International Studies Association – Annual Convention 2013

Australia’s Strategic Culture and Constraints in Defence and National Security Policymaking

Alex Burns, PhD Candidate, Monash University ([email protected])

Ben Eltham, PhD Candidate, University of Western Sydney ([email protected])

Abstract

Scholars have advanced different conceptualisations of Australia’s strategic culture. Collectively, this work contends Australia is a ‘middle power’ nation with a realist defence policy, elite discourse, entrenched military services, and a regional focus. This paper contends that Australia’s strategic culture has unresolved tensions due to the lack of an overarching national security framework, and policymaking constraints at two interlocking levels: cultural worldviews and institutional design that affects strategy formulation and resource allocation. The cultural constraints include confusion over national security policy, the prevalence of neorealist strategic studies, the Defence Department’s dominant role in formulating strategic doctrines, and problematic experiences with Asian ‘regional engagement’ and the Pacific Islands. The institutional constraints include resourcing, inter-departmental coordination, a narrow approach to government white papers, and barriers to long-term strategic planning. In this paper, we examine possibilities for continuity and change, including the Gillard Government’s Asian Century White Paper, National Security Strategy and the forthcoming 2013 Defence White Paper.

Introduction

Digging Up Silos in Australia’s National Security Community

On 23rd January 2013, the Gillard Government released Australia’s first National Security Strategy (NSS): Strong and Secure: A Strategy for Australia’s National Security.1 Amongst the NSS initiatives was a new Australian Cyber Security Centre that would coordinate Australian Federal Government expertise to combat cyber-attacks and cybercrime, provide cybersecurity and to strengthen the National Broadband Network’s rollout. At the NSS launch, Australian Prime Minister Julia Gillard claimed, “My message to the national security community is: if you see a silo, dig it up.”2 The NSS launch received extensive media coverage fr o m The Australian newspaper, independent media Crikey and New Matilda, and think-tanks including the Australian Strategic Policy Institute and the Lowy Institute.

Prime Minister Gillard’s “dig it up” silo claim is the latest salvo in academic, media, and think-tank debates about the Australian Government’s defence and national security policymaking. The claim deserves further, scholarly investigation and careful, dispassionate evaluation. Under what conditions might Australia’s defence and national security communities operate in constraints and silos? How might this possibility be assessed using publicly available information? Has the Gillard Government’s NSS addressed these possible concerns? If not, what remains to be done? This paper investigates these issues as a contribution to understanding the development and diffusion of strategic culture in Australia and in the Asian-Pacific region.

The suggestion that there might be “silos” or constraints that need to be dug up implies that Australian policymaking on defence and national security issues might currently be trapped in such compartments. What are these silos, and do they still afflict Australia's security and foreign policy-making? Almost certainly, yes. First, Australia’s Westminster political system, inherited from the United Kingdom, affects its balance of executive, legislative, and judicial powers. Despite Howard, Rudd and Gillard’s embrace of whole-of-government thinking,3 the Westminster system has created established departmental boundaries and bureaucratic institutions.4 Second, Gillard’s claim focuses on silos that are departmental, organisational, or that relate to a whole-of-government approach to inter-agency coordination. This potentially overlooks that silos can be analytic, cognitive, cultural, or influenced by long-term, culturally International Studies Association – Annual Convention 2013

transmitted factors. Third, terms like ‘national security’ have changed in meaning and scope over the past two decades: there are definitional differences and operational approaches.5

This paper explores how a deeper understanding of such distinctions about different kinds of silos might contribute to more effective, coordinated defence and national security policymaking. We argue that silos remain relevant to contemporary debates about Australia's unified national security system. In advancing this argument, we combine frameworks from the strategic culture literature (about long-term, culturally transmitted factors that might affect decision-makers) with an argumentation and coding analysis of the NSS. We consider a range of possible and plausible silos that policymakers might face, beyond inter-agency coordination. These include threat escalation and institutional capture dynamics; budgetary and legislative barriers; the public contestability and understanding of defence and national security planning documents; and the training of next generation analysts and strategic thinkers.

Australia In The Asian Century, Grand Strategy, and National Security

Gillard’s Australian In The Asian Century White Paper articulates the Australian Labor Party’s grand strategic vision of economic growth through an Asian engagement strategy.6 The Asian Century White Paper is an aspirational response to an emerging Asia-Pacific strategic cultural identity, and greater bilateral and multilateral agreements, trade, and cultural exchange between Asia-Pacific countries. The Asian Century White Paper is also an adaptation mechanism of grand strategic thinking, including to the “dilemmas of engagement” in the Asia-Pacific.7 It reflects an economic-security nexus.8 It provides a grand strategic framework to understand Australian defence and national security policymaking.

Australia faces an Asia-Pacific with China as a ‘rising’ power and the United States ‘pivoting’ towards Asia.9 It has strengthened bilateral relationships in the Asia-Pacific including with Indonesia. It has concerns about the Solomon Islands and other Pacific Island nation-states. Australia’s preferred mode of security cooperation is through bilateral and multilateral defence, trade and security treaties; and participation as a ‘middle power’ in multilateral political institutions such as the United Nations, the G20, the World Trade Organization, and other trans-national forums. In this paper we take a more narrow focus, particularly on the Gillard NSS which highlights possible constraints and silos. The Asian Century White Paper has a large scope but might not survive beyond the Gillard government.

Strategic Cultures, Constraints, and Silos

Defining Strategic Culture

One possible explanation for the development of constraints and silos in Australian defence and national security policymaking lies in the international relations literature about strategic cultures and strategic subcultures. Jack Snyder originally developed the concept of strategic culture to understand the long-term (diachronic), culturally transmitted factors such as history, geography, war experience, and politico-military institutions that might shape the Soviet use of nuclear weapons and their stance in détente negotiations.10 Snyder’s RAND report built on an earlier tradition of political psychology study of leaders, which had emerged during World War II.11 Snyder had created a new research program that others would develop.

One largely overlooked distinction Snyder made was between diachronic strategic cultures and institutional-based strategic subcultures which might compete within a nation-state, and could affect the resource-allocative dimensions of policymaking processes. In his influential strategic cultural analsis, Alastair Iain Johnston codified the subsequent yet disparate literature into a three generations framework, and developed a positivist research design to study Ming China.12 Despite this, the strategic culture literature has had several contrastive theoretical traditions, paralleling the influence of constructivist frameworks. Strategic culture has been criticised for not having the explanatory rigour of more popular neorealist frameworks and theories.13 One possible model of future theory-building development could be the microfoundations and macroconsiderations approach illustrated by strategic action fields theory.14

What can a strategic culture approach offer defence and national security decision-makers? Strategic culture focuses on ideational, long-term factors that are culturally transmitted through time (diachronic). These factors can be isolated from decision-making that is due to present-time factors (synchronic) or that are improvised. Fourth generation scholarship in strategic culture over the past decade has focused on developing a more rigorous understanding of the causal and epistemological factors involved, and policymaker relevance. Strategic culture explanations thus differ from yet relate to other approaches such as analogical reasoning about past historical events,15 and prospect theory16 about the cognitive biases and decision heuristics that policymakers can face. An awareness of these interrelated approaches International Studies Association – Annual Convention 2013

can improve decision-making processes.

The Fourth Generation’s Contribution to Strategic Culture

More recently, so-called “fourth generation” scholars such as Jeffrey Lantis,17 David Haglund,18 Patrick Porter,19 and Brice Harris20 have each explored more closely how strategic culture can inform decision-makers and policymakers. The Bush Administration’s development of the Global War on Terror as a grand strategy framework,21 and the Afghanistan and Iraq wars, underpinned this policymaking turn. Jeffrey Lantis connected strategic culture and constructivist approaches to national security policymaking.22 For Lantis, strategic culture provided novel insights compared with neorealist approaches. Other theorists have also developed the field. David Haglund has noted problems that strategic culture needs to overcome to be more parsimonious as a theoretical framework.23 Patrick Porter has critiqued the way that ‘metacultural’ theories like Samuel P. Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” hypothesis24 have been misused by historians and policymakers.25 Collectively, this fourth generation scholarship has applied the idea of strategic culture to policymaking problems and to ‘over the horizon’ threats that challenge the international system.

Fourth generation scholars have also explored how Australia’s strategic culture influences its defence policymaking. For Australia as a specific case study, the strategic cultural explanations have often reflected ‘epiphenomenal’ explanations informed by neorealism, or ‘conventional constructivism’ explanations of non-state actors.26 Michael Evans highlighted the role of cultural isolation, island geography, and naval power as enduring influences on Australia’s defence outlook.27 Evans has criticised the ‘continental’ approach of geography that has shaped much of Australia’s defence policymaking, and suggests that its liberal democratic values are the true source of a strategic culture.28 David McCraw found different strategic cultures in Australia and New Zealand, although they cooperated closely on regional security issues.29 Alan Bloomfield’s 2011 doctoral dissertation is perhaps the most in-depth analysis to-date of Australian strategic culture in relation to defence policymaking and strategic planning formulation.30 Jeffrey Lantis and Andrew Charlton found more complex strategic subcultures shaped by United States and United Kingdom alliance structures, and force power projection.31 For Lantis and Charlton, the electoral cycle and defence strategic planning meant that Australia had several competing strategic subcultures. Their insight is evident in how different political pundits vary in their evaluation of Australian defence policymaking in the

past two decades.

Australian Strategic Culture

This paper’s analysis extends the earlier work of Michael Evans,32 and Jeffrey Lantis and Andrew Charlton33 on Australian strategic culture. Evans examined how strategic culture factors including geography, sovereignty, and combat experience shaped the Australian ‘continentalist’ tradition and attempts to develop strategic alternatives. Lantis and Charlton gave a perceptive analysis of Australian Government and elite debates over the past 20 years, notably the Howard Government’s “regional defence plus” strategy: the peace-keeping mission of International Force for East Timor (INTERFET) in 1999; the humanitarian Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) in 2003; and Australian Defence Force support for the United States in Iraq and Afghanistan.34 Gillard’s NSS acknowledges this geopolitical shift.35 Our analysis highlights the different strategic subcultures that create potential constraints silos in Australian defence and national security policymaking. This position echoes Jack Snyder’s later work on the domestic bases of grand strategy.36

Michael Evans37 suggests that two competing strategic subcultures shape Australian defence and national security policymaking: “defender-regionalists” concerned with China and the regional balance of power, and “reformer-globalists” who focus on global networks and politico-mi litary diffusion.38 The “defender-regionalists” may be balance of power realists whereas the “reformer-globalists” reflects liberal institutionalism. Gillard’s Asian Century grand strategy and NSS appeal to “reformer-globalists” prioritising economic integration and multilateral institutions. This reflects the enduring influence of Australian strategists Hedley Bull and Coral Bell. The NSS responds to “defender-regionalist” fears about China stressing its military modernisation and Asia-Pacific role. Its regional engagement solutions in the Asia-Pacific broadly reflect a liberal institutionalist focus on multilateral solutions.39 For the NSS, Australia’s strategic culture ultimately emerges from “our values”, “our geography”, “our history”, “liberal democracy”, and “our reputation as a responsible member of the international community, committed to a rules-based global order.”40

International Studies Association – Annual Convention 2013

Defence Policymaking: The Australian Context

Australian defence planning has a tradition of government white papers which define “over the horizon” threats, and forecast the required joint military force structure. The current policy is articulated in the 2009 Defence White Paper, Force 2030.41 This policy emerged from 14 months of drafting, consultation, and contestability, including an academic review panel.42 The Defence White Paper posited the emergence by 2030 of China as a dominant military force in the Asia-Pacific region, and budgeted for an expansion of Australia’s maritime power projection to 12 submarines. Public responses to Force 2030 highlighted the Defence White Paper’s reliance on a neorealist view of Australia’s relationship to the international system.43 During the Keating government’s re-engagement with Asia, and later in the Rudd government, Australia’s Department of Defence was perceived to be in potential conflict with the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.44 This conflict illustrates the different theoretical stances of defensive neorealism (Department of Defence) versus liberal internationalism (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade).

Contemporary Defence White Papers have developed in a tradition that has bee strongly influenced by earlier iterations of the White Paper cycle. For instance, Australian defence policy in the 1980s and 1990s was marked by a shift towards “self-reliance” (also sometimes called the “Defence of Australia” paradigm), This shift was reflected in Paul Dibb's 1986 capabilities review and the government's 1987 Defence White Paper.45 The influence of Dibb and other senior thinkers at the time helped to create a strategic subculture in Australian strategic policymaking, including thinkers such as Dibb, Desmond Ball, Alan Dupont, and Hugh White, along with Andrew O’Neil at Griffith University, many who were affiliated with the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre (SDSC) at Australian National University.46

This politico-military elite culture remains influential today, evidenced by the prominent media profile enjoyed by Alan Dupont and Hugh White in public discussions of defence and national security policy in the media.47 Despite the criticisms that have been levelled at the SDSC by the ANU’s Peace Research Centre and the Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies,48 Jack Snyder’s theory of strategic subcultures seems well-fitted to the evident, normative, ideological differences in universities and think-tanks about defence and national security policymaking. Indeed, it could be argued that the dominance of these exemplars

possibly represents a kind of silo in itself. Without inter-generational knowledge transfer, who will be the ‘next generation’ of analysts and thinkers that will build on Ball, Dibb, Dupont, O’Neil and White’s legacy?

Constraints and Silos In Australian Defence Policymaking

Defence White Papers define ‘over the horizon’ military threats and forecast the required military force structure of land, sea and air capabilities. Paul Dibb’s influence on the Hawke Government signalled a change from Cold War ‘forward defence’ and defending the ‘air-sea’ gap to a ‘self-reliant’ stance. Hawke’s focus on macroeconomic growth and Keating’s emphasis on Asian engagement foreshadowed both the Gillard Government’s Asian Century White Paper and National Security Strategy White Paper. However, the Defence White Papers generally reflect a defensive neorealist stance. The analysis of threats, risks, opportunities and changes is framed to justify the defence force structure. The Defence White Papers thus are part of broader defence budget and resource allocation negotiations over defence force structure requirements, rather than being stand-alone strategy documents.

The public reaction to the 2009 Defence White Paper, Force 2030, illustrates a broader debate about possible silos in Australian defence policymaking. Prior to Prime Minister Kevin Rudd’s 2008 National Security Statement the defence white papers were often treated as de facto national security documents. However, the defence white papers often focused more on ‘over the horizon’ threats and joint military force structure rather than grand strategy thinking or national security issues and coordination. To-date the white paper process has rarely involved direct public consultation or academic contestability beyond pre-selected strategists: the Howard-created Australian Strategic Policy Institute has provided limited contestability, and has focused on budget and doctrine analysis.49 It rarely involves international relations frameworks other than neorealism. Actual threat scenarios are Defence-only or Top Secret so the defence white papers remain vague about the probable scenarios that defence planners and strategists might realistically face. Its fear of an “archipelago of instability”50 in the Asia-Pacific has led Australia into civil affairs and humanitarian reconstruction operations, such as the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI).51 The strategic formulation of other external threats had to be publicly vague due to diplomatic concerns about how the Defence White Papers would be received. International Studies Association – Annual Convention 2013

The focus on procurement projects for ‘next generation’ weapons systems also reflected unresolved domestic tensions about strategic subcultures and institutional capture by specific government departments. Then-Prime Minister Kevin Rudd acknowledged in his National Security Statement the need to overhaul program management, procurement and audit processes.52 The ANZAC frigates and Collins class submarines are case studies in program and budget management challenges.53 Australia’s force structure development faces institutional capture, either from security contractor lock-in for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter,54 or for local industry advocacy regarding Force 2030’s submarine projections.55 Consequently, Gillard’s NSS notes that, “Defence dominates our national security expenditure representing 68 per cent or $26 billion of total spending in 2011-12.”56

Other possible constraints and silos reflect enduring, geostrategic challenges or path dependencies. Australia’s enduring alliance structure with the United Kingdom and the United States still subtly shapes long-term planning. US President Barack Obama’s speech to the Australian Parliament on 17th November 2011 illustrates how macro-level issues such as the United States ‘pivot’ to the Asia-Pacific, and China’s growing military presence can be foreseen, yet can reorder domestic priorities.57 The domestic criticism of Australia as a “constabulary” or “Deputy Sheriff” that sends “expeditionary” forces is similar to concerns about US and European alliances raised by second generation theorists of strategic culture, and can be also traced back to the White Australia Policy and Yellow Peril fears.58 The Asian Century and National Security Strategy White Papers thus also reflect Australia’s historical concerns about the nature and scope of regional engagement.

National Security Policymaking: The Australian Context

The Gillard Government’s National Security Strategy emerged from a decade of policymaking debates in the predecessor Howard and Rudd Australian governments. The National Security Committee in the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet provides oversight of national security issues. The Secretaries Committee on National Security has an important role in interdepartmental coordination. The Rudd and Gillard governments have appointed a National Security Adviser to provide high-level policy advice. The Attorney General’s Department has

important operational responsibilities, including for critical infrastructure protection.

The Howard government debated how to create a coherent, national security framework which addressed grand strategic thinking, inter-agency coordination, and budgeting.59 Long-t er m planning, resourcing and staffing issues were addressed. This period of institutional development coincided with the Howard Government’s close diplomatic and politico-military links with the George W. Bush Administration in the United States. The alliance structure underpinned a shared politico-military worldview that would also be evident in the Counter-terrorism W h ite Paper Securing Australia – Protecting Our Community (2010).60

The Rudd Government made significant progress on national security issues. Rudd announced a National Security Adviser role that was adapted from the United States’ executive branch.61 Rudd created a small National Security and International Policy Group in the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet. He opened the new National Security College at Australian National University. On 4th December 2008, Rudd announced Australia’s first National Security Statement which defined national security in a whole-of-government context; considered a threat calculus and responses; and announced an annual national security budget.62 Collectively, these change initiatives elevated national security as a policymaking priority.

The Gillard Government at first appeared to be cautious about the predecessor Rudd Government’s reform agenda. Gillard’s NSS notes that, “National security expenditure has grown from approximately $18,600 million in 2001-02 to $33,546 million in 2011-12 (excluding aid).63 Rudd’s annual national security budget was enacted once in 2010 but not by Gillard, who made alternative budget arrangements. The National Security and International Policy Group was consolidated. Gillard announced and then delayed the National Security Strategy’s public release. On 28th September 2011, Gillard announced the Australia In The Asian Century White Paper which focused on geopolitical, diplomatic, and trade links, and multi-lateral engagement opportunities.64 The NSS reflected the Asian Century White Paper in its focus on Indonesia, China, and regional partnerships with Japan, South Korea, and India.65 On 17th November 2011, the United States President Barack Obama spoke to the Australian parliament. Obama publicly strengthened the alliance structure, and announced that the Asia-Pacific region would “a top priority” for his national security team. These events highlighted both the differences in the domestic bases of grand strategy and national security International Studies Association – Annual Convention 2013

policymaking. Close allies and the alliance structure can exert subtle pressure for Australia to develop a more coherent, unified national security system.

Constraints and Silos in Australian National Security Policymaking

In Australia's Westminster system, national leaders are chose by the party controlling a majority of the House of Representatives. In June 2010, the Australian Labor Party replaced Kevin Rudd as their leader with his deputy, Julia Gillard, making her the 27th Prime Minister of Australia.

The Rudd and Gillard governments each developed national security policymaking, primarily in the Department of Prime Minister & Cabinet, and in the Attorney General’s Department. Despite these developments, gaps and uncertainties still remain in Australia’s unified national security system. Gillard did not pursue Rudd’s promise of an annual national security budget. This was perhaps because the Department of Defence’s dominance of budget funding would make Rudd’s goal difficult to achieve in a coordinated manner. In the United States, the 1947 US National Security Act defines the national security community whilst the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act mandates a regular national security statement. To our knowledge, no similar legislative mechanism exists for a regular national security strategy in Australia, which also addresses the important budgetary processes. Instead, the legislative framework mandates a complex “diarchy” structure, which includes the National Security Legislation Amendment Act 2010 and an Independent National Security Legislation Monitor66.

Significant conceptual gaps also exist between the Rudd and Gillard government's statements on national security. Rudd67 acknowledged anthropogenic climate change68 and energy spikes69 as potential, systemic threats to national security. Indeed, resource security concerns did arise concerning the Australian firm Lynas and a 2010-12 speculative bubble in rare earths, which had created a diplomatic crisis between China and Japan, and competition between China and the United States.70 However, the Gillard Government’s National Security Strategy (NSS) did not elevate climate change resilience to the same priority level. It largely reflected the narrower conceptual parameters of traditional politico-military threats and multilateral linkages. Ben Eltham71 notes that the NSS did not fund or acknowledge major climate change initiatives, even though climate change posed a clear and present danger to national cohesion,

and despite the fact that the Gillard government had expended considerable effort in legislating a carbon tax and clean energy policy

Rudd also launched the new National Security College (NSC), based at the Australian National University in Canberra. The NSC has undertaken important work to raise awareness of national security approaches, frameworks, and methods, such as through its ‘Occasional Paper Series’ which has given the national security field a conceptual, theory-building coherence.72 However, both the NSC and the Australian Defence Force Academy’s national security program, which has revised its curricula to include strategic foresight approaches,73 are currently restricted mainly to senior Australian Government public servants and defence personnel. The NSC has organisational scope for executive and professional development programs, which would broaden the internal audience for its national security thinking. It is unclear how closely the NSC networks with other national security academics such as Carl Ungerer74 and David Martin Jones, or if there is a truly national community of practice that could embody a wisdom tradition. Thus, national security thinking and institutions still remains a ‘black box’ for many civilians, becoming visible to the general public only via occasional appearances by security intellectuals in the mass media.

Defence and intelligence strategists have relied for over a decade on complexity and systems thinking to anticipate and deal with a risk-defined world. For example, intelligence analysts distinguish between puzzles and mysteries on the one hand, and macro level problems that are complexities or mysteries-plus.75 Theorists such as John Urry,76 Robert Jervis77 and the late James N. Rosenau78 have each developed rich conceptual frameworks to understand the causal dynamics and interplay of the international relations system. However, it is unclear to us whether such conceptual frameworks were used to develop Gillard’s NSS. Nor are complexity and systems dynamics understood in the ‘wedge politics’ of Australia’s domestic debate about asylum seekers, which polarises the electorate, and affects domestic power-sharing between the major and minor political parties.79 Instead, the NSS frames this as a traditional security threat of “border integrity”, “people smuggling”, and “irregular maritime migration” resolved through partnership-based solutions.80

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Combining Defence and National Security Perspectives

The Risk-Opportunities Calculus

Gillard’s NSS situates national security as part of a risk-opportunities calculus that underpins the Asian Century White Paper’s vision of increased regional engagement with the Asia-Pacific region.81 This regional engagement is framed in terms of diplomatic, economic, and social integration. Defence force structure is framed simultaneously as defensive to protect Australian sovereignty and with power projection capabilities to pursue ‘middle power’ interests. This Janus-like duality links the Defence White Paper of 2009 with Gillard’s NSS in their discussion of international systems issues including China’s military modernisation; role in multilateral institutions and regional balance of power; and bilateral links.82 These are ‘middle power’ responses and attempts to accommodate changes in the “global strategic reordering” of the international system.

Long-Term Security Threats

We agree with Lantis and Charlton83 that Australian Defence White Papers have developed a more nuanced understanding of Asia-Pacific geopolitics. Australia’s defence posture has been modified to include humanitarian, peacekeeping, stabilisation, disaster and emergency response, and careful use of Special Forces capabilities in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, both the Defence White Paper of 2009 and Gillard’s NSS of 2012 have difficulty in conceptualising long-term threats. Instead, key challenges are pushed out to later years: a challenge of forecast-oriented futures studies and strategic foresight work. One important exception to this is Andrew O’Neil’s work on conceptualising future threats to Australian security.84 Another is that strategic cultural frameworks could provide estimative intelligence on insurgent and long-term terrorist groups such as Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia—Ejército del Pueblo.85

Study Methodological Framework

Below we discuss some possible silos in Australian defence and national security policymaking. First, we discuss the Australian historical and institutional contexts. Constraints and silos often emerge from strategic subcultures that exist as deep worldviews and

institutional logics that specific organisations thus enact. Nobel economics laureate Douglass C. North recognised this in his distinction between institutions and organisations, in his pioneering work on the new institutional economics.86 Next, we discuss the nature and scope of the possible constraints and silos. Awareness of constraints and silos can reframe and reinvigorate current academic, media, and think-tank debates, which may move between North’s different levels of institutions (norms) and organisations (players).

This paper also uses a three-phase process to analyse the Gillard Government’s National Security Strategy (2013). Our methodological approach is located primarily in the fourth generation of strategic culture theory. It builds on definitional aspects of Alastair Iain Johnston’s third generation work, and revives a ‘level of analysis’ distinction in Jack Snyder’s original RAND paper.87 Our proposed methodology:

1. Discovery: We situated the Gillard Government’s NSS in terms of the Howard, Rudd and Gillard Government’s debates and policymaking initiatives about national security. We suggest below that the NSS emerged from a decade-long debate in the Howard Government about national security policymaking. The Gillard Government’s NSS also built on the predecessor Rudd Government’s reform agenda for national security.

2. Coding: We coded the Gillard Government’s NSS inductively using open, axial, and in vivo methods.88 We coded the NSS for the following topics: grand strategy outlook; national security frameworks; national security threats and issues; institutional mechanisms; and strategic culture factors. These will each be discussed below in further detail. A structured, comparative coding of the NSS with other recent Australian Government white papers is beyond this paper’s scope but would highlight how national security policymaking has deeper relationships to defence, trade, and grand strategy policymaking and processes.

3. Analysis: We analysed the Gillard Government’s NSS using a mixed methods approach. Structured thematic analysis enabled us to identify deeper themes in the NSS from the Coding phase.89 Thematic analysis enables the NSS to be assessed and evaluated in terms of possible analytic objectives; the prevalence of themes which might suggest underlying values and worldviews; and for deeper, exploratory analysis. Argumentation analysis provides a structured way to identify the patterns in International Studies Association – Annual Convention 2013

policymaker reasoning that the prior Coding phase might overlook.90 Argumentation provides one way to develop rules-based approaches to document analysis. This framework also builds on previous comparative analysis we did of Iran’s 2009 election crisis and social media use.91

We also recognise that both Coding and Analysis are open-ended and exploratory processes which can be strengthened through inter-rater reliability practices; self-awareness of cognitive biases and belief schemas; and communal verification. Robert Jervis illustrates an ‘after action review’ or post-mortem process, about analytic failures in intelligence agencies,92 which others could use to build on this paper’s provisional analysis of the Gillard Government’s NSS.

The Contribution of Conceptual, Theory-Building Cycles

Our awareness of conceptual, theory-building cycles also shapes how we approach national security issues and methodological use. International relations theorists from schools of thought other than neorealism have struggled for over two decades to influence Australian defence and national security policymaking.93 For Alan Dupont and William J. Reckmeyer, this is “because they are either too theoretical, unfocused or overly quantitative in their approaches.”94 W e argue a middle ground of theory-informed estimative assessments that are policymaker relevant and communicable with clarity. Deep thinking on grand strategy and national security requires an awareness of different, competing political philosophies, statecraft, and creative solutions to perennial problems.95 Michael Evans96 also argues for the role of theory in conceptualising, framing, and communicating national security problems.

Methodological solutions such as Dupont and Reckmeyer’s advocacy of a System of Systems approach encode hidden theoretical assumptions which must be surfaced and considered, such as from the complexity and systems literature, or program management experience and diffusion of politico-military reforms.97 Good theory informs the art dimension that Dupont and Reckmeyer seek in national security thinking. The late Terry Deibel’s model of United States statecraft taught at the US-based National War College is one example of a wisdom tradition.98 We need to train future policymakers in how to conceptualise and think about national security problems and priorities.

The Gillard NSS: National Security Challenges, Issues and Problems

The possible existence of constraints or silos in Australian defence and national security policymaking poses a challenge to fourth generation literature on strategic culture. Its theorists need to heed Jack Snyder’s original distinction between enduring, culturally transmitted strategic cultures and competing strategic subcultures that may take institutional and organisational form.99 There is also always the risk that policymakers will use analytic insights for their own ends and priorities, regardless of the wisdom tradition in defence and national security institutions.100

Gillard’s NSS represents an important step in developing a unified national security system in Australia. We can learn from re-evaluations of the United States’ national security system, and reform attempts to better coordinate inter-agency processes.101 To grow, the NSS development process needs to integrate the structured, analytic practices from the US National Security Council and National Intelligence Council. The Office for National Assessments’ integrative approach on estimative threat assessment and strategic issues analysis remains important for a whole-of-government approach. Civilian input such as via Australian Research Council grants, think-tanks like the Australian Strategic Policy Institute and the Lowy Institute, and university research networks (such as the Research Network for a Secure Australia) will deepen the unified national security system. Different strategic subcultures need to be embraced to overcome the limits of institutional path dependency. Few people understand the complexity of the unified national security system and budget process, such as Mark Thomson of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute.

Regional Security Cooperation

One aspect of Australia’s strategic culture is “a long history of security cooperation with nations across the Asia-Pacific.”102 This period spans the Hawke, Keating, Howard, Rudd and Gillard governments over the past 20 years in Australia. The NSS acknowledges a strong partnership with New Zealand in Asia-Pacific security issues despite the differences in their respective strategic cultures. Multilateral arrangements such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the Five Power Defence Arrangements, and bilateral links with Japan, South Korea, and India are highlighted.103 Although the Pacific Island Nations are highlighted the International Studies Association – Annual Convention 2013

security challenges mentioned include Fiji’s democratic transition; Papua New Guinea’s growth; disaster and emergency response; regional law enforcement; migration flows; and fisheries. The deeper aspects of Pacific Island Nations and climate change adaptation are not explored in sufficient detail.

Eight Pillars

Gillard’s NSS frames its national security priorities around eight pillars and aligned programs. The eight pillars are a mix of grand strategy, national interests, security threats, and state power instruments.104 The eight pillars include the Australia-United States Alliance, promoting the international order, and being influential in the world and the Asia-Pacific (grand strategy); strengthening resilience and border integrity (national interests); and deterring attacks, terrorism, espionage, and organised crime (security threats and state power instruments).

This combination illustrates how strategic subcultures, institutional capture, and threat securitization have shaped Australia’s national security frameworks, rather than an overarching conceptual or theory-building approach. An in-depth analysis of specific program level initiatives is beyond the scope of this paper, but would highlight strategic subcultures, institutional dynamics, and the effectiveness of strategy formulation. Richard Rumelt, a business professor at University of California, Los Angeles, has done this level of analysis on the Bush Administration’s 2002 National Security Strategy.105

Global Challenges

Gillard’s NSS lists seven “broader global challenges with national security implications.”106 Although climate change is acknowledged it is not as central to Gillard’s NSS as it was to Rudd’s National Security Statement. The remaining six—demographics, urbanisation, corruption, internet growth, violent political groups, and resources security—represent a mix of macro level trends; meso level groups; and traditional security threats (such as inter-state

rivalry and trans-national security threats). It is unclear if dynamical modelling from complexity and systems frameworks were used to understand ‘proximate’ (near) and ‘distal’ (far away) causal relationships and flows.107 Although the NSS goes beyond event and threat-based analysis, it does not deal with the “complex interactions”108 of these global challenges.

National Security Budget Process

The national security budget remains a significant issue. The Rudd government announced an annual national security budget in its 2008 National Security Statement. Its first national security budget was delivered in 2010. However, the abrupt change to the Gillard government stalled Rudd’s reform agenda. Gillard’s NSS mentions but does not adequately detail the current processes for national security budgets. The NSS highlights that defence and military spending outweighs other government departments and non-military threats. This is a problem given that other government departments are relatively unfunded and that non-military threats are rising as national security problems. The NSS adopts organisation-level instead of program-level budgeting. However, there is still ongoing debate about which government departments and agencies should be included in a unified national security system. These tensions are reflected in the United States’ attempts to develop national security budgets in a whole-of-government approach.109

Australian Cyber Security Centre

One of the Gillard NSS’s most high-profile initiatives is the Australian Cyber Security Centre (ACSC). The ACSC integrates relevant expertise from different Australian Government departments and intelligence agencies: the Department of Defence, the Attorney General’s Department, the Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation, the Australian Federal Police, and the Australian Crime Commission. The ACSC illustrates the Gillard Government’s emphasis on a coordinated, whole-of-government approach to national security issues.

The ACSC also illustrates the Copenhagen School’s securitization process for how ‘over the horizon’ threats are transformed into national security problems that shape budget, program and resource allocation decisions. Richard Clarke, a counterterrorism expert with National International Studies Association – Annual Convention 2013

Security Council experience in the Clinton and Bush Administrations, raised public awareness in a 2010 book modelled on early nuclear war strategists.110 Bradley Manning’s leak of diplomatic cables to Wikileaks and the Anonymous hack of the geopolitics intelligence publisher Stratfor created a broader debate about cyber-activism, cyber-attacks, and national security institutions. In Australia, fears of Asia-Pacific rivalry and escalation scenarios, and cyber-attacks on BHP and Rio Tinto in the mining and resources sector led to national security debates and coordinated activities.111 The ACSC is a visible result of this securitization process and it shaped the public reception of Gillard’s NSS.

Afghanistan

A major near-term focus of Gillard’s NSS is on Afghanistan.112 Australia has been closely involved with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, including transition arrangements expected to be completed by 2014. Gillard’s NSS notes Australia’s continued involvement via Special Forces deployment; its 2013-14 membership of the United Nations Security Council; and its whole-of-government strategy for Afghanistan. However, it is unclear how these will be integrated into Afghanistan’s strategic culture, or whether a whole-of-government approach developed in the United States, United Kingdom, and Australia can be implemented. The emphasis on Afghanistan highlights how commitments in the Australia-United States Alliance can affect defence force structure, and can shape which national security problems are prioritised.

Climate Change

The debate over climate change illustrates a change in national security priorities between the Rudd and Gillard governments. Climate change emerged as a national security issue in the post-Cold War ‘interregnum’113 when non-military issues grew in significance. Climate change is a complex, multi-dimensional and nonlinear problematique which challenges how national strategic communities think about long-term and nonlinear threats.114 Simultaneously, constructivist, post-positivist, and actor-network discourse from the Aberystwyth school (which had influenced first generation work on strategic culture),115 the Paris school, and the Copenhagen school illustrated different, new views to the prevailing

neorealist approach that dominates national security thinking.116

These different trajectories combined in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations debates about Burma’s politico-military reforms, environmental degradation, and how small island developing states (SIDS) might adapt to climate change impacts.117 Reflecting these concerns, the Rudd government announced climate change impacts as the most significant national security issue in its 2008 National Security Statement. However, the Gillard government’s NSS does not reflect the same priorities. Although Gillard accepted climate change as a threat her NSS preferred to highlight cyber-espionage and cyberwarfare threats as the ‘clear and present danger’ facing Australians. The change between the Rudd and Gillard governments reflects the “failed securitization”118 of climate change as a national security issue, and broader public disenchantment with scientific debates.

Given both the ASEAN debates and Australia’s humanitarian and stabilisation role in Pacific-based SIDS, we argue Gillard has her national security priorities wrong.119 The change possibly reflects institutional capture dynamics between competing strategic subcultures in the formulation and development of Gillard’s NSS. For national security practitioner Michael Evans,120 it is still too early to place environmental threats in a risk or threats framework, due to the current state of scientific knowledge. However, one potential criticism of this may be the assumptions used in the risk-opportunities calculus and the risk-oriented approach that underpins Australian national security policymaking.121 A further way to de-politicise the links between climate change and national security policymaking is to develop risk registers.122 Defence and national security resource allocation is likely to be influenced by the downstream effects of climate change impacts.123

Future Directions

The NSS contains an extensive list of ‘Future Directions’ including regional coordination with China, India, Japan, South Korea, and the United States.124 Thus, Australia’s strategic culture is ‘mediated’ in the Asia-Pacific region through bilateral relationships, trilateral dialogues, and multilateral institutions. These aspects of the Gillard NSS interface with the Asian Century White Paper in which the risk-opportunity calculus of national security supports economic and regional integration. However, if the Asian Century White Paper is discarded by a future International Studies Association – Annual Convention 2013

Australian Government – such as a conservative Australian Liberal Party-dominated administration – then how will this affect future National Security Strategies?

National Security Strategies: A Comparative Evaluation of US, UK and Australian Experiences

To understand the development of Australia’s NSS we also need to triangulate its formulation with concurrent debates in the United States and the United Kingdom which reveal continuity and change dynamics. Australia has organisational continuity with the United Kingdom in terms of the Westminster political system; Cabinet-level oversight of national security; and the adoption of a whole-of-government approach. Australia has doctrinal continuity with the United States in terms of the new ideas and reform options that are adopted in Australian defence, and now, national security discussions. This process of doctrinal continuity appears to also fit the Copenhagen School’s securitization approach, as demonstrated by the shift from the Rudd Government’s emphasis on climate change to the Gillard Government’s emphasis on cyber-espionage and cyber-warfare as the dominant national security threats.

The United States Experience and National Security Strategy

During the Clinton and George W. Bush Administrations the national security climate changed in the United States. Civil-military issues such as defence and economic espionage, and the diffusion of politico-military secrets into the private sector, became significant national security problems. These trends changed the balance between military and non-military dimensions of national security policy. They reflected perennial national security concerns about surprise, deception, denial and warning.125 They also illustrated the meso-level tensions between the United States and China, and the concerns in 2010-11 in Australia about cyber-espionage in the mining and resources sector, and possible cyberwarfare attacks. Gillard’s NSS priorities reflect this evolution of national security problems over the past two decades.

US President Barack Obama released the latest US National Security Strategy on 27th May 2010.126 Obama posited a ‘necessary force’ doctrine to deal with national security problems. Obama scaled back the emphasis on pre-emption from the Bush Administration’s National

Security Strategies of 2002 and 2006. Whilst Obama rearticulated the ‘necessity’ of the use of force to confront ‘evil’ actors, he also grounded this in ‘just war’ theory and multilateral responses.127 Obama’s NSS echoed the Kennedy Administration’s ‘flexible response’ doctrines in its emphasis on Special Forces capabilities and expertise.128

The shift from the Bush to the Obama Administration doctrines appeared, at first, to reflect a debate between neoconservatism, realism, and democratic peace theories of national security.129 Post-election euphoria conveyed that Obama might take a more idealistic view of national security,130 but this view faded with the continuation of the Afghanistan conflict, the Arab Spring, and the development of drone warfare. Obama’s critics pointed to the continuity of some national security challenges from the Bush Administration including the focus on Al Qaeda; Middle East stability as a high priority; and the influence of politico-military institutions on Obama Administration decision-makers.131 Underlying these doctrinal debates was recognition – best articulated by the 2008 Project on National Security Reform by the Center for the Study of the Presidency - that institutional reforms were urgently needed: a comprehensive national security budget, a coordinated interagency process, and an expansion of the national security establishment. The institutional reform needs are traceable back to the 1947 National Security Act and how it defined the US unified national security system.132

The United Kingdom Experience and National Security Strategy

United Kingdom Prime Minister David Cameron released the National Security Strategy (NSS) and the Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) in October 2010.133 Cameron’s Coalition government overshadowed its national security reforms with the SDSR emphasis on defence budgetary constraints. Although the SDSR adopted a risk-based approach it struggled to rationalise the UK’s military force structure or to address long-term structural issues.134 Treasury’s economic forecasting and fiscal policies, and fears of economic decline, now influenced politico-military decision-ma k ing. In contrast, the UK NSS of 2010 reflected the Westminster system of Cabinet-level oversight; the UK National Security Council coordinating the review process with a National Security Adviser role; and an annual national security budget.135

However, the UK NSS also had several major and unresolved problems, confirming our constraints or silos hypothesis. The review process highlighted that the UK lacked a International Studies Association – Annual Convention 2013

comprehensible grand strategic narrative (informed by awareness of culturally transmitted strategic culture) which articulated its decisive, unique role in the world.136 The risk-based emphasis on national security problems obscured a lack of deeper conceptual clarity about what ‘national security’ means or strategic coherence.137 The review process also inevitably revealed interdepartmental conflicts which could not be made public.138 Cameron’s 2010 NSS made progress on institutional reforms for national security whilst its risk-based doctrine appears to be shaped by budget and fiscal constraints, and the domestic political cycle.

A Comparative Assessment

A visible pattern of policymaking and shared learning emerges from a comparison of the United States, United Kingdom, and Australian experiences. The US has long-term constraints and silos due to how the 1947 National Security Act structured its national security system.139 US doctrinal innovations and reforms are diffused to Australia via the Australia-United States Alliance and ‘norm entrepreneurs’. The UK’s Westminster organisational reforms in their 2010 National Security Statement echo the Obama Administration and the Howard, Rudd and Gillard governments’ whole-of-government approach. All three have adopted a risk-based approach, with the United States and Australia considering a System of Systems for defence force interoperability.140 All three countries have national security policies that are defence-heavy and that are still to integrate non-military security threats. Patrick Porter contends that the UK National Security Strategy lacks a conceptual grounding in grand strategy perspectives on ways, means, and ends.141 In contrast, Gillard has attempted to ‘nest’ her NSS within the Asian Century White Paper as an Asia-Pacific-oriented grand strategy.142 All three countries also deal with budget and fiscal constraints in strategy formulation. This means that any diachronic, culturally transmitted aspects of strategic culture are now shaped by more short-term, reactionary economic thinking. Each country’s strategic culture also reflects a ‘way of war’ approach.143

Reassessing The ‘Keepers’ of Strategic Culture, Defence and National Security

Patrick Porter has asked who the ‘keepers’ are of strategic culture.144 This is important for comparative analysis of national security strategies. One complication is the gap between conceptual analysis, policymaker and institutional response, and organisational design in national strategy formulation.145 Australia’s goal of a unified national security system draws

on the United Kingdom experience and the Westminster political system, whilst also being informed by United States doctrinal approaches, and the influence of domestic politico-military institutions and strategic subcultures. Collectively, these forces and influences shape the formulation process of national security strategy, rather than the perennial wisdom approach of grand strategy, which also informed the later work of first generation strategic culture researchers like Colin S. Gray.146 Porter’s question also reflects who is responsible in the Copenhagen School’s securitization approach for selecting, prioritising and communicating specific national security issues and problems. The Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet has a significant oversight role for Australia’s national security.

Gillard’s NSS is the latest development in a national security debate that is over two decades old. Alan Dupont, Michael Evans, Brice Pacey, Hugh White, Andrew O’Neil, and others have each been ‘norm entrepreneurs’ who as experienced national security practitioners have shaped the debate’s scope and parameters. The Hawke and Keating governments focused on the need for a national security approach unique to Australia. The Howard government differentiated national security from defence policymaking, and considered its role in terms of the Australia-United States Alliance. The Rudd government proposed a national security framework which the Gillard government has adapted to current threats, risks, and opportunities. The ‘norm entrepreneurs’ followed a process identified in the new institutional economics.147 First, the conceptual and institutional logics had to be developed. Only then could the appropriate organisational form be adopted for programmatic and strategic implementation.

Porter’s ‘keepers’ of strategic culture also reflect the creation and circulation of politico-military elites. For instance, the National Security College at Australian National University in Canberra has done important work on the conceptual and institutional logics of national security policymaking. Its current focus is to train Australian Government officials in national security thinking, issues analysis, and policymaking responsibilities. Other university programs such as at Griffith University, University of Sydney and Monash University enable the circulation of new strategists. However, this means that national security issues are likely to be discussed amongst a self-selective policymaker audience, compared with other socio-political issues and problems.

International Studies Association – Annual Convention 2013

Conclusion: Strategic Culture and National Security: Continuity, Change or Bayesian Updating?

Continuities in Australian Strategic Culture

Lantis and Charlton148 point to several continuities in Australian strategic culture including liberal democratic governments, and the role of elite frames to interpret and respond to geopolitical events. They argue that Australia evidences an incrementalist approach to defence and national security policymaking, as well as crisis responses to exogenous shocks. Our analysis highlights several reasons for these continuities. Australia’s Westminster government system shapes the scope and nature of national security institutions, despite a whole-of-government approach. The Australia-United States Alliance shapes defence interoperability and the lag of Australian doctrines compared with the United States: a neorealist example of alliance ‘lock-in’.149 Australian national security policymaking has limits on its conceptual frameworks; is still dominated by defence institutions and budgets; emphasises traditional threats and trends; and is still integrating non-military threats into the risk-opportunities calculus. Collectively, these continuities highlight the possible existence of constraints and silos in Australian defence and national security policymaking.

Changes in National Security Problems

The Gillard NSS recognises that geopolitical change can affect Australia’s strategic culture. Australia must understand global trends; the “global strategic reordering” of the international system; and the possibility of shocks. These shocks may emerge from several sources: the economic and security influence of other nation-states in the Asia-Pacific region including middle powers; competition and rivalry in “military modernisation” between regional actors; and non-state actors such as trans-national criminal networks, terrorist organisations, and ‘hacktivist’ groups. The concerns about non-state actors reflect a predominantly realist interpretation of constructivist ideas, and concerns over groups ranging from Al Qaeda to ‘hacktivist’ groups including Anonymous and Wikileaks. Consequently, these reflect more ‘synchronic’ or present concerns than the ‘diachronic’, culturally transmitted aspects of strategic culture.

A Third Option? Bayesian Updating of Defence and National Security Beliefs

There is an ‘excluded middle’ between Lantis and Charlton’s options of change and continuity: the Bayesian updating of prior beliefs including via a structured, analytic post-mortem process.150 This would allow for diachronic, culturally transmitted strategic culture to be modified, as Patrick Porter has suggested occurs with combat experience and adversary learning.151 Examples of this in Gillard’s NSS include continued concerns about nuclear weapons proliferation in the Asia-Pacific and North Korea’s nuclear agenda; the Pacific ‘arc of instability’ including peace-keeping work in the Solomon Islands and Timor-Leste; Australia’s contribution to the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan and regime transition plans; and awareness of the ‘shadow war’ between the United States and Iran.152 North Korea, Afghanistan and the Solomon Islands illustrate how Australia keeps a ‘watching brief’ on regional developments that could require changes in defence force structure or may create new national security problems. The Gillard NSS’s adoption of the geopolitical construct ‘Indo-Pacific’ to counterbalance the use of ‘Asia-Pacific’ also illustrates the processes of Bayesian updating in grand strategy discourse.153

The Australia-United States Alliance

The Australia-United States Alliance provides continuity in the geopolitical structure that Australia frames its force structure development and power projection within. The Gillard Government’s Asian Century White Paper echoes the Keating Government’s earlier engagement with Asia. This shows a continuity in the domestic Australian Labor Party whilst the domestic Australian Liberal Party was oriented during the Howard Government to maintaining the Australia-United States Alliance. A further continuity aspect that our research uncovers is that Australian defence and national security doctrine is often shaped with the US-Australian Alliance structure and force interoperability measures in mind. For Brice Pacey, this was effects-based operations154 whilst for Alan Dupont and William J. Reckmeyer it was a System of Systems approach.155 However, this means that Australian defence and national security discourse often lags the United States: new ideas are proposed but sometimes without the reflective awareness of operational problems. For example Australia adopted elements of both the Revolution in Military Affairs and Network-Centric Warfare, for pragmatic alliance reasons of interoperability, although this decision imposed limits on defence force structure International Studies Association – Annual Convention 2013

and doctrinal development in the context of collective security.156 The major barrier which is also a continuity is the separation of theoretically-informed conceptual debates about defence and national security from policymakers and decision-makers.

Public Contestation

Australia has recently opened up its debates on defence and national security policymaking to the broader public. There is limited, controlled contestation. The planned 2013 Defence White Paper had a round of public submissions. The Lowy Institute ran extensive public commentaries on the 2012 Asian Century White Paper and the 2012 National Security Strategy, featuring academics and public intellectuals. But this public engagement is largely separate from the White Paper formulation process, or the interdepartmental debates about defence force structure and national security problems. It is unclear if policymakers are actually influenced or whether this is domestic perception management and elite framing. There will always be information asymmetries in these debates, due to the compartmentalised, national security system, and the Australia-United States Alliance. Australia can learn from US bodies like the National Intelligence Council and the Central Intelligence Agency’s Sherman Kent Center on Intelligence. The Office of National Assessments is ideally placed to develop an analytical culture that can inform national security policymaking.157

Towards A New National Security Strategy?

Gillard’s NSS commits to releasing a new National Security Strategy roughly every five years.158 It is unclear how the NSS release will be aligned with electoral-driven government changes or if it will be aligned with the formulation and public release of future Defence White Papers. It is unclear as with the Goldwater-Nichols Act in the United States what the legislative requirements for a new NSS will be. A change in Australian government could alter the scope and priorities of future National Security Strategies. This would mean the constraints and silos identified in this paper—including conceptual and theory-building barriers; ‘keepers’ of strategic culture and strategic subcultures; national security problems; defence force dominance of non-military security threats; national security budget and oversight arrangements; politico-military elite creation and circulation—for Australian defence and national security policymaking could still remain for the near-term future.

Acknowledgments

The authors thank Jeffrey Lantis (Chair), Patrick Porter (Discussant) and the panellists of ‘Cultures and Security Policies in the Asia-Pacific Region: Continuity or Change?’ (International Studies Association Annual Convention 2013).

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