De-Europeanisation and Equal Citizenship in Turkey: the Case of Circassians

The International Spectator Italian Journal of International Affairs

ISSN: 0393-2729 (Print) 1751-9721 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rspe20

De-Europeanisation and Equal Citizenship in Turkey: The Case of Circassians

Diğdem Soyaltın-Colella & Eylem Akdeniz Gӧker

To cite this article: Diğdem Soyaltın-Colella & Eylem Akdeniz Gӧker (2019) De-Europeanisation and Equal Citizenship in Turkey: The Case of Circassians, The International Spectator, 54:4, 62-77, DOI: 10.1080/03932729.2019.1666233 To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/03932729.2019.1666233

Published online: 25 Nov 2019.

Submit your article to this journal

Article views: 153

View related articles

View Crossmark data

Citing articles: 1 View citing articles

Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rspe20 THE INTERNATIONAL SPECTATOR 2019, VOL. 54, NO. 4, 62–77 https://doi.org/10.1080/03932729.2019.1666233

De-Europeanisation and Equal Citizenship in Turkey: The Case of Circassians

Diğdem Soyaltın-Colella and Eylem Akdeniz Goker€

Altinbaş University, Istanbul

ABSTRACT KEYWORDS The Europeanisation process in Turkey that extended roughly from De-Europeanisation; Turkey’s 1999 to 2006 boosted the political and cultural rights of diverse Circassians; equal ethnic groups in Turkey, including Circassians, and strengthened citizenship; ethnocultural their claims for equal citizenship. With the loss or weakening of the claims EU as an anchor for democratic reform in the post-2007 period, however, the de-Europeanisation process has resulted in the disappearance of the main legal and institutional basis for the democratic integration of ethnocultural minorities. Nevertheless, analysis of the activities of four large Circassian communities in Turkey shows that the same process has enhanced the cultural reiﬁcation of these groups as their survival strategy.

The flourishing debate on the rights and status of ethnocultural minorities in multi-ethnic societies has had a substantial impact on the practices of citizenship. The scholars studying the citizenship regimes in post-communist Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries with ethnic and national minorities underline the fact that the status of such minorities was strengthened in parallel with the European Union (EU) accession process. Since protection of ethnic and national minorities and respect for cultural diversity were set down as important political conditions for EU membership under the ‘Copenhagen criteria’ (Schwellnus 2006), the Europeanisation process specifically boosted constitutional and legal changes that expanded the rights of ethnic minorities in order to create plural and democratically constructed citizenship in the CEE countries (Kelley 2004; Schimmelfennig et al. 2003;Schwellnus2005; Vachudova 2005). The EU accession process not only broadened the legal framework concerning the protection of and respect for minority rights, but also empowered ethnic civic actors through technical and financial aid to enhance their political activity and capacity to embrace the ‘diaspora’ (Çelikpala 2006;Kaya2013). The EU accession process resulted in the extension of civil rights to officially recognised minorities (Armenians, Jews and Greeks) and strengthened the institutional basis for the democratic integration of diverse ethnic groups such as Alevis, Assyrians, Circassians and Kurds in Turkey (Toktaş and Aras 2010). Yet, with the EU’sdeclining leverage over Turkey after 2007, there has been an observable paralysis and backwards slide in Turkey’s democratic reform process. The post-2014 period has even been shaped

CONTACT Di ğdem Soyaltın-Colella [email protected] @didemsoyaltin © 2019 Istituto Affari Internazionali THE INTERNATIONAL SPECTATOR 63 by increasingly authoritarian modalities of governance in Turkey with long-term negative consequences for the ethnic and national minorities. This article examines the probable effects of the (de-)Europeanisation of Turkey upon the claims for recognition of the ethnocultural rights and equal citizenship demands of Circassians (Çerkes). Circassians constitute one of the largest ethnic groups in Turkey; yet they are hardly studied within the Europeanisation framework. Although there is a wide literature focusing on Kurdish minorities in Turkey (see Yılmaz 2017), researchers tended to ignore how the (de-)Europeanisation process has impacted the democratic demands of other minorities, such as Circassians (Çelikpala 2006, 423). Based on original fieldwork, this article shows that the Europeanisation process encouraged Circassians to proclaim their legal and cultural demands, connect to the diaspora and be increasingly engaged in active citizenship practices in the public space. Different Circassian associations organised meetings, workshops and seminars devoted to the drafting of an inclusive and democratic constitution. However, the de-Europeanisation process, especially after the coup attempt of 2016, has narrowed down the institutional and legal basis for the ethnocultural minorities and diminished the prospects for the Circassians to initiate a process of active political participation. Having lost the institutional framework for advancing identity rights, it seems that Circassian ethnic associations limit their activities to the political terrain while cultural reification has become the core of their survival strategy. The empirical evidence comes from analysis of the activities of the main Circassians associations and face-to-face interviews with representatives of these communities. The overall argument is structured as follows. The next section presents the literature on minorities and citizenship regimes and assesses the overall impact of the (de-)Europeanisation process. The third section addresses the citizenship regime in Turkey and traces the effects of (de-)Europeanisation on the ethnocultural rights of minorities, while the fourth specifically focusesonthecaseofCircassians.Finally,thelastsectionreviewsourfindings regarding Circassians in Turkey1 and discusses the broader implications of the (de-)Europeanisation process on the citizenship regime and ethnocultural rights of minorities.

Impact of (de-)Europeanisation on citizenship regimes and minorities From the very start, the institution of citizenship has been built on a clear distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them’. For that reason, citizenship retains an inherently exclusionary dimension as well as its inclusionary core. Legal equality or formal equality is constructed upon one core principle: equality of everyone regardless of their differences. In that sense, it strips subjects of their identities, that is, their differences (Üstel 1999, 15). Yet, in the words of Bhikhu Parekh, this is simply an equation that “grounds equality in human uniformity” (Parekh 2000, 239-40). Such lines of formulation, Parekh argues, lack the potential to bring about genuine equality within a society that consists of diversities and differences. Therefore citizenship, defined solely with reference to the equality of all, regardless of their differences, will fall short of sustaining genuine equality and will not be able to provide the glue that holds society together.

1This study does not claim to generalize about all Circassians residing in Turkey or oﬀer an all-encompassing picture of Circassians in Turkey. Our empirical analysis is limited to the activities of four Circassian associations. 64 D. SOYALTIN-COLELLA AND E. AKDENIZ GOKER€

In the 1990s, in addition to many structural factors, such as the end of the Cold War and increasing global interaction, theoretical discussions on the topic of multiculturalism rekindled interest in the debate on citizenship. Ideas of multiculturalism underlay demands for political recognition and the right to maintain the cultural distinctiveness of minority groups (Taylor 1994). In order to cope with the question of ethnic and cultural diversities, democratic regimes engaged in processes of developing institutional and legal frameworks to accommodate these cultural differences. Within that conjunc- ture, the tension between the principle of the equality of all before the law and the principle of difference that underpins diverging identity claims became manifest. Citizenship, taken as a significant relationship arising from a constitutional basis between the individual and the state, appeared to be a major tool to overcome the tension between the principles of equality and difference (Marshall 1965; Turner and Hamilton 1994;Işın and Turner 2002). Nevertheless, some scholars questioned the validity of Marshallian citizenship, defined on an evolutionary historical basis as civil, political and economic rights, and tended to reformulate it with the inclusion of identity claims (Işınand Turner 2002). The challenges posed by identity claims, while calling for a new theoretical attempt to reformulate citizenship, inevitably brought to the fore new conceptualisations to solve the problem inherent in the institution of citizenship. One such conceptualisation, that of “constitutional patriotism”, was offered by Jürgen Habermas, who argued for a legitimate and normatively desirable form of governance and citizenship capable of accommodating minorities and recognising different cultural backgrounds and ethnicities (Habermas 1998, 145). A redefinition of citizenship that provides differential treatment for minorities (differences) would tend to solve the current problems in a country like Turkey, which has diverse ethnocultural groups (İçduygu and Soner 2006). Such a redefinition would expand citizenship from its basis as a legal status to include a cluster of activities like belonging to a political party, a civil society organisation or trade union, as well as signing petitions and partaking in civil disobedience, all of which define citizens’ rights to raise their voices in the political sphere and provide for political participation (Crick and Lockyer 2010; Işın 2008). Defined as a practice, citizenship could provide the framework for equal participation of all citizens in public life and the core principles of living together in a mutually respectful social environment without any discrimination based on race or ethnicity. Non-discrimination on the basis of race and ethnicity is a well-established norm in the EU. The Europeanisation process, defined as the impact of the EU on national policies, structures and policy processes (Börzel and Risse 2003, 57), promotes an equal citizenship regime and non-discrimination of minorities in the countries aspiring to become members of the Union. Yet, the EU does not provide a clear definition of what a national minority is (Kymlicka 2006,39).Theacquis communautaire also remained silent about minority protection until the Lisbon Treaty of 2007. The lack of common standards and monitoring mechanisms as well as the different minority policies in the EU states created ambiguity with regard to minority issues in Europe (Pridham 2009 ; Rechel 2008;Schwellnus2006). Nevertheless, the EU’s conditional incentives managed to promote substantial measures for the protection of minorities and respect for cultural diversity in the CEE countries as the governments introduced citizenship, language and educational legislation directed towards ethnocultural groups (Hughes 2003). THE INTERNATIONAL SPECTATOR 65

Minority protection in the CEE countries also triggered civil society activism and mobilisation. The civil society organisations representing different minority groups increased their interaction with the EU and intensely benefited from the EU’s political and financial pro- grams. The mobilisation through ethnic associations promoted political participation of diasporic subjects and increased the chances of becoming equal citizens in kin societies of CEE countries (Dumbrava 2019). Ethnocultural minorities mobilised around political parties and even managed to enter parliaments in several countries in the CEE (Spirova 2012). Yet, in some cases in the CEE, policies became more detached from EU requirements (see Sedelmeier 2017) with regard to minority rights once the incentives disappeared after accession (Sasse 2008). In Slovakia and Romania, minority parties have been increasingly excluded from government and/or political decision-making in the post-accession period. The illiberal parties governing in Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic have adopted powerful nationalist policies marginalising the voices of ethnic minorities and their claims for equal citizenship (Cianetti et al. 2018;HanleyandVachudova2018). These empirical out- comes have given rise to the notions of shallow Europeanisation or even de-Europeanisation. De-Europeanisation is defined as a loss or weakening of the EU/Europe as a normative political context and reference point in domestic affairs and debates in a target country (see Aydın-Düzgit and Kaliber 2017). De-Europeanisation is likely to result in the disappearance of the main institutional basis for the democratic integration of ethnocultural minorities and decreasing engagement in active citizenship practices.

(De-)Europeanisation of the equal citizenship regime in Turkey Minorities and citizenship regime in Turkey Turkey is a multiethnic and multicultural country, including approximately fifty different Muslim and non-Muslim ethnic groups (Andrews 1992). Yet, Turkish citizenship is defined as membership in the state based on a single religion (Sunni Islam), a single language (Turkish) and a single ethnicity (Turk). This understanding of the identity was reflected in Article 66 of 1982 Turkish Constitution, which states: “Everyone bound to the Turkish State through the bond of citizenship is a Turk”. This hegemonic statement left no space for ethnic and language-based communities such as Kurds, Alevis or Circassians, which are not officially recognised as minorities. Instead, they are regarded as groups belonging to the Turkish nation and categorised as Turks even though they are not ethnic Turks (Oran 2004,54). In Turkey, minority status is officially granted only to non-Muslims since the Turkish state employs a narrow definition of minority following the legal provisions of the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne. Although the Treaty did not mention which non-Muslim groups were to be considered minorities, the rights granted to minority groups were applied (with some limitations) to the three largest non-Muslim groups only: Greeks, Armenians and Jews (Oran 2007,36). The denial of the recognition of ethnic, religious and language-based minorities is largely explained by security considerations. From the early years of the Republic, minorities were seen as potential threats to the homogeneity, unity and indivisibility of the state, its people and its territory (Karpat 1973). Therefore, the founders of the Republic promoted the formation of an ethnically and culturally homogenous nation that fits in with the “holy 66 D. SOYALTIN-COLELLA AND E. AKDENIZ GOKER€ trinity” of Sunni-Muslim-Turk (Kaya 2013, 132) while not addressing the issue of minority rights at all. In fact, there is no mention of the word ‘minority’ in the Constitution.

(De-)Europeanisation of citizenship regime in Turkey: equal rights for minorities? After Turkey was given candidacy status at the December 1999 Helsinki Summit, the Europeanisation process gained momentum in the country and pushed for reforms for a plural and democratically constructed citizenship regime (Börzel and Soyaltin 2012). In the Accession Partnership Documents prepared for Turkey, the EU demanded that Turkish authorities

ensure cultural diversity, guarantee cultural rights for all citizens irrespective of their origin and promote respect for and protection of minorities in accordance with the European Convention on Human Rights and the principles laid down in the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, improve eﬀective access to radio and TV broadcasting in languages other than Turkish […] to enhance economic, social and cultural opportunities for all Turkish citizens (European Council 2008, 9).

The conditions for EU accession regarding the minority regime brought challenges to the citizenship policies of Turkey (Grigoriadis 2008;Schimmelfenniget al. 2003;Öniş 2006). Yet, the EU incentives compensated the cost of reforms and convinced Turkish authorities to introduce comprehensive changes addressing minority rights and cultural diversity. The EU reforms were initiated by the coalition government of 1999, but gained momentum with the adoption of EU harmonisation laws after the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) came to power in 2002 (Börzel and Soyaltin 2012). In 2002, constitutional amendments allowed broadcasting in languages other than Turkish, namely in Arabic, Bosnian, Circassian, Kirmanchi and Zaza, and made it possible to open private schools to teach languages and dialects (Toktaş and Aras 2010, 710-1). The Citizenship and Human Rights Education courses were abolished from the Turkish curriculum in 2005 and replaced by a new Citizenship and Democracy Education course based on a more democratic and pluralistic understanding of citizenship in 2011 (Çayır 2011). These reforms largely transformed the dominant notion of citizenshipinTurkeytowardsamoreinclusiveformandmarked a remarkable change in the perception of ethnocultural and religious minorities by state elites (Kaya 2013). Turkey’sreformeﬀorts, combined with its desire to join the EU, went asigniﬁcant way towards satisfying the conditions for the start of accession negotiations in 2005 (Börzel and Soyaltin 2012). Yet, the EU largely lost its ability to push the Turkish government into compliance with its rules as a result of the downward spiral in Turkey-EU relations after 2006 (Noutcheva and Aydin-Düzgit 2012). Only 13 months after negotiations started, the Europeanisation process in Turkey came to a critical juncture when the EU decided to suspend negotiations partially in eight chapters due to Turkey’s refusal to apply the Additional Protocol to the agreement on the Customs Union with Cyprus. Since then, the EU reform process has largely been stalled in Turkey. The reform process concerning the minority rights regime has also been limited by the resurgence of Kurdish terrorism and PKK (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê, THE INTERNATIONAL SPECTATOR 67

Kurdish Workers’ Party) violence as the ceasefire between the Turkish government and the PKK ended in 2015. Adopted in March 2013, the ceasefire initiated negotiations between the two parties – initially named the Solution Process – aimed at ending the bloody conflict that has been going on for almost three decades andhasclaimedthelivesofmorethan40,000people.However,thecivilwarin Syria and the increase in power of the Democratic Union Party (PYD), the Syrian branch of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), aggravated tensions in the domestic politics leading to a collapse of peace talks. As soon as the peace process ended, Turkey, as part of its security operations, declared some sixty curfews in the southeastern region, an act that was criticised by the EU as it was not based on the constitutional and legislative framework. The government also dismissed more than 400 academics who signed a declaration condemning the security operations in the southeast and calling for resumption of the peace talks (HRFT 2019,17). Thetensionintheregionrosefurtherafterthepro-KurdishPeoples’ Democratic Party (Halkların Demokratik Partisi,HDP)forthefirst time gained enough votes to secureaplaceintheTurkishparliamentinthe critical elections of 2015. In fact, in November 2016, the two co-leaders of the party were detained along with at least 10 HDP parliamentarians. The government’scrackdownonitsopponentscontinued more vigorously in the wake of the failed coup on 15 July 2016. The coup attempt, which was organised by a small fraction of the military believed to have ties to the Gülen movement,2 resulted in 248 deaths and the declaration of a state of emergency. Based on the emergency decree, more than 100,000 civil servants including judges, police and army officers, teachers, professors, academics were discharged from duty. Tens of thousands were arrested and prosecuted. Media outlets, schools, universities and civil society organisations were shut down (TUSEV 2018,31).The remaining civic associations have become increasingly depoliticised and have toned down their claims for equal citizenship as the AKP government has embraced the hegemonic discourse of Turkish nationalism, silenced minorities and sought to legitimise its authoritarian policies (Soyaltin-Colella 2019). In addition to emergency decrees having the force of law, the amendments to the constitution approved in a referendum in April 2017 have contributed to the ongoing de-Europeanisation process in Turkey. The constitutional amendments replacing the parliamentary regime with a ‘Turkish-style’ presidential system have been criticised by the EU, as they extend the president’spowerstoboththe legislative and judicial branches of government and remove necessary checks and balances. In its 2018 report, the European Commission underscored the fact that “Turkey has made big steps away from the EU” (European Commission 2018,3). The EU also highlighted serious backsliding concerning human rights, liberties and freedoms of the judiciary. The criticisms concerning the condition of minority groups in Turkey were another remarkable part of the report.

2Named after the US-based Islamic cleric Fethullah Gülen, the Gülen movement, known in Turkey as Hizmet, or service, is a religious and social movement whose followers have allegedly occupied positions in the police and the judiciary. The movement runs schools around the world, including in Turkic former Soviet Republics, Muslim countries such as Pakistan and Western nations including Romania and the US. 68 D. SOYALTIN-COLELLA AND E. AKDENIZ GOKER€

Impact of (de-)Europeanisation on Circassians: from active citizenship practices to folk dance courses Circassians in Turkey: a historical account Circassians constitute one of the largest ethnic groups in Turkey (Andrews 1992; Akgündüz 1998; Kaya 2004). There are approximately two and a half million people who identify themselves primarily as Circassian in Turkey, making it the largest Circassian diaspora in the world3 (Kurban 2007, 13). Circassians were ethnically cleansed, forced to migrate and expelled from their historical homeland, the greater part of the North Caucasus and the northeast shore of the Black Sea, in the aftermath of the Caucasian War in the last decades of the 19th century. 21 May 1864 marked the end of the war and the launch of the expulsion. The Circassian mass exodus is regarded as one of the largest mass population movements in modern history. Historical accounts show that more than a million Circassians left their homelands and were forced to settle in Ottoman lands including Anatolia, the Balkans and the Middle East (Karpat 1989). In the early years of the Turkish Republic, due to the Turkification policies, the Circassians incorporated themselves into the dominant nationalist discourse and largely avoided declaring their ethnic identity in public. With the transition to multiparty politics in the 1950s and the introduction of the 1960 Constitution, a more democratic political environment was created which led to the establishment of Circassian associations in the major cities (see Besleney 2014). In the 1970s, the Circassian associations started to take an active role in political movements lobbying for the right for self-determination in the homeland (Kaya 2004; 2012). Yet, the military coup in 1980 changed the political environment in Turkey banning all civic activities, including those of Circassian associations. In the aftermath of the 1980 coup, cultural and folkloristic forms of representation were the only way for Circassians to express their identity, as other ethnocultural activities of minorities were not welcomed by the Turkish state (Kaya 2005). After the years of silence that followed the 1980 military coup, a Circassian ethnic revival appeared on the scene during the early 1990s. On 21 May 1989, for the first time, the Circassians in Turkey organised activities in Ankara to commemorate the Great Exodus. Two factors seem to explain the newly emerging concern for the Circassian issue at that time: the end of the Cold War and the socio-political developments that accompanied it and, more specifically, the 1989 ethnic war in Georgia between the Georgians and Circassian communities. The dissolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the increase in the linkages with the homeland that were sparked with the end of the Cold War laid the base for the construction of a modern diasporic identity among Circassians (Kaya 2004, 230). The early 2000s witnessed the emergence of a diasporic discourse and increased political activism in the host country besides raising interest in the conflicts in the North Caucasus (Çelikpala 2006,434). With the increasing pace of Turkey’s Europeanisation after the 1999 Helsinki Summit, the Circassians felt empowered to proclaim their political and cultural demands. The diaspora associations increasingly turned into forums for the Circassians to engage in political discussions (Akdeniz Göker 2018) and active citizenship practices in the host

3The Circassian associations in Turkey claim the figure is around seven million. THE INTERNATIONAL SPECTATOR 69 society (Kaya 2004; 2012). In 2011, Circassian associations took to the streets of Ankara to criticise the assimilation policies that had been pursued over the years and to voice their rights and demands for the first time (Besleney 2014, 155). In 2014, a political party was established, the Pluralist Democracy Party (Çoğulcu Demokrasi Partisi, ÇDP), advocating the right for Circassians (and other ethnic groups) to take part in the political arena. However, as the institutional and legal basis for the ethnocultural minorities was subse- quently reduced by the de-Europeanisation process especially after the 2016 coup attempt, the Circassian ethnic associations had to take a step back in their active citizenship practices and limit themselves to non-political cultural activities. Our fieldwork, conducted in 2017, illustrates this argument. The fieldwork included analysis of the activities of four Circassian umbrella organisations in Turkey’s two biggest cities (İstanbul and Ankara4): Federation of Caucasian Associations (Kaf-Fed, Kafkas Dernekleri Federasyonu), United Caucasian Association (Birleşik Kafkasya Derneği İstanbul), Federation of Circassian Associations (Çerkes-Fed, Çerkes Dernekleri Federasyonu) and Federation of Abkhazian Associations (Abhaz Dernekleri Federasyonu). We conducted forty in-depth interviews with the members5 (activists, participants) of these Circassian associations and enriched our findings with two focus group studies.

Circassians within the (de-)Europeanisation process in Turkey The hegemonic discourse of Turkish nationalism manifested itself in our interviews as all respondents identiﬁed themselves as the citizens of the Turkish Republic. Some even stated that being Muslim has enabled them to have a privileged status compared to non-Muslim minorities and protected them from discrimination in Turkish society. Despite leaving limited political space for their ethnocultural demands, Turkish nationalism is highly respected among Circassians. This has become a way for them to diﬀerentiate themselves from other ethnic minorities to please the national authorities and survive in a nationalist state structure. The majority of interviewees felt obliged to emphasise that they disapproved of any separatist political initiative and did not want to be associated with the Kurdish movement.

There is one distinctive feature of Circassians that diﬀerentiates them from other ethnic communities. … We have never betrayed the Turkish state. We never demanded land. We have always been loyal to the principles of the Turkish Republic. We are exposed to discrimination because they confuse us with other ethnic communities and are therefore prejudiced against our ethnocultural demands (Seteney).6

Circassians have never betrayed the Turkish ﬂag or the Turkish Republic. The Ethem Bey7 incident has been represented incorrectly in history books. Most of the commanders, soldiers who served in the army during the Independence War were of Circassian origin. We demand to be able to use our mother tongue and we demand to use our traditional

4Since diasporic identity is basically an urban phenomenon facilitated by modern transportation and communication, the federations and ethnocultural associations in İstanbul and Ankara are treated as the focus of the analysis. 5Fictitious names have been used for all interviewees since they wished to remain anonymous. 6All translations by the authors. 7Çerkes Ethem was a Turkish militia leader of Circassian origin, who is referred to as a traitor in Turkish history books. 70 D. SOYALTIN-COLELLA AND E. AKDENIZ GOKER€

names, yet they [the authorities] confuse us with other ethnic minorities. We are not like them (Mefud).

When a new impulse in the identity discourse of Circassians emerged in the early 2000s, the concept of diaspora became the point of condensation for identity politics (Çelikpala 2006). One of our interviewees, Mefud, stated that “as of the 2000s, we began to use diaspora in our daily conversation. Our elders refrained from using it since they believed it is only used by Armenians”. The adoption of an explicit diasporic identity as a self-designation by the Circassians owes a lot to Turkey’s Europeanisation process. Following the EU norm of cultural diversity, the Circassian ethnic associations pre- ferred to employ diaspora in their lexicon, probably a clear manifestation of their expectations from Turkey’s integration into the EU.

Turkey’s EU candidacy contributed positively to eliminating barriers in the equal citizenship status of diverse ethnic groups in the country. It was an opportunity. It gave us a glimmer of hope and this meant a lot to us in demanding our ethnocultural rights (Janberd).

It was in this period that the Circassian community began to recognise itself clearly as a diaspora. As expressed by Jan,

We learned that we are a part of the diaspora through the activities held in the associations and federations. Formerly, we used to describe ourselves as exiles. Now, we call ourselves the diaspora. After all, the largest Circassian diaspora lives in Turkey (Jan).

Among the factors that contributed to facilitating ethnocultural consciousness within the Circassian communities was the impact of the Kurdish movement. The Kurdish movement, which gained strength throughout the EU accession process (Yilmaz 2017), brought the ethnic problems arising from Turkey’s citizenship regime to the fore and empowered the political and cultural claims of ethnocultural groups, including Circassians. Yet, there were only a few people among our interviewees who showed support for the Kurdish movement as most Circassians do not want to be stigmatised and criminalised as supporters of the Kurdish armed struggle.

Circassians struggle to raise their voices for their ethnocultural rights, which is an essential part of the general struggle of all ethnic minorities in Turkey. Within this process, the Kurdish movement has a leading role (Janset).

It is the Kurdish political movement that has encouraged other minority groups in Turkey to claim equal citizenship. It undoubtedly posed the greatest challenge to the minority regime and unequal citizenship practices in Turkey (Elbruz).

When the AKP government announced a new initiative, the Kurdish opening, as it was called by the public, I saw this as a huge step toward launching a democratic initiative to solve the existing ethnocultural problems in Turkey. Yet, of foremost importance among the factors that forced AKP to undertake such a manoeuvre was the EU (Seteney).

Turkey’s EU accession was supported by all members of the executive boards of those federations. Our interviewees strongly underlined the fact that Turkey’s EU accession process had a positive impact on the activism of the Circassian diaspora members for proclaiming their ethnocultural rights. Nartan, a member of the executive board of one of the federations, told us that the Circassian associations in Turkey had become visible THE INTERNATIONAL SPECTATOR 71 and politically engaged in an active struggle for equal citizenship rights with the EU accession process.

The diaspora organisations in Turkey (ethnocultural associations and federations) became vocal with the acceleration provided by Turkey’s EU adventure. As of that moment, Circassians ceased to deﬁne themselves as ‘exiles’ and engaged in an active process of claiming equal rights and non-discrimination (Nartan).

With the Europeanisation process, the ethnocultural associations became new grounds for democratic politics, rather than simply cultural meeting points. As Janberd put it, before these associations were simply centres for dance courses or socialisation among the Circassian community. “We were holding kermes (fairs) and charity campaigns in the dernek (association).” Yet, these communities started to demand education in their mother tongue, broadcasting in Circassian, restoration of the changed Circassian place names and surnames, the elimination of discriminatory phrases (especially descriptions of Ethem Bey as a traitor) from textbooks and the right to develop close contacts with compatriots in the homeland and all around the world. The increased activities of the civic associations enabled Circassians to engage in political debates. Hatko, one of our interviewees, identified diaspora associations as the most important tools for participating in the public sphere. Especially during the drafting of the new Constitution, the Circassian associations organised several meetings, workshops and seminars. For instance, in 2010 and 2011, Kaf-Fed held several meetings to create an open platform for Circassians. The common denomi- nator of all those meetings was the insistence on drafting a new and more inclusive constitution that would be built upon the pillars of protecting individual rights and enhancing the definition of citizenship without any mention of a specificethnic community (Kaya 2014, 55).

With Turkey’s path to democratisation which was further initiated with the EU process, we had some concrete gains like broadcasting in our mother tongue and education in our mother tongue. More importantly, we had a deep feeling that we would take part as citizens within a new democratically designed constitution-making process (Aytek).

Circassians taking part in diaspora associations aﬃliated with any of the four federations also became sensitive to the political atmosphere in the country. This sensitivity transcended ethnocultural demands and seemed to generate political awareness towards other topics concerning governance. One salient example con- cerns issues relative to ecology and the environment. One of the respondents, Seteney, stated that in the associations they were organising campaigns against genetically modiﬁed food and attempting to form an agenda. Another respondent, Janset, said she believed it was the main duty of every Circassian to protect the nature and cultural heritage of the (host) country, in that it was only through such attitudes that they could symbolically remain loyal to the green heritage of the ancestral homeland of Caucasia. The Circassian associations also participated in the debates concerning the reform of the education system. Sinemis, who stated that she took an active part in various 72 D. SOYALTIN-COLELLA AND E. AKDENIZ GOKER€ campaigns against the adoption of the primary education law in 2012 (popularly known as the “4+4+4 Law”8), argued that:

This is our country. We were born here. Our children were born here. The quality of education that our children will receive is of the utmost importance to us. We cannot and should not limit our agenda only to the elimination of discriminatory statements from school textbooks. For years, we fought for revising textbooks in order to restore Ethem Bey’s reputation. This is still important. However, the question of whether our children will receive a religious or secular education is just as important (Sinemis).

The civic engagement supported by the EU accession process turned into a mechanism allowing Circassians to keep ethnic and cultural bonds alive, but also to get involved with Turkey’s political agenda and become active citizens. As correctly put by Gujan, they were feeling like they were citizens of Turkey or at least becoming citizens of Turkey as they attended meetings of the Circassian associations. Yet, with the end of peace negotiations between the Kurds and the AKP government in 2014, Ankara became less eager to solve ethnic problems arising from Turkey’s citizenship regime, narrowing the political space given to ethnic associations. Coupled with the upsurge of nationalism, especially after the July 2016 coup attempt, the rising anti-Westernism resulted in the adoption of reverse measures that diluted the democratic impact of the previously adopted EU reforms.

We knew that EU candidacy would not solve every problem in the country. I never believed that Turkey would fulﬁl the Copenhagen standards. Suspension of EU negotiations had started long before. But EU conditionality was somehow like a lighthouse. It continued to be an opportunity for us to improve our ethnocultural rights (Gujan).

Things were diﬀerent in the near past, say ﬁve, seven years ago. It was easier to raise our voices for education in our mother tongue, or the elimination of discriminatory statements from school textbooks, for instance. But today, if we pursue the same sort of activities, they will put us into the same basket as the Kurds. It is easier to be stigmatised today. […] I would like to underline that Circassians have never betrayed this land and this state (Mefud).

The interviewees aﬃliated with a federation whose president was also a parliamentary candidate from the ruling AKP tended to underline the vulnerabilities of the country, especially after the failed coup. After calling on people to take to the streets and stand up for democracy only hours after the attempted coup began, President Erdoğan later appeared in several mass rallies staged by pro-government supporters. Speaking to millions, Erdoğan asserted a new nationalism that is Muslim and sceptical towards the West (Halpin et al. 2018). This rising nationalist sentiment among much of the Turkish population enabled the government to change priorities in its reform agenda. While several constitutional amendments were adopted to change the parliamentary

8This law extended compulsory schooling by four years, making education compulsory for a full 12 years. Yet, in reality, it reduced compulsory public schooling since it allowed students to enter vocational schools – including Islamic imam hatip schools – after ﬁfth grade rather than ninth grade. The original purpose of the imam schools (religious) was to provide manpower for Turkey’s mosques and religious establishment. However, the law turned “religious schools from a selective option to a central institution in the education system”. While entrance examinations were introduced for all high schools, the imam hatip schools were exempted from this rule and became an easy option for students who did not qualify for other schools. This controversial reform of education, it was argued, would boost religious education at the expense of secular schooling (Cengiz 2014). THE INTERNATIONAL SPECTATOR 73 system into a presidential one, promotion of ethnocultural rights was put back on the shelf without any opposition. One of our interviewees argued that Turkey has entered a new phase and that the priorities and agenda of the ethnocultural associations must be amended accordingly.

Turkey witnessed a very bloody coup attempt on 15 July 2016. As citizens of this country, we must be responsible. We should not behave in the same manner as the Kurds. The Circassian diaspora members should act in a responsible manner (Şamil).

There is no ban on speaking the Circassian language in the dernek. Turkey is a safe place for Circassians. But it is not the right time to raise our demands for ethnocultural rights or whatever (Elbruz). The rising nationalism and increasing distrust towards the EU (see Soyaltin-Colella 2019) forced the Circassian associations to decelerate their political activism. Folk culture has become a strategy for them to keep the Circassian traditions and ‘identity’ alive and survive in a domestic setting where the hegemonic discourse of Turkish nationalism has been embraced once again. During the in-depth interviews, the members of the executive boards of the federations stated that their activity agendas focused only on solidarity or charity campaigns for Syrian refugees, language courses in Circassian, folkloristic dance classes and the annual rally commemorating the Great Exodus of 1864. As the possibility of drafting an inclusive and democratic constitution fades away in the era of de-Europeanisation, it seems less likely for the Circassians to expand their activities to other spheres of political life.

A new phase has begun for Turkey. There is a rising tide of authoritarianism. The country is being governed by decree. Nobody feels safe. I sometimes think, I have a child and therefore have to care about him and limit my activity. Yet, I continue to attend the activities in the association. […] We continue to organise a demonstration to commemorate the Great Exile of 1864 that represents our purge from the homeland (Janset).

Since the country is drifting towards authoritarianism, my husband and I thought we would move to Caucasia. But then we changed our mind. It would be very diﬃcult for our children who were born here, raised here and who cannot speak the Circassian language. Even I cannot speak my mother tongue. […] I take the children to dancing lessons in the dernek. We sometimes attend breakfasts held in the dernek (Sinemis).

Conclusion This article examined the ethnocultural rights and citizenship practices of a minority group in Turkey, the Circassians, within the process of (de-)Europeanisation. As one of the largest ethnic groups living in Turkey, the Circassians were subject to a kind of structural exclusion from political and social rights, as was the case with other minorities in Turkey, such as Kurds and Alevis. Therefore, until the early 2000s, the Circassians manifested themselves only through cultural and folkloristic representa- tions. However, Turkey’s Europeanisation process raised awareness of recognition and respect for ethnocultural diversity in the country. Successive AKP governments introduced various reforms strengthening the legal base for the political and cultural rights of minority groups and took steps to introduce 74 D. SOYALTIN-COLELLA AND E. AKDENIZ GOKER€ an equal citizenship regime in Turkey. The ethnic associations were also empowered by the EU’s technical, material and cognitive help which contributed to their political mobilisation for the elimination of ethnic discrimination and respect for individual as well as cultural rights. Circassians taking part in diaspora associations aﬃliated with any of the four federations became more aware of governance issues and got involved with the political agenda/context in the host society. This was a way for them to become equal citizens in Turkey. The Circassian associations even engaged actively in the public debate on the new constitution and drafted their suggestions for the construction of equal citizenship. Yet, as Turkey started to distance itself from EU membership values after 2007-08, the reform process in general lost momentum. Furthermore, the return to violence between the Turkish state and the PKK after 2015 triggered a backlash in Turkey with regard to the promotion of minority rights. Finally, the state of emergency declared after the attempted coup of July 2016 contributed to Turkey’s democratic regression and detached Turkey from the EU accession process and European values. The de- Europeanisation process in the country diminished the prospects for Circassians in search of constitutional citizenship, equality and respect for their ethnocultural diﬀerences. As indicated by empirical evidence, the Circassian ethnic associations largely lost the institutional framework for advancing identity rights when the EU reform process stalled. Yet, instead of becoming totally invisible, these associations embraced cultural activities to survive within a political environment which is becoming increasingly nationalist and less tolerant of ethnocultural minorities. Only time will tell whether Circassians will have another opportunity to claim their ethnocultural rights to equal citizenship. As observed since 2014, the process of de-Europeanisation is still going on and its impact on equal citizenship in Turkey is now more a source of concern than of optimism.

Notes on contributors

Diğdem Soyaltın-Colella is Assistant Professor at Altinbaş University, Istanbul, Turkey. Eylem Akdeniz G€oker is Assistant Professor at Altinbaş University, Istanbul, Turkey. Email: [email protected] Twitter: @eylemakdeniz

References

Akdeniz Göker, E. 2018. Nereye Aitiz? Diasporik Kimlik ve Türk Vatandaşlığı Kıskacında Çerkes Kimliği. [Where Do We Belong? Conﬂicted Circassian Identity between Diaspora and Turkish Citizenship]. Altinbaş University Social Sciences Journal, Aurum 3 (1): 91–105. Akgündüz, A. 1998. Migration to and from Turkey, 1783–1960: Types, Numbers, and Ethnoreligious Dimensions. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 24 (1): 97–120. Andrews, P.A. 1992. Türkiye’de Etnik Gruplar [Ethnic Groups in Turkey]. İstanbul: Ant Tümzamanlar Yayıncılık. Aydın-Düzgit, S., and Kaliber, A. eds. 2017. Is Turkey De-Europeanising? Encounters with Europe in a Candidate Country. London: Routledge. Besleney, Z. 2014. The Circassian Diaspora in Turkey. London: Routledge. THE INTERNATIONAL SPECTATOR 75

Börzel, T. A., and Risse, T. 2003. Conceptualising the Domestic Impact of Europe. In K. Featherstone and C. Radaelli, eds. The Politics of Europeanisation:55–78. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Börzel, T. A. and Soyaltin, D. 2012. Europeanisation in Turkey. Stretching a Concept to its Limits? KFG Working Paper 36. Berlin: Freie Universität Berlin. Çayır, K. 2011. Turkey’s New Citizenship and Democracy Education Course: Search for Democratic Citizenship in a Difference-Blind Polity? Journal of Social Science Education 10 (4): 22–30. Çelikpala, M. 2006. From Immigrants to Diaspora: Influence of the North Caucasian Diaspora in Turkey. Middle Eastern Studies 42 (3): 423–46. Cengiz, O.K. 2014. Erdogan’s Reforms Meant to Educate Pious Generation. Al Monitor, 26 June. Cianetti, L. D., Dawson J., and Hanley, S. 2018. Rethinking “democratic backsliding” in Central and Eastern Europe – looking beyond Hungary and Poland. East European Politics 34 (3): 243–56. Crick, B., and Lockyer, A. eds. 2010. Active Citizenship: What could it Achieve and How? Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Dumbrava, C. 2019. The ethno-demographic impact of co-ethnic citizenship in Central and Eastern Europe. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 45 (6): 958–74. European Commission 2018. Turkey Progress Report. (2018/153/SWD). Strasbourg, 17 April. European Council. 2008. Accession Partnership Document with the Republic of Turkey. (2008/ 157/EC). Brussels, 18 February. Grigoriadis I. 2008. Trials of Europeanisation: Turkish Political Culture and the European Union. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Habermas, J. 1998. The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Halpin, J., Werz M., Makovsky, A., and Hoffman, M. 2018. Is Turkey Experiencing a New Nationalism: An Examination of Public Attitudes on Turkish Self-Perception. Washington DC: Center for American Progress. Hanley, S., and Vachudova, M. A. 2018. Understanding the illiberal turn: democratic backsliding in the Czech Republic. East European Politics 34 (3): 276–96. HRFT (Human Rights Foundation of Turkey). 2019. Academics for Peace: A Brief History 11 January 2016-15 March 2019. Ankara. Hughes, J. 2003. Monitoring the Monitors: EU Enlargement Conditionality and Minority Protection in the CEE Countries. Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe 1: 1–38. İçduygu, A., and Soner, B.A. 2006. Turkish Minority Rights Regime: Between Difference and Equality. Middle Eastern Studies 42 (3): 447–68. Isin, E. F. 2008. Theorizing Acts of Citizenship. In E.F. Işın and G.M. Nielsen, eds. Acts of Citizenship:15–43. London: Zed Books. Isin, E. F., and Turner, B. S. 2002. Handbook of Citizenship Studies. London: SAGE. Karpat, K. 1973. An Inquiry into the Social Foundations of Nationalism in the Ottoman State: From Social Estates to Classes, From Millets to Nations. Princeton, NJ: Center of International Studies. Karpat, K. 1989. Ottoman Population 1830-1914: Demographic and Social Characteristics. Madison, WI: Wisconsin University Press. Kaya, A. 2004. Political Participation Strategies of the Circassian Diaspora in Turkey. Mediterranean Politics 9 (2): 221–39. Kaya, A. 2005. Cultural Reification in Circassian Diaspora: Stereotypes, Prejudices and Ethnic Relations. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 31 (1): 129–49. Kaya, A. 2012. Circassian Claims to Equal Citizenship in Turkey: Institutionalizing Political Participation. Accept Pluralism Research Project, Project Report 12. Florence: European University Institute. Kaya, A. 2013. Europeanization and Tolerance in Turkey: The Myth of Toleration. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 76 D. SOYALTIN-COLELLA AND E. AKDENIZ GOKER€

Kaya, A. 2014. The Circassian Diaspora in and outside Turkey: Construction of Transnational Space in Post-Communist Era. Problems of Post-Communism 61 (4): 50–72. Kelley, J. G. 2004. Ethnic Politics in Europe: The Power of Norms and Incentives. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Kurban, D. 2007. A Quest for Equality: Minorities in Turkey. London: Minority Rights Group International. Kymlicka, W. 2006. The evolving basis of European norms of minority rights: Rights to culture, participation and autonomy. In J. MacGarry and M. Keating, eds. European Integration and the Nationalities Question:35–63. New York: Routledge. Marshall, T. H. 1965. Class, Citizenship, and Social Development; Essays. Garden City, NY: Anchor Books. Noutcheva, G., and Aydin-Düzgit, S. 2012. Lost in Europeanisation: The Western Balkans and Turkey. West European Politics 35 (1): 59–78. Öniş,Z.2006. Turkey’s Encounters with the New Europe: Multiple Transformations, Inherent Dilemmas and the Challenges Ahead. Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans 8 (3): 279–98. Oran, B. 2004. Türkiye’de Azinliklar: Kavramlar, Lozan, İç Mevzuat, İçtihat, Uygulama [Minorities in Turkey: Concepts, Lausanne, Legislation, Jurisprudence, Application]. Istanbul: TESEV Publications. Oran, B. 2007. Minority Concept and Rights in Turkey: The Lausanne Peace Treaty and Current Issues. In Z. F. Kabasakal Arat, ed. Human Rights in Turkey:35–52. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press. Parekh, B. 2000. Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Theory. New York: Palgrave. Pridham, G. 2009. Securing the Only Game in Town: The EU’s Political Conditionality and Democratic Consolidation in Post-Soviet Latvia. Europe-Asia Studies 61 (1): 51–84. Rechel, B. 2008. What has Limited the EU’s Impact on Minority Rights in Accession Countries? East European Politics & Societies 22 (1): 171–91. Sasse, G. 2008. The Politics of EU Conditionality: The Norm of Minority Protection during and beyond EU Accession. Journal of European Public Policy 15 (6): 842–60. Schimmelfennig, F., Engert, S., and Knobel, H. 2003. Costs, commitment and compliance: The impact of EU democratic conditionality on Latvia, Slovakia and Turkey. Journal of Common Market Studies 41 (3): 495–518. Schwellnus, G. 2005. The Adoption of Nondiscrimination and Minority Protection Rules in Romania, Hungary, and Poland. In F. Schimmelfennig and U. Sedelmeier, eds. The Europeanisation of Central and Eastern Europe:51–70. Ithaca, NY, and London: Cornell University Press. Schwellnus, G. 2006. Double Standards? Minority Protection as a Condition for Membership. In H. Sjursen, ed. Questioning EU Enlargement: The EU in Search of Identity: 304–21. New York: Routledge. Sedelmeier, U. 2017. Political Safeguards Against Democratic Backsliding in the EU: The Limits of Material Sanctions and the Scope of Social Pressure. Journal of European Public Policy 24 (3): 337–51. Soyaltin-Colella, D. 2019. (Un-)Democratic Change and Strategic Use of Social Sanctions The Council of Europe Monitoring in Turkey. Paper presented at the Workshop on Regional Sanctions and Democracy. Stockholm, 12-3 April. Spirova, S. 2012. European integration and minority politics: Ethnic Parties at the EP Elections. East European Politics 28 (1): 76–92. Taylor, C. 1994. The Politics of Recognition. In C. Taylor and A. Gutmann, eds. Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition: 25–74. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Toktaş, Ş. and Aras, B. 2010. The EU and Minority Rights in Turkey. Political Science Quarterly 124 (4): 697–720. Turner, B. S., and Hamilton, P. 1994. eds. Citizenship. Critical Concepts. London: Routledge. THE INTERNATIONAL SPECTATOR 77

TUSEV (Third Sector Foundation of Turkey). 2018. Civil Society Environment in Turkey. TUSEV Publications No. 76. Istanbul: TUSEV. Üstel, F. 1999. Yurttaşlık ve Demokrasi [Citizenship and Democracy]. Ankara: Dost Yayınevi. Vachudova, M. A. 2005. Europe Undivided: Democracy, Leverage, & Integration after Communism. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. Yilmaz, G. 2017. Minority Rights in Turkey: A Battleﬁeld for Europeanization? London: Routledge.