Homer and Rhetoric in Byzantium: Eustathios of Thessalonike on the Composition of the Iliad Van Den Berg, B

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Homer and rhetoric in Byzantium: Eustathios of Thessalonike on the composition of the Iliad van den Berg, B.

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Appendix I: The Proem of the Parekbolai on the Iliad (in Il. 1.1-5.3 = 1.1.1-1.8.6)1

Perhaps it would be good if someone kept clear of Homer’s Sirens altogether, by blocking his ears with wax or by steering another course, in order to escape the spell.2 But suppose he did not keep away, but made his way through that song, he would not, I think, easily disregard it, even though many chains bound him,3 nor would he, when he has disregarded it, be graceful.4 For if someone were to count certain sounds worthy of attention too, just as certain sights, such as the seven well-known ones found in literature, Homeric poetry would be foremost amongst them;5 thereof, I think, no one of the wise men of old did not taste, and especially of all who drew from pagan wisdom.6 For from Ocean flow all rivers, all springs, all wells, according to the old saying.7 And from Homer, if not the whole, at least much of the stream of learning flowed to the wise men. At any rate, not one of those who investigated the things above, nor of those who investigated nature, or

1 A partial translation of the proem can be found in C.J. Herington. 1969. Homer: A Byzantine Perspective. Arion 8(3): 432-4. 2 The reference is to the Sirens episode in Odyssey 12 (vv. 158-200). On the image of Homeric poetry as the song of Sirens, see Section 1.1.1 and Van den Berg, forthcoming (2016). 3 Cf. Od. 1.204: οὐδ’ εἴ πέρ τε σιδήρεα δέσματ’ ἔχῃσι, ‘not though bonds of iron hold him’. 4 For the interpretation of this gracefulness as rhetorical gracefulness, i.e. the ability to use Homer in an elegant and eloquent way in one’s own writings, see Section 1.1.1. 5 On the image of the seven World Wonders, see Section 1.1.1. Greek and Latin texts discussing the World Wonders are collected in Brodersen 1992. 6 I have translated ἡ ἔξω σοφία as ‘pagan wisdom’. Expressions denoting ‘outside’ are commonly used by patristic and Byzantine authors to refer to literature, wisdom, people, etc. ‘outside’ Christianity and the Christian community and, hence, for ‘Hellenic’, pagan literature, authors, etc. See e.g. 1 Ep. Cor. 5.12-3, where Paul distinguishes between those outside the Christian congregation (τοὺς ἔξω) and those within (τοὺς ἔσω ὑμεῖς). In Ep. Col. 4.5, 1 Ep. Thess. 4.12, and Ev. Marc. 4.11 the expression is used in the same sense. See Malingrey 1961: 212-3 for the use of similar expressions by Gregory of Nazianzos, Basil the Great, and Gregory of Nyssa. For examples from twelfth-century authors, see Basilikopoulou-Ioannidou 1971-1972: 55. 7 Il. 21.195-7: […] Ὠκεανοῖο, / ἐξ οὗ περ πάντες ποταμοὶ καὶ πᾶσα θάλασσα / καὶ πᾶσαι κρῆναι καὶ φρείατα μακρὰ νάουσιν· ‘Ocean, from whom all rivers flow and the entire sea, and all the springs and deep wells.’ On the image of Homer as Ocean, see Section 1.1.2 and Van den Berg, forthcoming (2016). 262 Appendix I: The Proem of the Parekbolai on the Iliad ethics, or pagan literature in general,8 whatever kind one would mention, passed by the Homeric tent9 without being entertained as a guest,10 but they all lodged with him, some to stay with him until the very end and live off his banquets, others to fulfil a certain need and to gain something useful from him for their own work.11 Among them also was the Pythia, who polished many of her oracles according to the Homeric mode.12 Philosophers are concerned with Homer, even though Hipparchus envies him, as will be examined a little later.13 Rhetoricians are concerned with him; grammarians reach their goal in no other way but through him. Of all the poets after him, there is no one who artfully composes something without his methods, imitating, adapting, doing everything in their power to Homerise. Geographers, too, treat him with great zeal and admiration. Even he who is concerned with the occupation of the sons of Asclepius and with wounds borrows good things from there [sc. Homeric poetry]. The thing attracts even kings, as is attested by Alexander the Great, who carried the Homeric book along with him as a treasure or as provisions even in battles and who, when it was time to sleep, rested his head on it, so that, perhaps, even while asleep he would not be separated from him, but seeing him in his imagination he would have auspicious dreams.14 Homer’s poetry, and the Iliad in particular, truly is a royal

8 For ἐξωτερικός as ‘pagan’, cf. n. 6 above. Eustathios uses the term ἐξωτερικός in the same sense in e.g. in Can. Jo. Dam. acrost. 57 and Emend. vit. mon. 143.1. 9 Van der Valk ad loc. (followed by Cesaretti 1991: 212) signals an ambiguity in the term σκηνή: it can refer to the tent where Homer receives his guests and/or to the poetic stage on which the Trojan War evolves. Cesaretti, moreover, sees a possible parallel in Tzetzes’ ποιητικὴ σκηνή referring to the ‘poetical trick’ or ‘poetical characteristic’ (ποιητικὸν χαρακτήρισμα) of opening works of poetry with a Muse-invocation (Ex. 75.11-2). 10 ἀξεναγώγητος (‘without being entertained as a guest’) is an Eustathian hapax. 11 On the image of Homer as a host and his poetry as a lodging, see Section 1.1.2. 12 Delphic oracles were commonly expressed in hexameters. See Parke & Wormell 1956, vol. 1: 33- 4. 13 In in Il. 35.37-45 = 1.58.14-22 (on Il. 1.39), Eustathios, following Strabo (1.2.3), explains that in antiquity Homeric poetry was considered to be a first form of philosophy and a source of every branch of learning, an idea rejected by the geographer Hipparchus. 14 On Alexander as a fervent admirer of Homer, see e.g. Plu. Alex. 8.2. Michael Choniates, too, uses the example of Alexander when advocating the relevance of the study of Homer (see Ep. 111.260- 5). Eustathios refers to Alexander’s (or, in fact, Aristotle’s) edition of the Iliad, ‘The Iliad of the Casket’, named after the richly wrought casket in which Alexander kept the book, in in Il. 6.42 =

Homer and Rhetoric in Byzantium 263 thing. A certain proverb speaks of ‘an Iliad of evils’,15 but this poem is an Iliad of every good. It is constructed in a kind of dramatic way, because the narrative on the one hand is uniform, but on the other hand has many characters;16 and it is full of innumerable things that one could call good: philosophy, rhetoric, the fine art of military strategy, teaching on moral virtues, and, in short, every kind of art and branch of knowledge.17 One can also learn praiseworthy deceptions from there and compositions of crafty falsehoods and acerbic elements of ridicule and methods for encomia.18 It is impossible to say how much prudence it brings to anyone who wants to pay heed to it. And as regards all the solemn things that are observed in historiography, no one would deprive Homer’s art of such qualities: wide experience,19 the capability of pleasing ears, of educating souls, of spurring toward virtue, and the other qualities for which the historian is highly esteemed.

1.11.4-5 (on Il. 1). Cf. Str. 13.1.27 and Plu. Alex. 8.2 (for further references, see J.R. Hamilton. 1969. Plutarch: Alexander. A Commentary. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 20-1). 15 The expression ‘an Iliad of evils’ is used by Demosthenes (19.148) and later became proverbial (see e.g. Zen. 4.43, Diogenian. 2.93 ed. Von Leutsch and 5.26 eds. Von Leutsch & Schneidewin). Further occurrences are listed in Karathanasis 1936: 35. 16 Cf. Pl. R. 393d-394d: epic poetry is of a mixed type of narrative, sharing with drama that it is mimetic in some parts, i.e. with various speaking characters; on the other hand, it shares with dithyrambs that it is plain and ‘single-voiced’ in other parts, when the narrator is speaking. Similar remarks occur throughout the Parekbolai. See e.g. in Il. 6.11 = 1.9.25-6 (on Il. 1), where Eustathios argues that Homer wrote his poetry in a dramatic way, without putting it on the stage. See also in Il. 263.6-16 = 1.400.16-401.6 (on Il. 2.494-877) with discussion in Section 2.4.2. 17 The idea that Homeric poetry contains every kind of learning was common throughout antiquity. See e.g. Verdenius 1970: 5-19, Russell 1981: 84-98, and Hillgruber 1994: 4-35. It was repeated in modern times by e.g. Jaeger (1946 [1933]: 3-56) and Havelock (1936: 61-96). A conspicuous example is Ps.-Plutarch’s encyclopedic Life and Poetry of Homer, who argues that Homer is ‘acquainted with every kind of learned art and every branch of knowledge’ (πάσης λογικῆς ἐπιστήμης καὶ τέχνης ἐντὸς, Vit. Hom. 6). Tzetzes expresses a similar idea in e.g. Ex. 45.9-10 and 343.12-5. For a similar idea in Prodromos’ Sale of Poetical and Political Lives, see Cullhed 2014a: 47*-8*. 18 On these rhetorical lessons, see Section 1.2.2. 19 Homer’s poetry both showcases the poet’s ‘wide experience’ (πολυπειρία) or ‘wide learning’ (πολυμάθεια) and brings its audience to wide experience or wide learning: see Section 2.3.3. On experience as an attribute of the ideal geographer/historian in Strabo and Polybius, see e.g. Str. 1.1.1-2 and Plb. 12.27. See Kim 2007 (for Strabo and Polybius); Marincola 1997: 71-5 (for Polybius) and 133-48 (for the importance of experience according to ancient historians). 264 Appendix I: The Proem of the Parekbolai on the Iliad

And in case there is a risk that he loses our admiration because he is full of myths: first of all, Homeric myths are not meant for laughter but are shadows or veils20 of noble thoughts, some invented by him with regard to the subject matter, which are properly allegorised with regard to it, but many also composed by the ancients and usefully drawn into his poetry, too; their allegorical meaning does not always and in every way concern the Trojan War, but is such as those who invented them expressed enigmatically.21 This nursling of wisdom,22 then, did not simply gain pleasure from myths. (For wisdom is contemplation of truth;23 this is the nature of the wise man; how could it not be that of Homer, too?) But he artfully weaves them into his poetry with a view to the allurement of the masses, in order that he,

20 Terms like ‘veil’, ‘shadow’ and ‘dream’ are common in discussions of myth and allegory. Proklos, for instance, repeatedly uses ‘veil’ (παραπέτασμα) in relation to Homeric myth in his Commentary on Plato’s Republic (e.g. 1.44.14, 1.66.7, 1.159.15-6). Clement of Alexandria speaks of veils, dreams, and symbols in Strom. 5.4.24.1-2. Psellos, too, refers to mythical stories as veils covering the mysteries of philosophy (e.g. Phil. min. 1.44.2-14). 21 On Eustathios’ dichotomy between myths invented by Homer and myths invented by others before Homer, see Sections 1.2.3 and 1.3.2. On myths that do not have a connection with the Trojan War, see also in Il. 123.13-6 = 1.190.11-5 (on Il. 1.401-4). 22 In in Il. 846.11-3 = 3.202.6-9 (on Il. 11.307), Eustathios explains the meaning of τρόφιμος, arguing that ‘rhetors after Homer in another way call the one who was brought up by someone τρόφιμος and τρόφις’ (οἱ μεθ’ Ὅμηρον ῥήτορες ἄλλως τρόφιμον καὶ τρόφιν τὸν ὑπό τινος ἐκτραφέντα φασίν). Cf. Menander Rhetor, who refers to the people of Athens as ‘the chosen men, nurslings of wisdom and virtue’ (ἄνδρας λογάδας, σοφίας καὶ ἀρετῆς τροφίμους, 394.8-9) and to Euripides as ‘nursling of the Muses’ (Μουσῶν τρόφιμος, 413.26). The latter example is also mentioned by Eustathios (in Il. 846.12 = 3.202.8). Eustathios designates Manuel as a ‘nursling of wisdom’ in his funerary oration for the late emperor (Opusc. 23, 205.62); in Emend. vit. mon. 126.3-4, he speaks of ‘an eloquent man and a nursling of letters and possessing wisdom’ (τις ἐλλόγιμος καὶ γραμμάτων τρόφιμος καὶ σοφίᾳ κατακώχιμος). 23 For the connection of truth with wisdom, philosophy, and theoretical knowledge, cf. e.g. Arist. Metaph. 993b19-21: ὀρθῶς δ’ ἔχει καὶ τὸ καλεῖσθαι τὴν φιλοσοφίαν ἐπιστήμην τῆς ἀληθείας. θεωρητικῆς μὲν γὰρ τέλος ἀλήθεια πρακτικῆς δ’ ἔργον∙ ‘It is correct that philosophy is called knowledge of the truth. For truth is the goal of theoretical knowledge, action of practical [knowledge].’ In his commentary on the Metaphysics (146.4-6), Alexander of Aphrodisias explains Aristotle’s notion of ‘contemplation of truth’ (ἀληθείας θεωρία, Metaph. 993a30) as ‘wisdom and theoretical philosophy’ (ἡ σοφία καὶ ἡ θεωρητικὴ φιλοσοφία).

Homer and Rhetoric in Byzantium 265 having enticed24 and enchanted them through the appearance,25 draws into his nets, as they say,26 those who shrink from the subtlety of philosophy; and next, having given them a taste of the sweetness found in truth,27 he will set them free to go as wise men and pursue it elsewhere too. Moreover, he is such a master in the method of the plausible invention of myths,28 that he serves as a teacher of this, too, for those who are fond of learning, as well as of the other forms of discourse. Among these things, Homer has above all the following admirable aspect, that, even though he is full of myths, he nevertheless is not shunned but loved; even those who pretend to hate him do not shrink from engaging with him anyhow, and [first] waiving him aside they take him in again, like the proverbial Scythian, who, while the Greeks were watching, kept away from his deceased noble horse, but after he had returned, he did the customary thing at leisure, while enjoying what he wanted.29 If those who use something are an indication of its usefulness, there is no denying that Homeric poetry is a thing that is useful for

24 The verb δελεάζω (‘entice by a bait’) and cognates are common in contexts of the educational value of myth (and fable). See e.g. Str 1.2.8 and Jo. Sard. in Aphth. Prog. 9.19. Cf. Tz. Ex. 43.6-9, who argues that the mythical aspect of Homeric poetry is ‘an enchanting attraction and entertainment for the young’ (τις θελκτήριος ἐφολκὴ τῶν νέων καὶ ψυχαγώγημα), while the mathematical, natural, and philosophical element of Homeric poetry serves as a ‘bait’ (δέλεαρ) for more divine souls. 25 With τὸ προφαινόμενον (‘the appearance’, ‘what is apparent’), Eustathios refers to the literal meaning of myths. Elsewhere, he uses τὸ προφερόμενον (‘what is put forward’, e.g. in Il. 2.35 = 1.3.21 below) and τὸ φαινόμενον (‘the appearance’, ‘what is apparent’, e.g. 3.19 = 1.4.18 below) in the same sense. 26 The reference is to E. Ph. 263. Eustathios employs the same expression in Emend. vit. mon. 121.11 (with commentary in K. Metzler. 2006. Eustathios von Thessalonike und das Mönchtum. Berlin: De Gruyter, p. 481). 27 ‘Sweetness’ (γλυκύτης) is one of the Hermogenean types of style. See Lindberg 1977: 229-35 on sweetness in Hermogenes and Eustathios. Throughout the Parekbolai, Eustathios repeatedly connects ‘sweetness’ with myth. See e.g. Eust. in Il. 717.45 = 2.596.2 (on Il. 8.366-73): ἱστορίᾳ τε γὰρ ἤρτυται καὶ μύθῳ γλυκάζεται, ‘[the passage] is seasoned with history and sweetened with myth’; cf. in Il. 625.63-626.1 = 2.248.1-2 (on Il. 6.73-101). Tzetzes, too, connects sweetness with myth in his Allegories of the Iliad and the Odyssey. See Cesaretti 1991: 135 and n. 46 on p. 143 for references to relevant passages. 28 On plausibility and myth, see esp. Sections 1.3.1, 3.2.2, and 4.4.1. 29 Zenobius (5.59, with a reference to Pindar fr. 203) explains that the proverb refers to those who secretly long for something they openly reject and scorn. See the conclusion of Chapter 1 for a more detailed discussion. 266 Appendix I: The Proem of the Parekbolai on the Iliad many purposes.30 But while thus roughly making clear that the poet is highly useful, we have touched upon the fact that we have no intention to speak up for Homer. For if someone were to make this matter his aim, he will not need many arguments, but will easily bring forward the books of which some were composed concerning him [sc. Homer], others based on him, and he will easily accomplish his task. Since it has been demonstrated that the one who has laboured over Homeric poetry is not altogether ludicrous, it remains for us to get to what we intended and not to commend the poet any further, but to do what we were commissioned to do with regard to him, not by some influential figures – the sort of thing that pompous men fabricate –31 but by our dear friends, who have a somewhat high opinion about us.32 The friendly request was to go through the Iliad and provide the things useful for someone who makes his way through it. I do not mean for a learned man, for it is unlikely that any of such things escapes his notice, but for a young man who has just started to learn; and perhaps also for someone who has already learned but needs a reminder.33 The following, then, happens: the useful things are selected in good order, following the sequence [of the Iliad], not, however, so that the work contains all material provided by those who have worked on the poet – for that would be a foolish, superfluous, and not easily attainable toil, – but so that the one who wishes to learn finds the non- redundant information in good order in the right place, for instance: useful

30 Notice the wordplay on words with the stem χρη-: εἰ δὲ καὶ οἱ χρώμενοι δηλοῦσι τὸ χρηστὸν πρᾶγμα, οὐκ ἔχει ἀντιλογίαν πολύχρηστον εἶναι χρῆμα τὴν Ὁμηρικὴν ποίησιν. ἀλλ’ ὅτι μὲν εὔχρηστος ὁ ποιητής […]. 31 Cullhed (2014a: 10*-1*) suggests that this remark is directed at authors of philological works composed for influential patrons in general. See Section 1.2.1. Van der Valk’s suggestion ad loc. that this remark is directed at Tzetzes, whose Allegories of the Iliad were commissioned by the empress Eirene and later sponsored by Constantine Kotertzes, must be considered speculative, since many twelfth-century authors worked on commission. 32 In the proem of the Exegesis of the Iliad (3.1-5), Tzetzes, too, claims to have been persuaded by friends to take up the work. Similar statements commonly occur in Byzantine historiographical proems, too (see Grigoriadis 1998: 328, 332, 340). 33 On the intended users of the Parekbolai, see Section 1.2.1; Cullhed 2014a: 9*-12*. A parallel with Photios’ description of Stobaios’ anthology as providing the reader efficiently and without effort with all he needs, may point to a common topos in compilatory literature (see Phot. Bibl. 167, 115b22-31 with translation and discussion in Nilsson & Nyström 2009: 59).

Homer and Rhetoric in Byzantium 267 thoughts34 for the one who writes in prose and intends to make rhetorical ‘inweavings’35 at the right moment; methods, from which someone who wishes to imitate the poet benefits, too, and by virtue of which he admires him for his excellent technique;36 words, most of them as appropriate for prose writing, but often also austere and harsh and poetical ones;37 if someone will not explain them in a kind of etymological way, the passage that has been excerpted will not be easy to understand; gnomes, exactly through which Homeric poetry is solemn in many places;38 historical narratives, not only the ones that the poet employs according to his own rule,39 but in some places also in fuller detail, how others have related historical narratives based on the Homeric ones; furthermore, myths, some pure, ‘incurable’, and considered with regard to what is put forward only,40 but others also with an allegorical or anagogical ‘remedy’;41 and countless

34 The first three elements on the list – ‘thoughts’ (ἐννοίαι), ‘methods’ (μεθόδοι), and ‘words’ (λέξεις) – are identified in Hermogenes’ On Types of Style as the main building blocks of a speech (see esp. Id. 1.1.9.) On these elements and their relation to the types of style, see Hagedorn 1964: 19-23 and Lindberg 1977: 30-9. For a more extensive discussion of the ‘table of contents’ of the Parekbolai on the Iliad, see Section 1.2.3 and Van den Berg 2015. 35 Cf. Hermog. Id. 2.4.22: ‘inweavings’ from poetry produces pleasure in a speech. On the re-use of Homeric verses, see Nünlist 2012 and Cullhed 2014a: 39*-46*. 36 On the Homeric methods, see Chapter 2. 37 In his discussion of τραχύτης (‘harshness’), Hermogenes argues that metaphorical and austere words produce this type of style. Such words lead to obscurity, as do poetical ones, all of them being rare in common usage (Id. 1.7.14; cf. 2.12.24 on Thucydides’ style). For a similar idea, see e.g. Theon, Prog. 5, 81.8-12. 38 For Eustathios’ discussion of Homeric gnomes, see Andersen 2014: 62-114 and Cullhed 2014a: 46*-9*. The link with solemnity may betray Hermogenean influence. In Id. 1.6.10, Hermogenes argues that solemnity is produced by everything that is said in general or universal terms. Later commentators on Hermogenes refer to gnomes in particular, which are general and universal by definition. See Syrian. in Hermog. Id. 44.18-21; anon. in Hermog. Id. 977.24-7; I owe these references to Cullhed 2014a: 49*, n. 122. Ps.-Plu. Vit. Hom. 151-60 argues that Homer was the first to use apophthegmata and gnomes and demonstrates, by means of examples, how later authors re-used Homeric gnomes. 39 Eustathios considers it a typically Homeric method to weave into the basic storyline of the Iliad additional historical narratives or historical facts to accomplish various effects: see Sections 2.3.2 and 3.3.1 (i). 40 On τὸ προφερόμενον (‘what is put forward’), see n. 25 above. 41 With ‘anagogical’ Eustathios refers to ethical and natural allegorical interpretation or, in general, to allegorical interpretation that does not rationalise Homeric myth in historical terms, but 268 Appendix I: The Proem of the Parekbolai on the Iliad other good things that are useful for life.42 And [we discuss] these things not only concisely, but also in a varied manner. Thus, if someone, after going through this complete work without a grudge, would rather kindly say that the undertaking is not altogether useless, he will, I think, not lie. For instruction of the young and study of reading directed at the Homeric Iliad, this, too, could be a good thing, whether one takes the present work alone and studies it on its own or one wishes to examine this production while handling the Iliad at the same time, to see if something somewhere is relevant to it. In addition to the other things, the present work has not been spun out to one web and body in a continuous sequence,43 in order not to wear out the reader by its uninterruptedness and provide a lodging that is difficult to find,44 but every useful thing stands apart, on its own, and the transition from something that was finished off to something else is as if starting afresh. Thus, the person who goes through this work often takes rest as if lodging. We did something similar in the works on Periegetes and the Odyssey.45 For there, too, we arranged the work in a similar way: we excerpted the useful passages as in a selection in a well-organised sequence and certainly did not make the work in question into an elaborate exegesis,46 in order that nobody, disdaining the

transposes the meaning of myth to more lofty issues, such as the universe and human intellect. See Section 1.2.3. 42 Eustathios refers to the βιωφελεία of Homeric poetry in e.g. in Il. 38.27 = 1.62.11-2 (on Il. 1.43). In the proem of the Parekbolai on the Odyssey (1380.5 ed. Cullhed, with commentary in Pontani 2000: 39-40), Eustathios claims that all poetry is useful for life. 43 The expression ὕφος ἓν καὶ σῶμα may echo Ps.-Hermog. Inv. 3.8.2, where it is recommended that the ‘proofs’ (ἐπιχειρήματα) used in a speech be connected in order for ‘the speech to become one web and body’ (ὕφος ἓν ὁ λόγος γένηται καὶ σῶμα). 44 On the image of the Parekbolai as a lodging, see Section 1.1.3 and Van den Berg, forthcoming (2016). Cf. in Il. 1.13-6 = 1.1.12-6 above, where Eustathios refers to Homer’s ancient readers as guests lodging with the poet. 45 Eustathios expresses a similar idea in in Od. 1380.11-3 ed. Cullhed, as quoted and discussed in Section 1.1.3. 46 The explicit rejection of the method of exegesis may be directed at Tzetzes, who designates his exegetical work on the Iliad as ἐξήγησις. See. Tz. Ex. 3.6-7.17, esp. 7.8-10: μιᾷ πραγματείᾳ τῆς ὠφελείας χάριν τῶν νέων συντάξαι πειρώμεθα τὴν πᾶσαν ἐξήγησιν, ‘for the benefit of the young, we endeavour to bring together the entire exegesis in one work’. On this point, see also Pontani 2000: 41 for further parallels and Cullhed 2014a: 23*.

Homer and Rhetoric in Byzantium 269 work,47 sneers at us that we have accomplished nothing new. Such a person – wherever he may be now – who is not very sensible and who believes confidently that he finds things that have been said in a plain manner48 in works by others to be mentioned here, too, will say, according to the proverb, that the present work is ‘nothing sacred’.49 However, such a person must know that he judges badly, to say nothing further, associating ourselves with the proverbial Astydamas.50 But even if, perhaps, the person who holds this opinion judged correctly, we would still dedicate ourselves to our work in this way, to please, if not others, then at least those who forced us into service,51 having taken upon us the imposed burden without complaining. All things, then, that from its entrances52 wise men write as

47 See Cullhed 2014a: 23*-4* for a possible polemic between Eustathios and Tzetzes. 48 Odysseus uses the words ἀριζήλως εἰρημένα (‘things that have been said in a plain manner’) in Od. 12.453, when he breaks off his story in order not to repeat what he has told the Phaeacians the day before. 49 The proverbial expression οὐδὲν ἱερόν (‘nothing sacred’, in Il. 3.6 = 1.4.4) is included in the collections by Zenobius (5.47) and Diogenianus (7.13 ed. Leutsch), as well as in lexica by, for instance, Pausanias (ο 31) and Hesychios (ο 1563). The proverb applies to things that are considered worthless. Zenobius ascribes it to the philosopher Clearchus of Soli (fr. 66b ed. Wehrli). Karathanasis 1936: 24-5 lists further occurrences. 50 The tragic poet Astydamas (fourth century BC) became proverbial for his self-praise. The story goes that he wrote an epigram for his own statue, which was turned down by the boulē because of excessive boastfulness. See e.g. Paus. σ 6, Suda σ 161, and Zen. 5.100. In the Parekbolai on the Iliad, Eustathios repeatedly refers to the proverb. See in Il. 94.46-95.1 = 1.148.30-1 (on Il. 1.244), 121.46-122.2 = 1.188.14-6 (on Il. 1.396-8), 665.59-61 = 2.403.13-5 (on Il. 7.75), and 957.30-1 = 3.546.10-1 (on Il. 13.725). See Karathanasis 1936: 40-1 for a list of further occurrences in twelfth-century rhetorical works. 51 Cullhed (2014a: 12*) observes an allusion to Ev. Matt. 5:41: καὶ ὅστις σε ἀγγαρεύσει μίλιον ἕν, ὕπαγε μετ’ αὐτοῦ δύο, ‘and if anyone forces you to go one mile, go two miles with him’ (eds. K. Aland et al. 1975 [1966]. The Greek New Testament, third edition. Münster: United Bible Societies). This allusion ‘reinforces the projection of charity and selfless devotion to his pupils which probably reflects the ideals of his literary circle and functioned as an attribute of his persona as an author and classroom performer’. Cf. Eust. in Il. 2.18-21 = 1.3.1-5, where Eustathios claims to have produced the Parekbolai at the request of his ὁμιληταί (‘students’ and/or ‘friends’) and not of influential patrons. 52 Eustathios and Tzetzes share the metaphor of the Iliad as a building; see Cesaretti 1991: 210-1, who interprets ἐκ προθύρων (‘from its entrances’) here as a reference to the rich hermeneutic tradition preceding Eustathios. On the basis of two other occurrences of the same expression later in the Parekbolai on the Iliad (1059.50 = 3.850.5 on Il. 16.269 and 1203.13 = 4.390.11 on Il. 20.188-90), however, I would suggest that it refers to the beginning, the proem, of the Iliad itself. This 270 Appendix I: The Proem of the Parekbolai on the Iliad prefaces to the Iliad, from those things one must select, for it is not our intention to render invisible the writings of the others, nor to hunt after empty glory, nor to attract mockery for copying the works of others altogether. Only the following things must be set forth here in advance, in a very concise manner, namely that some people have completely overshadowed Homer’s poetry and, feeling ashamed, as it were, whenever the poet speaks in a human voice,53 they elevated everything and transposed it to allegory, not only whatever mythical element they came across, but also matters that are generally assumed to be historically reported – Agamemnon, Achilles, Nestor, Odysseus, the other heroes – with the result that the poet seems to speak to us in dreams.54 Others, having gone in the direction exactly opposite to the aforementioned [critics], pulled out the Homeric feathers and did not allow him to spread his wings in mid-air at all; instead, by focusing on what is apparent55 only and dragging the poet down from his anagogical height,56 they allowed nothing at all to be allegorised in his poetry, but they let the historical elements, too, be as they are – this, in fact, they did well – and at the same time prescribed that the myths not be altered into allegory.

interpretation is also suggested by Van der Valk (on in Il. 1059.50), who argues that ἐκ προθύρων is synonymous with ἐκ προοιμίων as used in in Il. 1072.39 = 3.889.19 (on Il. 16.492). 53 Eustathios uses the expression ‘to speak in a human voice’ (ἀνθρωπίνως λαλεῖν) in a similar context in the Parekbolai on Iliad 6. At the beginning of Iliad 6, he explains, Homer indicates that he will not include any divine episodes, but ‘will speak about history in a ‘flatter’ way and in a human voice, so to speak’ (πρὸς ἱστορίαν ὑπτιώτερον λαλήσει καὶ ὡς εἰπεῖν ἀνθρωπίνως), without amazing the listener with marvel tales (in Il. 621.40-5 = 2.231.18-232.5 (on Il. 6.1) as quoted and discussed in the concluding paragraph of Section 4.2). 54 Cesaretti (1991: 231) and Cullhed (2014a: 59*, n. 177) suggest that Eustathios may have the allegorical interpretation by Metrodorus of Lampsacus in mind, who interpreted gods as well as heroes in an allegorical way, as Tatian argues (or. ad Gr. 21.3); cf. Hsch. α 299 (Agamemnon = ether, according to Metrodorus). A second option suggested by Cullhed is the holistic allegoresis of Neoplatonists like Proklos (cf. e.g. Prokl. in R. 1.175.12–176.8, where Proklos interprets Helen as worldly beauty). 55 I.e. the literal meaning of myth. Cf. n. 22 above. 56 For the expression ‘to bring down from a sublime height’, cf. Str. 1.2.6, where Strabo argues that later authors ‘took down [prose] as if from a sublime height’ (κατήγαγον ὡς ἂν ἀπὸ ὕψους τινός), by making it less poetic; similarly, comedy was like tragedy at first, but now it is ‘brought down from its [i.e. tragedy’s] sublime height’ (κατ’αὐτὴν ὕψους καταβιβασθεῖσαν) to a more prosaic form. On ‘anagogical’, see n. 41 above.

Homer and Rhetoric in Byzantium 271

Among them, as will be indicated in what follows, too,57 was also Aristarchus, who has established this rule not very well. The more accurate [critics], just as they let the historical facts stand on their own, so too at first consider the myths to be such as they are told and examine their invention and the plausibility herein, through which a certain truth is reflected in myths.58 Next, because of the falsehood that is in them by nature, they [sc. the accurate critics] pass by the bodily59 representation and proceed to the remedy of myth through allegory, examining it either in terms of nature, as others demonstrate in more detail, or in terms of ethics, and in many places also in terms of history.60 For many myths are perfectly remedied with reference to history, too, because this or that event truly happened in the world we live in, yet myth forces the truth towards the more

57 Throughout the Parekbolai, Eustathios repeatedly criticises Aristarchus for depriving Homer of universal wisdom. See e.g. in Il. 561.28-34 = 2.101.13-20 (on Il. 5.395-400) and 614.5-7 = 2.215.6-8 (on Il. 5.842-4). See also Cesaretti 1991: 243-8. In in Il. 40.28-34 = 1.65.22-9 (on Il. 1.46), Eustathios argues that Aristarchus allows only ‘rhetorical allegory’, i.e. a certain type of metaphorical language. On rhetorical allegory in Eustathios, see Cesaretti 1991: 251-4. See Van der Valk 1976: LXXVII, n. 1 for references to examples in the Parekbolai on the Iliad. Nünlist (2011) explores the evidence for Aristarchus’ attitude toward allegorical interpretation and concludes that ‘[t]o picture him as a fervent and uncompromising opponent of allegory requires an inappropriately narrow understanding of the relevant evidence that takes its cue from Eustathius’ (p. 117). Aristarchus’ rejection of allegorical interpretation is also referred to in schol. D Il. 5.385. 58 Cf. Aphthonios’ definition of myth (Prog. 1.1): Ἔστι δὲ μῦθος λόγος ψευδὴς εἰκονίζων ἀλήθειαν. The same definition is found in Theon, Prog. 4, 72.28 and Ps.-Hermog. Prog. 1.1. Like Nikolaos of Myra (Prog. 1, 6.9-15), John of Sardis (in Aphth. Prog. 5.11-5) adds that it is through the plausibility in its invention that myth reflects truth. On Eustathios’ definition of myth, see Section 1.3.1. 59 Throughout the Parekbolai, Eustathios repeatedly uses σωματικός and σωματοειδής for the ‘bodily shape’ of the Homeric gods and the literal meaning of the mythical narrative. See e.g. Eust. in Il. 826.24-5 = 3.135.1-2 and 826.32= 3.135.12 (on Il. 11.1-4), as discussed in Section 4.2.1. The term σωματοειδής is occasionally found in the scholia vetera, too (e.g. in schol. bT Il. 14.344; schol. D Il. 4.439). The term σωματικός, referring to the ‘bodily shape’ of the Homeric gods and the literal meaning of the mythical narrative, occurs a few times in the D scholia (e.g. schol. D Il. 8.1 and Il. 14.434). It is more common in Christian writings and biblical exegesis, referring to the bodily appearance of Christ (see Lampe s.v. σωματικός 1; σωματικῶς 1, 7a) and the literal sense of scripture (see Lampe s.v. σωματικός 6c; σωματικῶς 10). Cesaretti (1991: 246-7) misinterprets the term and connects it with historical allegory. 60 Tzetzes discusses the types of allegory more elaborately in e.g. Ex. 43.12-44.15. On Tzetzes’ allegorical method, see Section 4.1.3 (iii). 272 Appendix I: The Proem of the Parekbolai on the Iliad marvellous.61 The present study, too, will follow this road: it will not leave the myths completely unexamined, but will investigate them to a certain extent, following the example of the ancients. Also now,62 however, it is not necessary for the one who has heard that we follow the example of the ancients also in these matters to lose interest, as if it is possible for him, too, to collect for himself such things from there [sc. ancient sources]. For first of all, exactly as there is gratitude for cooks not because they prepare things that did not prior exist,63 but because they have put together into one things that are toilsome to bring together,64 having gathered them together themselves, so too will there be some gratitude for us, because without toil the readers have at their disposal what they seek, gathered together from many sources.65 Next, – even though the statement contains something arrogant and haughty –66 I think some somewhat dull people could hardly read those works from which much of the information here provided

61 This principle underlies Eustathios’ discussion of myths throughout the Parekbolai on the Iliad. See Section 4.2.1. 62 Cf. Eust. in Il. 3.2-8 = 1.3.35-4.6 above. 63 Eustathios may allude to Diotima’s definition of ‘poetry’ (ποίησις) in Plato’s Symposium (205b8- 206c1): οἶσθ᾿ ὅτι ποίησίς ἐστί τι πολύ· ἡ γάρ τοι ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος εἰς τὸ ὂν ἰόντι ὁτῳοῦν αἰτία πᾶσά ἐστι ποίησις, ὥστε καὶ αἱ ὑπὸ πάσαις ταῖς τέχναις ἐργασίαι ποιήσεις εἰσὶ καὶ οἱ τούτων δημιουργοὶ πάντες ποιηταί. ‘[Y]ou know that poetry is more than a single thing. For creation or poetry is the whole cause for anything whatever that passes from not being into being; so that the productions of all arts are kinds of poetry, and their craftsmen are all poets (transl. W.R.M. Lamb. 1925. Plato: Lysis, Symposium, Gorgias. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, adapted).’ See Section 1.1.3. 64 Eustathios’ formulation may echo E. Or. 1640: Ἕλληνας εἰς ἓν καὶ Φρύγας συνήγαγον, ‘[the gods] brought Greeks and Phrygians to one place’, with the Trojan War as the result. On the culinary metaphor, see Section 1.1.3 and Van den Berg, forthcoming (2016). 65 Tzetzes makes a similar point in. All. Il. prol. 478-87 and 493-4: his work presents his readers with the knowledge of hundreds of books in an abbreviated form so that they can learn everything effortlessly. 66 Cf. Suda γ 78 and τ 597 (= Eun. fr. 70 FGH 4.44-5): ὁ δὲ γαῦρός τε ὢν ἀνὴρ καὶ ἀγέρωχος καὶ στρατείαις ὡμιληκώς, ‘being a haughty and arrogant man and habituated to military campaigns’ (about Timasius, a general and, later, consul under emperor Theodosius). In a positive sense, the same words occur in Plutarch’s Life of Marcellus, who is said to ‘display much impetuosity and high-spiritedness in battles’ (πολὺ τὸ γαῦρον καὶ ἀγέρωχον ἐπιφαίνων ἐν τοῖς ἀγῶσι, Plu. Marc. 1.2-3 ed. K. Ziegler. 1994. Plutarchus: Vitae Parallelae, vol. 2.2: 105-51. Leipzig: Teubner) and, moreover, to be interested in Greek paideia. The latter parallel may render Eustathios’ words (deliberately) ambiguous.

Homer and Rhetoric in Byzantium 273 has been collected. But if in various places something has been invented in addition, it will, they say, be self-evident.67 Since we investigate a great poet, one must examine such a noun and note that, just as in general ἔπος means ‘word’, like ‘winged words’,68 and ‘metrical expression’ in particular, so too does ποιεῖν mean ‘to do’ in general.69 This usage can be found in many places in the poet, too,70 but, in its specific sense, the word is also used with regard to those who recite poems in particular because of the distinction of this practice in them as if divine and endowed with reason. Hence, having combined ‘metrical expression’ and ‘to act as a rhapsode’, some people gave the compound name ‘epic poets’ to those who, in all simplicity, are also called ‘poets’, and especially to those who write epic poems in hexameter.71 One Phemonoe, a priestess of Apollo, is said to have been the first of them, having invented, they say, the epic poem herself first,72 which, according to the ancients, was called thus not only because of a superiority, through which the hexameter appropriated the common name for ‘word’,73 but also because the matters, they say, ‘follow’ the oracles.74 If such an etymology requires the word ἔπος to be aspirated, it is nevertheless possible to plausibly advocate its unaspirated pronunciation, too, if one would like to do so. What epic poetry is and that also

67 See Section 1.3.1: αὐτό δείξει is a proverbial expression with its origin in Plato’s Theaetetus 200e7- 201a2 (cf. schol. Pl. Tht. 200e). For further references, see Kambylis 1991: 104, n. 374. 68 E.g. Il. 1.201, 2.7, 4.69: ἔπεα πτερόεντα. 69 The same distinction between ἔπος in its general sense (λόγος) and its specific sense (ἔμμετρος λόγος) is found in e.g. schol. D.T. 173.19-20, 307.37-8, 308.5-6, 476.15-6; EM 367.56-7; Suda ε 2816. 70 E.g. Il. 6.56 with explanation in Eust. in Il. 624.43-4 = 2.242.18-9: Τὸ δὲ πεποίηται φανερῶς εἴρηται ἀντὶ τοῦ πέπρακται. 71 Cf. Suda ε 2811. On the terms ἐποποιός and ποιητής in antiquity, see also Ford 2002: 131-9 and Graziosi 2002: 41-9. 72 Phemonoe is mentioned as the inventor of hexametric poetry in EM 327.52-3. Pausanias (10.5.7) mentions Phemonoe as the first to use the hexameter, as does Tzetzes (Ex. 70.12-3). See also Parke & Wormell 1956, vol. 1: 33-4; 36. 73 The same point, i.e. that hexametric discourse as discourse par excellence appropriated the common name for ‘word’, is made in EM 327.55-7 (excerpting Prokl. Chr. 14) and schol. D.T. 21.6- 9, 308.5-6. 74 This etymology is found in e.g. EM 327.54 (excerpting Prokl. Chr. 13) and Tz. Ex. 70.14-5. With a slight difference: schol. D.T. 173.26 = 308.11-2 = 476.25 (Ἔπος δὲ παρὰ τὸ ἕπεσθαι τῷ μέτρῳ); schol. D.T. 476.16-7 (ἔπος δὲ νῦν λέγει τὸν δακτυλικὸν στίχον παρὰ τὸ ἕπεσθαι τοὺς πόδας ἀλλήλοις). 274 Appendix I: The Proem of the Parekbolai on the Iliad this is a type of poetry, just as tragedy and comedy and dithyrambs75 and lyric etc., one must seek in works by others. And ‘to do’ became used in this way, from which both ‘poet’ and ‘poetry’ [are derived]. It is clear that ‘to do’ in the works of ancient authors, as also the Comic poet indicates, means to sing and write in a poetical, i.e. metrical, way,76 such as ‘did you once make, Euripides’ [Ar. Th. 913] instead of ‘did you write in your poetry’. Accordingly, the one who writes in this way is a poet, whatever kind of poet he may be,77 whether he is a comic poet or whatever other kind of poet, but Homer par excellence. For just as, whenever someone says ‘the orator’, especially Demosthenes was immediately understood, and whenever we have heard ‘the lyric poet’, we interpret it as Pindar, so too, upon hearing ‘the poet’ with the article, one would understand Homer.78 Why? Because every virtue of poetry is present in his work and because, in sum, he was the beginning and a teacher for all poets of being what they are called. Let us leave this at that, lest we wander from our goal any further. We will not investigate thoroughly the very origin of Homer. For it has been discussed by many others, so that we could not discuss it any better;79 except, then, en passant only the following must be said, that, since the poet concealed himself and suppressed who he was, when he lived, and where he was from, he became fought over quite a lot and [became] a man with many

75 Cf. Ar. Av. 917-8: μέλη […] κύκλιά (with commentary in N. Dunbar. 1995. Aristophanes: Birds. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 531, on Av. 918-9). 76 Cf. Et. Gud. π 475.51-3 (ed. F.W. Sturz. 1818. Etymologicum Graecae linguae Gudianum et alia grammaticorum scripta e codicibus manuscriptis nunc primum edita. Leipzig: Weigel). In in Il. 624.44 = 2.242.19-20 (on Il. 6.56) and 1358.45 = 4.931.11-2 (on Il. 24.449) Eustathios again argues that ποιεῖν can mean ‘to write or speak in a poetical manner’. 77 In Po. 1447b13-23, Aristotle protests against the use of the word ‘poet’ for any author writing in metre. 78 Cf. EM 328.1-2 (excerpting Prokl. Chr. 14, ed. A. Severyns. 1977. Recherches sur la Chrestomathie de Proclos, vol. 2. Paris: Les Belles Lettres). Eustathios refers to a common practice in twelfth- century literature. See e.g. Eust. Ep. 5.5, Ann. Komn. 2.4.6, and M. Chon. Ep. 113.100. On Homer as ‘The Poet’ in antiquity, see A.M. Harmon. 1923. The Poet ΚΑΤ’ ΕΞΟΧΗΝ. Classical Philology 18(1): 35-47. 79 For ancient views on Homer’s place of origin, see Graziosi 2002: 79-86; for various accounts of Homer’s biography in twelfth-century literature, see Basilikopoulou-Ioannidou 1971-1972: 115-8. Tzetzes’ Exegesis of the Iliad opens with a long discussion of the historical person of Homer.

Homer and Rhetoric in Byzantium 275 fatherlands.80 In accordance with the desire of those who long for [him], he is from Ionia and Smyrna81 and Athens82 and Egypt,83 and from Italy as well. The Chians, too, lay claim to him,84 adducing as evidence the so-called ‘Homerids’,85 whom Pindar also mentions [N. 2.1]. Many others also pretend to Homer, appropriating him and priding themselves to have him as a citizen or to be exalted with other good things. That there were other poets before him, too, among whom also was Musaeus,86 who wrote down cures for diseases,87 and that, as Aelian relates [VH 14.21], after Orpheus and Musaeus Suagrus was a poet, too,88 who was the first to sing of the Trojan War, also this must be said so far. And [it must be said] that Homer breathed forth the epics89 and thus had a share of the inquisitive and melodic Muse,90 unlike others who write prose in a simple style, as Herodotus also relates in his writings on Homer.91 And that there were many

80 Tzetzes discusses the various options in Ex. 9.6-11.3; in All. Il. prol. 53-8, Tzetzes argues that seven places claim to be Homer’s fatherland, but that the truth is that Homer is from Smyrna. The many cities claiming to be Homer’s fatherland are also listed in e.g. Certamen 7-43 and Suda ο 251. 81 Tz. Ex. 10.9-10; Tz. All. Il. prol. 58; Prodr. Rhodante & Dosikles, 5.96 (ed. F. Conca. 1994. Il romanzo bizantino del XII secolo, 63-303. Turin: Unione tipografico-editrice torinese). 82 For references to texts in which Homer is said to be Athenian, see T. Hedberg. 1935. Eustathios als Attizist. Uppsala: Almquist och Wiksell, 8-9. 83 Hld. Aethiopica 2.34.5, 3.13-4, Tz. Ex. 9.13-4, Eust. in Od. 1379.64-1380.1 ed. Cullhed and 1713.17-26 = 2.11.19-28 (on Od. 12.65). 84 Theoc. 7.47, h. Ap. 172. 85 On the Homerids, see also Suda ο 248; Graziosi 2002: 208-17. 86 See e.g. Ar. Ra. 1030-6 (Orpheus – Musaeus – Hesiod – Homer). The same four poets are mentioned in Pl. Ap. 41a6-7. On Musaeus, see also Suda μ 1294; on Orpheus, Suda ο 654. 87 Cf. Ar. Ra. 1033. 88 In his edition of Aelian’s Varia Historia, Dilts reads Οἴαγρος (M.R. Dilts. 1974. Claudius Aelianus: Varia Historia. Leipzig: Teubner); in his app. crit. Dilts notes that some manuscripts and Eustathios read σύαγρος. Oiagros was usually identified as the father of Orpheus (see e.g. Suda ο 251; ο 654). Eustathios discusses the etymology and occurrences of the word σύαγρος in in Od. 1872.12-3 = 2.211.21-3 (on Od. 19.439). 89 Cf. Hes. Th. 31-2: ἐνέπνευσαν δέ μοι αὐδὴν θέσπιν, ‘they [sc. the Muses] breathed prophetic song into me’ (ed. F. Solmsen. 1990. Hesiodi Theogonia, Opera et dies, Scutum, third edition. Oxford: Clarendon Press). For ancient ideas on poetic inspiration, see e.g. P. Murray 1981. 90 For Eustathios’ ideas on the relationship between Homer and the Muse(s), see Section 4.3.2. 91 The reference may be to Ps.-Hdt. Vit. Hom. 5.48-50, where Ps.-Herodotus relates that Homer as a boy was talented by nature and stood out among his peers, or to 27.372-4 and 36.512-4, where it is related that Homer was widely renowned for his poetry. 276 Appendix I: The Proem of the Parekbolai on the Iliad

Homers,92 also this was related by others; and that the man in question has been named either after ‘to not see’, because he was μήορος, as it were, and with a transposition of letters Ὅμηρος,93 or because Homer became exactly that what the name indicates, just as those who, as we know, are given as pledge for peace, this is discussed by others in detail, too. They say that hostages for peace are given this name from ‘together’ and ἀρῶ, ‘to unite’: for those who stand apart from and are at variance with one another are united in concord through the hostages.94 The use of such a word occurs in many other authors and in Euripides in ‘seize her as a hostage’ [Or. 1189]. And whether there also are other poems by Homer, such as the Margites and The Battle of the Mice and the Frogs,95 others have also examined this with precision, as well as the question whether the Iliad has been composed before the Odyssey or vice versa.96 And whether Homer competed with Hesiod of Ascra and was defeated, as the Homerids, too, mention with hesitation,97 one

92 The Suda lexicon has two entries on Homers different than The Poet (ο 253 and 254). See also Ps.-Hdt. Vit. Hom. 13.160-2: the council of Cyme refused to support Melesigenes (as Homer was called before he became blind) because they cannot support all ὅμηροι (‘blind people’). 93 This etymology is found e.g. in Ps.-Hdt. Vit. Hom. 13.162-6 and EM. 623.47-50. 94 This etymology is mentioned e.g. in Suda ο 251 and EM 623.51-3. For ancient views on the etymology of Homer’s name, see also Graziosi 2002: 79-82. Tzetzes, too, mentions both etymologies, but dismisses the one based on Homer’s alleged blindness as unacceptable (Ex. 55.13- 56.5). 95 Ps.-Herodotus mentions various works by Homer: the Lesser Iliad (Vit. Hom. 16.203), Phocais (16.209), Cercopes, Battle of Frogs, Battle of Starlings, Heptapaktike, Epikichlides as well as other playful poems (24.332-5), Iliad, and Odyssey (26.346-28.398). Tzetzes gives a list of thirteen works by Homer in All. Il. prol. 78-85. Cf. Ex. 56.6-10. Graziosi 2002: 166-7, n. 7 lists references to other texts in which Homer is considered the author of poems other than the Iliad and the Odyssey. On Homer’s authorship of the Margites, see also Graziosi 2002: 66-72. 96 Ps.-Longinus (9.11-3), for instance, argues that Homer wrote the Iliad at the peak of his career, whereas the Odyssey shows signs of old age and waning talent. He designates the latter poem as no more than an epilogue to the Iliad. Eustathios seems to assume that the Iliad is older than the Odyssey, when he suggests that the Odyssey was made of ‘the leftovers of the Iliad’ (τὰ τῆς Ἰλιάδος ἐλλείμματα, in Od. 1380.10 ed. Cullhed). 97 Throughout the Parekbolai on the Iliad, the word ‘Homerids’ has a broader meaning than the Homerids of Chios (see in Il. 4.23 = 1.6.10 and n. 85 above). In its more general sense, it refers to readers (including commentators) and admirers of Homer. See e.g. Eust. in Il. 262.2 = 1.399.9 (on Il. 2.493), 662.61 = 2.390.20 (on Il. 7.58-61), 1356.20 = 4.923.22 (on Il. 24.410-5). Tzetzes uses ‘Homerids’ in the same sense in e.g. Ex. 3.3. Cf. Tz. Ex. 20.5-6, where Tzetzes announces to call

Homer and Rhetoric in Byzantium 277 must seek this in the works of those who have written on this subject,98 in which also the terms of the competition are set forth. The same holds for the question whether he happened to live in the time of the Trojan War or rather after the Trojan War.99 For if someone will carefully distinguish between all these matters, a loquacious history book will be composed. This is not our goal, but rather that what we have set forth earlier, too.100 Furthermore, it is necessary to notice also the following in advance, which already pertains to and calls forth the object of the Parekbolai, namely that the Iliad is manly, and more solemn,101 and has sublimity,102 since it is more heroic, too; but the Odyssey is rich in character, as has been written there more clearly.103 And [it is necessary to notice in advance] that it is not possible to observe the Homeric vigour as much in the Iliad as in the Odyssey.104 For here [sc. in the Iliad] are many starting points for an abundance of

everyone acquainted with the Homeric epics Homer’s children, and presents himself as Homer’s ‘model child’ (see Cullhed 2014b: 59-61). 98 The contest between Homer and Hesiod is narrated in the Certamen. On this text, see Graziosi 2002: 165-80 (with references to the Certamen in ancient texts and modern scholarship). 99 Ps.-Herodotus (Vit. Hom. 38.539-553) calculates that Homer was born 168 years after the Trojan War. For more ancient views on Homer’s date, see Graziosi 2002: 90-124. The question of Homer’s date is also addressed in the Suda’s entry on Homer (ο 251). Eustathios infers from several passages in the Iliad that Homer must have lived after the Trojan War. See e.g. Eust. in Il. 549.43 = 2.78.1-2 (on Il. 5.304), 888.59-60 = 3.341.12-3 (on Il. 12.4-33), 910.51-2 = 3.409.11-2 (on Il. 12.383), and 986.16-7 = 3.642.17-9 (on Il. 14.287). Tzetzes expresses a similar view in Ex. 39.11-4. 100 For the intended users, the ‘table of contents’, and the layout of the Parekbolai, see Eust. in Il. 2.17-3.1 = 1.3.1-34 (with discussion in Sections 1.2.1 and 1.2.3). 101 Σεμνότης (‘solemnity’) is one of the Hermogenean types of style. See Hermog. Id. 1.6. On solemnity in Hermogenes and Eustathios, see Lindberg 1977: 200-10; on solemnity in Byzantine rhetoric, see Kustas 1973: 127-58. 102 On ‘sublimity’ (ὕψος), see esp. Ps.-Longinus’ treatise On the Sublime. 103 I.e. in the Parekbolai on the Odyssey. See Eust. in Od. 1379.40-2 ed. Cullhed (with discussion in Pontani 2000: 27-8 and Cullhed 2014a: 55*-6*). A similar distinction between the Iliad and Odyssey is found in Arist. Po. 1459b13-6, Ps.-Longin. 9.11-5 (with discussion in Bühler 1964: 47-8 and 74-6), Heraclit. All. 60.2. On the meaning of ἠθικός in Eustathios’ Parekbolai, see Van der Valk 1971: XCV- C. On Eustathios’ rhetorical characterisation of Iliad and Odyssey, see also Section 1.2.2. 104 Van der Valk’s note ad loc., arguing that Tzetzes, too, prefers the Odyssey over the Iliad, is based on an misinterpretation of Ex. 43.4-9, where Tzetzes argues that the subject matter of both Homeric poems is twofold, being mythical on the one hand and scientific and philosophical on the other, and does not discuss a difference between the respective poems. 278 Appendix I: The Proem of the Parekbolai on the Iliad oratory, but there [sc. in the Odyssey] the scope of the book is very meagre and has little matter altogether.105 Nevertheless, the poet was strong enough to produce a book, one so great and the other one of such a kind, showing that he is very rich and very ambitious both in his writings with abundant material and in the ones that are not such. Therefore, he called that book after one character, Odysseus, hinting at the small amount of material to write about, as if he, apparently, would only tell the things about Odysseus, even though he also wove in many other things besides, following his own method.106 This book he more comprehensively called Iliad and it was neither called after one person, e.g. Achilleid or something similar, nor after the Ilians, as if, of course, comprising the misery of the Ilians only, but [it is called Iliad] because it comprises the events that happened in relation to Ilium, i.e. the Trojan War.107 But if some exert themselves to show that, as if after an affected character, in this case the Ilian people of course, this poem is called Iliad,108 from which practice the tragic poets after Homer and others have benefited and often entitle their plays after the affected characters, such people are immediately refuted both for other reasons and because, here, the poet does not simply tell about the Ilians what they endured; he indeed tells this, too, but the aim of his book, as he himself also sets forth in its proem, is to tell how much misery both the Trojans and the Greeks, and especially the Greeks, suffered during the period of Achilles’ wrath. Therefore, when calling Achilles’ wrath ‘accursed’ [Il. 1.2], he adds ‘which brought countless sorrows upon the Achaeans’ [Il. 1.2], almost saying that such a wrath became destructive because, as a result of it, the Achaeans suffered according to

105 Eustathios expresses the same idea in the proem of the Parekbolai on the Odyssey. See Eust. in Od. 1379.42-8 ed. Cullhed (with discussion in Pontani 2000: 28 and Cullhed 2014a: 54*-5*). This view is found in the scholia vetera, too. See Buhler 1964: 46-7 for examples. Similarly, in Po. 1455b15- 23, Aristotle argues that the story of the Odyssey is rather short; the poet has expanded his poem with additional episodes. The word ὀλιγόϋλος is an Eustathian hapax. 106 On this Homeric method, see Section 2.2.1. 107 Schol. bT Il. 1.1b explains that the Iliad is not called Achilleid because, even if Achilles excelled all others, other heroes, too, enjoyed successes. Eustathios expresses a similar idea in in Il. 14.25- 44 = 1.23.27-24.8 (on Il. 1.1) as quoted in Section 2.2.1. See also Tz. Ex. 73.10-4. 108 This explanation of the title Iliad is found in Tz. Ex. 67.12-3.

Homer and Rhetoric in Byzantium 279 a certain destiny, as will be indicated in what follows.109 For these reasons, this book is called Iliad. Such a word appears to be a possessive and to be used elliptically. For just as a spear110 and land [E. Hec. 940-1] and Troy [E. Hec. 922] and a battle [Theoc. 22.220] and a look-out place [E. Hec. 931] are ‘of Ilium’ in the works of the tragedians instead of ‘Ilian’, i.e. Trojan, so too, here, ‘of Ilium’, a book of course, is ‘Ilian poem’ or ‘Ilian story’. The same holds for Ionic. For this, too, is used elliptically, indicating that a dialect is Ionic. Notice here also that saying ‘the Iliad by Homer’ is the same as ‘the Trojan matters by Homer’ and, in tragic style, ‘the Ilian battle’ can be the same as ‘the Trojan War’. But one must now certainly undertake what this work was written for, lest we hear from some place or other that we are dealing with superfluous subtleties when we should not.

109 In in Il. 20.5-10 = 1.33.5-11 (on Il. 1.5), Eustathios argues that Homer absolved his protagonist from blame by showing that it was the plan of Zeus rather than the wrath of Achilles that caused so much misery. Numerous times throughout the Parekbolai, Eustathios interprets Zeus as an allegory of ‘destiny’ (εἱμαρμένη). See e.g. in Il. 20.10-1 = 1.33.11-3 (on Il. 1.5) and in Il. 695.1-3 = 2.514.22- 5 (on Il. 8.27). In ancient allegoresis, too, Zeus is interpreted as destiny. See e.g. schol. bT Il. 8.69, schol. T Il. 17.409a1. This interpretation is also frequent in Tzetzes’ Allegories. See e.g. All. Il. 2.83, 3.133-4, and 9.14. 110 Van der Valk ad loc. suggests that Eustathios may be mistaken and have S. Tr. 1058 (λόγχη πεδιάς, ‘spearmen of the plane’) in mind. Another, in my view more likely, option is that he refers to E. Hec. 102: τῆς Ἰλιάδος, λόγχης αἰχμῆι, ‘[being expelled] from the city of Ilium, by the point of a spear’.

281

Appendix II: Eustathios on Similes (in Il. 176.20-178.1 = 1.270.23-272.35 on Il. 2.87-93)

The poet, seasoning his poetry with many spices, has also the simile as one of such good things, by means of which he accomplishes many beautiful things.1 For by means of the simile in many places he sets forth properties of animals and various kinds of information on natural phenomena, as will be indicated in what follows.2 And in general, in the poet’s writings the simile is not only a philosophical matter,3 but also teaches matters that happen every day and produces enargeia4 and yields much experience. One of its functions is also to teach in a clear way the underlying matters, for which it has been used. For the person who hears that Hector was very eager to withstand Achilles, and when he, next, has heard the poet say that as a serpent of the mountain awaits a man, having fed on evil herbs, and dread wrath has entered into him [Il. 22.93-4], so Hector with unquenchable might did not give ground [Il. 22.96], he was surely taught together with the information about the serpent also the great eagerness of Hector. A simile, then, is a thought that confirms the things that are told on the basis of matters that happen every day or an expression that teaches and confirms the underlying matter on the basis of things that always tend to happen. It is called παραβολή, because it provides a parallel with the things that are told, i.e. compares to [them] and places beside [them] a familiar matter that always tends to happen, which by all means should be more familiar than the matter for which it has been used. For the unfamiliar and unusual is a defect of a simile, for which Choerilus’ similes are reproached,5 because such a simile is not useful for teaching. And [the simile] is

1 For the simile as a ‘spice’ of Homeric poetry and its functions, see esp. Section 2.3.3. 2 See e.g. Eust. in Il. 472.7-12 = 1.746.11-7 (on Il. 4.275-81), 497.30-4 = 1.788.16-21 (on Il. 4.452-6), 856.49- 53 = 3.234.13-9 (on Il. 11.473-84), and 1058.44-8 = 3.846.27-847.6 (on Il. 16.259-67). 3 Cf. Eust. in Il. 1065.42 = 3.867.12-3 (on Il. 16.384-93). 4 For enargeia in Eustathios’ Parekbolai on the Iliad, see Section 3.3.3. 5 The reference is to the epic poet Choerilus of Samos (fifth century BC). Choerilus’ similes are disapproved of by Aristotle, who recommends the use of similes for the sake of clarity in the Topica: Εἰς δὲ σαφήνειαν παραδείγματα καὶ παραβολὰς οἰστέον, παραδείγματα δὲ οἰκεῖα καὶ ἐξ ὧν ἴσμεν, οἷα Ὅμηρος, μὴ οἷα Χοιρίλος· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν σαφέστερον εἴη τὸ προτεινόμενον (157a14-7). ‘For clarity examples and similes must be adduced, and the examples [should be] suitable and drawn from 282 Appendix II: Eustathios on Similes taken from everything, whether rational or without reason, alive or lifeless, as will be indicated in numerous places. In general, it is marked by the adverbs of comparison that are attached to them. Some of these adverbs are common, such as ὡς, ὥσπερ, καθάπερ; others are poetic, such as εὖτε, ἠΰ, ἠΰτε, anyone of which means ‘just as’.6 Sometimes a simile can also occur without them, for instance if someone, speaking of a duel, and then wishing to use a simile, will say the following: in this way animals fight too, a lion, perhaps, and a boar doing this and that. Or in another way: ‘the story goes that a lion and a boar fighting with each another also did this and that’. Or: ‘once I saw a lion and a boar doing this and that’ or ‘neither a lion nor a boar will join such a battle, doing this and that’. Such then, to summarise, is the simile, about which the necessary things will be said in many other places too. One must also know that, in general, the simile precedes the corresponding clause,7 for instance: just as this happens, so does that. But sometimes the opposite also occurs, for instance: this certain thing was brought about in this way, just as whenever this certain thing happens. And [one must know] that some similes are without a corresponding clause,8 for instance when someone would say that certain people fought like animals doing certain kinds of things; others are with a corresponding clause, for instance when someone would say that, just as when fighting animals bring about these certain things, ὧς or οὕτω [‘so’] too were these people doing these things. For such a simile has been completed in ὧς and in οὕτως. The same holds for the rest too. Such a simile is also the poet’s simile here, where he wishes to teach the onrush of the Achaeans to what we know, as Homer does, not as Choerilus does.’ In his commentary on Aristotle’s Topica, Alexander of Aphrodisias explains: ἐναργεῖς γὰρ καὶ διὰ γνωρίμων αἱ παρ’ Ὁμήρῳ παραβολαί· οὐ τοιαῦται δὲ αἱ Χοιρίλου (533.13-4). ‘For the similes in Homer are also clear because of familiar things; but those of Choerilus are not such.’ 6 Eustathios discusses common and poetic adverbs of comparison in more detail in in Il. 117.34-44 = 1.182.15-26 (on Il. 1.359). 7 Eustathios’ use of ἀνταπόδοσις corresponds to the use of the term in the scholia vetera. Nünlist (2009a: 283) explains: ‘Parallel passages demonstrate that ἀνταπόδοσις here [i.e. in schol. A Il. 2.139b] designates the part, usually beginning with ὥς (‘so, thus’), by which the Homeric narrator returns from the simile to the narrative.’ While Nünlist translates ἀνταπόδοσις as ‘So-Stück’, I have chosen for the more general ‘corresponding clause’ (cf. Nünlist 2009a: 370). The order of simile and corresponding clause is also discussed in e.g. schol. A Il. 2.207-10. 8 Eustathios seems to use ἀνταπόδοσις and ἀπόδοσις without distinction for the corresponding clause or ‘So-Stück’ of similes.

Homer and Rhetoric in Byzantium 283 the place of assembly with a simile and compares them with bees and speaks as follows: ‘just as tribes of swarming bees emerge from a hollow rock, constantly coming on afresh, and in clusters over the flowers of spring fly in throngs, some πεποτήαται’, i.e. ‘fly’ in the Ionic dialect, as will be said a little later,9 ‘here, some there, so from the ships and huts marched out in companies their many tribes to the place of assembly [Il. 2.87-93]’. And such a simile indicates and teaches the movement of the Greeks from a thing that is familiar and usually happens all the time. For he says that, just as the bees fly in clusters, emerging from a hollow rock, i.e. a certain cave probably in the mountains, many at the same time and close- packed, fly in clusters, so too did the Greeks go to assembly in companies. For the poet’s simile applies to only this and not to the entire matter.10 For here the entire simile cannot apply to the entire matter. For the tribes of the bees, emerging from one rock, disperse themselves among the flowers; but the Greeks, by contrast, emerging from many tents and ships, made their way to one place, the place of assembly, so that in this respect the simile is opposite and dissimilar to the matter. Here, then, the poet used the simile for one aspect only, in order to show that, just as the bees are many and [move] in clusters, in the same way the Greeks are many and [move] in companies. But if the bees [emerge] from a rock, and the Greeks from the tents, the poet does not take this into account. For it is necessary to know that not many similes will be found in his poetry that in their entirety are completely reconciled with the underlying matters,11 but in general the larger part of the elaboration of the simile is useless for the poet. Sometimes even a contradiction with the matter is found, and a small part from the simile is reconciled with the matter.12 For such is the poet’s method in the similes. He brings forth some of the similes in a very concise and simple way, for instance when he says that Thetis emerged from the sea ‘like a mist’ [Il. 1.359]. For ‘like a

9 Eust. in Il. 234.20 = 1.356.8-9 (on Il. 2.340). 10 Throughout the Parekbolai, Eustathios repeatedly discusses the correspondence of simile and narrative. See e.g. in Il. 253.44-254.2 = 1.386.27-31 (on Il. 2.455-8), 395.44-396.1 = 1.623.4-7 (on Il. 3.150- 3), and 1058.50-3 = 3.847.8-12 (on Il. 16.259-67). For the views of ancient scholiasts on the correspondence of simile and narrative, see Nünlist 2009a: 288-9. 11 Eustathios uses similar terminology (συμβιβάζω, τὰ ὑποκείμενα, etc.) for myths: its allegorical meaning needs to be reconciled with the subject matter of the mythical narrative. On this ‘reconciliation’ or correspondence of allegorical meaning and mythical narrative, see Section 4.4.1. 12 See e.g. Eust. in Il. 856.40-3 = 3.233.32-234.4 (on Il. 11.473-84). 284 Appendix II: Eustathios on Similes mist’ is a simile.13 Such is also ‘like birds’ [Il. 3.2] and ‘like wolves they leapt’ [Il. 4.471-2]. Others he puts forth in detail, in an elaborate way – they narrate in full the whole matter for the sake of information, as it usually happens – but he leaves it to the listener to select the elements of the simile that are useful for the matter, and to let the rest be there for the completeness of the narrative of the simile. In this way, then, while the present simile contains the facts that the bees emerge from a rock and that they fly and that [they fly] over spring flowers and that some [fly] here, others there, and that they fly in clusters, and only this last element from the simile is useful for the matter. For just as they [move] in clusters, so [do] the Greeks [move] in companies, because it is the same that the bees were gathered together in clusters and that the Greeks rush in companies, i.e. in phalanxes and in companies.14 For both ‘in clusters’ and ‘in companies’ indicate a gathering of a crowd and both are adverbs of quality. Perhaps the fact that they fly in throngs, too, i.e. in herds, is useful for the simile. For to fly in throngs is similar to ‘in clusters’ and ‘in companies’. All the other things of the simile are beautiful and complete with a view to the information about the bees, but they are altogether useless with regard to the matter. For neither do the Greeks [emerge] from a rock, nor do they fly, nor [do they fly] over flowers, nor do some [fly] here, others there. One must, in fact, also keep this observation in mind in the case of the elaborate similes that follow. For, as has been said,15 an entire simile seldom applies to the matter completely. These things are thus. Such is, in detail, the simile in question.

13 Nünlist (2009a: 284-6) observes in the scholia vetera a tendency to reserve the term παραβολή for extended similes with an ἀνταπόδοσις. Eustathios, conversely, uses the term both for elaborate similes and for short similes or comparisons without ἀνταπόδοσις or corresponding clause. 14 φαλαγγηδόν: cf. schol. A bT Il. 2.87a; ἰλαδόν = κατὰ ἴλας: cf. schol. D Il. 2.93. 15 Eust. in Il. 177.24-8 = 1.272.8-12 (on Il. 2.87-93).

285

Appendix III: Eustathios on Muse-Invocations (in Il. 9.31-11.20 = 1.15.21-18.23 on Il. 1.1)

In ‘sing, goddess’ the poet calls the knowledge in his own soul a goddess,1 exalting the story in a more marvellous way. For knowledge is something divine, as is the soul, too, yet surely not a goddess. In general, poetry ascribes everything that is extraordinary and surprising and remarkable and miraculous or even marvellous to a divine race and to a god.2 Here, it is the same to say ‘goddess’ and ‘Muse’: the former [is derived] from ‘to run’ and the velocity of knowledge, the latter from μῶ, I inquire.3 For knowledge, too, inquires and is the result of inquiry, if indeed difficulty of inquiry is the mother of an abundance of knowledge according to the wise men.4 The poet commands this goddess, the Muse, his own knowledge to sing of Achilles’ wrath, encouraging his domestic art, as it were, or his beloved heart, according to Pindar [O. 1.4], and kindling the spark of philosophy in him.5 Pindar does the opposite of this in ‘a Muse has sent me forth’,6 i.e. persuaded me. For he did not persuade the Muse, but she persuaded him. In a certain way, the lyric poetess Sappho also uses the Homeric figure and commands her lyre: ‘come

1 On the Muse as the poet’s knowledge, see Section 4.3.2. 2 For the poetic custom of explaining marvellous etc. matters in terms of the gods, see Sections 1.3.1 and 4.2.1. 3 The etymology of θεός - θέειν is found in e.g. EM 445.42-3; cf. Corn. ND 1, 2.13-6. The etymology of Μοῦσα - μῶ is also found in e.g. EM 589.41-2. Cf. Corn. ND. 14, 14.7-8: Μοῦσα derives from μῶσις (‘searching’). 4 The reference seems to be to Psellos’ Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics 4.1.18-9: ἡ γὰρ ἀπορία μήτηρ εὐπορίας ἐστί, ‘for difficulty is the mother of abundance’. Psellos’ comment concerns Arist. Ph. 208a34-b1: ἔτι δ’ οὐδ’ ἔχομεν οὐδὲν παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων οὔτε προηπορημένον οὔτε προηυπορημένον περὶ αὐτοῦ, ‘moreover, we have nothing at all that has been stated as a difficulty or has been solved by others before us on this topic’. Cf. Arist. Metaph. 995a28-9, where Aristotle defines εὐπορία as ‘the solution of earlier defined problems’ (λύσις τῶν πρότερον ἀπορουμένων). The process of acquiring knowledge through inquiry, and of reaching ‘abundance’ (εὐπορία) through ‘difficulty’ (ἀπορία) is described in similar terms by Proklos in his Commentary on Plato’s Alcibiades I (235.23-236.8). 5 Cf. Porph. VP 57, 49.20-1, where Archippus and Lysis are said to have saved ‘sparks of philosophy’ (ζώπυρα τῆς φιλοσοφίας); Clem. Al. Paed. 2.1.18.1: Πλάτων τὸ ἔναυσμα τῆς Ἑβραϊκῆς φιλοσοφίας ζωπυρῶν, ‘Plato, kindling the spark of Hebrew philosophy’. 6 Pi. fr. 151. 286 Appendix III: Eustathios on Muse-Invocations on, noble lyre, be endowed with speech’.7 The comic poet, too, somewhere says ‘o soul, invent some ribald trick’ [Ar. Eq. 1194]. Many others, too, have taken delight in this Homeric figure. For not only does Hesiod begin with the invocation of the Muses [Op. 1-2], but also Antimachus, in emulation of Homer, says ‘tell, daughters of the great Zeus, son of Kronos’.8 And Pindar, the ‘muse-maker’ according to the proclamation concerning him,9 says ‘speak your prophesy, Muse; and I will be your interpreter’.10 But Stesichorus, too, [uses the Homeric figure] in ‘come on, clear-voiced Calliope’.11 The poet [sc. Homer], while he undoubtedly wishes to invoke Calliope, too, does not explicitly mention her, but, in a more solemn manner, uses the generic name ‘goddess’ and leaves it to the intelligent listener to examine who she could be, with the only indication that he calls a Muse. For singing is what a Muse does. Just as Homer, with a generic name, is a living being possessed of reason, but with a specific name a human being, so too is Calliope called a goddess in generic terms, a Muse in specific terms, as in the Odyssey [1.1]. But Stesichorus mentions her proper name in ‘clear-voiced Calliope’. Not only did the person who has invoked a goddess or a Muse to sing call every Muse due to the universal character of such terms, but in a certain way the person who invokes Calliope does so, too, if indeed, as the poet somewhere says, ‘all answer Apollo with a beautiful voice’ [Il. 1.604].12 From this expression, ‘Calliope’ is formed, obtaining the name that is formed from the activity of all the Muses, i.e. their beautiful voice.13 In this way, those who say to begin from Zeus are somehow

7 Sapph. fr. 118 eds. E. Lobel & D.L. Page. 1955. Poetarum Lesbiorum fragmenta. Oxford: Clarendon Press. The fragment is also quoted by Hermogenes in Id. 2.4.14. 8 Ant. fr. 1 ed. B. Wyss. 1936. Antimachi Colophonii reliquiae. Berlin: Weidmann. The examples from Hesiod and Antimachus, as well as (a part of) the following example from Pindar, are also referred to in schol. AT Il. 1.1d. 9 A Life of Pindar relates that Pausanias of Sparta, when attacking Thebes, ordered that it be burnt with the exception of the house of Pindar. He proclaimed: ‘Do not burn down the house of Pindar the muse-maker’ (Πινδάρου τοῦ μουσοποιοῦ τὴν στέγην μὴ καίετε, Vit. Pi. 2.12-3 ed. A.B. Drachmann. 1964 [1903]. Scholia vetera in Pindari carmina, vol. 1. Amsterdam: Adolf M. Hakkert). 10 Pi. fr. 150. 11 Stesich. fr. 63 ed. D.L. Page. 1962. Poetae melici Graeci. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 12 Tzetzes makes a similar point in Ex. 76.7-13. 13 Eustathios repeats this etymology in e.g. in Il. 161.32-5 = 1.249.14-8 (on Il. 1.604), 370.23-4 = 1.584.14- 5 (on Il. 3.1), and 396.35-7 = 1.624.23-6 (on Il. 3.150-3). It is also found in D.S. 4.7.4.

Homer and Rhetoric in Byzantium 287 called forth,14 if the mind is Zeus and the knowledge in the mind the Muses.15 That there are nine Muses and why and that they are daughters of Mnemosyne and Zeus and as many other things that are said about them have been said by many people and in many places.16 Therefore, it would be superfluous that these things were defined also now. But if somewhere an occasion has presented itself, the relevant information will not be withheld. Notice that the poet beautifully both now and in what follows in many places makes the Muse associate with himself,17 in order to indicate that he speaks in a ‘musical’, melodic, and rational manner in accordance with his human essence. For according to the wise man who spoke [these words], ‘whomever the Muses do not regard, them Circe has harmed with her potion’,18 i.e. bestial irrationality has caused them harm.19 Furthermore, notice also that active speech, the type that is observed in the weighty and, so to speak, manly practical science, is called Hermes in accordance with masculine utterance, in order that, just as a loud roar of the sea, in a trope, becomes masculine, being called ‘masculine sound of sea’ [S. Ph. 1455], in the same way excellent speech, that is to say noble philosophy that has escaped its female voice, also imitates Hermes in its utterance.20 Zeus/the mind, then, also uses this Hermes as messenger and like an assistant. However, the part of speech that is not such, but clad in women’s clothes, as it were, with its predominant striving for elegance, pleasure, brilliance, and beauty, such a type [of speech] is the Muse

14 Arat. Phaen. 1: Ἐκ Διὸς ἀρχώμεσθα, ‘let us begin from Zeus’. 15 On Zeus = mind and Muse = knowledge, see Sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2 respectively. 16 For the number of the Muses, see e.g. Tz. Ex. 76.1-7, where all nine Muses are listed; Plu. Qaes. Conv. 743C6-747A1, where the number of Muses is the subject of ‘problem’ 14 of the ninth book of the Table-Talk; D.S. 4.7. For the origin of the Muses, see e.g. Hes. Th. 53-60. 17 Homer invokes the Muses also in Il. 2.491-2, 2.761, 11.218, 14.508, and 16.112. 18 Cf. Theoc. 9.35-6: οὓς γὰρ ὁρεῦντι / γαθεῦσαι, τὼς δ’ οὔτι ποτῷ δαλήσατο Κίρκα, ‘for whomever they regard with delight, Circe with her potions never harms’ (text and translation are taken from A.S.F. Gow. 1950. Theocritus, vol. 1. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 19 Cf. schol. Theoc. 9.33-36h (ed. C. Wendel. 1914. Scholia vetera in Theocritum. Leipzig: Teubner): <οὓς γὰρ ὁρεῦντι:> διὰ τὸν Ὀδυσσέα τοῦτό φησι. οὓς δὲ οὐχ ὁρῶσι, τούτους ἔβλαψεν ἡ ἀμαθία. ‘for those whom they regard’: he says this because of Odysseus. But those whom they do not regard, stupidity has caused them harm. 20 On Hermes as λόγος in ancient allegorical interpretation, see Buffière 1956: 289-96. See also the references listed by Van der Valk in his annotations on in Il. 10.20-30. On Hermes as προφορικός λόγος (‘uttered speech’) as opposed to ἐνδιάθετος λόγος (‘internal speech’), see Section 4.3.4. 288 Appendix III: Eustathios on Muse-Invocations

Calliope or the Muses in general; they are spoken of as being of the female sex and they, too, were born from Zeus, but above all care for the song-loving Apollo, whom they answer with beautiful voice, in accordance with ‘Phoebus, lord of songs’ [E. Med. 426], who therefore is also called ‘Leader of the Muses’;21 and, thus, through themselves they hint at the difference with Hermes, whose kinship with the Muses is indicated by his mother Maia, too. For ‘Muse’ [is derived] from μῶ, ‘I inquire’, and ‘Maia’ has the same origin.22 One must also know that ‘sing’ and imperatives in general do not necessarily indicate authority of the person who utters them over the one who is commanded, unless somewhere and sometime by chance. For imperatives urge on only gently and rouse to action, and certainly do not point to outright despotic authority. Our whole life is full of examples. The term, too, indicates the nature of the matter: for προστάσσειν is formed from the preposition πρός, which means ‘near’,23 and from τάσσειν and it means ‘to place someone near’ and close to this activity, from which he was separated before. Not only do a master or a father do this to a slave and a son, but it also happens the other way around. For it is necessary to know that, in an inoffensive and natural way, every act of exhorting and arousing and every act of rousing to action happens with an imperative verb. If at some time or other there is a certain underlying timidity or fear or shame or desire or some other indication of internal natural passion, then, instead of an imperative, the statement is constructed with

21 The connection of Hermes as λόγος, the Muses, and Apollo as Leader of the Muses with the art of speaking may echo Aristides’ invocation of these deities in his oration To Plato: in Defence of Oratory (Or. 2.19): καλῶ δ’ ἐπὶ τούτῳ τῷ τολμήματι καὶ Ἑρμῆν λόγιον καὶ Ἀπόλλωνα μουσηγέτην καὶ Μούσας ἁπάσας ἡγεμόνας γενέσθαι, μάλιστα μὲν καὶ δι’ αὐτὸ τὸ ἴδιον τῆς νῦν κλήσεως, ὅτι τούτων ἡ δωρεὰ ὑπὲρ ἧς ἅμα καὶ δι’ ἧς ἀγωνιζόμεθα (eds. F.W. Lenz & C.A. Behr. 1978. P. Aelii Aristidis Opera quae exstant omnia, vol. 1, fasc. 2. Leiden: Brill), ‘In this bold act [sc. the defence of oratory], I invoke Hermes, God of oratory, Apollo, the leader of the Muses, and all the Muses, to be my guides, particularly because of the propriety of the present summons, since it is their gift [sc. oratory] on behalf of which and by means of which we contend. (Transl. C.A. Behr. 1973. Aristides, vol. 1: Panathenaic Oration and In Defence of Oratory. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.) 22 The etymology of Maia – Muse – μῶ is found in EM 589.45-7. Eustathios discusses the etymology of the name Maia also in in Il. 604.13-5 = 2.195.2-4 (on Il. 5.748). 23 Cf. Et. Gud. 482.30-1 (ed. F.W. Sturz. 1818. Etymologicum Graecae linguae Gudianum et alia grammaticorum scripta e codicibus manuscriptis nunc primum edita. Leipzig: Weigel): ἡ γὰρ πρὸς πρόθεσις τὸ πλησιάζον καὶ προσεγγίζον σημαίνει, ‘for the preposition πρός indicates what is near and approaches’.

Homer and Rhetoric in Byzantium 289 an optative. And this is what invented optative verbs.24 And here, then, the poet, in a simpler way, said ‘sing’ to a mythical goddess. If he doubted whether or not he would be answered, he would have constructed ‘sing’ in a more optative way. That the term θεός [‘god’] is said with regard to stars in accordance with θέειν [‘to run’],25 and with regard to elements in accordance with their orderly position, and with regard to the mind that arranges everything well,26 and with regard to wise men, who lift themselves up toward the primal mind through a powerful likeness, it is possible to find this, too, in [the works of] the ancients in detail.27 Therefore, let this much be said about it at present. One must know the following matter, too, that, in a more mythical way, the poet invokes a goddess or Muse with a view to the attention of the listeners, in order that, because the Muse speaks, they lend their ears to the things that are said and in order that he exalts himself as loved by the gods and having in his soul either one or all the Muses and therefore being divinely inspired, but especially with a view to the plausibility of the inventions, whenever he tells mythical matters, for instance plans of gods, their wars, schemes, love affairs, journeys, and manifold actions in general. For having learned that a Muse speaks after being called upon, the listener would not be puzzled as to how the poet knows such things, once and for all knowing that the poet is Muse-inspired, and that the Muse, as a goddess, knows everything.28 It is the same to say Muse and goddess and, in the plural, Muses and goddesses, just

24 Eustathios gives the same etymology of the verb προστάσσειν and a similar explanation of the use of imperatives (and optatives) when discussing imperatives in prayers to God in a treatise on the phrase Κύριε ἐλέησον (‘Lord, have mercy’). See Op. min. 5, 63.92-9. Cf. schol. AT Il. 1.1d: poets use imperatives rather than optatives when addressing the Muses in accordance with their poetic licence. The same scholion offers a second possible justification of the imperative that ties in with Eustathios’ interpretation of the Muse as the poet’s knowledge: the scholiast argues that poets do not command the Muses but themselves. 25 For θεός – θέειν, see n. 3 above. 26 Cf. EM 445.48-50. 27 Eustathios’ explanation of the term θεός resembles Tzetzes’, who in his Exegesis of the Iliad (45.9- 51.12) gives five meanings of θεός: (i) natural elements, (ii) intellectual abilities and emotions, (iii) kings and queens, (iv) wise men and other virtuous figures, (v) stars and other celestial bodies. On Tzetzes’ explanation of the term, see Cesaretti 1991: 157-8, Goldwyn, forthcoming. 28 For a discussion of the functions of Muse-invocations that Eustathios mentions here, see Section 4.3.2. On the Muse-invocation in the Catalogue of Ships, see Section 2.4.2. 290 Appendix III: Eustathios on Muse-Invocations as both the singular Eileithyia and the plural Eileithyiae are found in the poet.29 Therefore, he will say in rhapsody 2 that the Muses, being goddesses, are present and know everything [Il. 2.485]. There it will also be clear that he is inspired by all the Muses. Therefore also now, when he speaks of a goddess and in the Odyssey of a Muse without calling one or the other by name, he nevertheless indicates that he calls all of them, i.e. all nine. And in truth, thus, it is necessary to understand that he even needs all of them, if indeed each of them is distributed over the learned arts and one is in charge of this, another of that branch of knowledge, on their own account, and Homeric poetry is considered to be full of all wisdom. That, sometimes, it is also the same to say ‘Muse’ and ‘song’ is indicated by the female musician30 as well as ‘Muses, fond of the flute’ [S. Ant. 965] in Sophocles.

29 Singular: Il. 16.187, 19.103; plural: Il. 11.270, 19.119. 30 The expression μουσουργὸς γυνή occurs also in D.S. 17.72.5 and Tz. H. 3.98.596; in both cases it refers to Persian female musicians. Cf. the definition of the Suda: Μουσουργοί· ψάλτριαι. αἱ δὲ μουσουργοὶ βάρβαροι ἦσαν γυναῖκες· (μ 1303). ‘Musicians: female harpers. Barbarian musicians were women.’