Ecotaxes: a Comparative Study of India and China
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TAX REFORM and SMALL BUSINESS Eric J
REFERENCES TAX REFORM AND SMALL BUSINESS Eric J. Toder * Institute Fellow, Urban Institute and Co-Director, Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center House Committee on Small Business April 15, 2015 Chairman Chabot, Ranking Member Velazquez, and Members of the Committee. Thank you for inviting me to appear today to discuss the effects of tax reform on small business. There is a growing consensus that the current system of taxing business income needs reform and bi-partisan agreement on some of the main directions of reform, although not the details. The main drivers for reform are concerns with a corporate tax system that discourages investment in the United States, encourages US multinational corporations to retain profits overseas, and places some US-based multinationals at a competitive disadvantage with foreign- based companies, while at the same time raising relatively little revenue, providing selected preferences to favored assets and industries, and allowing some US multinationals to pay very low tax rates by shifting reported profits to low tax countries. • The United States has the highest corporate tax rate in the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). This discourages investment in the United States by both US and foreign-based multinational corporations and encourages corporations to report income in other jurisdictions. • The US rules for taxing multinational corporations encourage US firms to earn and retain profits overseas and place some companies at a competitive disadvantage, encouraging *The views expressed are my own and should not be attributed to the Tax Policy Center or the Urban Institute, its board, or its funders. I thank Leonard Burman, Donald Marron, and George Plesko for helpful comments and Joseph Rosenberg, and John Wieselthier for assistance with the Tax Policy Center simulations. -
Creating Market Incentives for Greener Products Policy Manual for Eastern Partnership Countries
Creating Market Incentives for Greener Products Policy Manual for Eastern Partnership Countries Creating Incentives for Greener Products Policy Manual for Eastern Partnership Countries 2014 About the OECD The OECD is a unique forum where governments work together to address the economic, social and environmental challenges of globalisation. The OECD is also at the forefront of efforts to understand and to help governments respond to new developments and concerns, such as corporate governance, the information economy and the challenges of an ageing population. The Organisation provides a setting where governments can compare policy experiences, seek answers to common problems, identify good practice and work to co-ordinate domestic and international policies. The OECD member countries are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States. The European Union takes part in the work of the OECD. Since the 1990s, the OECD Task Force for the Implementation of the Environmental Action Programme (the EAP Task Force) has been supporting countries of Eastern Europe, Caucasus and Central Asia to reconcile their environment and economic goals. About the EaP GREEN programme The “Greening Economies in the European Union’s Eastern Neighbourhood” (EaP GREEN) programme aims to support the six Eastern Partnership countries to move towards green economy by decoupling economic growth from environmental degradation and resource depletion. The six EaP countries are: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Republic of Moldova and Ukraine. -
Trends in Electricity Prices During the Transition Away from Coal by William B
May 2021 | Vol. 10 / No. 10 PRICES AND SPENDING Trends in electricity prices during the transition away from coal By William B. McClain The electric power sector of the United States has undergone several major shifts since the deregulation of wholesale electricity markets began in the 1990s. One interesting shift is the transition away from coal-powered plants toward a greater mix of natural gas and renewable sources. This transition has been spurred by three major factors: rising costs of prepared coal for use in power generation, a significant expansion of economical domestic natural gas production coupled with a corresponding decline in prices, and rapid advances in technology for renewable power generation.1 The transition from coal, which included the early retirement of coal plants, has affected major price-determining factors within the electric power sector such as operation and maintenance costs, 1 U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS capital investment, and fuel costs. Through these effects, the decline of coal as the primary fuel source in American electricity production has affected both wholesale and retail electricity prices. Identifying specific price effects from the transition away from coal is challenging; however the producer price indexes (PPIs) for electric power can be used to compare general trends in price development across generator types and regions, and can be used to learn valuable insights into the early effects of fuel switching in the electric power sector from coal to natural gas and renewable sources. The PPI program measures the average change in prices for industries based on the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS). -
TTB F 5000.24Sm Excise Tax Return
OMB No. 1513-0083 DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY 1. SERIAL NUMBER ALCOHOL AND TOBACCO TAX AND TRADE BUREAU (TTB) EXCISE TAX RETURN (Prepare in duplicate – See instructions below) 3. AMOUNT OF PAYMENT 2. FORM OF PAYMENT $ CHECK MONEY ORDER EFT OTHER (Specify) NOTE: PLEASE MAKE CHECKS OR MONEY ORDERS PAYABLE TO THE ALCOHOL AND TOBACCO TAX AND 4. RETURN COVERS (Check one) BEGINNING TRADE BUREAU (SHOW EMPLOYER IDENTIFICATION NUMBER ON ALL CHECKS OR MONEY ORDERS). IF PREPAYMENT PERIOD YOU SEND A CHECK, SEE PAPER CHECK CONVERSION ENDING NOTICE BELOW. 5. DATE PRODUCTS TO BE REMOVED (For Prepayment Returns Only) FOR TTB USE ONLY 6. EMPLOYER IDENTIFICATION NUMBER 7. PLANT, REGISTRY, OR PERMIT NUMBER TAX $ PENALTY 8. NAME AND ADDRESS OF TAXPAYER (Include ZIP Code) INTEREST TOTAL $ EXAMINED BY: DATE EXAMINED: CALCULATION OF TAX DUE (Before making entries on lines 18 – 21, complete Schedules A and B) PRODUCT AMOUNT OF TAX (a) (b) 9. DISTILLED SPIRITS 10. WINE 11. BEER 12. CIGARS 13. CIGARETTES 14. CIGARETTE PAPERS AND/OR CIGARETTE TUBES 15. CHEWING TOBACCO AND/OR SNUFF 16. PIPE TOBACCO AND/OR ROLL-YOUR-OWN TOBACCO 17. TOTAL TAX LIABILITY (Total of lines 9-16) $ 18. ADJUSTMENTS INCREASING AMOUNT DUE (From line 29) 19. GROSS AMOUNT DUE (Line 17 plus line 18) $ 20. ADJUSTMENTS DECREASING AMOUNT DUE (From line 34) 21. AMOUNT TO BE PAID WITH THIS RETURN (Line 19 minus line 20) $ Under penalties of perjury, I declare that I have examined this return (including any accompanying explanations, statements, schedules, and forms) and to the best of my knowledge and belief it is true, correct, and includes all transactions and tax liabilities required by law or regulations to be reported. -
A Proposal for a Simple Average-Based Progressive Taxation System
A proposal for a simple average-based progressive taxation system DIRK-HINNERK FISCHER, Ph.D.* SIMONA FERRARO, Ph.D.* Preliminary communication** JEL: H21, H24 https://doi.org/10.3326/pse.43.2.2 * We would like to thank the participants of the FairTax special session of the conference “Enterprise and Competitive Environment 2017” for their comments on a draft of this paper. We would also like to thank Ton Notermans of Tallinn University of Technology for his advice on the paper as well as the two anonymous referees. ** Received: January 9, 2019 Accepted: April 1, 2019 Dirk-Hinnerk FISCHER Tallinn University of Technology, Akadeemia tee 3, 12611 Tallinn, Estonia e-mail: [email protected] ORCiD: 0000-0002-1040-8347 Simona FERRARO Tallinn University of Technology, Akadeemia tee 3, 12611 Tallinn, Estonia e-mail: [email protected] ORCiD: 0000-0001-5175-5348 Abstract 142 This paper is a first theoretical presentation of a simple progressive taxation sys- tem. The system is based on two adaptations of one easily calculable formula that is based on the societal average income of the previous year. The system contrib- utes to academic discussions as it is a novel approach. It is a progressive tax that 43 (2) 141-165 (2019) ECONOMICS PUBLIC does not discriminate against anyone as the progression increases continuously SECTOR and the increase in tax payment does not go beyond the additional income. The analysis in the paper shows that the core advantage of the system is its simple, transparent and adaptable mechanism. Keywords: taxation, flat tax, progressive tax, taxation efficiency 1 INTRODUCTION A DIRK PROPOSAL Complicated taxation systems do not only lead to a significant increase in admin- - HINNERK istrative costs for all parties involved, but they can also lead to unjustified tax FOR exemptions and loopholes. -
Regressive Sin Taxes
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES REGRESSIVE SIN TAXES Benjamin B. Lockwood Dmitry Taubinsky Working Paper 23085 http://www.nber.org/papers/w23085 NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138 January 2017 We thank Hunt Allcott, Alan Auerbach, Raj Chetty, Stefano DellaVigna, Emmanuel Farhi, Xavier Gabaix, Nathaniel Hendren, Louis Kaplow, David Laibson, Erzo F.P. Luttmer, Matthew Rabin, Alex Rees-Jones, Emmanuel Saez, Jim Sallee, Florian Scheuer, Stefanie Stantcheva, Matthew Weinzierl, and participants at seminars and conferences for helpful comments and discussions. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research. NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer- reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official NBER publications. © 2017 by Benjamin B. Lockwood and Dmitry Taubinsky. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is given to the source. Regressive Sin Taxes Benjamin B. Lockwood and Dmitry Taubinsky NBER Working Paper No. 23085 January 2017 JEL No. H0,I18,I3,K32,K34 ABSTRACT A common objection to “sin taxes”—corrective taxes on goods like cigarettes, alcohol, and sugary drinks, which are believed to be over-consumed—is that they fall disproportionately on low-income consumers. This paper studies the interaction between corrective and redistributive motives in a general optimal taxation framework. On the one hand, redistributive concerns amplify the corrective benefits of a sin tax when sin good consumption is concentrated on the poor, even when bias and demand elasticities are constant across incomes. -
An Analysis of the Graded Property Tax Robert M
TaxingTaxing Simply Simply District of Columbia Tax Revision Commission TaxingTaxing FairlyFairly Full Report District of Columbia Tax Revision Commission 1755 Massachusetts Avenue, NW, Suite 550 Washington, DC 20036 Tel: (202) 518-7275 Fax: (202) 466-7967 www.dctrc.org The Authors Robert M. Schwab Professor, Department of Economics University of Maryland College Park, Md. Amy Rehder Harris Graduate Assistant, Department of Economics University of Maryland College Park, Md. Authors’ Acknowledgments We thank Kim Coleman for providing us with the assessment data discussed in the section “The Incidence of a Graded Property Tax in the District of Columbia.” We also thank Joan Youngman and Rick Rybeck for their help with this project. CHAPTER G An Analysis of the Graded Property Tax Robert M. Schwab and Amy Rehder Harris Introduction In most jurisdictions, land and improvements are taxed at the same rate. The District of Columbia is no exception to this general rule. Consider two homes in the District, each valued at $100,000. Home A is a modest home on a large lot; suppose the land and structures are each worth $50,000. Home B is a more sub- stantial home on a smaller lot; in this case, suppose the land is valued at $20,000 and the improvements at $80,000. Under current District law, both homes would be taxed at a rate of 0.96 percent on the total value and thus, as Figure 1 shows, the owners of both homes would face property taxes of $960.1 But property can be taxed in many ways. Under a graded, or split-rate, tax, land is taxed more heavily than structures. -
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5th International Conference on Accounting, Auditing, and Taxation (ICAAT 2016) TAX TRANSPARENCY – AN ANALYSIS OF THE LUXLEAKS FIRMS Johannes Manthey University of Würzburg, Würzburg, Germany Dirk Kiesewetter University of Würzburg, Würzburg, Germany Abstract This paper finds that the firms involved in the Luxembourg Leaks (‘LuxLeaks’) scandal are less transparent measured by the engagement in earnings management, analyst coverage, analyst accuracy, accounting standards and auditor choice. The analysis is based on the LuxLeaks sample and compared to a control group of large multinational companies. The panel dataset covers the years from 2001 to 2015 and comprises 19,109 observations. The LuxLeaks firms appear to engage in higher levels of discretionary earnings management measured by the variability of net income to cash flows from operations and the correlation between cash flows from operations and accruals. The LuxLeaks sample shows a lower analyst coverage, lower willingness to switch to IFRS and a lower Big4 auditor rate. The difference in difference design supports these findings regarding earnings management and the analyst coverage. The analysis concludes that the LuxLeaks firms are less transparent and infers a relation between corporate transparency and the engagement in tax avoidance. The paper aims to establish the relationship between tax avoidance and transparency in order to give guidance for future policy. The research highlights the complex causes and effects of tax management and supports a cost benefit analysis of future tax regulation. Keywords: Tax Avoidance, Transparency, Earnings Management JEL Classification: H20, H25, H26 1. Introduction The Luxembourg Leaks (’LuxLeaks’) scandal made public some of the tax strategies used by multinational companies. -
1 Progressive Taxation in Developing Economies
1 Progressive Taxation in Developing Economies: The Experience of China and India By Michael A. Livingston1 The concept of fairness in taxation is as old as the Bible, and applies to young or developing economies no less than large industrial democracies. Yet the debate on progressive (and especially progressive income) taxation has been conducted primarily in the wealthier countries. This results in part from experience: the most advanced and frequently studied progressive tax systems have been in developed countries, and the principal theoretical work was done in them. There is also a certain condescension here, a sense that poorer countries can perhaps not afford too much progressivity, and should content themselves with the collection of sufficient tax revenues—no small task in its own right—without indulging the “luxury” of a progressive or redistributive tax system. Yet tax equity is an issue that applies to all societies, and there is no inherent reason that it should be less important in a new or developing country than a more established nation. This paper considers the issue of progressive taxation and tax equity in younger, developing economies. The issue being extremely broad, it is necessary at the outset to impose some limitations. Thus I will limit myself to tax rather than spending policy and, within the tax system, provide special emphasis on progressive income taxes, although I am well aware that the income tax is only one of several revenue sources and, in many developing countries, is less important than other, less high-profile taxes. I will likewise eschew a statistical evaluation of progressivity, which I am in any case ill-equipped to do, in favor of an abstract but I hope engaging discussion of the issue in theoretical terms. -
Taxation of Land and Economic Growth
economies Article Taxation of Land and Economic Growth Shulu Che 1, Ronald Ravinesh Kumar 2 and Peter J. Stauvermann 1,* 1 Department of Global Business and Economics, Changwon National University, Changwon 51140, Korea; [email protected] 2 School of Accounting, Finance and Economics, Laucala Campus, The University of the South Pacific, Suva 40302, Fiji; [email protected] * Correspondence: [email protected]; Tel.: +82-55-213-3309 Abstract: In this paper, we theoretically analyze the effects of three types of land taxes on economic growth using an overlapping generation model in which land can be used for production or con- sumption (housing) purposes. Based on the analyses in which land is used as a factor of production, we can confirm that the taxation of land will lead to an increase in the growth rate of the economy. Particularly, we show that the introduction of a tax on land rents, a tax on the value of land or a stamp duty will cause the net price of land to decline. Further, we show that the nationalization of land and the redistribution of the land rents to the young generation will maximize the growth rate of the economy. Keywords: taxation of land; land rents; overlapping generation model; land property; endoge- nous growth Citation: Che, Shulu, Ronald 1. Introduction Ravinesh Kumar, and Peter J. In this paper, we use a growth model to theoretically investigate the influence of Stauvermann. 2021. Taxation of Land different types of land tax on economic growth. Further, we investigate how the allocation and Economic Growth. Economies 9: of the tax revenue influences the growth of the economy. -
Denmark Ecotax Rates Green Budget Germany (Gbg)
DENMARK ECOTAX RATES GREEN BUDGET GERMANY (GBG) EFR in Denmark: General Tax- Tax rate national cur- Tax rate – Name Typ Specific Tax-Base Base rency Euro € Denmark Waste manage- Charge on batte- ment - individual Lead batteries - car 1.61 € per ries Fee/Charge products batteries < 100 Ah 12.00 DKK per unit. unit. Waste manage- Charge on batte- ment - individual Lead batteries - car 3.23 € per ries Fee/Charge products batteries > 100 Ah 24.00 DKK per unit. unit. Waste manage- Charge on batte- ment - individual 2.42 € per ries Fee/Charge products Lead batteries - other 18.00 DKK per unit. unit. Waste manage- 33.6 - Charge on ha- ment - individual 250 - 88,000 DKK 11828 € zardous waste Fee/Charge products Hazardous waste per tonne per tonne. 185.20 € per Charge on mu- household nicipal waste 1378.00 DKK per per year collection / Waste manage- household per year on aver- treatment Fee/Charge ment - in general Municipal waste on average age. 2.20 € per Charge on sewa- Management of 16.40 DKK per m3 m3 on a- ge discharge Fee/Charge water resources Water consumption on average verage Duty on carrier Waste manage- bags made of pa- ment - individual Carrier bags made of 1.34 € pr per, plastics, etc. Tax products paper 10.00 DKK pr kg kg. Duty on carrier Waste manage- bags made of pa- ment - individual Carrier bags made of 2.96 € pr per, plastics, etc. Tax products plastics 22.00 DKK pr kg kg. 0.27 € per kg net Duty on certain 2.00 DKK per kg net weight of chlorinated sol- Hazardous che- weight of the sub- the sub- vents Tax micals Dichloromethane stance. -
Oklahoma Oil and Gas Industry Taxation
OKLAHOMA OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY TAXATION Comparative Effective Tax Rates in the Major Producing States January 11, 2018 Oklahoma Oil and Gas Industry Taxation Contents I. Introduction .......................................................................................................................................... 2 II. Severance Taxes .................................................................................................................................... 4 Recent Tax Law Changes .................................................................................................................. 4 Oklahoma Severance Tax Payments ................................................................................................ 4 Oklahoma Effective Severance Tax Rate.......................................................................................... 7 Oklahoma Versus Other Producing States ....................................................................................... 8 State Trends in Severance Tax Rates ............................................................................................. 10 III. Ad Valorem Taxes ............................................................................................................................... 11 IV. Measuring the Broader Tax Contribution of Oil & Gas ....................................................................... 16 Personal Income Taxes and Oil and Gas Earnings ......................................................................... 17 Oil and Gas-Related