of Ratu Mara. He has essentially defined Fiji's role, interpreted Fiji's aspirations and priorities in the SPF and determined the content and style of Fiji's policies and actions in the Forum. In stating that Fiji, through Ratu Mara, has exercised a prominent role in the SPF, the question remains: Does this equate with leadership of the SPF? As shown in Chapter Two, although clearly at the forefront of the development of regionalism in the South Pacific, Fiji's leaders vigorously denied claims or suggestions that they had assumed a leading role in the region. This would have appeared contradictory to the prevailing ideals of self-determination and sovereignty, interesting^ enough, Fiji's leaders now openly acknowledge Fiji's leadership role in the region (Note Ratu Mara's address to the Asian and Pacific Affairs Council cited in the Intro- duction). It may be argued that this is an admission of what is essentially a reality, however this view is contentious - 139 -

since Fiji appears less of a regional leader in the 198O' s I than in the late 196O's and early 1970's. There is, perhaps, a greater perceived need now to impress important neighbours by alluding to Fiji's leading role in regional affairs. This can further economic as well as political aspirations.

Other Forum Island countries do not accept Fiji's claims to regional leadership. In fact Fiji does not attempt to assert these claims in the SPF; despite doing so in international fora. For this reason it is perhaps not entirely appropriate to refer to Fiji as a leader in the SPF. It has "pulled its weight" in the Forum; that is evident. In doing so, • jfj Fiji has acted in its own interests, but also those of the region (note; Law of the Sea, trade, regional shipping line). It is perhaps no coincidence however that most Forum policies (especially on divisive issues), have tended to reflect, or conform to, Fiji's own policies and perceptions. While not suggesting that Fiji has 'dictated1 Forum policy*, by adopting an assertive and vcjal stand on various issues, it has arguably influenced the views of other Forum members. This is evidenced by its often instrumental role in forging consensus in the Forum.

Fiji's role in the SPF has had an impact on regional cooperation. This can be seen to be both positive and adverse. On the positive side Fiji did much to promote an indigenous regional indentity at a time when the South Pacific was emerging from its colonial tutelage - and this was an important ideological basis upon which to build regional - 1

cooperation. By advocating common regional concerns in international fora, namely the United Nations, Fiji served to gain for the SPF some measure of recognition and attention from the international community. Fiji also strongly advocated functional cooperation in areas such as shipping and civil aviation, contrary to some suggestions, for the wider regional interest as well narrow self interest.

Above all, Fiji's commitment to regional cooperation, which was fundamental, served as a significant motivating force: partly shaping, partly fuelling the regional movement .

However, it is this very commitment Cor rather, the increasingly pragmatic nature of this commitment) that has defined Fiji's adverse or negative impact on regional cooperation. As with all Forum members, Fiji is concerned primarily with Furthering specific national interests.

That it supports regional cooperation is because it perceives that those interests are to some extent shared by other Pacific Island nations, and that it is more effective and efficient to coordinate and cooperate in political and economic endeavours. As Mr. Jioji

Kotobalavu emphasised to the author:

Regional cooperation is important only in that we are smal-l-a-nd-.it makes sense 'that we should be cooperating so as to promote our own economic development. But we don't support regional cooperation out of pure sentiment . We are practical people...1.

Given the acute disparities that exist between the Forum

Island countries - in economic , cultural> geographic and

political terms - the reality of regional cooperation is that it yields an unequal distribution of benefits, with the larger countries (particularly Fiji) clearly the main beneficiaries.

In supporting regional cooperation, Fiji has pursued policies and actions essentially designed to enhance national interests, and these do not necessarily conform to the needs and interests of other Forum Island countries. In fact, it was ,'jhown in Chapter Four that Fiji's role tends to accentuate, to some extent, these inherent disparities within the region and it has not encouraged policies aimed at redressing some of the imbalances and inequities of regional uoupera tion. It is not clear that Fiji has been as "exploitative" of its position in the region aa has been suggested, but its role has served to frustrate the realisation of some goals basic to the SPF and to regional co- op a rat ion »

Fiji clearly occupies a significant position in the SPF:' a position uf advantage, of influence and, arguably, of responsibility- By identifying more with the needs of smaller

L'iUncJ countries (for instance in economic cooperation) Fiji can play a role in increasing the benefits they gain from regional cooperation. This is perhaps crucial to the future of regionalism in the South Pacific. As Ron Crocombe has argued, these countries will turn elsewhere if they continue to be at the losing end of regional evdeavours:

Unless the benefits of Pacific regional cooperation are more realistically shared, not only will the Pacific nations be worse off, but the leverage of the superpowers will also be must greater^. By promoting initiatives which do not necessarily benefit itself, Fiji could help make regional cooperation more mean- ingful for some Pacific Island countries, and diminish the prospects of damaging, perhaps permanently, that "spirt of regionalism" that it helped to build. Thi3 need not require

"sentiment", but perhaps a long-term vision.