Cycle of Dysfunction 1 Running head: ARMY COMBAT READINESS A Cycle of Dysfunction in Army Combat Readiness SGM Dwight Wafford United States Army Sergeants Major Academy, Class #35 Cycle of Dysfunction 2 Abstract Throughout its 234-year history, the United States Army has been unfortunately plagued with certain reoccurring themes related to an inability perform its primary mission at the outbreak of hostilities. Today’s courageous and competent leaders of the contemporary operating environment continue to face many of the same challenges that faced leaders at the Army’s inception in 1775. This inability to achieve decisive victories stems from a number of factors to include readiness and preparedness, command and control, politics, and relevant doctrine. A direct correlation exists between failure in one or more of these operating concepts and poor performance during the first battle. Although the United States Army has made great strides in its ability to overcome these limitations, its Soldiers and leaders continue to face many of the same issues and challenges today. Cycle of Dysfunction 3 Historically, the United States Army is the most successful and powerful combat force in the world. However, the Army has unfortunately experienced limited success during specific times in its history. These limited successes involve a unit’s inability to achieve decisive victory during the onset of each major conflict. The research conducted indicates that these inabilities are rooted in four main challenges of combat, which are readiness and training, effective command and control, political factors and relevant doctrine (Heller & Stofft, 1986). A failure in any of these factors impacts the Army’s ability to execute its primary mission. The Army has made strides in improving these limitations; however, many of these same challenges continue to pose obstacles for combatant commanders as we negotiate the contemporary operating environment in Iraq and Afghanistan. A brief discussion of these four challenges follows. The first challenge involves readiness and training of combat forces. This includes but is not limited to personnel strength, training and equipping forces and the overall ability to wage war. Secondly, is the combatant commander’s ability or, in some cases, inability to exercise effective command and control of their subordinate forces due to a lack of experience or a lack of training. The political climate of the times has historically impacted the Army’s ability to plan, prepare and execute effectively. Finally, the inability to develop and maintain relevant doctrine for combat use is the last challenge of discussion. Were leaders utilizing the most current and effective doctrine for the conflict at hand? In an effort to illustrate how a lack of emphasis on any one of these factors can have lasting negative results, two separate but similar battles will serve as evidence. The results of these first battles will depict the cycle of dysfunction that led to loss of the battle, loss of life and finally, the loss of pride. Additionally, Cycle of Dysfunction 4 evidence will show that the Army of today, although extremely modern, continues to spin, to some degree, in this same cycle of dysfunction. The Army’s combat history is filled with examples that demonstrate its first-battle ineptness, but none more clearly than the World War II Battle of Kasserine Pass in January 1943. This battle provides the full spectrum of dysfunction which includes all four of the formerly mentioned military challenges. The Army units dedicated to this battle suffered great losses in personnel and equipment. These units were plagued with significant readiness issues prior to the battle’s outbreak, officers that displayed a failure to properly command and control their elements, a political atmosphere that was less than supportive and combat doctrine that was stuck in World War I (Blumenson, 1986). Military historians describe the Battle of Kasserine Pass, the first battle of World War II, as an embarrassing event for the United States Army. A battle that produced many critical lessons learned. Martin Blumenson, a military historian, succinctly described the forces as, “undermanned and underequipped, and practiced obsolete procedures with outmoded weapons” (Blumenson, 1986, p. 227). Theses factors along with senior commander’s inability to tactically maneuver their units made for a disastrous recipe for these units. The government directed demobilization of military forces following World War I took a large toll on the Army as it executed preparedness efforts prior to World War II. The toll came in the form of significant personnel reductions, cuts in military funding and political leaders that were less than ambitious about sustaining military readiness as compared to the years prior to the end of the First World War (Blumenson, 1986). Based on these facts, the Army’s II Corp entered the Tunisia Campaign ill prepared for their assigned mission. Cycle of Dysfunction 5 As we evaluate the readiness of these units, the reduced numbers of personnel and the lack of skilled, competent leaders equated to Army combat forces that were both technically and tactically unfit for duty. The shortages in personnel made combined arms training all but impossible in the critical months prior to their first encounter with the Germans. The political sentiment of the time, lack of funding, the poor economy and reduction of troop strength negated the use of realistic training exercises for pre-war preparation (Blumenson, 1986, pp. 228-229). Although noncommissioned officers did what they do best, training Soldiers on individual tasks, larger scale collective training events were not available to validate this training. The lack of combined arms training on critical tasks and drills resulted in leaders who were less than capable of managing large units effectively. To put it simply, commanders were not proficient at command. Most importantly; however, was the fact that little had changed with the combat doctrine utilized near the end of World War I. The lack of a relevant set of doctrine was classified as a severe limitation of Army combat forces (Hickman, 2009). Briefly stated, the Army found itself in a less than optimal environment to prepare for and conduct combat operations. As one could surmise, the skilled, prepared and powerful armored forces of the German Army crushed the units that executed combat operations in the winter of 1943. In the end, the American forces suffered 300 deaths, 3,000 wounded and another 3,000 missing in action (Blumenson, 1986). These statistics paled in comparison to the casualties suffered by the opposing forces. The results of the Battle of Kasserine Pass are typical of an Army unit caught in the cycle of dysfunction created by a government seeking to forget. These results are also typical of a government seeking to capitalize on the peace dividend created by the void of war. Within this cycle of dysfunction, we find the noncommissioned officer struggling to prepare their Cycle of Dysfunction 6 Soldiers for combat with outdated weapons, limited equipment and virtually no tactics, techniques or procedures for their use. The Korean War and the efforts of Task Force Smith in the summer of 1950 display a subsequent example of dysfunction in management of our national defense. Not seven years later, our government along with Army leaders fell into the same trap of complacency as previously discussed during the onset of World War II. This period of complacency resulted in a similar performance by the units of the 24th Infantry Division (Flint, 1986). The Army noncommissioned officer, once again, found themselves in an organization void of resources while, simultaneously, being asked to prepare young Americans for combat. The 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry Regiment, Task Force Smith, along with artillery units was the first units to engage opposing forces on the eve of the Korean War (Summer, 2008). At this time, the United States Army had once again suffered national neglect resulting from the years following the end of World War II. As previously stated, this era was characterized by demobilization of personnel, reduction in funding, lack of modernization, and an unavailability of training or training resources (Flint, 1986, p. 297). Our nation was simply tired of war and wanted to do all things possible to erase the loss and suffering experienced by many Americans. Due to significant political pressure, the Army transformed from a combat force to an Army of occupation in Japan (Blumenson, 2003). The results of this stagnation and redefinition of the Army were extremely similar to that of Kasserine Pass. Task Force Smith, an element of the 24th Infantry Division would suffer the brunt of the negative consequences resulting from the apathetic stance taken by our nation and its leaders. At the point when the Army 1st Cavalry replaced the ailing 24th Division, this infantry unit lost over a third of its personnel were killed or suffered wounds as well as a large percentage Cycle of Dysfunction 7 of its equipment during this initial battle (Flint, 1986, pp. 296-297). These losses were a direct result of a lack of emphasis on the readiness of these units. Task Force Smith was sent into a combat environment without their full set of tools to accomplish their mission. To serve as an example, Christopher Eger describes the units committed as undermanned, very inexperienced in the junior ranks and without a vital tool to assist in accomplishment of their mission. This tool was an anti-tank weapon of any kind (Eger, 2009). This caused significant destruction to the units assigned to Task Force Smith. However, one tool that always seems to overcome their deficiencies is that of the noncommissioned officer. During this battle, their ability to train, lead and motivate subordinates shined (Flint, 1986, p. 298). There were numerous examples of simply heroic events by noncommissioned officers that contributed to the small success found in this battle.