1 Introduction 2 China and Taiwan Relations with the Underdeveloped World
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NOTES 1 Introduction 1. Those nation-states in the Caribbean basin with formal relations with Taipei are Belize, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, St Kitts and Nevis, St Lucia, and St Vincent and the Grenadines. 2. Both the United States and United Kingdom have made efforts to update their international broadcasting outputs in recent years in line with the global com- munications environment. The Smith–Mundt Act is currently in a period of congressional reform and the BBC World Service has been incorporated into the main BBC structure. The effect on output remains to be determined. 2 China and Taiwan Relations with the Underdeveloped World 1. Taiwan has not asked its formal diplomatic allies to raise the motion at the UN since the agreement of the diplomatic truce in 2008. This will be discussed in greater detail later. Taiwan currently participates in the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (APEC) under the designation “Chinese Taipei”. It also has observer status at the World Health Organization (WHO). 2. In Africa the PRC is the incumbent in all but four nation-states—Burkina Faso, San Tome and Principe, Swaziland, and The Gambia. 3. Bahamas (1989), Central African Republic (1991), Grenada (1989), Guinea-Bissau (1990), Lesotho (1990), Liberia (1989), and Nicaragua (1990). 4. Historian Evelyn Hu-De Hart provides a somewhat satirical commentary on the assertions of Menzies: “I don’t have any grand book about discoveries to rival Menzies’ fertile and, some would say, fervid imagination. I will not succumb to flights of fancy as—given my occupation as a professional historian—I do not 204 Notes have the freedom to imagine and invent, to speculate freely and extrapolate as widely as others do” (Hu-De Hart, 2007: 114). 5. Brautigam (2009) explains that the PRC was de-recognized by a host of nation- states following the Tiananmen Square massacre in June 1989. However, she does not give credit to the role of domestic politics in her explanation. Nicaragua is therefore a testimony to the need to understand changes in diplomatic recogni- tion through both domestic and international affairs. This is a policy that I take forward in the following chapter when discussing Costa Rica’s decision to move its embassy from Taipei to Beijing in 2007. 6. The 228 incident or massacre as it came to be known was the beginning of a period where political dissent was severely punished in Taiwan. Until the lifting of martial law in 1987 it was estimated that around 140,000 perceived political dissenters were either arrested, beaten, executed, or “disappeared” (see Huang, 2005; Marks, 1998). Professor Lee Shiao-feng states that the reasons for such bru- tality were, “to strike down pro-Communists or left wing rhetoric and conduct; to crush Taiwanese independence movements and ideas; to purge the Aboriginal elite and to oppress dissenters within the democratic movement; in-fighting within the intelligence agencies; rhetoric used—whether privately or in public— that ran counter to the interests of authorities; and fabricated cases made up by secret agents solely for the purpose of competing for personal benefit” (Lee, cited in Huang, 2005). 7. The KMT system was based on the Soviet-Leninist model taught to them by the Russians at the Whampoa Military Academy on the Chinese mainland while the ROC was still based in Beijing (Marks, 1998; Hsieh, 1985). 8. For information on Central America’s literary traditions involving political pro- test, see Beverley and Zimmerman (1990) and Rowe (2000). 9. ARENA were the party in power during El Salvador’s armed conflict. 10. In a batch of classified Wikileaks cables published in May 2011 originating from the US Embassy in Panama Ambassador Barbara Stephenson (2010) documents how the government of Panama approached the PRC regarding formal recogni- tion in January 2009 but were told that it was not possible due to the diplomatic truce. However, crucially they were also told to “remain calm”, insinuating that if things were to change that it would be possible. 3 Costa Rica: Crossing the Taiwan Strait 1. In addition to Costa Rica, Taiwan lost Chad (2006), Dominica (2004), Grenada (2005), Liberia (2003), FYI Macedonia (2001), Malawi (2008), Senegal (2005), and Vanuatu (2004), although in the case of Vanuatu they gained and lost them again within a short period in 2004. They gained St Lucia (2007) and regained Nauru (2005) after it had de-recognized them in 2002. 2. Figueres is affectionately known as “Don Pepe” and is widely considered the father of the nation such has been the legacy of his political decisions to abolish Notes 205 the army and give women and blacks the right to vote. For further reading see Ameringer (1978). Figueres is also the father of President Jose Maria Figueres, who is currently in self-imposed exile in Switzerland after several corruption scandals during his presidency. 3. Ko (2004) states that this practice has gone on since at least 1986 although the lack of transparency makes it difficult to confirm. While there is some likelihood that the practice began before 1986, the diplomatic recognition of the PRC by the Sandinista government of Nicaragua in 1985 would have catalyzed Taiwanese fears of a domino-effect across the region. The poli- cies of paying for embassy upkeep in Taipei and contributing to the Foreign Affairs budgetary purse may have been a response to this. This was con- firmed in private conversations with the staff of several embassies in Taiwan, all of whom wanted to remain completely anonymous. Further inquiries in Taiwan revealed that the island continues to financially support its formal diplomatic allies with secret funds that come from extra-political sources. Interviewees explained that the funds were always in cash and that an ally could expect around US$40–50 million over three years. This would be given to the embassy in installments of perhaps US$10–20 million per year and brought back to the recipient country in diplomatic bags so as not to be declared. The money could be spent as the recipients wished. However, the funds were received on the basis that the recipient would maintain formal diplomatic relations with Taipei for at least the next three years. 4. This case will be discussed further in the chapter on Guatemala. 5. Trade figures, while important indicators of economic strength, must be criti- cally appraised. Costa Rican exports to the PRC between 2000 and 2010 rose from US$12 million to US$286 million with the latter figure down from a high of US$848 million in 2007. A caveat must however be placed over these numbers because Costa Rica is home to Intel’s semiconductor assembly and test plant. Consequently, consistently around 90 percent of all exports to the PRC are ship- ments of Intel products being sent to IT manufacturing sites within the PRC (PROCOMER, 2010). As such, it is misrepresentative to use these international trade figures as evidence of greater economic integration given that Intel is based in California, USA. For further reading on Intel in Costa Rica see the World Bank Report (2006). 6. In 2006 the final two countries—Costa Rica and El Salvador—relocated their embassies to Tel Aviv (Jerusalem Post, 2006). El Salvador’s decision will be dis- cussed in greater detail in the following chapter. 7. These companies were the focus of a documentary in 2011 on the controver- sial trade in shark-fins. In response to criticism, the Costa Rican government imposed further legislation and restrictions on these companies. However, the issue was the most public criticism of Taiwan in Costa Rica since the corruption scandals of 2006 and has arguably allowed those in favor of a relationship with the PRC to receive vindication for their preference (see Alexander, 2011b; Sanchez, 2011). 206 Notes 8. It should also be noted that the current President of the Costa Rican Football Federation is Eduardo Li who comes from the Chinese Diaspora of Costa Rica. 9. There has been criticism within Costa Rica of the stadium location, not least from former Minister for Culture, Guido Sáenz, who publicly stated that, “there’s plenty of room for a stadium in other parts of San José that are not designated areas for a public park [ . ] Now there are going to be 35,000 people trying to get in to see a game in an already crowded part of town. It’s a catastrophe.” (Saenz, cited in Williams, 2011) Moreover, as John Holtz (2011) pointed out, there are only 200 parking spaces at the stadium resulting in the need to bus spectators in from suburbs. The extent to which the PRC requested its location to ensure maximum publicity remains unclear. 10. Several domestic and international media organizations tried to establish the mood of the audience at the opening of the stadium when Costa Rica played Argentina in a friendly football match. Feedback was generally positive, for example, “Yenia, a 27-year-old psychology student, said: “I’m delighted with what they’ve built. It’s so important for our country’s infrastructure and for Costa Rican sport.” She had no qualms about paying the $100 ticket price, despite predicting a 3–1 defeat for her team.” There were also quotations of negativity however. “Not everyone was convinced by the gift. Jason, a 31-year-old labora- tory technician, said he was “very proud of the stadium, which we could never build ourselves,” but had reservations about his government’s association with China. “I don’t like the fact that we have relations with a Communist country. Though clearly there are many financial incentives China can offer that [others] can’t.” (Freedman, 2011) As with all media questioning of such ilk, the interview of spectators outside a stadium on the night of its opening must inevitably be skewed, as those in opposition to the PRC’s role in its construction would be less likely to be in the vicinity.