Cycle of Dysfunction 1

Running head: ARMY COMBAT READINESS

A Cycle of Dysfunction in Army Combat Readiness

SGM Dwight Wafford

United States Army Sergeants Major Academy, Class #35

Cycle of Dysfunction 2

Abstract

Throughout its 234-year history, the Army has been unfortunately plagued with certain reoccurring themes related to an inability perform its primary mission at the outbreak of hostilities. Today’s courageous and competent leaders of the contemporary operating environment continue to face many of the same challenges that faced leaders at the Army’s inception in 1775. This inability to achieve decisive victories stems from a number of factors to include readiness and preparedness, command and control, politics, and relevant doctrine. A direct correlation exists between failure in one or more of these operating concepts and poor performance during the first battle. Although the has made great strides in its ability to overcome these limitations, its Soldiers and leaders continue to face many of the same issues and challenges today.

Cycle of Dysfunction 3

Historically, the United States Army is the most successful and powerful combat force in the world. However, the Army has unfortunately experienced limited success during specific times in its history. These limited successes involve a unit’s inability to achieve decisive victory during the onset of each major conflict. The research conducted indicates that these inabilities are rooted in four main challenges of combat, which are readiness and training, effective command and control, political factors and relevant doctrine (Heller & Stofft, 1986). A failure in any of these factors impacts the Army’s ability to execute its primary mission. The Army has made strides in improving these limitations; however, many of these same challenges continue to pose obstacles for combatant commanders as we negotiate the contemporary operating environment in Iraq and Afghanistan. A brief discussion of these four challenges follows.

The first challenge involves readiness and training of combat forces. This includes but is not limited to personnel strength, training and equipping forces and the overall ability to wage war. Secondly, is the combatant commander’s ability or, in some cases, inability to exercise effective command and control of their subordinate forces due to a lack of experience or a lack of training. The political climate of the times has historically impacted the Army’s ability to plan, prepare and execute effectively. Finally, the inability to develop and maintain relevant doctrine for combat use is the last challenge of discussion. Were leaders utilizing the most current and effective doctrine for the conflict at hand? In an effort to illustrate how a lack of emphasis on any one of these factors can have lasting negative results, two separate but similar battles will serve as evidence. The results of these first battles will depict the cycle of dysfunction that led to loss of the battle, loss of life and finally, the loss of pride. Additionally,

Cycle of Dysfunction 4 evidence will show that the Army of today, although extremely modern, continues to spin, to some degree, in this same cycle of dysfunction.

The Army’s combat history is filled with examples that demonstrate its first-battle ineptness, but none more clearly than the World War II Battle of Kasserine Pass in January 1943.

This battle provides the full spectrum of dysfunction which includes all four of the formerly mentioned military challenges. The Army units dedicated to this battle suffered great losses in personnel and equipment. These units were plagued with significant readiness issues prior to the battle’s outbreak, officers that displayed a failure to properly command and control their elements, a political atmosphere that was less than supportive and combat doctrine that was stuck in World War I (Blumenson, 1986).

Military historians describe the Battle of Kasserine Pass, the first battle of World War II, as an embarrassing event for the United States Army. A battle that produced many critical lessons learned. Martin Blumenson, a military historian, succinctly described the forces as,

“undermanned and underequipped, and practiced obsolete procedures with outmoded weapons”

(Blumenson, 1986, p. 227). Theses factors along with senior commander’s inability to tactically maneuver their units made for a disastrous recipe for these units. The government directed demobilization of military forces following World War I took a large toll on the Army as it executed preparedness efforts prior to World War II. The toll came in the form of significant personnel reductions, cuts in military funding and political leaders that were less than ambitious about sustaining military readiness as compared to the years prior to the end of the First World

War (Blumenson, 1986). Based on these facts, the Army’s II Corp entered the Tunisia

Campaign ill prepared for their assigned mission.

Cycle of Dysfunction 5

As we evaluate the readiness of these units, the reduced numbers of personnel and the lack of skilled, competent leaders equated to Army combat forces that were both technically and tactically unfit for duty. The shortages in personnel made combined arms training all but impossible in the critical months prior to their first encounter with the Germans. The political sentiment of the time, lack of funding, the poor economy and reduction of troop strength negated the use of realistic training exercises for pre-war preparation (Blumenson, 1986, pp. 228-229).

Although noncommissioned officers did what they do best, training Soldiers on individual tasks, larger scale collective training events were not available to validate this training. The lack of combined arms training on critical tasks and drills resulted in leaders who were less than capable of managing large units effectively. To put it simply, commanders were not proficient at command. Most importantly; however, was the fact that little had changed with the combat doctrine utilized near the end of World War I. The lack of a relevant set of doctrine was classified as a severe limitation of Army combat forces (Hickman, 2009). Briefly stated, the

Army found itself in a less than optimal environment to prepare for and conduct combat operations.

As one could surmise, the skilled, prepared and powerful armored forces of the German

Army crushed the units that executed combat operations in the winter of 1943. In the end, the

American forces suffered 300 deaths, 3,000 wounded and another 3,000 missing in action

(Blumenson, 1986). These statistics paled in comparison to the casualties suffered by the opposing forces. The results of the Battle of Kasserine Pass are typical of an Army unit caught in the cycle of dysfunction created by a government seeking to forget. These results are also typical of a government seeking to capitalize on the peace dividend created by the void of war.

Within this cycle of dysfunction, we find the noncommissioned struggling to prepare their

Cycle of Dysfunction 6

Soldiers for combat with outdated weapons, limited equipment and virtually no tactics, techniques or procedures for their use.

The and the efforts of Task Force Smith in the summer of 1950 display a subsequent example of dysfunction in management of our national defense. Not seven years later, our government along with Army leaders fell into the same trap of complacency as previously discussed during the onset of World War II. This period of complacency resulted in a similar performance by the units of the 24th Infantry Division (Flint, 1986). The Army noncommissioned officer, once again, found themselves in an organization void of resources while, simultaneously, being asked to prepare young Americans for combat.

The 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry Regiment, Task Force Smith, along with artillery units was the first units to engage opposing forces on the eve of the Korean War (Summer, 2008). At this time, the United States Army had once again suffered national neglect resulting from the years following the end of World War II. As previously stated, this era was characterized by demobilization of personnel, reduction in funding, lack of modernization, and an unavailability of training or training resources (Flint, 1986, p. 297). Our nation was simply tired of war and wanted to do all things possible to erase the loss and suffering experienced by many Americans.

Due to significant political pressure, the Army transformed from a combat force to an Army of occupation in Japan (Blumenson, 2003). The results of this stagnation and redefinition of the

Army were extremely similar to that of Kasserine Pass. Task Force Smith, an element of the 24th

Infantry Division would suffer the brunt of the negative consequences resulting from the apathetic stance taken by our nation and its leaders.

At the point when the Army 1st Cavalry replaced the ailing 24th Division, this infantry unit lost over a third of its personnel were killed or suffered wounds as well as a large percentage

Cycle of Dysfunction 7 of its equipment during this initial battle (Flint, 1986, pp. 296-297). These losses were a direct result of a lack of emphasis on the readiness of these units. Task Force Smith was sent into a combat environment without their full set of tools to accomplish their mission. To serve as an example, Christopher Eger describes the units committed as undermanned, very inexperienced in the junior ranks and without a vital tool to assist in accomplishment of their mission. This tool was an anti-tank weapon of any kind (Eger, 2009). This caused significant destruction to the units assigned to Task Force Smith. However, one tool that always seems to overcome their deficiencies is that of the noncommissioned officer. During this battle, their ability to train, lead and motivate subordinates shined (Flint, 1986, p. 298). There were numerous examples of simply heroic events by noncommissioned officers that contributed to the small success found in this battle.

As we consider the past attempts at solving these specific challenges, evidence demonstrates solutions come out of necessity. The American Soldier experiences the necessity of survival and senior leaders and governmental officials develop and implement solutions. This cycle of dysfunction is similar to a pendulum that swings in the direction of public opinion and political support at one end and towards full military support on the other. In each case presented, the Army’s senior leaders identify the challenges and weakness of their units and make attempts to increase numbers, advocate for training and equipment and develop plans for developing a more ready and relevant Army for the purposes of war. For example, in the ten plus years between 1920 and 1930, six separate Army Chiefs of Staff advocated strongly to develop a more modern combat force but were met with significant opposition from the public eye and budgetary constraints from the government (Blumenson, 1986, p. 231). So, we can see that the Army itself was attempting to solve its own challenges. Current Army leaders continue

Cycle of Dysfunction 8 this advocacy program for troop strength, effect training and adequate resources. Once the political machine becomes engaged in the current combat challenges, the challenges during initial conflict progressively and aggressively is rectified. The overall strength of units significantly increases as lessons are learned but not until then. For example, only one week after the Battle of Kasserine Pass had begun, President Roosevelt agreed to raise the end strength of the active and National Guard components by 17,000 and 135,000, respectively (Blumenson,

1986, p. 227). Large sums of money are funneled into the Army for equipment and weapons procurement as well as development. With the larger units comes the ability to properly train organizations as opposed to commanders constantly determining how they will do some much with so little. It is quite amazing how, with the support of senior governmental leaders, a military organization can function so effectively.

To get a full appreciation of the extent of the problems causes by a lack of attention on the previous four factors of combat, it is prudent that we start at the beginning of the cycle. The scenario begins with a swift and evident draw down of personnel followed by a diversion of traditional funds used for military purposes (Kaplan, 1996). When this occurs, combat readiness is severely handicapped. Generally speaking, readiness for the purposes of this discussion will concentrate on unit strengths, the unit’s ability to effectively train, and the adequacy of weapons and equipment. With a reduction in sheer numbers, the Army loses the ability to perform many critical pre-war activities. The Army loses a very valuable commodity, which is the experienced, well trained leader. As a result, there are fewer leaders with the appropriate level of combat experience to train the new recruits that the Army will eventually have to acquire as the war progresses. If you consider the numbers by themselves, a reduction in overall strength all but negates the unit’s ability to train as a company, battalion or brigade, either separately or together.

Cycle of Dysfunction 9

Each are very important for leaders to gain experience in command and control, linking combat service support elements to combat forces, and for senior commanders to train and maneuver large units, aircraft and artillery at one time. If the numbers are not there, the training will be less than effective. If units are not continually funded at a minimum level for sustainment and growth, they will not remain relevant for future use. If the funding streams are depleted, the units will be relegated to utilize out of date weaponry as well as old and worn equipment. These factors also play a role in readiness and training of combat units.

As history describes, the major extent of the issues of readiness for combat in the first battles, affects mainly that first unit. Once it is discovered that failure has occurred and many lives have needlessly been lost, the government put everything into full swing in an attempt to fix the issues as quickly and efficiently as possible. This is good; however, often it is too little too late for unit such as Task Force Smith and the units at Kasserine Pass. An article by Ike

Skelton describes the Army Senior leader’s frustration the best. In the 1940s, General George

Marshall stated, “For almost 20 years we have had all of the time and almost none of the money; today we have all the money and no time,” to describe his efforts in preparing the Army for combat (Skelton, 2006).

Readiness is paramount to every unit in the Army no matter what their primary mission may be. If units are sent to battle with low readiness levels, the repercussion can and have been devastating. If units are short changed in their efforts to remain ready or provided environments that are not conducive to readiness, then everyone is affected. The young, scared private is not trained properly on his role within the unit. He does not operate with the correct equipment or weapon. His vehicle is unable to move from place to place because there are deficiencies that the unit can not fund to fix. The first time that battalion commander is able to have their entire

Cycle of Dysfunction 10 staff in the same place for planning is right in the middle of their first combat mission. The combat medic is unable to respond with the correct skills or in the time necessary to save a

Soldier’s life. These are only a few simple examples of how a lack of support can translate into disaster for the units on the ground. It really is the second and third order affects from a lack of emphasis by senior governmental or military leaders that cause the devastation found in at

Kasserine Pass and Task Force Smith’s experience. Even in the current operational environment in Iraq and Afghanistan, military readiness is as paramount as it was in 1943. Although the

Army has made great strides in overcoming many of these obstacles, many continue to plague our Army even today.

The Army of today faces many of the same challenges that were faced in the two examples provided here. The war in Iraq is a great example. We find three separate but connected elements of these four factors in play. As one considers troop strength, General Eric

Shinseki, the Army Chief of Staff, stood his morale post by admitting in front of senior governmental leaders that an increase in troop strength was needed to sustain forces in Iraq

(Hanson, 2005). As the war played out, this statement became fact although Secretary of

Defense Rumsfeld denied its validity. The reduced strength in number stretched our forces thin, and reduced ability to adequately train and prevented units from undergoing to proper rest and refit activities necessary to sustain the fight. Doctrine is another issue that required proper attention prior to or shortly after the war in Iraq began. It was not until much later into the conflict that the correct counterinsurgency doctrine was developed to combat the current threat of insurgents. With the new doctrine came the need for new equipment and weaponry to sustain forces in Iraq. One of the main issues regarding the combating of the new improvised explosive devices is the need for the better armoring of both combat and non-combat vehicles (Burgess,

Cycle of Dysfunction 11

2004). The battle field changed but the Army doctrine, tactics, equipment and procedures were a half a step behind the need.

Although readiness rates have been portrayed as low in some cases, the Army has made great strides in readiness training for its larges combat forces. The Joint readiness Training

Center (JRTC) and the National Training Center (NTC), as examples, provide the opportunity for units to train as combined elements and more often than not, major combat units have used these facilities to train their forces before combat. The Army’s initiatives to draw from its experienced leaders also serve as evidence that the Army is trying to learn lessons from the past.

This initiative involves sending recent combat veterans to the educational classrooms and Drill

Instructor duties in order to transfer these lessons learned to enlisted and officer Soldiers. The last and most impressive attempt at solutions is the recent Army Forces Generation Model that dictates three separate pools of forces for combat and specific role within each pool. These pools are the reset and training pool, the Ready pool and the available pool. Units are either training or resetting equipment, ready for deployment or actually engaged in combat operations (United

States Army). This model is designed to allow ample time for rest, training and sustainment of forces. Nothing similar was in place during the times of Kasserine Pass or Task Force Smith.

The role of the noncommissioned officer has been paramount to any success the Army has made in the midst of any overall systemic failures. As history has unfolded, the noncommissioned officer has grown into a true combat leader. The NCO now leads and commands larger groups of Soldiers on convoys, patrols, logistical missions and MiTT teams.

These activities incorporate the NCOs ability to train individual tasks with a more mature vision of the Army’s mission in our current environment. Often, it is the NCO that officers and

Soldiers alike, look to lead them in critical missions. In an article by Robert Kaplan, he

Cycle of Dysfunction 12 describes the NCO as the linchpin of success or failure in our current operational environment in

Iraq (Kaplan, 2005). He serves as all things to all people.

Through the evidence presented from the Battle of Kasserine Pass and the activities of

Task Force Smith, it is apparent that there is a logical link between readiness and preparedness and success during the pre-war years as well as the first battles of these wars. Both elements were neglected in the years previous to their engagements in most matters crucial to its preparation. The Armies during these periods of time were reduced to an inadequate number, left with a very minimal budget in which to operate and relegated to an Army that was almost forgotten until needed again. The Army of the twenty first century is very similar and faces many of the same challenges although their leaders continue in the efforts to overcome these deficiencies. It is almost as if the scenario is the same, and only the names, dates and locations have changed.

The opposition to these theories might question why the American public should have to continually pay, through taxes, for the continual upkeep and sustainment of forces when war is not imminently present. The evidence present can be likened to that of a personally owned vehicle. If you keep the services of a vehicle up to date, change the oil on schedule, rotate tires and replace worn parts, your vehicle will last considerably longer than if you dot not perform these functions. If not, you end up having to purchase new, brakes, tires and possibly the engine at the end of your obligation which is considerably more expensive. The same theory applies to our Armed Forces. Sustain them with adequate strength and funding over time to avoid the large bill when battles go wrong based on your neglect of the past. History shows us that our past and present methods of filling, sustaining, training and maintaining our Army have its weaknesses but they are not insurmountable.

Cycle of Dysfunction 13

As stated previously, the United States Army has an illustrious history of success and is world renowned for its power and prowess. The leaders of the past and the leaders of the present share the same history at least concerning the support and preparation for first battle combat operations. The Army’s inability to achieve decisive victories targets challenges with readiness and preparedness, command and control, politics, and relevant doctrine. Evidence shows that there is a direct correlation between failure in one or more of these operating concepts and poor performance during the first battle. Evidence also shows that our current Army is even more powerful and agile, but too, suffers from many of the same challenges. We have yet to be able to overcome the reasons that plague units in their readiness and preparedness efforts.

Cycle of Dysfunction 14

References

Blumenson, M. (1986). Kasserine Pass. In C. Heller & W. Stofft (Eds.), America's First Battles:

1776-1965 (pp. 226-265). Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.

Blumenson, M. (2003, July). Lessons Learned: Reviewing the Korean War. Retrieved June 14,

2009, from Government Industry Web site: http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3723/

is_200307/ai_n9257416/pg_3/

Burgess, L. (2004, December 16). With More Humvees Acquired, Army Shifts Focus to Iraq

Trucks. Retrieved June 21, 2009, from Military.com Web site: http://www.military.com/

NewContent/0.1390,SS_121604_Armor,00.html

Eger, C. (2009, March 11). Task Force Smith and the Bazooka. Retrieved June 17, 2009, from

Suite 101.com Web site: http://modern-war.suite101.com/article.cfm/

task_force_smith_and_the-bazooka

Flint, R. (1986). Task Force Smith and the 24th Division: Delay and Withdrawal, 5-19 July

1950. In C. Heller & W. Stofft (Eds.), America's First Battles: 1776-1965 (pp. 266-299).

Lawrence: University Press Kansas.

George, J. (1999, May 27). Is Military Readiness Overrated? Retrieved June 14, 2009, from

Cato Institute Web site: http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=5445

Hamilton, J. (2005). Kasserine Pass: North Africa Campaign Pits Inexperienced Antiaircraft

Artillery Units Against Rommel's Vaunted Afrika Corps. Air Defense Artillery, April-

June, 40-42.

Cycle of Dysfunction 15

Hanson, D. (2005, October 21). The Troop Strength Question. Retrieved June 21, 2009, from

American Thinker Web site: http://www.americanthinker.com/2005/10/

the_troop_strength_question.html

Heller, C., & Stofft, W. (Eds.). (1986). America's First Battles: 1776-1965. Lawrence:

University of Kansas Press.

Hickman, K. (2009, June 16). World War II: Battle of Kasserine Pass [Fact Sheet]. Retrieved

June 16, 2009, from About.com Military History Web site: http://

militaryhistory.about.com/od/wordwarii/p/kasserine.htm

Kaplan, M. (May 14, 1996). Effects of Previous Drawdowns of the NCO Corps (Information

Paper). Retrieved April 15, 2009, from The Center for Advanced Studies of the NCO

Web site: http://www.ncohistory.com/ncoDrawdowneffects.pdf

Kaplan, R. (2005, October 24). In Praise of Noncoms. Retrieved May 16, 2009, from LA Times

Web site: http://articles.latimes.com/2005/Oct/24/opinion/Oe-Kaplan24

Murtha, J., & Obey, D. (2006, September 13). United States Army Military Readiness [Press

release]. Retrieved May 11, 1009, from The Online Office of Congressman John Murtha

Web site: http://www.murtha.house.gov/

index2.php?option=com_content&do_pdf=1&id=135

Nagl, J. (2009, May 5). A Better War in Iraq. Retrieved June 21, 2009, from Armed Forces

Journal Web site: http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2006/08/1931298

Skelton, Ike. (2006, September). Neither Time nor Money. Retrieved June 1, 2009, from Letters

Web site: http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3723/is_200609/ai_n17193962

Summers, H. (2008, June 10). The Korean War, A Fresh Perspective. Retrieved June 18, 2009,

from Route 66 Web site: http://www.rt66.com/~korteng/SmallArms/24thID.htm

Cycle of Dysfunction 16

Unites States Army. (n.d.). Army Force Generation [ARFORGEN]. Retrieved June 20, 2009,

from Promodel.com Web site: http://www.promodel.com/solutions/government/

Project%20%Review%20-%20Govt%20-%20ARFORGEN.pdf