Looking Ahead: Security Challenges in the Balkans through 2010
2
Looking Ahead: Security Challenges in the Balkans through 2010
István Gyarmati and Theodor Winkler, Editors Marc Remillard and Scott Vesel, Associate Editors
Belgrade ● 2002
3 Looking Ahead: Security Challenges in the Balkans through 2010 Published by: EastWest Institute, New York Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces Edited by: Ambassador Dr. István Gyarmati Ambassador Dr. Theodor Winkler
Asssociate Editors: Marc Remillard Scott Vesel Proofreader: Elizabeth Seuling Cover design: Marija Vuksanović Type setting: Leviathan Design Executive publisher:
Centre for Civil Military Relations, Belgrade
Printed by: Goragraf, Beograd © 2002 EastWest Institute and Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces
ISBN–86–83543–06–4 Belgrade ● 2002
4 TABLE OF CONTENTS Foreword – Carl Bildt ...... 7
Introduction – István Gyarmati and Theodor Winkler ...... 13 A Russian Perspective on National Security Dilemmas in South Eastern Europe – Vladimir Baranovsky and Dmitri Glinski Vassiliev ...... 17 The OSCE and Regional Security in South Eastern Europe – Vladimir Bilandžić ...... 34 American Perspectives on Balkan Security – James Dobbins ...... 57 Regional Security Issues in South Eastern Europe: A Council of Europe Perspective – Hans Peter Furrer ...... 65 The Main Issues of Regional Security in South Eastern Europe: A Yugoslav Perspective – Miroslav Hadžić ...... 81 The Security Situation in the Balkans through 2010 – François Heisbourg ...... 102 The Austrian View on Regional Security in South Eastern Europe – Predrag Jureković ...... 115 The Stability of the Balkans through 2010: A View from Hungary – Arnold Koltai ...... 121 Germany’s Policy towards South Eastern Europe – Joachim Krause ...... 137 Security in South Eastern Europe in the Coming Decade – Zvonimir Mahečić ...... 147 New Approaches to Security in the Balkans – Sašo Ordanoski ...... 163 Albania, the Balkans and the Future – Auron Pasha ...... 173 Yugoslavia: The Economic Dimension of Security over the Next Decade – Norman Scott ...... 183 Key Regional Security Issues in South Eastern Europe – Gerard Stoudmann ...... 201 Security in South Eastern Europe in the Next 10 15 Years – Bisera Turković ...... 212 A Swiss Perspective on Key Regional Security Issues in South Eastern Europe through 2010 – Philippe Welti ...... 235
5 6 Foreword Carl Bildt Special Envoy of the UN Secretary General for South Eastern Europe There is no other part of the continent of Europe where security issues are as challenging as they are in the Balkan area. And there is no way in which one can look ahead towards their resolution without first looking back at their origins. During the 19 th century, the question of what was then often re ferred to as the Near East was high up on the international agenda. The Congress of Berlin in 1878 still often figures in discussions concerning the order of the region. As Europe entered the 20 th century, the problems of the Balkans erupted one time after another. The first major political crisis of Eu rope in the 20 th century was the crisis in 1908 over Bosnia’s sover eignty, followed by the First and the Second Balkan Wars. Then, the lights went out all over Europe as a result of the sequence of events initiated in Sarajevo on the 28 th of June, 1914. And much as the first decade of the 20 th century was dominated by the conflicts in the Balkans, the last decade of the century was as well. When the evil Soviet empire, and the Soviet Union itself, came crashing down between 1989 and 1991, there was a feeling that we were entering a new period of both peace and freedom, in which old conflicts and confrontations would melt away as open societies and free economies asserted themselves around the world. There was talk about the end of history. But it was in the Balkans that we were first forced to confront the old realities of the new era. Here, we saw the comeback of history with a force that took practically all international actors by surprise. It will be some time until a full account of the different international interventions in the region during these years can be written, but when that is done, it is unlikely that any of the major actors will emerge with much glory. As an international community, we stumbled from crisis to crisis, and from short term response to short term policies. It was not our most glorious hour. Today, the guns are silent in the Balkans. Occasional bursts of rifles in Mitrovica or Tetovo do not alter the main picture. But the reality is that the absence of open conflict is more a function of the
7 presence of major international military forces in Kosovo, Bosnia and Macedonia than of genuine reconciliation and reintegration in the region itself. With core issues of the conflicts still open, there is neither the prospect for a fast withdrawal of these forces, nor for the speedy integration into a wider European economic and political framework that has become the new gospel of the region. Thus, the task as we look ahead must be to discuss how we can address the core issues of the conflicts, facilitate compromises that meet the minimum demands of everyone while meeting the maximum demands of no one, provide incentives for the necessary economic and political reforms in the different parts of the region, and thus over time pave the way for the self sustaining stability and gradual normalisa tion of the region. This will not be possible without understanding the nature of the conflicts in the region. During the height of the controversies over the war in Bosnia, a school of thought that spoke about “ancient hatreds” was seen as standing against a school that laid the blame for everything on the policies of Serb leader Slobodan Milošević. As the conflict over Kosovo threatened to explode, the spokesman for the US State Department proclaimed that Milošević was not part of the problem of the region, but was in fact “the problem” that had to be tackled in this part of Europe. Today, simplistic notions of this sort have largely disappeared, and we South Eastern Europe the emergence of a broad consensus that stresses both the historical and structural tensions of the region and the irresponsibility of ruthless individual leaders in using and aggravating them. The International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia (ICTY) is supposed to deal with the latter issue, while wise statesmanship in the region and the international community must tackle the former. What makes this part of Europe different from all others is its long history as part of a series of multi national empires, starting from the days of Rome and Byzantium, and continuing through half a millennium of rule by Istanbul, and in some cases by Vienna. Throughout these long centuries, they developed a mosaic of cultures and nationalities throughout the region that lead to massive problems as the empires started to crumble and the idea of the nation state emerged as the organizing principle for a new Europe. The fundamental problem of the region during the past century and a half has been the conflict between the multi national realities throughout the region and the national rhetoric and ambitions of dif ferent leaders. While it was possible in other parts of Europe to draw up borders separating different nation states from each other, in the Balkans these borders tended to be drawn in blood, as they nearly always separated brothers from each other, and as patterns of majority 8 and minority changed with the way borders were drawn, states were set up or political conflicts were managed. Today, it is obvious that the successive efforts to set up a common state of the Southern Slavs – a Yugoslavia – have failed. Relations between the dominant Serbs and the determined Croats turned out to be too complex to be handled within a common framework. But it was the process of separation between the two that led first to the wars in Croatia itself, centred on its areas with substantial Serb populations, and then in the highly complex and often contested land of Bosnia. One can only regret that this conflict has now been settled primar ily through a very high degree of ethnic separation. Leaders in Bel grade clearly aimed at establishing some sort of wider Serb dominated area, including areas of Croatia and Bosnia, but have instead ended up with the largest number of refugees of any country in Europe. Before 1992, Sarajevo was a symbol of different cultures meeting and living together. It was, in fact, the second largest Serb city in the region. Today, although there has been an encouraging trend towards refugee return in Bosnia in the last few years, the reality in Sarajevo as well as throughout the region is a very different one. If economic and political reforms continue in both Serbia and Croatia, and if both these countries continue their pursuit of economic and political integration with the European Union, there should be room for the gradual improvement in the situation in Bosnia as well. But so far we have seen its leaders more interested in continued conflicts over constitutional arrangements which have resulted in structures making the country increasingly ungovernable, than in the profound economic and social reforms that would give hope not the least to the young people of the country. And too often the international community has been too willing to play along with these games, neglecting the long term viability of the structures they have helped set up. With European integration over time perhaps taking some of the rough edges off the reality of ethnic separation between Serbs and Croats, the question mark hangs much lower over the future of the large fracture zone between wider Slav and Albanian interests in the region. The question of the status of Kosovo is by no means resolved, and as long as that is the case, there are risks that the expectations of the one side and the fears of the other will fuel instability in the wide area from Montenegro to Macedonia, with potentially dangerous con sequences. Here, we will once more be faced with the core issue of integra tion or disintegration in the region. While the rhetoric of the interna tional community has always been one of integration, the reality has often been somewhat different, with acceptance of the reality of dis integration sometimes seen as a more expedient short term policy,
9 ignoring warnings that there is no obvious end to the cycle of disintegration in the region. In much the same way as some leaders in Zagreb also recently dreamt about a Greater Croatia that, inspired by previous periods of Croat independence, would take in large parts of Bosnia, and as lead ers in Belgrade sought to create some sort of Greater Serbia, there is no doubt that there are ambitions to create some sort of Greater Albania community, although here far less formal and state like than might have been the case with the Croats or the Serbs. The different Albanian dominated parts of the region have been differently shaped by recent history, often look in different directions and lack a clear and common political and economic centre, but there is no denying the very strong cultural and national links between them. The same statue of Skenderbeg dominates the central squares of both Tirana and Priština, and the same national flag flies throughout all these areas. While the divide between Serbs and Croats, and indeed the Bos nian Muslims, can be ameliorated by what remains of a common language, younger generations in the fracture zones between Slavs and Albanians risk having no such way of communicating in the future. Here, we are faced with a national conflict harder than the one be tween the different Slav nations. The task of international policy must be to facilitate the setting up of political structures that bridge these conflicts and to create constitutional frameworks throughout the region that all nations are prepared to accept and work within. Difficult as this will be, it will have to be based on some sort of compromise, and it will also have to secure the support of all the major international actors, most notably Europe, the United States and Russia. The importance of the latter point is often overlooked. But if there is not a solid international consensus, expressed through the UN Security Council, we will over time South Eastern Europe one or another local actor trying to secure a better deal by trying to mobilise international support for its position, thus undermining stability. And the importance of compromise should be evident. If there is not a compromise, but instead a dictate that divides the region into winners and losers, the main long term result might well be to sow the seeds for future conflicts. I remain convinced that we must be daring and farsighted in trying to set up structures of integration, based on compromises, in the region and that these must be firmly tied to structures of European integration, over time taking all these countries fully into the European Union. We must seek to move the debate in the region away from its 19 th century preoccupation with national sovereignty and state borders and towards a 21 st century concept of sovereignty vested on
10 different levels, with cultural autonomy within entities as important as the wider structures of European integration. This will not be easy, will take time and will require sustained efforts. The effort must be led by the European Union, although it should always seek the support and the active cooperation of the United States as well as Russia. It must be ready to employ instruments of diplomacy and economic integration, be innovative in creating new structures and solutions, and firm in trying to resist the slide of the region into more and more, smaller and smaller mono ethnic statelets. This volume brings together some of the key practitioners and thinkers of the security and stability of the region during the past dec ades. It brings different perspectives on issues that can never be solved if all the different perspectives are not fully understood. It will be essential for all that the crucial quest for self sustaining stability in this important part of Europe continue.
11 12 Introduction István Gyarmati and Theodor Winkler EastWest Institute Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces
When the Berlin Wall came crashing down and the Cold War was, to almost everyone’s surprise, suddenly over, Yugoslavia was the communist country by far closest to the West. Its per capita GDP surpassed that of all former Warsaw Pact countries – and rivalled that of Greece. Hundreds of thousands of Yugoslav guest workers had for decades brought hard currency, democratic ideas and modern values back to the country. The beginnings of a genuine multicultural society had started to carpet over the deep antagonisms and wounds of history. Yet in 1991 Yugoslavia exploded. In South Eastern Europe, the end of the Cold War brought not the end of history, but its return – and with a vengeance. Borders were redrawn in blood. “Ethnic cleans ing” entered the vocabulary of international politics; murder, rape, pillage, wanton destruction, hatred and human tragedy held South Eastern Europe for more than a decade in their deadly grip – as one murderous war after another shook the region. South Eastern Europe is still stunned and profoundly marked by that experience. The democratic revolution in Belgrade on 5 October 2000 has thrown open a new chapter. To the pictures of the fall of the Soviet empire (from the demonstrations in Leipzig to Yeltsin’s stand in the Russian White House) were added those of the people of Belgrade driving out, with their bare hands and raw courage, Milošević and his dictatorship. Today, all countries of South Eastern Europe strive to overcome the destructive heritage of totalitarianism, to join European integration, to rebuild civil society and to restore prosperity to their people. That road is long, far from easy, and all too often treacherous. The peace in South Eastern Europe is still precarious and brittle – as the delicate balance between the hope for peace and the continuing threat of murderous self destruction in Macedonia shows only too clearly. And there are new challenges. If the threat of “Sarajevo” type scenarios may (except in Macedonia), gradually, be waning, that of “Colombia” type scenarios is – everywhere – clearly on the rise. There 13 exists, indeed, the genuine threat that the remnants of dictatorship – organised crime, extremism and nationalism – may form an unholy alliance, profoundly challenging the perspectives of the countries and the people of the region for peace, stability, democracy, prosperity, and a fair chance. To counter that threat, much will be needed: the will of the people of the region to replace the nightmares of the past with a vision for the future (South Eastern Europe has indeed, for centuries, produced more history than it could stomach, destructively subordinating the present to the past – and neglecting to ever even bother about the future); international assistance; and above all, a vision for the future that is promising for the entire region. The studies in this book were originally commissioned in re sponse to a request by the new Yugoslav leadership under President Vojislav Koštunica and Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Djindjić. They formed part of an overall assessment of the Federal Republic of Yugo slavia, Serbia and Montenegro after Milošević, which was handed over to the Yugoslav and Serb governments in December 2001. For that yearlong stocktaking exercise, the Geneva Centre for the Demo cratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) and the New York based EastWest Institute (EWI) brought together some 130 renowned experts from over 30 countries. It was, thus, one of the most thorough international assessment missions in the region. The main conclusions of this study are straightforward: The greatest hope for the region is the overwhelmingly shared conviction that South Eastern Europe’s future lies with membership in Europe’s institutions: above all the European Union, which is in principle willing to conclude with all countries of the region Stabilisation and Association Agreements, but also the Council of Europe, Partnership for Peace, the Euro Atlantic Partnership Council and, for most countries, NATO. The “European Option” is, as the example of France and Germany shows, indeed the only avenue to overcome deep rooted historic antagonisms. The European Union is very much conscious of this fact and, step by step, is taking over practical responsibility for guiding the region towards a better future, its engagement ranging from the police mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina to “Amber Fox”, from the “Ohrid Agreement” to the creation of “Serbia and Montenegro”. Such intense engagement inevitably causes strains, as in Macedonia where many do not yet truly want to recognise the “Ohrid Agreements” as the only path to an ethnically unbiased and politically fair path to the future. It also continuously risks to over stretch the European Union – whose structures seem to be condemned to lag permanently behind its vision. If wars and conflicts leave behind the tragic heritage of land mines and unexploded ammunitions, dictatorships leave behind the dangerous heritage of overblown security structures. These structures, 14 deprived of any civilian, parliamentary and democratic control, tend to form a genuine “State within the State”, which – through badly de fined responsibilities of the different services – are not only ineffi cient, but present a continuous source of friction, a permanent po tential source of civil strife and international conflict, and a standing invita tion for internal power struggles. The only way to overcome the dark legacies of the past and to strengthen the options for a brighter future is to define in each country of the region, in a democratic, transparent and open way, a national security policy that is looking toward peace, stability and prosperity in the region as a whole. The shadows of the past must be finally overcome by the promises of a brighter future in which, among other things, European integration replaces ethnic segregation. From such new national security policies clear missions must be derived for each arm of a country’s security structures (armed forces, police, and border guards). Effective and democratic parliamentary controls must be established to hold the security structures accountable to those missions. This book intends to assist the countries of South Eastern Europe in that process by providing them with an insight of how experts from throughout the Euro Atlantic world – from the United States to Russia, including the region itself – look at South Eastern Europe, what the international community expects from the region, and to what extent and in what way the international community is able and willing to assist the region. The essays in this volume thus provide a comprehensive overview of both the aspirations of the countries in the region and of the expectations of the international community towards South Eastern Europe.
15 16 A Russian Perspective on National Security Dilemmas in South Eastern Europe Vladimir Baranovsky and Dmitri Glinski Vassiliev IMEMO, Moscow
This paper aims at identifying and presenting security related problems in South Eastern Europe as they have evolved in Russia's thinking about the region. However, the paper does not represent an official government view on these subjects, which is in the process of development. Nor does it claim to offer an established institutional opinion, as there are a wide variety of views and no durable consensus on South Eastern Europe in Russia's academic circles, except on the most general commonsense issues. Nevertheless, it is worth drawing together some conceptual parameters of approach to these problems, with implicit and explicit lessons learned in Russia from the multiple Balkan crises of the past decade and from the ups and downs of Russia's diplomatic and military involvement in the region.
THE CONTEXT OF RUSSIA'S APPROACHES Russia's perceptions, attitudes towards, and policies in South Eastern Europe are affected by three major factors: First, Russia's views on the region are inscribed into Russia's broader thinking on international developments. Retrospectively, this was the main context of Russia's negative assessments concerning the NATO military operation against the FRY in 1999. This operation was considered to be a flagrant violation of international law, as well as a clear sign of NATO’s pretensions to operate in Europe without any constraints. Consequently, further developments in the region are perceived as indications of ongoing trends in the evolution of the European international system in the making. The dynamics of Rus sia's interaction with other major external actors in the region seem to be of primary importance for Moscow. Secondly, some aspects of the situation in the Balkans and endur ing problems therein resemble challenges that Russia was or still is facing in its own development. In particular, this concerns such issues 17 as separatism, irredentism, the “divided nations” phenomenon, poli cies towards ethnic kin in neighbouring countries, actual or potential territorial claims, and so on. The Kosovo related “humanitarian inter vention” was also regarded as a pattern that might eventually be ap plied to Russia or its “near abroad”. Thirdly, South Eastern Europe has a certain relevance for Mos cow in the context of its search to consolidate Russia's international position. It is the only major power that has a longstanding historical and confessional relationship with the Orthodox Slav nations of the region. During the Kosovo crisis, as well as at some earlier stages of conflicts in the Balkans, it tried to capitalise on its role as mediator, looking for peaceful solutions as a way to make Russia's engagement indispensable to all parties involved. Nowadays, it is the only major power present in South Eastern Europe that is not a member of a mili tary alliance, which is expected to be an attractive factor in terms of establishing a more balanced international pattern in the region. However, a number of powerful factors at play undermine Russia's impact: One of them is the Russian leadership's controversial policies in the Balkans over the past decade that alienated its traditional allies without dispelling mistrust on the part of other groups. Russia's par ticipation in KFOR, with its highly controversial standing among the Serbs, is a case in point. Second is the lack of a sustained and coherent strategy in Russia's approach to the regional issues. Russia's policies in the Balkans appear subordinated to great power politics, primarily to its relationship with the USA, NATO, the EU and the G7(8). Third is Russia's economic weakness, which reduces its capacity to contribute to the economic reconstruction of the region.
CONCEPTUAL ASPECTS The notion of national security, which had traditionally served as the cornerstone of international relations, has undergone dramatic change in recent times. This process of change has accelerated with the advent of globalisation. Three interrelated aspects to this development seem particularly important: • The objective transformation and expansion of the meaning of security (e.g., new risks and opportunities brought about by in formation technology, etc.), which makes it more volatile and fluid than before; • The emergence of new actors in security related interplays and the transformation of the old ones’ roles therein;
18 • The increasing differentiation of views on national security and its often conflictive understandings, both within nations and in the global community as a whole. As a result of these trends, national security in many countries has become a moving target, both intellectually and politically. The changes in the framework and terms of the national security debate have been conditioned to a very large extent by changes in the cast of international actors. Indeed, on the one hand, the end of the 20 th century was characterized by the weakening and occasional fragmentation of states or their subordination to trans national forces. On the other hand, there is an expanding proliferation of non state, inter state and supra state actors, ranging from international bureaucracies, trans national corporations, NGOs and ethnic diasporas to organised crime groups and terrorist networks. Some of these have become significantly stronger and more influential than many of the traditional state actors, and, as demonstrated by the latest developments, their power may match even the power of the strongest states, such as the US. These developments profoundly change the meaning of the balance of power, making it more complex and relative than ever before. The post socialist countries of South Eastern Europe are a clear example of these trends. • The relatively strong states of the Cold War era, some of which were based on ruthless coercion, have either fragmented or weakened. Most of them are crippled by fiscal impotence, foreign dependency, lack of legitimacy and lack of loyalty on the part of their constituents. • The erosion and collapse of over centralized political patterns in the early 1990s gave rise to multiple non state actors, from po litical parties to organised ethnic communities and diasporas. Al most all of them champion their own ideas of national security, which exerts further pressure on the fluctuating identities of states. They often try – and occasionally succeed – in monopoliz ing the debate and, consequently, the definition of national secu rity, to the detriment of other actors involved. The principal in strument in this competition in many South Eastern European countries is the re actualisation and reframing of the idea of “na tion”. This process is often developed in assertive forms accom panied by the exclusion or denial of legitimacy of rivals and their interpretation of the national interest. • In addition, the range of actors is being expanded from out side, with the intervention of NATO, the US government, interna tional financial institutions, the EU, trans national corporations, Western grant makers, and others. Their presence both directly changes the objective security environment and subtly influences
19 the terms of the internal debate by weakening and strengthening, rewarding and punishing its domestic participants. Thus, the central problem for regional policy makers dealing with national security is very basic: how to arrive at a viable and coherent definition of this concept that would enjoy public legitimacy and have an operational value for specific governments and their constituencies. Given that all of the regional governments are now committed to dem ocratic principles (although the extent and sincerity of this commitment and the interpretation of these principles often varies), it is clear that the concept of national security ought to result from the process of democratic deliberation and be inclusive, rather than “privatised” by the most powerful minority of citizens. Yet, in most of South Eastern Europe even forging a democratic majority behind a given definition of national security proves difficult, not to speak of integrating the minority perspectives into it. This is because the loyalty of many people is firmly tied to their respective ethnic groups rather than to the nation states. The larger the rift be tween ethnicity and state, the weaker is the sense of national identity. This makes the concept of national security tenuous and elusive. This situation puts multiethnic states of the region (such as Yu goslavia, Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, or – in a particular way – Cyprus) at an inherent disadvantage vis à vis ethnically based states that command the deeper loyalty of the overwhelming majority of their citizens (such as Slovenia, Albania, Greece or Turkey). Fur thermore, multiethnic states could find themselves uncompetitive even with respect to non state actors that are often more consolidated, resolute and action oriented. For multiethnic states, this implies a con tinuous threat of fragmentation along ethnic lines – de facto, if not de jure – and a concomitant decrease or, in the worst case, complete loss of national sovereignty. This inherent disequilibrium is at the core of security challenges in South Eastern Europe for the foreseeable future. There are few possibilities for it to be resolved within a “national consolidation” perspective for multiethnic states. First, even if re arrangement of multiethnic patterns into ethnic ally based ones were desirable as a theoretically more stable model, the process of transformation is fraught with so numerous and significant destabilizing implications that they might outweigh all possible advantages (if not make them unattainable at all). Secondly, the developments along this line would be prevented both by external actors (such as NATO) and, in a different way, by the cultural legacy of Yugoslavism. Thirdly, even if this were not the case, the imaginable Serb, Bosnian and other ethnic states would be conceivably stronger only in relation to other regional states but not in relation to non state,
20 interstate and supra state actors, many of whom are typically more powerful than any single state in the region. The rift between ethnicity and state, however important and crisis prone in South Eastern Europe, is only one aspect of the larger na tional security dilemmas there. If analysis is shifted from the narrowly regional to the global level, the problems of South Eastern Europe are to be considered an element of the core periphery relationship. If viewed from this angle, South Eastern Europe belongs to the world’s economic and political “semi periphery”. The latter is con ceived in juxtaposition both to the wealthy “core” (which overlaps with, but is not identical to, the so called “golden billion” of mankind) and the “periphery”, which comprises the poorest and underdeveloped countries of the Third World. Indeed, the Balkan nations can be seen as representatives of the developing world within the European (Euro Atlantic) civilization. For the nations of the region, as well as for individual citizens and groups within these nations, this creates a common denominator of national security. Indeed, while national security conceived in military and geopolitical terms is different not only for different nations, but also for different ethnic groups within and across these nations, it is the economic and social aspects of national security that unite most of them in the region. It is only in this regard that one may speak of an integrated notion of “regional security” for South Eastern Europe as a region encompassing a community of semi peripheral actors. This understanding of security may become the basis for coop eration between the Balkan nations in a framework that would put them in a more advantageous position than when they were politically “locked” within the region and mired in parochial conflicts. In contrast to a military or indeed any other alliance among the nations of the region, or between some of them and other powers (such as NATO and/or Russia), their rapprochement on the basis of common socio economic security interests vis à vis the global wealthy “core” (which does not need to mean against it) is a fully realistic possibility. Also, this might enable the weaker states to compensate for their disadvantages vis à vis the stronger states of the region, and possibly even vis à vis the much stronger non state actors. In addition, this framework might hypothetically promote common security interests of South Eastern Europeans and other semi peripheral countries, such as Russia, other post Soviet states, and many of the non European nations. Broadly speaking, they might all be interested in consolidating their security through the equalization brought about by development, with increased access to the benefits of economic globalisation together with minimization of its costs and injustices.
21 To sum up, there are three key dimensions of national security in South Eastern Europe where significant interest and capability gaps exist and eventually need to be bridged: • At the sub national level, a gap between state and non state actors; • At the regional level, a gap between multiethnic and ethnic ally based entities; • At the global level, a gap between the core, semi periphery, and periphery.
KEY SECURITY ISSUES In line with the perspective outlined above, this section considers the three levels of security challenges in the region, along with the key questions and alternatives available at each level.
Sub-National Level In the short and medium term, weakness of the state appears to be the source of all major security challenges in South Eastern Europe, leading to a general loss of ability to govern. State weakness undermines the ability of government institutions to fulfil their function of being an effective tool for achieving societal goals, including the protection of personal security and property of citizens and maintenance of their well being above a minimal level. This breeds disillusionment and frustration among the people and increasingly alienates them from the state. Some societal and political groups, facing the lack of government protection or effective means to defend their interests through legal channels, turn to violence – which further undermines the state. These societal tendencies and state weakness reinforce one another in a kind of vicious circle that is especially hard to break. The roots of state weakness, in the case of the post socialist states of South Eastern Europe, are partially related to their historical legacy and ill conceived decisions of the transition period. However, the principal causes of this weakness are systemic. They are inherent to these states' semi peripheral position in the global economy and their belated integration into the world system. Like other semi peripheral and peripheral states, they are typically plagued by a combination of an extensive debt burden and revenue shortage that virtually disables their fiscal policies and imposes rigid domestic and foreign constraints on the government’s ability to function in general. As a result of this dependency, they fail to provide the necessary minimum of economic and social security to individual citizens. Instead this is increasingly
22 provided by non state and foreign actors – often on a highly selective basis. In such countries as Yugoslavia or Bosnia and Herzegovina, these structural systemic features are only aggravated by the very fact of the federal organisation of the state. At several levels, various layers of weak institutions compete with each other over spheres of com petence. These developments may become the source of major security risks in the not so distant future. The problem of state weakness, understood in this broad sense, has no immediate solution. A unilateral effort to build a “strong” state in isolation from the world system is most likely not a feasible option. Nor is a radical surrender to externally imposed governance a solu tion; it is the easiest way to proceed, but whether it is conducive to strengthening the state is more than questionable. The alternative is to seek a long term strategic solution at the international level with a wider collective effort. Such a strategy might require the involvement of external forces and partial shifts of state power towards foreign governments, international institutions and non state actors. In fact, the problem consists of ensuring a proper balance between these two trends – sharing power with other actors, on the one hand, and consolidating the state on the other hand. How to achieve the former in order to promote the latter without compromising it – this is the challenging task now be fore most South Eastern European countries.
Regional Level
The Challenge of Ethnic Identities Ethnic identities in the Balkans prevail over civic ones. This not only has historical roots but also, perhaps more importantly, is caused by systemic state weakness, which undermines its legitimacy in the eyes of the citizens. Whatever the cause, the rift between state and ethnicity is at the root of all the ongoing conflicts and enduring problems of the region. They are manifested by the phenomenon of “divided nations” (as in the case of Serbs and Albanians), ethnically generated separatism and irredentism, and the relative weakness of multiethnic states in comparison to stronger mono ethnic states. Government repression of anti state ethnic loyalties was tried more than once in various forms and with various intensities. This approach contributed to aggravating problems rather than resolving them. Furthermore, it invited outside intervention and foreign policing of the region. Intervention, however, achieved little in terms of shaping sustainable multiethnic communities. Its outcomes have
23 exposed the ideological and practical flaws of interventionist “peace enforcement”. The answer to these challenges may be twofold. In the short term, national security calls for adapting the state society relationship to the prevailing reality of ethnic cleavages. Fail ure to do this may undermine a state's legitimacy and promote uncontrolled conflicts along ethnic lines. The role of states, in this perspective, consists in ensuring “damage limitation” and channelling ethnic aspirations to crisis free developments. Thus, in the case of the Serbian/FRY government, it may have to admit its special responsibility for the Serbs throughout the region, who at present display more loyalty and cohesion as an ethnic com munity than as citizens of the states in which they reside. A similar approach may be justifiable for the Albanian government. However, this should be done only if accompanied by a number of parallel developments: • Any actual or potential territorial claims should be renounced, and the existing frontiers should be reconfirmed; • There should be a commitment to refrain from supporting any manifestations of irredentism in neighbouring countries; • The governments of states with minorities should be obliged to respect their rights, with effective monitoring by international institutions. In the longer term, the “Balkanisation” model can be overcome through promotion of a supra ethnic legitimacy for states in the re gions. There seem to be three candidates for such a legitimising ide ology. • The slogan of “European integration” is viable as at least a temporary substitute. But it may not withstand the prohibitive ob stacles to such an integration and the underlying identity conflicts that are facing some of the countries in the region. • The only other supra ethnic ideology currently available in the region, that of Islamic radicalism, is by definition even more ex clusive. • The alternative suggested in this paper – the legitimacy of shared “semi peripheralism” – could potentially consolidate both the Islamic nations and the “failed Europeanisers” of the region. But this collective identity would take time and comprehensive public debate to develop.
Regional Arms Control and Confidence Building A deficit of trust among the countries and governments of the region is another extension of ethnic and cultural cleavages. At present, a high level of mistrust is particularly noticeable between
24 Albania, on one hand, and the FRY/Serbia and Macedonia, on the other. In the absence of international efforts, it may remain a major source of re gional instability for the foreseeable future. The negotiation of multilateral agreements on arms control and confidence building measures is an established recipe for reducing tensions that has worked elsewhere in Europe. In particular, the 1996 Florence Agreement between the FRY/Serbia, Croatia and the constituent entities of Bosnia and Herzegovina envisioning the limitation of military capabilities and their transparency, is worth being considered as a model that might be used under other similar circumstances in the region. For instance, this could be a case of a trilateral pattern involving the FRY/Serbia, Macedonia, and Albania. Furthermore, it is important for the countries of South Eastern Europe to engage in a multilateral regional dialogue on military and security issues, both within and outside the framework of the Stability Pact. As a first step, they could consider establishing a consultative forum, perhaps under the auspices of the OSCE and with the involvement of extra regional actors. Its agenda could include common anti terrorist operations as well as issues of organised crime and international corruption, which can be dealt with only at a supra national level.
Foreign Actors in the Region There is a web of external players present in the region – both sovereign states (including the international “heavy weights”) and multiple security related associations and alliances, which are regional actors in their own rights (NATO, EU, Organisation of Islamic Con ference etc.). For the countries of the region, a relationship with each of these players is a highly sensitive issue (and sometimes may be a divisive one). It is strongly affected by a plethora of factors, such as historic memories and economic constraints, ethno linguistic links and religious identification, recent experiences and expectations for the future. Attitudes may vary within a very broad spectrum – as, for instance, with respect to Russia or Germany's presence in the region. Or, while some in the Balkans welcome NATO and its member states as their present or future allies, others blame them for having infringed on their national sovereignty or taken a biased approach to solving their problems. Foreign military and political intervention in the region is justified by arguments pointing to humanitarian concerns, minority protection and peace enforcement. Also, the regional states' aspiration to join Western institutions is a decisive factor shaping the configuration of external involvements in South Eastern Europe.
25 By and large, external intervention has played the main role in limiting the expansionist drive of some political forces, including the proponents of a Greater Serbia or a Greater Albania, and Montenegrin secessionism. However, it has not been successful in addressing some of the crucial security related issues in the region. NATO’s presence in Kosovo and Metohija as well as on Albanian territory has obviously failed to prevent a spillover of Albanian irredentism and violence to Macedonia – a failure that is increasingly recognized as such in the West. And, judging by the experience of the early 1990s, it is unlikely that the verbal recognition of the FRY’s integrity will act as a brake on the Montenegrins' and Kosovo Albanians' drive toward de jure or de facto independence. Without being a universal recipe for addressing security problems in South Eastern Europe, external involvement is fraught with a risk of competition among (and divisions within) foreign actors. In spite of proclaimed common goals, there may be divergent interests of indi vidual states operating as external actors, differences between some of them and international agencies, such as NATO and the EU, and dis crepancies between official and unofficial policies. This in itself could be yet another source of potential instability in the region – even if only by promoting competition and rivalry between South Eastern European states rather than due to a new “big power game” in the Balkans. It could be argued that from this point of view the countries of the region would be interested in foreign interventions that are coordi nated to a maximum degree (and, ideally, possess a joint character) rather than in a free interplay of various external actors. At the same time, the case could be made for external involvement that is more diversified, rather than unilateral. In particular, the presence of Russia, its economic weakness notwithstanding, could play an important bal ancing and compensatory role in regional political developments.
Broader Security Framework
Institutional Integration and Alliance Membership The possibility of accession to NATO and/or the EU is at the top of the agenda for several Balkan governments. The prospect of expan sion of the Euro Atlantic institutional network to cover South Eastern Europe is often viewed as a stabilizing factor in the region. Indeed, stringent political requirements of candidacy for such a membership arguably played a role in the power shifts from radical nationalists to moderate forces in several countries (such as Croatia and Romania) and in the settlement or downplaying of regional disputes, e.g. be tween Romania and Hungary.
26 At the same time, there are some limits to the nations' and elites' readiness to renounce identity politics for the sake of European integration. At the regional level, the relationship between Greece and Turkey, both NATO members, and Greece's dispute with Macedonia, which centred on the issue of the latter's identity, serve as illustrations of this point. Furthermore, competition for membership among the countries of the region, or frustration of those candidates that will be left out in the forthcoming rounds of NATO/EU expansion, may provoke destabilizing outbursts of mutual hostility. Moreover, the countries of this region that are aspiring to membership in security related clubs, with the exception of Slovenia, are likely to face thorny paths toward this membership, which may take a decade or more to achieve. Also, even when a given country qualifies for membership by objective criteria, its admission might simply be not in the interest of every member of this alliance. Setting unrealistic targets in this regard may lock these countries into the category of perpetual aspirants, which is bound to hurt collective self esteem, national identity and, therefore, national security as well. Turkey's permanent bid for membership in the EU is a telling example. In addition, there may be a price to pay for membership that will not necessarily always be considered adequate. A historic record in this regard might be considered rather controversial. Those Balkan countries that have been members of Euro centric hegemonic alliances (NATO, EU, and before 1990, the Warsaw Pact and COMECON) always played peripheral roles in them. Greece, the only member of all European clubs, is one example. In addition, a given country’s membership in NATO or the EU may prejudice its valuable relation ship with non members. In light of all this, it seems important for the countries of South Eastern Europe to refrain from excessive expectations and illusions with regard to institutional integration. Their formal membership in the institutional infrastructure of the global “core” is not a panacea for the region's ills, nor is it a guarantee of escape from the periphery. Furthermore, they might discover that this is more likely to provide additional pockets of the hegemonic powers' penetration into the periphery, rather than serve as a means for the periphery's integration into the “core”. This does not imply distancing and alienation from, much less hostility to, these important organisations. But full fledged participa tion therein is not necessarily the best option, even less so the only available one. Other options ought to be considered as well, such as association, participation in the Euro Atlantic Partnership Council, involvement in the Partnership for Peace programme, and so forth. These bodies do not give specific advantages to membership but provide more space for “individual” policies (for instance, in military 27 reform or in developing command and control systems of the armed forces). Countries of the region, particularly those that intend to pursue neutrality, would also benefit from intensifying their security links to other states in Europe that refrain from participating in military alliances, such as Switzerland or Austria. The possibility of an informal security association among these states is not unthinkable. Also, in order to have more options in the international arena, developing long standing security dialogues and relationships with countries outside of the Euro Atlantic area, including China, India and Iran, might appear as a viable foreign policy line.
Trans National Civil Society Any country of the region that has ethnic and political lobbies in other states, especially in the USA, is provided with a potential and almost unexploited asset for national security policy. Over the past decade, these lobbies (from Polish to Albanian) have played a crucial role and occasionally were the driving forces behind such developments as NATO expansion and multiple interventions in the Balkans. Their less direct role in EU expansion is also not to be discounted, as they exercise substantial influence on US policies vis à vis the EU countries. The FRY/Serbia and, to an extent, Macedonia, have another powerful and untapped foreign policy asset that is unavailable to other nations in the region. It is the international anti war forces that e merged in response to NATO’s intervention in the Balkans. They consist of a range of organisations and individuals, both well established and emerging actors, across the ideological spectrum from left to right. This constellation of forces has been rather vocal in Russia, the USA, Italy, Greece, Germany and Britain. While some of these actors have become politically weaker or dis illusioned by a lack of response or attention paid to them on the part of South Eastern Europe, they still have strong sympathies for these na tions and represent potentially powerful assets of both public diplomacy and back channel influence. In the longer term, strategic cooperation with these groups in international civil society may give a major advantage to regional governments. It may play a role in the pace and modalities of further NATO/EU expansion and in the dura tion of the foreign military presence in the Balkans, as well as in the debate on potential new interventions in the region.
28 “PERIPHERALISM” AS A SECURITY STRATEGY It is a historical paradox, but the most durable security of the Balkan states and of their national sovereignty was achieved during the Cold War period, especially from the 1960s through the 1980s. This was partly due to the fact that several of these states and their neighbours – the SFRY, Albania, Romania, and to a lesser extent, Hungary and Greece – thanks to their peripheral position achieved a safe distance from both superpowers. Indeed, none were under significant threat of foreign military intervention (both the British intervention in Greece in the 1940s and the Soviet 1956 intervention in Hungary proved to be prohibitively costly precedents). Furthermore, the leading position of the SFRY in the region was related to the fact of Belgrade's reaching out to non European coun tries and playing a major role in the creation and development of the Non Aligned Movement. In fact, it was one of the few cases in mod ern history when a Balkan nation was a central rather than a peripheral player in international developments and an actor rather than an object. The significance and political salience of the Non Aligned Move ment have significantly decreased with the end of the Cold War. However, recent developments seem to provide it with a second wind. Against the background of today's acute confrontation between the US led “north” and non state based radical political Islam, the role of the Non Aligned Movement may increase in the future. For many countries of the region, the Non Aligned Movement could be attractive for a number of reasons: • It could raise these countries' profiles at the global level. • It could remove them from the “grey area” of uncertainty. • It provides an alternative to the unipolar model of regional se curity. • It could restore a viable element of historical continuity in their foreign and security policies. All the nations on the territory of the former SFRY (with the possible exception of those that are going to join NATO) qualify for membership in the Non Aligned Movement. At the same time, such membership would in no way contradict their longer term important objective of joining the EU, and may in fact even improve their negotiating positions. It would also put some of the looming economic security issues, such as debt negotiations, on the broader international agenda of the developing world. For the FRY/Serbia, this option must be more attractive than for anyone else. The moral authority that it enjoys in the developing world for resisting NATO aggression, coupled with historical memories, is likely to ensure it a prominent role in the Non Aligned Movement. This would probably be insufficient for restoring the role 29 of Belgrade as an influential global actor. But this will certainly broaden its foreign policy assets, which, in turn, would be instrumental in resolving or alleviating its regional security challenges.
PRACTICAL RECOMMENDATIONS The purpose of this section is to indicate some priority steps that would help the countries of the region to address the security dilemmas outlined above. While it incorporates suggestions for different governments of South Eastern Europe, it bears in mind that the FRY is the central mass of the region and attempts to provide some input for the formulation of its national security policy.
Consolidating the Political Status Quo The future of the FRY needs to be clarified, together with the issue of the Serbian state identity. The institutional weakness and fragmentation of potentially the strongest country in the region is a major security challenge for South Eastern Europe. The problem goes beyond the relationship between Belgrade and Podgorica and needs to be addressed in all its complexity. Obviously this is an issue for the people and leaders of the country and its communities to resolve. Their consent is essential for allowing any outside participation aimed at promoting this goal and minimizing destabilizing developments. That said, some general points are worth considering: • The functioning, cohesion and full democratic legitimacy of government institutions in Serbia at all levels capable of advanc ing the interests and needs of its citizens in the region and the world should be seen as an absolute key priority. • The outcome of a referendum in Montenegro will be an im portant factor of state legitimacy, particularly for the key external players in the region (US, EU, Russia). However, as shown by the experience of the Soviet 1991 referendum on preservation of the Union, it may not necessarily play a decisive role in the absence of political will and instruments to implement its decisions. • As regards Kosovo and Metohija (K&M), given the legacy and the current intensity of mistrust between Serbs and Albanians, the practical restoration of Serb/FRY sovereignty over the Alba nian populated parts of K&M is unrealistic in the foreseeable fu ture. • From an outside perspective, continued occupation of Serb/FRY territory by foreign powers is a larger obstacle to the restoration of its national sovereignty and strengthening of its in stitutions than the possible de facto recognition of the political 30 status quo on the Albanian populated territory of K&M. This is particularly so given the fact that the presence of UNMIK and KFOR proved to be largely ineffective in preventing inter com munal violence and terror or securing Belgrade legitimate rights in the political process, and occasionally served to strengthen one community against another. • The outcome of the November 17 elections in K&M is likely to reinforce the de facto independence of this territory, in line with the so called constitutional framework for autonomy. In this situation, it is a key priority both for Serbia/the FRY and for the international community to insist upon, and ensure, self govern ment and protection of the Serb populated areas of K&M. • To sum up, it must to be admitted that the present arrange ments in K&M are inherently flawed: the policies of preserving a fictitious unity of this territory under a fictitious FRY/Serb sover eignty and governed by a mechanical majority cannot ensure the security of the Serb population and runs counter to the interests and priorities of consolidating the Serbian/FRY state. These poli cies are, in fact based on UN Security Council Resolution 1244. It has to be recognized that Belgrade's insistence on its full imple mentation has not achieved much and may be worth reconsider ing. • These considerations do not need to imply a break up of le gally existing national boundaries. To the contrary, the legal in violability of the borders should be reconfirmed at the interna tional level, to avoid further de stabilisation of the region. How ever, one has to accept the fact that in the short and medium term the boundaries of legal and actual sovereignty in the region will not coincide. The reassertion and strengthening of actual sover eignty wherever possible, alongside the preservation of the legal status quo, seems to be the primary requirement of national secu rity. • This might be accompanied by a policy of strengthening legal and political bonds with Serbs in the Balkans and potentially other communities and individuals that gravitate toward the FRY/Serbia for various cultural, historical, and political reasons. A similar ap proach should be encouraged towards Albanians in the region liv ing outside Albania. Promoting trans border ethnic and confes sional links and creating appropriate mechanisms would minimize the danger of attempts at a unilateral and violent revision of bor ders.
31 Promoting International Connections In terms of international security associations, an emphasis could be placed on those that are more realistic for the countries of the re gion to join and in which they may play pivotal rather than peripheral roles. Specifically, as mentioned above, membership in the Non Aligned Movement could be considered. In terms of historical legacy, it would be logical for Belgrade to take the lead in this process. The restoration of the FRY/Serbia’s membership, as well as the admission of other neutral nations of the region, would be possible at the forth coming XIII summit of the Non Aligned Movement in Dhaka, Bangladesh. In relations with the European Union, it would be highly desirable for the FRY/Serbia, Macedonia, and others to begin moving toward an association agreement establishing a customs union of the kind that has been reached with all EU applicants. In this context, membership in the Partnership for Peace/Euro Atlantic Partnership Council could be regarded as an issue of second ary importance.
Focusing on Terrorism, Organised Crime and International Corruption This set of issues needs to be recognized as the focal point of shared long term interests between the states of the region and key foreign players, including the USA, the EU, and Russia. The idea of a global and, perhaps, a regional anti terrorist pact is to be encouraged. It is in the interest of the countries of the region to take an active role in the on going development of the International Convention against Organised Trans national Crime and in setting up the International Criminal Court. Dialogue with international law enforcement authorities (including, inter alia, the ICTY) could be expanded to treat terrorism, war crimes and other forms of organised crime, as well as government corruption, as interrelated international phenomena that have no ethnic identity and are to be addressed accordingly.
Addressing Economic Issues Economic development and debt need to be put front and centre in the regional security agenda. Given the worldwide economic down turn and crisis tendencies in the international economic system, unilat eral negotiations with Western creditors and aid givers are unlikely to bear much fruit in the short term. The sluggishness of Western
32 institutions in providing agreed upon aid to the FRY illustrates this point. Without abandoning these unilateral efforts, countries of the region would be advised to cooperate, on the basis of their common interests and concerns, in working out joint positions on the re structuring of the international economic system, including debt write offs for developing countries. These joint positions would be presented and defended through the appropriate global fora and addressed to creditor associations. It would be on the basis of these common regional interests vis à vis the global economy that a constructive supra ethnic legacy might be constituted in South Eastern Europe.
33 The OSCE and Regional Security in South Eastern Europe Vladimir Bilandžić OSCE Mission to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia EVOLUTION OF THE OSCE’S APPROACH TO REGIONAL SECURITY IN SOUTH EASTERN EUROPE
There was barely an international organisation that did not get involved, sooner or later and in one way or another, in trying to help solve or alleviate the consequences of the ten year long Yugoslav crisis in South Eastern Europe. In doing so, these organisations differed substantially in the form of their involvement and intervention and in their effectiveness, which depended in part on the nature of the organisation (whether it was political, military, economic, or humanitarian), but also on its cohesiveness and on the political will of its member states. One could say that the performance of the organisations in a way reflected the very dynamics of the Yugoslav crisis. The crisis and wars developed in stages. Conflict erupted and wars flared not simultaneously, but in waves, one after the other – from Slovenia (June 1991) to Croatia (summer 1991– early 1992 and then again in 1995), then to Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992 1995), and finally to Kosovo (1999) and Macedonia (2001). Never were there two conflicts running at the same time at the height of their intensity. One would die out, and another would escalate. Similarly, international organisations acted or reacted in a fragmented, gradualist, and, especially at the beginning of the crisis, a rather uncoordinated way. First to intervene were the European Union (EU) – at the time still the European Community – and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), negotiating cease fires and sending observers; this had some effect in Slovenia but much less in Croatia. Then came the United Nations (which helped to a chieve a peace plan in Croatia, but failed to prevent or curb the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina), followed by NATO (which after a slow start intervened forcefully and brought an end to the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina and pacified Kosovo), and then again the EU, which devised the most ambitious regional plan: the Stability Pact for South 34 Eastern Europe, launched in Sarajevo in July 1999 and aimed at post conflict rehabilitation and reconstruction of the region. The process began with partial and largely uncoordinated steps, and gradually the degree of coordination increased, like a learning process, leading at the end to what could be called a comprehensive approach, or even a strategy for dealing with the issue of conflict and instability in South Eastern Europe. Where does the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) stand in this context, what kind of contribution did it make, and what can it still give in the future to stabilise, pacify, and rehabilitate the region? Has it also developed a strategy of its own in addressing this most acute crisis situation in post World War II Eu rope? Before an answer to that question is given, a few words on the nature of the organisation are needed in order to explain its specific character and to understand the limits of its potential.
The Role and Evolution of the CSCE/OSCE * The CSCE started in the early seventies as an initiative to regulate East West relations in Europe and to promote the process of détente. It evolved during its first phase, from 1973 to 1975, due in part to the activity of neutral and non aligned states, into a process that was char acterised, at least formally, not as bloc to bloc negotiation but as a democratic, pan European process based on the full equality of all participants, irrespective of their size or political and military power or status, and on consensus as the absolute decision making rule, even for procedural decisions. This guaranteed the democratic nature of the process, but in turn resulted in its slowness and affected the content of the decisions and documents, which often expressed the least common denominator of the positions of the participating states. Although the consensus rule was modified in 1992 to the so called “consensus minus one” (the possibility of making decisions without the consent of one state, should it be grossly violating the CSCE norms, which was used in the case of suspending FRY from the CSCE in the same year), the consensus rule has remained the basic principle of the OSCE up to the present day. This is vitally important for maintenance of the OSCE’s democratic character, but at the same time it can reduce its effectiveness. Another characteristic of the OSCE is that its decisions and doc uments are regarded as not legally but only politically binding, which reduces somewhat their impact and application. Also, the CSCE was until 1994 only a process and not an organisation with permanent structures and institutions. In a way this was an advantage compared to other international organisations, ———— * The CSCE became the OSCE in 1994. 35 making it less bureaucratic and more flexible, but this also made it at times less organised and less prepared for dealing with crisis situations.
The OSCE: 1994-2001 In the eight years since the CSCE became the OSCE, it has e volved into an organisation with specific instruments and tools. At the time of the emerging crisis in South Eastern Europe, however, it was still in the process of change and adaptation. The OSCE is characterized by comprehensiveness. It deals with all of the main dimensions of security and cooperation – political, military, humanitarian, economic, cultural, etc. On the other hand, unlike NATO or the EU, it possesses neither military might nor economic power, which could be used either as a threat or an incentive. This has resulted in its reduced capability for persuasion and enforcement of its principles and decisions. Of course, all these characteristics also have given a specific advantage to the OSCE, since it remained, in spite of fundamental changes in international relations, the only truly pan European organisation also possessing a Transatlantic dimension based on genuinely democratic principles and centred on all the main components of international security and cooperation. It is an organisation that, on the normative level, already declared (in the Final Act of 1975) that the security of Europe is indivisible. However, the CSCE did not develop – and could not have done so, given its pan European nature – a specific strategy for addressing different sub regional issues of security. It did have from the very beginning a so called Mediterranean dimension, but it remained rela tively limited and aimed primarily at cooperation among the Mediterranean non participating states. While the CSCE did not deal directly with sub regional issues, its evolution, which became very dynamic in the late eighties, in a way anticipated regional problems, because the CSCE embarked upon introducing and developing instruments specifically designed to deal with conflict prevention and conflict management. Designed in its early stages to deal with interstate relations, it gradually acquired capabilities designed for monitoring and influencing intrastate developments (primarily in the field of human rights) and for dealing with conflicts that had internal roots but whose consequences extended internationally. In other words, while the CSCE was designed, at least initially, to stabilise the existing situation in Europe, the OSCE was designed to manage changes and deal with instability and conflicts.
36 The first breakthrough in this orientation towards addressing internal issues was the acceptance of an on site inspection in the military field at the Stockholm Conference on Disarmament in 1986. This was followed, at the Vienna Meeting in 1989, by the adoption of a control mechanism for monitoring the situation in the field of human rights. After adopting of the principles of pluralist democracy, rule of law, and a market economy in the 1990 Paris Charter, the CSCE introduced in 1991 a mechanism for unusual military activities and a so called mechanism for consultation in crisis situations and in 1992, the already mentioned “consensus minus one” rule. Additional steps aimed at increasing the OSCE’s capacity to deal with crisis situations included, inter alia, at the Helsinki Summit in 1992, creating a Forum for Security Cooperation, elaborating a concept for the OSCE peacekeeping operations (which, however, has not yet been put into practice), and establishing the post of High Commissioner for National Minorities as an early warning and preventive instrument for minority issues; at the Budapest Summit in 1994, changing the name from the CSCE to the OSCE and establishing a code of conduct for political military aspects of security; at the Lisbon Summit in 1996 adopting a “Declaration on a Common and Comprehensive Security for Europe for the Twenty first Century”; and, at the Istanbul Summit in 1999, elaborating a “Charter for European Security”. In addition to these adjustments and innovations aimed at dealing with new security challenges, another important step towards the more active role of the OSCE was the increased emphasis on field activities – primary the establishment of “missions of longer duration”, which began in 1992 when a mission for Yugoslavia (under the title “Mis sion for Kosovo, Sandjak and Vojvodina”) was formed. Although the activity of this mission lasted only for one year, since the Yugoslav government under Milošević chose not to agree to an extension of its initial mandate, the number of OSCE missions has increased over the years to more than twenty – most of them on the territory of states that emerged from the former Soviet Union and the former Yugoslavia. The fact that the missions are mostly concentrated and largest in size in the region of South Eastern Europe, where there are six of them – five on the territory of the former Yugoslavia (Bosnia and Herzego vina, Croatia, Macedonia, the FRY and in Kosovo) and the remaining one in Albania – shows that the OSCE has developed, in spite of the lack of an integrated concept at the time, an active policy towards South Eastern Europe. In fact, forced mostly by events related to the break up of the former Yugoslavia, the CSCE/OSCE established quite early on certain principles that form a normative framework for its approach to the region. For example, shortly after the declarations of independence of Slovenia and Croatia in 1991 and the intervention of the JNA, the OSCE in reaction to the escalation of violence that ensued, 37 concentrated its efforts to stop the conflicts, to prevent the spread of aggression, and to formulate the principles for a peaceful solution. Consequently, the CSCE Committee of Senior Officials, which met at a series of meetings in the summer and fall of 1991 in Prague, formulated norms of long term significance that became an element of peace settlements achieved later on. These norms included non recognition of any border changes or territorial gains achieved by force, the unacceptability of forcible transfers of populations, the guarantee of refugees’ right of return, the prosecution of war crimes based on indivi dual responsibility, etc. Although the OSCE did not have at its disposal military or diplomatic leverage to enforce these principles, most of them became an integral part of peace plans that were later negotiated by international mediators and that were enforced by the political and military weight of NATO and the EU, with the assistance of, or under the auspices of, the UN. In addition to this “normative” response to the crisis in South Eastern Europe, the political activity of the OSCE missions in the region reflected, if not an explicit or firmly developed strategy for South Eastern Europe, then at least a set of priorities in dealing with the problem of instability and conflict in the region. In general, the OSCE approach to the region contained two main dimensions, which are distinguishable but not mutually exclusive, as they reinforce each other. These are conflict prevention and post conflict rehabilitation, which is also effective in preventing conflict in the long term by making the re emergence of conflicts less likely. Missions that were designed and deployed to prevent the emergence of conflict were the OSCE Spillover Mission to Macedonia, the first OSCE Mission to the FRY (for Kosovo, Sandjak and Vojvodina) in 1992, and to a certain extent, the Kosovo Verification Mission, deployed in 1998 99. In addition to the aforementioned, the activities of the High Commisioner on National Minorities (HCNM), which, as far as South Eastern Europe is concerned, were mainly concentrated on Macedonia but also touched upon the situation in Romania, also had a preventive and early warning function. While for a relatively long period Macedonia remained protected from the conflict in the region and even Kosovo remained calm, albeit torn between Milošević’s repression and the Kosovo Albanians’ ex tremism, ultimately both regions did not manage to avoid being drawn into conflict; Kosovo was first, followed by Macedonia. However, one should not attribute this to the failure of the OSCE’s preventive diplomacy but rather to other more complex factors that are beyond the scope of this article. Nevertheless, these conflicts demonstrated that the OSCE could not cope with the conflicts by itself and that its performance could not have been more effective than the policies of 38 the major powers, which, after all, constitute the OSCE member states and formulate its common policy. In its other task, post conflict rehabilitation, the OSCE proved more effective, although to varying degrees in different countries and in different activities. With regard to such issues as the return of refugees, the OSCE could not overcome the restrictive policies of local governments or the inadequate policies of certain specialised agencies. In another important field of activity – democracy building, the OSCE did contribute significantly to the organisation and monitoring of a series of elections: in Bosnia and Herzegovina (on six occasions), in Albania, and, most recently, in Kosovo (both local and parliamen tary). The OSCE missions also engaged in helping to reform basic democratic institutions in a number of South Eastern European countries – such as parliamentary bodies, judiciary systems, ombudsmen, media, etc. In the security field, the most important OSCE activities were in creating multiethnic police forces in the Danube region in Croatia, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and recently in south Serbia, where this very successful initiative directly contributed to the defusing of crisis and conflict. Finally, in the field of military security and arms control, the OSCE provided the framework and guidance for the negotiation of Articles II, IV, and V of the Dayton Peace Agreement, which resulted in the development of specific CSBMs for Bosnia and Herzegovina and in arms limitations and reductions for Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and the FRY, as well as, most recently, in recommendations for sub regional CSBMs for South Eastern Europe and the adjacent area. Consequently, while the OSCE did not elaborate for a relatively long time a specifically designed and coordinated strategy for South Eastern Europe, it did develop over time, through practical actions, a specific approach. Emerging after initial setbacks at the beginning of the conflict, this approach brought the organisation back to the region as an important player, together with the EU and NATO, which e merged as a leading force for the stabilisation of the region. The OSCE found its role mainly in democracy building and in promoting reconciliation between the opposing sides. These practical achievements eventually led the OSCE to formulate its own strategy in dealing with the region. As early as at the Stockholm ministerial meeting in 1992, the OSCE addressed the situation in the region but dealt only with the war on the territory of former Yugoslavia, in particular the aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina. One year later, at the fourth meeting of the OSCE Coun cil in Rome, the ministers made references to the region as a whole, emphasizing the need for a just and durable peace in the region, and to 39 the readiness of the OSCE to contribute to the process of reconcilia tion, rehabilitation, and rebuilding of democratic institutions and the rule of law. They also emphasized that the military security and stability of South Eastern Europe was of importance for the peace and stability of the OSCE area as a whole. Eventually, as the EU and other major powers developed a re gional strategy formulated in the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe in 1999, the OSCE Istanbul Summit held later in the same year underlined that the OSCE “experiences in South Eastern Europe demonstrated the need for a broader view of the region” and emphasized that regional cooperation would serve as a catalyst for the integration of the countries into broader structures. The Summit tasked the Permanent Council with developing a regional strategy to that effect. Finally, one year later, at the eighth OSCE Ministerial Meeting on 28 November 2000, a “Vienna Declaration on the Role of the OSCE in South Eastern Europe” was adopted. In this document, a regional strategy for dealing with the issues of South Eastern Europe was formulated, although not in an explicit way as such, but as a set of main directions and priorities. These included advancing progress towards full democracy, respect for human right and fundamental freedoms, including the right of persons belonging to national minorities, institution building, rule of law, work on free elections, media development, and reconciliation and reconstruction, including the return of refugees and internally displaced persons. The area of arms control was also mentioned, as was the importance of maintaining a broad network of missions in the region to support the OSCE’s efforts. While this document did not bring fundamentally new elements to OSCE activities already embarked upon in the region, it indicated that this organisation had its own place and role in the overall strategy of the international community towards South Eastern Europe. This was confirmed as well at the Bucharest OSCE Ministerial Council Meeting on 5 December, 2001, where the region of South Eastern Europe was defined as one of the strategic priorities for the OSCE. Support was pledged for “sustainable stabilisation, democra tisation, institution building and economic reconstruction”, as well as for additional steps to facilitate the plight of refugees and internally displaced persons in the full exercise of their right to return home and to repossess their properties throughout the region. Furthermore, the contribution of all countries of South Eastern Europe to enhance re gional cooperation and to foster regional security and stability was underlined. In this connection, what is particularly important is the fact that the OSCE is accepted by all countries of the region as an organisation of their own, since all of them, after the admission of the FRY in Nov 40 ember 2000, are members within its ranks. Therefore, the success of the OSCE in dealing with the problems of security and stability in South Eastern Europe can be also perceived as successes of the countries in the region themselves. In spite of the limitations stemming from the character of the OSCE that were mentioned earlier, its advantages – such as broad membership of all the European and North American countries and its democratic decision making process – can be utilized for its continued engagement in the region. Naturally, the forms and the scope of the OSCE’s engagement will depend not only on the enhancement of its capabilities but primarily on the evolution of the situation in the region and on the priorities and needs perceived by the OSCE participating states, including the countries of the region themselves.
PERSPECTIVES FOR REGIONAL SECURITY IN SOUTH EASTERN EUROPE After a decade of wars and instability, human suffering and economic impoverishment, the region of South Eastern Europe, and in particular the area referred to as “the Western Balkans” (or the “post Yugoslav countries, minus Slovenia, plus Albania”), resembles a land scape that has suffered a series of earthquakes. The major shocks and devastation are over, but the area is still hit by an occasional tremor, causing fear that a major catastrophe could strike again. However, in geology this seismic activity of minor aftershocks usually signifies stabilisation of the ground and not the advent of a new major earth quake. Similarly, the armed incidents and larger scale fighting that took place in South Serbia and in Macedonia during 2001 could be considered the manifestation of the last stages of earlier conflicts, rather than the indication of a major new conflict. What are the reasons behind such an assessment? First of all, the countries of South Eastern Europe are in a new and unprecedented situation. For the first time in modern history, they share the same political ideology and subscribe, not only in declarations but also in creasingly in practice, to the values of liberal democracy, i.e. to party pluralism, parliamentary democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms of individuals and minorities, and to the market economy. Secondly, for the first time in history, they have the same strategic goal in their foreign policy orientation – integration, as early as possible, into all major European and Euro Atlantic institutions, above all to the European Union. If we look back in history, it is paradoxical that in the twentieth century, the Balkans were most stable at a time when the region was divided into blocs and when its geopolitical structure was presented by the formula “2+2+2” – two members of the Warsaw Pact (Bulgaria and Romania), two members of NATO (Greece and Turkey) and two 41 non bloc countries (non aligned Yugoslavia and self isolated Albania). However, this was a static formula that only provided for basic stability, while now, for the first time, there is an historic opportunity to achieve stability through dynamism and political and economic change, i.e. through the transition to democracy.
The International Community On the other hand, the political and military presence of the international community in the area of South Eastern Europe became, after years of hesitant but gradually more and more forceful involvement, a permanent feature, and is likely to remain so for the foreseeable future. Whether in the form of the direct military presence of NATO and Western countries or through the SFOR and KFOR, whether through an increasingly widening network of stabilisation and association agreements with the EU or through the OSCE’s presence, the international community will not in the foreseeable future resign from its responsibilities in the region. After some contradictory moves and conflicting messages sent to the region, the message of the day is clear: “we will stay”. The international community will no longer allow the region to plunge again into the turmoil of populism and aggression, for its own sake and that of the Balkan nations. Of course, the dynamics of politics cannot remain frozen. This might include the rearrangements of some states, such as the new shape of the Yugoslav federation or even its dissolution, but all these changes will have to be done in a peaceful manner and under the close monitoring and approv al of international community. The international community will be represented in the region first of all by the EU, whose influence, after revived confidence in its viability confirmed by bold expansion plans, will increase even more, due to not only its economic leverage but also its orientation for the completion of the project for a “whole and free” Europe. NATO as a major military factor will also stay, with constant, albeit somewhat reduced US participation. In spite of the new agenda forced upon the US after the terrorist attacks of September 11 th , the burden of the Balkans is not too heavy for such a major power. According to some estimates, in the year 2000 the American share in the total number of NATO troops in the region (65,000) was less than 20% (11,400), representing only one tenth of the total number of US troops in Europe (120,000), with a share of only one percent of the US military budget (one percent of 280 billion dollars). Moreover, keeping the military presence in the region serves not only its stability but also represents an element of the global struggle against terrorism, which has links and even some roots in the Balkans.
42 Besides the monitoring and peacekeeping role of the international community, another factor of enhanced security in the region is the reduced military threat of indigenous military forces. One of the main driving forces of past conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, the heavily armed and aggressive regular and irregular military forces – in particular those that inherited the bulk of weapons, equipment and man power of the former JNA – are now exhausted after lengthy warfare and demoralized due to the burden of war crimes and political manipulations to which they were subjected. In addition, and perhaps most importantly, the armed forces of local actors have been put under firm international control, which is to remain and, subjected to reductions and limitations, is likely to be even stricter.
Arms Control and Confidence-Building Measures The Balkan states are, first of all, obliged to respect and implement all the confidence – and security – building measures included in the Vienna Document of 1999, as OSCE participating states. Those countries that were or are alliance members (Greece and Turkey as NATO member states and Bulgaria and Romania as former WTO members) have to respect measures and limitations from the Conventional Armed Forces (CFE) Agreement. In addition, the countries that are signatories of the Dayton Peace Agreement are bound by two additional agreements from 1996 based on Articles II and IV of the respective Annex, which provide for additional sub regional confidence and security building measures and for arms limitations and reductions. The first document – the Vienna Agreement based on Article II – introduced the elaborate system of measures for the exchange of information on military forces and activities and inspections throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina. The second agreement, concluded in Florence and based on Article IV, put the military forces and major armaments of the three countries – Bos nia and Herzegovina (all army components), Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia – within strict limits, which signified, primar ily for the forces of Republika Srpska and the FRY, substantial reductions in some categories. The Florence agreement introduced ceilings in five categories of conventional armaments (battle tanks, artillery pieces, combat aircraft, attack helicopters and armoured combat vehicles) that will remain in force for the unlimited duration of the agreement itself. The ceilings limited the FRY to approximately 75% of its 1996 holdings, while Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina were assigned about some 30% of the FRY's 1996 holdings (two thirds for the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and one third for the Republika Srpska). The agreement
43 also provided for specific reduction methods, extensive exchange of information, intrusive inspection, and implementation review. By the end of the statutory reduction period, on 31 October 1997, close to 6,600 armaments had been reduced by the parties, almost two thirds of the total within Bosnia and Herzegovina. The parties to the agreement also had accepted “voluntary limitations” on manpower. It is politically important that the parties, which prior to Dayton, had been engaged in almost four years of heavy fighting, recognized in signing the agreement “the importance of achieving balanced and stable defence force levels at the lowest numbers consistent with their respective security”. Finally, a new set of measures recently was approved in a con cluding document of the negotiations based on Article V of Annex 1 b of the Dayton Peace Accords, which was negotiated by twenty participating states – countries of the region and other interested parties. Although the measures are of a voluntary nature, they represent a set of new or elaborated confidence and security building measures designed to respond to the regional requirements of South Eastern Europe. It is logical that the countries of the region, especially those already bound by the two earlier agreements, will be expected to follow the spirit and letter of this new document, which was endorsed at the OSCE Ministerial Conference in Bucharest on 4 December 2001. All this makes the perspective for renewed conflict in the region unlikely. This is, however, only one aspect of stabilizing the situation in SEE. A “negative peace” – the mere absence of war, is a much bet ter situation than that of the previous decade, but not nearly enough. Long term stabilisation of the region undoubtedly requires much more: economic recovery and prosperity and the removal or, at least, the containment of all those elements that could lead to disputes and tension. In this regard, the situation in the region is still burdened with some uncertainties.
The Economic Dimension Economic recovery, especially for such countries as Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro and Albania, for the province of Kosovo, and perhaps even for Serbia, will be slow and painful, requiring structural readjustments and social sacrifices which could create political setbacks, as has occurred in most transition countries. Here, however, it could have more serious consequences, since the political parties that could profit from these setbacks are not just popu list or formerly communist in orientation but those political parties that actively promoted pro war policies. Therefore, massive economic assistance to the countries of the region would be important, not
44 strictly for economic reasons but also to prevent regression in the political and security realms. However, since the economic issues, notwithstanding their crucial importance, are beyond the scope of this paper, we would like to men tion some other potential obstacles to the stabilisation of the region and to indicate problems that must be dealt with by regional actors and the international community in order to attain longer term stability in South Eastern Europe.
Status and Border Issues One of the potential factors of instability in the region is uncer tainty concerning the current arrangement of states, i.e. whether the present state borders are final or whether the process of fragmentation is still unfinished. The prevailing view in the region and, more impor tantly, of the international community, at least at this juncture, is that further territorial changes are unwelcome. However, it is certain that the shape of the Yugoslav federation is going to change, since both constituent republics, in spite of the lack of substantial meaningful negotiations between them, agree that a new constitutional arrange ment is necessary. Whether the federation will be preserved in this process, leading to a looser union as is preferred in Belgrade, or whether the drive for independence will lead to the emergence of a sovereign Montenegro, as is preferred in Podgorica, remains un certain. However, if events transpire in this manner, it will be vitally important for the process to be kept under the full scrutiny of the inter national community and for steps and guarantees to be taken to ensure that this will not serve as a precedent for similar requests in Kosovo, Macedonia, or Bosnia and Herzegovina. Reaffirmation of the princi ples of the Badinter Commission formed by the EC in 1991, which granted independence only to the five republics of the former federa tion and not to other territories within them, could serve as a legal foundation for this. Irrespective of the outcome of these tendencies for independence, it seems that the complexity of the states in South Eastern Europe would call for further decentralisation processes within each of the states, based, however, not on an ethnic but on a civic principle. Tendencies towards centralisation within the states would only encourage secessionist movements, while real autonomy would provide a more durable basis for the survival of states and for the promotion of civic values. Closely connected to the problems of “unfinished statehood” are some remaining border disputes in the region, the legacy of the dissolution of the former federation. These include the dispute over the Slovenian Croatian sea border in the Bay of Piran, disputes over 45 the border between Croatia and Bosnia along the Una River, and problems between Croatia and the FRY (Montenegro) on the entrance to the Bay of Kotor, at Prevlaka Peninsula, as well as border issues in the Danube region between Croatia and the FY (in the Vojvodina Pro vince of Serbia). What is interesting is that these issues concern areas of seawater or river flows and not the land frontier. This indicates that they should be manageable and, indeed, in some cases, such as the Bay of Piran, preliminary arrangements have been achieved. In any case, the border issues as such, although they represent one of the unresolved problems in the region, are not of such magnitude that they should be considered a serious threat to security and stability in the long run.
Refugees and Displaced Persons Another legacy of the war in the region is the problem of the return of refugees and displaced persons. In spite of the commitments undertaken in documents such as the Dayton Peace Agreement, the UN resolution and other international and bilateral agreements, the process has been slow, leading to the conclusion that for some govern ments or political forces in the region one of the results of the war – the creation of ethnically homogenous territories – is an acceptable or even preferred outcome. If the efforts of the international community to deal with this problem should falter, then a logical conclusion would be that such an outcome is acceptable to the international community, which would send out a very wrong message to the region and might encourage further conflicts. Understandably, with the passage of time and the settlement of refugees in new environments, especially in the case of younger generations, the pressure for resettlement will inevitably diminish. However, should this happen, it remains politically important and morally and legally justified that the displaced persons be offered compensation for their lost or destroyed property. Conveniently sidelining or overlooking this issue would signify realization of one of the main goals of the post Yugoslav wars – displacement of populations. This, in turn, would have extremely negative consequences for mutual trust among the states and nations in the region and for the process of reconciliation.
War Crimes and Reconciliation The results of the process of reconciliation will also depend on the prosecution of war crimes. Indeed, any reluctance to pursue bringing to justice those most responsible for war crimes would send out a wrong signal and would imply condonation of the horrible practice. Therefore, the international community should continue to insist on full cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the 46 former Yugoslavia (ICTY), making it also one of the main conditions for the development of greater cooperation between the EU and the post Yugoslav states. However, since The Hague Tribunal would deal only with those most responsible from the political and military establishments, it is important that the states of the region also engage in prosecution of war criminals in domestic courts. This is perhaps even more important for mutual reconciliation than the trials at the Hague Tribunal. If the judicial systems of the states concerned show that they are prepared and ready to deal with their own war criminals, then the process of moral recovery within the nations and reconciliation with their neighbours would gain strong momentum.
Minority Issues Although the process of disintegration of the former Yugoslavia has resulted in the creation of more ethnically homogenous states, the ethnic diversity of the region remains one of its characteristics. In order to ensure that this does not become a potential detonator for future conflicts, the treatment of minorities should remain high on the agenda, and standards for the protection of minorities should be exemplary. With such an approach, the minority issue will cease to be one of the factors of instability. The problem, however, will remain and will require the scrutiny of the international community, although probably not its direct involvement, except in certain cases. Indeed, if we look at the map of minorities in South Eastern Europe, notwithstanding its complexity, there are only a few problems that present a long term security threat for the region. Thisis, in spite of the fact that minorities are still generally perceived in the region as a source of mistrust and potential disputes and not yet as an element of rapprochement between “host states” and “kin states”. However, while it cannot be denied that minorities present a complex issue with the potential to evolve into a factor complicating inter state relations, a combination of elements are required to turn this problem into a real security threat. Even though the following list is certainly not an exhaustive one, we consider it to contain the most important elements that have the potential to transform a minority issue into a security problem or threat, on their own or, more likely, in a combination with others. These are, in order of relative importance: • repression or a policy of assimilation by the “host state”; • irredentist or imperialist policy of the “kin state”; • size of the minority; • degree of territorial concentration of the minority; • location of the minority (proximity to the border of the “kin state”);
47 • minority characteristics (ethnic, religious or linguistic minority or a combination of these elements); • degree of self consciousness as a minority; • level of civil and political culture of both the majority and mi nority; • diversity of populations in a given state; • degree of urbanization of the minority; • duration of minority status (traditional minorities vs. new mi norities). It is widely assumed that it is precisely the “ethnic mixture” of the Balkans that makes the region a troubled area from the point of view of security. Indeed, the sheer number and territorial distribution of minorities in the region is impressive, even if we list only those generally known. Albanians make up sizeable minorities in Yugo slavia and Macedonia, while an Albanian speaking assimilated min ority exists in Greece. Macedonian minorities are present in Bulgaria, Albania and Greece. Turkish minorities live in Bulgaria and Greece, and there is a Greek minority in Albania. Small Bulgarian minorities reside in Yugoslavia, Macedonia and Romania. In the northern part of the region, Hungarians are the most numerous and widespread minority, represented in four countries: Romania, Yugoslavia, Croatia and Slovenia. The last two countries also have small Italian minorities. To these “traditional minorities,” new ones – although most of them not recognized as such – can be added. These are the ones that resulted mainly from the break up of ex Yugoslavia. These are: Serbs in Croatia and Macedonia; Croats in Serbia and Montenegro; and Muslims (Bosnians) in Serbia, Montenegro and Croatia. At the other end of the region, in Moldova, there is a new minority (Russians) and an older one (Gagauz). Besides these minorities, most of which have their kin states in the immediate neighbourhood, there are minorities without such territorial connections, like the Roma and Vlachs. Finally, there is the specific case of Bosnia and Herzegovina where the three ethnic groups are not minorities but constituent na tions with equal rights. However, as a result of population transfers and territorial divisions within the country, some segments of the Serbs, Croats and Bosnians have found themselves in the position of a minority, or are treated in such a way. If we take into account the above mentioned factors, it would seem that, despite the fact that there are many minorities in the Bal kans, only a few of them pose an actual or potential security threat. The combination of factors such as size, territorial concentration, and mutually connected elements of repression and irredentism or separat ism would suggest that minorities like Albanians in Kosovo and Macedonia, Serbs in Croatia and in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina (although do not have the status of 48 minority in Bosnia and Herzegovina) have the potential of becoming, or remaining, a security issue. This is true to a lesser extent for Turks in Bulgaria and is least likely for Hungarians in Romania and FRY. Without delving into the concrete problems of the different minorities and the legitimacy of their demands, we can say with confidence that the conflict between minorities’ aspirations for increased self rule or autonomy and the principle of territorial sovereignty and integrity creates an unstable and security threatening situation. Therefore, the solution to the minority issues should be based on a functioning compromise between the two seemingly conflicting no tions. Besides drawing upon experiences in other regions (such as the Åland Islands), we can find potential reference points for these solu tions in the norms from the 1990 OSCE Copenhagen Document on minorities, which were reaffirmed in later OSCE documents, and in documents of the Council of Europe, such as the European Convention on the Protection of National Minorities (1995), which stated that minority rights are “a matter of international cooperation.” In addition, Recommendation 1201 (1993) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe is of special importance for the promotion of minority rights on the normative level. It speaks explicitly of collective rights of minorities and refers indirectly to territorial autonomy, recommending that in certain situations minorities be given a special status corresponding to their historical and territorial position (Article 11). The recommendation also lists specific minority rights, including the right to form minority political parties, to use publicly their language in contact with governmental and judicial institutions, to have schools in their mother tongue, etc. Finally, the recommendation attempts to give a definition of a “national minority,” enumerating criteria such as: residence on a defined territory and links with the state; specific ethnic, cultural, religious or linguistic characteristics; representation in a “sufficient” number that is still smaller that the rest of the population; and a separate identity, accompanied by a wish to preserve this identity. Whether all these elements will be sufficient to satisfy the aspirations of those ethnic groups in the Balkans that have objectively surpassed the status of a minority – like the Kosovo Albanians or the Albanians in Macedonia – remains to be seen. Admittedly, the issues of national minorities remain one of the most controversial subjects in international relations, since this question touches on the national unity, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of states. However, it seems that the international community, at least in Europe, has finally devel oped a relatively coherent strategy for dealing with the problem. Even the most restrictive countries do not deny the importance of minority rights, and policies of assimilation have been discredited. The rights of national minorities in the field of culture and education are gradually becoming more widely accepted, while political rights (including the 49 right to self rule, particularly in relation to territorial autonomy), al though still disputable, are also gaining wider support. These rights would certainly be less objectionable to the states if they were clearly distinguished from the right to self determination (statehood), a right whose subjects can be nations only. Within these coordinates, solutions should also be searched for the most serious ethnic problems – like the Albanian “national ques tion”. Pragmatism should be the key word, and some arrangements, despite being considered “temporary” by all actors involved – the international protectorate in Kosovo for example should remain in place until a solution acceptable to all is found.
Terrorism Terrorism is another issue that must be addressed by the countries of the region. This is a difficult challenge, but one that appears even manageable in light of the more united and forceful stand taken by the international community after the events of September 11 th and in view of new international commitments undertaken, including the OSCE Declaration from the Ministerial Conference in Bucharest. Indeed, anti terrorist cooperation could serve as an element bringing the states of the region closer together. However, another issue – organ ised crime and corruption – does seem to be more persistent and requires political and societal changes. Countries unable to resolve this issue are usually unable to develop a stable civic society, which in turn has the potential to pull the region back into backwardness and instability. Commenting on the October changes in Belgrade, Timothy Garton Ash claimed in his article “The Last Revolution” (The New York Review of Books, 16 November, 2000) that a crucial test for new authorities in Serbia, as was learned from other transitions, is whether they can establish the rule of law in a highly criminalized society. This will determine, he observed, whether Serbia becomes “a little Russia or a civilized European country”. It would seem that this warning is relevant not only for Serbia but also for most other states of South Eastern Europe.
SCENARIOS FOR THE FUTURE Presuming that the region of South Eastern Europe does not sink into a new cycle of violence, what might its future look in the next ten or fifteen years? A pessimistic variant of the region’s future would probably presume that the process of fragmentation will continue, affecting primarily those states that have complex ethnic structures, such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, the FRY and Macedonia; that the economic gap with Europe will grow; that regional cooperation will 50 fail to take root; and that all of this will be followed or accompanied by the withdrawal of the international community from the region and the states’ increased reliance on their own military forces as the guarantors of security. This scenario, although not entirely unlikely, does not seem prob able, predominantly due to the likelihood that the international com munity will remain present and engaged in the region. It is difficult to imagine that the EU, with its strategy of expansion, would allow itself the luxury of withdrawing from a region that it borders directly and which will be a candidate in the final step of the project for a united Europe. Similarly, it is unlikely that NATO, once installed in the re gion, would permit the creation of a security vacuum in its centre, opening the door for the more direct involvement of non NATO powers. The other, most optimistic scenario envisions all the Balkan states in the foreseeable future, say 10–15 years, as full members of the European Union – which in turn would imply that all their bilateral problems as well as democracy building and economic recovery will have been solved, or will be well on the way to being solved. Howe ver, while it is indeed true that full integration to the EU is a declared aim of all South Eastern Europe states, its realization in this time frame does not seem likely, due both to the huge economic and social gap that presently exists between the Balkans and the area of the EU that needs to be overcomed and the EU to “take a breather” after the first and second rounds of expansion (the effects of which have to be tested in practise). Therefore, the most likely scenario lies between the two extremes – namely, the South Eastern Europe region would be basically stabi lised with a degree of regional cooperation, primarily as a free trade area zone and possibly with a common currency (the Euro), but with a different level of “Europeanisation” and association with the EU. For states that are at present already candidates for the EU, membership in this organisation looks like it might become a real possibility by the end of the decade (for Croatia and also Bulgaria and Romania). Other states may get quite close to this aim (the FRY, or Serbia and Montenegro), while the others, beset by internal problems, will probably still remain for some time outside the EU, but firmly connected to its structures and under the close monitoring of the EU and NATO (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Albania). Finally, some territories will remain in an “undefined status”, as “quasi protectorates” (Kosovo). In any case, it is unlikely that that region will be left to itself to manage its problems of transition and integration with the international community. However, even this “relatively optimistic” scenario will require the persistent efforts of domestic political elites and consistent policy
51 on behalf of the international community, with a combination of incentives and pressures.
Priorities for Governments The first priority of domestic political forces must be, in addition to economic reconstruction, the building of stable democratic institutions and the establishment of the rule of law as the guiding principle for the functioning of society, leading to the eradication of corruption in both political and economic life. A liberal and forthcoming policy on minorities, in accordance with the highest international standards, including those established by the Council of Europe and the OSCE, remains an important element of regional stability. A firm stand on the prosecution of war criminals is a prerequisite both for normalisation of bilateral relations in the region and for the acceptance of states with obligations in this field into a community of democratic nations above all for integration into the EU. Doing away with the politics of populism, demagoguery and na tionalism that characterised much of Balkan politics in the last decade of the 20 th century is another condition for the successful transition to civil society. In this context, an unequivocal message from the international community should be sent to the South Eastern Europe societies and their political elites that democratisation and the acceptance of the values of a liberal democracy do not signify an amnesty for “an authentic nationalism”. Making deals and compromises with any kind of nationalism would again distance the Balkans from the rest of Europe. In this context, it is worth mentioning that the OSCE has recognised the potential destabilising character of nationalism and adopted documents at the ministerial meeting in Rome in 1993 and at the Lisbon summit in 1996 that specifically mention “aggressive nationalism” as one of the main threats to stability on the continent. It has recommended that this issue be kept high on the OSCE Agenda and that specifically the High Commissioner on National Minorities and ODIHR be called upon to act upon this. In addition, the activities of the OSCE missions in the countries of the former Yugoslavia are also directed towards eliminating and curbing the manifestations of nationalism in politics, media, education, etc. While national efforts to build civil societies remain the most important strategy to achieve stabilisation of the South Eastern Europe region, the international community’s activity is necessary to comp lement these efforts. A key element of the stability of South Eastern Europe is the continuous presence of the intentional community in the region. The ideas of withdrawing from the region or making it a sort
52 of “cordon sanitaire” to protect the EU from waves of immigration and criminal or other destabilizing flows from non European areas, if realized, would make the South Eastern Europe region once again an “outcast of Europe” exposed to destabilisation. Ultimately, the best strategy for both “Europeanising” the region and protecting Europe from destabilising trends would be to firmly integrate the region into Europe rather than to keep it outside, on the doorstep.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SHORT TERM ACTION While stabilisation of the region requires long term and persistent efforts to build up stable democratic institutions and restructure and revive national economies, certain steps can and should be taken by governments concerned in order to create more favourable conditions for the successful outcome of these long term efforts. Keeping in mind the subject matter of this paper, our recommendations will focus on the field of international security. Stabilisation of South Eastern Europe and the establishment of mutual trust among the region’s states and nations require, in addition to longer term reconciliation, full predictability in the military field and certainty that the armies of the region will be considered allies and not adversaries. An increase in mutual confidence has already been achieved by implementation of the confidence and security building measures from the Vienna Document and the Florence and Vienna agreements, reached on the basis of Articles II and IV of the Dayton Peace Agreement. However, the participation of all the countries of the region in NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme would serve as an additional element of stability and mutual trust. Therefore, those states that are not members of this programme – Bosnia and Herzegovina and the FRY – should take urgent steps to prepare themselves to meet the requirements for membership and to be able to submit an early application. Initial steps to this effect have been taken by the government in Belgrade, but further measures are needed, especially those aimed at full democratic control of the army. Constitutional uncertainties, like those concerning the future of the Yugoslav Federation, should not be regarded as an obstacle for finalisation of the decision to join the PfP. These uncertainties are not cited as an obstacle for membership in the Council of Europe, which requires substantive legal and even constitutional adjustments, or for the opening of negotiations with the EU on a stabilisation and Association Agreement, so there is no convincing argument as to why they should be considered an obstacle towards joining the PfP. Quite the contrary, the process towards membership in the PfP would be an additional 53 incentive for necessary reform and reorganisation of the army and for increased democratic control over the military and greater transparency in military matters in general, all of which in turn would serve as additional confidence building potential and would have a direct positive effect for dialogue on the future of the federation and stability in the region. The governments in the region should also consider steps to implement unilaterally, or through bilateral agreements, measures pro posed in the recently adopted Concluding Document in Article V, negotiations aimed at strengthening security and stability “in and around the former Yugoslavia”. Although the measures proposed are voluntary and represent variants of those contained in the Vienna Document of 1999, they are designed for the specific situation of post conflict rehabilitation in the region, and they represent a set of recommendations and guidelines that the participating states can and should implement in accordance with their security requirements and with a view to contribute to regional stability. One of these measures could include, for example, increased defence budget transparency and the exchange of information on actual yearly expenditures of the countries in the region, as well as on the financial contribution or donations of armaments and equipment received from any other state (paragraph 10 of the Concluding Document). Another measure could be the exchange of information, on a bilateral basis, with regard to the national holdings of conventional armaments among the countries of the region and with those in its pro ximity (paragraph 11). The confidence building process in the region could be reinforced also by the establishment of joint training for peacekeeping, search and rescues, or disaster relief, by the establishment of hotlines be tween regional military commanders, and by the development of consultative mechanisms in the case of unusual military activities (paragraph 12.2). Reduction of the threshold for the notification and observation of military activities in the region should also be considered (par. 13), keeping in mind that the threshold from the 1999 Vienna Document makes it unlikely that the forces of most states in the region would reach the required obligatory levels for notification/observation. Further steps to be taken in the military field could also refer to adjustments in military doctrines emphasising their non offensive pos tures, in order to reassure neighbours of their defensive nature. Another possible measure could be regular consultations and the sharing of information, including regional round tables, among parlia mentarians of the South Eastern Europe states on their respective experience in exercising parliamentary oversight over the military
54 sector. This would emphasise the commitment of all the states in the region to the principle of democratic control of the military. Finally, additional negotiated reductions on the level of armaments and manpower of the armies in the region would also make a concrete contribution to confidence and stability. The increased international attention to dealing with the threat of terrorism could provide an additional new area of cooperation among the states in the region of South Eastern Europe. Development of a common regional strategy along the lines contained in the “Bucharest Plan of Action for Combating Terrorism”, adopted at the OSCE Ministerial Meeting on 4 December, 2001, could be considered. The action plan clearly points out some problems, characteristic also of South Eastern Europe, which if not addressed properly could give rise to terrorist activities. For example, the need to deal with the problems of refugees and especially with the issue of protracted displacement is also of relevance for the situation in SEE. Promoting human rights, tolerance, and multiculturalism is also a long term preventive strategy for reducing the threat of terrorism. Also, the explicit identification of a close connection between terrorism and trans national organised crime, illicit trafficking in drugs, money laundering, and illicit arms trafficking should be understood by the South Eastern Europe states as a clear indication of the need for close cooperation to cut these links. Development of a common regional strategy to deal with the scourge of terrorism would widen the scope of cooperation between the relevant security services of the states in the region and would also help to develop common criteria and principles for dealing with the problem, thereby minimising the policies of different or at times double standards, which have hampered cooperation and have occasionally led to mistrust and tension among the states in the region. However, it should be again emphasised that the specific mea sures for cooperation in the military and security fields, while having their own confidence building potential, can produce concrete effects only if the partners in the cooperation effort are genuinely democratic governments. Even the most elaborate network of measures and agree ments, if agreed upon and implemented by governments of limited democratic credentials, will be only marginally effective and, in some cases, even counter productive by creating false expectations. The experience with numerous peace plans and agreements that were neg otiated, and even concluded, with earlier authoritarian leaders of the opposing sides in conflicts in the former Yugoslavia can be instructive in this sense. Therefore, in conclusion, it should be stressed once again that the actions of the international community and the efforts of domestic political forces in the South Eastern European countries should remain primarily concentrated on building stable democratic structures in the region and promoting common European democratic standards and 55 the rule of law, thus making the axiom that democracies do not go to war against one another relevant for the region of South Eastern Eu rope as well.
56 American Perspectives on Balkan Security James Dobbins U.S. Department of State OVERVIEW
America’s interest in Balkan security is derivative of its stake in Europe’s stability, a paramount concern of the United States for most of the past century. Since the end of the Second World War, American has sought to promote a prosperous, peaceful and outward looking Europe. It has encouraged the development of both European and Atlantic integrative structures and promoted European unification to that purpose. With the end of the Cold War, and after a period of some uncertainty, the United States determined to support the gradual ex tension of European and Atlantic structures to encompass all of Eu rope, including all the Balkans. This policy, originally enunciated by the Clinton Administration, has been embraced and given further impetus by its successor. There was a time, in the early 1990s, when the Washington policy establishment hoped that conflict in the Balkans could be incidental to Europe’s overall stability and within the capacity of Europe alone to address. Both assumptions proved wrong. By the mid 1990s, American policy makers therefore felt compelled to assume the lead in dealing with these issues. The current US administration recognizes the link between Balkan security and European stability, but believes that the problems of the region are becoming more manageable, and that Europe is gradually increasing its capabilities to deal with such challenges. Consequently, while remaining engaged in the region, Washington is looking to Brussels to take a greater lead and shoulder more of the burden. The United States supports full membership for all the countries of the Balkans in both the European Union (EU) and NATO. American policy and American aid programmes are designed to foster this objective. Washington sees the offer of such membership and the process of preparing for it as the most important incentive and the most influential factor in steering the foreign, security and domestic policies of all the states of the region in mutually compatible directions. Within five years, some states of the region should have 57 qualified to be full members of NATO. Within ten, some should also have become members of the EU, while a larger number should have qualified for NATO. The objective of international peacekeeping operations in Bosnia, Kosovo and Macedonia is to promote the development of polities capable of fully participating in this process of integration. To do so, unsettled territorial questions and associated issues of minority rights will need to be resolved. The United States will play an active role in facilitating such settlements, while opposing efforts to impose solu tions, either by the contesting parties or by external actors. It is rea sonable to expect the status of Montenegro to be settled within the next few years. A consensual solution to Kosovo, the only sort likely to last, will take longer. Failure to resolve these disputes will retard the progress of all parties toward full European and Atlantic integra tion. This fact itself may eventually provide some impetus toward their settlement. The September 11 th , 2001, terrorist attacks on New York and Washington will result in a shift of American attention and assets from the Balkans. The United States has already begun to look to its allies in Europe to take up a greater share of the burden for Balkan security. At the same time, these attacks also revealed to Americans their vulnerability, interdependence and need for engagement, soli darity and support from allies and friends. The result will be more resources for foreign affairs and defence, and more willingness to en gage and commit American power. The attacks of September 11 th also brought home to Americans what has been evident for some time in the Balkans – that the current challenges to international security lie less in the traditional realm of geopolitics and derive more from trans national criminal and extremist elements. The secularised Muslim societies of South Eastern Europe have proved remarkably resistant to Middle Eastern fundamentalist influence. But Muslims, Catholic and Orthodox communities of the Balkans have all proved fertile ground for home grown forms of extremism, and these have formed links and melded with the organ ised criminal activity so typical of post communist transitions. This nexus of trans national extremism and organised crime is the most serious threat that Balkan national security establishments are likely to face in the next five to ten years.
Key Issues of Regional Security Serbia stands at the centre of the region’s unresolved territorial issues. The United States, like the rest of the international community, would prefer to see the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia preserved by common consent among its various elements. But only Serbia can
58 decide how much effort to invest in this quest. Consensual union with Montenegro may be achievable over the next several years. Serbia must consider whether this objective is worth the disproportionate power sharing and weak central institutions that would be the price. Consensual reunion with Kosovo, if it is achievable at all, is much further off. For the present, Kosovo’s interim status as an international protectorate meets both Serb and Kosovar needs. As time goes on, however, and while opposing any unilateral or non consensual resolution of the issue, the international community will begin to encourage both sides to consider how their broader interests in joining the European and Atlantic mainstream may be served by a resolution of this issue.
Bosnia The United States, like the rest of the international community, has a large investment of prestige and resources in the Dayton settlement. This does not mean it regards Dayton as immutable. It does mean that the Dayton agreement must form the basis for the further evolution of Bosnia’s internal arrangements and external relations. The competencies of the central government in Sarajevo need to be developed to the point where it can effectively perform those functions necessary to fulfil the obligations of EU and NATO membership. Against these broad (and not terribly demanding) criteria, there is scope for considerable decentralization and autonomy for the constituent entities. Neither should Belgrade’s support for Dayton mean foregoing a special relationship with the Republika Srpska. On the contrary, the more effective Bosnia’s internal arrangements become, the more scope there should be for expanding links between Banja Luka and Belgrade, as between Mostar and Zagreb. Over the next several years, the US will continue to seek a grad ual reduction of military peacekeeping forces in Bosnia. To do so, it will seek to accelerate civil peace implementation, pressing for a consolidation of international civil functions and a strengthening of the international police presence. The break up of Bosnia in the early 1990's was caused, in significant part, by centrifugal pressures exerted from Belgrade and Zagreb. Successful termination of the current peacekeeping mission depends upon a reversal of these polarities – upon Belgrade and Zagreb joining with the rest of the international community in helping to consolidate a viable Bosnian state. With such support, the current peacekeeping mission in Bosnia should be brought to a conclusion within the next five years. The willingness of Croatia and Yugoslavia to assist the international community in building a viable Bosnian
59 state will be important criteria in judging their readiness to enter the European and Atlantic mainstream.
Kosovo Technically, Kosovo’s final status must be determined by the UN Security Council. As a practical matter, this cannot occur until the political leadership in Belgrade and Priština is ready to resolve the issue. That in turn must await some evolution in public attitudes. Any imposed solution, either by one of the parties or by the international community, would simply increase tensions in the region, and require more, not less, international oversight and resources to secure. The current interim status, an international protectorate, meets the needs of both parties. The Kosovars want independence some day, but not now. The Serbs want reunion some day, but not now. Preserving this interim status imposes a considerable burden on the international community, however. Over time, therefore, pressures for an agreed settlement will build. The prerequisites for progress toward any such agreement are: 1) the establishment of democratic institutions in Kosovo capable of giving legitimate voice to the views of the populace; 2) the assurance of minority participation in such institutions and the protection of minority rights; 3) the beginning of a dialogue between Belgrade and Priština, initially focused on limited issues of practical cooperation; and 4) additional time for passions to cool. The international com munity is working to put these prerequisites in place. Similarly to Bosnia, the United States will seek a gradual reduc tion of peacekeeping forces in Kosovo, as achievement of the above objectives permits. The United States will also encourage Europe to take on a greater share of the overall burden. The current operation is likely to be scaled back considerably over the next five years, but not phased out entirely until resolution of Kosovo's status can be achieved.
Montenegro Whereas any consensual determination of Kosovo’s final status must await changes in public attitudes, determination of Montenegro’s future awaits only decisions at the top. In Montenegro, a majority of the population would vote to support a continued loose union with Serbia, if offered such a choice. In Serbia, a majority would accommodate themselves to Montenegro’s independence, if faced with such an outcome. The United States, like the rest of the international community, prefers the first option, and will continue to counsel against any unilateral rupture. There is a domestic cost to this policy, however, given sympathy for Montenegro in some quarters 60 within the US Congress. The United States is unlikely, therefore, to persist in support for continued union between Montenegro and Serbia beyond the point at which the leadership in Belgrade loses interest.
Macedonia The United States wants the conflict in Macedonia settled in a manner that maintains that state’s territorial integrity and accommodates the reasonable demands of the Albanian minority. The Ohrid Agreement fully meets these criteria and has strong American support. While fully sharing in diplomatic efforts to secure and implement this settlement, the United States is looking to Europe to take the lead and to provide any necessary peacekeepers. If European leadership were to falter, or if some significant expansion of the peacekeeping mission were to become necessary, Washington might be forced to consider some increase in its role, but in light of competing demands, would do so with great reluctance. Recognizing that the conflict in Macedonia has been, in some significant measure, inspired and supported from abroad, the United States has taken the lead in seeking to identify those outside Macedonia responsible and to hinder their ability to render material support to the Albanian insurgency. As ethnic Macedonians begin organizing their own paramilitary forces, it will be important that Belgrade effectively discourage cross border support from Serbia’s own fringe elements, just as UMMIK and KFOR seek to do the same in Kosovo. More regional cooperation to deal with the general phenomenon of trans national extremism is also called for.
NATO vs. ESDP Europe’s dependence on the United States to lend force to its Balkan diplomacy, combined with the American disinclination to remain militarily committed in this region indefinitely, has been a prime motivator in the development of defence and security competencies within the European Union, the so called European Security and Defence Policy or ESDP. American opinion has responded somewhat ambivalently supporting greater European leadership and burden sharing, while wondering whether the European Union was the proper instrument for the task. Reacting to these concerns, Europe has made a considerable effort to design EU structures for defence compatible with NATO and capable of operating in close coordination with it. As already noted, Washington will be looking for Europe to in crease its overall share of the peacekeeping burden in the Balkans. 61 The United States preference would probably be for Europe to do this within the existing NATO framework. For the present, that is Eu rope’s preference as well. Thus in mid 2001, when the Alliance was debating whether to maintain a NATO force in Macedonia beyond the originally envisaged 30 days, the United States, not willing to join in such a mission, suggested that the EU might take on the task. The Europeans expressed a preference for NATO, even without American troops. At some later date, once EU defence structures are more firmly established, the European answer may be different. In any case, whether Balkan peacekeeping is conducted by NATO, the EU or some combination of the two, the bulk of the forces will increasingly be European. The diplomacy that supports such ac tion, on the other hand, will remain transatlantic, and the United States will provide some specialized military support in areas such as logistics, intelligence and communications. Memories of the divided and feckless diplomacy of the early 1990s, and the impotent peacekeeping efforts that accompanied it, are sufficiently alive on both sides of the Atlantic to discourage repetition.
CONCLUSION In the Balkans, as elsewhere, post Cold war peacekeeping has proved less a matter of separating hostile antagonists than of introdu cing the rule of law into societies whose structures for security, law enforcement and the administration of justice have collapsed or been heavily compromised. This is the most difficult task presently facing the international community in Bosnia and Kosovo. This same task is even more challenging for states like Serbia, which face a comparable need for institutional reform, without the freedom to build new structures from scratch, or the scale of resources at the disposal of the international community. Reform of the military, law enforcement and judicial establishments requires a focus on the software rather than the hardware of security, and on the quality rather than the number of personnel. Serbia, the most multiethnic society in the Balkans, will need to lead the way in the integration of minorities into its security and law enforcement apparatus if it is to deal effectively with the prime threat to regional security – trans national extremism and its links to organised crime. The recent successful effort to restore Yugoslav authority in the Preševo Valley demonstrated Serbia's newfound capacity to conduct such counterinsurgency actions within the rule of law. At the same time, Serbia undertook the reforms and adopted the restraints key to the success of this operation only under considerable international pressure. Furthermore, this operation also demonstrated the extraor 62 dinary demands placed on the civilian leadership to ensure that demo cratic controls and legal restraints were applied comprehensively and conscientiously. Reform of the police and military services should be directed toward making the extraordinary ordinary. The primary threats to Balkan security over the next decade will, as noted, be trans national and non conventional. Security, law en forcement and judicial establishments will need to be heavily oriented toward international cooperation on a bilateral, regional, European and global basis. Forging such ties, recruiting and training personnel suit ed to such collaboration, and participating fully in all relevant multinational structures should be essential features of any new national security strategy. The international community will respect whatever decisions Serbia makes regarding the future of Yugoslavia, provided these are made democratically and implemented peacefully. In the end, how ever, leaders in Belgrade will need to engage on these matters with the elected leaderships in Podgorica and Priština. The international com munity will resist unilateral moves toward independence in either case, but it will not force the people of Montenegro or Kosovo into relationships that the majority of those societies reject, nor allow Serbia to do so. Progress toward European and Atlantic integration may not make Balkan borders entirely irrelevant any time soon, but that prospect offers the best incentive to all concerned to find mutually satisfactory answers to these issues.
63 64 Regional Security Issues in South Eastern Europe: A Council of Europe Perspective Hans Peter Furrer Council of Europe THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE APPROACH TO SECURITY IN SOUTH EASTERN EUROPE
The Council of Europe (CoE) was founded in 1949 as the first po litical organisation in Europe. Its aim is to achieve a greater unity among its members for the purpose of safeguarding and realising the ideals and principles that are their common heritage and facilitating their economic and social progress (Statute, Article 1). The Council’s principles are pluralist parliamentary democracy, respect for human rights, and the rule of law. The implementation and promotion of these principles constitute the specific mandate and “raison d’être” of the CoE. In its essence the CoE is an alliance for the defence of these principles. To that end, it established a system of col lective enforcement of respect for human rights through mutual con trol. It also brings its members ever closer together through their participation on an equal basis in common activities to promote the implementation of its principles in response to changing challenges. At the first CoE summit meeting held in Vienna in October 1993, heads of state and government of the member states declared: “The end of the division of Europe offers an historic opportunity to consolidate peace and stability on the continent. All our countries are committed to pluralist and parliamentary democracy, the indivi sibility and universality of human rights, the rule of law and a common cultural heritage enriched by its diversity. Europe can thus be come a vast area of democratic security”. “Democratic security”, i.e. the guarantee of stability and security both between states and within states through the efficient implementation of democracy, human rights and the rule of law, has been referred to as the specific contribution of the CoE to the OSCE Common and Comprehensive Security Model for Europe for the 21st Century and Platform for Cooperative Security between organisations and institutions concerned with the promotion of comprehensive security in Europe.
65 While in 1993 the heads of state and government identified territorial ambitions, the resurgence of aggressive nationalism, the perpetuation of spheres of influence, intolerance, and totalitarian ideologies as risks and challenges for democratic security, at their second summit meeting in Strasbourg on 10 11 October 1997, they drew up an action plan in the following fields considered to be major topical challenges for stability and security in Europe: • The promotion of human rights and the strengthening of pluralist democracy; • Social cohesion through the promotion of social rights as an essential complement to the promotion of human rights and dignity; • The concerns of citizens about the new dimension of threats to their security and the dangers that these threats constitute for democracy; • The role of culture and education in strengthening mutual understanding and confidence between people. On the occasion of the CoE’s fiftieth anniversary in May 1999, member governments reaffirmed their “determination fully to use the potential of the CoE as the pre eminent political institution capable of bringing together, on an equal footing and in permanent structures, all the countries of Greater Europe” and committed themselves “to build ing this Greater Europe without dividing lines” and to “continue to consolidate the stability of (the) continent based on democratic institutions”, inter alia by pursuing the fight against terrorism, aggressive nationalism and threats to the territorial integrity of states. Under the statute of the CoE, member states agree to be bound by the fundamental principles of the organisation and to cooperate within the Council of Europe to promote them. Consequently, questions re lating to democracy, human rights and the rule of law are no longer matters pertaining to the exclusive internal competence of member countries: these questions are of common concern. On the one hand, the implementation of the principles is a task to be performed within and throughout each member country. On the other hand, performance of each country is subject to collective control. In the case of the European Convention on Human Rights, this control has reached the most stringent legal nature: people themselves, besides governments, can take the initiative for judicial review by the European Court of Human Rights of alleged violations of human rights, and the outcome of this review is binding upon governments concerned, the execution of judgments being supervised by the Council’s Committee of Ministers. CoE activities do not only involve governments but they involve the full range of state institutions, including parliament and the judi ciary, as well as citizens themselves, through their participation in spe
66 cific cooperative frameworks (non governmental organisations, youth organisations, etc.) Compliance with commitments is also promoted by various devic es aimed at correcting failure and shortcomings. Accession to membership is subject to significant conditions in terms of democratic institution building, free and fair elections, and the rule of law, including in particular the independence of justice, freedom of expression and the media, protection of national minorities, and observance of the principles of international law. Concerning member countries, both the Committee of Ministers and the Parliamentary Assembly (and in its field the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities as well) have established special political monitoring procedures for compliance by member states with their obligations. Publicity and public awareness building is the essence of parliamentarian monitoring, whereas monitoring by the Committee of Ministers aims at cooperative measures to overcome difficulties. With respect to the region of South Eastern Europe, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) in particular, the following are the parameters of the CoE’s perspectives and approach: All countries of the region are eligible for membership and in volvement in the Council’s collective effort to bring about “democrat ic security”, but each of them must demonstrate willingness to join and prove its capability to comply with membership requirements. Willingness seems to be present on the part all countries, their political forces and public opinion, support the intention to join European cooperation and integration structures and to advance their transformation into modern democratic states capable of guaranteeing increased prosperity and security for the people. The FRY as well as Bosnia and Herzegovina are still in the process of accession. To complete this process, the Council (the Parliamentary Assambley and the Comitee of Ministers) must assess each candidate’s qualifications “on its own merits”, while not objections reciprocal repercussions of accession. All countries in the region, and in particular candidate countries, are partners in specific CoE cooperation and assistance programmes on matters relevant to their membership qualification. The CoE attempts to promote security through cooperation. Members and candidates are expected to participate fully and in good faith in the different cooperation structures of the CoE: • the political bodies with their exchanges and peer control, i.e. the Parliamentary Assembly and the Committee of Ministers with its network of intergovernmental cooperation, including meetings of specialised Ministers (e.g. of the Interior); • the judicial and other control and monitoring mechanisms and the corresponding obligations of transparency, reporting and implementation of judgments and recommendations; 67 • representation of local and regional authorities; • civil society networks, etc. This also implies a high degree of “democratic solidarity”, that is, the sharing of concerns about undemocratic situations, human rights violations or other threats to democratic security in other parts of the region or in Europe as a whole. KEY SECURITY ISSUES FOR SOUTH EASTERN EUROPE AND THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA
The following may be described as the main topical issues from a more regional angle.
Exclusive Ethnic Aspirations and Interethnic Conflicts as Opposed to the Need to Form and Stabilise Democratic States Based on Equal and Inclusive Citizenship The breakdown of the former Yugoslavia, with its sequence of hostilities and wars that have not yet terminated, may have a number of different causes, but one of the most important was (and still is) without a doubt the failure of peaceful coexistence of people from different origins and with different cultural affinities. In other words, the instrumentalisation of interethnic oppositions by political protagonists contributed greatly to the violence and the dimension of the breakdown as well as to its lasting, unsettled consequences. The new territorial configuration that in part has been enforced upon former Yugoslavia follows to an important extent ethnic lines, and new states or intrastate entities may still be promoting cohesion with ethno national rhetoric, exploiting the natural feelings of the peo ple and the importance they attach to their different origins, culture, religion and traditions. But due to the price paid during and after this reshaping of the territorial landscape and the weight of questions regarding terms of human sufferings and the disruption of past social and economic connections that remain unresolved, there should be no doubt about the fact that ethno national determination can provide neither legitimacy nor lasting foundations for further territorial changes in South Eastern Europe, just as it cannot help to consolidate situations brought about by violence and war. Consequently, “greater” ideologies and rhetoric – whether Serbian, Croatian or Albanian – should not be used or supported, nor be seen to be supported, by state officials or politicians, nor indeed be accepted by the international community. The price to be paid for the implementation of such policies would indeed be much too high and unacceptable, either due to renewed ethnic manipulations (transfer and exchange of
68 populations) or the imposition or perpetuation of second class citizenship. The cohesion of the people is an essential element of state build ing, and this appears to be the most important single task to be pur sued in the region today for the purpose of its stabilisation. Eth no nation building, however, would be the most problematic path to choose. Instead, efforts must be concentrated on promoting equal, inclusive and participative democratic citizenship at the constitutional level, through legislation, and in the judiciary and law enforcement and administrative spheres, through support for the emergence and strengthening of civil society. A crucial element in modern state building in the region is the rec ognition of minorities and their rights and, as the case may be, the creation of conditions for a fair position for national or ethnic communities within the state, with proper devices to ensure their protection and security, freedom of movement, participation in public affairs, and autonomy in caring about the enjoyment and enhancement of their common identity. This requires the greatest attention and imaginative policies and political engineering, for instance, for the purpose of power sharing where required. In addition, interstate relations should integrate a sincere collec tive search for adequate mutual solutions concerning the protection of minorities, mainly as regards minorities and communities with foreign kin states. Bilateral agreements in this field are essential and should not only be signed but also monitored by common bodies mandated to watch and manage their implementation. Security and stability in South Eastern Europe depend inter alia on two principles: on the one side, intangibility of frontiers and re spect for the territorial integrity of states, and on the other, full protection and integration of minorities and national or ethnic commu nities, including their links abroad. The CoE proposes a set of instruments to help the countries of South Eastern Europe in this endeavour: • standards and common objectives embodied in international treaties (European Conventions) on minority protection, minority languages, trans border cooperation, local self government, etc., with specific monitoring mechanisms and follow up cooperation programmes; • assistance for legislative changes (eg. for non discrimination), institution building, intergovernmental contacts and the prepara tion of bilateral agreements; • surveillance and checking of intolerance and racism, and re commendations for preventive or corrective measures; • support for confidence building measures and programmes for cooperation between people from different origins and with dif ferent identities (“Link Diversity” project). 69 The CoE is also in favour of “Truth and Reconciliation” projects in the countries of the region that suffered from violence and war in the recent past. These should not be aimed at justifying past and pres ent policies but at bringing out into the open past and present crimes and sufferings of the people, establishing and recognising guilt, and pursuing potential reparations for human rights violations, including those with regard to missing persons. This is indispensable – not only inside these countries but above all among them – for real peace to be restored, even if only in the distant future. In this context, it must be emphasised that there should be no escape from cooperation with the International Tribunal of The Hague concerning investigations into war crimes and crimes against human ity and the prosecution of perpetrators. UN law as established by the Security Council acting under the UN Charter provides a sufficient legal basis; its observance is compulsory upon states. Internal law must be brought into line with international obligations and its implementation made possible. A state’s failure or reluctance to cooperate for instance, by advancing the argument that it lacks necessary internal legal provisions, does not exempt the state from international liability. If a state risks to cover up crimes and sustain impunity, it will in turn harbour feelings of revenge among the people and, in some cases, prolong tension between states.
The Return of Refugees and Displaced Persons For the CoE the return of refugees and displaced persons raises crucial questions of respect for basic human rights, including freedom of movement and access to housing and property and the enjoyment of family life. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, under the Dayton Agreement, the Human Rights Chamber with its balanced composition of local and international judges established by the CoE, dealt with a number of cases of violations of the rights of refugees and displaced persons to return in accordance with the European Convention of Human Rights and other applicable legal instruments. Other countries of the region, CoE member states or candidates for membership, must also be pre pared to accept judicial review in such matters by the European Court of Human Rights and to abide by and implement its judgments under supervision of the CoE Committee of Ministers. Failure to allow for, facilitate, and complete return – at least insofar as the people are still willing to return – and to provide compensation for abandoned homes and reparation for damages will constitute a lasting threat to security and stability everywhere. It will generate and sustain deep feelings of frustration and hatred, injustice and revenge. It may help to consolidate ethnic domination and
70 exclusion and to legitimise ethno nationalistic rhetoric and policies. While the CoE is not in a position to help directly in the shaping and implementing of return policies, it nevertheless lends its political support to those international organisations that are mandated and able to do so, in particular the UNHCR. In addition, questions concerning return are included in the regular political monitoring of developments in member and candidate countries, mainly within the CoE Parliamen tary Assembly.
The Future of Kosovo and the Albanian Context Albanians consider themselves as one of the main, indeed the old est, people of the Balkans, besides the Serbs, Croats, Bosnians and Macedonians. At the same time there is widespread frustration concerning their lack of self determination and territorial separation, minority status, and oppression (in Kosovo, Macedonia, southern Serbia and Montenegro). This has led in the past, and still can lead, to hostile attitudes and acts of violence. Not only in Macedonia but also in southern Serbia this constitutes a serious security threat today and for the immediate future, both locally and for the greater neighbourhood and region. No doubt this is intimately connected with the uncertain outlook regarding Kosovo’s future status and the interethnic violence and lack of law and order inside Kosovo. The CoE stands by UN Security Counsel Resolution 1244 and its basic principles: while being placed under the provisional administration of UNMIK, Kosovo remains a part of the FRY. It must develop as a democratic and multiethnic entity, and a new mutually beneficial relationship with Serbia and the FRY within the European framework must be prepared with the greatest possible autonomy for Kosovo. Albanian expectations for independence must at present be met with clear determination by the international community, which should maintain authority and responsibility for Kosovo until a new relationship can be established, mutually accepted and guaranteed. From a CoE viewpoint, options such as Kosovo’s independence, an ethno Albanian nation state, a “Greater Kosovo” along ethnic lines, or even a “Greater Albania” are not conducive to sustainable solutions but rather will generate new violence and hostilities. The consider ations set out above against the ethno national option in South Eastern Europe are particularly valid in the case of Kosovo, for itself and its neighbours. Doubts can be shared in this respect concerning the wisdom of some of the basic features of the provisional constitutional framework for Kosovo, which has been prepared under UNMIK guidance (and with the assistance, albeit only partially followed, by the CoE Venice
71 Commission for Democracy through Law) and which forms the basis for the forthcoming elections for a provisional Kosovo assembly (17. November, 2001). The establishment of a single constituency for the elections of a Parliament with majority rule is not a device in line with the multiethnic composition of the electorate and, as such, provides no guarantee that the legitimate rights of minorities (Serbs in particular, but also Roma, Bosnians, Turks, Goranis, etc.) will be respected. It is to be welcomed that in spite of this, Serbs participate in elections; their elected representatives should be properly heard for the sake of future constitutional changes that will allow for minority participation in government and appropriate minority autonomy in Kosovo.
The Question of Regional Cooperation Capacities in a European Perspective In the Balkans, security is a regional issue, and local security issues have in most cases regional causes or links. This is the case of security threats stemming from the instrumentalisation of ethnic aspirations or interethnic divergences as well as those connected with organised crime, which develops trans border ramifications. Tensions that may have only local origins can rapidly evolve into conflicts with trans national repercussions or attract interference from abroad. The international community has not had a good record in master ing the trans national aspects of conflicts in the region. Albania in 1997 and its aftermath is a case in point. Internal tension was dealt with in a way that triggered the widespread illegal distribution of weapons and arms in a largely criminalised context – the Serbs mobilised brutally against armed Albanians in Kosovo. After NATO intervention, the situation there still includes pockets of armed extremists, who in turn create (or exploit) conflict in southern Serbia, Macedonia and perhaps other places in the region. Both ethnic extremism and organised crime (in some cases in combination) can be contained and reduced only through adequate regional cooperation. The same can be said for the development of lasting conditions for economic recovery and the solution of issues stemming from social stress, for instance the drama of refugees and displaced or missing persons. Much will therefore depend on regional cooperation frames and facilities, including those in the political field, and on combating crime, corruption and terrorism. The international community should give developments in this direction as much attention as it gives to the traditional country by country approach that takes account of each country’s “own merits”. This should also apply to the question of territorial integrity and the situation vis à vis minorities and national or ethnic communities,
72 as referred to above. The FRY proposal for an international confer ence on regional security may be assessed with this issue in mind and deserves positive consideration by all the countries in the region and the international community as well. The aim should not be the creation of a single, all inclusive coop eration frame but rather a common general reference for fundamental principles of cooperation and the establishment of sectorial, where appropriate geographically, cooperation structures. It will also be important to extend the scope of the regional approach beyond the countries of the former Yugoslavia and Albania, so as to include, for instance, Bulgaria and Romania (and other neighbours such as Hungary, Greece and Turkey, at least in their capacity as facilitators); this is because of the nature of the security objectives to be achieved and also for the sake of overcoming fears regarding a resurgence of the old “Yugoslav Idea”. Regional cooperation, which should also contribute to fostering trans border cooperation, might equally help to bring about changes in the relevance and perception of interstate borders, gradually reducing their practical importance for the life of the people and their meaning as symbols of state sovereignty and interstate division. Together with the development of intrastate decentralisation and autonomy, such regional cooperation in the longer term could create conditions under which questions of territorial integrity within safe borders would lose their crucial security relevance.
KEY ISSUES FOR THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA (FRY)
Concerning more specifically the FRY, the most topical issues ap pear to be the following.
The Constitutional Issue and the Future of Relations between Serbia and Montenegro The ongoing uncertainty and political struggle regarding the fu ture of the FRY – which in turn affects the internal situation of Monte negro and of Serbia, including Vojvodina, Sandjak, its southern components, and its future ties with Kosovo – entail for certain a degree of security risks that should not be underestimated, including possible trans border interference in the case of Montenegro. Montenegro is bound to search for the broadest possible basis of a consensus for its future stance towards Serbia and the FRY, in order to bring about a transparent, inclusive and fair process of decision mak ing; any forced solution could trigger off internal conflict and regional
73 destabilisation. The FRY and Serbian authorities should show more active interest in preparing for solutions that incorporate vital Montenegrin interests and do away with “Greater Serbia” attitudes. Rapid progress in matters relating to minorities and national or ethnic communities and a more open policy towards the regionalisation of Serbia could be more than helpful in this direction, as it would also be noted positively in relation to the question of the future of Kosovo. Both Belgrade and Podgorica may be well advised to overcome fears of undue international interference through mediation and to accept assistance and cooperation on all outstanding constitutional issues from outside institutions such as the CoE (Venice Commission on Democracy through Law), the EU, and the OSCE. Contributions from this side – if offered with due respect for the final say of the authorities and residents of the country themselves – could bring added value in terms of acceptability by all sides and political support and guarantees for implementing the solutions reached.
Democracy, Human Rights and the Armed Forces “Democratic Security” also means democratic control of the armed forces in their broadest meaning: the army, border control forces, law enforcement (police) and intelligence services, and their integration into the democratic constitutional order. This is a compon ent of the general political monitoring conducted by the CoE (Parliamentary Assembly and the Committee of Ministers). More specifically, the armed forces are also subject to the provisions and procedures of human rights protection under the terms of the European Convention of Human Rights and the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. The following considerations apply: • Members of armed forces also can submit applications for judgment in case of failure of internal control bodies to provide the required remedy for a violation of their human rights. • While conscription and compulsory service in such forces and the constraints that they normally entail, do not fall under the scope of the Convention’s rights to freedom and liberty, the right to conscientious objection is more and more widely recognised by CoE member states and has been the subject of recommendations from the organisation (requiring fair procedures and accepting the imposition of a corresponding special service as a substitute). • Excessive restrictions, for instance through disciplinary measures and arbitrary detention, may, however, be examined and sanctioned by the Court.
74 • Military Justice (courts martial) must comply with Conven tion prescriptions concerning independence, fair trials – including legal representation and the treatment of persons detained. • Places of detention under the control of armed forces, as pris ons and other such places, are subject to control visits and the assessment by the Independent Committee of Experts under the CoE Convention for the prevention of torture and inhuman and degrading treatment. • The rights to freedom of expression and of association of members of the armed forces must be respected. • The use of force by military and security forces, for instance to combat terrorism, must also comply with Convention stan dards, in particular the prohibition of torture. • The Convention also applies to the intervention of armed forces of a contracting party outside its own territory and that of another contracting party. • The European Convention on Human Rights contains restrictive provisions concerning derogatory measures in time of war or other public emergencies threatening the life of the nation, which can only be made to the extent strictly required by the situation and are subject to notification to the CoE and to assessment by the European Court.
Protection of Minorities and National or Ethnic Communities As explained above, as a future member of the CoE, the FRY is expected to do its best in adopting appropriate legislative and institu tional measures for the protection of minorities and national or ethnic communities and the rights of their members and to integrate them as far as possible in the state, its institutions and civil society, while help ing to develop equality and solidarity among all citizens with respect for their different identities. The FRY has already ratified the CoE convention on the protec tion of national minorities and is preparing wide ranging legislation and institutional measures in line with that convention. It is also en gaged in the ratification and implementation of the CoE charter on minority languages. In addition it is an active partner in CoE activities in this field, such as the non discrimination review, the promotion of bilateral agreements, intergovernmental exchanges and civilian con fidence building measures. This policy deserves the highest attention and support, together with the allocation of the necessary resources. Performance will be closely followed and evaluated by the CoE and the international community at large. Efforts at the federal level must be complemented
75 and relayed at the level of Serbia and Montenegro, which will be called to substitute in the case that work at the federal level cannot advance further. The constitutional reform of the federation (or the creation of a new common state) should make sure that competence for minority protection, as for human rights protection in general, continues to rest with the federation (or the common state). This will be indispensable for the continued responsibility of the FRY for, and its compliance with, European human rights standards and their collective control within the CoE.
Internal Order and Security, and the Challenge of Terrorism Failure and shortcomings in internal law and order, above all if connected with organised international crime, entail obvious security risks, internally and internationally. Many countries in the Balkans, including the FRY (Serbia and Montenegro) and Kosovo, still suffer from this to a significant extent. This situation can become a source for international insecurity by providing a breeding ground or tempo rary shelter and logistic support for potential and actual actors in international crime. International cooperation is indispensable to overcome this. Furthermore, recent developments in international terrorism have underlined the crucial importance of such cooperation for the region, since places like Albania, Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina have been referred to for potential links with international terrorism. All countries of the region are called upon to contribute to the new international alliance against terrorism by stepping up their control measures and sharing information about terrorist threats, links and action. Within the CoE, members and candidates for membership are expected to participate in the following: • the fight against organised crime: contribution to reports on the state of organised crime in Europe and to surveys of best practices to combat it; • combating corruption: ratification of the CoE Civil and Criminal Law Conventions on Corruption and participation in the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) to monitor the imp lementation of these conventions and CoE guiding principles; • the fight against money laundering: participation in the committee of experts in charge of examining through a procedure of common evaluation and peer pressure legislation and practice against laundering of criminal proceedings, and ratification of the CoE convention in this field; • the fight against traffic in human beings and drugs: participation in relevant CoE activities and, in particular, the
76 “Pompidou Group” for ministerial and multidisciplinary cooperation to combat drug abuse and trafficking; • the fight against terrorism: ratification of the CoE convention on the suppression of terrorism (concerning extradition and mutual assistance) and the international convention for suppressing the financing of terrorism; contribution to the drafting of a UN Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism; participation in new CoE projects for the review of conventions, legislation and the conduct of law enforcement officials; the improvement of international information flows; the prevention and punishment of “cyber crime and cyber terrorism”; etc. On 8 November 2001, the CoE Committee of Ministers expressed “a common democratic resolve” to contribute within the CoE area of competence to international action against terrorism in all its forms and manifestations and the factors likely to fuel it. This contribution will have three cornerstones: • intensifying legal cooperation to combat terrorism, by steps intended to increase rapidly the effectiveness of existing interna tional instruments; • safeguarding fundamental values, with new guidelines to help stand up to movements that threaten the CoE’s fundamental principles and values; • investing in democracy through the fight against discrimina tion and intolerance in all its forms and through the promotion of intercultural and inter religious dialogue. The Committee set up a multidisciplinary group on international action against terrorism. All member, candidate and observer states are urged to participate, as are international organisations and institutions such as the EU, the OSCE, the UN, etc.
Internal Security and Respect of Human Rights In accordance with its specific mandate to promote human rights in member countries, the CoE is duty bound to care about the repercussions of the increasing security concern shared by the international community, state authorities, and the public at large on the human rights situation. While helping to organise the collective response to this concern at the level of internal measures and of international cooperation, the CoE will at the same time give special consideration to the question of whether such measures are compatible with the overall obligation to respect human rights and whether possible restrictions can be considered appropriate or necessary in a democratic society, as required by the European Convention on Human Rights.
77 Particular attention must be paid to the question of the protection of privacy and personal data in the case of crime prevention, prosecution and intelligence operations. Member countries should be guided in this matter by the principles embodied in the CoE human rights case law and relevant conventions, such as the Convention on Data Protection. Exchanges of experience among member and candidate countries in this field might be helpful to find a fair way to cope with apparent contradictions. Similar considerations apply to the question of restrictions on the free movement of persons and, in particular, the entry of asylum seek ers and their treatment by member countries.
URGENT STEPS TO BE TAKEN
At the present juncture, it seems difficult – and would not be advisable – to single out one or several absolute priorities for action in the field of security and stability in South Eastern Europe and inside the countries of the region. Governments as well as the international community must be aware of the interconnection of a number of quite different factors that can endanger or foster security in the region. In contradiction with the tendency to treat specific issues and needs in one country separately from others and to deal with specific aspects of security and stability independently from other factors, it is necessary to develop, on the one hand, a genuine regional approach and regional cooperation structures for the countries in South Eastern Europe and corresponding regional planning capacities of the international com munity and, on the other, a better understanding of the combined secu rity relevance of a number of otherwise unconnected issues and a greater effort to deal with them jointly, with due consideration for their interdependence in the field of security and stability. Governments must therefore be enabled – and assisted where necessary – to create adequate capacities for the simultaneous analysis and comparison of different issues from the angle of their security rel evance. At the same time, appropriate structures and frames must be created for the exchange of information and dialogue with the widest possible range of public institutions, political forces, academic sectors, the media and civil society for the purpose of awareness building, early warning, and common evaluation of security threats whatever their origins and sources. Similar capacities should also be developed and used at the regional and European levels, where intergovern mental organisations with their institutional capacities and academic or other civil think tanks should be properly interconnected in their work and in the dissemination of their findings.
78 Subject to, and in line with, these considerations of principle, three more general items can nevertheless be selected for their overall importance and urgency.
Reform and Consolidation of the Constitutional Order This is certainly the top priority in at least three of the countries in the region: In the FRY, a new fair relationship between Serbia and Montenegro must be found and put into effect through transparent democratic and inclusive negotiations, taking account also of the federal context. Serbia has to shape a new territorial order to properly accommodate its own multiethnic society. The international community together with the local authorities, including Serbia and the FRY, must engage in constructive and sustained efforts to lay new foundations for a democratic multiethnic Kosovo with appropriate links to Serbia and the FRY and peaceful, cooperative relations with neighbouring countries and the overall region. In Macedonia it is of the utmost importance to implement fully and effectively the recent Ohrid Agreement in its constitutional and other components. In Bosnia and Herzegovina the common state must be strength ened in its competencies, authority, and democratic governance capacities in order to foster political and social cohesion and to contain and overcome ethno national (Serb and Croat) secessionist pressures.
Approaching European and Transatlantic Cooperation and Integration Structures Accession to the CoE must be completed rapidly by Bosnia and Herzegovina and by the FRY (depending also on the future of the fed eration), in full compliance with membership requirements and all specific commitments asked for, and agreed to, during the accession procedure. Inclusion into other European and transatlantic institutions and organisations, mainly the EU and NATO, must remain a major ob jective that will be attained through a step by step process. This requires constant attention and efforts: everything that could potential ly create obstacles on this path or slow down progress must be avoid ed. For the people at large, the “European Perspective” remains one of the most important security guarantees.
79 Regional Cooperation The generalisation and efficient structuring of regional coopera tion is an indispensable tool both for strengthening security safeguards and enhancing the European perspective. The objective of such coop eration should be political in scope yet focused on single purposes. Politically, cooperation frames should guarantee the territorial order of the region and the territorial integrity of each country, while organ ising safeguards for the protection of minorities and trans border links and cooperation. Among the specific distinct purposes, security coop eration at all levels will play a central role, including in the field of crime prevention and prosecution (with the necessary human rights checks) and the fight against international crime and terrorism in particular. In no case should regional cooperation be promoted, or appear to be promoted, as a substitute to European cooperation and integration. On the contrary, it must be organised and shaped in close contact with European and transatlantic organisations and institutions, as an indispensable part of the process of European integration.
80 The Main Issues of Regional Security in South Eastern Europe: A Yugoslav Perspective Miroslav Hadžić Centre for Civil-Military Relations Belgrade By deposing Milošević and partially dismantling his regime, the new authorities in Serbia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) substantially reduced the number of security risks in South Eastern Europe. The main benefit of this is the fact that any further spread of potential war crises from Serbia has been suspended. The alternative – intervention in Montenegro by federal military forces or police, or, rather, commencement of a civil war – has been averted. At the same time, the danger of a violent ending to political conflicts in Serbia has been removed. Consequently, so has the danger of a possible conflict between the FRY armed forces and the KFOR or the renamed KLA in Kosovo. 1 The initial changes were validated by the joint action of the Serbian authorities, NATO and the local Albanian community in south eastern Serbia, announcing further changes in the external and security policies of FRY/Serbia. Thus, they were partly a product of the situation and partly an expression of the DOS's willing ness to accept an externally imposed framework for stabilizing the security situation in South Eastern Europe. The rapid entry of the FRY into the UN, the OSCE, the World Bank and the IMF, as well as the Stability Pact, has improved prospects for the joint efforts of local and international actors aimed at stabilising the region, as confirmed by the restraint manifested by the FRY in the Macedonian crisis, or rather the country's support for a peaceful resolution of the Macedonian Albanian conflict. Instead of remaining an agent of crisis, the FRY turned into a potentially active and constructive factor in increasing the region’s security. This course
———— 1 Although the prospects that Milošević would mount a military expedition on Kosovo were extremely small, he repeatedly used this possibility to stir up currents of revanchism and xenophobia in Serbian society. The benefits he expected from this manoeuvre were twofold: first, to focus the public’s attention on the external aspects of the national crisis and, second, to suppress demands for internal change. 81 was favoured by the prompt economic assistance of the Euro Atlantic community, which helped consolidate the position of the new authorities in the FRY. It is therefore hardly surprising that the DOS has ranked the speedy return of the FRY/Serbia into the international community topmost among the accomplishments of its one year rule. The coali tion failed to note, however, that this outcome was largely attributable to the will and needs of the Euro Atlantic community. The new au thorities likewise have neglected to clearly inform the public about their readiness to fulfil the related obligations. The reasons behind the shared interest of the EU and the USA in seeing the FRY rapidly integrated into international organisations are easy to understand. In the first place, they sought to ensure the irrever sibility of the political change in Serbia. Naturally, they did not miss an opportunity to emphasize their role in deposing Milošević. By eas ing the procedure for the FRY's admission, the external interven tionists have, along the way, partly compensated for the negative con sequences – economic, political and socio psychological – caused by their inferior management of the Yugoslav crisis and war(s). 2 Far more important for them was the fact that the FRY’s entry into the international community implied the DOS’ agreement to observe Euro Atlantic security standards. Hence, the FRY became their partner in a very short time. In this way, the EU and the USA actually brought the FRY inside the sphere of their direct influence – a fact that may facilitate submission of the entire region to their security requirements. Furthermore, the Euro Atlantic community has thus obtained an opportunity to additionally legitimise to the Yugoslav public its practice of imposition and ad hoc expansion of the list of conditions for effective admission to Euro Atlantic security structures. This is due to the fact that the imposition of the desired behaviour by force has been replaced by voluntary decision making on behalf of the DOS and the majority of FRY citizens. The reasons behind the DOS’ rush to incorporate the FRY into the international community are still easier to list. The initial impulse derived from the need to urgently free the country from sanctions. Normalisation of relations with the USA and EU member countries earned the new authorities international legitimacy, which in turn reinforced their internal position. This was followed by the ———— 2 This is evidenced by the fact that both sides have avoided commencing of ficial discussions on the achievements and consequences of the ten years of Euro Atlantic management of the Yugoslav crisis and wars, which was crowned by NATO’s “humanitarian” intervention. In this context, community officials naturally refrained from publicly addressing the contribution of the majority of parties, formerly of the opposition but presently DOS adherents, to Milošević’s war policy. 82 normalization of relations with neighbouring countries. By changing its approach to the issue of succession, the DOS in fact resolved most of the disputes with the states that emerged from the second Yugoslavia and thus cleared the path for economic and – given time – perhaps political cooperation as well. Thereby, an important condition for unobstructed access to Euro Atlantic integration was fulfilled. The compelling motive behind the DOS’ haste was the disastrous economic and social situation in Serbia. It was quite clear that without abundant external assistance, which could have been forthcoming only from the Euro Atlantic community, the DOS could not meet even the current needs of the population and state. It was just as clear that the intended economic transition would not be possible without strategic reliance on the EU and the USA. Consequently, the notion of the international community was alive in the FRY/Serbia, which accounts for the predominance of the Euro centric orientation that primarily emphasises the need to join the EU as soon as possible. The unresolved state status of the FRY and Serbia ranks just as high, if not even higher, on the motivation scale. After the successful joint action in the Preševo valley, the view that cooperation with NATO (and thus the EU and the USA) offered the possibility of substantially influencing the status of Kosovo and the Serbs living in it prevailed within the DOS. The DOS is obviously hoping that by applying this new approach it will at least hold up the one sided definition of the future (state) status of Kosovo. The coalition would thus obtain a chance to incorporate the FRY on an equal basis into the process of deciding on Kosovo. This would proportionately, at least in principle, increase prospects for the peaceful reintegration of Kosovo into Serbia and the FRY. The likelihood of this solution undoubtedly depends largely on the progress of the ongoing process of democratisation in the FRY and Serbia, i.e. on the prospects for their prompt economic recovery and development. The DOS, consequently, is particularly interested in obtaining the strongest possible support from the EU and the USA for preservation of the FRY, Montenegro already being sequestered from it by Milo Djukanović’s administration. Despite all this, it would be difficult to prove that the FRY had an integral foreign policy and security strategy, especially with the knowledge that in a year’s time the new authorities have not even managed to verify the principles of their external and security policies in the country's parliament. Moreover, they even failed to inform the people’s elected representatives on the results of their efforts. The absence of political will in the DOS to launch a thorough reform of the security system is therefore hardly surprising. That also explains the fact that the changes carried out in the army and the police have thus far remained of a personnel type, largely symbolic and all rhe toric. 83 All this is rooted in the fact that the DOS has not made a clean break with the former regime in two critical areas. First, the practice of wielding excessive power has not been changed. This power is still generated and distributed outside established institutions. Consequent ly, the political struggle for the redistribution of power is being pur sued by all means available, outside the system and quite independent of the public’s participation. Second, a political discussion on the role of Serbia and its armed forces 3 in the violent break up of the second Yugoslav state has not been initiated yet. This accounts for the ab sence of political, and especially criminal, sanctioning of individual responsibility for the Yugoslav war(s) and the crimes committed therein. The lack of a foreign policy and a security strategy is a direct result of the combined effects of two groups of factors: first, the DOS still lacks a clear and efficient strategy for social development and, second, the FRY is a state whose sovereignty is limited both internally by the authorities in Montenegro and externally by NATO’s taking control of Kosovo. This has given rise to two anomalies: first, inter nationally the FRY has full legality and legitimacy, but this is con stricted internally, and second, the federal state has complete authority in international relations but is insufficiently empowered internally to fully implement the obligations it has undertaken. The confusion is intensified by political conflicts within the DOS, which keep derogat ing even the declarative agreement of its members on the need for complete FRY/Serbian integration into the Euro Atlantic community. The basic disagreements with respect to the foreign policy and security orientation of the FRY (DOS) may be summarized as follows: • the general determination for integration into the Euro Atlantic community has not been sufficiently and consistently channelled into a unified strategy, hence the prevalence of the situation conditioned behaviour and ad hoc decisions; • intentions regarding the full incorporation of the FRY are not matched by readiness to accept the full consequences of this inte gration, which leads to the selective interpretation and fulfilment of obligations, as has been clearly revealed for example in ob structions towards cooperation with the Hague Tribunal and reluc tance to prosecute those accused of war crimes; • a differentiated understanding of integration, with an empha sis on separate entry to the EU, disregarding the Euro Atlantic communion of economic, political and security interests and ob jectives; • the domination of a partial approach to integration, reflected in the acceptance of economic and political obligations, as well as ———— 3 Serbian remnants of the JNA, police, state security services, and para military and para police units. 84 potential benefits, exists simultaniously with the avoidance of the formalization of security cooperation so that the state, although it effectively cooperates with NATO, still defers its accession to the Partnership for Peace (PfP); and • obvious differences between the political and economic au thorities (elites) with respect to the pace and scope of integration represent a source of constant danger that the initial results of economic cooperation may be annihilated by the political (ill) will of one of the DOS factions. This is the extent to which the external, i.e. security, policy of the FRY (i.e. of the DOS) in the region is marked by deficiencies and inconsistencies. These policies are also limited by the small security capacity of the Balkans and the absence of a regional infrastructure for the autonomous resolution of disputes and conflicts between and within the states. Still, there is no doubt as to the declarative and effective readiness of the DOS to participate in efforts to improve security and stabilise the region. To this end the FRY has joined most regional multilateral initiatives and simultaneously intensified bilateral relations with the majority of South Eastern Europe countries. Bel grade has even broached the idea of convening a Balkan conference at which all the countries of the region would confirm their attachment to the principle of the immutability of borders, with countersignatures provided by the USA, the EU and Russia. The focus of the DOS approach to the region was determined by the situation it inherited and the resulting new challenges and risks. Ironically, that is why the issue of the so called Albanian national and state problem occupies the centre of its attention, although it is treated only as the largest obstacle for final resolution of the Serbian/Yugo slav state status. The DOS has, therefore, throughout this period been preoccupied with attempts to prevent the KLA spillover from Kosovo into southern Serbia. Equal, albeit less successful, attempts were made to improve the position of the Serbs and other ethnic minorities in Kosovo, through the UNMIK and the KFOR. Within this – let's call it – “Kosovo policy”, the DOS has frequently requested additional assurances from the Euro Atlantic community that the Kosovo issue would not be resolved without the FRY. When the conflict in Macedonia broke out, the DOS resolutely supported its state sovereignty and territorial integrity. But, quite expectedly, it used the conflict to conjecture additional arguments proving the creation of new Albanian (para)states unviable. Comparative reviews show that, generally speaking, the approach of the FRY authorities to regional cooperation and security has two points in common with the approach adopted by other South Eastern Europe countries. The first similarity derives from the fact that they all wish to take a shortcut to membership in the Euro Atlantic com munity. Thus, despite the publicly broadcast awareness of the need for 85 regional cooperation and integration as a precondition and introduc tion for incorporation into the Euro Atlantic community, all, including the DOS, would gladly skip this intermediate step. The second simi larity is revealed in a narcissistic self reflection of most states in the region, based on their respective allegedly strategic importance and, consequently, their (future) central role in the Balkans.
THE KEY REGIONAL SECURITY ISSUES OVER THE NEXT 10 15 YEARS An attempt to project a map of long term risk factors in South Eastern Europe (the Balkans) falters as early as at the first step. The problem that immediately arises is how to measure, and then incorporate into the projection, the cumulative effects of a multitude of complex factors of different origins, unequal reach and changing lines of influence. Difficulties then follow in defining the vantage and/or starting point for envisaging the effect of the known and unknown, inherited or emerging, factors and actors of regional security. With use of a model, this point may be established by correlating the key events and the times of their occurrence. A dispute may arise, however, with respect to the importance and influence of the selected events. Dilemmas may also be created over selection of the time period when decisive changes were taking place, which in turn cannot be overcome without a detailed consideration of the causality chain started by the chronic shortage of security in South Eastern Europe, and so forth. For instance, one may, without being incorrect, regard the out break of the Yugoslav war as an event that thoroughly changed the social, national, state, political and military topography of the region. This is especially true seeing as it has been the key generator of security risks in the Balkans over the past decade. However, the reasons for its destructive and lasting nature may – depending on the intentions and/or needs of the research – be traced back to the 1980’s as well as to the 1940’s. To take another example, the NATO bombing of the FRY in 1999 was not only the turning point in the Kosovo conflict but also a global precedent with far reaching effects for the Euro Atlantic community. However, the launch of NATO’s humanitarian action cannot be explained outside the context of the spillover of the Yugoslav wars. Neither would this be possible without consideration of the alliance’s abortive, self frustrating search for an effective strategy to manage the Yugoslav crisis. Its failure also is rooted in the global structural changes caused by the toppling of the Berlin wall, as well as US ambitions to control the world. If we decide to draw the line before 1999 we will stop short of crucial events. The changes initiated in Serbia/the FRY do not deserve
86 to be overlooked, since their consequences still remain open ended. Similarly, the benefits for the security situation resulting from Milošević's downfall had ever expanding effects. Or, if we take the spillover of the armed KLA groups into southern Serbia and Macedonia, no matter how strongly it endangered the security of the region, it remains but a consequence of the violent break up of the second Yugoslav state and the incomplete series of Yugoslav wars. Moreover, it is also a product of the inferior Euro Atlantic management of the Yugoslav crisis. Only the terrorist aircraft strikes on the USA can be classified as a dramatic and historic turning point. Their influence on security in the Balkans will be discussed later, however. My prognosis will therefore be built on concise insights into the security heritage of the Balkans, since that is where the generators of the present and future risks are contained. This should enable us to identify the critical points and, in accordance with them, evaluate the security capacities of each of the countries and, consequently, of the entire region. Recent history reveals the Balkans as a region neglected from the security point of view. This is a consequence of two centuries of inter action between two sets of deciding factors. The first derives from the fact that the modern history of the Balkans developed under the cru cial influence of powers external to it. The Balkan states, ultimately, emerged and disappeared as dictated by foreign interventionists. It is in this region that the imperial aspirations of the European and world superpowers converged and clashed. Local actors have indeed been the central instigators and mediators of these conflicts, but they have been unable to influence the final outcomes. In this respect, the Balkans has remained a replica of the main courses and stages of history in the Euro Atlantic circle, albeit moderated by local heritage and circumstances. It was for this reason that the foreign powers, on a rebound, produced local imperial powers in the Balkans and created centre and periphery, rich and poor. The second group of factors results from the geopolitical displace ment of the Balkan peoples outside the main course of European history. These nations, being marginal actors, were trapped in the con sequences of the workings of “great history” – moreover, quite inde pendently of their will. This is also one of the key reasons for their developmental lag, which is why they are still today belatedly grap pling with state and national problems characteristic of the previous two centuries. Engaged in the work of times past, the Balkan states and nations remained firmly attached to military power, seeking the attainment of their objectives through wars. This accounts for the domination of authoritarian orders in these parts, which signifies that the internalisation of democracy has been indefinitely postponed.
87 Due to neglect, the Balkan region and its nation states became permanently dependent on others for their security, which is why they are insufficient in terms of security today. This initial dependence prevented them from attaining self sufficiency in security. Chronic insufficiency in turn increased the degree of security dependence on others, which explains the not entirely unmerited absence of autonomous procedures and instruments for the establishment and/or preservation of individual and regional security in the South Eastern Europe states. That is why they could not – and would not – resolve a single one of their mutual disputes and conflicts by themselves. Moreover, each one of them, looking after its own interests, sought the involvement in the local conflict of sympathetic foreign actors. Naturally, these actors were not difficult to find, as the large powers had long ago appropriated for themselves the right of military and political intervention in the zones of their strategic interests. The converging of the local actors’ need for foreign guarantors of security and the latter’s wish to obtain strategic benefits from intervention most often resulted in the transformation of an ally into a military political tutor with unlimited tenure. The security flaws of the Balkans and its states were brought to the surface by two blows that came in the 1980s. The first was caused by the downfall of global and national socialism, which was followed by a security shock generated by the abolishment of the world’s bipolar structure. This shattered the apparent internal and external security of most Balkan states. Only the local NATO and/or EU members (Greece and Turkey) were spared direct consequences of the impact. Minor consequences were felt by those states and nations (Romania, Bulgaria, and the bordering state of Hungary) that immediately and voluntarily opted to leave socialism behind and join the Euro Atlantic community. The deferred collapse of Albanian “bunker socialism” resulted in the collapse of the state over pyramid scheme scandals; some ten years later, the state’s sovereignty still has not been re established. No longer sandwiched between the blocs, the second Yugoslav state was left without external guardians of its security. Moreover, its national (republic) leaders eliminated chances for the state’s survival or peaceful dissolution by turning the crisis into a war. The Euro Atlantic community, while getting involved in the management – as well as the further entanglement – of the Yugoslav crisis and subse quent wars, at an early stage (July 1991) immediately removed control over the final results of the conflict from the sphere of competence of the local warlords. For want of a better solution, it supported the violent crumbling of the second Yugoslavia and then placed the emerging (para)states under its patronage, one by one. Ten years later, it is confronted with the fact that in the central Yugoslav states (Bosnia and Herzegovina, the FRY and, of late, Macedonia) not one 88 basic cause of the war has been completely eliminated, and possibilities for its re newal remain. In this period, the alliance managed to contain the war within the borders of the former Yugoslavia, but it could not protect the region, or itself, from the adverse consequences thereof. More over, the Euro Atlantic security concept, based primarily on the military attachment of ex socialist countries to NATO, suffered a fiasco on the territories of the former Yugoslavia. Owing to the spiralling of events (only selectively outlined in this paper), South Eastern Europe has not yet been constituted as a region in economic, political, or security terms. It is therefore hardly surpris ing that some of the countries are trying to extract themselves from this milieu and fit into other nicer (more useful) surroundings. More important is the fact that the South Eastern Europe countries, although most have already begun integration into the Euro Atlantic security community via the PfP, remain incapable and/or unwilling to improve the security of the region jointly and independently of any external pressures. The current situation in South Eastern Europe confirms the noted characteristics of the security environment. Arguments based on reality allow us to translate our insights into a list of acute challenges to the region’s present and future security: The Euro Atlantic community is the holder of central security power in the region, which means that the latter’s current and future (medium term) stability is directly dependent on the USA and the EU, especially since all the states of the region are highly dependent on the community – economically, politically, and militarily. However, the distances separating them from the community are unequal, as are, therefore, the degrees of their dependence. The most distant states – Bosnia and Herzegovina, the FRY, Albania, and Macedonia – are also the most dependent security wise; they are located, completely or in part, under the alliance’s military and administrative protectorates. Moreover, the survival of their economies – and therefore of the states themselves – is, in the long run, largely dependent on the economic and financial assistance provided by the Euro Atlantic community. That is why any reduction of the alliance's military presence or economic and social assistance to the dependent states would directly endanger security in the region. This, naturally, does not necessarily prove the success of the alliance’s management of the crisis and wars, but it is certainly the result of it. The violent dissolution of the former Yugoslavia has not yet been completed, and the state entities created from it – including Bosnia and Herzegovina, the FRY, Macedonia – are susceptible to further breakdown. Furthermore, the potential disbanding of one of these entities, especially if it were to occur in a violent manner, would render the survival of the remaining two hardly sustainable. Assuming 89 this actually happens, the new post war cycle of re composition of the central Balkans would necessarily sweep over bordering Croatia and Albania. Other states on the rim – primarily Greece, Turkey and perhaps also Bulgaria – would only reluctantly remain uninvolved in the process. The fundamental causes of the Yugoslav wars have converged in the Serbian Albanian Macedonian triangle, the epicentre of present and future instability in South Eastern Europe. Risks are generated by the opposing desires of the three entities, of different origin and un equal legality and legitimacy, to (re)arrange their ethnic and state statuses. The intentions of Macedonia and the FRY/Serbia to preserve and/or restore their state integrity and territory are obstructed by the more or less concealed ambition of Albanian elites to gather all Albanians into a single state as soon as possible, even if this must be done incrementally. The risks will continue to grow concurrently with Albanian political majoritarianism in Kosovo, the further division of Macedonia, and the continuing lawlessness in Albania. Their increase is favoured by the Euro Atlantic community’s hesitation to explicitly demand from the Albanian political elites in Kosovo, Macedonia and Albania the same economic, democratic and security requirements it imposed on the FRY and then substantiated with bombs and sanctions. Most states in the region are experiencing a stage of post socialist transition, and the pro democratic orders currently in power are generally unstable. Moreover, the central regional states are only now facing the task of finally leaving the wars behind. All this expands the range of transition security risks of internal origin. The key risks de rive from the fact that these societies cannot bear the full costs of the transition to capitalism in either economic or social terms. In addition, they lack sufficient social consensus for change, and substantial numbers of their citizens refuse to pay this price. Furthermore, the devastation inflicted by Communism in the central states has been increased by that of war, and therefore the price also includes bringing to justice those responsible for fomenting war and for carrying out war crimes. Now the new and former elites refuse together to pay that price. Under the most unfavourable circumstances, the possibility of political restoration of the old order or of current regimes turning authoritarian is not inconceivable in the FRY/Serbia and Croatia. Such an unfolding of events would endanger the formal survival of Bosnia and Herzegovina while encouraging the greater Albanian state project. Thanks to the war, the central Balkan space has become the main European crossroads for arms, drugs and human trafficking. War related criminalisation of the central states – Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the FRY, Macedonia, and Albania – set the pace for mafia networking in first the bordering states and then the entire region. This was followed by the establishment of vertical links along national and/or ideological (religious) lines and horizontal expansion 90 following the market logic of the mafia run pseudo economy. Initially, terrorism on a local level was hatched under the auspices of versatile (para)state violence and in the name of the struggle for national liberation (self determination). Nourished by the Yugoslav wars, it employed crime to serve its needs and established itself as a relatively autonomous social power in no small number of the regional states. The stage set by war favoured the creeping entry into the Balkans of an anti modernizing terrorism, clad in Islamic fundamentalism. The means by which it arrived and took root in the states of the region were initially discerned only after the terrorist strike on New York and Washington. From that moment on, terrorism, naturally in combination with other risks, became the potentially largest threat to stabilisation of the region’s security. Due to the combined effect of the above mentioned factors, the courses and achievements of reforms in the security sectors of the region’s countries are widely unequal. Greece and Turkey have continued modernizing their armies in line with their needs and NATO standards. It goes without saying that the public and secret police services, as well as para police units in these countries, have at least been subject to parliamentary control. Most of the remaining states joined the PfP programme and thus received an additional impulse towards initiated reform of the whole security sector, and of the inherited armies in particular. In these efforts, however, they are generally limited by slim budgets. On the other hand, in the focal states – Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the FRY, Macedonia and Albania – reform of the sector has been prevented, stopped or postponed for a number of reasons. In Albania, collapse of the state spurred disintegration of the army and the police. Despite substantial assistance by the alliance, the two forces are still on the verge of chaos, and their main body remains outside the effective control of the nominal centre of power. By contrast, Macedonia, owing to the fact that its army was completely disarmed by the Yugoslav People's Army and that the Alliance failed to equip and train a new one in eight years, had to create an army by itself from scratch and at its own cost. Its efforts to do so have now been thwarted by the armed rebellion of local Albanians. As for the Bosnia and Herzegovina entities, all three national armies, although directly con trolled by the SFOR and Petritsch’s civil protectorate, have thus far avoided radical reforms. The main reason behind this is the pressure stemming from their war heritage. Naturally, the same reason has caused the postponement and/or faking of reforms in Croatia and the FRY. In both these states the armies pledged their allegiance to the new authorities following the demise of their leaders. It seems that the top brass have thereby bought time and peace, and both armies underwent no serious changes except for those of a lateral personnel nature. To this we should add the fact that the police forces in Croatia and the FRY (Serbia and 91 Montenegro) have been only superficially reformed and that the secret services and para forces (party armies) – the main instigators of the Yugoslav wars – remain intact. Therefore, the war cores of these armies and accompanying forces represent a real force resisting reforms of society and of the military. Moreover, in critical situations these forces may easily become agents of revenge and restoration of the former regime. Just as the Euro Atlantic management of the Yugoslav crisis and wars was motivated by security reasons, it was also, and perhaps even more so, the product of the international community’s economic and political aspirations. The initial impotence of the EU caused in part by the solo play of some of its members (e.g. Germany) ushered the US into the game. From that time on (1992 1993), administration of the Balkans was measured by American strategic interests. Consequently, the instrumental value of the Yugoslav wars kept increasing, and the US used them both to reinforce its domination within the community and to obtain worldwide leadership. This had numerous adverse con sequences for the Balkans. The instrumental approach deprived the US and the Alliance of applying an appropriate strategy to stop the war and condemned them to endlessly act upon its consequences. This, in turn, allowed local warlords to use intra Atlantic discord for the attainment of their own objectives. With its irreversible entry into the region, the Euro Atlantic community finally took over respons ibility for security. This, however, only encouraged political inertia and calculations on the part of local actors and stimulated them to look for, and expect, solutions from others. Meanwhile, as the Alliance grew increasingly stuck, the Balkans actually became an important factor in the security of the Euro Atlantic community; it now cannot and must not withdraw, even if it wanted to do so. The terrorist strike has, for an unpredictable period of time, redirected the attention of the alliance, and this may result in a reduction of its assistance, as well as a decrease in the US’s political interest in the Balkans. The announced transfer of authorities and obligations to the EU may slow down the initiated processes, since there is still no proof that the Union has sufficient capacities for restoring security in the Balkans. Therefore, we should not rule out the possibility that the EU may opt to defer or fictitiously resolve the problem by preserving the status quo . Under the circumstances prevailing in the Balkans, this would, in the long run, favour the renewal of local destructive energies that have accumulated over the past ten years. The previous findings lead to the conclusion that the list of risks for the future security of the region is being decided today. The fact that over the past ten years the basic reasons behind the chronic lack of security in the region have become public knowledge makes this all the more true. There are grounds to believe that, with the political 92 changes in Croatia and the FRY, the need for peace and prosperity of the majority in the South Eastern Europe states has been completely articulated and given official standing. The potential for action by pro ponents of change in the critical central states, however, is inherently limited. These advocates for change are in fact elites who formed polit ically within the coordinates of an ethno religious war and whose activity or lack thereof contributed to its conflagration. They confront ed the war seriously only when it was stopped by external forces and prohibited under the threat of new sanctions. At the moment when these elites arrived in power from the opposition, the results of the war were beyond change. Therefore, they have, less of their own volition and more by force, consigned the war to the archives and turned towards stamping out its consequences. Their lack of distance from the war made them incapable of eliminating its basic causes, since among these elites some had given their wholehearted support to the war leaders. To make matters worse, these elites together with the old regime used various means to prevent in their respective societies the emergence of anti war and potentially emancipatory movements– or to destroy those already existing. In destroyed societies such as those prevailing in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the FRY, Macedonia and Albania, it is not easy to revitalize the sentiments and agents of democracy. This particular point reveals an essential insufficiency of central Balkan societies that cannot be fixed by foreign interventions or donations. Acceptance of market democratic and liberal values in these societies will take time, perhaps even the passing of three to four generations of economic political elites. Consequently, the new authorities in Croatia and the FRY, as well as those in Bosnia and Herzegovina, may only be expected to lift their societies out of the cycle of war and violence. They may also be expected to try to encourage the economic and social recovery of their societies, which will be guided by their will to govern. It is likely that the new authorities will partly reform the security sector and incorporate into its institutions the means for controlling the armed forces. In sum, they have the responsibility to create the initial groundwork for the radical transformation of their societies and states and thereby also for the irreversible expulsion of war from the region. To that end, the Euro Atlantic community should conduct an appraisal of its administration in the Balkans and redefine its approach. The evaluation of US and EU engagement in the Balkans certainly exceeds the frameworks of traditional methodology. In this process the Euro Atlantic leaders should be wary of complacent self reflections on the validity of the job done, especially since the quantity of the military political and economic power the community possesses protected it against the negative consequences of its abortive 93 interventionism. Moreover, having power permitted the Alliance to transfer its frustration over the unsatisfactory results to some of the culprits of its troubles, in a variety of forms (sanctions, bombs, etc.). Despite this, NATO is not spared all the risks created by the de ployment of its peacekeeping troops, especially in Kosovo. Namely, the main task of the KFOR is to deter the armed forces of Serbia/the FRY or, rather, to prevent the renewal of armed conflicts between these forces and the KLA. Protection of its own men is a task of even greater importance. NATO has therefore reduced the KFOR’s con tribution to bolstering the security of Kosovo to the very minimum. At the same time, it has thus revealed its greatest weakness, and the KLA or its elements may easily try to take advantage of this, especially since conflict between the KFOR and the KLA would be far from inconceivable should the Euro Atlantic community refuse to establish an independent state of Kosovo. 4 In this respect NATO has fallen into its own trap in Kosovo. As soon as it landed, it exposed itself to the danger of turning from a liberator into an occupier due to the KLA’s growing dissatisfaction with the status of Kosovo. Should this dissatisfaction explode – an event that is not strictly hypothetical, NATO may witness another consequence of its failure to demilitarise the KLA in June 1999. 5 That is why the Alliance today faces in the centre of the Balkans essentially the same challenges faced in 1991. 6 At the same time, the inherited and newly created security parameters in the region are changing in various directions. The risks today coalesce in a different way, and the result of these combinations makes the recent security stabilisation of the Balkans rather uncertain. This uncertainty is the source of a new set of reasons to re examine the validity of the Euro Atlantic community’s intervention so far. The results of this evalua tion should enable the formulation of an optimum Euro Atlantic strategy for shaping a new security identity of the Balkans and the states in it. In this formulation it would be reasonable to observe the ———— 4 NATO occupation of Kosovo operated in that direction. Cf . “U.S Officials Expect Kosovo’s Independence”, by R. Jeffrey Smith, Washington Post Foreign Service , TFF Features , 24 September, 1999. 5 In addition to the fact that NATO left the KLA to disarm itself and translate its core into the Protective Corps (cf: Laura Rozen, “KLA Demilita rization Deal Despite Last Minute Wrangles”, TFF Features, September 21, 1999, www.transnational.org ), we should note that in 70 years not one of the Yugoslav states managed to disarm the Kosovo Albanians despite the use of such means as military administration in Kosovo, states of emergency, and police repression. 6 This is, naturally, even more applicable to the citizens of Serbia, who after the demise of Milošević still have to resolve the same problems as in 1990, only now under incomparably worse conditions. 94 principle that the range of EU and US (NATO) assistance is ultimately determined by the readiness of the Balkan states to help themselves. The future security identity of the Balkans still remains determined, however, by the needs of the Euro Atlantic community, which is why it demands that local states adopt Euro Atlantic security standards and devise a complementary model. This still, however, does not eliminate the need for the alliance to thoroughly re examine its security concept and the role of NATO in it. In fact, this is made all the more necessary considering that the alli ance lacks valid answers to quite a few dilemmas. For instance, the view that the numerical and territorial expansion of NATO singularly increases the security of Europe and the Euro Atlantic region is still disputable, especially because the political, systemic, and technical limits of NATO’s expansion have not been set. Namely, the dilemma over the extent to which NATO can extend the radius of its operations and increase its membership numbers without changing the nature of the Alliance still remains open. An important indicator of this point is the ongoing search by the EU for its own foreign policy and security identity, independently from the fact that this is nominally placed within NATO coordinates. 7 The question is, namely, whether this search is motivated by the adoption of the concept of joint security based on US leadership and the monopoly of NATO, or by a camouflaged resistance to the su premacy of the US. An additional problem emerges in identifying the prospects for further cohabitation of the “UN model”, which has been sidetracked thus far, and the expansive “NATO model” of global security. In addition, we should also add the need to place NATO under democratic civil control. The instructions given to the Euro Atlantic community to urgently reconsider the security concept imposed on the region and the world has been verified by two events. The first was the 1999 NATO aggression towards the FRY, which confirmed the Alliance’s incapacity to efficiently and thoroughly resolve the security crises in its strategic environment. The inadequate results of NATO’s management of the Yugoslav wars therefore compel the Euro Atlantic community to finally resolve the fundamental dilemmas concerning the scope, type and purposes of its administration in the Balkans. In the first place, it must choose between the currently valid model of the protectorate and the model of integral support for the democratisation and modernisation of South Eastern Europe. The former, although seemingly cheaper, has a merely tactical range. It suppresses the causes of crises and wars, thereby creating a framework for the recovery – but not for the lasting ———— 7 For more, see: “Europe's Military Revolution”, Gilles Andreani, Christoph Bertram and Charles Grant, Centre for European Reform , London, 2001. 95 security – of the region. The second model has an historical charge and strategic range, but requires a Marshall Plan style programme that implies thorough restructuring of the societies and states in the Balkans. Only on that basis will lasting security in the region become possible, along with its integration into the Euro Atlantic community. For that purpose, the community must, among other things, decide whether pacification of the region is to be pursued through arms control and the gradual dis arming of the local states, or whether their incorporation into NATO’s sphere is primarily intended to create the need for additional or different types of arms from Western sources. The problem boils down, however, to the dilemma over who are to be the strategic decision makers and proponents of the region’s future security. In other words, will the desired objective be attained by the simple dislocation of security powers to Strasbourg and Brussels, or should the states of the region first jointly master their own security and on that basis irrevocably join the Euro Atlantic community? This dilemma is revealed as a controversy between the thriving network and number of governmental and non governmental Euro Atlantic mediators (commissions, commissioners, instructors, controllers) and the need to maintain the disintegrating regional infrastructure for mutual support and cooperation of the local states. The second is the terrorist attack on the USA, because the devel opments it has triggered will essentially determine not only the future security of the Balkans but also that of the global community. This strike has, among other things, removed the illusion that the isolated achievement of one country's security in a poorly and unjustly organ ised world is possible. It simultaneously changed radically the scope of challenges to global and national security. The virtualisation of war, which started in Desert Storm and continued in Kosovo, has reached the point of self destruction with the announced metamorphosis into a terrorist bellum omnium contra omnes . This, in return, has created the danger of an Orwellian transformation of the leading societies and states of democracy and liberalism. Hence, the response of the US and the emerging multinational anti terrorist coalition to this challenge will, without exaggeration, determine the future image of the global community. This was an attack not only on the military, economic and political power of the US but also on the foundations of modern democratic society, and the response will be the largest test of the democratic capacities of American society and the Euro Atlantic community. The initial test results will be implicitly contained in the American response to the strike. If the reaction remains limited to dealing strictly with the consequences of the attack, as is the case of the current campaign in Afghanistan, terrorism may actually receive an additional impetus. If, however, the elicited American counter attack turns into a long term strategic uprooting of the sources and causes of terrorism using 96 economic and political means, this will prove the security resistance of the democratic based states and communities. Repercussions of the American choice will reach South Eastern Europe and decisively determine the contents and courses of its future security profiling. An incomplete response by the USA and the Euro Atlantic community to the challenges of terrorism may turn the Balkans into its new arena. This, in turn, could serve as the initial spark for the renewal of local conflicts under the pretext of fighting domestic terrorism. This is made even more likely by the fact that many of the Yugoslav warlords and their newly enthroned political protectors will be only too ready to use antiterrorism to legitimate their thus far destructive performances.
PRIORITIES FOR THE REGION’S GOVERNMENTS
The field of possible activity for the governments in the region is limited by the situation they inherited. They South Eastern Europe this situation as imposed on them by contemporary realities. Therefore, the list of priority steps to be taken by the region’s governments may derive not from the sphere of the desired and the required but from that of the possible. As for the range of government intervention, this in reality will be determined by the potential of the imposed situation for transformation and the amount of work faced by the government. That said, the mode and scope of intervention is ultimately conditioned by a government’s political power and will, and the true direction in which a government is moving can only be revealed by a comparison of this existing political will/power and the results produced against the situational background. This process discloses whether a specific government is primarily concerned with its political survival, whether it uses its will and power to serve only its own purposes, or whether it uses this power to reform society. Only after making such a disclosure, on the basis of the score obtained by comparing the intended and the achieved and the intention behind the wielding of power, can we predict the contribution of every one of these governments to the security of their respective societies and therefore the region as a whole with any degree of reliability. The given reality of South Eastern Europe is manifested as a state of movement under the surface and of postponed radical changes. External interference has generally prevented any further violent re composition of the region and any change in the inherited state borders. This has terminated the possibilities for large moves and sudden turns but has not put an end to the undercurrent of the war’s heritage with its overtones of revenge. Pressured by the Euro Atlantic community, the local governments had to give up their public and private imperial intentions. This pressure, naturally, did not remove their aspirations but simply forced them to be reshaped or 97 suppressed. Furthermore, lacking a meaningful strategy, the community froze the situation, postponing the key decision for a later date. That is why the only choice the governments in the region were left with was to take an indirect approach in looking for positive decisions. This search for support encourages their proximity with the community. It compels them to engage in cooperation with neighbours, but this cooperation is for the time being imposed by external demands. In view of the above, the local governments may not be expected to engage in more intensive security cooperation in the near future. Under the assumption that they are, after all, willing to make their region more secure, they presently lack the required peace making po wers. They may, for instance, collectively declare their attachment to the principle of maintaining immutable borders through force, but they cannot change the actual situation, and Kosovo thus will remain closer to independence than to reintegration into the FRY. Furthermore, their political will is not sufficient to make the Albanians in Macedonia content with the change in constitution. Along the same lines, despite having recognized one another, the FRY, B&H and Croatia are not reliable guarantors of each other’s security; this role is assigned to NATO (SFOR). Therefore, the concept of the two step process of integration – first regionally and then with the Euro Atlantic community – to make the borders between the states soft and eliminate lines of separation is, at this moment, regarded in the Balkans as a pleasant but hardly attainable vision. It therefore seems that, in due course, these governments will be able to substantially increase the security of their states and of the region only by resolving internal problems. Generally speaking, their contribution to the stabilisation of the region shall grow at the rate by which the security of their respective societies increases. The first condition for that is for each government to adopt and implement the integral concept of personal security. Due to the multitude of mutual differences, the scope of the tasks and security challenges the govern ments in the region are faced with necessarily vary. These differentia specifica may be identified by measuring the degree to which these governments reflect the liberal democratic principles of an open so ciety. Last place in this respect is taken by the central states of Yugo slav origin and Albania, which is why I focus my attention on them. Moreover, these states today are the source of the main challenges to individual and joint security of the region. We would not be too wrong in claiming that Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the FRY, Macedonia and Albania are in the stage of crossing from chaos and war to peace. This is a formative stage wherein the governments, at least declaratively, wish to lay the foundations for a new and different order. Therefore, they face the task not only of dealing with the consequences of war and 98 disintegration but also of reconstructing and restructuring the state and society. The ongoing process of consolidation in these societies is difficult to delimit; it is open ended, and anything is possible, from regression to extended impotence to a positive solution of the crisis. This is also the reason why in most of these states the post war transfer of government was not accompanied by a transfer of power. In Croatia and the FRY this was logically accompanied by an intra coalition struggle for the redistribution of power, which postponed resolution of the crisis. For this reason, the ruling coalitions in Croatia and the FRY have not yet managed to translate their initial attitude into a meaningful strategy of effective exit from the war and socialism. On top of all this, the destiny of the state of Yugoslavia is today an issue of bargain ing and trade between the national republic elites of Serbia and of Montenegro, mediated by the emerging informal federal centre of power that formed around Vojislav Koštunica. The war anchor still keeps the Bosnia and Herzegovina and its entities within the competence of NATO, while Macedonia and Albania apparently may only survive as states if they become official protectorates of the Euro Atlantic community. To this extent the governments of states from the last Balkan car of the train, despite all their differences, still face generally the same tasks. An additional similarity is created by the fact that the trans forming capacities of their societies are minimal, and they have not yet found the Archimedean point of their reform projects. The popula tion’s low level of social tolerance prevents and/or postpones radical economic moves, while the legacies of nationalism and the war prevent the reconstitution of liberal and democratic principles. Conse quently, the security sector and armed forces in these societies remain outside the reach of the initiated change. Under these assumptions the governments of these states (especially the FRY, i.e. Serbia) are condemned to wage a daily political struggle for survival and will be considered successful if they at least manage to prevent the annihilation of the initial achievements of the reforms. This makes it difficult to compile a list of the necessary and desir able steps to be taken by the ruling governments that would sufficient ly grasp the real prospects and express the real priorities of each state individually. In the case of the FRY, the list of priorities was dictated by the course of events from 5 October 2000, to the present date. Due to the quasi legalist postponement of the dismantling of Milošević's regime, the DOS has not yet removed a single security risk of internal origin. The fragmentation of the DOS put an end to the initial, inadequate measures, and there is an underground battle going on for the establishment of party (personal) control over the army and police. In addition, the secret security services, especially the military ones, are still beyond public and parliamentary control, and hardly anyone 99 knows for sure who controls them, or what they are used for. Milo Djukanović's government has done nothing to change this situation. Although he could have hardly been expected to begin the reform of the militarised police in Montenegro, it is difficult to explain why Djukanović, as a member of the Supreme Defence Council, did not embark upon a thorough reform of the Yugoslav Army and urgently replace the leading generals appointed by Milošević, especially since the Montenegrin authorities looked upon the army as the main threat to their (para)sovereignty. At the risk of referring to expectations that have already been end lessly repeated, I still maintain that in order to achieve internal secu rity and thus add to overall regional security, the FRY authorities should: • first, draw the final balance of the war and then identify, and hold responsible for their political and criminal acts, the war lead ers, war mongers, and executors; • secondly, establish a consensus for transition among the coun try’s citizens based on an accommodation between the real situa tion in society and the real price that must be paid for rehabi litation and future development. Bearing in mind that this is not the case of one off measures with a certain outcome, in order to protect the initial assumptions for the announced transition and to ensure the security stabilisation of Yugoslav (Serbian) society, the DOS should urgently: • on the basis of a state plan, verified in the Parliament, start a thorough reform of the armed forces which, in the first stage, re quires radical personnel changes, decriminalisation and demilitarisa tion of the police, as well as removal of policing functions from the army; • develop and implement a plan for the reform of the security sec tor based on the constitutionally redefined competencies of each of the armed forces’ components and public internalisation of the new thinking and security practices; • activate the existing constitutional and systemic capacities in or der to place the armed forces under democratic civilian control and, accordingly, change the new constitution(s) and laws and install ef fective procedures and instruments for irrevocable submission of the armed forces to democratically elected civilian authorities; • in line with a Parliament approved strategy of social develop ment, formulate a foreign policy and security strategy for the FRY and, on that basis, first define the defence policy and the military doctrine, and then ensure that, security wise, the FRY finds its place in the region and the Euro Atlantic community in a new and differ ent way; • apply at once for the FRY’s admission to the PfP in order to ac complish the above. 100
101 The Security Situation in the Balkans through 2010 François Heisbourg Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique Foundation Council of the Geneva Centre for Security Policy GENERAL PERSPECTIVE, METHODS AND ASSUMPTIONS Although this paper is written from a French perspective, the analysis and proposals that follow contain few elements that would be substantially different had the vantage point been British, German or Italian. Personal visions or biases of the author will be of greater importance in determining the paper’s content than his national affilia tion to a given Western European state. In this sense, the general perspective is Western European rather than French. Gazing into the future is a perilous exercise even in the most stable of times. We are clearly not living in particularly stable times, and “catastrophic” change (with the word “catastrophic” taken in its scientific, non judgmental, meaning) is by no means improbable during the next ten years in or around the Balkan region. The sudden disappearance of the Soviet Empire with its global and regional domino effects, not least of all in the Balkans, is an obvious and recent example. It is entirely plausible that the eastern approaches of the Balkans will undergo wrenching change in the not too distant future. The social regression, economic stagnation and political authoritarianism characteristic of the Middle East is becoming less and less sustainable in the face of external pressures (notably economic globalisation) and internal contradictions (with population growth exceeding available oil revenues). For this reason alone, it is necessary to consider multiple scenarios when examining the future security situation in the Balkans. Naturally, the scenario method will not be used simply as a hedge against such non linear events, but rather as a tool to determining the key factors that will produce a given outcome. The main objective of this method is to make policy recommendations favouring desirable outcomes.
102 A number of assumptions will be common to all of the scenarios. At the strategic level, these are: From November 2002 onwards, NATO enlargement proceeds at a rapid pace. The Baltic states, Slovakia, and Slovenia are definitely part of the first group. Uncertainty emerges as to the fate of Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania, which may just conceivably join in a “big bang”. More likely, they will gain entry as a separate, second group within a few years. By 2010, all of the former Warsaw Treaty Organisation countries plus the Baltic states, Slovenia and Croatia could be part of NATO. However, there is an outside chance that Bulgarian and Romanian membership may encounter substantial difficulties (see next section). Sweden, Finland and Austria could also join, although their absence would have little strategic impact. Conversely, the positioning of other countries (Macedonia, Moldova, Albania, etc.) vis à vis NATO is the scenario dependent question that will be dealt with in the relevant section of this paper. Russia and NATO, as well as Russia and the US, are linked by agreements going well beyond the Founding Act of 1997. This could translate into direct NATO membership for Russia; but Moscow may well prefer to pursue a peer to peer relationship with NATO and the US rather than becoming one member out of 27 or 28 others within NATO. The Russia NATO/US agreements could include a mutual security component, reaching as far as a “post 9/11” interpretation of Article V, on “commitment”. These assumptions rest on an accom panying assumption, i.e. that Russia, having shed much of the “dead wood” industries that were a Soviet legacy and having reduced the lawlessness and unpredictability characteristic of the Yeltsin era, will continue to pull out of the economic depression of 1991 1998. NATO has ceased to be a war fighting defence organisation based on the automatic commitment of the members’ military resources in the case of aggression against a member state. The Kosovo air war, with its competition between two US led chains of command (one, based in Washington under the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the other, in Mons under SACEUR) and its delegation of targeting to NAC, was a bruising experience that the US is determined never to repeat. Future wars will be based at best on Gulf War style coalitions. NATO confirms its evolution into an “OSCE with weapons”, essen tially capable of conducting PETERSBURG tasks, and of lending assets to EU or US led operations (see the current transfer of NATO AWACs to the US). US military involvement in the Balkans is residual, at levels no higher and probably lower than the current 10% share of forces pres ent in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Macedonia. Similarly, direct US invest ment in the Balkans is marginal in relationship to the involvement of the EU.
103 At the societal and economic levels, the fundamental assumptions include several basic trends: Notwithstanding the “dot com” crash of 2001 and the post 9/11 trend towards a degree of societal and economic re regulation, the development of information technology proceeds unimpeded. The influence and prosperity of human societies (whether as states or as non state actors) will increasingly be dependent on their ability to exploit the fruits of information technology. This in turn will depend on the level and spread of knowledge management skills, which are generated by a solid education system. The presence or absence of such knowledge management capabilities in the Balkans will have indirect, albeit substantial, security implications. The general trend towards the empowerment of non state actors will continue notwithstanding the post 9/11 reaction of nation states to assert or re assert themselves in the face of non state challenges. Even if the process of economic globalisation decreases in this new climate, the pace of technological innovation (not least of all on line applica tions) will not slow down during the next ten years. Thus NGO’s and also criminal organisations will continue to benefit from the ability to acquire information and to extend their influence in a manner that was formerly monopolized by the state or very large corporations. This empowerment of non state actors will be particularly spectacular in geographical areas where the state is weak or incapable of adaptation – and/or loath to cooperate with other states (as well as with friendly non state actors). Indeed, increasing challenges from non state actors operating across borders can only be met if states operate together a cross borders. Such cooperation is not characteristic of the Balkans. The demographic crunch in the EU, and particularly in the countries closest to the Balkans (Italy, Austria, and Germany), will generate a growing requirement for immigration, legal or illegal, to supplement a shrinking post baby boom workforce, as well as to contribute to pension regimes (insofar as immigration is legal). Naturally, the acceptability of immigration will be dependent on economic circumstances, as well as on post 9/11 fears. By the year 2010, however, the Balkans will have become an even greater source of immigration towards Western Europe than it is today, and the region will continue to be a major transit area for immigrants from farther east and south.
SCENARIOS: THE GOOD, THE BAD AND THE UGLY Three scenarios will be spelled out. As will become apparent, the causalities leading to each scenario are a mix of internal and external
104 factors. The final section of the paper will focus on the corresponding policy recommendations.
The “Good Scenario” By 2010, the Balkans are overall, in a situation similar to that enjoyed by post communist Central Europe in 2000, with a comparable (and fairly narrow) range of strategic, political military and economic disparities within the region (e.g. three Central European countries were members of NATO by 1999; the remaining Central European states were not). In this scenario, the 1990s appear in retrospect as the “lost dec ade”, whose negative effects have been overcome by 2010.
Geo Strategic Picture In geo strategic terms, Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia will have been NATO members for several years, while Serbia, Montenegro, and Albania will have joined shortly before 2010. Macedonia and Kosovo (see below) have entered into negotiations on the basis of their Membership Action Plan. As in the case with the entry of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, NATO membership entails realisation of a number of reforms: democratic control of armed forces, electronic and linguistic interoperability with existing NATO forces, and a corresponding effort with respect to the budget. This remains, however, comparatively modest, akin to the efforts of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary (respectively 2.1%, 2.3% and 1.6% of GDP devoted to defence). The expectation is not for the new members to provide substantial force capabilities or even substantial territorial defences; rather, it is the reception and support of forces (as in Hungary during the Kosovo air war) and interoperability that are valued. In other words, the extension of existing NATO enlargement procedures and criteria to the Balkans is essentially compatible with the overall evolution of NATO from a collective defence organisation to a mode that can be called “OSCE with weapons”. Such a trend has been apparent since its accentuation, both by 9/11 (with its accelerating effect on America’s strategic emphasis on Asian commitments) and the Russia NATO rapprochement. Before 9/11, Russia appeared to be less concerned by NATO enlargement towards the south than by the prospect of the Baltic states joining. Since then, Russia’s overall attitude vis à vis enlargement has become more relaxed. Similarly, turmoil in the Middle East would presumably not change the nature of the NATO enlargement process; indeed, it could increase its relevance. 105 In summary, the NATO strategic dimension of the “good scenar io” is comparatively impervious to the direct effects of external shifts. Whether enlargement happens or not will thus be essentially a func tion of trends within the Balkans, ultimately influenced by the indirect effects of external events. As it happens, the “good scenario” occurs in part because such outside trends are no worse than they were during the nineties. In particular, the Middle East – not least Turkey – does not collapse into chaos, generating massive waves of highly destabilis ing economic and political emigration transiting through the Balkans.
Political Military Picture In political military terms, the wars of succession in Yugoslavia have petered out by 2002, and interethnic tension has been reduced and managed along lines comparable to those prevailing in Central Europe in 2000. Russian Baltic minority relations, Slovak Hungarian friction, and the treatment of the Roma: these are by no means in perfect order, but their potential for creating conflict, which was quite high in the early nineties in the Baltic states and Slovakia, has been reduced to manageable proportions. Thus it would be in the Balkans by 2010. Kosovo’s independence occurs during the four or five years following the November 2001 elections in a manner agreed upon by Belgrade, Priština and the UN. Reasonably amicable frontier adjust ments occur along lines established by plebiscite results, with the Mi trovica area going to Serbia and Preševo to Kosovo. The precedent here is the Schleswig Holstein plebiscite between Denmark and Ger many after World War I. In a sense, this re alignment marks the fail ure of the multiethnic state in and around Kosovo. Bosnia and Herzegovina remains somewhat in limbo in 2010. A residual foreign force presence remains because the nature of the final status is not yet clear. Bosnia’s population (unlike that of Kosovo) includes a substantial share of people (notably in the cities) who prefer living in a federation to a carved up territory, while Croatia and Serbia exhibit no enthusiasm for inheriting assorted chunks of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Thus Bosnia and Herzegovina continues to function as a hybrid, a ward of the international community, but with comparatively little tension. Montenegro may or may not become independent by 2002, but relations between Belgrade and Podgorica are no more tense than those existing between pre or post partition Prague and Bratislava. Macedonia for its part has managed, through interethnic compromise, to continue to function as a state. Emergence of a “Greater Albania” along 1941 1944 lines has not occurred: speaking a common language is not sufficient to transcend the differences of experience and political and economic evolution and experience among the Albanophone inhabitants of Albania, 106 Kosovo and Macedonia. Tirana, Priština and Skopje are on tracks as separate as Berlin, Vienna and Bern. By 2010, Romania, Bulgaria and Croatia have just joined the EU, which had already gained ten new members in 2004 5. The difficulties in absorbing the acquis communautaire along with the “indigestion” subsequent to the “big bang” enlargement to 25 members in 2004 5 explain why no other Balkan states have made it into the EU by 2010. However, the prospect of EU membership remains an essential mobilising factor for the pacification of ethnic tension and the improvement of standards of governance. The diffusion of tension between Hungary and Romania in the early 1990s was facilitated by the opportunity of joining NATO and the EU. Indeed, the “good scenario” occurs to a large extent because this prospect is opened to a new set of Balkan states in the closing years of the decade: Serbia, Macedonia, Albania and Kosovo enter the first round of negotiations on accession by 2007 2008. In effect, the “good scenario” is highly dependent on the EU possessing sufficient dynamism to pursue the enlargement process, while reforming its institutions sufficiently to give them greater coherence and effectiveness in the Balkans.
Economic Picture In economic terms, the EU’s role is no less important. The EU manages to rationalise its various Balkan oriented organisations and programmes, while the countries of the region cooperate as members of a Marshall Plan style “Balkans Reconstruction Programme”. The integration of the Balkans into the Euro sphere will be a contributing factor to that end. Reasonable stability in the region and in the Middle East leads to an increase in the transit trade through the Balkans, and enough foreign investment occurs – with help from the non criminal elements of the various diasporas – to reduce the reliance of local economic actors on criminal activity (trafficking in human beings remains a significant concern but the drug trade is curbed through the reduction of Afghan and Central Asian exports). Post 9/11 measures taken to fight cross border terrorism have a substantial side effect in terms of curbing cross border criminal trafficking. By 2010, the more dubious parts of the regions look no worse than Sicily or Calabria in terms of the black market economy. In other words, serious progress has been made since the situation in 2001. Overall, by 2010, the Balkan states have everywhere seen their per capita GDPs restored to pre 1990 levels.
The “Bad Scenario” In the “bad scenario” the tentative progress of recent years halts in its tracks, with the wars of secession in Yugoslavia continuing to simmer, while most of the Balkans do not manage to pull up the slide 107 of the 1990s into the Third World. Intra regional differentiation is high, while contrasts with the rest of Europe are enhanced in all spheres. In many ways, this scenario flows from the forces at play in the region during the 1990s.
Geo Strategic Picture At the strategic level, only Romania, Bulgaria and Croatia manage with some difficulty to make it into NATO by 2010. There are no prospects for other countries in the region to join, in the ab sence of solid Membership Action Plans. This situation flows essentially from the lack of progress in the region, compounded by America’s lack of willingness to take on new commitments. The same evolution eventually occurs in terms of EU membership: Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia are the last countries to be considered for membership (which occurs sometime after 2010). Thereafter, the EU stabilises at 28 member states. The current FRY, FYROM and Albania, as well as existing CIS members and Turkey, are barred from entry in the foreseeable future. In effect, a hard dividing line separates the EU from these entities. This is the result both of internal developments in the Balkans and of the EU’s inability to cope with further expansion.
Political Military Picture In military and political terms, the situation is quite grim. No agreement is worked out between Serbia and Kosovo. The latter remains under UN supervision with NATO, and subsequently EU, military protection. Mitrovica has become as symbolic of the hardening of dividing lines as Checkpoint Charlie used to be, with one difference: life is equally uninspiring on both sides of the intra Balkan divide. Kosovo is wracked by tension between the Albanian community and the European protection force. The absence of a high profile American presence – Camp Bondsteel was shut down in 2004 as part of Americans’ hand over of responsibility to the Europeans – reduces the authority of KFOR, which is further hampered by the EU’s inability to establish a politically coherent and militarily integrated chain of command for KFOR. However, KFOR stays on, despite a Northern Ireland type atmosphere. Bosnia is somewhat less restive, and the handover of SFOR from NATO to the EU occurs without difficulty. The real problems are within Macedonia, which splits into warring factions, with pro partition hard liners getting the upper hand within both the Slavic and Albanophone communities. Eventually, a Cyprus style division occurs, with an EU peacekeeping force manning the checkpoints between the rump FYROM and the 108 “Independent Republic of Western Macedonia”, which secures recognition only from Albania. The Tetovo republic, as it is better known, is itself a bone of political contention between Tirana and Priština. Although matters are not quite as bad between Serbia and Montenegro, the latter republic’s governance is compromised by the virtual civil war between pro independence and pro Serbian factions. Not surprisingly, the standards of political governance are often reminiscent of the Caucasus rather than of mainstream Europe. This does not mean a return to the era of Milošević and Tudjman. The 1990s’ dreams of territorial expansion have dissipated. But in Tirana, Sarajevo and Skopje, as in Priština and Tetovo, standards of political conduct are those of Yerevan and Tbilissi, of Stepanakert and Nazran. Things are somewhat better in Belgrade, which benefits from its economic links with its stable EU neighbours, but there is much that remains to be desired as nationalistic factions play on the Kosovo and Montenegro friction points.
Economic Picture A large swathe of the regional economies remains in a post Cold War depression. There is some improvement in the Danubian heart land, insofar as major warfare no longer occurs in that part of the re gion. Tension in Kosovo and open conflict in Macedonia is bad news for regional development and also hurts northern Greece. But at least war doesn’t prevail along Serbia’s northern and eastern confines. In other words, the areas of tension – Bosnia, Kosovo, Albania and par ticularly Macedonia – stagnate at per capita GDP levels comparable to those of North Africa, while Serbia manages by 2010 to achieve economic consolidation putting its GDP at something close to the pre 1990 level. The black market economy continues to develop. Here again, the parallel with the trans Caucasus comes to mind: the political and economic governance in the southwest Balkans is inextricably linked to the power of criminal activity. Anti terrorism measures have some effect in insulating the EU from Balkan lawlessness, but within the Balkan region itself criminal activity flourishes, aided and abetted by the political and institutional vacuum extending from Bosnia to partitioned Macedonia by way of Montenegro, Kosovo and Albania. Bad as this scenario sounds, its differences with the current situation are ones of degree, not of nature.
109 The “Ugly Scenario” The “ugly scenario” is substantially worse than the previous one and results from trends that are not a direct extrapolation of current events.
Geo Strategic Picture In the strategic realm, the EU does not enlarge to include Croatia, Bulgaria and Romania. Indeed, in 2004, the EU fails to agree on constitutional reform and doesn’t manage to bring its institutions into arrangement. Nonetheless enlargement proceeds, albeit with reluctance and extreme difficulty, with the ten new members singled out by the European Commission in November 2001. Conversely, negotiations over accession with Bulgaria and Romania, which had begun in March 2000, are put on indefinite hold. Such an EU is incapable of acting coherently in the military realm, and the Europeans are not ready to substitute for the departure of the Americans from KFOR and SFOR. The ensuing shockwaves in Sofia and Bucharest throw into question the rapid entry of Bulgaria and Romania into NATO. Bulgar ia is furthermore challenged by the break up of Macedonia: unlike its exemplary restraint vis à vis the Yugoslav wars of the 1990’s, this time Bulgaria gets directly embroiled in the Macedonian troubles. All prospects of moving “into the West”, under its NATO and EU guises, dissipate. Simultaneously, the Balkans suffers from turmoil in the greater Middle East. This dries up the transit trade between industrialised Europe and southwest Asia and provokes massive population movements towards the Balkans. The collapse of Saudi Arabia or Egypt with domino effects in the broader region would be a vast challenge for a reasonably stable and developing Balkan region advancing towards NATO and EU membership. Strategically, the consequences become unmanageable in the absence of such circumstances. In the ugly scenario, not only have the Americans withdrawn militarily from the region, but the Europeans as well have implemented, quite literally, the “in together/out together” principle. Furthermore, relations between the EU and Turkey have hit a new low, as Ankara proceeds with its threat to annex Northern Cyprus following the Nicosia government’s entry into the Union in 2004. Bereft of any long term prospect of entry into the Union, Turkey is caught in the Middle East turmoil, with severe economic and political consequences, as Ataturk authoritarians (largely in the military), Is lamists, and liberal modernisers vie for power.
110 Political Military Picture In the military and political arenas, the word “balkanisation” is too mild to describe the failed state situation in the region. War and partition in FYROM, unmitigated by a NATO or EU military pres ence, led to Albanian forces moving into western Macedonia, while Serbia, Greece and Bulgaria nearly come to blows (as in 1913) over the fate of the rump FYROM. Only US, EU and Russian political and economic pressure avert a direct clash. Kosovo gains de facto independence. Notwithstanding its reticence vis à vis backward Albania, Priština relies on Tirana’s military support to deter nationalist Serbian pressure, with Belgrade deploying forces in and around Mitrovica. Political governance is mostly of the Transcaucasian “quality”, with elements of warlordism reminiscent of Liberia or Sierra Leone prevailing in various areas. The parallel with the failed states of Africa is all the more appropriate since political and criminal elements have become totally indistinguishable. Trafficking has developed to an unprecedented degree with massive trade in human beings, drugs (now that poppies are growing from Anatolia to the Hindu Kush), and arms (including biological, chemical, and radiological weapons in demand in the Middle East). A new Iron Curtain is set up between the EU and this Balkan wasteland.
Economic Picture The economic picture is reminiscent of sub Saharan Africa. Per capita GDP falls further from the low levels of the late 1990’s (GDP in Albania is approximately $800 per capita, just slightly ahead of the Ivory Coast). Disparities shrink, but this is not the result of social progress but rather the consequence of countries converging towards the bottom.
KEY VARIABLES AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
External Variables and Policy Recommendations As is apparent from the three scenarios selected above – and there is no prima facie reason to believe that other scenarios would draw significantly different observations, the security situation is highly dependent on external variables over which the Balkans states have minimal control. In the “good”, the “bad”, and the “ugly” scenarios, the key variables are by ascending order of gravity: (1) the degree of American (dis)engagement in Europe;
111 (2) change, presumably violent, in the greater Middle East (more like Algeria after 1992 than Central Europe after 1989); (3) the capability (or lack thereof) of the European Union to sustain its enlargement process while pursuing integration and sustaining the ESDP. Although it is certainly not in the capacity of the Balkan states to determine the evolution of these variables, they are not entirely devoid of influence. More importantly, the Balkan states have the option of factoring into their own plans consequences flowing from the nature of these variables. In the case of US commitment, the Balkan states, like other European countries, can help encourage the Americans to stay on by making them feel welcome, both in human terms and from a political standpoint, for instance by demonstrating willingness to move forward towards final discussions regarding the status of Kosovo and by fos tering inter ethnic cooperation in Bosnia. There is an element of paradox here in that positive movement in Kosovo and Bosnia will help reduce the need for a foreign presence – but such a reduction will have a very different meaning if it is the result of success than if it takes the form of a withdrawal born of dissatisfaction. The prospect of wrenching change in the Middle East is one over which the Balkans have essentially no political or economic bearing. However, there may be at least limited scope to “preach by example” (e.g. by demonstrating that Muslim and Christian can live and work together as in Bulgaria), but the record of the wars of Yugoslavia’s secession do not provide the best of backdrops against which to dem onstrate the virtues of tolerance and mutual respect. More directly, the Muslim institutions of a country such as Bosnia could play a role in the debate that needs to be opened by Islamic societies on the relationship between Islam and modernity. The ability of non Arab Muslim societies such as Bosnia to help set the terms of the debate in the Arab world is admittedly limited, but it is something worth trying, given the dreadful nature of the threat of militant fundamentalist change in the Middle East. The main recommendation will therefore be that the Balkan coun tries need, as do others, to factor the Middle East time bomb into their projections. In particular, institution building in the fields of immigration control and anti criminal activity need to be accelerated and reinforced, on the assumption that things could get rapidly worse than they already are: the spillover of Afghan refugees flowing from Iran and Turkey to the Balkans and then to the Channel Tunnel is an illus tration of what could happen on a large scale. As for the evolution of the EU, here again there is obviously little or nothing that the Balkan states can do to ensure the success of the 2004 EU convention. As in the previous case, recommendations will be of a precautionary measure. Countries that are currently negotiating or hoping to negotiate with the EU have every interest in proceeding
112 to the fullest with acceptance and observance of the acquis commu nautaire. Time is not necessarily playing into the hands of slow reforms (or of overly tough negotiating postures); EU enlargement will end at some stage, and those who wish to be inclined should act on the assumption that enlargement is a non linear process. Domestic Policies From the three scenarios, a number of factors are not highly dependent on new or changing external factors, and it is obviously in these areas that the scope is greatest for initiatives from the Balkans. First in this category is NATO enlargement. Although NATO enlargement is not a process as complex or lengthy as EU expansion, there is nothing easy or automatic about it and the corresponding demands for a reasonably stable economy and polity (included in the so called “Perry criteria”), democratic control of the armed forces, and a reasonable and sensible defence effort. These are not givens but goals to be worked towards. Being a member of NATO is worth the effort. In and of itself it may not be an absolute condition to ensure protection against political destabilisation (Greece in 1967 74 or Turkey on a number of occasions bearswitness to the limits of what NATO membership provides beyond the strictly strategic realm). The fact remains, however, that the reforms leading to NATO membership and the value system embodied by NATO are assets that extend beyond narrow defence and security considerations. In the field of defence proper, preparations for NATO member ship should focus on the one hand on Perry criteria reforms (e.g. dem ocratic control) but also on “force reception” and interoperability, so as to pave the way for joint action with the forces from NATO (and PfP) countries in the Balkans, if required. Second, it is incumbent on the Balkan states to make it a priority to invest in the fight against criminal networks. Strong judiciaryes and serious police forces are going to be even more important in the future than they are today, if the analyses proposed above are correct. Both in terms of internal reform and in terms of the sort of assistance that the Balkan countries would wish to secure from the EU and other bod ies, this is an absolute priority for the short to medium term. Efforts in this area should integrate cooperative links not only with foreign law enforcement agencies (such as the FBI, Europol, etc.) and legal es tablishments but also between Balkan states. Third, and in the long term, investment in education is of prominent importance, notably in order to create a human basis for effective knowledge management. Notwithstanding the dire economic situation in much of the region, this is an area in which there already exist significant foundations, not least of all in Serbia and Bulgaria. In the search for EU and other foreign resources, a premium should be put on education focused funding, in contrast to the current tendency to mobilise funding for infrastructure spending. As useful as the latter 113 may be, its opportunity costs should be measured vis à vis the benefits of spending for organisational purposes (in particular, crime fighting institutions) and educational purposes. While education may be sever al degrees removed from immediate security concerns, in the long run its contribution to security will be substantial if the Balkans are to resemble, say, Italy, rather than Transcaucasia. Finally, preparations for entry into the EU, as has been noted earl ier, should be conducted with determination, with time being of the essence.
114 The Austrian View on Regional Security in South Eastern Europe Predrag Jureković Bureau for Security Policy Austrian Federal Ministry of Defence
AUSTRIA’S INTEREST IN SOUTH EASTERN EUROPE
Due to Austria’s proximity to the Balkans, it is one of those EU member states that are particularly affected by both positive and nega tive developments in South Eastern Europe. The negative results of these developments mainly concern security risks caused by permanent instability in the Balkans. During the Yugoslav wars of dissolution in the 1990s, Austria (along with Germany) was the country with the highest number of ref ugees from the former Yugoslavia. Austria admitted 80,000 people from war torn Bosnia and Herzegovina alone. A large part of these refugees was integrated into the labour market, although that further strained the domestic employment situation. Organised crime and, above all, drug smuggling are additional security risks for Austria caused by the unstable situation in South Eastern Europe. The security and political vacuum in parts of South Eastern Europe has led to the region becoming a hub of organised crime in Europe. Austria has accordingly strengthened its border con trols. Border security in general is accorded special importance for the security of the EU in the context of Austria's function as an outpost of Schengen Europe. Austria sees itself as a bridge between Western Europe and the states of South Eastern Europe due to its historical and cultural links, as well as to its high proportion of citizens of South Eastern European origin. Its view is that opportunities can arise from this function, opportunities such as economic investment and the strengthening of cultural and scientific relations with South Eastern European states. In order to be able to realise these opportunities and in order to minimise the aforementioned security risks, real stabilisation of the western Balkans is needed. The following three elements are neces sary in order to bring stability to the Balkans:
115 • The first element is the establishment of regional cooperation in South Eastern Europe, which should also contain elements of a system of cooperative security. This is necessary in order to hin der interethnic conflict and political conflict over the maintenance of order from becoming a danger for the region in the future. Aus tria supports the goals of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, as well as the establishment of a system of confidence building measures by the OSCE. Parallel to the goal of establish ing regional cooperation in South Eastern Europe there must be a possibility for individual South Eastern European states (depend ing on their state of development) to have access to the European integration process. Austria sees Stabilisation and Association Agreements (SAA), concluded with the EU as partner, as the cor rect instrument for this process. • The second element for stabilising South Eastern Europe is the establishment of mechanisms for solving or defusing continu ing interethnic conflict and political conflict regarding the main tenance of order. Not only does the question of whether these con flicts can be defused by granting autonomy, by federalising, or even by way of secession (thereby establishing a new state) play an important part in this context, but so does the more basic ques tion of how to establish a cooperative relationship between one or more national minorities and the majority population groups in the states of South Eastern Europe. Solving this question seems to be necessary because national minorities’ dissatisfaction with their legal and social status was one of the reasons behind the es calation of interethnic conflict in the former Yugoslavia. • The third element is the readiness of the international com munity of states to continue to help build a system of regional co operation and to hinder the eruption of further armed conflict by making forces available for international peace operations. Aus tria is ready to continue to contribute to the international stabilisa tion measures, not only by making financial and economic help available through EU channels, but also by contributing forces to the international peacekeeping mission in Kosovo.
AUSTRIA'S VIEW OF THE ROLE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA IN THE STABILISATION PROCESS IN SOUTH EASTERN EUROPE
Austria's view is that Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) are the most important regional actors in the western Balkans. The importance of the FRY for security policy is shaped by the following: 116 • A positive outcome of the Dayton peace process is only pos sible if the Yugoslav leadership, which has considerable influence on the political elite of the Republika Srpska plays a constructive role therein. This includes the strengthening of relations with the federal Bosnian government as well as Yugoslav participation in military confidence building measures prescribed in the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (the Dayton Treaty), especially the so called Article IV Agreement. • It is an important goal for the EU and for Austria to gradually involve the states of the western Balkans in the Euro Atlantic in tegration processes. With the coming to power of a democratic regime in Belgrade, the danger of the FRY becoming a long term security and political vacuum in the western Balkans, and thereby a hindrance in the stabilisation of the whole region, was avoided. Austria supports the FRY’s endeavour to conclude an SAA with the EU as well as to join NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme. The Austrian view is that Yugoslavia's approach to the Euro Atlantic integration processes would not only lead to a strengthening of democratic forces within the FRY, but it would also contribute to the improvement of the security situation of the entire region. • The new leadership in Belgrade is confronted with internal in ter ethnic conflicts and political conflicts over the maintenance of order. These range from demands for autonomy in the Vojvodina and in Sandjak to secessionist tendencies in Montenegro. In addi tion, Kosovo is de facto no longer under the control of the Yugo slav government, and its majority population wants independence. The crucial test for Belgrade with regard to this potential for in ternal conflict will be whether the Yugoslav leadership is ready to compromise and to include the relevant international organisa tions in the search for solutions – in contrast to the confrontational political style of the Milošević era.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A NEW NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY OF THE FRY
The Austrian view is that the national security policy of the FRY will be confronted with three security political challenges in the next few years, all of which are interdependent: 1. approaching the Euro Atlantic integration processes (there is no alternative, not if Yugoslavia wants to avoid once again being in a “special position” in South Eastern Europe); 2. continued normalisation of relations with the other former Yugoslav republics and with Albania in order to improve regional
117 stability (this includes an active role for the FRY in strengthening regional cooperation); 3. the development of solutions for internal political conflict over the maintenance of order so as to work on democratic and eco nomic reform without hindrances and in order to be able to con duct an active foreign policy.
Euro-Atlantic Integration The mid term goal for Belgrade with respect to the Euro Atlantic integration processes has to be the conclusion of an SAA with the EU as well as admission to NATO’s PfP programme. How quickly these aims can be achieved depends, firstly, on Belgrade’s willingness to cooperate within the region; secondly, on a solution to internal political conflicts over the maintenance of order; and, thirdly, on securing a monopoly of power for the state. Entry into the PfP programme presupposes democratic control of the military and the police. The independent actions of special units of Serb police (“crvene beretke”) in November demonstrate that demo cratic control over the security forces is not yet fully established.
Normalisation of Relationships with Regional Countries Foreign political initiatives vis à vis Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina will be especially important when the FRY wants to normalise its relations with the other former Yugoslav republics, because these states and the FRY are the core of the western Balkans. In the future, Belgrade can use the Serb minority in Croatia and the Croat minority in Serbia as an instrument for the development of cooperative relations between Serbia and Croatia. Austria and the EU think that an important indicator of the predictability of the FRY’s regional policies will be the support Belgrade gives to implementation of the Dayton Treaty, analogous to the assessment of the Croatian policy on Bosnia. Belgrade's readiness to intensify its relationship with the Bosnian government in Sarajevo and to work on implementing the Article IV Agreement is accorded spe cial importance. Belgrade’s readiness to normalise relations with the other former Yugoslav republics is also assessed by looking at its readiness to co operate with the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) in The Hague. This court is an important tool for Austria and the EU in the reconciliation of the peoples of the western Balkans,
118 because guilt for war crimes is individualised, and the tribunal takes a stand against the theory of collective guilt.
Defusing and Managing Internal Conflict The Austrian view is that the new security policy of the FRY must prioritise solving or at least defusing internal political conflict regard ing the maintenance of order. Neither far reaching political and economic reforms nor the development of a new military doctrine is possible without settlement of this conflict. Belgrade’s maximum readiness to compromise should be the principle behind the solution of such conflict, if a relapse to the antagonist policies of Milošević is to be avoided. Much of this conflict could be solved by further federalisation of the FRY, by giving more rights to regions with a specific historical development or multiethnic structure. This concerns the conflict between Belgrade and the leadership in Vojvodina as well as the demands for autonomy by the Muslims in Sandjak. In the central political conflict regarding the maintenance of order within the FRY between Serbia and Montenegro, Austria, like the other EU members, is in favour of keeping a unified Yugoslav State, but dissolution by mutual agreement would be acceptable. Austria supports the pragmatic position of the Serb leadership with regard to a referendum for independence in Montenegro. In Kosovo a strategy of reintegration does not seem wise in the short to medium term in light of the current security situation and the Albanian endeavour for independence. Any such attempt would lead to a renewed armed uprising by the Albanian population, and this would endanger the very existence of the Serb population that remains in Kosovo. Belgrade's security and political policies should focus on improving the standard of living for the non Albanians in Kosovo rather than stressing legalistic points. This improvement can only be achieved if Belgrade cooperates with the UNMIK administration and moderate Albanian politicians, who remain in the majority following the first parliamentary elections in Kosovo.
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120 The Stability of the Balkans through 2010: A View from Hungary Arnold Koltai Hungarian Army
The Balkan states, including Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Moldova, Romania, Slovenia and Yu goslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), support an estimated 60 million inhabitants in a roughly 667,000 square kilometre area. As of now, the majority of these states are still suffering from the fierce fighting and series of ethnic cleansings of the last ten years that had a striking impact on the social and economic life of the Balkan region. Although numerous and exhausting negotiations put a stop to the wars in the peninsula, most of the Balkans is artificially kept glued together in one piece by NATO’s peacekeeping forces stationed all around the region. Kosovo, being the trigger of the most recent disputes, is key to solving the Balkan dilemma and preserving the stability of the region. Given Kosovo’s importance, this paper will examine the possibilities regard ing Kosovo’s future status and their likely consequences concerning the FRY and neighbouring states. This work will also touch upon the most burning issues pertaining to the long term stability of the region and the security of Europe itself.
KOSOVO AND THE FRY
Kosovo is similar to the Bosnia scenario in many ways. Like the Dayton Peace Accords in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Kosovo Agree ment also failed to look beyond the immediate task of stopping the killings and atrocities. Therefore it did not provide Kosovo with a solution to the problem of how to create a framework for a multiethnic society and a transition to a democratic government. The US led aerial bombing campaign against Yugoslavia aimed to prevent ethnic cleans ing in Kosovo, but once the Serb forces withdrew it did not prevent Albanians from expelling Kosovar Serbs from their homes, which reversed the result of the war efforts and created an opportunity for further extremist actions. Even with the strong NATO, OSCE, and UN presence in the province, the international community is still having difficulties persuading the Kosovar Albanian political elite to en
121 courage co existence with the various ethnic groups. It seems that Kosovar Albanians will not accept any plans that would cause them to live together with their former oppressors. Albanians cannot forget what happened in the past ten years. International assistance in Kosovo is being undermined by fund ing shortages, not to mention the political unwillingness to open up towards Belgrade’s new democratic government. According to ex perts, out of the estimated $10 billion allocated for the Balkan recon struction effort, over $3.8 billion will be needed for Kosovo’s recon struction alone through the end of the year 2002. These figures do not even include humanitarian and macroeconomic assistance. Donor fa tigue is creeping in as the international community’s willingness to finance the reconstruction and democratisation of the province, espe cially after witnessing the slow progress demonstrated by Bosnia and Herzegovina in the past six years, is decreasing. Moreover, the status of Kosovo remains undetermined. All efforts to promote stability in Kosovo are endangered by the uncertainty of what the international community’s final goal may mean to Kosovar Albanians. As stated earlier, Albanians are not willing to accept anything but independence from Yugoslavia. Although accepted by both the Serb and the Albanian sides, UN Security Council Resolution 1244 has been violated numerous times by the Albanian leadership at the expense of the Serb and other minor ities, and there is no immediate guarantee that it will be better respect ed in the future. If one takes some time to study Kosovo’s history, it soon becomes apparent that it is a repeated tale of Serbs wiping out Albanians or Albanians killing Serbs. This is one of the reasons why the international community must oppose a fully independent Kosovo, where human rights are not respected, and where minorities are vul nerable to atrocities centrally generated in the dream of a mono ethnic state. Another principal argument against Kosovo’s independence is its short term inability to survive as a sovereign state. No matter how loud the Kosovar Albanians cry for independence, no Albanian politician has been able to come up with a plan for how a sovereign Kosovo state – landlocked, economically weak, to put it mildly, and surrounded by Europe’s poorest countries – could survive without violating the territorial integrity of its neighbours. The EU and the international community together with the US, now that the latter’s attention is focused on the recently declared war against international terrorism, will probably not be able to provide any of the additional aid that Kosovo will definitely need in order to be able to stand on its own two feet. In addition, Kosovo’s independence would raise hard feelings and anxiety among neighbouring states such as Macedonia, Montenegro, Bulgaria, and primarily Serbia. By 1244, Belgrade was guaranteed that Kosovo would remain within the FRY and that its territorial integrity would 122 not be violated. Concerns about giving full independence to Kosovo would also be shared by Macedonia, Montenegro, and Bulgaria, together with Greece. Most of these countries are home to Albanian minorities who would be more than happy to support such a move, hoping for unification first with Kosovo and then Albania. This could only be achieved through the partial dismemberment of all of the states in question. The consequences of such an event would be disastrous to the Balkans’ “temporary cease fire” situation. Furthermore, the example set by the international community in granting independence to Kosovo would encourage other ethnic groups within the Balkans to blink an eye or two over violent secessionist movements. This alone could easily undermine the fragile stability of multiethnic states in the region. It is clear that Kosovo, no matter how much the Kosovar Albanian majority wants to secede, will probably not gain independence in the near future in order to prevent still aching wounds from being torn open and the Balkans from plunging into another war. The international community will have to gain time so that a new breed of players can be brought into the political area and be instrumental in continuing long term negotiations on Kosovo’s long term status, which is going to be based on democratic values and mutual respect for the sovereignty of peaceful states and their basic human rights. This is of crucial importance, because the current UN administration cannot by itself change Albanian minds over Kosovo’s multiethnic future. For this, NATO and other international organisations will have to stay for at least the next decade but more likely for fifteen years, in order to help build a society that gives people a reason to live other than to take revenge for disputes of the ancient and recent past. This will allow the international community to help the province come up with new leaders, receive the necessary economic aid, strengthen internal stability, and strive for democracy. Gaining time could help implement another option that Kosovo may have to face: autonomy and self government within the FRY under the new democratic government. The question, however, remains the same: How can we expect Albanians to live together with their former oppressors in the same state after all they have done to them? Or, will the Kosovar Albanians ever allow Belgrade to represent them in international matters? These questions are hard to answer, but one thing is certain: even under the democratic government of Serbia and in light of all the support the West has pledged to Belgrade, the FRY will most probably have to first focus on improving living conditions and its poor infrastructure, as well as breathing new life into industry in Serbia. While Belgrade has to South Eastern Europe that only an economically stable and democratic Serbia can possibly keep the province, Kosovar Albanians on the other hand will have to understand that they cannot successfully exist 123 as a state in the short term. Any attempt to create a “Greater Albania” or a bigger Kosovo to accommodate Kosovo’s short term survival will not be tolerated by the international community and will be opposed accordingly. Instead, the most probable course of action and the most acceptable short term solution regarding Kosovo could be its reintegration into the democratic FRY with autonomy and self governing powers, which would give both the province and the international community enough time to tie all loose ends and continue to work things out. Yes, it might be a dangerous game in which the international community will play for time and the Kosovar Albanians for their freedom, but one cannot really think seriously about a possible secession until the international community is shown evidence that Kosovo can and will maintain domestic stability and interethnic peace. This will eventually have to occur, especially if Kosovar Albanians do not divert from their current goals. However, Kosovo will not be left alone without the “adult supervision” that is currently provided mainly by NATO and the UN. It will still need a strong international military and law enforcement presence to maintain its internal and external stability, including the protection of ethnic minorities and their basic human rights. This, however, could occur only in the long run and only if Kosovo’s reintegration attempt ultimately fails during the interim period of negotiations. In such a case, the international community will have to deliver a clear and concise message to the Kosovar political leaders: Kosovo cannot negotiate its secession from Yugoslavia without involving Belgrade in the process. This would be totally unacceptable even for the most democratic government in Serbia, and one should not forget that Yugoslavia is still politically divided over many issues, Kosovo being one of the major ones. It would be foolish to think that Kosovo could gain independence peacefully with representatives from only the international and Kosovar Albanian communities sitting around the negotiating table. Belgrade must be involved, so that it can discuss (and be guaranteed) the rights and future status of the Kosovar Serb minority, to mention only one of the many important questions that Kosovo’s independence would bring up. Even if faced with the threat of Montenegro seceding from Yugoslavia, Belgrade will not let Kosovo secede without being asked. If the Serbian people lose faith in the current government and its promising leaders for the latter’s inability to keep what it believes belongs to Serbia, chances are that another right wing movement will be given credit to do so. This is a valid possibility, due to the division in Belgrade’s political life over Kosovo and other burning social and economic issues. We have already experi enced what a dictator and extreme nationalist can do to the region, and, with the pending issue of Montenegro’s possible secession in the background, Belgrade’s current government has a lot to lose in the eyes of the Serb people. 124 Kosovo is unlikely to gain full independence in the near future, for neither the international community nor Belgrade will allow it to do so. Kosovar Albanians are deeply mistaken if they assume they can neglect Belgrade and a country to which they belong according to the internationally accepted Kosovo agreement. The agreement might be changed, but, if the aim is to avoid another armed conflict, not without the involvement of the Belgrade government.
MONTENEGRO
Montenegro, although not encouraged by the international com munity to secede from Yugoslavia, will most probably put out a refer endum on the issue. Its population does not number even close to a million inhabitants, and its biggest income derives from tourism with a negligible industrial and agricultural capacity. Should it decide to become independent, Montenegro could easily become another coun try desperately seeking additional foreign aid, which the international community is more and more unwilling to give to the Balkans. Al though Montenegro is valued by Serbia for its access to the Adriatic and because it is the last piece of what’s left of Yugoslavia, it most probably will not have to worry about a Serb intervention if it does decide to secede. The population, however, as well as the government, is very divided regarding the issue of secession. If a referendum were held today, almost the same number of Montenegrins would vote in favour of secession as the number electing to stay in the federation. Experts estimate that the ratio would be about 40 percent of voters pro secession to 40 percent against. The current Belgrade government will not take a chance in preventing Montenegro’s secession by force and will probably let it go, being unwilling to risk losing its hard earned international reputation and prestige. At the same time, inside Montenegro, if the country does decide to secede, the actions of the anti secessionist opposition will be unpredictable. Djukanović does not enjoy the support of the army, and this can be dangerous, even though the 15,000 Yugoslav troops stationed in Montenegro would more than likely be called back by Belgrade or told not to interfere in events. This, however, is hard to foretell based on what we ex perienced with the JNA in Bosnia. The possible actions of anti Djukanović leaders in the Yugoslav Army or in the Montenegrin police forces in the case of an internal dispute over Montenegro’s future are hard to predict, but should be considered as hostile towards the current government in power. Contrary to other multiethnic states, Montenegro’s minorities can be considered negligible in influencing the outcome of the referendum. The Albanian and Muslim Bosnian minorities that constitute about ten percent of Montenegro’s population do not really 125 play a significant role in any case, although they are eager to support the separation of Montenegro. For them, Montenegro’s independence would probably signify a chance to demand more rights, as they would become a “bigger” minority, percentage wise, in a separate Montenegrin state. The Montenegrin Albanian minority out of this ten percent is so small that it would not be a concern to an independent Montenegrin government, and its voice would be negligible even if it would wish to join Kosovo or Albania in the future. Although it is hard to tell whether Montenegro will decide to secede or not, it is almost certain that Montenegro’s separation from Yugoslavia would probably not cause such an intolerable situation as to prompt Belgrade’s involvement. Belgrade will not use force to make Montenegro remain, but its internal division over this and the Kosovo question should not be overlooked. The real problem might come from inside Montenegro itself. If the opposition leaders with support from the Yugoslav Army try to take control over the Djukan ović government, potential clashes between the equally divided pro and contra Djukanović elements could lead to an insurgency. From there, if not dealt with in time, the situation could swiftly deteriorate, with civil war remaining only a stone’s throw away. In such a case, Belgrade’s intervention would be more than likely to restore order and stability within its borders, but the extent to which it would be able to do so without external help is questionable.
MACEDONIA
As mentioned earlier, although an end was put to the conflict in Kosovo and to the atrocities against Kosovar Albanians, controlling the flow of weapons and the KLA in the province proved to be a more difficult task faced NATO peacekeepers. This ultimately led to the spread of violence over the Macedonian border, where leaders of the remnants of the disbanded KLA formed a guerrilla movement and established the so called National Liberation Army (NLA), with the aim of gaining more political and social rights for the Macedonian Albanian minorities. As a result of this, Macedonia, which had managed to somewhat stabilise its fragile independence after seceding from the former Yugoslavia in 1991, found itself on the brink of an ethnic disaster and officially asked NATO for help, in return for the full support it had provided to NATO during the Kosovo conflict. After six months of negotiations and continuous fighting in the northern part of Macedonia, the Macedonian government finally agreed to a Western brokered peace agreement adopted in September 2001 to prevent escalation of the growing ethnic conflict. The agreement requires ethnic Albanian rebels of the NLA to put down and hand over their weapons to NATO’s international peacekeepers in 126 three phases, while the Macedonian government has to amend the country’s constitution to give ethnic Albanians greater rights. Despite NATO’s successful arms collection operation, Skopje seems to be delaying the amendment, which is not well tolerated by the international community. This hesitation has already resulted in Macedonian troops not being allowed to move into and occupy areas currently under NLA control and the postponement of the planned meeting of the EU’s aid summit, which had promised Macedonia foreign aid if the constitutional changes agree upon were made. Although the Macedonian government agrees with the need to change its institutions, indications suggest that the majority of Macedonians are strongly against the idea of giving Albanians greater rights, which puts the newly elected government in a difficult situa tion. The most prominent problem is that the Macedonians do not consider Albanians first class citizens and, therefore, do not want to give them citizenship status equal to the Macedonians’. Instead, they wish to keep them as an Albanian minority. International attention and the presence of international troops are now strong enough to make both sides comply with the regulations of the agreement. Therefore, if the Macedonian government keeps its promise, it is likely that Macedonia can find relative peace to focus on its long term goal of integrating with the EU and the West. No one can positively assure Skopje, however, that remnants of the NLA will not be left behind with caches of hidden weaponry and the postponed dream of a “Greater Albania”, waiting for another opportunity to back up another ethnic Albanian movement after its members have gained more rights to influence internal matters. Although ethnic tension remains high in Macedonia, a peaceful solution is more likely than a renewed conflict, especially if Skopje keeps its word in front of many watchful international eyes.
ALBANIA
Albania is perhaps the poorest country in Europe. After the disastrous outrage and anarchy ignited by the scandalous pyramid investment crisis of the Berisha government in 1997, Albania became a place where robbery, kidnapping, and other criminal activities were left totally unpunished. The Berisha government lost control of the country and a significant part of its population fled to neighbouring Greece and Italy. Today’s Albanian government is not in an easy situation either. Although it is heading in the right direction, towards integration with the West, the country still has a very long way to go. The GDP per capita is the lowest in Europe, and the unemployment rate is very high. Except for the somewhat improved domestic security, the 127 situation today is not considerably better than it was before NATO’s deployment to Kosovo. There is still massive corruption in government agencies. The judicial system is weak. The poor infrastructure together with the lack of adequate transportation and telecommunications continue to be major drawbacks, and on top of all this, bribery and bureaucracy make most initiatives unsuccessful. All these are obstacles to economic development and cause unwillingness among other countries to risk making the investments that Albania desperately needs. NATO used Albania as its primary staging base for the Kosovo operation and undeniably brought some stability into the country. Hoping to benefit from siding with the Western powers, Albania immediately agreed to put itself at NATO’s disposal, thus creating a longer international presence in the country to help stabilise the domestic incoherence. Many Albanians are still hesitant to believe in any government promises and South Eastern Europe their safety and protection guaranteed only by NATO troops and the international police forces in country. That is why Albania wants so much for NATO and other international organisations, such as the OSCE, to remain for the long term. Albania is also a participant in NATO’s Membership Action Plan and seeks a strong economic development programme. Given its geopolitical position in the Balkans, Albania could play a significant role in the region’s stabilisation process, or it could serve as a source of further instability in neighbouring Macedonia, Greece, and Montenegro. Since January 2001, when diplomatic ties were restored between Albania and the FRY, Albania has stepped back – at least officially – from its “national question” kind of attitude, which, of course, was not welcomed within the Kosovar Albanian community. This move showed them that Tirana was moving away from the nationalistic idea of a “Greater Albania”. This is understandable. The Albanian government has been desperately trying to convince the international community that Albania does not seek territorial changes in its close proximity. Having realized that the future of the country depends on foreign assistance and aid, Tirana cannot afford to jeopardize its international relations and all that it has achieved since the Kosovo campaign began. This is a pivotal point in Albania’s history. Now is the time when Albania can either grow closer to the rest of Europe, or slide back to the bottom of the barrel to become one of the most unstable pieces in the Balkans’ domino theory, with which we are all so familiar. That is why it is so important for Tirana to convince the international commu nity that it is not pursuing the policy of “Albanisation”. As is the case for all Balkan countries, integration into the family of western demo cracies is of critical importance for Albania’s future survival. Know ing that it will definitely take years until the country can step through NATO’s “open door”, Tirana still needs not only economic aid and an 128 international presence, but also massive support to fight widespread organised crime and corruption, which are only two of the main obstacles in the path towards its integration into the EU. Albania is opening up to the West the most it can, and it will probably not risk worsening relations with neighbouring Macedonia, Montenegro and Greece, which would be looked upon negatively by the international community. The Greek minority living in Albania is another issue of Albanian’s internal stability to which Greece pays particular attention. Greece is very much concerned about the future of ethnic Greeks in Albania, and will become even more so should the independence of Kosovo become a possibility. Albania will not turn its back on its “brother country” despite all its efforts to hide its high hopes for the independence of Kosovar Albanians. So, if for instance Kosovo gained independence and asked Albania to let it join it in a federation, Albania would probably say yes to what the Kosovars would vote for in a referendum. This would mean that the already mistreated minor ities in Albania would likely lose even more significance, as they would become an even smaller minority within a larger Albanian country. This, of course, would be unacceptable to Greece, even if Macedonia’s territorial integrity remained untouched. A conflict bet ween Greece and Albania could trigger another wave of heightened interethnic tension in the region with now the Macedonian Albanians wanting to support their “brothers”. Albanians would fear that Greece would use the situation to strengthen what they term the “Hellenisa tion” process in southern Albania, that is, encouraging ethnic Greeks to stand their ground against possible threats of “Albanisation”. To avoid such events Tirana would probably try to put the ethnic Greek minority in control to tighten security in the south, which the Greek minority in turn would consider a further restraint and denial of their minority rights. This would worsen the situation, and if Greece stepped into a conflict with Albania, it would almost be sure that Turkey would not let the opportunity pass to raise concerns against Greece. This is certainly what NATO would not want to South Eastern Europe happen. Building better relations with Greece would, therefore, be sug gested, but this does not seem to be an easy issue, especially after the scandalous local elections held in the past few years in the ethnic Greek districts of Albania, where Albanians claimed that Greece tried to use the ethnic Greek minority for “Hellenisation” purposes, while ethnic Greeks protested against Albanian attempts to take away minority lands and to force ethnic Greeks to become Albanians. However, as a member of the EU, Greece could be of great help to its neighbours on their path towards European integration. Escalating eth nic tensions in Albania, moreover, could easily threaten not only Greece but also Macedonia and Bulgaria, and these Orthodox coun 129 tries could be dragged into a Muslim Orthodox rivalry. Bulgaria already offered help to Macedonia during its fight against the NLA and would be expected to help again to smooth its relations with Skopje. The issue of “Albanisation”, therefore, has to be carefully kept in a low profile, in order to reassure other states that their ter ritorial integrity, along with the human rights of their ethnic minori ties, will not be threatened by ethnicity or religion based disputes. Therefore, to keep its fragile reputation in international circles, Albania will have to reassure its neighbours and the international community that it will not seek territorial changes at the expense of other multiethnic states in its geographical proximity. The coming years will most probably witness Albania’s increasing cooperation with the West in order for the Albanian government to be able to se cure the country’s integration with Europe. Given Albania’s potential for serving as a stabilising or destabilising force in the region, the international community will pay close attention to the country. It will probably invest a good deal of effort into Albania in order to create a more instrumental tool in the hands of Western policy makers for sav ing the Balkans. For the next decade, therefore, the international community should make sure that Albania is not left alone to drift from its current path of democratisation. With all the support and prospects promised to Tirana in return for its full contribution towards assisting NATO and the international community in solving the Kosovo crisis, the West now has to be careful about when and how it is going to keep its promises, because if left without hope, the Albanian sparks of hopelessness could once again ignite a firestorm in the Balkans.
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
Although the Dayton Agreement put an end to the killings and open violence in Bosnia and Herzegovina, it has not solved the problem of advancing the country’s transition from the socialism it inherited to a functioning democracy, which has caused major institutional instability. Bosnia is still divided and plagued by internal difficulties generated by ethnic self awareness and pride. Last year’s Bosnian Croat attempt to declare independence from the federation was short lived but again raised the issue of interethnic unsociability. This is especially true in the Herzegovina region, where Croats have always been hardliners when it has come to living together with the Bosnians. We have to face facts: living together in a federation with former opponents is still a forced and undesired option in the eyes of many Herzegovina Croats. The creation of a mono ethnic state of Herzeg Bosna is still on the hidden agenda of nationalist Croats.
130 Besides the Croat Bosnian Serb problem in the south, the Serbs in the north have their own agenda, since Dayton put a border between them and Yugoslavia. Now that in their eyes Brčko is considered lost, the Serbs feel even more isolated with their republic cut into two piec es by the Brčko corridor. While the question of Kosovo would not really concern the Bosnians, the Croats and Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina, on the other hand, would be more than excited to hear about Kosovo’s independence. This is not to imply that they are supporting Kosovo’s secession from Yugoslavia, for this really means nothing to them. If Kosovo gained independence, however, it would set a precedent for the Bosnian Serbs and possibly to the Herzegovina Croats, possibly resulting in attempts to secede from Bosnia and Herzegovina and ultimately seek unification with “mother” Serbia and Croatia. If Kosovo gets what it wants in a short period of time, this issue would definitely be raised and would not be easy to handle within Bosnia and Herzegovina. If the Republika Srpska declared independence from Bosnia, the Herzegovina Croats, who would see a “now or never” chance to secede, would not be afraid to raise hell to achieve their goal. The popularity of the Croat HDZ has increased over the past twelve months, which is indicative of the dissatisfaction and the determination of the Herzegovina Croats. These events would easily lead to the quick collapse of the artificial state of Bosnia and Herzegovina, despite it being closely monitored and considered relatively stable. SFOR, holding the country together and still dominated by the US, would possibly not be able to decisively react to two insurgencies of this scale. In addition, now that America is already waging a war against international terrorism, using the bulk of its military will to destroy terrorist armies in the world, and considering that the new administration has thus far been less enthusiastic about stationing troops in the Balkans than the previous one, it is also conceivable that the US may withdraw its military forces from Bosnia if so dictated by its internal situation and national security, thus leaving the Europeans to finally garden and tidy up their backyard alone. With regard to the military, the components of the Federation Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina (ABiH) are not as cohesive as the international community imagined. With extensive external pressure from the international community and after numerous sackings of military leaders, the Federation Army, though functioning (its members even sport a common shoulder badge), is still far from being united in the hearts and minds of its members. Who can say for sure that an internal conflict described above would not make these components split and start fighting to complete what they could not finish six years ago? The same lack of cohesion can be used to describe the most prom inent players of Bosnia’s daily political life as well. While the political leaders of the divided ethnic groups have to play by the rules imposed 131 on them by the international community, they also have to meet the expectations of their own electors, the people of their cantons, regions, and country. These at times nationalistic demands, however, do not always correspond with the intentions of the international community and, therefore, put political leaders in the crossfire of conflicting re sponsibilities. As a result, leaders from all sides have been buying themselves time to stay in office and hold on to the accompanying fringe benefits. They have been spending foreign money on so called “reconstruction and development programmes” for long enough to make donor countries more and more reluctant to help a country that shows no great results. As a matter of fact, so much aid has fallen pray to criminal misuse or gotten “lost” in the labyrinths of bureaucracy that many donor countries are considering cutting their support if visible results are not achieved soon. Furthermore, although Bosnia’s administration is returning to local control, and the country is con sidered more stable than it was several years ago, a strong inter national presence will be needed for at least the next decade, both administratively and militarily.
THE COMMON ENEMY: ORGANISED CRIME
Capitalising on the opportunity provided by the Balkan wars in the 1990s, new organised crime groups were born, and already exist ing ones managed to grow bigger, strengthening themselves and estab lishing complex and rather sophisticated networks. Due to the lack of law enforcement and legal administration throughout the Balkan states, crime, corruption, money laundering and weapons smuggling became integral parts of the daily life of the societies here. This has had a profound effect on the region by slowing down economic, tech nological, social, and political developments. Despite the billions of dollars the international community has poured into Bosnia, Kosovo, Albania, and the FYROM since late 1995, only moderate results can be shown in terms of economic reconstruction, returning refugees, and fighting corruption. Many of the Balkan countries are still deeply involved in black marketeering and smuggling weapons and drugs, with regional criminal organisations and local mafias the main beneficiaries of the flourishing illegal interstate businesses. While black marketers and organised crime groups are establishing stronger and more and more influential relations with individuals in political decision making positions, the international community is trying to find ways of financing Balkan reconstruction efforts so that countries of the region such as Albania can be stable enough to take socio political matters into their own hands. Corruption is still a significant motivating force in most of the Balkan states. Although the year 2000 brought some undeniable changes to the Balkans, the region has 132 become the graveyard for many stabilisation initiatives and plans and the bottomless pit for billions of dollars in foreign aid. South Eastern Europe is one of the cradles of Europe’s problems with organised crime, terrorism, illegal immigration, smuggling and drug trafficking, corruption, money laundering and proliferation of small weapons. It is therefore critical for the future of both Europe and the Balkans to make fighting international organised crime a primary goal. Most of these activities require a specific social, economic, cultural and psychological context in order to proliferate. Unfortunately, the Balkans has proved to be a perfect environment to foster criminal organisations and activities. The current governments of the Balkan countries, however, are willing to cooperate with their Western European counterparts in fighting corruption and organised crime, which in the long run will serve to promote the building of internal stability and trust in their judicial systems. This is where the Stability Pact’s South Eastern Europe Regional Table will be instrumental, with its Working Table focusing on fighting corruption and crime and dealing with issues such as borders, customs and environmental protection. In all these activities the Working Table will work in partnership with all related international institutions, thus enhancing the economic development of the region in the forthcoming years. This means that the governments of the Balkan states will have to re evaluate their domestic efforts in the field of crime prevention and will ultimately have to rid their administrations of corrupt elements. This process, however, cannot be expected to be finished in the next decade, and will almost certainly require a generation or two to be fully successful.
THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND THE BALKANS
While working tables are working out the details of economic and social issues and matters pertaining to democratisation, human rights, and regional security, the countries of the South Eastern Europe re gion are all competitively striving to join Western institutions such as the EU and NATO and are looking forward to integrating with Eu rope. The responsibility of the international community in this process is tremendous. Many Balkan governments gave their full support to the West during the Balkan conflicts, sometimes taking dangerous political heat from the opposition and risking the loss of public support for decisions NATO or the UN asked them to make for the sake of “fruitful future cooperation”. In return for these favours, they have been promised to be rewarded by inclusion in the list of aspirants for membership to NATO or the EU if they become sufficiently economically and internally viable to be admitted to these institutions. 133 The trick to this is that the EU and NATO are not overly eager to hastily accept most of the Balkan countries among their ranks in the near future. On the other hand, the governments of aspirant countries such as Romania, Bulgaria, the FRY, Albania and Macedonia, to mention only a few, do not want to get behind any of their neighbours in the competition for integration. They are concerned that the more they cooperate with their neighbours in the region, the less Europe will view them as countries that need to be integrated into the EU or NATO for stabilisation purposes. The international community is going to be in a difficult situation in trying to placate those governments passed over in the next round of NATO’s expansion or for accession to the EU. There is a great deal of jealousy among the rival aspirants, and this should not be over looked in negotiations with these countries. The catch here can be lack of patience, which could endanger fragile democratic governments. Irredentist movements and public support in countries not being selected for integration in the near future. This can easily be accelerated by any tension that could heat up in the region for reasons discussed in the aforementioned paragraphs. Therefore, the international community will have to be extremely careful regarding which of its promises it will keep and how it will convince governments of countries not chosen to be part of the European family of democratic states in the next decade to wait until the West is ready to open its gates again. As it was emphasised earlier in this paper, until Kosovo’s stability is guaranteed, KFOR and its UN, NATO and EU counterparts will continue to be necessary bastions of security and stability in the region. The international community will have to maintain constructive cooperation among the countries within the region while reassuring less developed Balkan states that, although in the near future they will not be accepted into the EU or NATO, they are not going to be forgotten. This requires a selection process that is based on impartiality in judging performance. Jealousy, however, will continue to be a destructive factor in building good neighbourly relations and desired cooperation in the Balkans. Eventually, Europe will have to open up more and more to the Balkans, accepting the region’s most developed and cooperating countries as full members of the European community. Patience is not free in the Balkans, and the leaders of the Balkan states know this well. So, to make sure Europe will not have to face another Balkan collapse, the international community in the meantime will probably continue to pay not only attention but also hard currency to ease tensions in those countries with the potential for renewed instab ilities. Although this is not a desirable option, it will most likely continue in the Balkans until corruption is dramatically pushed back, and the political elite of the Balkan states is carefully filtered. This along with many other burning issues has to be solved to promote stability in the region. In the meantime, we should not forget that although the 134 dominos of the Balkans are standing in a different order now, if one of them falls, it would still be an exceedingly difficult task to remove any one of them and to prevent the whole set from going down.
CONCLUSION
This paper has discussed pending issues of stability regarding the most unstable countries of the Balkan Peninsula, as well as the possibilities for Kosovo’s short term future and how those options would affect regional stability. Based on the issues discussed in this paper, the conclusion is that the Balkan states have four major areas to focus on to foster their internal and external stability. These are: economic development, education, fighting organised crime, and cornering corruption. Economic development is instrumental in creating job opportunities, thus offering the public not only the prospect of social betterment, but also the chance to divert attention from the past to what lays ahead: a new life to build and live. This is of vital importance from the psychological side of the matter alone. States and citizens of a reasonably wealthy and stable society do not seek conflicts that should potentially endanger their hard earned welfare, while people and leaders of countries or ethnic groups living in bitter poverty and social uncertainty will go to extremes if there is nothing else left for them to hang on to. This, of course, is not the single and only factor that could cause civil unrest, but undoubtedly it is one of the major factors that could play a significant role in the development of possible insurgencies. In addition, economic development, as was already mentioned earlier, is also necessary for the Balkan states to be convincing candidates for EU and NATO membership, this being one of the main goals of the majority of the states in question in the region. Speaking of the psychological side of creating democratic and stable states in the Balkans brings us to the area of education, which is vital to the rising new generations capable of advancing and over coming the problems of the past. Education refers to both the public and the political elite. Creating increased educational opportunities for the general public would ensure that young people would be able to remain in their respective countries to study and would later become valuable assets of their society, thus decreasing the loss of their pre cious human resources. On the other side, educating the political elite would ensure communication and common understanding of well defined goals that could lead to the integration of the Balkan states into the family of democratic states of Europe. Without communica tion established between the leaderships of the Balkan countries, there is little chance of avoiding misunderstandings and overcoming the
135 distrust that has developed over the last decade. Only if the political elites of the Balkan states learn how to communicate with one another will it be possible to set and achieve common goals for the stability of the region as a whole. The last two areas are closely related, and therefore they should be discussed together. Fighting organised crime is a problem that cannot be solved solely by individual states, for it has grown international in scope and does not respect borders. This issue will not only require regional cooperation to be tackled, but also a new way of thinking from political elites. This is why it is so important to take steps to put an end to corruption within internal circles of the political elite. Until ties between corrupt elements of national governments and the different organised crime groups are cut and these corrupt elements removed, these groups will continue to have support and be able to legitimise or covertly carry out their operations. Regional cooperation is therefore needed to successfully combat these organisations. An example of such cooperation could be, for instance, the establishment of a joint intelligence cell, which would use shared information on the operations of criminal groups to help participating governments find ways to engage organised crime on their own soils. Another form of cooperation could be joint training exercises and the operation of border guard troops along common borders between neighbouring states. This is where the education of political leaders could be key to building trust and mutual respect, because the govern mental bodies, such as the armed forces or the police forces, are to be directed by the political elite. In the absence of political will, however, such cross border operations will simply be impossible to conduct, thus leaving organised crime groups flourishing and untouched. One can South Eastern Europe that all of these areas could signi ficantly influence the development of each and every one of the Balkan countries. Ho wever, it is also clear that none of these areas could possibly have a positive influence on the region itself unless they are part of a concept of regional cooperation. The Balkan states have a tremendous challenge ahead, which, depending on their ability to work together, can be translated into the prosperity or, yet again, the downfall of the troubled region. The future of the Balkan states and their stability will heavily rely on the successful teamwork of all nations of the peninsula involved in dealing with the aforementioned political, military, social, and economic issues.
136 Germany’s Policy towards South Eastern Europe Joachim Krause Institute of Political Science, University of Kiel, Germany
INTRODUCTION
The policy of the Federal Republic of Germany towards South Eastern Europe is by and large in line with her general foreign policy orientation, which can be characterised as an attempt to deviate from a traditional interest oriented approach to one in which structural elements of the regional order of Europe are the most important. This has to be seen against the background of Germany’s past in the first part of the 20th Century and the positive developments West Germany has made since the late 1940s. The general foreign political orientation of Germany can be summarised as follows: Germany’s current overall security situation is being conceived of as being better and more advantageous than ever in her history. Today, Germany is not surrounded by enemies but by friends. Ger many is a crucial part of an international order that is based on free trade, mutual independence, open borders, international institutions, cooperative security and multilateralism, with liberal democracy and the welfare state as the basic building blocs of national governance. This model of international/regional order, which was brought to Europe after WW II by the US, has proven to be a palpable one and definitely more appropriate for Germany than the old balance of power model. Among the major European powers Germany today is the greatest supporter of maintaining and adopting the existing cooperative international order and of extending it to other regions, especially to Eastern Central Europe and South Eastern Europe. An important element of Germany’s foreign policy approach is the preference for economic and multilateral instruments and the relative decline of military instruments. It is also characterised by a preference for non zero sum game solutions, i.e. the belief that it is always better to organise international order in a way that the interests of all participants are somehow taken into account.
137 There is a growing consensus within Germany that as long as Germany together with the United States, France and other important European states pursues such a multilateral, cooperative strategy, the overall strategic environment of Germany will remain stable and that this interest will be shared by others too. As regards the Balkans, the German interest here is characterised by the overarching concern for stability in South Eastern Europe as part of pan European stability. In this regard, stability is regarded as important, since otherwise: • Instability will have direct consequences for Germany, such as refugee flows, criminalisation of societies, economic back lashes; • The overall repercussions from instability on the Balkans could have consequences for the rest of Europe, in particular Eastern Europe. The general approach of Germany towards developments in the Balkans has also been shaped by historical experience during the past ten years. Since the beginning of the civil war in former Yugoslavia in the summer of 1991, the inadequate responses of the international community towards aggression, ethnic cleansing and various atrocities have been a subject of concern in Germany. The general understand ing is that timely and determined action could have prevented violence from spreading almost uninhibited during the years after 1991. In the words of Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer: In Bosnia the international community acted much too late and much too timidly. By intervening in Kosovo we were able to prevent Milošević from reaching his goal of displacing an entire population and pushing the region even deeper into the abyss. However, for the hun dreds of thousands of people who were expelled, killed, tortured or raped, help once again came too late. The most important lesson from the Kosovo war must therefore be to react not when it is too late but to act preventively, making a comprehensive, massive and sustained effort in order to finally break the vicious circle of violence, oppression and instability once and for all... 1 Hence, the main thrust of Germany’s policy towards the Balkans lies with what is termed preventive diplomacy. Former UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali once described preventive diplomacy as “the use of diplomatic techniques in order to: 1) prevent disputes from arising; 2) prevent them from escalating into armed conflicts if they do arise; and 3), if that fails, to prevent the armed conflict from
———— 1 Policy Statement on the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, delivered by Mr. Joschka Fischer, Federal Minister of Foreign Affairs, in Berlin on 27 January, 2000, www.auswaertiges amt.de . 138 spreading”. 2 This triad seems to guide German policy on the Balkans, whereby most emphasis is laid on what is often dubbed structural conflict prevention. By this term it is meant that conflicts are to be prevented at a very early stage by working on the sources of the conflict such as lack of democracy, disrespect for human rights, lack of rights of minorities, lack of freedom of the press and economic backwardness. Structural conflict prevention also encompasses post conflict reconstruction efforts. In this regard, the federal government is pursuing several mea sures to stabilise South Eastern Europe: 1. Promotion of democratisation and support for democratically legitimate governments; 2. Support for the creation of open and pluralistic civil societies; 3. Promotion of human rights and the rights of minorities; 4. Fostering of free and independent media; 5. Support for the development of market economy structures and economic prosperity; 6. Improvement of cross border cooperation; 7. Strengthening of cooperative security structures; 8. Combating of organised crime and corruption; and 9. Creation of conditions for the return of refugees. 3 The main instruments for implementing this policy are the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe as well as coordinated efforts within the European Union, the Organization for Security and Cooper ation in Europe (OSCE), and NATO. The Stability Pact was launched in June 1999 and it comprises three “tables”, in which projects and reforms are drawn up, presented, discussed and coordinated. Table I deals with democratisation and human rights issues, table II with economic reconstruction, development and cooperation, and table III with security issues, defence, justice and home affairs. It is a new diplomatic instrument that goes beyond traditional financial and technical assistance. The Stability Pact’s aim is to mobilise the social forces themselves within the states concerned. The countries of the region are not considered to be simply the recipients of technical and financial aid; they have to commit themselves to implementing necessary reforms. Hence, the Stability Pact is thought to promote a gradual change of mentality and consciousness throughout the region. This should be achieved through the promotion of cross border cooperation or of projects in the political, legal, social or economic spheres whose effects will be felt by the population in the countries ———— 2 Boutros Boutros Ghali, “Challenges of Preventive Diplomacy”, in: Kelvin M. Cahill (ed.): Preventive Diplomacy. Stopping Wars before they Start (New York: Harper Collins, Basic Books, 1996), pp.16 32 (p. 18). 3 South Eastern Europe The Stability Pact and German Policy on South Eastern Europe , www.auswaertiges amt.de. 139 concerned. The majority of projects funded under the Stability Pact were not confined to one country only. So far the German government has been ready to invest in the future of the Stability Pact. It has earmarked special funds equalling EUR 600 million over four years (EUR 150 million each year from 2000 to 2003) for the Stability Pact. The German government has also spent an additional EUR 50 million in the framework of bilateral dev elopment cooperation with the countries in the region, and has granted Montenegro a general purpose loan of EUR 20 million. The German government has tried to confine its activities mainly to civilian means and to financial and economic assistance. However, where it was necessary to take part in international interventions aimed at conflict management, peacemaking or even peace enforce ment, it has participated and is aiming at a greater military role in the face of the likely withdrawal of US forces from the Balkans in re sponse to the new terrorist threat.
KEY ISSUES OF REGIONAL STABILITY From a German perspective, the Balkans are harbouring an impressive set of key issues that need to be addressed in the coming years if the overall preventive approach is to be successful. Among the most important ones are the political and economic transformation of Yugoslavia and Croatia, the successful implementation of the Dayton Agreement on Bosnia and Herzegovina, the stabilisation of the situa tion in Kosovo, the prevention of a full scale civil war in Macedonia, the search for a political formula to reconcile the Slavic majority and the Albanian minority, and the search for political stability in Albania. Each of these tasks is fraught with huge problems and difficulties to overcome. However, there is a growing sense in Germany that it is imperative to address these challenges head on; otherwise the con sequences of failure to stabilise the Balkans will extend widely into the rest of Europe and might lead to further destabilisation of the whole continent.
The Economic and Political Transformation of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) The successful transformation of Yugoslavia, in particular of Serbia, is the most crucial issue and remains a major point of concern for Germany. Yugoslavia, in particular Serbia under Slobodan Milošević, was the main – but not the only – troublemaker in the Balkans for more than a decade and the most important stumbling bloc for peace negotiations. The political change that took place in late 2000 in Yugoslavia and Serbia is hence conceived of as a strategic opportunity. With democratic forces in power both on the federal level 140 and on the regional level of Serbia and Montenegro, there is hope that both will become cooperative partners and a source of stability. However, this would presuppose that the unity among the different parties forming the current governments’ coalitions will not dissipate and that their policy of cooperation with the West will not lead to frustration. It is crucial that the reforms and the aid received from the Western world – in particular the European Union – are felt by the population and that they lead to some kind of palpable relief. Serbs must feel for themselves that it pays off to cooperate with the EU and NATO rather than to try to defy the Western alliance militarily. Therefore, for the current German government, the continuous support for the federal government as well as for the democratically elected governments of Serbia and Montenegro is a high priority. If the transition towards democracy and a market economy fail in Serbia, this will most likely spell the end of all attempts to stabilise the Balkans for a considerable time. The wish of the government of Montenegro to separate from Yugoslavia is a rather disturbing factor in that regard. Without want ing to deny Montenegro the right of self determination, the German government – as well as a vast majority of Parliament – is not entirely enthusiastic about the idea of creating another small state like entity without a solid economic and civil society basis. It is, therefore, en couraging any steps of reconciliation between Serbia and Montenegro and supporting any measure that would keep the Yugoslav Federation intact. The main instruments to further the democratic and economic transition of Yugoslavia are the Stability Pact as well as individual contributions given as part of the donors conferences’ grants and cred its.
The Economic and Political Transformation of Croatia Croatia is a potential troublemaker in the region as well, and was already very hard to handle during the tenure of late President Tudjman and his nationalist party (HZDB). The German government strongly supported the democratic change following Tudjman’s death in late 1999 and has since been involved in many efforts to foster the transition of Croatia as part of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe.
Implementing the Dayton Peace Accord for Bosnia and Herzegovina Germany has been supportive of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina from December 141 1995 and has been active both within the Peace Implementation Council as well as in the Office of the High Representative. It has devoted substantial contributions as part of bilateral and multilateral projects and is – through the EU – among the major donors. It also has played a significant role in urging other governments to contribute to the implementation of the Dayton Accord. German soldiers have been part of IFOR and then SFOR; cur rently around 2,100 soldiers are doing their service in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In addition, a contingent of 160 German police officers is part of the international police mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina. There are also major efforts in the field of humanitarian assis tance, such as delivery of heating materials, food and clothing and provision of transport service. In the year 2000 alone, EUR 4.8 million was spent for this, divided among the Croat Bosnian Federation and the Republika Srpska. Humanitarian assistance was carried out in cooperation with international governmental and non governmental organisations. Another EUR 3 million was spent in 2000 for emer gency assistance in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Bosnia and Herzegovina will remain very high on the agenda of German policy in the Balkans. Without a peaceful and successful transition of this conflict ridden area, there will not be a democratic and economic transition for the entire Balkans.
Creating Peace and Stability in Kosovo The most difficult current problem is how to find a lasting solu tion to the Kosovo problem and how to overcome the manifold problems bedevilling that province for the time being. In the German government’s view, the Kosovo problem cannot be viewed in isolation from other security related issues of the region. The situation regard ing the regional Preševo refugee movements is a case in point. A possible escalation could trigger new ones (following Kosovo and Macedonia). Although UNMIK and KFOR have the situation in Kosovo under control, destabilising effects on the neighbouring states cannot be discounted in the Balkans. Rather, any solution to the Kosovo conflict must find acceptance with Kosovo's neighbours. Hence, the German government has demanded the involvement of Macedonia, Bulgaria, Romania, Albania, Croatia, Bosnia and Montenegro, as well as of the democratic forces in Serbia, in the dialogue on the development of Kosovo. The main contributions of Germany take place within the frame work of UNMIK and KFOR as well as within the Stability Pact. There is currently a huge international presence operating in Kosovo coor dinated by UNMIK and KFOR, which is responsible for joint peace implementation. Within UNMIK a certain division of labour has been
142 agreed upon, and in each of these areas Germany tries to play an ac tive role. There is a major effort towards establishing a civil administration. This effort is led by the United Nations with a German national serv ing as special representative of the UN for establishing a civil admin istration. Germany continues to be strongly involved in helping to set up a Kosovo police and administrative and judicial structures. It has made available the second largest police contingent (after the USA) and has provided six judges and public prosecutors for the development of the justice system. There are various activities in the field of humanitarian assistance and return of refugees that are being led by the UNHCR. Here the German government has rendered material assistance. The OSCE is tasked with democratic development and protection of human rights, and here, too, Germany is rendering massive assistance. The German government has actively provided help for the media in order to ensure media plurality and freedom of the press and of opinion as vital components of democratic development. It has also contributed personnel for UNMIK and funding (EUR 1.5 million for registration, and special training courses in Germany) for the preparation of the registration of the population and the subsequent elections beginning in autumn 2000. The EU has taken the lead in organizing the economic recon struction of Kosovo. Here too, Germany has played an active role. It cooperates with the EU Reconstruction Agency and has carried out bilateral reconstruction projects, primarily in the fields of energy, water, transport, the environment, business promotion and social programmes. The German government, through its contributions to the EU and to the World Bank, is financing a major part of the multilateral reconstruction and rehabilitation programmes for Kosovo. UNMIK's tasks as specified in Security Council Resolution 1244 are: support for the development of substantial autonomy and self administration; provision of basic administrative functions; promotion of a political process to create the framework for a just and lasting peaceful resolution of the Kosovo issue; support for the reconstruction of key infrastructure as well as social institutions and disaster relief; maintenance of law and order; guarantee of the safe and unimpeded return of all refugees and internally displaced persons. Germany made an essential contribution (financial and personnel) towards making possible the rapid establishment of UNMIK. Germany has contributed substantially to the UNMIK budget.
143 Germans are represented in all key areas and in various leading positions within the UN administration. In order to coordinate Germany's contributions to peace implementation on the spot, the German Foreign Office established a civil coordination office in Priština (with an office in Prizren). This serves as a point of contact for matters relating to civil implementation and maintains political contacts locally, particularly with UNMIK. The German coordinator works closely with the offices of the implementing organisations (GTZ, KfW, DEG), which the German Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development has opened in both towns to coordinate, prepare and implement reconstruction measures. Germany has also been strongly involved in the military implementation of the accords since June 1999. For six months it provided the commander of KFOR. Germany is the lead nation responsible for the southern sector of Kosovo. With a total of roughly 4,900 soldiers, Germany provides one of the largest contingents for KFOR, in second place alongside Italy and behind the US. Germany is one of the nations that has to date kept all its promises, has not made any unilateral reductions and has only a very few, legally based reservations regarding the tactical deployment of its troops. It has fully participated in most of KFOR’s activities, such as: monitoring compliance with the withdrawal agreement with the Yugoslav forces; monitoring the internal borders with the republics of Serbia and Montenegro as well as the external borders with Albania and Macedonia; monitoring the activities of the Kosovo Protection Corps; enforcing air sovereignty over Kosovo; protecting minorities and returnees; ensuring its own freedom of movement; contributing to the rehabilitation of the infrastructure; and supporting UNMIK.
Containing the Civil War in Macedonia and Preventing the Outbreak of Further Hostilities For a long period, Macedonia was not in the centre of German activities. Now it has gained importance after the outbreak of a limited civil war in 2001, which seems for the time to have been contained by the international diplomatic efforts of both the US and the EU, which was supported by NATO’s organisation of Operation Essential Harvest in fall 2001.
144 After having solved its problem of international recognition, Macedonia’s main problem is how to find a modus vivendi enabling the various ethnic groups to live together, taking due account both of the aspirations of the Slavo Macedonian majority and of the country's minorities, in particular the large Albanian ethnic group. The situation in Macedonia was different from that in the other former Yugoslav Republics, as in Macedonia interethnic differences were handled within the constitutional context of a parliamentary democracy established very soon after gaining independence. The attempts by armed Albanian extremists to ignite the justified concerns of the Albanian population in order to break out of this constitutional framework were at the heart of the civil war activities that took place in summer 2001. Germany from the beginning of this violence supported international attempts to arrive at an amicable solution. The federal government also provided economic assistance in the form of bilateral measures (e.g. the debt conversion agreement of 1 August 2001). Within KFOR German soldiers participated in preventing the infiltration of UCK fighters from Kosovo; KFOR has considerably tightened border controls. Although the geography of the area does not allow the border to be completely closed, substantial numbers of weapons have been secured (e.g. over 70,000 pieces of munitions, over 1,000 anti tank weapons and almost 600 guns; 385 people have been arrested). Germany participated in NATO's Operation Essential Harvest with around 500 soldiers and is now ready to take the lead in a peacekeeping mission recently mandated by NATO. Beyond that, Germany has encouraged the participation of Macedonia in the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe. Meanwhile, the Stability Pact is running 76 projects in Macedonia with a total volume of about 187 million Euros, particularly in the fields of democratisa tion, human rights, education and infrastructure. According to the German government, the main objective now must be for the EU to follow the political process closely and to coordinate the activities of the international community with special reference to democratisation and the improvement of interethnic relations, economic reconstruction, humanitarian assistance, security and the return of refugees.
Stabilising Albania Although the stabilisation of Albania is as important as the stabilisation of the other states in the Balkans, Germany so far has only contributed indirectly to this aim by supporting multilateral endeavours, in particular through the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe. There was no German contingent to Operation Alba, which helped to re establish state authority in Albania in 1997, and there was
145 less enthusiasm to get engaged in this state than in Bosnia and Herzegovina or Kosovo. However, since the events in Macedonia during the year 2001 have shown that radical Albanians pose as much a political problem in the Balkans as do radical Croatians or Serbians, attention might shift more towards Albania.
OUTLOOK
The Islamic fundamentalist terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre in New York and the Pentagon Building in Washington, DC on 11 September 2001 have led to a fundamental reassessment of Germany’s role in world affairs. There seems to be a new consensus emerging, according to which Germany must assume new internation al responsibilities and should pursue those responsibilities adopted earlier with much more rigor and determination. The old inhibitions against the use of military force in international affairs – often decried by many international commentators – seem to have given way to a rather “normal”, albeit not militaristic, attitude. The readiness to take the lead in an international effort to support the peace and reconciliation process in Macedonia may serve as a testimony to this. Beyond that, the old anxiety over being left alone in the Balkans should the Americans withdraw has also subsided. Meanwhile, German politicians openly speculate about the possibility of Europeans substituting for the US military in Europe while US forces fulfil duties in Afghanistan or other trouble spots involved in Islamic fundamentalist activities. Such a greater readiness to get engaged and to take risks might be a boon for the Balkans, since this is not a traditional policy with the purpose of creating zones of interest, but is rather an attempt to extend a model of security and cooperation that has proven useful and practical in Central Europe and that might be the only one har bouring hope for the Balkans.
146 Security in South Eastern Europe in the Coming Decade Zvonimir Mahečić Office of the President of Croatia PERSPECTIVES ON REGIONAL SECURITY ISSUES
Background
In today’s world it is only acceptable to undertake a broad ap proach to national security matters. Only through the organised activities of a national security system is it possible to achieve a satisfactory level of national security and the preconditions necessary for the stable and thorough development of society. To this end, it is necessary for the full range of state institutions to use a wide array of available resources, means and tools. The bottom line is that procedures need to be established that will enable all of a society’s capabilities to be used in order to achieve the best possible results. At present, the national security situation in our region is more or less characterized by the following: • national security is still not defined (conceptually, organisa tionally, theoretically or practically); • therefore, the national security system (including its organisa tional structure) is not being given proper treatment and careful consideration by political institutions. It is also true and evident that civil society institutions are not involved in the process; and • what is supposed to be the national security system does not operate and function according to the needs of the security envi ronment, the internal social, economic and political processes in societies, and the well being of all citizens. In order to address the above mentioned deficiencies, institutions and citizens should reach a basic agreement about the foundations of national security and the national security system. A certain set of val ues determines the overarching social superstructure, institutions and their interrelations, the behaviour of citizens, and many other important elements that make society operational and acceptable to its citizens and surrounding nations. This foundation should be derived from the common and accepted values of societies – values accepted, 147 supported and exercised by the vast majority of citizens – and embodied in the constitution of each country. If these values are applied, clashes should not exist between, for instance, the freedom of citizens and human rights on one side and national security on the other. National security cannot be pursued and achieved at the expense of existing common values. Misusing national security to justify actions contrary to the accepted values of the so ciety serves only to facilitate an authoritarian and totalitarian concept of state security. In such a case, so called security requirements will always prevail over the individual liberties and rights of citizens. Hence, democracy and legitimacy are at the heart of the concept of national security. If and when common values are applied, the national security system will perform its tasks in such a way that respects, protects, promotes and pursues the basic common values of society. If common values are not applied by the national security system, then the system whose raison d’être is the protection of common values will act a gainst its own foundations. Therefore, it is absolutely necessary to understand national security as the protection and exercise of the common values of society. Unfortunately, some positive elements of life in the former Yugoslav state (such as accessibility of information, distribution of a certain level of economic decision making, etc.) did not take root and develop during the first ten years of the existence of the newly established independent countries. This was partly because of the aggres sion and undeclared war that were hampering efforts to build democracy and the economies of the countries in the region. Additionally, there was a great disparity between what should have been the national interest, and what was in reality the relatively narrow interest of the group in power. Those in power defined their interests as national interests. For example, in the case of the Republic of Croatia, the first Croatian government run by Franjo Tudjman’s nationalist HDZ party showed an ability to secure independence, but at the same time re vealed an inability to rebuild the economy and state institutions and to move democratic forces and processes forward. Finally, the loss of lives during the war, material damages and the destruction of infrastructure, and above all, disillusionment among the people and the inability of state institutions to set preconditions for progress will definitely influence stability in the countries of the re gion for some time to come.
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Driving Elements of this Perspective
The Pace of Change
Changes that take place in today’s world affect all segments of our lives. The speed and importance of changes require immediate reaction and the ability to estimate future political, economic, and technological development. Slowness in making the right decisions will result in a state’s lagging behind other nations, and it can easily influence the security of the nation for some time in the future. Although it is impossible to foresee the future with certainty, it is safe to say that most of the citizens in the countries of South Eastern Europe have great hopes for economic and social development within their society.
National Unity
Internal changes and their consequences are one of the most important security factors to be considered. The unity of the nation in moving towards a common objective can be very easily undermined by the real operational problems of institutions. A nation’s unity can also be undermined by groups who use imaginary, irrelevant or unimportant problems to advance their own agendas, which are contrary to the will of the majority of the nation. It is absolutely important that institutions not provide an excuse for the discontent of citizens. Initiatives that focus on integration into the international commu nity clash with more or less isolationist politics, long lasting differences between rural and urban populations, or between former military veterans and civilians, etc. They all contribute to sub optimal development of the society and the formation of stable democratic institutions. In some instances, if connected with the emergence of violence or violations of the rule of law, these differences can become serious threats to the well being and existence of citizens and society.
The European Security Environment
The development of the situation in the European security envi ronment supports the multilateral context of security. In the globalised world, interests of small states can be pursued effectively only if they interconnect with the interests of other countries and if they are pur sued through cooperation with different international organisations.
149 On the other hand, in parallel with the endeavours of South East ern European countries to integrate formally and institutionally as members of international organisations, it is necessary for them to retain a certain level of autonomous capabilities in order to be able to act independently in favour of promoting and pursuing legitimate national interests. This is especially important for countries that are not yet full members of NATO and/or the EU.
What Are the Alternatives?
An important question that has to be answered, not only by state institutions, but also by the whole society is: Are there better alterna tives to the process of joining different political, economic and security organisations? If there are not, then the real question is not “to join or not to join”, but how to use the process of integration to the best possible benefit of the nation: how to transform integration into progressive economic development, the reduction of security threats and weaknesses, the strengthening of defence capabilities, and the general satisfaction of citizens, promoting our own ideas and interests and contributing to the security and stability of the international com munity. In order to make this integration effective it is important to detect our own capabilities that can be used in unison with the activities and objectives of the international community. That will help achieve the best possible benefits for the nation and enable the promotion of our own interests in situations where it is considered important. In any event, the nation state will remain the basic cornerstone and instrument of achieving and exercising democratic values and the rule of law in a way that will remain acceptable to citizens and their understanding of national and citizen identity. Cooperation between sovereign states will be the key to securing and enabling conflict prevention, crisis management and all other kinds of security building measures, not only between states but also within the borders of individual countries.
KEY ISSUES FOR REGIONAL SECURITY
Economic Development
Economic development is the key to the well being of a society and its citizens. Unfortunately, the economies of nearly all the countries in South Eastern Europe have been more or less devastated by the military operations that took place over the last ten years. A successful economy and improved living standards for citizens can
150 easily have a positive influence on the existing divisions between different social groups and improve citizens’ quality of life. The inability of national economies to provide growth and secure better living standards is underlined by the fact that, following the national revival at the beginning of the 1990s and recognition of the newly emerged countries, people expected better living conditions than before. The lack of success in this area adversely influences the self confidence of a nation and the belief of its people in state institutions. The global economy has become a primary factor that influences all countries and regions. Countries whose political, security and defence potentials are not firmly based on economic development are losing ground in international relations, even if they have managed to retain for some time relatively strong armed forces. The economies of the countries in South Eastern Europe lost a significant part of their markets during military operations. Achieving a return to pre war standards of living will be a very demanding task. Investments in new projects and new production are not sufficient, and internal debt is equally as unbearable as external debt. These are only some of the problems related to the demanding task of develop ing economies. The end result of all these factors is a very high un employment rate (for instance, in Croatia it is somewhere between 15 20%). Damaged and destroyed infrastructure from the fighting in some of the countries in the region makes the task of developing an economy significantly harder then in most other transitional countries. In this respect the Slovenian example is very significant. With very little involvement in the fight for independence and a relatively stable economic and political base, Slovenia has been able to consolidate its democracy and economy to reach a level of stability and prosperity that is equal to some of the EU countries. If there is one single area where citizens rightfully expect their governments to “deliver”, it is the economy. The time will come when the economic situation will be very likely the most important factor for the majority of citizens in deciding which political option they will support during elections.
Weakness of the Legal System
The legal system and judiciary and state management are very important factors for the everyday operation of state and economic institutions, as well as for the ordinary life of citizens. These are the systems that will have to ensure the equality of citizens, and by doing so they influence operations in other areas and segments of the state. Without adequate laws on foreign investment – laws that provide
151 reasonable protection of the investor’s interests – this critical source of revenue cannot be tapped. Establishing effective preconditions may help solve problems, but without adequate reform these systems become part of the problem itself. This has a great impact on the people’s satisfaction with and perception of the state and institutions. Crime and corruption cannot be dealt with effectively unless international security systems and judicial systems are organised, managed, and functioning adequately, and unless adequate national systems are organised and run in a way that will support international efforts and provide societies with stable conditions for development. It is essential to understand that an effective economy cannot be built without the necessary legal framework. This in turn demands reform of the legal system as a whole, especially in the countries that have a clear intention of joining the EU.
Strengthening Democracy and Protecting Human and Civil Rights
It can be argued that in most countries in the region there is still an absence of effective state institutions. Furthermore, the present and past political elite has shown a clear inability to establish these. State institutions have not been built to serve people in the long term, but rather to support and advance the short term interests of their originators. The development of democracy and democratic institutions will play a key role in developing the trust of citizens, the mutual tolerance of different social groups, etc. Protection of human and civil rights will be a significant part, indeed, a cornerstone, of these objectives. It is absolutely essential to ensure that institutions and organisations of the national security system conform to these values. In order to achieve the disbanding of former national ideologies, it is necessary to resolve the question of national minorities. It is even more urgent in the case of those countries whose national movements at the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s sparked the wars and atrocities in this region, resulting in the current instability.
Relations with International Legal Institutions
Legal prosecution of those who undertook illegal actions during the military operations represents one of the most important and emotional factors of national security. By refusing to deal effectively with this issue, the domestic courts have lost credibility and respect in the eyes of the international community. The controversy over legal
152 prosecution is a question of the acceptance of certain obligations that have to be incorporated into our civilisation. Prosecution is even more important because of the fact that some of the actors were, at the time they committed illegal acts, members of the state service, of both its political and military branches. It would be ideal if each country prosecuted its own criminals, but that would probably require a level of responsibility nationwide that is currently unachievable. It could be argued that it would be most advantageous for the countries in question to take effective legal action regarding war crimes. However, as indicated above, the nature of this sensitive problem is probably, at this point, beyond the grasp of the nations involved. Hence, the controversial role of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) appears to be the only viable option at this point, despite the turbulence its actions have created in the countries of the former Yugoslavia. But the international community must recognise that this issue is the most divisive in both the social and legal structures of our societies, and it has created numerous internal problems for the newly elected democratic governments.
Restructuring of the Armed Forces
There has been a common trend of downsizing armed forces in and beyond Europe. Instead of maintaining and supporting large ar mies, developed countries have tried to compensate for quantitative downsizing with qualitative improvements in their armed forces. In the past, most countries in South Eastern Europe supported exten sively large armies. The only visible outcome was that their armies lacked quality, because the countries were not strong enough to fi nance modernisation of their forces. The biggest part of the military budget is in the area of personnel. What we need to South Eastern Europe is a radical change of policy towards the armed forces if we want to establish a relatively small but capable armed forces manned, equipped and ready to respond to new security threats. With international forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Macedonia, and considering the completely exhausted economies of most countries in the region, the threat of a new military clash be tween the states in the region is highly unlikely. Internal clashes among military or paramilitary structures are another matter; they are and will be used as a means of undermining internal and regional stability, and may be used to spark the ignition of a wider regional conflict. This makes it even more important for the political elite in these areas to strive to improve their economies in order to put an end to violence and facilitate the effective application of reforms. 153 The downsizing, transformation and modernisation of all security forces, including the military and police, are three equally important parts of restructuring as a whole. They have to be followed and supported by programmes for improving the quality of personnel and by the restructuring of appropriate budgets. The economic and social challenges in reducing the size of the armed forces are immense. This sheer fact has prevented the political and military elite in the past from successfully addressing these problems. But it has to be done, and there are certainly ways to do it effectively without producing undesirable consequences. Putting those who won independence “on the street” will always have to be consid ered in the light of what many people perceive as unbalanced and illegal benefits to war veterans. This is already proving to be a significant problem. The bottom line is that security and defence systems in the states of the region will have to be transformed. In particular, democratic reforms are necessary in order for the people of these nations to trust these systems in their role as guardian of their nation.
Terrorism, Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), Drug Trafficking and Organised Crime
Organised crime and drug and people trafficking demand decisive measures by the institutions whose task it is to prevent these activities. The consequences of these activities are not only visible as a disregard for but also as the undermining of the rule of law. They also nega tively influence development of the economy, prevent prosperity of society and citizens, and undermine belief in the ability of elected governments to prevent destruction of the social structure and the stability of the political system. Terrorism is a subject of its own, especially after the recent events in the US. But terrorist activities are and can be very often financed or facilitated through close connections with organised crime, which makes it very hard for state institutions to fight against them. This is particularly true since these very same institutions are still in the early stages of stabilisation and restructuring in our region. It is reasonably clear that armed forces alone are not suited to fight terrorism or organ ised crime on a regular basis. The most likely answer lies in the in tegration of different national and international resources and capa bilities, in order to find an optimal mix that will achieve success in this fight. The current issue of terrorism and the need for the South Eastern European countries to be involved in the international coalition will have to be taken seriously by their institutions. Carefully considering what the nature of the contribution can be, the nations should come to 154 the conclusion that a high quality contribution, although small in scale, will have a greater effect than grand rhetoric and verbal support. This contribution is most likely to be found in the areas of intelligence cooperation, enhanced border security, and reforming and restructur ing security services.
Ecological Threats
Ecology is one of the areas where threats may easily have a trans national character. State boundaries do not constitute protection a gainst these threats. Water pollution and chemical and technological disasters can affect neighbouring countries as well as the countries where they emerge. A particular ecological and social problem is represented by the existence of vast minefields, left after the military operations in our region. Since the areas covered with mines could have been used for economic purposes, secondary damages are significant, and they make impossible the return of the citizens and economy to a normal and productive life.
Health Services
Recent events show that this is one of the new battlefields. It is very likely that terrorists will increase the use of biological and chem ical substances, so national and international health care capabilities will have to be strengthened, too. The emergence of different sicknesses like foot and mouth disease is hard enough to counteract. Health services are currently not suited to respond to such wide scale epidemics, and if the latter should emerge as part of biological warfare they are almost impossible to fight. If biological or chemical terrorism were to emerge in this region, it would present an extraordinary challenge. For the countries of the Balkans, however, this danger is not very likely and will probably not arise from deliberate attacks by terrorist groups. Rather, it is more likely that our territory will be used for the transport of biological and chemical weapons to Western Europe. The possibility of chemical accidents and natural and technological disasters demands well organised, manned, and equipped civilian and military institutions and organisations that can be effective in fighting these threats.
155 Geopolitical Changes
Geopolitical changes in Europe, including South Eastern Europe, in the late 1980s and early 1990s have set preconditions for the emergence of military operations in Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Although international military forces are present in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Macedonia, it is still not clear what will happen if and when they leave these countries. The success of political, economic and social renewal in these countries is a must, because foreign military forces will not remain forever (although they may stay for a very long period). The best hope is that the presence of the international community will contribute a degree of stability sufficient for the transition process to proceed. The direction of development and democratic transition in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is still open to question. What has been proclaimed by the present Yugoslav government remains on the operational level, connected with the real problems of creating a functional and democratic government that officially rejects the objectives of the former Serb government. The concept of a greater Serbia has been at the root of many of the region’s problems over the last twenty years. If the present Serbian government can effectively put an end to this issue it will serve as a very significant sign of the democratisation of society and produce benefits for all countries in the region. Serbia would then be recognised by the international community as part of the solution, and no longer as the part of the problem. There is also the challenge of creating a favourable resolution to the difficult problems in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Significant among these problems is the very grim task of returning refugees to their homes, which among the countries of the region is widely considered one of the elements that will determine over the long term whether the Dayton agreement will succeed or fail. It is essential to set security preconditions that will facilitate the refugees’ return; this is only possible if the present cultural and political mentality (based mostly on nationalistic ideology and rhetoric) is rejected. All the countries in the region have a role to play in this process, and any country that can produce results will get the upper hand in international political and security relations. The success of the Dayton agreement in stopping the fighting, followed by only limited success in creating the conditions for Bosnia and Herzegovina to develop stable state institutions, has left this coun try in a state of uneasy peace. All three ethnic groups are awaiting the future development of the situation, hoping that it may give them an opportunity to achieve their objectives. It is also worth noting the inability of the international community in preventing the ignition of Kosovo and Macedonia. NATO success 156 fully ended Yugoslav operations in Kosovo and clashes in Macedonia but left the area in an unstable and undefined situation.
Border Disputes
Efforts to resolve border disputes in the region are not very likely to spark serious military action, or even the threat of such action. The significance of these disputes is that the states involved will not likely be permitted to join some of the most important international organ isations like NATO and the EU if they cannot first resolve border disputes with their neighbours. Additionally, if the disputes are not resolved they may provide ideal ground for the revitalisation of nationalistic feelings. All of these are not likely to completely prevent bilateral cooperation, but if left unattended, they will certainly be obstacles to the transition process.
Junctures
The global, mutually complementary processes of liberalisation, democratisation, multiculturalism, and the development of communications, etc., strongly influence the position and development of small nations. These influences can be felt internally, regionally and globally. These trends tend to blur what were once clearly defined borders in the approach and execution of national and international economic and security policy. Compared to the relative “simplicity” of the Cold War era, the present state of affairs is increasingly fuzzy and subject to rapid and frequent changes. It can be argued, however, that small states today have much better options and possibilities for promoting their own national interests than they did during the Cold War. Once again, one of the most significant internal weaknesses and challenges for nations in transition is rooted in economic development, which is necessary in order to make progress in developing the economic, social and legal security of the people. Hidden military or paramilitary threats boosted by regional hegemonies and the side by side existence of ethnically different states with internal ethnic minority groups are not to be underestimated. Their intensity is likely to rise if structures and institutions of the state fail to deliver reasonably secure preconditions for the development of democratic societies. Manipulation of ethnic diversity remains one of the most likely sources of misunderstanding between states. It is manifested as an internal weakness of the society, and it can be misused as a basis for external threats coming from states in the region. The results of eventual tensions will depend on the quality of decisions taken by 157 state institutions. The possibility of promoting and pursuing their own national interests, within the circle of the more or less friendly states that share the same cultural and societal values, will be highly beneficial for the small transitional states. In this respect, the desire of the small transitional states to join NATO and/or the EU can be viewed as a reflection of their wish to find their lost political, cultural and civilisation identity of more than a half century ago. But membership in international organisations will not bring only benefits; it will also bring obligations. The small states will be judged by their performance and their success in transforming obligations into positive changes within their societies. Consequently, it will be necessary to find the means and ways that will allow all countries to compete on an equal basis. Successful integration will depend on how effective countries are in finding methods for stable economic growth and political development. Their effectiveness will spark their competitiveness and strengthen the internal coherence of their society. For the small transitional European states and potential members of the international organisations, it is crucial to achieve certain skills, competency and professional expertise in order to achieve a favourable image and perception. As already mentioned, the presence of international forces in the neighbourhood renders outside military threats unlikely. The possi bility of the emergence of non military threats and challenges as a consequence of poor internal development is higher, which leads us to focus on the need to carefully evaluate priorities. Moreover, an adequate level of military capability will still be needed for some time in the future. Of course, it is very important to have the tools and methods that will help define what is adequate in a reasonable way. It is necessary to retain or develop a certain level of military capability that is more compatible with the needs of the na tional security environment. These demands can be fulfilled only through the close cooperation of different civilian and military institutions. It is important to agree and to achieve a sufficient level of flexibility in creating and operating the instruments of national security policy. It may be argued that it is even more important to achieve flexibility of thinking in the approach of the top national security policy decision makers.
KEY STEPS
In light of the foregoing discussion, it seems reasonable that the states of South Eastern Europe should base their approach to their national security policies on three strategic pillars:
158 • cooperation and integration into the international community as an instrument of achieving and strengthening stability and se curity; • wide ranging development of the resources, instruments and capabilities of institutions as a path to building a successful state and society; • enhancing readiness in order to ensure a range of options in the case of emergency, including the ability to effectively manage unexpected situations.
Cooperation and Integration
Through cooperation and integration into the international com munity, processes that lead to the development of understanding will be strengthened. This in turn will consequently strengthen peace and stability in the region and in Europe as a whole. This is the way to present each country as a responsible member of the international community, a member that exhibits responsibility in using the benefits of membership and at the same time fulfils its obligations. This represents the first step in gaining respect from the international community; this is the framework for promoting and pursuing a nation’s legitimate interests. This will also clearly show commitment to the common values of the international community and facilitate contributions to strength ening the fundamental principals of democracy and the rule of law, both in individual countries and in the region as a whole. Stability and security will be the cornerstones of the foreign, se curity and defence policies of the countries in the region. The security and stability of an individual country is greatly dependent upon that within the region and the continent. For this reason, our nations must exercise their responsibilities and roles in creating regional and European security systems that are based on the cooperation of equal nations. This is even more important because, contrary to the first round of NATO enlargement when political considerations prevailed, the next round of NATO enlargement will require potential members to demonstrate and prove their contribution to the development of security in Europe. As each country develops its relationship with the EU and NATO, it is important for each of them to participate actively and bona fide in different international activities and associations of a regional character. These activities will have full support as long as they are not aimed at the reunification of Yugoslavia or some other regional grouping that will not allow countries to participate as individual entities.
159 As responsible members of the international community, coun tries in the region must accept the obligation to settle differences with neighbouring or other countries through the process of bilateral negotiations and through consultations with the international community. Members of international organisations are obliged to demonstrate their willingness to accept new members according to their individual performance. It is also very important to develop better understanding in the institutions of the EU and NATO on how South Eastern European re gional cooperation can be enhanced. It is necessary for the EU and NATO to find a more effective balance in this area without stirring the fears that each country’s progress will be held hostage to an unaccept able level of regional cooperation.
Wide-Ranging Development
Securing the prosperity of our societies is possible only through a systematic approach to the development of necessary capabilities. Strengthening the capabilities of society and its institutions will logi cally influence the strengthening of defence and security capabilities. As Vaclav Havel said, the nation is secure only when the people of the nation feel secure. It will be possible to downsize the military component of our countries, but not at the cost of a necessary level of security, defence and military capabilities. Effective capabilities in the area of defence and national security will remain necessary tools for preventing potential military and paramilitary threats. Progress in this regard will establish preconditions for greater for eign investments and greater satisfaction for the people. It will help reverse the current poor economic situation, one of the most important sources of our weaknesses. Additionally, progress in economic devel opment will provide financial assets for upgrading the security and defence capabilities of nations. Development of democracy, the rule of law, equality of citizens, freedoms of citizens and human rights will be served well by such a development. Pursuing national security objectives based on these strategic concept pillars will reduce tensions within societies. When people begin to experience a higher degree of prosperity and rising living standards, radical and rigid political ideas will lose ground, and many of the problems associated with the unequal distribution of wealth will be diminished. By strengthening the capabilities of our countries, we will be recognised by the international community. If needed, our own strengthened capabilities could be offered to the international com munity. That will facilitate greater influence in crisis management and decision making processes. It will be followed by the improved image 160 of the state and society and the possibility of a more effective and effi cient pursuit and promotion of legitimate interests within the international community. All of these will lead to the development of more successful societies, along with the growth of countries’ general capabilities and the satisfaction of their citizens.
Improving the Level of Readiness Improving the level of readiness regarding unexpected situations will facilitate the decision making process and provide institutions with the possibility to better evaluate available options. It will be espe cially important since the current capabilities of many institutions are not yet well suited to address security challenges. In that respect, it is necessary to build sufficient data collection and analysis capabilities as the basis for decision making processes. By doing so, national in terests will be protected, national security objectives will be more effectively pursued, and the national security system will have suffi cient quality information, on a timelier basis, in order to consider its actions. Sufficient readiness will provide the institutions of the national security system with the necessary time to respond, as well as opera tional flexibility. The inability to effectively evaluate available options will be regarded as a point of failure of a particular national security system, after which the particular country may face the grim prospect of passively waiting for the outcome, without the possibility of influencing the development of the situation.
Priority Tasks
Basically, the above mentioned pillars emerge from the most crit ical issues in each country in the region, and although their execution may take different forms, and their operational and functional con sequences may have different weight in each case, there are definitely common threads among them. In terms of key steps to be considered by the governments in the region, operational execution of these pillars will certainly have to include priority tasks such as: • strengthening and developing the economy; • restructuring and reforming the national security system, and the armed forces in particular; • integrating into NATO and/or the EU; • reforming the legal system; • strengthening democracy.
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New Approaches to Security in the Balkans Sašo Ordanoski Forum – Centre for Strategic Research & Documentation
"Nothing stops the bullet like a job." Brother James Holub, Jesuit in Milwaukee After the fall of Milošević a year ago, the death of Tudjman be fore that, the recent Ohrid Agreement, and Kosovo's first democratic elections, talk is emerging of “a new political decade” in the Balkans. It is almost as if we are finally coming to South Eastern Europe the light at the end of a decade long tunnel. The events of the last couple of years truly signify an important change of ambience in the region. But, as a famous Balkan joke goes, one can never be sure whether the light at the far end of the tunnel is the daylight – or the headlight of an approaching train! In the last elections in Bulgaria, it was, in fact, a locomotive that arrived. How can we grasp the reasons for which the emperor became a Prime Minister, when even most social and political analysts still find it impossible to understand how the ex communist boss became the new President? Bulgaria was – and potentially still may be – a promising paradigm of a sort of success, and it is much closer to the next phase of European integration than the rest of the western Balkans. Something may be wrong with the analysis with which we ap proach the region. For almost thirteen years most of the Balkan countries underwent thorough reforms and transformations. Ironically, though, after ten years of judiciary system reforms, Balkan states are more lawless than ever. After years of reform of the security struc tures, all countries are less secure than they were in the previous decade. And after so many years of economic reform, the numbers of unemployed are skyrocketing, and the majority of those who are employed earn only US $100 per month. The sum result is far from encouraging: people are tired, disillusioned, afraid, and jobless. Their quality of life was much higher during the communist days and under the socialist regime. They were promised a better future, but instead
163 they were confronted with war, corrupt domestic regimes, and ar ogance and ignorance on the part of the international community. In the meantime, the West is richer than ever and even more distant from the Balkan perspective. What went wrong?
STATE BUILDING: THE MOST IMPORTANT PROCESS
The Balkan states are not a homogenous group. Some are relative newcomers, but they all have roots in historic traditions of long exis tence. This is especially true for the ex Yugoslav independent states. Others, like Romania, Bulgaria, and Albania, come from rigid communist systems and have not had any exposure to the basis of Western democratic models. While Greece has the longest state tradition, it is still not comparable with most Western democracies. This phenomenon can be analysed through different groupings and regroupings of the varying internal political scenes in the Balkan states. There is one constant attribute of all the states, even Greece: in their political landscape they each have a so called left centre that represents nothing more than rejuvenated ex communist parties tending to foster some sort of social democratic ideals. Their right centre political tendencies, however, are to an important degree fluid, representing radical nationalistic ideas, or encompassing small political groups within which ideas of the extreme left and extreme right can be identified. This political deficiency is coupled with weak state administrative capacities. Among them, security and army structures in all of these countries are obsolete both technically and with regard to human re sources. As a result of various PfP/NATO reforms, they have mostly reduced capacities and distorted structures. In some of the countries this capacity reduction and structural disorder has reached such an extent that they are not able to guarantee territorial integrity and se curity of their individual state borders (as in Albania, Macedonia, and Bosnia). Most of the intelligence and counterintelligence services have been devastated as a result of the total ideological collapse of their black and white approaches. Generally speaking, various intelligence services in these states are not under full democratic control, are highly politicised, overlap in their activities, and spend more than the necessary resources. Most of them are inefficient and to an important extent involved in illegal activities. State administrations in most of the ex Yugoslav republics turned sovereign states are still having acute problems adjusting to the absence of the old state centre, Belgrade. In the Bulgarian, Albanian and Romanian cases, state administrations suffer from a lack of their respective communist party centres. As a result, the state administra 164 tion in each of these countries is inefficient, slow, corrupt, etc. Fur thermore, the reform and transformation of state administrations is occurring concurrently with a systematic redistribution of the national resources and capital. The level of corruption is high. In Greece, the whole political battle is over the appropriation of foreign aid that comes to the countries. This situation is further complicated by the non existence of political vision and imagination among the political elites in these countries. This is generally mirrored by a similar lack of ideas on the side of the international community. It seems that the communist world has collapsed too fast, and there is no already prepared set of substitute ideas and values to take its place. State building should be given the highest priority. But this approach could be used for the support of totalitarian ideas, especially considering the high degree of unemployment and social problems as well as the inherent political weaknesses of the Balkan's multiethnic societies. Given the tolerance of such shortcomings among domestic and foreign agendas circulating in and around the Balkans, however, the residents of this region may find they do not have much of a choice. They can either join the political criminal groups running rampant in their countries or find escape in physical or mental exile.
Stability Reduced to Security
After almost a decade spent on devising short and mid term tactics on how to fight the battle over the region’s state building agenda, the international community finally invented the strategic plan: a regional pact with an elaborated strategy (executed by the World Bank) that was supposed to coordinate the efforts of various donors and aid agencies (systematised by the EBRD) and bring stability to the Balkan countries. It was named the Stability Pact. The failure thus far of the Stability Pact to address the most urgent needs of the region represents a downfall on the part of the interna tional community’s efforts toward the Balkans. As it is known, the Pact was supposed to be the “strategic development arm” of the international community in its stabilisation approach to the region. Since the Stability Pact was a multi sector and multilateral endeavour, encompassing economic, human, political, and security ambitions, its fiasco is likewise multi dimensional and particularly unpleasant. “Created by Western foreign ministries, the Stability Pact did not get the support of Western treasuries in the same governments,” said George Soros at a recent event in Washington D.C. “So, it was pretty dead on arrival,” he concluded. In his study “On the Forming and Reforming of Stability Pacts – from the Balkans to the Caucasus” (May, 2001), Michael Emerson, 165 senior fellow of the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) in Brussels, notes that there are at least two major reasons for the Stability Pact’s constant “awaiting the maturing of events”: 1) the states of the region do not want a serious regional political structure and 2) financiers do not want some other body to coordinate their money. Regardless of the reasons, the structure that was supposed to stabilise the region and support institution and capacity building has failed in its mission. Furthermore, in view of the personnel change at the head of the Pact at the end of the year 2001, it is likely that no thing important will happen with regard to possible reforms of the strategy or operations of the Stability Pact for at least the next six months. “Dead on arrival”, the Pact will remain a non option for short and possibly even mid term improvements in the region’s stability. The “fact in progress” of the last decade is that the international community has been and continues to observe the Balkans predomi nantly through security “lenses”. The number of NATO and non NATO soldiers and other security structures demanded in the region is still high. However, this number is diminished by the high calibre of people dealing with the region, all of whom have distinguished military/defence components to their careers: Lord Robertson (former Secretary of Defence for the UK, current chief of NATO), Mr. Javier Solana (former chief of NATO), Mr. Hans Haekkerrup (former Defence Minister of Denmark for nine years), Mr. François Leotard (former Defence Minister of France), Mr. James Perdew (former military intelligence officer), Mr. Colin Powell (former Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff), etc. Many of the lower ranking diplomats and various other representatives and envoys, including the majority of the prominent international NGOs and UN agencies, are filled with military/intelligence officers and similar experts. Their style is decisive, and their scope is limited. After a decade or so of engagement in various crises in the region, most of them share a special syndrome called “Balkan fatigue”; their enthusiasm and optimism evaporated some time ago. Security, of course, is an important factor in the continuing devel opment of the regional situation. The Balkans will need regular “security checks” for years to come, given the present crisis in Macedonia, the unresolved question of Kosovo’s future, and the ongoing presence of various paramilitaries, dangerous political extremists, and a number of criminals with substantial regional and continental ambitions. All of these only heighten the risk of Islamic terrorism. However, the biggest problems of the Balkan region continue to stem from the weaknesses of its states, states that are incapable of 166 delivering functional public goods such as education, social security, health care, garbage collection, etc. Most of the governments are not held accountable, and many of the state administrations are corrupt and inefficient. This complex situation cannot be addressed strictly through se curity lenses, for in the final analysis, the security approach is about control, not about development. The inherent logic of this approach can be seen in the proliferation of various types of protectorates throughout the region, spanning from Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, through Albania and Macedonia, and ending with Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. However, protectorates by definition do not strength en nor develop states; at best they maintain the status quo. In the Balkans this means a further slide into state and social dysfunction. Ultimately, this regress affects security as well. It can be argued that by adopting this kind of approach, the international community has become part of the problem instead of the solution.
EU INTEGRATION – ALL POLITICS ARE LOCAL
This “ideological” problem of how to approach the situation is complemented by another “structural” problem. Namely, there is a political and public consensus among the countries in the region that one of their most important political priorities is integration into the European Union (EU). The EU, however, has offered somewhat confusing suggestions as to how the countries in the region should ap proach this priority. On the one hand, it is urging them to follow a collective pattern towards EU integration – the so called “regional approach” to integration through the Stability Pact, “Europeanisation” initiatives, the creation of a collective customs zone, western Balkan schemes, etc. On the other hand, the EU has divided the Stabilisation and Association Agreements into a highly personalised and genuine mechanism for faster and more coherent stabilisation and integration of individual “Western Balkan” countries into the EU. It is clear that, generally speaking, the EU is trying to bring the countries of the Balkans closer together by bringing them closer to the EU. When understood in that context, it is clear that although these two approaches (collective and individual) may not contradict one another, they produce a certain amount of confusion among the rather unimaginative and passive state administrations in the Balkans. Also, they are a constant cause of public misapprehension and political mystique. Prospects are grim: if the development and implementation of reforms continue at the current pace, no country from the region will be able to join the EU in the next decade, and most likely, not even for the next two.
167 Do these very remote prospects for integration constitute a do mestic political agenda for Balkan politicians? No. This is because Balkan politicians, soon after gaining power, adopt a “double track” political agenda – one for international and one for domestic use. The international agenda consists of political correctness and co operation with the Brussels bureaucracy and European integration processes. Politicians regularly shake hands with the EC representa tives in front of cameras, small parts of their administrations are strongly engaged in a continuing dialogue with various EC director ates, and political dialogue is full of vocabulary in the vein of “EU integration”, “stability”, and “Europeanisation”. In actuality, this only represents relations between two bureaucracies – one in Brussels and the corresponding one in the region, and has nothing to do with the everyday life in the Balkan countries. It is a virtual reality at its best. On the other track, after ten years of economic and political transition and numerous unsuccessful reforms, the politicians’ administrations are still deeply mired in economic troubles and political shortcomings. An important part of their real, domestic agenda is devoted to strengthening their political party's structures and finances, pressuring the local media, and engaging in personal corruption, nepotism, counter reform measures and short term political projects. This constitutes the authentic local political agenda, in which politicians make promises and real deliveries – which they know are very important for upcoming elections. This is what everyday life is all about. As many people have rightly observed, no reformist government in the region has won elections twice in a row. Regional governments are presented with a tough choice: to be good to Brussels (and to their own country in a long run) and lose in the next elections, or to be superficially cooperative with Brussels while running a different agenda at home, and stay in power. In the majority of the cases, the choice is obvious.
NATO: The Case of an Erroneous Regional Approach
When NATO and the Balkans happily met a decade ago in a new spirit of post communist reform, they had related ideas in mind. All of the countries in the region wanted a new security arrangement that would guarantee their state sovereignty and territorial integrity, preferably through full membership in the western alliance. NATO wanted to reform the region's armies in such a way as to firstly prevent them from fighting wars amongst themselves (and, of course, against NATO members in the area) and secondly, to reduce both the
168 possibility of these countries joining, and the ability of these countries to join, a security arrangement other than NATO. A collection of “tough” and “soft” security measures and reforms were implemented in order to achieve these goals. This was the area in which capacity reduction – not building – was necessary. It wasn’t just the structure of the ex Soviet/JNA style armies and their Soviet era weapons that was shaken, replaced, or destroyed. Now generals from different countries have the opportunity to directly call their neigh bourhood colleagues to discuss all the details concerning upcoming English language summer school classes for their officers. However, during the process of reform of the oversized and overspending Balkan military structures, these armies have terminated threats to their neighbours but have become a real hazard to the sta bility and security of their own states. For instance, the Albanian army has both failed to reform and practically ceased to exist by arming the Albanian population in its own country and in neighbouring areas, and in effect has thus sown the seeds for future dangerous events. The Macedonian army is another example. After so many years of reforms, foreign aid and adjustments, it was not able to defend its territorial integrity – which adds a very hazardous dimension to the complex internal political and security situation. But the Balkan issue has reshaped NATO, as well. The Alliance’s armed forces had to get accustomed to humanitarian and refugee re lated matters. They are now expected to carry out certain law enforce ment activities in lawless, post conflict areas. The most prominent re make, however, occurred in NATO’s strategy, drawing upon the understanding that the Balkans will not generate a conflict between major powers. This enabled the alliance to direct some of its resources and interests to other ends. There was, however, another, more dangerous consequence from the “big powers’ reconciliation” over the Balkans. Namely, what NATO seems to have underestimated is the imminent change in the security threats to the region as such. It is even clearer after the events of September 11 th that states are not the entities threatening Balkan stability; rather, the region’s real menace is to be found in terrorist and extremist organisations, criminal cartels, or a mixture of both. These organisations do not have sovereign territories, they do not have ministers and generals, and they do not depend on loans from the World Bank and the IMF. Their leaders do not run for office in the next round of democratic elections. They cannot be pressed or blackmailed by traditional political and diplomatic methods imposed on them by arrogant, ignorant Western “special envoys” and “facilitators.” Moreover, NATO and the other countries in the region cannot fight this kind of an enemy with the conventional (or nuclear!) forces at their disposal. Expensive weapons and more satellites in the stratos 169 phere are not an efficient answer to this kind of threat. NATO cannot fight these types of guerrilla extremist/criminal networks with aircraft carriers in the Mediterranean Sea. To be more precise, even an ex tremely updated Clausewitz kind of war strategy does not stand a chance today against Osama bin Laden's terrorist cells. Evidence for this hypothesis can be seen in the failure of NATO to deal with the Albanian criminal and armed extremists’ networks in and around Kosovo. Even assuming sufficient political and military willingness in NATO to stop Ramush and Daut Haradinay's people from spreading instability in the province and the greater region, this still could not have been accomplished through the employment of traditional military methods and instruments such as more armed forc es on the borders, more helicopter flights per day, and more soldiers on foot with heavier armoured shields on their shoulders. However, those were precisely NATO’s actions. If the key to winning the war against this kind of a security threat lies in constantly limiting its effects rather than achieving a final victory against the enemy, then a fundamentally new approach to se curity in the region is necessary. Such an approach should consist of greater intelligence efforts, an intensified fight against criminals, less tolerance for political extremism, more cooperation between the army and police structures, and better trained special forces. The strategy should fall more along the lines of “follow the money”, and should deal with radical political diaspora groups and their financial centres in the West. It is very important to note that responsible governments in the re gion – not political parties or other interested lobbies – should firmly control this process of a new security approach. There is an intention among security circles, secret services, and certain political structures in the region to misinterpret the necessity of firmly clamping down on terrorist and criminal threats. In the name of this struggle, they resort to illegitimate and undemocratic measures and form various kinds of paramilitary or para police forces under insufficient democratic control and of questionable accountability. Typical examples are the units of the so called “Frenkijevci” in Serbia, or the “Lions” in Macedonia. These may become even bigger threats to democracy, law and order in their countries than the actual armed enemies of the state themselves. Everything discussed above again recalls the “protectorate story”. Protectorates are havens for criminal networks and political extrem ism. As such, these superficial state structures in time become morally and politically corrupted on both ends, by domestic and foreign factors alike, and in the final analysis only help to foster the existence and development of a parallel world. The two most obvious examples in the region are Bosnia and Kosovo.
170 US POLICY IN THE BALKANS AND THE NEW EU ROLE IN THE REGION
In the light of the September 11 th events, but also for reasons prior to this date, the US will try to reduce its military presence in the Balkans, while preserving its political influence. The US does have a lot of fundamental interest in Europe, and some in the Balkans as well. Some serious analysts predict that the US, although continuing to project its power over Europe, could pull its “hardware” out of the Balkan region as early as 2003. The new US policy on the Balkans, as recently described by a high representative of the State Department, “is going to be more measured to the global needs of the US”. Although the EU is not mature enough to replace the US’ role in the region, especially in the collective European military component, it is and will be under constant pressure to take leadership. Lord Robertson and Javier Solana's almost daily involvement in the Macedonian crisis shows the political readiness of Europeans to fulfil their new obligations towards the region. This strategy complies with the “division of labour” that is gain ing ground among the western allies in NATO. According to this scenario, the US will fight in the “major wars”, while its western, predominantly EU allies will take care of peacekeeping operations if and where necessary. Most of the wars in Europe in the last few centuries were fought over two predominant issues: the matter of control over Central Eu rope and how to divide the Balkans. Today, traditional Serbo Croat rivalry and the question of the future of Bosnia seem to be, for the moment, under a sufficient degree of control in South Eastern Europe. These sticking points could, however, be negatively influenced by the second focal regional problem, the Albanian question, and its political and security effects on Macedonia, Serbia/Kosovo, Montenegro and even Greece. It seems that both the US and the EU have adopted a somewhat “schizophrenic” approach towards these issues. The US is presently divided between two realities. On the one hand, after the events of September 11 th , it must not ignore the Islamic fundamentalist terrorist threats emerging from political extremists’ circles among Albanians and Bosnian Muslims in Kosovo and Albania. On the other hand, most of the key people and ideas in George Bush Junior’s “security camp” are a throwback to the days of Cold War victory experienced by Reagan and Bush Senior. In that context, there are some indi cations that even today, in the never ending post Cold War competi tion with Russia, some of these people consider Muslims to be more reliable partners in the region than Orthodox Slavs. In the not so distant past, various Serbian, and more recently some Macedonian, politicians have proved this “pro Russian” orientation to be a reality, 171 asking Moscow for stronger political support and military aid, regard less of what Russia thought about their motivations. For instance, on their last two meetings this year in Kyiv and recently in Moscow, Macedonian president Boris Trajkovski was clearly told by Russian president Vladimir Putin that Moscow, despite maintaining a firm position about the dangerous nature of Albanian nationalism and extremism in the Balkans, is not going to risk confrontation with the West by supporting Macedonian political extremists (who are concentrated around Ljubčo Georgievski, the Macedonian Prime Minister and leader of the nationalistic Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation – Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity, VMRO DPMNE). Although it arises within a different context, anti Americanism in Greece should not be taken too lightly. So, in the decade to come, in this kind of a “split personality” approach to the region, Americans are not to be expected to trust or rely on anyone too much. Their pivotal country in the region will continue to be Turkey, while they will use the opportunity of discounted geopolitical space to maintain some limited military presence in Albania, Kosovo and Bosnia. Their proximity to the region will depend heavily on intelligence and military assessments, rather than the political or economic needs of the countries. In the case of the EU’s “schizophrenia”, the situation seams to be somewhat more convoluted. Most of the politically and economically bigger EU countries – particularly France, Italy and Germany – understand only the concept of multi cultural societies (in which people dance ethnic minority dances two times a week after work and wear colourful hats from Asia or Africa). They neither practice nor understand the concept of multiethnic societies (where ministers in the government representing the ethnic minority decide on more than 50% of the state budget or have an equal opportunity to share the fruits of corruption together with representatives from the ethnic majority). Because of that misconception (or rather non conception), their approach to the region is sometimes dubious and not always comprehensive. Now and then, due to the frustration of not grasping all of the narratives and necessities of the multiethnic societies in the region, they stretch back to their “great powers” foreign policy concepts from the 18 th and early 19 th centuries and to their old regional “clients”. Drawing new borders is one of the sporadic exercises that some of the most prominent EU members perform secretly. Also, as in the case of Germany and Russia, when the Balkans is in question, some old understandings and mutual empathy seem not to be forgotten.
172 PRIORITIES FOR REGIONAL GOVERNMENTS: NO NEWS, JUST REPEATING GOOD OLD SUGGESTIONS
Corruption / Criminality This is an area closely connected to various forms of insecurity in the region that demands much more urgent activity. Although corruption is a complex socio political phenomenon that requires a multi task and multi sector approach, with results not to be expected in a few months’ period, the general expert opinion is that not enough has been done in the region in the fight against it. It is too easy and too comfortable for governments to operate with their own crooks and through their own money laundering channels, which tells on the gen eral ability of political and state structures in security related areas. There are strong incentives for some of the players to acquire more arms from less controlled sources. As a matter of fact, some of the players invest in the conflict precisely because of the criminal benefits they receive from instability in the region. Criminal profits are made out of instability, not stability. Also, there is a well developed, cross border cooperation between different structures of the opposing sides in or around the hot spots in the region (Macedonians Albanians, Serbs Albanians, Albanians Croats, Serbs Macedonians, Bulgarians Macedonians, Bulgarians Albanians, etc.). In the short and medium term, the following priority measures in fighting corruption and criminals are called for: • changes in criminal laws and constitutions that currently for bid special police investigative means and methods – without these technical means and investigative methods no efficient fight against corruption is possible (it goes without saying that democ ratic control over the use of these resources should be strength ened and put in place); • fundamental reform of the range of secret service structures in the countries around the Balkans, because these security configur ations, acting often on the pretext of “national security”, are one of the most prominent facilitators and instigators of criminal ac tivities and corruption; • establishment of national anti corruption commissions at the highest governmental and non governmental levels with the power to supervise concrete cases of criminal investigations or corruption scandals and to support national strategies for fighting corruption (which already exist in most of the Balkan countries); • reforms in the state administration to facilitate administrative procedures and more transparent dealings during public procure ments or public tenders;
173 • education and efforts to increase public awareness about cor ruption and its role in all spheres of society (stronger civil sector role); • control of the business sector – strengthening the internal in tegrity of the business community through the establishment of “clean hands” or “corruption free” associations of businesses, with support from governments and foreign actors; • strict control over the financing of political parties.
Disarming Civilians / Police Reform The number of illegally armed civilians in the Balkans is huge. The total number of weapons – all calibres and types – is in the seven digits. A regional project legitimised by the international community and led by the UN should be a high priority in relations between the international community and the political and state structures in the Balkan countries. Joint methods and strategies for collecting arms should be employed, but politically and practically it is very important that local activists from the most influential political parties be in volved in these activities. In this context it is important to note that reforms of various po lice structures, now mostly oriented towards the greater involvement of ethnic minorities in the police units (Kosovo, Macedonia, Bosnia, etc.), should focus on the creation of a type of community service oriented uniformed police (multiethnic by definition) with profession ally trained criminal and anti terrorist units. A combination of these two approaches will increase personal and community security levels in the region.
Kosovo Changing the discourse on the “future of Kosovo” discussion is badly and urgently needed. Dialogue should focus on issues of content, rather than of status. The overall preoccupation with the status of Kosovo and the discussion that prevails around it (dozens of studies have been written already on this problem, and many more are in preparation) only complicate the future of this ex Yugoslav province. The only feasible future for Kosovo is integration into the region. Integration will make its economy viable, its security guaranteed by a broader regional security arrangement, and its political development controllable and constructive. So far, exactly the opposite is happening. No economic integra tion is taking place, and the province is fully dependent on foreign aid and on the massive transport operation required to import everything 174 needed there. The issue of security is perverted and mostly concentrated on how to prevent instability from spreading to Kosovo’s neighbours and protect the small number of Serbs remaining in the province, while politically all methods and instruments are being used to underline Kosovo’s separation from the surrounding region. Let us imagine this situation for a moment…instead of importing Coca Cola beverages, mineral water, and beer each day by truck, someone – the EBRD, for instance – could approach Skopje's Brew ery, offer a good loan, and support it in building a production capacity in, say, Vitina or Prizren. Doing this would not only employ people, stimulate investments in other support industries, and produce a build ing of some capacity; it also would fundamentally change the dis cussion over the future of Kosovo. It will be argued from a region and integrative rather than a separatist and provincial approach. It should be explained to Albanians that this will not undermine future possibilities for Kosovo’s independence, but will reduce ten sions in and around the province tied to its future status. For all others, a prosperous Kosovo is of a vital interest, regardless of its formal status.
Institution and Capacity Building There is really not much to be added on this matter: state building should be pursued as the highest priority, keeping in mind that state building implies strong civil society as well. But long term patience and programmes are needed. Most of the policies in this area are well known and have produced positive results where appropriately imple mented.
175 176 Albania, the Balkans and the Future Auron Pasha IDRA, Albania I was in Cetinje in August 1900 where I got in touch for the first time with a thread of the Bal kan “clew”, without knowing how deep I would get involved later on and how this clew would further grow to mess the whole world. Edith Durham 20 Years of Balkan Intricacies
ALBANIA AND ALBANIANS IN THE 21 ST CENTURY
Albania is entering the 21 st century having made some progress from its initial starting position. During this decade Albania has experienced every sort of crisis that a state could possibly undergo, including a very deep economic crisis, an institutional crisis in every cell of the state structure, a financial crisis due to pyramidal schemes, and civil unrest bringing the country almost to the verge of civil war in 1997. Just when these conflicts seemed to be resolved, another gov ernmental crisis bordering on a coup d’état in 1998 exploded and was followed by a refugee crisis involving some 500,000 persons during the Kosova war. All this has made Albanians very careful in evalu ating progress. While it is difficult to liken these painful experiences to those of Bosnia, Kosova, and Serbia, it can be said that their impact on the respective entities’ positions towards European integration could be comparable. There is no doubt that Albanians have gone through a painful dec ade of transition that, on the one hand, was full of delusions and, on the other, helped shape the maturity with which they regard their fu ture.
Albania When the most cruel and isolated regime in Europe came down, Albanians were faced with the perspective of a democratic society, which was absolutely desired but lacked a concrete framework. The 173 democratic revolution began with French notions of “liberty, fraternity and equality”, and ironically, people wanted to “build capitalism” with the same enthusiasm with which they had striven once to build social ism. The knowledge of institutions and their role in a democratic so ciety and economy was virtually non existent in Albania. There had been no historical reference from which Albanians could develop a social framework strong enough to hold people together, with the exception of a “virtual” constitution of the mountains 1. The notion of the state, already fragile in the Albanian mindset (independence was declared only in 1912), was deformed during the totalitarian regime. Because the idea of “state” came to be identified with totalitarianism, it was natural that the fall of the regime brought about the fall of the Albanian notion of the state. Albanians were thus faced with the challenge of building a concrete democratic state without a methodological framework. It was imperative to first generate a positive concept of state in the minds and views of people. The delusion that brought about the political instability in Albania was unavoidable; even political forces themselves were not sure about their identity and place along the political spectrum. Although unde sired, former regime attitudes contaminated the society, and a painful period of purification was necessary. While in this difficult period, Albania was also faced with the challenge of how to behave and what to do for its nationals who were experiencing real problems in the greater region – in Kosova and, more recently, in Macedonia. The issue of national identity arose in a particularly difficult period for both the Albanian government and its people. Now that the situation has calmed down, however, a better assessment of Albania’s role in the region may be possible. The simple fact is that Albania itself has been too busy recovering – and has been too weak – to impose any action pushing for the rights of Albanians in the greater region. Paradoxically, it was exactly this that was advantageous. The fact that the “motherland” did almost no thing in this decade to improve the situation of Albanians in former Yugoslavia and elsewhere actually neutralised the arguments of the “Greater Albania danger” and of the potential interference of an emo tionally involved state in its neighbours’ affairs. Although the thesis of “Greater Albania” was sometimes put forth, and is still tried in European policy circles, enough evidential grounds for the theory to actu ally be an obstacle to the actions of the international community in resolving the crises in Kosova and Macedonia were never found. ———— 1 Mountain code of Lek Dukagjini. 174 Two conclusions can be drawn from recent history: First, enough Albanian leaders today understand that their state/national interests lie in playing the game of Euro Atlantic integration and not in unrealistic plans for territorial division. Second, with all that has happened in Kosova and in Macedonia, it is clear that Albanians are becoming a very important factor in re gional politics. This is a clear cut fact, no matter what kind of historical or causal analyses we undertake, and no matter how many future scenarios are discussed. In a region that aspires to integration, it cannot be otherwise. With Albania continuing to progress (albeit from a bad starting position) and Kosova in de facto state status (under the umbrella of the international community), and with the increasing role of Albanians in the political life of Macedonia, the situation has changed. These simple facts will always be exploited by the “dinosaurs” of regional politics as a way to point out the potential danger to future of the Balkans; Albanian growth is portrayed as a threat to the European values. In fact, what is currently happening is that Albanians are find ing their deserved position to be in the way of old Europe. Without defining this position there was no hope for the region to join Europe, and to the disillusion of these same “dinosaurs”, the current situation is as follows: Yugoslavia: Milošević, the last “fortress” of communism in the Balkans is gone, and in his place is a new government that is helping to make Yugoslavia a viable partner in the region. It is doubtful that this would have occurred spontaneously without the intervention of the international community in Kosova. Kosova: The terrorising image of ethnic cleansing is now weak ening as democratic institutions are built under the supervision of the international community. Macedonia: Albanians have achieved their deserved place in so ciety, which will create a much more stable environment for the negotiation process (started previous to the conflict) with the EU. All these events suggest a trend in the right direction.
EU Integration What does EU integration mean for Albania and its neighbours? It means investments, creation of jobs, adherence to the rule of law, and the control of corruption in public institutions. It represents the most successful conflict prevention and resolution mechanism that currently exists. European integration of the Balkans is not only just the desire of certain nations dreaming of a better future; it is also a concrete and
175 decisive factor for regional peace and security. 2 Hence, Europe should bear its share of the costs raised by the delay of each country in join ing the developed world. The costs associated with this are much shigher than the costs associated with active involvement “in the field” to help achieve standards.
NATO Membership In one of his recent speeches, Chris Patten said, “We should not discredit the process (accession), water down its integrity by constant ly feeling obliged to offer some new step forward, like opening negotiations on a new agreement, before our partner is really ready, or hustling negotiations to a premature close. We should not lose faith in the attractiveness of the final destination to the countries in transition out of fear that they may lose faith in the process if it seems too tough. It is tough precisely because the destination is worthwhile.” This said, standards for NATO membership are not always re spected. It must be asked: What does that suggest? Is there or is there not a flexible policy towards the region? Do the countries have to re spect the predetermined standards or might they promise to do so in order to start serious negotiations on the process for accession (remember the Macedonian case)?
KEY ISSUES IN THE NEXT 10 15 YEARS
Political Aspects American presence and involvement in the region, especially tak ing into account the terrible events of September 11 th , will be reduced on an as yet undetermined and unknown scale. However, the role of Europe will increase, as was clearly testified in Macedonia. The predominant questions are: Is Europe able to handle all the aspects of the fragile Balkans without the balancing effect the US brings to the region? Is Europe able to have a single, united voice in various future moves in regional politics? During the last few years, there has been a remarkable consensus on several Balkan issues, but should this be ascribed to the improvement of mechanisms on the European side or to the stronger presence of US foreign policy in the region during the Clinton admini stration? Let us consider some geography. ———— 2 Ismail Kadare, “The Balkans: Truths and Untruths”, www.iss.eu.org/chailot/chacibe.html 176 Greece, which geographically is part of the region, has shown some controversial signs in regional events of the recent past. While at the governmental and legislative levels there has been collaboration with and support for the actions of the international community, there seems to be considerable disagreement among the Greek population regarding the politics of the international community. (Note in particular Clinton’s visit to Greece and the burning of American flags in the streets, etc.) While the governmental level is no doubt very important, are we not seeking more in the Balkan region? Are we not seeking links among people and not just between governments? What might happen if tomorrow a populist party were to assume control and actually express some of the current concerns of the Greek population regarding its neighbours? For regional cooperation, it is necessary but not sufficient for governments to work with each other. There must also be cooperation on the level of civil society, and we must ask, how do businesses cooperate with each other? What is the image of each country in the eyes of its neighbours? Italy is not a part of the region but borders it, and like Greece, has interests in the region. Until recently, and due to immense internal political problems, Italy’s attention to the region has not been significant enough or deep enough to affect long term objectives. Macedonia is itself emerging from an internal crisis that has created in the Macedonian population a general alienating image of Albanians. This is compounded by political crisis. In addition, problems with Greece regarding recognition of the Macedonian name continue, although at a lower amplitude. The image of the country is suffering, and the blame is always searched for outside of Macedonia. Serbia on the other hand is still in a “decontamination” period that of course will require some time. For Serbia the issue now is recov ering internally; the other regional issues are not on the agenda. Even if they were brought onto the agenda, the political class would not be able to handle them with care. The pool of civil society organisations in Serbia is slightly progressive, but they have definitely not reached the required level.
Economic Aspects This is a very important dimension of the future of the region. Myth will stop impacting policies against the entities’ neighbours only once the standard of living for regional people is raised to appropriate levels. A higher economic stability will be produced in the region’s countries once business interests are important enough. In order for the region to generate sustainable growth, it badly needs foreign investment. Aid, budget subsidies, loans and technical assistance are important but are not enough to ensure long term 177 growth. Naturally, investment return is the main factor in encouragement and orientations of capital flow, but there are several other factors related to the confidence of investors in pretended advantages of the economy and to their future tendencies to action. Two of the most important factors in investor decision making are political and macroeconomic stability. Recent decades have clearly shown that private investors prefer to invest in countries that have established both economic stability and the policies that guarantee this stability for the foreseeable future. The most significant indicators in this regard are: • economic growth; • price stability and foreign exchange rate; • size and sign of governmental fiscal balance; • stability of the monetary policy; and • instruments used for the implementation of these policies. We should, however, be conscious that the Balkan area is more attractive for investors from the regional point of view than from the country point of view. A regional integrated market (of 56 million people) with fast growth rates will create an attractive opportunity for investors. In order to create this desirable state of affairs, governments of the region should understand that they are not working in competition but towards the same mutual goal. Immediately after the Stability Pact was launched, scenarios about the economic integration of the region as a whole were shaped. They were just playful scenarios describing a sort of “Europe II” until re cently, when they were mentioned by some important figures of European policy making, for example, in the paper of Joschka Fisher. The idea of these scenarios is to have the countries of the region firstly integrated with each other and only then to integrate the region as a whole into Europe. Intra regional economic integration is, at least, easier than integrating each country into the EU. Governments should therefore more carefully examine this option. Signs of initial intra regional economic integration were demonstrated with the signing of the free trade agreement, but further steps for liberalising trade should be undertaken. One question that should be asked in the economic realm is: What will happen with the process of integration that is already underway? Romania and Bulgaria are in negotiations for membership, while Albania and Macedonia are at the stage of Stabilisation and Association Agreements. Many of the states in the region were part of a united structure (e.g. Yugoslavia) that was not only political but also economic. Mem ories are still too fresh to allow for any efforts at joining these coun tries together again. The scenario “Yugoslav countries minus Slovenia
178 plus Albania” cannot work out for this simple fact, at least not in the mid term period.
Organised Crime and Corruption This is a significant regional security issue. The corruption issue has been brought to the forefront of the agendas of most governments in the region. Corruption is more prevalent in these transition countries, not because the people are different from those in Western countries, but because economic conditions are more conducive to encouraging corruption. Given the reality of widespread poverty and meagre public sector salaries, the motivation to gain as much as possible, as soon as possible, is very strong. Some try to present the phenomenon of widespread corruption in the region as a genetic inheritance of the culture of the Ottoman Empire. During that empire, bribes and favours were almost “institutionalised”. Whatever impact this may have had, its effect is probably now minimal. In this regard, consider that 100 years ago in England a rich man could buy a title that would ensure him a public position, but today in that very same country to buy a public position is considered one of the most dangerous forms of corruption. Corruption is a way to bypass the uncertainty created by a weak state and the low developed market economy typical of a transition society. Also common to transition countries is a fragile political stability that controls the business of the legal state. As is well illustrated in Albania, significant confusion between the terms “state” and “power” exists in the minds of most citizens. There are many reasons for the extent of corruption in the region. Some of these are: Political clans and the absence of internal extension of authoritarianism in political parties made possible the expansion of corruption. In the transition from total state control over society to an open market economy, people are still not accustomed to assuming account ability for their own actions. They tend to remain apathetic and pas sive as a result of their experience during the prior generation. Intro ducing individual accountability and cultivating a pro active citizenry requires further significant effort in Albania. One of the main tasks in transition countries is to aid the transformation of passive citizens into active ones. Political instability gives rise to the feeling by those in public structures of “being temporary”. This situation generates a proven inverse relationship between the extent of corruption and political stability. Low political stability means high corruption, and vice versa. This implies that political instability brings about uncertainty in 179 public structures, causing the “temporary” feeling by people in government. In their emergence from a system where the state controlled all people and owned all assets, Albanians have been slow to clearly understand the concept of conflict of interests.
Economic versus Political Development When the country first opened, the Albanian business sector deve loped much faster than did the political structure. The former sector more successfully withstood and recovered from the 1997 crisis. Due to its own lack of growth, the public sector created artificial barriers to development, which might be overcome only through private parties using corrupt practices. Corruption and organised crime are problems of the entire region and have quite an impact on the stability of the individual countries. The reduction of this phenomenon, therefore, is a priority for the improvement of security and stability.
Ethnic and Religious Problems In the region (even among nations that are already economically integrated), nations still are using their legends as benchmarks. This impacts their policies towards their neighbours. At the same time, most of the Balkan region has undergone a state formation process, and historically, these processes – no matter where the location – are accompanied by problems. It is to be expected, then, that this region faces national identity problems, standards for human rights protection issues, and other obstacles to stability. However, some lessons have been learned from the experience of other countries and regions. Even if it is sometimes painful and difficult, the region will hopefully be successful in applying those lessons. This issue of religion is more one that was artificially created and imposed from outsiders than generated by Balkan people themselves. Even when Balkan people use religion, they use it as a speculative means for certain interests and profits. Balkan Muslims have always felt more European than anything else, and Albania belongs to Europe not only geographically but also historically and morally. Changing the religion from Christian to Muslim did not change the basis of Albanian feelings towards Europe. The religion took mainly a pragmatic shape rather than a mystic one. Efforts to use religion as a threat to the values of Europe are destined to fail, because this runs counter to the whole philosophy of integration.
180 SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Corruption and Organised Crime This is an area of extreme importance where the governments of Balkan countries can begin to cooperate effectively with the help of the EU and the international community. This fight against corruption and organised crime should not be fragmented by individual countries but should be built upon a regionally acceptable platform. Another very important issue in this regard is targeting not only “big corruption,” but also targeting more effectively and more often the petty, everyday corruption that is destroying the basis of society.
“Ethics versus Economics” Because people in Albania and in other neighbouring countries were under severe ideological pressure during the totalitarian period, for today’s common citizen, combating corruption based on ethics and good behaviour is rather difficult. The process of implementing principles of ethics is long and difficult, and it is actually too soon to impose a new set of ethics from another society, as Albanians must first develop a respect for their own. The importance of societal recovery from totalitarianism and the difficulty of the initial transition should not be underestimated, but people can without a doubt comprehend better if they understand the costs they have to pay in a corrupted environment. These high costs, which often become significant barriers for development, should be measured and explained to the participants of the transitioning society.
Trade Integration More than 85% of Albania’s trade relations are with the EU (Greece and Italy). However, its economy is still considered closed. Exports constitute only 7% of GDP, while imports constitute 25 30%. Trade with neighbours sharing a “common fate” is inconsiderable. Things are moving in this direction though. Free trade agreements would be a very suitable means to promote trade within the region and to help integrate the separate entities from a trade perspective. In this regard, another step, that of free movement of people within the re gion, should be considered. The elimination of visa restrictions would be a very important step towards regional integration.
181 Macro-Stabilisation versus Local Government Decentralisation Countries of the Balkan region have mainly focused on macro economic reforms during this decade. As this period comes to an end, the focus should be shifted more to the local government decentralisation process, which will bring the government closer to people and to their concerns. This will require more investment in capacity building if local government is to be able to handle the added responsibilities. Much must be accomplished at the local level in terms of budgeting, strategic planning, and citizen participation, etc. In the long run, the more responsible the citizens feel for their actions and their local environment, the more stable the country will be.
Education The EU should invest heavily (much more than it currently does, and probably more than even in infrastructure or energy measures) in education. Only education will prepare people to operate public institutions and to enforce laws. Roads, however crucial and important they may be in connecting cultures and environments, are not able to change the predominant mentality. Education, and heavy investment in curriculum, computerisation, Internet connections, and teachers should be priorities. The more a citizen knows, the more Balkan le gends will fade out of his mind and the more his conversation with neighbours will take shape over common interests rather than compet ing ones. Truth be told, it is not that difficult. If a comprehensive strategy of education is put in place today, then in 15 20 years there will exist a generation with much more of an open vision towards development. This education strategy will not be segmented by train ings, assistance, and so on but will be an integrated approach to a whole new generation that will eventually claim the flag of running the country.
Stability Pact Now that it has been established, the Stability Pact should seek to help the region cohere. It is of crucial importance to the region that this mechanism work, and that it not be viewed as another “link in the chain”. Efforts should be made to make the Stability Pact process less bureaucratic and more cooperative in helping individual governments shape their priorities. The image of the Stability Pact as a “sack of money” from which every country will receive rewards should be avoided. Rather than as a competition for awards for various projects, the Stability Pact should be viewed as a common boat and common philosophy.
182 Yugoslavia: The Economic Dimension of Security over the Next Decade Norman Scott Institute of Graduate Studies, University of Geneva
THE PERSPECTIVE OF MULTILATERAL DONORS, NOTABLY THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
The first post Tito decade was lost to development in Yugoslavia because of weakening political cohesion, macro mismanagement and a downward drift into centripetal and centrifugal nationalism. If the 1980s were bad, the decade of the 1990s brought unrelieved disaster. To economic stagnation were added devastating strife entailing large scale destruction of lives and assets, disintegration, economic regression declining into impoverishment, and international isolation. Twenty years of economic decline had brought the impoverished pop ulation of Yugoslavia down to a level of per capita GDP barely 25% of the European Union average in the year 2000. In 1980 it had stood at 46%, comfortably ahead of neighbouring socialist countries such as Hungary and just about on par with Greece. 1 The first post Milošević decade thus poses a monumental challenge for the democratically elected successor government of Yugoslavia and for the providers of multilateral assistance. The challenge consists of setting the economy on a path of reconstruction and growth sufficiently vigorous to alleviate widespread poverty, to bring decent work and incomes to the unemployed and underemployed, and to revive hope in a population – particularly the youth – that has lost confidence in itself, in its leaders and in its future. Prosperity and external viability are far beyond the reach of domestic capacity and effort alone. A significant and sustained programme of international assistance and support is a sine qua non for these aims to be achieved.
———— 1 A World Bank table showing the main economic indicators for recent years, with forecasts for 2004 and 2010, is attached as an Annex. 183 This challenge subsumes many questions about ends and means. What economic strategy can be devised and implemented that can restore prosperity to the level it was at before devoured by the locusts of war? Over what time frame will it be possible to catch up with other countries in transition in central Europe and the Baltic that once were lagging behind, but now have successfully emerged from a painful decade of economic reform and institution building with fully functioning market economies? To what extent does the restoration of peace, stability and the achievement of sustainable development depend on Yugoslavia’s mobilisation of its own resources for growth and modernization, and what is needed by way of progress towards regional and broader European integration? Can the quality and honesty and discipline of political leadership match these, after all, reasonable expectations? Some tentative answers to these and other questions are offered below. They should be prefaced, though, by recognition that there exists a real but indeterminate interaction between economic progress and stability, on the one hand, and political developments on the other. The extremely difficult task of repairing damaged or neglected productive capacities in conditions of financial discipline and austerity will inevitably compress already low living standards and thereby threaten to sap support for reform. Resultant social tensions mani festing themselves in strikes and shifting political alliances could then weaken the commitment of the authorities to pursue the radical reforms required. Any such weakening in the resolve to reform in turn will reduce the willingness of international donors to continue their support. Conversely, political strains and uncertainties stand in the way of economic recovery and of reintegration into the regional or broader international economy. The unresolved internal question of the constitutional relations between Serbia and Montenegro still has the potential to disrupt economic ties between the two and thereby hamper progress along the path of recovery and revitalisation. The future of Kosovo remains undetermined, although many outside observers would hold that Kosovo is the key to the future of South Eastern Europe (SEE). 2 Interethnic and inter community tensions are still
———— 2 The German Foreign Minister, Mr. Joschka Fischer, is reported to have said so in so many words in a ‘non paper’ presented in September 2001 to an informal meeting of EU foreign ministers held in Geneva, near Brussels: “ a purely intergovernmental approach will not do....[the main problems of SEE] do not exist between states but between different ethnic groups inside the states; these ethnic groups will have to be brought into the process case by case and at an appropriate stage”. According to the report the proposal envisages a ministe rial conference to include all states and ethnic minorities of the region. The con 184 smouldering in all three of these entities and in neighbouring FYR Macedonia. They could flare up again without warning in some remote village or back street and spread like bushfire to neighbouring areas. For as long as this situation persists, investor (and, far from negligible, tourist) confidence and willingness to invest in or even visit the region will remain well below its potential contribution to economic revival. Economic policy alone cannot resolve these essentially political factors of risk, but it can help alleviate the underlying problems and thereby reduce the threat of new outbreaks of interethnic conflict. Some elements of policies aiming at inclusion, non discrimination and inter community cooperation, especially with respect to small and medium sized enterprises, and the creation of a climate of confidence and security for the vitally important private sector are mentioned later in this text. Here, the point to be stressed is that interethnic distrust and tension have become so deep seated in the aftermath of a decade of devastation that their adverse effects on economic well being demand that their removal be a priority of political and security as well as economic policy. Otherwise, they will deflect resources from the reform agenda to military expenditure. By providing a clear and credible commitment to the integration of South Eastern Europe into sub regional, regional and global structures, the international community, notably the EU and the international financial institutions, can seek to underpin by financial and technical assistance the democratisation and demilitarisation not only of Yugoslavia but also of its neighbours. Many within and outside Yugoslavia believe that the high road to stability and prosperity there, and in South Eastern Europe (in which it occupies a salient position), is the one that leads initially to progres sive trade and then to economic integration with the EU. Intermediate staging posts could well be a South Eastern Europe regional free trade agreement, and association with an enlarged CEFTA. But the final destination would have to be membership in the EU, for that more than any other option would guarantee a sustained and unambiguous commitment to lasting reform and regional cooperation. For the international financial institutions such a strategy would provide an anchor for their decade long endeavour to help overcome the legacy of the past and would strengthen the institutions of a plural ist democracy and an effectively functioning, private sector driven market economy. For them, as for the EU itself, the merit of a vigor ———— ference, foreseen as having its timetable settled after the November 2001 elec tions in Kosovo, would be based on the Helsinki Final Act and would have three planks: democracy and human rights; economic Cupertino; and disarmament – almost a replica of the Helsinki process. Financial Times, September 11 th , 2001 185 ous and constructive integrationist strategy pursued by Yugoslavia would be the acceleration brought by that option, as the Central European states seeking accession have demonstrated, in introducing pro democracy, pro market and pro cooperation reforms. Hans Van den Broek has put the essence of this perception very persuasively as follows: Almost ten years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the Kosovo crisis has been a bloody reminder of what, in another context, we used to call ‘the cost of non Europe’. For the current member states of the European Un ion, the integration process that began in the early 1950s has brought both remarkable political stability and a spectacular increase in eco nomic well being. Conversely, the disintegration of South Eastern Europe during the past decade has exacerbated poverty and interethnic hatred, and cost the lives of many thousands of innocent civilians. The comparison of these two polar cases may not constitute a very rigorous scientific demonstration, but it does provide a prima facie argument in favour of regional cooperation and progressive integration. 3 The subsequent (December 2000) articulation of the vision of the new Yugoslav Government 4 was looking in the same direction, but was more explicit: Our strategic mid term goals are clear: we want to create an efficient, open market economy, to eradicate corruption, to protect the neediest and to increase sharply living standards. Such a...FRY would be an im portant stabilizing factor in the Balkans. Such a country would strength en South Eastern Europe and ultimately the entire European continent. Our vision for the country closely mirrors what the members of the European Union have already accomplished, democracy and economic prosperity. In addition to an efficient and open economy, we want to have a vibrant civil society... freed from fear, corruption and misery.... Ultimately, our vision [is] accession to the European Union...
Key Elements of the Economic Dimension of Security From the point of view of the Bretton Woods Institutions (BWI), in light of the experience acquired by other regions in transition, the following elements would seem central to their perspective on the issue of security in South Eastern Europe: ———— 3 “Time for Enlargement”, Hans van der Broek, Chapter Five in The Second Decade: Prospects for European Integration after Ten Years of Transition, Sdu Publishers, The Hague, 1999, p.99 as cited by the IBRD, South Eastern Europe Regional Strategy Paper, 1 March, 2000. 4 In its position paper to the Donors’ Coordination Meeting on 12 December 2000, entitled Vision for the FRY: Breaking with the Past, Building a Democratic and Prospering Country. 186 For over a decade Yugoslavia has been the “missing link” in attempts to stabilise and rehabilitate a region driven into economic regress by recurrent conflict and post conflict tensions. To avoid the risk of these tensions flaring up into renewed conflict, Yugoslavia must be viewed as being essential to peace, prosperity and stability in South Eastern Europe as a whole. The fragile stability maintained since 1999 must be buttressed by significant progress towards economic recovery by means of bold and far reaching reforms at the national level. These reforms on the national level must aim simultaneously at achieving sustainable growth in output and living standards and instituting policy measures to reduce the defence burden, to convert defence capacities progressively to civilian purposes, to promote the social integration of displaced persons, and to reduce the causes of interethnic tension. At the sub regional level it is of the utmost importance to restore the trade and transport links disrupted during years of conflict, sanc tions, and isolation and to move forward, ideally in the context of a revitalized Stability Pact, to closer South Eastern Europe economic integration as a half way house towards broader integration within Europe and with the EU. The BWI therefore regard assistance to the reform programme in Yugoslavia as having many implications for and linkages to the broad er aim of regional stability and economic progress. The support so far provided has been analytical, technical and financial, involving short to medium term commitments up to 2004. Experience gleaned from the successes and failures of programms of support for other regions in transition may be regarded as promising for a higher level of effectiveness of aid to Yugoslavia. Financial support from the international financial institutions has to be seen as being only part, albeit an important part, of a broader coalition of international donors. The resources needed for Yugoslavia to reach by 2010 even 80% of its level of 1989 are immense. The implication is that support from the EU, inter alia and in particular, will have to be on a scale commensurate with that of what is required to bring Yugoslavia to a level of development – of the economy, of democracy, of thriving civil society – warranting admission to EU membership. Such EU support will have to include asymmetrical trade policy measures to encourage exports from Yugoslavia as the potentially most dynamic factor propelling the 5 6% annual growth rate of GDP set as a minimum target before the most recent downscaling of growth forecasts for western Europe in the IMF World Economic Outlook. The BWI, and the Bank in particular, will play a central role in donor coordination, and in the provision of adjustment financing, 187 technical assistance and policy advice in the formulation and implementation of reform programmes. A constructive and close dialogue has been achieved with the new government, with which cooperation has been assured in monitoring performance benchmarks measuring the progress of reform.
THE CORNERSTONES AND BUILDING BLOCKS OF THE HIGHWAY TO ECONOMIC RECOVERY AND INTEGRATION
The magnitude of the very difficult challenge of simultaneously reconstructing and reforming the economy of Yugoslavia is daunting. If successful by the end of the decade (and it must be said that the current government has made a bold, imaginative and determined start), the risks of social and ethnic tensions stand a good chance of being left by the wayside. The relative capacity and considerable potential of the economy, if harnessed to South Eastern Europe sub regional integration, could make as significant a contribution to economic progress and stability in the Balkans as it did the reverse in the previous decade. To do so, the dismal legacy of the Milošević years must first be overcome. Transforming the inherited institutions and social cum state economic control specific to Titoist socialism compounds the difficulties standing in the way of creating a viable market economy. Yugoslavia must now try to catch up with the reforms started a decade ago in Central and Eastern Europe. No other country embarking on the path of transition, not even Albania, had to contend with the painful measures called for by radical reform in the context of a collapsed economy so wracked by macroeconomic imbalances and with its resources so depleted. A brief description of the current, for the most part inherited, state of the economy indicates the scale of the domestic effort and international support that will be required to restore it to a semblance of health. That is followed by an inventory of the key problems of re structuring and reform needed to raise the level of economic governance and performance to reach the threshold of admissibility to membership of the EU.
Overcoming the “Daunting Economic and Human Legacy” Left by Ten Years Lost for Development * As observed earlier, 1989 marked the beginning of a steep decline in economic performance that had started more slowly almost a dec ade before (around the time of Tito’s death in 1980) in the Socialist ———— * IBRD, op.cit. 188 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), formed in 1992 as the SFRY broke up, was deeply involved in the civil strife of those and subsequent years and committed the lion’s share of its budget to military expenditure. The resultant and concomitant massive misallocation of resources under authoritarian rule, widespread corruption amongst the ruling elite, which appropriated a huge proportion of the state’s resources to itself, international sanctions and isolation have left in their wake an impoverished economy on the verge of collapse. The GDP is now less than half of what it was at the start of the decade. The number of poor has doubled. State and socially owned enterprises have been bled white and are decapitalised as a result. Banks have lost entirely the trust of the population. The social security network is under funded and poorly administered. Hundreds of thousands of resentful and comparatively neglected or excluded refugees and displaced persons are symptomatic of a social fabric that is severely rented. Infrastructure damaged or destroyed during the last phase of the conflict in 1999 has to be rebuilt. But remedial action has to be undertaken in a context of strong fiscal pressures, crippling external debt (118 % of GDP) and – until very recently – weak governance. Provided the will and the resources are available, the physical scars of the past decade can be made good, but the psychological damage will take longer to heal.
The Rreform Agenda and International Support in the Short to Medium Term Historians may view national and international action in the first year of a democratically elected government in a less generous light than seems appropriate at the time of writing, close to the anniversary. From this vantage point, both the flying start made to tackle reform by the young government and the rapid mobilisation of international support were impressive. 1 Shortly after taking office the new governments of the FRY and Serbia introduced a package of measures designed to achieve macroeconomic stabilisation and a beginning to liberalisation, the former by means of reducing inflation through cash balanced budgets and tight monetary policy, the latter by unifying multiple exchange rates and relaxing trade controls. ———— 1 Speed was, of course, of the essence and was feasible thanks to the work of the team of non regime economists known as the G17, who had regularly ana lysed and criticised the mismanagement of the Milošević regime and had pre pared the main elements of a reform programme well in advance of their entry into office. The rapidity of the IMF response was facilitated by the experience already gained in its ad hoc programme of support for Montenegro. 189 The programme won the immediate support of the IMF in December 2000 when it extended an Emergency Post conflict Facility of SDR 117 million (25% of quota), which enabled the clearance of arrears to the Fund as well as provided short term financing for the a bove mentioned programme up to March 2000, and membership in the Fund was restored on 20 December 2000. Some months later the government committed itself to a more ambitious programme of reform and that in turn received the backing of a Fund Stand by Arrangement (a credit of SDR 200 million, or US $249 million) on 11 June 2001 through March 2002. Meantime, the World Bank, the EU and the Fund had cooperated, well before the fall of the Milošević regime, in the preparation of an economic recovery and transition programme for the South Eastern European region as a whole. This provided a framework to guide international donors and also paved the way for the negotiation at a propitious time of a Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) regarded as the first step towards eventual EU accession. 2 Although the World Bank had been active since 1999 in the provision of analytical and advisory support, as just mentioned, restoration of formal relations with and membership in the World Bank Group took some time because of the need to find a solution to the problem of clearing Yugoslavia’s arrears (amounting to US $1.7 billion at 31 December 2000) to the Bank. By 8 May 2001 a consolidation plan had been agreed upon and Yugoslavia resumed membership as the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on that date. The Bank had meanwhile continued to work closely with the Yugoslav authorities on the reform programme as well as with the international donor community on issues of direction, speed and sequencing of reforms in advance of the donor pledging conference that took place in Brussels on 29 June 2001. The outcome of that conference slightly exceeded expectations, as pledges were made to the value of US$ 1.3 billion. Timely disbursement of these and other promised sums was and will continue to be of crucial importance. That, in turn, will depend on the maintenance of relations of trust and confidence and shared policy aims between donor governments and Yugoslavia. 3 ———— 2 The European Parliament has explicitly stated that the SAAs should be re garded as carrying with them a real prospect of accession at a later date. This parliamentary position recognises the need to sustain the dynamics of political and economic reform and the level of popular support for such reforms, which the perspective of membership at a not too remote date in the future is believed to engender. 3 Delays in, or half hearted reforms, would rob the policy framework of conviction and discourage donors and investors with a resultant lowering of growth rates and slower recovery of living standards in relation to expectations. 190
Stabilisation and Reform of Structural Fundamentals For most of the decade of the 1990s the public finances of Yugo slavia hovered on the brink of collapse, caused by major economic imbalances that the regime concealed by suppressed inflation and hidden subsidies to the enterprise sector. (There was, however, a phase of open hyperinflation in 1992 1994 – only once exceeded in scale historically, in Hungary in 1945 1946 – that at its peak in January 1994 reached a monthly inflation rate of 313 million percent). Priority tasks of the new government have therefore been to institute effective control over public expenditure, to reform tax policy, and to reduce quasi fiscal deficits. In drawing up a set of decisive measures to remedy these imbalances the BWI have been active in providing technical assistance in respect to diagnosis and the design of, for example, public expenditure management and controls. In that context a medium term strategy for expenditure management has been prepared. A bold tax reform has also been started in Serbia, including a reduction in the number of taxes (of which there were 230 different varieties on the territory of Serbia alone!), a lowering of tax rates, and a widening of the tax base by means of the elimination of very numerous discretionary exemptions. Sales taxes and excise taxes have also been unified or streamlined. These reforms, while essential and reflecting an admirable determination on the part of the government, will not in themselves suffice to restore macro economic stability unless accompanied by sweeping structural reforms of enterprise ownership, the banking system, and governance. Each of these will call for a judicious blend of political courage and economic policy finesse. One of the root causes of imbalance and poor or even catastrophic economic performance has been the peculiar form of “social owner ship” inherited from the SFRY. This is a hybrid form of public and private ownership under which enterprises are formally owned by their employees (the formal legislative underpinning of the concept of “workers’ self management”) but subject to centralised regulation and control. They are thus easy to manipulate, particularly through the appointment of the executive director – by tradition a prerogative of the ruling political party. Alongside these “socially owned” enterprises are traditional state owned enterprises, which were subject to overt political interference and whose assets were plundered by the corrupt members or followers of the previous regime’s ruling elite.
———— Social and political reactions could then have incalculable consequences for sta bility and economic progress. 191 When to the built in inefficiencies of this ownership system are added the distortions caused by the regulatory environment in which enterprises have had to operate, it is small wonder that most social and state owned enterprises have chronically run at a loss. 4 To its credit, the government of Serbia has already begun to tackle the problems caused by the central regulation of prices by freeing them from controls or – as in the case of public utilities (notably electric power) – progressively aligning them more closely to economic costs. The problems that remain to be addressed concern the massive overhang of arrears of inter enterprise debt (the “stock” of debt) and the avoidance of further additions to that debt (the “flow” of fresh debt). The former could probably be dealt with by means of mutual write offs of debt, accompanied by injections of public funds to clear up enterprise balance sheets. This policy carries with it, of course, the risk of moral hazard. The flow problem can be managed only by price liberalisation and the imposition of hard budgetary constraints on enterprises in the framework of a comprehensive effort at enterprise restructuring that includes the reform of ownership forms and privatisation. The harder budgetary constraints for enterprises will have to include the removal of policy and legal barriers to bankruptcy, liqui dation, and the transfer of assets from socially owned to private ownership. As for the difficult reforms required for privatisation, the existing legal framework is already being modified so that 70% of enterprise equity will be offered to strategic investors with a view to establishing clearly defined and dominant owners. A privatisation agency has been set up, and preparations are underway to sell 34 “early win” firms to strategic investors, with the assistance of international in vestment bankers, by mid 2002. These reforms, together with the underlying problems that they are designed to address, are all inter related. Thus, an efficient and competitive banking sector is indispensable for recapitalising the enterprise sector and applying credible performance criteria for lending and investment policy. A vigorous start has been made to weeding out or restructuring inefficient and insolvent banks within a tight time frame and with the active support of a newly created Bank Rehabilitation Agency (BRA). With a view to promoting a healthy and flourishing private sector, steps are being taken in both republics to enhance competition and to reduce barriers to the start up and operation of SMEs, such as barriers
———— 4 The cumulative uncovered losses of both of these categories of enterprises in the period 1994 1999 amounted to the equivalent of US$15.5 billion, or 125% of Yugoslavia’s GDP in 2000. 192 to competition, restrictive labour practices and legislation, and licens ing requirements. An SME agency has been established in Serbia. Rehabilitation of aging and damaged infrastructure – particularly in energy, transport and water/waste management – has already begun, but after so many years of neglect, compounded by the destruction caused by bombardment, a great deal remains to be done. This represents a heavy claim on resources where international support from the financial institutions is a key priority. The defence sector is certainly a candidate for streamlining, as it was in some of the other ex communist countries, such as Slovakia, when they embarked on transition. The conversion to civilian purpos es of military personnel and productive capacities is a challenge that should be faced in the near future and one in which the comparative experience of other countries in the region could provide useful guidance. Clearly, the pace at which conversion is undertaken will depend to an important degree on the responsiveness of both the armed forces and the local “military industrial complex” to democratic control, as well as on the perceived level of tension in southern Serbia and in neighbouring countries vulnerable to instability.
Rebuilding Institutions and Strengthening Democratic Governance Civil society was largely mute throughout much of the past dec ade in Yugoslavia, although there were several honourable and conspicuous exceptions (subject to constant harassment) such as Helsinki Watch, the B92 audiovisual and Internet news commentator and provider, the G17 group of independent economists, and the three month long street demonstrations in the winter of 1997 in favour of a change of government. Government and enterprise institutions, and the media, were largely “owned” by a clique that was a law unto itself, often closely associated with sanctions busting groups and others engaged in mafia type activities. The rule of law was not respected and the judiciary was far from independent. Corruption was rampant. A blind eye was turned by the administration and the police to many abuses, whether economic crimes of embezzlement and smuggling or the murder of prominent politicians or journalists. These dismal facts are recalled here in order to underline the mag nitude and urgency of the challenge faced by the new government in making a clean sweep of the malpractice of the past. This can be done only by building or rebuilding the institutions necessary to and appropriate for a democracy governed by the rule of law. Such institutions will function properly only when subject to the principles and practice of good governance. Needless to say, root and branch 193 reforms of public administration accompanied by the eradication of the privileges attributed to their members by the ruling political parties will not be popular amongst those who stand to lose. Opposition both to the required legislation and to its implementation is to be expected. Against that must be placed the reality that accession to the EU and reinsertion into the international community is inconceivable without such reforms being successfully undertaken. Much encouragement can be drawn from the demonstrated wil lingness of the new government of Serbia to rise to this challenge. It has started to diagnose and neutralise sources of corruption and tax evasion, to attempt to build up public confidence in government, and to develop rules based governance. Preparation of a strategy for reforming public administration has been entrusted to the newly established Public Administration Council of Serbia. The civil service will have to be put on a more professional footing by means of improvements in its structure, recruitment and remuneration. (The undertaking announced by the minister of justice of Serbia at the end of November 2001 to raise the salary of judges to US $500 per month next year is a promising step toward strengthening the independence and honesty of the judiciary.) It is noteworthy that a recent law enacted in Serbia has cut in half the number of ministries and targets have already been set for reducing public sector employment as a whole. External monitoring of public sector performance will have to be introduced in order to ensure the accountability of governance.
Exports and Regional Integration as Key Contributors to Success The foreign trade sector of the economy has a long way to go before any recovery can be envisaged. The Milošević regime closely controlled foreign transactions by means of administrative measures and quantitative restrictions, with favours being granted to selected enterprises controlled by the regime's favourite sons. As a result, trade flows were highly distorted, and monopoly profits (rents) were creamed off by the select few. The chronic current account deficit was financed with the savings accounts confiscated from households and revenue from a few large scale privatisation deals with Italian and Greek financiers. As with the transition economies of Central Europe and the Baltic states, which enjoyed brisk growth in the past year thanks to buoyant exports, the prospects for growth in Yugoslavia will depend more on the strength of demand for its exports than on supply side constraints. The gloomy outlook for growth in its main trading partners in Western Europe is therefore particularly bad news at a time when the country is
194 at such an early stage of a radical programme of reform and external financing requirements are large. For that reason also it therefore seems important to speed the co operative programmes envisioned (but very slowly implemented) in the Stability Pact that aim at stimulating economic and democratic reforms by fostering closer integration of the countries of the South Eastern Europe region with the EU. All countries of the region would gain from the restoration and strengthening of the trade ties that exist ed in the SFRY and from the technology and export know how asso ciated with higher levels of foreign direct investment, for which sta bility and the absence of political risks are indispensable. Efforts will also have to be made to liberalise trade policy (still unduly protective) and to build up trade related institutions such as customs services and the agencies responsible for the implementation of trade policy.
Achieving Human Security by Means of Social Integration and Interethnic Tolerance Part of the dire legacy of the past decade has been a doubling in the number of poor people. 5 Those who are out of work, or underem ployed in socially owned and state enterprises (where there has been labour ‘hoarding’ on a large scale) and living on average wages that do not exceed DM 140 per month, or pensioners who have often had to make do with much delayed or no payments at all of their entitlements, or displaced persons and refugees for whom the social security net is inadequate all add up to a major claim on the scarce resources and social support capacity of the government. Here again, the problem has been recognized by the government, which has given some additional resources for health care, social security and education in the Serbian draft budget for 2002. Reforms are also being introduced to correct structural imbalances (e.g. by raising the at present low retirement age), to improve unemployment benefits, and to review labour market legislation in order to remove rigidities that result in overprotection of those holding jobs while acting as a barrier to new entrants and discouraging the development of SMEs. All of these measures should contribute in some degree to alleviating the grave problems of social exclusion and/or destitution experienced by the 600,000 displaced persons concentrated in Serbia. The fact remains, however, that the achievement of a higher degree of human ———— 5 The scale of impoverishment is illustrated by the increase in the proportion of the non agrarian population classified as being in the poverty bracket, from 24.7% in 1995 to 38.4% in 2000. (Figures are for Serbia without Kosovo and Metohija and are taken from the G17 Institute report of November 2001). 195 security as a vital component of security on the national and regional plan has attracted neither political attention nor economic and human resources on the scale required. Progress has been minimal and barely perceptible to those living on the brink of subsistence.
KEY ELEMENTS OF THE MEDIUM TERM AGENDA FOR SUCCESSFUL AND LASTING REFORM
Much courage and creative thinking has gone into framing and launching the medium term programme of reforms of the Serbian government. In office for just about a year (at the time of writing), the government has accomplished a good deal, especially as regards short term macro economic stabilisation. But it is faced with the difficult policy dilemmas of choosing between measures that will raise ef ficiency, such as price reforms, or putting yet more pressure on al ready very hard pressed consumers at a low level of living. Not e nough resources are available to escape from this type of dilemma. Chaos and instability could possibly ensue, with incalculable con sequences. Clearly, a sustained and generous provision of external resources is needed to limit the pain of the transition to a modern democracy and prospering market economy. Primary responsibility for the mobiliza tion of external resources on an adequate scale rests with the interna tional community and with the EU in particular. The role of the international financial institutions is to maintain the speedy and open handed financial and technical support that they have offered in the first year, to advise on and, when within their mandate, provide part of the funding for well conceived programmes of reform drawing on the considerable reservoir of experience accumulated in Central and Eastern Europe. As in similar situations elsewhere, the “certificate of good housekeeping” issued by the Fund and Bank can be a powerful incentive to other donors to loosen their purse strings, as well as to private investors to put funds into enterprises in Yugoslavia. The level of international support, both multilateral and bilateral, governmental and private, is a function of the commitment of the gov ernment to sweeping reforms and of the degree of popular backing for the manner in which they are carried out. 6
———— 6 A survey conducted by the G17 Institute in July 2001 found that an unex pectedly high proportion of citizens, some three fourths, believes that there will be an improvement in their economic situation within two or three years. Some 196 That in turn will depend on tangible improvements in the level of living, notably of the poorest sections of the population (the unem ployed, displaced persons and pensioners). Progress in the other ele ments of human security – the rule of law, social justice and the social safety net, equitable and sustainable development, protection of human rights, inter group dialogue and reconciliation – must go hand in hand with a rise in the standard of living. For all of this a high level of political skill and determination is called for. The new government has so far demonstrated that it possesses these qualities and a high level of commitment to the achievement of its stated aim of “breaking with the past”. 7 It cannot hope to move ahead on all fronts at the same speed. Nonetheless, amongst its priorities greater weight could usefully be ascribed to: instituting a national reconciliation procedure to exorcise the demons of memory and make possible a fresh start in an at mosphere free of social mistrust; finding negotiated solutions to outstanding constitutional problems; downscaling the armed forces and drawing up plans for the staged conversion of the defence sector of industry to civilian purposes; accelerating the enactment of measures leading towards re gional integration, using preparations for accession to the EU as a catalyst; speeding up privatisation and the encouragement, as appropri ate with incentives, of strategic foreign investments.
———— 94% favour faster reforms, and privatization is supported by 67% of those polled. 7 The Serbian Finance Minister, Mr. Božidar Djelić, echoed Winston Chur chill at a conference in Belgrade on 27 November 2001 by warning Serbia to expect one more year of “blood, sweat and tears.” 197 ANNEX Table 1. Federal Republic of Yugoslavia: Key Economic Indicators 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2010 National Accounts GDP (USS millions) 1/ 16253 14353 10338 9015 11413 13092 14219 15362 24538 Real GDP growth 15.7 6.0 5.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 CM.) Investment (% of GDP) 13.0 11.1 14.3 17.5 19.5 21.0 21.3 22.5 Gross Do mestic Sav ing (% of 3.9 0.4 3.5 0.8 1.7 5.2 6.5 14.1 GDP) Public Sec- tor Balance Expendi tures (% of 40,3 47,4 49.2 48.9 48.7 44,7 GDP) 2/ o/w public investment 1.3 1.5 1.8 2.9 3.2 3.5 4.0 4.0 Revenues (% of GDP) 39.1 41.2 42.2 41.4 41.8 42.0 Deficit (% of GDP) 1.2 6.2 7.0 7.5 6.9 2.7 External Accounts Exports of goods and 35.0 22.2 10.0 13.0 14.5 10.0 8.0 services (% change) Imports of ~ and services 30.5 29.6 20.4 10.7 6.1 6.0 5.1 (% change) Current account 1164 480 690 400 712 1268 1297 1324 1209 balance as % of GDP 7.2 3.3 6.7 4.4 6.2 9.7 9.1 8.6 4.9 Indebted- ness TDO/XGS 333.4 254.2 182.4 179.2 178.1 152.8 TDO/GDP 136.1 99.2 62.9 65.2 66.4 62.6 TDS/XGS 3/ 2.3 8.2 14.8 14.3 15.7 14.9 Prices Retail price inflation 18.5 29.8 42.4 71.8 80.9 20.0 12.0 7.0 5.0 (p.a.) Real interest rate (e.o.p.) 51.9 25.1 3.3 0.0 28.1 11.3 7.5 4.9 4.0 4/
198 1/ GDP estimates include Kosovo. The economy of Kosovo is es timated to be about 6 percent of the total FRY economy. 2/ Reported on a commitments basis, but excluding accumulated arrears on external debt. 3/ Exports exclude workers' remittances. XGS = export of goods and services. TDO = total debt. TDS = total debt service. 4/ Annualised short term lending rate. Rate in 2000 is for August. Source: World Bank Federal Republic of Yugoslavia: Transitional Support Strategy, June 26, 2001 (Report no. 22090 – YU)
199
200 Key Regional Security Issues in South Eastern Europe Gerard Stoudmann OSCE Office on Democracy Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR)
THE OSCE APPROACH
Until 1996, the OSCE had been almost completely absent from South Eastern Europe. Over the last five years since the Dayton Peace Accords of 1995, however, the Organization has developed possibly one of the largest civilian presences in the Region (it has more personnel in South Eastern Europe than anywhere else, including in its Headquarters), with field missions in each state/entity, from Albania to Croatia, Kosovo and Montenegro. The Balkans provided the OSCE, a relative newcomer among international organisations, with the first "reality check" of its operational capabilities. If it has seldom been in the driver's seat during negotiations in crisis situations, it has never theless been a key implementing agency in Bosnia (1996), Croatia (1997), Kosovo (1998/99), and now in Macedonia. Each of these missions has a different mandate, although they are mostly known for supervising elections. What else do they have in common, and what is the underlying strategy to address regional issues related to stability and security? When assessing what the OSCE is attempting to achieve in the region through its field presence or its institutions such as the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) or the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM), one should bear in mind some of the characteristics of the Organization. First, the main raison d’être of the OSCE is conflict prevention and post conflict rehabilitation. As such, it logically seeks to develop methodologies that are conducive to achieving democratic normality and is therefore particularly active in institution building. Its activities and goals include: developing political parties, strengthening civil society, and developing rule of law and other elements essential for the promotion and establishment of a sustainable democracy, from police reform to judiciary training. Thanks to its developed field net work and contact with all sectors of the society, it is also in the best position to facilitate such developments and to reach all segments of 201 the population. It is thus attempting a “bottom up” approach, which is essential if citizens are to have a sense of ownership of their political system and be seriously committed to democratisation efforts while changing traditional behaviour and the institutional culture. Preaching good governance at the level of central state authorities is fine, but will lead nowhere without an improvement of local governance and “grass roots” perceptions. Second, the OSCE has inherited from its predecessor, the CSCE, the concept of comprehensive security, which links the military, economic, and human dimensions together as all equally relevant for peace and stability. In the South Eastern European context today, this means that long term stability and security, economic development, and the building of democratic institutions that guarantee fundamental freedoms and respect for human rights are interconnected and inter dependent. As the essential pillars for building a secure and predic table political environment, they need to be developed in parallel. For example, democratic institutions are about building good governance with a strong, supporting civil society. Institution building is essential not only for long term stability and security in each country but also for economic development, and the economy, in turn, needs a predictable environment in order to flourish. To have good governance, a system of checks and balances is necessary, and therefore, democratic rules of the game are required. It is also through the system of checks and balances that one can ensure that civil society supports and backs the institutions. Any state that disregards these fundamental principles risks disconnection among the government, its institutions, and the people of the country, and therefore must accept an element of unpredictability and instability in its functioning. This multidimensional theory is the basis for the OSCE approach, and it is reflected in the structures and priorities of the OSCE’s field missions as well as in the range of personnel deployed – from military experts to human rights lawyers. OSCE institutions such as the ODIHR, the HCNM, and the Representative on Freedom of the Media also contribute to such a multidimensional approach through their respective activities. Third, the OSCE is the only European organisation active in the region that has both a political approach and that counts both Russia and the states of the region among its members. It offers, therefore, unique potential; this inclusiveness implies that participation in the decision making process should – at least in theory – be based on cooperation and not on imposed and “ready made” solutions from a broad. A common sense of purpose is necessary from the national counterpart and the Organization, as the collisions of agendas can at times prove a limiting factor for the Organization, in particular when determined and quick action is requested. The OSCE is, more than 202 any other international organisation, the reflection of the political will of its participatory states and therefore a reflection of their agendas. All together, the combination of substantial and flexible field deployment, a comprehensive, cross cutting approach to security, focus on conflict prevention and post conflict rehabilitation, and the presence within its ranks of all key players, puts the OSCE in a unique position to play a major role in institution building and democratisa tion of the region, thus contributing to its long term stabilisation but also reflecting that security parameters today – contrary to the Cold War era and its concept of balance of forces between two blocs – emphasise the non military aspects of a comprehensive security system. Whether the OSCE is actually fulfilling its promises and using its potential to the full extent is altogether another question. The OSCE has not been much better than the International Community as a whole in setting the priorities of a long term strategy for the region, in establishing clear objectives or in developing the sort of long term, patient approach that guarantees success. Short term objectives and reactive measures have, as elsewhere, too often characterised its action. Sometimes the methodology has rested too much on “imported” solutions and know how from abroad, dismissing in a somewhat arrogant way the local potential at hand. But sometimes, too, serious commitment from local counterparts and the will to fully participate in democratic, political and economic changes are lacking and limited to “lip service”. There is definitely a need for a clear assessment of the key is sues and challenges facing the countries and the international community in South Eastern Europe, and to set short , mid and long term priorities for everyone.
KEY ISSUES FOR REGIONAL SECURITY
General Considerations As stated above, the concept of security in the 21 st century is broader than its mere military aspects, as the recent global developments of terrorism, organised crime, and civil conflicts clearly indicate. When addressing key issues for security in South Eastern Europe, it must be kept in mind that the military potential in the region is more relevant in terms of its political dimension than its purely technical military one. The role of the international community in facilitating the creation of a secure and stable environment and as a guarantor of security is an essential factor in the regulation of security issues. But political will and commitment to democratic changes from national leaders – and
203 support thereof from civil society – is and will remain the only engine for effective change.
Additional Factors for Consideration by the International Community The international community's involvement will continue to be necessary to facilitate the process of change, but the areas of and objectives for that involvement must be clearly defined. Until now, the international community's role in South Eastern Europe has been reduced too often to a reactive, emergency policy, with short term priorities but no long term vision. Despite the existence of the structure of a Stability Pact as a basis for regional cooperation, there is no clear understanding or policy of how to succeed in transforming societies into democracies, i.e. how to build the necessary institutions without imposing structures that are not always compatible with socio political realities in the respective states. Currently most of the political change and institution building in South Eastern Europe is being undertaken by a handful of national leaders and a large number of international advisors. Even though large numbers of experts and resource persons from different fields exist in most of the region’s countries, they are not sufficiently integrated into the design and development of concepts relating to democratic institution building, judicial and economic reform, and restructuring of the public and social sector. Sensitivity to the complex interaction between political transformation and economic reform is lacking, and hence there are no methodologies that would allow for a process that would link both types of development.
The Challenges The following issues need to be addressed by states in South Eastern Europe as a relevant part of their security policy and integrat ed as priorities into their national policies. Many are already being addressed, albeit partially. Some need time to ripen and mature before they can be successfully dealt with. All are interconnected and demand a parallel approach: unresolved issues related to the former Yugoslavia's disinte gration; the fight against organised crime/corruption; institution building/democratisation; the integration of minorities; mechanisms of regional cooperation; 204 economic reforms and development; the advancement of education; and integration into European structures.
Unresolved Issues Related to the Former Yugoslavia's Disintegration Determining the future of Montenegro , either as a federal state and equal partner within the FRY, or as an independent, sover eign state or any variation thereof, such as a loose union be tween sovereign states, is essential and urgent. The question of Montenegro’s future has destabilising potential, draws energy and resources from other priorities, and leaves open the question of the future existence of the FRY. In addition, decisions cannot be made on a number of issues in the realm of federal control until the question of Montenegro’s future is answered. More over such deadlock affects negatively, both in Serbia and in Montenegro, the momentum following the return of democracy in Belgrade and further delays urgent reforms. Considering that the positions of Belgrade and Podgorica are not very far apart on most substantial points, it is all the more frustrating to observe the lack of progress towards an agreement. In any case, the pres ent institutional mess is a factor of uncertainty and instability, which calls for a permanent solution. In the case of Kosovo's final status , more time is needed to de velop a solution, as both sides’ positions are incompatible. Ob viously, developments in Montenegro will be closely observed by Kosovar Albanians, and independence for the first would necessarily lead to questioning of the relevance of UN Security Consel Resolution 1244, which specifies that Kosovo is a part of the FRY. What would happen if the latter ceased to exist? Even so, the two cases must be analysed on their own merits, and the parameters are fundamentally different in terms of re cent history, religion, ethnic origin and, not to be underesti mated, emotional charge. The present situation in Kosovo, how ever, will remain a permanent factor of instability for the region – much greater than Montenegro – and block any exit strategy for the international community, thus preventing normalisation. The return or integration of refugees and IDPs is another issue that prevents full normalisation and impacts negatively on the development of good neighbourly relations. In addition, it con stitutes an economic and social liability. In the interest both of the state and of the individuals, pragmatic solutions should be sought on a case by case basis, favouring integration when re turns remain “wishful thinking”. 205 The healing process : Last but not least among “unresolved is sues”, the other legacies of the war, such as war criminals or files from security agencies, should be dealt with expediently, as they also constitute a major obstacle to normalisation of rela tions with neighbours. Beyond that, dealing with individual cas es of war crimes is the only method to distance collective re sponsibility. It should lead to a socially beneficial healing pro cess and a coming to terms with the past.
Fight Against Organised Crime and Corruption The combined effect of war, sanctions and the collapse of the former social and political order has created an environment in which organised crime has flourished and increased its influence through all state structures up to the highest political spheres. It is fair to say that today it constitutes one of the major obstacles to sustainable, transpar ent economic reform and to the functioning of democratic institutions, in particular the rule of law, and that it represents a permanent challenge to stability and security through the intimate links between criminal organisations and extremist nationalist groups, as the recent case of Macedonia shows. Moreover, links with international terrorism are a realistic proposition, even if only occasional and opportunistic. It therefore continues to fuel tensions beneath the apparent stability imposed in the region. It should figure on top of the list of any government in the region, keeping in mind that any efficient action implies cooperation at the international and regional level. Trans border cooperation should be strongly facilitated and efficient law enforcement improved substantially by capacity building and technical assistance, on the one hand, and a thorough “clean up” and restructuring of law enforcement agencies, on the other.
Institution Building A concept presented and repeated over and over, and which remains unavoidable in all serious reform processes, institution building implies more than just building democratic institutions through elections, such as electing government and parliament; rather, it is all a bout ensuring the democratic functioning of state structures and establishing a system of checks and balances. The population must identify itself with the system, feel empowered, and develop a sense of ownership of the democratic structures established. To this aim, the regeneration and strengthening of civil society is important, and should be accepted and understood as a key factor for the creation of a predictable and stable environment and, therefore, relevant to
206 security policy. Any long lasting and growing gap between the power structures and the public should be an “early warning” regarding the incompatibilities of respective agendas, which eventually threaten na tional and regional stability. Many examples, in the region and be yond, prove this point, such as the collapse of the Albanian state in 1997. The security and armed forces (police, border guards, militia and, generally speaking, all law enforcement bodies plus the military) and the judiciary should be considered as priorities. Both need to be depoliticised and understand that their purpose is to serve the people and the common interest rather than a political regime. The democratic control of the armed forces is particularly relevant to the environment of South Eastern Europe, where some 10 years of war and non democratic heritage have taken their toll. But a fundamental restructuring is also necessary if organised crime is ever to be controlled, as it is well known that police and security services are often deeply involved in criminal activities and cannot therefore play any major role in curbing these activities. Ensuring an independent judiciary is important well beyond the impact it can have on individual citizens: it will provide the state with a tool that is indispensable to prosecute corruption and crime as well as guarantee a predictable legal environment for investors, both national and foreign, and will thus contribute directly to favourable conditions for economic development. Seen from the security policy point of view, armed forces and the judiciary are extremely important factors of stability. They can be either an obstacle to democratisation and the reform process or an element spearheading progress and a factor of integration inside the society.
Integration of Minorities The explosive potential of not fully integrated minorities is largely exemplified by recent events in Macedonia. It should therefore go without saying that arrangements providing for the full integration of minorities into the state are key to stability and security. The con cept of full integration is pro active and does not mean renouncing or losing one’s cultural identity. It goes beyond minority protection. It implies adapting the state structures, constitutional and legislative framework so that minorities are represented at the local and national level, with equal rights and credible equal opportunities. They should perceive themselves as citoyens à part entière and share the same sense of ownership of state institutions as members of the majority. Obviously this was not the case in the recent past, as the dramatic con sequences have already demonstrated. Here again, any sensible secu
207 rity policy must consider the minority factor seriously if the roots of nationalist conflicts in the region are to be eradicated.
Mechanisms of Regional Cooperation In a global environment, most problems cannot be tackled at the national level; therefore, trans border, regional cooperation among neighbours is called for. This is even more valid for states with rela tively small territories and economic potential that aspire to larger in tegration in European structures. Regional cooperation constitutes a step towards such integration. Such mechanisms should be developed with particular but not exclusive regard to trade, freedom of move ment, the combating of organised crime and all forms of trafficking (where, by the way, regional cooperation between criminal gangs works quite well), and environmental issues, etc. Mechanisms to ad dress problems and potential crises would add an element of coopera tive security as well.
Economic Reform and Development South Eastern Europe comes out of the last decade extremely impoverished, with economic structures and theories inherited from the communist system. Talking about the need for economic reform and development may seem, therefore, to be stating the obvious. This topic is, however, too often segregated from the issues that are tradi tionally mentioned in the context of security and stability, such as institution building. As stated before, sensitivity to the complex interaction between economic reform and political transformation is still very much lacking, both in the countries of South Eastern Europe and in the international community. Economic reform and development can nevertheless offer a key contribution to security policy, in addition to the obvious benefits. It will: • have a stabilising effect by eroding nationalist feelings and ethnic divisions, therefore contributing to the prevention of poten tial nationalist conflicts and crises; • be an incentive for institution building, an independent judici ary, and good governance in general, because economic operators need transparent and predictable “rules of the game”, which they know cannot be changed abruptly; • create other sources of wealth than those stemming from the black economy, and thus decrease the influence of the latter; • allow for the regeneration – or creation – of a middle class, as the case may be, which will turn out to be one of the strongest supports for stability as it usually represents a conservative social
208 segment. Also, the general level of education will be affected pos itively, therefore increasing qualitatively the human resources of a given country. Therefore, by creating an environment conducive to market economy, for example through the creation of a legislative framework favouring investments or a transparent and accountable privatisation process, governments of the region will have an impact that extends far beyond purely economic benefits and that will contribute to re gional and European integration.
Advancement of Education It is necessary to place more emphasis on the education sector for the following main reasons: elements of human rights, tolerance, sen sitivity to vulnerable groups, and peaceful conflict resolution can easily be included in the curricula at any school level, including universities, and can thereby positively influence society and future generations through prevention and confidence building mechanisms. Access of minorities and other vulnerable groups to education, includ ing education about one’s own language and a curriculum that takes cultural and regional aspects into account, if introduced as a process, could help defuse broader existing ethnic problems. Independent experts’ commissions should be established, building on already existing models (e.g. the German Polish Commission and their work on developing history books), to assist stakeholders in the region in learning to develop schoolbooks and curricula that are depoliticised. This issue should be perceived as a long term investment in security and stability. Aimed obviously at the younger generations, it should benefit students as well as well as professionals in all cate gories, particularly civil servants, judiciary and armed and security services. It should also contribute to raising the qualitative level of human resources available in countries of the region and possibly to slow down the “brain drain” of these last years.
European Integration All leaders and intellectual circles of South Eastern Europe today advocate European integration as the ultimate goal. For some, the motivation may be linked to the status symbol of European Union membership and the immediate benefits they expect from it, but one should hope that there is a more profound, even possibly subconscious motivation: it is only through integration that definitive stability will come to the region. After ten years of disintegration, everyone should
209 understand that there is no alternative but to rebuild some sort of integration, which would go through Brussels. However, many governments of the region that proclaim integration as the new religion may not always understand all its implications and, with time, as the process develops and the realities shape up more clearly, there may be disillusionment and new reticence, in particular if public opinion changes. Such examples can be observed in opinion polls today in certain states that are candidates for the next enlargement. Therefore one should caution against presenting European Union membership today as the El Dorado, but instead present it as a necessary, if at times painful and difficult process that is about South Eastern European countries adapting to the Eropean Union’s structures and objectives and not the opposite! Political leaders will have to remember that European integration has to remain the ultimate goal of their security policy.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
As stated above, the key issues have to be dealt with and progress in a simultaneous, parallel process. Therefore, establishing priorities among priorities can appear somewhat artificial. Is the criterion feasi bility or desirability? Answers are bound to be subjective, depending on one's own predilection or specialisation. I am personally tempted to suggest the following priorities: • unresolved issues from the past, such as the Montenegro ques tion and the status of Kosovo, because of their deadlock effect on the reform process and their destabilising potential; the issue of war crimes, as well, to come to terms with the past and thus allow for a dynamic boost in the society; • organised crime and corruption, because of their widespread, increasingly negative effects on building a functioning, democ ratic state where rule of law prevails, their appalling human rights implications and their devastating consequences on the credibility of the states of the region as sovereign, international actors, as well as their negative impact on foreign investment and therefore on economic reform and development; moreover, such phenom ena present a permanent risk to security and stability in South Eastern Europe because of their links with political extremism and international terrorism; • institution building, because of its positive, crosscutting ef fects on the stability of the state and the development of civil so ciety, and because it provides the platform upon which to build growth and economic development. In many ways, building func tioning democratic institutions can provide the answer to a num
210 ber of the key problems that remain to be addressed in South Eastern Europe.
211 Security in South Eastern Europe in the Next 10 15 Years Bisera Turković Centre for Security Studies Sarajevo
INTRODUCTION: A PERSPECTIVE ON REGIONAL SECURITY IN SOUTH EASTERN EUROPE
A New Security Environment The transformation of security and stability considerations has meant that the formulation and implementation of security and foreign policy cannot be undertaken from a unitary, state perspective; rather, the new environment, together with accession to common security organisations, demands that South Eastern European states must also develop their security policies within a “supranational” context, in the means of formulation and application. This ambiguity transforms the traditional concept of a unitary state enemy, which now is considered a definition of the past, into the notion that enemies and risks will come in the form of particular actors or groups. Specifically, this involves focusing upon ethno na tional and ethno religious movements, religious extremists, criminal organisations, terrorists and insurgents. In addition, it is equally important to consider that many of the South Eastern European states are comprised of ethnic minorities, who, in the light of democratic and systemic change, seek self determination, which also provides challenges to the security and stability of South Eastern Europe and the region as a whole. As a result, ethno political determination and the proliferation of organised crime will provide the background for security and political considerations in South Eastern Europe during the next decade. The ambiguous nature of the new security dilemma has demanded a certain level of departure from the traditional logic of the Westpha lian model of the international system, which characterised the secu rity and defence policies of European states during the Cold War. The nature of direct causality between the security of nations has equally demanded that security and defence cannot be based around the principle of political autonomy. The prevailing idea of an enlarged 212 security concept is a direct response to this security dilemma. It takes into account the fact that there must be a transformation of the multilateral security structures of Western Europe if they are to adequately respond to the challenges of the new security environment. A similar approach will need to be adopted in South Eastern Europe to guarantee long term stability in the region. Moreover, where traditionally military means were the primary instruments of security and defence management and planning, the transformation of the political land scape of South Eastern Europe has meant a shift in focus. Traditional military instruments may no longer be the most efficient and practical means with which to maintain security. The rapid demise of ideological confrontation and the political and security concerns of the Cold War to some extent left a vacuum, which has been filled by new security and political concerns and threats; although the collapse of two ideologically opposed blocs has, to some extent, lessened the likelihood of global conflict, the security situation today has been transformed into a succession of actual or potential conflicts and threats of lesser intensity. The transformations seen in the region of South Eastern Europe over the past years demand that the focus of security be taken away from purely military terms and concepts. Security challenges and threats appear in entirely new forms, such as organised crime and political unrest. Consequently, a redefinition of the security model, together with the search for new mechanisms of security management, is required in order to respond adequately to these new challenges. In particular, changes in the political landscape and the advent of trends towards wider integration necessitate adequate collective responses to growing cross border security issues. The concept of security in the contemporary world has been trans formed into an idea that encompasses global, regional and national approaches. There has also arisen a need to redefine strategic stability, deterrence, crisis management, arms reduction, and confidence build ing measures; these have all become important contributing factors to the management of stability and security. It is imperative that Western Europe, and indeed, the countries of South Eastern Europe, include and further develop these concepts within their own security policies. As has often been noted, the collapse of the bipolar system has lessened the likelihood of global conflict. This transformation has occurred primarily for the reason that the proliferation of independent states has caused a shift in focus from one “risk” bloc towards a number of risk areas. Consequently, this transformation has meant that security assessments must now take into focus concerns that are more ambiguous in nature, and which cannot be assessed by traditional se curity and military methods. In particular, the waning of direct threats to national security and the rise of more general threats to inter 213 national stability require thought about the nature of strategic interests and appropriate responses to these threats.
The Cultural Dimension of Security In addition to the above prevailing trends and considerations, it is also necessary to take into account the heterogeneous nature of the South Eastern European region, forged by historical experience. In order to appreciate the political and security concerns of today, an approach that encompasses an understanding of this experience is re quired. Moreover, it is equally important to consider the significance of South Eastern Europe’s cultural experience and heritage, and how these concerns interact with security and political considerations. It is often easy to conceptualise conflict in terms of “Huntington esque” reasoning and arguments. Indeed, there is a tendency to over simplify the causes of conflict and to categorise these as having roots in religious opposition – leading implicitly towards a categorisation in terms of differing and opposing civilisations. One of the largest problems in defining conflict in this manner is that it understates and overlooks the significance of cultural identity and security. This perhaps is a consequence of analysing events and trends with a Western mindset, defined by specific cultural and societal norms and attitudes. When these norms and attitudes are implicitly applied – through a type of Western universalism – to the societal values present in South Eastern Europe, the specific historical and cultural experiences of these countries are consequently ignored. The Western idea of security is comprised of a larger and broader set of cultural and political assumptions about the nature of cultural expression and diversity, and this especially relates to the notion of pluralism and the interaction of minorities in western societies. As a result, more often than not, the concept of security is applied within a broader definition. Although this broader definition of security may have been adapted to the new environment, it still fails to take into account the significance of cultural security, which must be regarded as one of the primary requirements of overall stability, particularly in South Eastern Europe. Cultural security is an idea that involves the security of the individual and in turn transcends definitions of security from a material point of view. Cultural security is defined by non material factors such as language rights, freedom of religion and other forms of cultural expression, which indicate whether a specific culture is in jeopardy. The advent of self determination in South Eastern Europe has largely been a result of the failure of states to provide adequate plural istic measures that guarantee that minorities and other cultural 214 communities have a place in society and governmental structures. Whereas in western societies the pluralistic nature of society, the composition of civil society, and the nature of democratic experience have allowed for the expression of cultural identity, and even guaranteed it through practice and law, the relative lack of democratic experience in South Eastern Europe has meant that cultural determination and expression is much harder to establish. The political systems and experience of South Eastern European countries have been shaped by the existence of a cultural hegemony of traditional elites, who more often than not suppressed and ignored the heterogeneous reality of their societies. In turn, as the political circumstances of these countries changed, many of these cultural groups and communities felt exposed within a system that failed to address the reality of cultural diversity. Consequently, by failing to protect the rights of minorities, and by engaging in discriminatory practices against ethnic groups, these states exacerbated cultural insecurity. The domination of cultural e lites and the lack of mechanisms in which minorities could express themselves further intensified this feeling of insecurity. Genuine solutions to the problems associated with minorities are one of the essential prerequisites for the creation of long term stability in South Eastern Europe. Unless these issues are adequately ad dressed, they will produce further instability in the region during the next decade. This paper will examine a number of countries in South Eastern Europe and key issues for regional security that arise from their parti cular circumstances. Although most South Eastern European states face similar security risks, the nature of these risks have become more serious in some states due to other weaknesses and problems present in their societies. The resolution of these problems will provide many challenges during the next decade.
CONFLICT AND RISK AREAS
It is clear that the removal of Slobodan Milošević has paved the way for a distinct possibility of peace in the region of South Eastern Europe, and has, at least, removed the largest threat to security and stability in the region. However, the problems associated with in security and instability have not suddenly disappeared as a result of his departure. The potential for conflict and instability remains high due to the nature of the problems that the region faces. In particular, there a number of common problems that present challenges to the future stability and security of the region. These include the existence of nationalist sentiment, the wish for political determination, refugees
215 and displaced persons, dire economic circumstances, corruption and organised crime, and ineffective government institutions. It is clear that finding solutions to these problems will provide the background to the security environment of the next decade, and that the task of facing these challenges will be up to European organisations and national governments alike. The countries of South Eastern Europe have been given the op portunity to integrate with Europe, and as a future blueprint for stability in the region, this remains a practicable plan. However, it is equally clear that these countries first must address the causes of insta bility that are at the root of so many of their problems. Additionally, greater levels of political and economic reforms must be undertaken, not just to meet the criteria for European integration but also to improve the lives of ordinary citizens. This will in turn make criminal alternatives less desirable and help internal stability flourish. Although, as stated above, the countries of South Eastern Europe face similar threats to security and stability, for the purposes of presenting and underlining the key issues for regional security and the implications for the region, this paper will examine a number of coun tries in which those risks are exacerbated due to their particular circumstances. This paper will examine the countries of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo), Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and Albania.
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) Although the departure of Slobodan Milošević has paved the way for democracy and reform, it is clear that there still remain many prob lems – some directly due to his legacy, and others common to the whole of South Eastern Europe. In particular, one of the main challenges to be faced is the fate of the FRY as a whole; specifically, whether the current status of the FRY is politically sustainable. In view of the political determination of both Montenegro and Kosovo, it is clear that endeavours towards a solution to this problem – and in particular a solution that is acceptable to all sides – are going to be difficult to achieve. Given the complexity of the issues, it is equally apparent that any solution will not be achievable in a short space of time. Currently, as shown by the narrow victory of the pro indepen dence parties in April 2001 in Montenegro, there still remains divided opinion as to whether the country should split from the FRY. In par ticular, in consideration of the presence of strong nationalist sentiment within both Montenegro and Serbia, any such moves towards independence could potentially result in violence and conflict. In 216 addition, if Montenegro would leave the FRY, this would clearly also have serious implications for Kosovo, as self determination is a driving factor there as well. The future relationship of Kosovo to Serbia and the FRY is equally unclear. Currently, UN Security Counsel Resolution 1244, which has placed an UN organised civil administration in Kosovo (UNMIK), has effectively suspended the FRY’s capacity to govern the province. This leaves a largely unanswered question as to the fate of Kosovo once a final political arrangement is achieved. It is clear that if Kosovo were to achieve independence, a corresponding situation would be called for by nationalist elements in Montenegro, and vice versa. Clearly, the dilemma for the international community is whether to push for independence, which currently they do not support and which could result in further instability, or whether to push for the re establishment of some kind of federal arrangement, which could be equally destabilising. The current direction of thinking towards the FRY is somewhat characterised by the regional approach of European organisations towards South Eastern Europe. In particular, as we have already mentioned, the impetus is towards greater inter regional and intra regional cooperation. Therefore, despite evidence that a greater degree of autonomy will have to be provided, as a strong federal arrangement within the FRY is now no longer practical to either expect or implement, it is highly unlikely that the international community will make greater moves towards independence. From the Bosnian perspective, maintenance of the FRY will provide stability in the region and enable international cooperation between Bosnia and Herzegovina and the FRY to improve.
Serbia Serbia's problems are largely characterised by its relationships within the FRY and with Kosovo, with the insurgency in southern Serbia, and by its own economic and political difficulties. The contin ued presence of strong nationalist thinking within the country’s institutions (particularly military) remains one of the largest problems, especially in light of the fact that solutions for Montenegro and Kosovo must be found. Milošević's former party, the Socialist People's Party (SPS), remains united against any moves towards independence for Kosovo, as do FRY President Koštunica and the Yugoslav Army. Additionally, it is equally clear that Serbia cannot keep condescending towards Montenegro without causing greater tensions and further calls for independence. Consequently, the Montenegro and Kosovo problems remain among the largest potential causes of instability in the region. A solution is not obvious but will 217 most likely come in the form of a looser federal arrangement that appeases the nationalists on all sides, while remaining politically viable and sustainable. Political determination and ethnic unrest, however, are not only limited to Montenegro and Kosovo. Ethnic Albanian insurgency is also present in southern Serbia, particularly in Preševo valley, where ethnic Albanians constitute a large majority of the population. The primary security concern is that ethnic fighting could spill over into Macedonia, especially into northern Macedonia where Albanians represent a majority of the population. This will further destabilise an already unstable country. The extremist movement, the Liberation Army of Preševo, Medvedja and Bujanovac, is largely responsible for the action, but the situation has been exacerbated by official discrimination and persecution on the side of Serbian authorities towards the ethnic Albanian majority, which was present for years under Slobodan Milošević's rule. If the situation is to be adequately addressed, it will be essential that Serbia’s democratic and institutional reform process ensure institutional responsiveness towards minority concerns and rights. If existing practices remain unchanged, there is a large risk that minority uprisings and sporadic violence will continue. Crime and organised crime are also of particular concern in Serbia. The spread of crime has been exacerbated by the poor economic situation in Serbia. The average monthly salary is currently in the region of US $100, while the minimum monthly cost of living for a family is approximately US $200. 1 The increased levels of crime are also related to the activities of the police and military, which were responsible for highly criminal activities under the authority of Slobodan Milošević. Clearly, efforts must be made to bring them under democratic control and hold them much more accountable and culpa ble for their actions. The establishment of the rule of law is one of the fundamental processes that Serbia must go through for stability and confidence to increase. Ubiquitous corruption remains one of Serbia's, if not the whole region’s, largest problems; this suppresses democratic reform and results in judicial bias, lack of economic investment, and in particular, discredited public institutions and a general lack of trust in all levels of authority. This institutional frailty facilitates instability and insecurity. Clearly, efforts must be made towards the ———— 1 Balkan Regional Profile: The Security Situation and the Region Building Evolution of South Eastern Europe Research Study 6, 2001. June issue in Brief. Institute for Security and International Studies, Sofia, Bulgaria. www.isn.ethz.ch/isis/Research_Studies/Balkan_Regional_Profile/Balkan2001 06.htm 218 implementation and establishment of more CSBMs, as well as towards institution building and democratic and economic reform. Greater bilateral European cooperation will help to facilitate the spread of reform, and democratisation should pave the way for greater stability within Serbia during the next decade. At a regional level, the normalisation of relations between Serbia and Croatia, and more importantly, with Bosnia and Herzegovina, should provide the background for further cooperation and integration. In particular, this relates to FRY President Koštunica's statement that they now recognise Bosnia and Herzegovina as a state. The degree to which nationalist forces in Belgrade are still prompting Serb national ists in Bosnia, though, remains worrisome. As stated above, the implementation of reforms and the spread of democratisation will clearly aid in the dissipation of these negative elements. However, it is equally clear that these processes, besides requiring much time and effort to produce results, will be difficult to facilitate as certain elements of society have a stake in the continua tion of the status quo.
Montenegro We have previously mentioned some of the problems within Montenegro, in particular, the nature of its relationship within the FRY towards Serbia and the division over independence that remains the largest source of potential instability in the forthcoming period. The narrow margin of victory of the pro independence parties in the election this year shows that this issue must be resolved with two factors in mind: firstly, the establishment and clarification of relations between Serbia and Montenegro, and secondly, the appeasement of nationalists – on both sides – within Montenegro. The independence issue has additional implications for Montenegro. The erosion of federal institutions and the subsequent development of national institutions require measured and sustained institu tion building efforts. If Montenegro is going to achieve greater au tonomy, it is vital that the country has the administrative capacity with which to govern and implement reforms effectively. Rather than simply finding new mechanisms of rule, it would be prudent to equally consider how existing institutions and practices could be reformed. Montenegro must also ensure that the independence debate does not overshadow all other issues and that equal attention be directed towards other urgent reform measures and programmes. Montenegro faces the characteristic problems of the region: in particular, crime, corruption and the need for judicial and institutional reform. Any
219 judicial and institutional reforms should take into consideration the presence of ethnic minority groups in Montenegro. Currently, Montenegro does not face problems concerning its eth nic Albanian minority. Although the areas that border with Albania are predominantly comprised of ethnic Albanians, so far there has been no insurgency. Consequently, it is important to ensure that the tensions and problems present in the region as a whole do not spread to Montenegro. The development of democratic institutions’ respon siveness to minority rights will ensure that insurgency does not be come a factor, and it is highly likely that if these necessary reforms are implemented, Montenegro will not experience the type of problems that have been seen in the immediate area. Overall, it must be stated that although the situation is potentially unstable concerning the issue of independence, so far, arguments surrounding this issue have been expressed by legitimate means, and Montenegro has not experienced the insurgency present in Serbia, Kosovo and Macedonia. Provided that a collective solution for the FRY can be found, and that democratic reforms are implemented effec tively, Montenegro should not prove a destabilising factor within the region during the next decade. However, independence for Montenegro may provide short term instability for Bosnia. The current leadership in Montenegro has worked on establishing direct relations with the Republika Srpska (RS), which has not been looked upon favourably by the central Bosnian authorities. There is a possibility that, depending on the progressiveness of the government in Podgorica, these types of issues may sour relations between Bosnia and an independent Montenegro. In the long term, independence for Montenegro would be of strategic benefit to Bosnia and Herzegovina, as it would provide Bosnia with a third neighbour, thus breaking its encirclement by Yugoslavia and Croatia. This would provide international access to Bosnia through three different countries. A new balance of power would be favourable for Bosnia and Herzegovina, which would in that case have an eastern border with two weaker neighbours (Serbia and Montenegro) rather than one strong (the FRY).
Kosovo Some of the issues surrounding Kosovo and its relationships to wards the FRY and Serbia have already been discussed. The search for a solution to the status of Kosovo is going to be extremely dif ficult. It is highly unlikely that the international community will push for total independence. However, Kosovar Albanians are united in their quest and wish for independence, and the re imposition of a fed eral arrangement – especially one that sees Belgrade as the political 220 and administrative centre point – is not practical to hope for nor im plement. Clearly, in any solution, Kosovo must be given more auto nomy, but the scope for which Belgrade will be willing to negotiate is limited. FRY President Koštunica has indicated that he is ready to allow Kosovo more autonomy, but it appears that the scope of that autonomy would be no more than was allowed under the 1974 Yugoslav constitution, and it is doubtful that the Kosovar Albanians would be willing to accept such a limited solution. Another factor of concern is the implications of independence for Kosovo on Macedonia. The deep tensions in Macedonia between the ethnic Albanian and Macedonian communities could be further exacerbated by Kosovo’s independence. Independence for Kosovo could provoke calls for independence by the ethnic Albanian presence in Macedonia and, possibly, by the Hungarian presence in Vojvodina. The province is currently ruled by a system of governance created by United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244. However, this system is a merely temporary measure while a four stage process of political reform and development takes place. Progress to date has shown that the implementation of this process is not going to be easy. The lack of certainty surrounding the results of this process, together with uncertainty as to the status of Kosovo once this process has been implemented, contributes to instability and insecurity in the region. It is also clear that this instability will continue until new governmental structures and processes are put into place and the future status of Kosovo is resolved. Although large scale fighting has disappeared, other factors contribute to the security situation in the province. In particular, these factors include sporadic terrorist attacks (aimed at both locals and KFOR), outbreaks of violence and public unrest, and clashes on the Kosovo Macedonian border. The outbreak of clashes on the Kosovo Macedonian border is particularly worrisome; there is a risk that the conflict and unrest from Macedonia could spill over into the already unstable province. The outbreaks of violence, and in particular, the type of ethnically oriented violence and revenge attacks, have not been stopped by the presence of KFOR and United Nations police. Indeed, it must be said that they have proved largely ineffective in any attempts to halt this type of violence amongst the local communities. Institution building and especially the establishment of civil society are extremely pressing issues that must take place in order for the situation to calm. The establishment of a civil society, with means other than violence by which to express grievances, is clearly needed. This also includes the establishment of institutions to protect human rights and to deal with human rights violations. The search for a solution to these problems must also not over shadow the other social and economic problems in the province, 221 which are equally destabilising factors. As was mentioned above, the proliferation of crime, and in particular organised crime, is often exa cerbated by poor economic performance and lack of general pro sperity. An additional problem is that of how to facilitate the return of dis placed persons and refugees and to safeguard the rights of all citizens, both ethnic Albanian and Serb alike. The climate of uncertainty and the outbreaks of violence between the ethnic groups must be stopped in order to allow returnees the chance to resettle in their original homes. The apprehension of suspected war criminals will also be essential for returns to be able to take place and for a sense of justice for wartime atrocities to prevail. Greater confidence building measures are also needed, but they alone will not provide a solution to the current environment. It is clear that democratisation, dialogue and other reforms remain the key to stability and security in the region; the search for the solution to these problems will provide the background to the security situation in the province during the next decade. Independence for Kosovo may also South Eastern Europe calls for RS independence in Bosnia and Herzegovina. While Montenegrin independence is provided for in the Yugoslav constitution, independence for Kosovo is not. Calls for RS independence would therefore be more likely linked to Kosovo independence than Montenegrin, since, like Kosovo, the RS is not provided with any constitutional provisions for independence. The crucial difference between the two would be the fact that Kosovo has had a tradition of autonomy for a much longer period than the RS, and has in recent years been a UN administrative province. Any moves towards RS independence would almost certainly draw Bosnia and Herzegovina into renewed war, since they would undermine the compromise reached at Dayton.
Macedonia and Albania Although the issue of ethnic Albanian self determination is in volved in many of the region's problems and disputes, the relationship between Macedonia and Albania remains relatively stable. Albania is primarily concerned with its numerous internal problems – political, social and economic, although it too must come to terms with the a wakening of national Albanian consciousness within the wider region. Macedonia struggles to find a solution to accommodate the minority rights of its ethnic Albanian communities, and to find a democratic dialogue (as an alternative to fighting) by which to solve their problems. Equally, it is clear that the internal stability of each of the countries is also unquestionably linked to that of the entire region as a 222 whole. Consequently, adequate solutions to these countries' problems relate heavily to the region's security and stability during the next dec ade.
Macedonia Macedonia has a complex history and culture, as well as a range of contentious issues, including its name, historical territorial claims, and disputes with neighbours. However, the question of the status of ethnic Albanians inside Macedonia remains the largest source of instability. This factors into both the current relationship between eth nic Albanians and Macedonians and the uncertainty of Kosovo's po litical status – and how these could be perceived and acted upon by ethnic Albanians inside Macedonia. Fighting between ethnic Albanians and Macedonians poses one of the largest recent threats to the security and stability of the region of South Eastern Europe. The main reason behind the fighting is that eth nic Albanians seek the recognition of certain minority rights towards citizenship, ownership, education, language, and representative gov ernment. The fact that there has been continued failure to find demo cratic dialogue and that arguments have been expressed through violence and terrorist action presents the largest threat. Many of these problems have been secondary results of circumstances in Macedonia's neighbouring countries, not least the exodus of hundreds of thousands of ethnic Albanians from Kosovo in 1999 during the NATO campaign in Serbia and Kosovo. However, as much as the fighting may have been the result of provocation by insurgents, it is also clear that the ethnic Albanians have legitimate grievances. The failure of the Macedonian authorities to address these must therefore also be seen as a contributing factor to the situation. The situation has also been provoked by Macedonian mistrust of ethnic Albanians, which additionally relates to the uncertainty of the status of Kosovo and subsequent Macedonian fears that ethnic Albanian enclaves could seek to break away from the Macedonian state. Therefore, as we have previously stated, the solution for Kosovo has implications across the entire region, and requires profound thought and debate before being finalised. The largest challenges are to halt the violence between the two communities in Macedonia and to find democratic dialogue, while installing and improving civil rights mechanisms. European Union delegates have been pushing for a peaceful democratic solution, and the international community has been relatively successful in bringing greater peace and stability to the country. A NATO force has recently successfully completed its mission to disarm the ethnic Albanian reb els; however, if adequate civil rights mechanisms are not established, 223 it is clear that the situation will deteriorate once again. If the situation is allowed to deteriorate, unrest and fighting may well spread to Kosovo, Serbia and Montenegro; therefore, an adequate solution is urgently required. NATO has been successful in reducing the activities of insurgents alongside the Kosovo border. Macedonia's membership in the Partnership for Peace (PfP) has also added to the country’s effectiveness in combating terrorist activity. Indeed, the key factor to stability thus far has been the presence and influence of the international community. Nevertheless, it is also clear that the above problems must not overshadow additional problems in Macedonia that demand equal attention. Macedonia faces problems concerning organised crime and corruption, as well as poor economic conditions. The economic situation has remained stable since independence, but growth is stagnant. Corruption and illegal smuggling in particular hinder progress. These were intensified by the economic sanctions on the FRY, which was one of Macedonia's key economic partners. The relatively porous border between Kosovo and Macedonia has greatly contributed to the proliferation of organised crime. Attention must also be given to the development of strong demo cratic institutions, as well as to mechanisms for the development of civil society. As in the majority of South Eastern European countries, it is essential that institutional responsiveness to minority rights and concerns formulate an integral part of the process if the country is to enjoy long term stability. However, pervasive corruption, nepotism and cronyism greatly hinder the development of the political system. While it is imperative that solutions be found to these numerous problems, it is equally clear that a pragmatic, quick solution does not lie in the international community granting Macedonia entry into organisations for which it clearly does not fulfil membership conditions. Granting membership to these organisations primarily as a political decision can be destabilising for current members as well as demoralising for other prospective members. Specifically, this relates to Macedonia's membership in the Council of Europe, and perhaps even the PfP, in which it was obvious that Macedonia did not fulfil requirements relating to civil and minority rights. Macedonia clearly faces many challenges in the future, and the search for solutions to these challenges will provide the background to the security situation during the next decade.
Albania Although the recent awakening and influence of ethnic Albanian consciousness in the region has been the cause of many problems, this 224 has had a limited effect on Albania itself. Admittedly, Albania has faced increased pressure within its foreign policy towards the plight of ethnic Albanians elsewhere, but the vast internal problems that it faces are a brutal reminder that it cannot afford to be heavily involved with problems outside its own borders. The situation in Albania has been unstable since the fall of the Communist regime in 1991, when the country largely descended into lawlessness. The period from 1991 until 1997 was largely anarchic in nature and the pyramid collapse of the banking system in 1997 sent the country into complete decline. Consequently, the necessary task is to establish and develop democratic institutions and to facilitate a wide range of economic and social reforms. Albania faces a number of primary problems, including the devel opment of democratic political institutions, the desperate need for economic reforms, and the need to re establish the rule of law – the lack of which currently accounts for the very high levels of corruption and crime. The general collapse of the state system in 1997 and the subse quently attempted coup d’état in 1998 resulted in general lawlessness in all parts of the country. In particular, the country is besieged by banditry and gang violence, which is closely related to gun and drug smuggling. The events in 1997 and 1998 resulted in the widespread looting of military establishments, and as a result, the mass possession of weapons is a particular problem. The climate of insecurity and uncertainty further facilitates the development of crime, which is seen as an attractive alternative in a country with little or no infrastructure, industry, or economy. The country is also plagued by widespread corruption in all activities and levels of society. Perhaps the largest security risk that Albania presents to the re gion and beyond is the widespread smuggling and illegal migration that originate from its territory. In particular, Albania is a country of origin for trafficking in human beings – mostly by people who are desperate to escape in search of new opportunities in the West – as well as gun smuggling and drugs. The porous nature of its borders, together with widespread corruption and lawlessness, enables smugglers to be very effective. This presents not only a danger to the immediate area, but to Western Europe as well. In particular, there have been numerous reports linking the growth of organised crime to the existence of increased contact between Albanian gangs in other parts of the region and in Europe. Clearly, effecting change in a country that is so plagued by intern al problems of varying magnitudes is not going to be a rapid process. In particular, much of the success will depend upon the efforts of the international community. Additionally, it is apparent that in order to halt the spread of crime originating from the country, Albania's 225 neighbours will have to ensure that their own security and intelligence mechanisms rise to the challenge. It is clear that the future will be dominated by efforts to rise to these challenges, and much success will depend upon the ability of Albania to recognise and react to its plight.
Bosnia and Herzegovina The security situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina remains stable and calm, as the country does not face any type of direct external threat. For the time being the biggest threats are posed by nationalist elements present in Bosnia’s political arena. It must be noted, how ever, that those elements themselves have seen a democratic fall in influence during the past twelve months. The chances for stability in the country were given a major boost with the death of Franjo Tudj man and his party’s electoral defeat in Croatia, and with Slobodan Milošević’s removal from power in Yugoslavia. The main challenge that remains is how to facilitate the spread of democracy, confidence, and economic development. The solutions to these problems will largely provide the background to the political and security environment during the next decade. One of the main problems at present is that Bosnia and Herzegovina's stability is still effectively dependent on an international military presence, albeit one that has been significantly decreased since its initial arrival to the country. In the short term, it is likely that this presence will continue, with further reductions in troop numbers. By 2010, it is likely that the presence will no longer be necessary as the country’s institutions take over the responsibility for ensuring peace. At present one of the largest sources of instability is the lack of any common administrative or coordinating body over the armed for ces; as a result, two separate armies exist, with little or no control on the state level. The fact that there is no common training or doctrine helps to sustain the “duality” of the armed forces. The armed forces of the Republika Srpska are still heavily linked with those of Yugoslavia; in particular, this relates to training, doctrine and command. Accord ing to a statement by then FRY Defence Minister Slobodan Krapović, currently 1,740 high ranking military personnel from the RS are on Belgrade’s pay roll. Moves towards the establishment of any central ised state command and control body have so far been slow, with progress resisted from within both entities. A disproportional amount of public funds is also spent on entity defence budgets, and trans parency and control over the allocation of this expenditure is lacking. To improve stability and security, a unified body of command and control over the armed forces should successfully be established. It is most probable that the Standing Committee on Military Matters 226 (SCMM) would be expanded in order to fulfil that role. Current trends and debate suggest that the establishment of a single army is unlikely, at least for the near future. However, the establishment of a unified command and control structure would allow for greater democratic control over the armed forces, and would provide the conditions and capacity for Bosnia and Herzegovina to participate in European secu rity and defence structures and missions. The PfP offers the first op portunity to realise this role, and a unified command and control body is a vital prerequisite for membership. The international community in Bosnia has been effective in reducing the influence of extremists, and, with the elections last year, the influence of nationalist parties on the political process was re duced. However, nationalist influence still remains a contributing factor in public opinion. The lack of general confidence and economic well being allows nationalists and extremists to continue to exercise some influence, but as the country’s economic situation improves it is likely that this influence will further wane. Stability is likely to be further reinforced as the ability of the country’s institutions to take ownership over their responsibilities increases. The commencement of this process is already apparent and can be attributed to both the in creasing normalisation of the country, which has enabled institutions to tackle issues more effectively, and to international institutional capacity building activities in the country. One example of this trend was the recent Constitutional Court ruling against ethnic discrimina tion (on the constituent peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina), which has yet to be implemented. With implementation, thousands of laws and the entity constitutions would have to be brought in line with this ruling, the long term impact of which will be to reinforce the pro spects for continued stability by ensuring equal rights for all citizens, regardless of their ethnic background. Two issues that will be important to address for long term sta bility are refugee returns and war criminals. At present the inability of refugees and displaced persons to freely return, together with the continued presence of war criminals, contributes to the lack of both confidence and security. Although the international community has been working on both these issues, a more vigorous international engagement will be essential to ensure that they do not act merely in the short to medium term future. Administrative practices and the presence of extremist elements at the local level have especially ham pered the return of refugees. Bureaucracy – specifically the length of court processes to reclaim property – is a contributing factor towards the lack of return. Characterised by a culture of informal power, pa tronage and corruption, and especially by the arbitrary application of regulations and laws, this bureaucracy causes problems in all spheres of activity in daily life. 227 The above factors point towards the need for judicial reform and the strengthening of the rule of law to enhance the prospects of long term stability in the country. The process of the elimination of the pa rallel institutions of Herzeg Bosna must continue, and at the same time state institutions should be strengthened. As the economic situation in Bosnia continues to improve, as is expected following the conclusion of the country’s privatisation pro cess, it is likely that stability throughout the country will be enhanced. The prospects for that increased stability are further highlighted by the gradually more effective functioning of the country’s institutions, and by the more moderate authorities in power in Zagreb and Belgrade. Nonetheless, challenges such as bringing war criminals to justice, continuing institutional capacity building programmes, and ensuring the return of refugees will still need to be met in the near future for long term stability to be guaranteed.
CONCLUSION
There can be no doubt that the security environment has altered due to the consequences of political and societal change in Central, Eastern and South Eastern Europe. The nature of the new security environment has meant that focus is now no longer directed towards unitary state enemies, but towards a much broader spectrum of issues that undermine stability. Indeed, as we have mentioned, globalisation and integration have ensured that states are now much more connect ed, and in particular, this also relates to physical borders, which have become much more porous than before. As a result of these factors, security now is much more indivisible, and the direct causal linkages between the security and stability of the various states in the region are undeniable. This change in focus has meant that security threats are now much more ambiguous than was previously the case. Consequently, this ambiguity together with the fact that these threats are intrinsically linked to security in a broader sense – by definition and by geographical nature – has meant that there has been a subsequent shift in focus away from military instruments of security and defence planning and management. This shift towards other mechanisms has occurred because these are no longer efficient and practicable mechanisms with which to maintain security and defence. From our overview of security risks and threats in South Eastern Europe a number of key issues for regional security during the next decade can be identified: • multilateral cooperation and integration issues; • cultural security and ethnic/human rights considerations;
228 • internal instability; • proliferation of organised crime and corruption.
Multilateral Cooperation and Integration Issues The countries of the region of South Eastern Europe have all expressed their desire to become EU and NATO members, viewing membership as providing solutions to their multitude of problems. However, it is extremely important to realise that membership in itself is not a solution to these problems; the prerequisites and subsequent development of laws, regulations, practices and institutions that membership requires are the real keys to the resolution of these problems. Membership should be viewed as a final objective, with the fulfilment of the prerequisites of membership being the real stabilising and reforming factors. As much as it is clear that the next decade will South Eastern Europe increased cooperation and integration between countries of South Eastern Europe and European organisations, it is equally important that this period also sees greater cooperation and integration between the countries of South Eastern Europe themselves. This is as much a matter of political necessity as a matter of political expediency, due to the fact that the collective security problems with which South Eastern Europe is currently confronted with and which will need to be tackled over the coming years, require collective solutions. Additionally, it is much more realistic to expect that countries that share common security concerns can more effectively tackle these problems collectively rather than unilaterally. These security concerns are often cross border in nature, and as such, cannot effectively be dealt with via a unitary state perspective. The development of regional cooperation – political, economic or other – is also a way in which integration into wider organisations can be facilitated. Regional cooperation in this manner also allows for the standardisation of regulations and practices, and greatly aids interop erability and organisational capability and capacity. More importantly, as history has shown, regional cooperation decreases the risk of interstate conflict or rivalry among the cooperating states. The international community has also advocated the widening of regional cooperation, and it is highly likely that some type of political and economic integrative structure will be pushed as a solution for the countries of the former Yugoslavia. Indeed, it has often been stated that these countries should integrate into Europe as a group rather than unilaterally. However, in addition to the positive factors that cooperation will impart, it is equally important to understand that
229 there could be a number of limitations and negative consequences to such a policy. Clearly, linking the future of one country to that of another could potentially be problematic, especially if we take the example of Croatia, which has been particularly opposed to the idea that its ability to integrate with Europe should depend upon the other countries of the region. In particular, it is likely that Croatia will be ready for EU membership long before the other countries of former Yugoslavia. Effectively making countries wait while other countries fulfil the ne cessary requirements could have an enormously demoralising and debilitating effect.
Cultural Security and Ethnic/Human Rights Considerations
Conflict and tensions between ethnic groups have also been pres ent, and this has largely been related to the search for self determi nation and independence. This situation has been further exacerbated by the inadequate provision of minority rights and freedoms in certain countries, and especially the lack of adequate institutions coupled with widespread prejudice and discrimination against minorities. The expo sure of these minorities, to harsher economic circumstances, together with the lack of cultural security, has meant that they have sought ways to establish their own means of security, through self determi nation and the search for independence. This problem will continue to pose a threat to security in South Eastern European countries until state and other institutions become more responsive to minorities’ rights and concerns. Consequently, security mechanisms should focus much more upon cultural considerations. It is equally important that individual South Eastern European countries also take into consideration the het erogeneous reality of their societies. Greater institutional responsiveness will ensure that ethno cultural considerations are provided for in governmental structures in terms of representation and policy making. The solution to the problem of cultural insecurity requires a two fold process: firstly, it is important that the current security mechanisms of the EU and NATO take into account the importance of this factor; secondly, that greater development by individual states occurs to allow the adequate provision of rights and freedoms. Clearly, it is also important to analyse the specific issues of each state rather than to express minority rights and freedoms under the provision of general rights and freedoms. Equally, it is important to
230 remember that perception is just as important as reality, and this translates to the alleviation of the fears of each community.
Internal Instability Economic problems particularly feature at the heart of instability, which have resulted in widespread poverty and the lack of prospects for countries’ citizens. This leads to further security problems in the form of crime and corruption, and especially in illegal migration as people seek to improve their prospects by moving to the West. Additionally, this has also furthered other forms of crime such as trafficking, as many of the victims of trafficking have no other means of escape than this. Addressing the economic problems facing South Eastern Europe will not be easy. However, it is essential that South Eastern European countries continue with the economic reforms they have all commenced if they are to address the prevailing economic situation and associated problems within the forthcoming decade. The existence of deep institutional frailty further exacerbates security and stability risks. Primarily, many institutions are still unre sponsive to the requirements and realities of their respective countries and are therefore unable to resolve the problems present in society. Institutional frailty serves to further enhance instability and insecurity by eroding public confidence Clearly, a number of measures are required in order to tackle this problem. The establishment of CSBMs, institution building and dem ocratic reform will enhance both the capacity and capability of institutions to provide solutions to the many issues and risks at hand. It is important also to focus upon the personnel of these institutions – delegates, officials, and bureaucrats – in order to enhance their skill and capabilities. Greater European bilateral cooperation will accomplish many of the tasks needed for the development of institutions and their personnel.
The Proliferation of Organised Crime and Corruption The proliferation of organised crime has become a major threat to security and stability. In particular, we have seen that trafficking in human beings, drugs and weapons trafficking, as well as smuggling and money laundering have all spread during recent years. The ubi quitous nature of corruption in the region of South Eastern Europe has allowed this to spread, together with the relative insecurity of borders, as well as other factors that shall be mentioned shortly.
231 Prolific levels of corruption also suppress democratic reform, lim it economic investment (particularly foreign direct investment), and result in discredited public institutions and a general lack of trust in all levels of authority. One of the key requirements for success in this area is the re establishment of the rule of law. As much as this issue calls for judi cial reform, there is also a need for the re training of police forces, customs officials, and border control services. The establishment of professional law enforcement agencies will greatly enhance prospects for the resolution of the problems of corruption and organised crime.
Towards Long-Term Stability One additional factor of importance that is seen from the aforementioned is that all of these issues are intrinsically linked together within a continuous cause and effect scenario. As a result, rather than prioritising any given issue, it is important that any approach takes all into consideration. The presence of one of these problems is usually the cause of another, and is further exacerbated by the existence of an additional number of these factors. Consequently, finding solutions to these problems has meant that a broad based mechanism must be used which addresses societal, political and economic problems as a whole. Mechanisms are therefore required to take into account the broad subject matter of the problems. Indeed, the formation of new cooperative bodies to tackle the issues should be considered. This would be a logical progression con sidering the fact that the countries of the region share common historical and cultural factors and experience common problems. The main premise behind this reasoning is that collective security threats require collective responses. Equally, as much as the onus is upon the EU and NATO to help find solutions to these problems, it is more important that the countries of South Eastern Europe seek to solve these problems themselves. The countries of South Eastern Europe are far better positioned to understand the nature of their specific problems and societies than are either the EU or NATO. However, the EU and NATO's help will be required to allow these issues to be resolved. It is also important that current prevailing attitudes concerning security continue to adapt to the new environment and also expand to encompass significant new factors. As was argued above, the concept of cultural security must also be addressed, as this can also greatly affect stability and security. Failure to deal with these issues will mean that they will continue to pose security threats during the next decade. This is the dilemma
232 that characterises the new security environment and that must be addressed.
233
234 A Swiss Perspective on Key Regional Security Issues in South Eastern Europe through 2010 Philippe Welti Swiss Federal Department of Defence Civil Protection and Sports
REGIONAL SECURITY IN SOUTH EASTERN EUROPE FROM A SWISS PERSPECTIVE
The gradual demise of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugosla via in the 1990s has been viewed with growing anxiety and increasing involvement by the Swiss public. There were strong repercussions of the wars in the Balkans on Switzerland. Most visible for the man in the street were the waves of refugees : At the peak of the crisis, more than four hundred thousand persons from former Yugoslavia were liv ing in Switzerland as permanent residents or refugees − against an overall population of some 7 million. About half of the refugees were Kosovar Albanians, corresponding to roughly 10% of the total population in Kosovo! Switzerland was – per capita − the most preferred harbour for refugees, not just due to her economic appeal but obviously also because she is not a member of the Dublin asylum agreement, restricted to EU member states. The citizens of former Yugoslavia constitute a cultural group clearly discernible from other foreigners in Switzerland. In addition, the effects of the activities of criminal organisations that fed on the political and economic instability of the region did not stop at the borders of Switzerland. Another impact of the Yugoslav crisis on Switzerland was the cruelty of warfare on the spot. Of course, most countries were shocked at the notion of ethnic cleansing, as it occurred for the first time in Europe since 1946. But from the perspective of a country that has always considered herself especially fragile due to her cultural di versity, the resurgence of the aggressive ethnic nationalism may arguably have been considered as particularly outrageous: Violence against one’s neighbours purely on the grounds of ethnicity was in deed a slap in the face of the very principles and values upon which Switzerland has been built.
235 Both features of the Yugoslav wars, the stream of refugees into Switzerland and the humanitarian crisis on the spot, showed that Cold War neutrality no longer provided any useful protection nor any meaningful yardstick on where to take a stance. Indeed, Switzerland had in several respects become a virtual neighbour country or a front line state in the Yugoslav war. True, when NATO staged a military intervention on behalf of the Kosovars in 1999 without a mandate of the UN Security Council, Switzerland was obliged to take some measures (including the denial of military overflight rights for NATO) according to the doctrine of neutrality that had been reformulated only six years previously. This challenge to the traditional foreign and security doctrine provided a third, albeit minor, specific feature of Switzerland’s view towards the Balkan wars. Thus regional security in the Balkans, or rather the lack of secu rity there, mattered a lot to Switzerland and produced broad domestic support for contributions aimed at creating conditions that would allow the refugees to return home in dignity and at supporting them in rebuilding their lives afterwards. These efforts, as was soon shown, needed to be internationally coordinated. In a way, the Balkans be came the first major area of application for the 1993 “report” of the Federal Council to Parliament on foreign policy. That white paper, which was to be valid until 2001, formulates five foreign policy goals for Switzerland: 1. the maintenance and advancement of security and peace; 2. the furtherance of human rights, of democracy and the rule of law; 3. the promotion of welfare; 4. the reduction of social differences; 5. the protection of natural resources. Hence, when Switzerland decided to contribute her share to the international efforts for peace and reconstruction in former Yugosla via, this act did not merely reflect sheer national interest but was also in line with a politically approved concept. Switzerland did so from the outset through humanitarian measures, but eventually provided military means as well, the most significant being the OSCE head quarters support unit from 1996 to 2000 in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the service company (called SwissCoy) providing logistic support within KFOR in Kosovo, since 1999. For the first time, indeed, Switzerland used military means in addition to civilian means of crisis management, in order to fight security challenges that had so obvious ly begun to cut across borders. The OSCE observer mission and SwissCoy were also the most prominent manifestations of what would become the motto of another “report” of the Federal Council, namely the white paper on security policy, approved by Swiss parliament in 1999: “Security through co 236 operation”. Other steps in this new direction for a country traditionally introverted in security terms were the foundations of the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) in 1997 and the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) in 2000 − each of them has been heavily involved in the Balkans ever since. Both military units in support of OSCE and (NATO led) KFOR, respectively, were more substantial in size and numbers than anything Switzerland had contributed to a peacekeeping action before. So, arguably, the Yugoslav wars had an even more profound impact on Swiss foreign and security policy in concrete terms than did the end of the Cold War, in 1989 1991.
THE KEY ISSUES FOR REGIONAL SECURITY IN THE NEXT 10 15 YEARS
As mentioned above, the overall aim of Switzerland towards South Eastern Europe has been to help create an environment in which military conflict will become unthinkable and thereby to help expand the area of peace, stability, prosperity and freedom – alongside all like minded countries. The key issues for regional security are enum erated by the priority fields spelled out in the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe. The Pact’s concrete targets include: overcoming crises and tension, setting up democratic structures, ensuring the protection of national minorities, promoting economic co operation, strengthening regional co operation, and combating organised crime. These are the established targets and, they should be achievable within a time frame of 10 15 years. Through the Stability Pact, South Eastern Europe is encouraged to adopt the appropriate reforms in favour of democratisation, the rule of law, the defence of human rights and security, and the establishment of a market economy. There is a large consensus on these aims and also that the civil society has to play a central role in the process of transition. These aims tally entirely with Swiss interest. Therefore Switzerland is not only a full member of the Stability Pact, but also very active in all of its three working tables: Working Table I on Democratisation and Human Rights has de fined seven priority areas from bringing about stability in the region. They are: (1) human rights and national minorities, (2) efficient ad ministration, local governments and the creation of an ombudsman, (3) equality and gender questions, (4) the media, (5) the return of refu gees and displaced persons, (6) education and youth and (7) inter parliamentary co operation.
237 Through this table, Switzerland supports various projects: in the field of human rights, the promotion of women in politics, democratisation and good governance, conflict prevention, independent media (e.g. through co funding of radio and TV stations), education, employment (especially of youth), support of civil society and the return of refugees. Working Table II on Reconstruction, Economic Cooperation and Development strives for sustained improvement of the conditions for a reinforcement of the private sector. To this end, a variety of activities are being conducted in the following main fields: (1) economic integration in Europe, (2) improvement of the climate for investment, (3) development of the private sector, (4) development of the regional business, (5) development of regional infrastructure (railroads, motor ways, telecommunication and electricity networks), (6) environmental issues and (7) social cohesion. In total, some 35 investment projects are being run through this table, comprising measures of support to investment and trade, professional training and the creation of jobs, as well as measures for the protection of the environment. The World Bank’s “Social Development Initiative” is one major project, which must enable the governments to analyse the social situation of the countries of the region and to formulate coherent policies. In the context of this table, Switzerland supports several projects of trade and of infrastructure development, including water supply in Macedonia and energy production in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Moreover, Switzerland contributes to programs and funds aimed at the improvement of conditions for private investment. Furthermore, Swit zerland finances projects linked to regional cooperation in environmental protection, and measures aiming at the promotion of small and medium capitalized firms, professional training and social development as the foundations for the transformation towards an efficient market economy. Working Table III on Security is divided into two sub tables, one related to defence and security proper and one related to justice and interior affairs. There are a wide range of projects, including (1) defence reform and economics, (2) arms control, non proliferation and military contacts (transparency increasing measures), (3) small arms and light weapons, (4) humanitarian de mining, (5) disaster relief, (6) the anti corruption initiative, (7) the initiative against organised crime, (8) migration and asylum, (9) trafficking in human beings, and (10) judiciary reforms. Switzerland is also very active in these areas. The mainly Swiss funded Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) runs a number of projects through sub table I. So does the International Centre for Humanitarian De mining (GICHD). More directly, the Swiss Government supports projects for the training of 238 border police and − as far as justice and police matters are concerned − contributes to the Pact’s Anti Corruption Initiative. Currently we are studying ways and means to support the initiative against organised crime. Outside this table, but in line with its thrust, Switzerland provides, as has been mentioned above, the service company SwissCoy in support of the Austrian contingent, AUCON. SwissCoy’s main task is to provide logistical support to AUCON in the field of camp construc tion, specialised transport, and water treatment and supplies. SwissCoy has been assigned to work together with AUCON, but internal organisation, personnel and disciplinary matters remain Switzerland’s responsibility. Based on a referendum in June 2000, SwissCoy’s armament for self protection will be optimised, so the company will be able to assume further tasks (i.e. guarding and patrol ling), from autumn 2002 onwards. SwissCoy will also be increased in number from roughly 150 now to some 220 persons in the future. The strong interest Switzerland has in the success of the Balkans’ Stability Pact is mirrored in her financial commitment: In total, the overall funds released by Switzerland in support of South Eastern Europe amounted to CHF 207.8 million after some CHF 577.2 million had been spent in the period 1996 1999. In 2001, the amount will most likely be higher, since the funds for humanitarian aid to Yugo slavia have been more than quintupled to about CHF 77 million since Milošević has been out of office. Not included here are the annual costs of CHF 30 40 million associated with SwissCoy and the se condment of other personnel who are posted in former Yugoslavia for technical missions. Nor does this include the humanitarian efforts − in terms of food, clothing, medicine etc. − of private companies and charity organisations in support of the former Yugoslavia, especially Kosovo. Generally speaking, Switzerland prefers the funding of concrete regional projects, co funded by other donor nations and international financial institutions and conducted in cooperation with longstanding, well known partners. This latter aspect poses a new challenge right now in Yugoslavia, since new partners need to be identified there. In the medium term future, Swiss capacities for support may be cut by Parliament. This obliges Switzerland to shift her approach to the Balkans in that regional projects will have to be selected more carefully and purely on their merits: quality and political value will become ever more important. This also means that Swiss support will be accorded once a comparative advantage or specific interests in a certain project are evaluated. As for the Stability Pact, Switzerland appreciates its role of coordinating international aid to this region. Through its structures, the Pact acts as a facilitator and broker of a large number of actors and 239 activities. Yet, we deem, the Pact needs to be reinforced and im proved. In particular, the mutual obligations between the donor na tions and the recipient countries have to be clarified and developed. This holds true for the sharing of roles between the EU and OSCE in the framework of the Pact and the Pact’s role of coordination, but also in the framework of its task forces and working groups. Here again the role of civil society is crucial: Since summer 2000, efforts have been undertaken to better integrate the representatives of civil society into the Pact’s mechanisms. These efforts need to be continued. For the same reason, Switzerland opposes the expansion of the existing struc tures of the Pact; instead, we advocate their reinforcement and clarification so efforts can be focused instead of duplicated. Likewise, the Pact’s priorities need to be defined more clearly according to the results of the most fruitful working table meeting, which took place in autumn 2000. An important tool for monitoring the activities and proceedings of the Pact is the information exchange (also through the internet pages www.seerecon.org and www.stabilitypact.org ) that must be kept up to ate.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
In terms of specific recommendations for the region’s governments, the author can on a personal basis recommend two general attitudes and four concrete measures:
Outside Efforts Need to be Matched by Internal Efforts In all that local actors do, they should start from the assumption that fostering peace and stability throughout the region cannot, obvi ously, be the task of the external donors alone, but needs to be matched by a similar effort from the countries of former Yugoslavia. This holds true for the economic aid as well as for the structural reforms to be undertaken. The prerequisite for this process to succeed is the effort of the people and governments in the region. Once these efforts gather momentum, foreign investments into the economy will ensue. Much has been achieved in this regard since Mr. Milošević left power. Along with Kosovo’s Parliamentary elections in November 2001, resulting in the first democratically legitimate government, the prospects for a generation of enduring peace and prosperity across the whole of South Eastern Europe are good.
240 Zero Tolerance for any Deviation from European Standards Governments in the region must also start from the assumption that if the Balkans want to become, politically and economically, what they have always been in cultural and geographic terms, namely a part of Europe , it is the Balkan states that have to adopt the agreed stan dards of human and minority rights, the rule of law and market eco nomy. Switzerland wants to help bring the region closer to these stan dards, and to do her share for the preparation of these countries for gradual integration into Europe. Not a member of EU and NATO, Switzerland will obviously not be in a position to decide on the eventual political integration of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and of Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, Switzerland can further this process indirectly, considering the integration of South Eastern Europe was defined as the ultimate goal of the Stability Pact. Things are slightly different as far as the Council of Europe is concerned. Here, Switzerland would be entitled to advocate the membership of the Yugoslav Republic and of Bosnia and Herzegovina in this organ isation. There can be little doubt that Switzerland will strongly do so – once all its standards are met. As to the concrete measures to be taken now:
Provide Full Support to the Work of the Hague Tribunal There are 39 accused criminals of war, most prominent among them, Mr. Karadžić and Mr. Mladić, who are hiding in former Yugo slavia, unmolested by the judicial authorities there. Whereas the Fed eration in Bosnia and Herzegovina cooperates satisfactorily with the Hague Tribunal, the Republika Srpska does not, and the Federation of Yugoslavia has only just begun to do so. All suspected war criminals have to be extradited to the court in The Hague without delay, so they can be brought to justice. In parallel, the court depends on being supplied with the necessary documentary evidence. Cooperation with The Hague would enhance considerably the credibility of the Serb communities’ commitment to the rule of law, and it would be an important step on the way to domestic reconciliation as well.
Support the Efforts Against Islamic Fundamentalism There are Islamic fundamentalist groups, such as the “Active Islamic Youth”, in Bosnia and Herzegovina. They are monitored by SFOR, yet this job can only be done efficiently with the full support of 241 local authorities. The fight against Islamic fundamentalism and ter rorist networks is a struggle on many levels, requiring a lot of inves tigating and prosecuting resources.
Allow Minorities to be Over-Represented Minority rights should be provided generously by allowing the minorities to be represented beyond the level of their numerical share. Minorities should be over represented in the political system: in Gov ernments, in the Administration, in Parliament (including its committees) and in Courts, but also in everyday life. For example, only those products should be allowed access to the market that are labelled in all languages equally. And above all: no one should be referred to as a member of a minority! Over representation is considered a key success formula for the maintenance of the linguistic peace and a climate of tolerance and mutual respect in Switzerland. The message of all these measures would be a strong commitment to cultural diversity as being an asset, not a liability! This is the basis for rebuilding Bosnia as a multiethnic state according to the Dayton peace agreement, sealed in 1995, and even more ambitiously, Kosovo as a multiethnic society − even if this may have a long way to go.
Abolish Internal Barriers Inter entity cooperation should be improved by allowing free movement of personnel, goods, capital and services. The abolition of regional trade barriers is the prerequisite for larger scale business rela tions to develop in favour of eventual market based prosperity.
242 CIP – Katalogizacija u publikaciji Народна библиотека Србије, Београд 327.56 (497) (082) LOOKING Ahead: security challenges in the Balkans through 2010 / István Gyarmati and Theodor Winkler, editors ; Marc Remillard and Scott Vesel, associate editors. – New York: EastWest Institute ; Geneve Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces; Belgrade: Center for Civil Military Relations, 2002 (Beograd : Goragraf). – 240 str. : tabele ; 24 cm Str. 7–11: Foreword / Carl Bildt. – Str. 13–15: Introduction / István Gyarmati and Theodor Winkler. – Napomene i bibliografske reference uz tekst. ISBN 86–83543–06–4 1. Gyarmati, István 2. Winkler, Theodor a) Bezbednost (politika) – Balkanska država – Zbornici COBISS–ID 100826124
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