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COAST GUARD RESPONSE TO THE V0LG0NEFT263 OIL SPILL Downloaded from http://meridian.allenpress.com/iosc/article-pdf/1991/1/279/1743061/2169-3358-1991-1-279.pdf by guest on 26 September 2021 Capt. Thomas E. Fagoe Swedish Coast Guard Headquarters Stumholmen S-371 23 Karlskrona, Sweden ABSTRACT: On the morning of May 14, 1990, a collision occurred their being inefficient, but because experts claim that they harm the between the Soviet tanker Volgonef 1263 and the West German dry cargo sensitive environment of the Baltic Sea. ship Betty off the south coast of Sweden. One Coast Guard air surveil- lance aircraft and one oil spill recovery ship arrived at the site less than two hours after the collision. The Coast Guard considered the threat to the marine environment to The Rescue Law be serious and therefore ordered not only the most effective Swedish oil spill recovery resources to the place, but also requested assistance from According to the rescue law, a rescue leader should be appointed to U.S.S.R., F.R.G., Denmark, and Finland. lead any rescue operation. The leader has a staff to assist him, but the After less than 48 hours, 26 Coast Guard, Naval, and foreign ships full responsibility lies on his own shoulders. In spill accidents at sea, the were fighting the spill. The operation lasted for 13 days and practically regional Coast Guard commander or his deputy will serve as rescue all the oil was recovered before it reached shore. The operation showed leader. that using modern oil spill recovery equipment it is possible to recover The rescue leader has not only the responsibility for actions against practically all the oil at sea and also showed that international coopera- the spill, but also a very important legal mandate that allows him, for tion can be quick and efficient, if, as in this case, an agreement of example, to: cooperation has already been reached. • request personnel and equipment from outside his own organiza- tion, • give orders to personnel outside his own organization, • restrict air and sea access to areas, Before a review of the Volgoneft oil spill accident, it is necessary to • take possession of a harbor that is deemed necessary for the consider briefly essential elements of the Swedish strategy regarding operation. response to oil spill accidents. The three most important are the Swedish Coast Guard, the Swedish Rescue Law, and North European oil spill response agreements. International agreements Sweden is a member of the Helsinki commission's spill response The Swedish Coast Guard committee, the Bonn agreement, and the Copenhagen agreement. These deal with mutual assistance in response to large spills as well as The Swedish Coast Guard is, among other things, responsible for coordination of regular air surveillance activities. All agreements pro- responding to spills of oil and chemicals at sea. The director general, vide for regular plenary meetings and working groups as well as exer- with headquarters in Karlskrona, has the overall responsibility under cises on communication, equipment, and operational matters. the Department of Defense. The headquarters is organized in one Five cornerstones constitute the Swedish Coast Guard response operational and one administrative office. strategy: Sweden has a coastline of about 1,500 miles and therefore it has been • the Coast Guard organization, necessary to divide the Coast Guard into four regions: north, east, • high preparedness, south and west. The regional commander has the operational respon- • spill recovery based on mechanical means, sibility for responding to spills in his region. However, headquarters • the rescue law, and can take over the responsibility for actions against a very large spill, • international agreements. covering, for example, more than one region. The Swedish Coast Guard has about 130 ships and boats, located all along the coast. All of them can take part in spill response operations, but some 30 of them are especially designed and equipped for this The Volgoneft oil spill accident work. All personnel (about 600) are trained for response work. The principles for location of response vessels and regional stores The area where the accident took place (N 56°00', E 16°04') is a very along the coast are based on the following requirements: Within four busy zone where hundreds of ships pass every day. In the morning May hours after being alerted, the Coast Guard shall be able to start 14, 1990, the weather was calm but misty, with visibility of only 100 containing measures with booms, and within eight hours start spill meters. Ten minutes before nine, the German dry cargo ship Betty, recovery actions. bound for Riga in Estonia, collided with the Soviet tanker Volgoneft Of course, each region has a 24-hour center and a surveillance 263, loaded with waste oil and bound for Copenhagen, Denmark. aircraft. Sweden has stopped using oil spill dispersants, not because of Volgoneffs port tanks 3 and 5, with a total tank volume of 1,500 m3, 279 280 1991 OIL SPILL CONFERENCE 3 were heavily damaged down to the waterline and some 1,000 m of oil Twice every 24 hours, the Swedish Meteorological and Hydrological escaped, almost instantaneously. The Coast Guard was alerted over Institute delivered oil drift forecasts for the following 72 hours. These the MRSC Karlskrona, and about one hour after the collision, the first forecasts turned out to agree well with the oil's actual drift and were Coast Guard cutter arrived at the scene. The area was surveyed by a quite useful in the response work. Coast Guard aircraft after about an hour and a half. After another 48 hours more than 1000 m3 of oil was recovered and Immediately after coming on board the Betty, the Coast Guard the main threat could be considered to be warded off. The foreign ships officers realized that the personnel conditions on the ship were unsat- were sent back with thanks for a very good job. isfactory. There were signs of improper use of alcohol, so Coast Guard The Swedish units continued to operate for eight days, but in that officers took command of the ship and brought her to Karlskrona, time could only collect around 150 m3. The oil had already begun to where she had to stay for several weeks. disappear. So on May 27, Coast Guard operations were finished. By In the alarm message, the Coast Guard—probably due to language 3 this time, some small oil slicks had gone ashore, and about 50 men had problems—got the opinion that only 100 m of oil had leaked out. But to carry out beach cleaning for a couple of days. Some birds were within a couple of hours it was clear that the spill volume was around killed. 3 3 Downloaded from http://meridian.allenpress.com/iosc/article-pdf/1991/1/279/1743061/2169-3358-1991-1-279.pdf by guest on 26 September 2021 1000 m and that another 400 m had to be lightened from the damaged Although the accident had taken place only about ten nautical miles tanks as soon as possible. Consequently, this rather large spill required from the shore, only slight shore pollution occurred. One very impor- firm and fast action. A rescue leader with his staff were immediately tant reason for this was the favorable wind and current conditions that appointed. Within a couple of hours they left the regional center in kept the oil at sea, especially during the first 48 hours. But even with Malmö and stationed themselves near Karlskrona where equipment good weather conditions, the oil must be picked up. I credit this stores and workshops were also deployed. successful operation to high readiness, a well-trained organization, Immediately after receiving the alarm, the commanding office of the good equipment, excellent cooperation between the Navy and local nearest Coast Guard area, ordered ships to restrict the outflow and to authorities, and effective international agreements. I would also like to start recovery measures. During the afternoon, a tanker was also sent assert that our personnel are well trained in national and international to lighter the remaining oil in the damaged tanks. During the following exercises. 20 hours, the first recovery ship, KBV050 with a Lori system, recov- 3 In the operation, 28 ships, 3 aircraft, 2 helicopters, 500 men, 3,000 ered around 230 m . The remaining oil in the damaged tanks was meters of booms were involved, as well as quantities of paper and removed. In the afternoon, another four recovery ships were alerted documentation. The total cost of the operation has been estimated at and sent to the area, some of them with Lori systems, others with some three million U.S. dollars. skimmers, troil booms, or Expandi booms. The rescue leader also ordered naval tankers. Soon it became obvious that the Coast Guard needed assistance from some of the parties to the Helsinki convention. The first foreign Another consideration ship to arrive was the Danish Gunnar Seidenfaden—less than 24 hours after the request. Soon the Finnish Halli, the Soviet Svetlomor, and the It is very important to take spill samples rapidly to determine if the German Bottsand arrived. Assistance was also offered by the other oil is harmful to personnel. This oil had a very suspicious origin. parties, but it was not considered necessary under their current circum- Questions were raised: "Did it contain PCB?" "Was it toxic?" and stances. even "Was it radioactive?" Rumours about radioactivity, forced us to After less than 48 hours more than 20 Coast Guard, Naval, and 3 get a rapid analysis. Luckily, the oil turned out to be quite normal foreign ships were dealing with the spill and more than 500 m of oil was (Figure 2).

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