In Buddhist Logic Author(S): V
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Rationality, Argumentation and Embarrassment: A Study of Four Logical Alternatives (catuṣkoṭi) in Buddhist Logic Author(s): V. K. Bharadwaja Source: Philosophy East and West, Vol. 34, No. 3 (Jul., 1984), pp. 303-319 Published by: University of Hawai'i Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1398631 . Accessed: 06/11/2013 13:19 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. University of Hawai'i Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Philosophy East and West. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded from 130.65.109.155 on Wed, 6 Nov 2013 13:19:08 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions V. K. Bharadwaja Rationality,argumentation and embarrassment: A studyof four logical alternatives (catuskoti) in Buddhist logic In thispaper I shallconsider several interconnected issues centering around the fourlogical alternatives (catuskoti) in Buddhist logic which, it seems to me, involve questionsof rationality,argumentation, and philosophicalembarrassment. It is mycontention that philosophers who have worked in thisarea of Buddhist logicduring the past fifty years or so havenot faced these issues squarely. In theirwork, they show either an obsessionwith logic,' or a tiltin favorof the Inexpressible,2orhave felt a certainlevel of philosophical embarrassment3 while discussingthem. Let me state these issues: One: In theearly Pali Buddhistliterature we find(a) notonly expressions "Thereis a nextworld" and "There is no next world" but also the forms "There is andis not a nextworld" and "There neither is noris nota nextworld" 4, and(b) "The worldis finite,""The worldis infinite,""The worldis bothfinite and infinite,"and "The world is neither finite nor infinite".5 There are two features of theseexamples (a) and (b): (1) Regardingthem as a subject/predicateform of statement,what is in question in (a) isthe existence of the next world (the subject term)in each one of these four expressions; while in (b) theexistence of the world, thesubject term, is not in question; what is in question is whether or not the world is finite.(2) In both(a) and (b), fourlogical possibilities have been taken into account:affirmation, negation, both affirmationand negation,and neither affirmationnor negation. These four possibilities have been historically called catuskoti,and philosophershave taken upon themselves the task of explaining them,the question being as to how it is thatBuddha, the Enlightened One, rejectedeach one of them.6Nagarjuna exploits this rejection as a formof argumentationagainst his critics and opponents.7 There is a vasthistorical gap betweenthe date of the Buddha and the date of Nagarjuna; yet when one reads Nagarjuna'sworks one is surprised by the similarity between his work and that of theBuddha-in theformulation of thefour alternatives and theirsystematic rejection.8 Two: Nagarjunais saidto haveheld no thesisor philosophicposition of his ownon thegrounds that he rejects each one of the the four possible alternatives and thathe himselfsays that "he has no thesisof his ownor no positionto defend."9 The question, however, is thatif he has no thesisof his own to defend, thenwhat is he doing?Is he engagedin vitoa,0a formof debate in which one is concernedonly with refuting the opponent's thesis but not with establishing one'sown? An affirmativeanswer to thisquestion is "an embarrassmentto the philosophers,"11however "useful and effective a philosophic method" 12 itmay proveto be. Three:The above two become issues only when we think that both Buddha, V. K. Bharadwajais a memberof the Department of Philosophy at theUniversity ofDelhi. AUTHOR'S NOTE: I am deeplyindebted to ProfessorsS. S. Barlingay,R. C. Pandeya,and Mahesh Tiwari,and to Kanchanafor theirkind commentsand criticismof an earlierdraft of thispaper. However,I alone am responsiblefor any mistakesin it. PhilosophyEast and West34, no. 3 (July1984). ? by theUniversity of Hawaii Press.All rightsreserved. This content downloaded from 130.65.109.155 on Wed, 6 Nov 2013 13:19:08 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 304 Bharadwaja theEnlightened One, and Nagarjuna, the Madhyamaka philosopher, were con- cernedwith the Inexpressible. "'All thingsare void' is nota proposition.It only expressesthe Inexpressible with the help of theconventional truth. The real languagehere would be silence."13 Or,as RamchandraPandeya puts it: Since noneof the four alternatives have been asserted, the question of their denial does notarise such that "if there be any reality, itcannot be expressed in terms of four kotis." 14 I willdiscuss these issues one by one. My plan is as follows:First, I willpick up one or twomajor positions on each one of theseissues and examinethem in detail.My strategy is to take into account the context in which these issues make theirmaiden appearance; to drawimportant distinctions, like the one between differenttypes of questions; to indicatethe role which the Buddhists assign to denyingeach one of the fourpossible alternatives in orderto rejectthe opponent'sposition; and finallyto outlinethe conceptual framework within whichboth the Buddha and Nagarjunaare operating.In thecourse of my argumentI suggest that both argumentation and embarrassment presuppose a certainanalysis of the concept of rationality which to mymind is toonarrow to go withthe sense in which we say that 'man is a rationalanimal'. In theearly Pali Buddhisticliterature,1s four types of questionshave been differentiated.(1) There are questions which ought to be explained categorically. Forexample, to thequestion "Is formimpermanent?" the answer is "Yes,it is." To thequestion "Is theworld full of suffering?" the answer is "Yes,it is." To the question"Does everyonedie?" the answer is "Yes, everyonedies." These are questionswhich are clearin respectof bothsyntax and semanticsand which thereforeare answeredcategorically. The Buddhistscall thempanha ekam- savydkaranlya.6 (2) Thenthere are questions which ought to be answered with a counterquestion. For example, the question "Is consciousnessa person's soul or is consciousnessone thing and the soul another?" is respondedto with a counter question"What do youtake to be thesoul?" The Buddhistscall thempanha patipucchavydkaraniya.17(3) A thirdtype of questionis thosethat should be set aside.For example, the question "Will the Tathagata live after his death or not?" isa questionwhich is tobe setaside. Such questions are called panhathapanryo. 8 (4) Thefourth type of question is thosewhich ought to beexplained analytically and thenanswered. For example,to the question"Are all humanbeings reborn?"the answer is "Someare and somearen't." Questions like these are calledpanha vibhajjavydkaraniya.'9 In the case of thefourth type, adequate specification,clarification, and analysis are required before these questions are answeredcorrectly. For mypurposes, two types of question are important: the firsttype of questionto whicha categoricalanswer is possible,and also is generallygiven; and the third type of question, those questions which are to be set aside-thatis, the ekamsa and the thapaniya questions. The remaining two types of questionrequire clarification and analysis but they are both askable and answer- ableaffirmatively or negatively as thecase may be. The questions of evidence- This content downloaded from 130.65.109.155 on Wed, 6 Nov 2013 13:19:08 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 305 whetherthat evidence is analyticor empiricalor whetherit is of someother admissiblekind of evidence-are definitely relevant to thetruth and falsityof theiranswers. Considerfirst the thapaniya kind of question.A thapaniyaquestion is one whichis to be set aside. Jayatilleke sees in this type "a modernparallel in the kind of questionswhich the Positivist dismisses as meaninglessand thereforeun- answerable."20 The question,however, is: "Whatis thecriterion by applying whicha certainquestion is saidto be setaside? One answer which Buddhaghosa givesis thata thapaniyaquestion is "a questionwhich ought not to be explained andwhich ought to be setaside on theground that it was not explained by the Exaltedone." 21 But as Jayatillekeobserves: "This is notvery helpful, for he is virtuallysaying that these questions ought to be setaside because they have been setaside by the Buddha." 22 Buddhaghosa's position thus amounts to accepting theauthority ofthe Buddha, an authoritywhich even the Buddha himself did not regardas unchallengeable,and this is philosophicallyvery embarrassing. We do needa criterionto tella thapaniyafrom a thapaniyaquestion. Broadly,there are twodifferent criteria for identifying a thapaniya question: (1) thepragmatic criterion and (2) thelogical criterion. As regardsthe pragmatic criterionJayatilleke observes: "These questions were 'to be setaside' (thapaniya) on pragmaticgrounds since belief in any of the possible answers was considered irrelevantand otiosefor our purpose."23Here theparable of thearrow is relevant.The parable is designed to bring home the idea that what is importantis givingurgent medical attention to the one who is shotwith the arrow. Questions suchas