PROGRESSIVE TAX REVENUE RAISERS HI TAX FAIRNESS January 2021

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PROGRESSIVE TAX REVENUE RAISERS HI TAX FAIRNESS January 2021 YES PROGRESSIVE TAX REVENUE RAISERS HI TAX FAIRNESS January 2021 www.hitaxfairness.org HAWAI‘I CAN PULL ITS ECONOMY OUT OF RECESSION BY USING TAX FAIRNESS MEASURES TO RAISE REVENUE & AVOID CUTS As Hawai‘i’s leaders head into 2021 Revenue Proposal Revenue Estimate while facing high unemployment (Millions) rates, an economic recession, and state budget shortfalls, it’s important Low High to keep in mind that deep government Raise income taxes on the richest 2% $12.6 $100.2 spending cuts would have a devastating effect on our already Phase out low tax rates $18.5 $153.9 injured economy, as well as hobble for those at the top social services that have become more and more essential during the Tax investments the same way $80.2 $80.2 pandemic crisis. regular income is taxed That’s because spending is the fuel Increase taxes on wealthy inheritances $6.6 $18.3 that keeps our economic engines running. As the private sector Raise corporate taxes $2.9 $103.0 engine of our economy sputters, the government needs to throttle Make global corporations pay taxes $38.0 $38.0 up its spending in order to keep the in Hawai‘i economy going. Past recessions have Make REITs pay their fair share of taxes $30.0 $60.0 shown us that state spending cuts just exacerbate the economic damage. Increase taxes on the sales of mansions $17.0 $71.5 At this crucial time, cutting government spending would be akin Tax vaping and increase $21.1 $24.1 to taking our foot off the pedal and other tobacco taxes letting the second engine of the Place a fee on sugary drinks $65.8 $65.8 economy sputter as well. In fact, the International Monetary Fund has Suspend some GET exemptions $254.6 $254.6 found that every dollar of reduced government spending results in as TOTAL $547.3 $969.6 much as $1.50 in lost economic activity. Calculations for these revenue estimates are drawn from a variety of sources and are based Instead, we should look for every on a normally-functioning economy. With Hawai‘i currently facing an unprecedented economic opportunity to keep the economy downturn, actual revenues are likely to differ from these estimates. However, they still serve as running. One important way to do so a guide to where progressive and significant revenues can be found. is by avoiding government worker furloughs, as a reduction in their pay felt and seen on our streets. Social to tap progressive revenue sources would hurt not just state workers service providers still haven’t been and borrow some funds in order to and their families, but also the local able to undo all the damage inflicted maintain operations and avoid budget Hawai‘i businesses that they support, on nonprofits and the state’s mental cuts. It will pay off in the long run and therefore inflict more damage to health system by funding slashed a with a healthier economic recovery. the economy. decade ago. Lawmakers can, and should, utilize Our leaders should also remember Especially now, with record-low a range of progressive tax options that social service cutbacks during interest rates and a high credit rating, to close the deficit without slashing the Great Recession continue to be the best course for Hawai‘i would be critical government spending. REVENUE RAISERS ∙ 1 YES HI TAX FAIRNESS Increase taxes on wealthy inheritances ($6.6 PERSONAL INCOME TAXES –$18.3 million) Raise income taxes on the richest 2% ($12.6– The federal Tax Cuts and Jobs Act gave a tremendous $100.2 million) tax break to literally the richest among us, shielding $11 million for singles (and $22 million for couples) of Hawai‘i’s top 1 percent earn more than $557,600 per year, property transferred from the deceased to their heirs with an average income of about $1.3 million. The federal from taxation. Tax Cuts and Jobs Act gives each of them an average Among the states that have estate taxes, Hawai‘i has federal income tax break of $35,460 in 2020. This would the fourth-highest exemption amount of $5.5 million be a good time for them to share some of those federal tax for singles (and $11 million of couples). The exemption savings—estimated to total $253 million—with the state. amount was only $675,000 in 2001, or less than one- If Hawai‘i’s millionaires, top 1 percent, or top 2 percent eighth of the exempted amount today. were subject to higher personal income tax rates, that If Hawai‘i’s estate tax exemption were dropped to would raise between $12.6–$100.2 million in additional between $1 million and $3.5 million, that would generate revenues per year. between $6.6–$18.3 million in additional taxes per year. Phase out low tax rates for those at the top Possible Revenue: $117.9–$352.6 million ($18.5–$153.9 million) Hawai‘i currently allows its wealthiest households to benefit from the lower tax brackets designed to benefit middle and lower-income residents. While Hawai‘i’s top CORPORATE TAXES marginal tax rate of 11 percent kicks in at $200,000 for a single taxpayer and $400,000 for married couples filing Raise corporate taxes ($2.9–$103 MILLION) jointly, these households do not pay 11 percent tax on all of their income. Even multimillionaires benefit by having The federal Tax Cuts and Jobs Act cut the federal the first $400,000 they earn in any given year taxed at corporate income tax rate by 14 percentage points, from the state’s lower rates of 1.4 percent to 10 percent. 35 percent to 21 percent, so companies are getting a large Three states—Arkansas, Connecticut and New York— tax break at the federal level. have made their tax systems more fair by gradually Hawai‘i’s current top corporate tax rate of 6.4 percent phasing out these lower rates for the very richest is below the median of the states. We are ranked 34th taxpayers. Adopting a similar approach in Hawai‘i would among states in per capita corporate tax collections, at raise $18.5–$153.9 million in additional tax revenues. $103 per person, while the 1st state, New Hampshire, collects $582 per person. Tax investments the same way regular income Corporate taxes differ from individual income taxes in is taxed ($80.2 million) important ways. First, the corporate tax is applied only to profits, so companies facing losses do not pay corporate Hawai‘i is one of only nine states that allows capital income tax. Second, having different income tax brackets gains—profits from the sale of stocks, bonds, investment makes sense for individual income taxes because those with real estate, art, and antiques—to be taxed at a lower rate lower incomes are less able to afford a high tax bill. However, than ordinary income. That’s a tax break that goes almost there is no similar “ability to pay” concept for corporations. entirely to high-income taxpayers, including non-residents Hawai‘i has three corporate tax brackets, while more than who profit from investing in real estate in Hawai‘i. 30 other states have a single corporate tax rate. Long-term capital gains constitute 10 percent of total If Hawai‘i were to have a single tax rate on corporate taxable income in the state, or nearly $3.5 billion in 2018. profits of between 6.4 and 10 percent, it would raise an If those capital gains were taxed at regular individual additional $2.9–$103 million in revenue per year. It is income tax rates, it would yield about $80.2 million in estimated that nearly 60 percent of Hawai‘i's corporate new revenue annually. income tax is paid by non-residents. 2 ∙ REVENUE RAISERS www.hitaxfairness.org Make global corporations pay taxes in Hawai‘i INCREASE TaXes ON THE SALES OF MANSIONS ($17– ($38 MILLION) 71.5 MILLION) Corporations use complicated schemes to shift earnings Real estate is one of the few sectors of Hawai‘i’s economy to subsidiaries in offshore tax havens —countries that’s been booming during the pandemic, with home with minimal or no taxes—in order to reduce their tax prices soaring to new record highs in 2020. However, liability by billions of dollars. The result is that large sellers of high end properties are not paying their fair multinationals have an unfair advantage, avoiding taxes tax share. In fact, between January 2019 and September that small local competitors must pay. 2020, just over half (52 percent) of homes priced at or Worldwide combined reporting requires a corporation above $2 million were sold to non-Hawai‘i residents. And to report their total global profits and the portion of their of homes worth at least $4 million, 62 percent were sold overall business activity in a given jurisdiction. So if a to non-Hawai‘i residents. state makes up 2 percent of a company’s global business, Our current real estate conveyance tax rates are only then 2 percent of their taxable profit would be subject to 0.50–1.25 percent on multi-million dollar mansions. state tax. We should not allow our real estate to be sold at such If Hawai‘i adopted worldwide combined reporting, it high prices with such low tax returns. If the conveyance would collect an additional $38 million per year from tax were raised on properties valued at $2 million and large multinational corporations. above, that would mean a boost of $17–$45.4 million to the state’s treasury.
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