Revista de Relaciones Internacionales, Estrategia y Seguridad ISSN: 1909-3063 Universidad Militar Nueva Granada

Arratia Sandoval, Esteban BEYOND PACIFICATION. COMPETITION STATE-MAKING IN RIO'S FAVELAS * Revista de Relaciones Internacionales, Estrategia y Seguridad, vol. 12, no. 2, July-December, 2017, pp. 231-265 Universidad Militar Nueva Granada

DOI: 10.18359/ries.2221

Available in: http://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=92751348011

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BEYOND PACIFICATION. COMPETITION STATE-MAKING IN RIO’S FAVELAS*

Esteban Arratia Sandoval**

Abstract

During the 2016 World Economic Forum, the strategy of pacification in Rio’s favelas was recognized as the most innovative public security policy in the last decade. From this scenario, and using Competition State-Ma- king, this paper analyzes, under a qualitative approach, the design and implementation of that initiative. Then, we seek to assess its results after implementation, and finally outline main lessons to extract from the Brazilian case. The main conclusion of this survey is that the Bra- zilian pacification strategy was based on three pillars: operational decriminalization; adoption of comprehen- sive approach; and coordination between three gover- nment levels (federal, state, and municipal).

Keywords: Brazil, competition state-making, organi- zed crime, pacification.

* Artículo de investigación financiado por Centro de Estudios Estratégicos de la Academia Nacional de Estudios Políticos y Estratégicos (ANEPE) ** Analista en Políticas y Asuntos Internacionales mención en Seguridad y Defensa. Universidad de Santiago. Magíster en Estudios Internacionales. Universidad de Santiago. Investigador Asociado Academia Nacional de Estudios Políticos y Estratégicos, Santiago de

Recibido: 3 de septiembre 2016 Evaluado: 10 de noviembre 2016 Aceptado: 24 de enero 2017 Artículo de Investigación Referencia: Arratia, E. (2017). Beyond pacification.making en Rio‘s favelas. Revista de Relaciones Internacionales, Estrategia y Competition state- Seguridad , 12 (2), 231-265. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.18359/ries.2221 Chile. Correo electrónico: [email protected] 232 REVISTA DE RELACIONES INTERNACIONALES, ESTRATEGIA Y SEGURIDAD

MÁS ALLÁ DE LA PACIFICACIÓN. COMPETITION STATE-MAKING EN FAVELAS DE RÍO

Resumen

Durante el Foro Económico Mundial 2016, la estrategia de pacificación aplica- da en las favelas de Río fue reconocida como una de las políticas de seguridad pública más innovadoras en la última década. A partir de este escenario, y utilizando el concepto Competition in State-Making (Construcción Competitiva de Estado), el presente artículo analiza, bajo un enfoque cualitativo, el diseño e implementación de la iniciativa. Luego, buscamos realizar un balance de los resultados obtenidos tras su ejecución, y finalmente, examina las principales lec- ciones que pueden extraerse del caso brasileño. La principal conclusión de esta investigación es que la estrategia brasileña de pacificación se fundamentó en tres pilares: descriminalización operacional; adopción de enfoque integral; y coor- dinación entre los tres niveles gubernamentales (federal, estadual y municipal).

Palabras clave: Brasil, competition state-making, crimen organizado, pacifi- cación.

ALÉM DA PACIFICAÇÃO. COMPETITION STATE-MAKING NA FAVELAS DO RIO

Resumo

Durante Fórum Econômico Mundial 2016, a estratégia de pacificação nas favelas do Rio de Janeiro foi reconhecida como uma das mais inovadoras políticas de segurança pública na última década. A partir desse cenário e usando o concei- to, Competition in State-Making (Construção Competitiva do Estado), este artigo analisa, sob uma abordagem qualitativa, o desígnio e implementação da iniciati- va. Em seguida, faz um balanço dos resultados obtidos após sua execução e final- mente, examina as principais lições que podem ser extraídas do caso brasileiro. O trabalho conclui que sua aplicação foi baseada em três pilares: descriminali- zação operacional; adoção de foco integrante; e coordenação entre os três níveis de governo (federal, estadual e municipal).

Palabras-chave: Brasil, competition state-making, crime organizado, pacifi- cação.

BEYOND PACIFICATION. COMPETITION STATE-MAKING IN RIO’S FAVELAS REVISTA - Bogotá (Colombia) Vol. 12 N.° 2 - Julio-diciembre 233

Introduction they meddle into the State monopoly of violence or, more precisely, in the According to a report prepared by state monopoly of war and justice. So, the Centre for Democratic Control of to protect the borders of their doma- Armed Forces, Qualified Armed Non- ins and kill armed enemies that enter State Actors: Current Trends & Future their territory, they charge vaccines, Challenges, organized crime is largely exercise judgments, provide political an economic phenomenon in the sen- support, and carry out social work. se that criminal organizations provide goods and services that were origina- The main deficit of many Latin Ameri- lly provided by the State. This process can countries is the inability to restore gives to the abovementioned orga- their presence in its respective territo- nizations, in some cases, more social ries, not only from the security pers- legitimacy than the State has in those pective but also in a comprehensive territories (DCAF, 2012, p. 17). range of goods and services (see Table 1). That way, integral presence of the However, it should be noted that, State has two levels: firstly, there are unlike the insurgents or terrorists, cri- social actions that will serve to restore minal groups are motivated primarily the confidence between the coercive by economic incentives, not for poli- power of the State and the citizens, tical or social objectives. In that sense, and, in a second level, there are ac- Ioan Grillo (2016) uses the neologism tions concerning specific responsibili- gangster warlords, which is considered ties of the State in mentioned places. as more appropriate to define a set of The first have operational immediate hybrid criminal leaders characterized value to occupy the zone, motivated by concurrent presence, controlling by the forces on their role as peace- certain territories, and threatening the maker and modifying the attitude of fundamental nature of the state, not their inhabitants towards the police. trying to dominate it completely but to The second was proposed to transform seize some of its parts and weaken it, the factors that reproduce violence operating in it instead. In certain areas, and crime (Buxton, 2015).

Table 1. Configuration of State presence in Latin America

Dimension Limitation on regulatory capacity Limitation on force monopoly All territory vs. All territory vs. Territorial zones of the national territory zones of the national territory All policy areas vs. All policy areas vs. Sectorial specific policy areas specific policy areas Total population vs. Total population vs. Social population segments population segments Temporary Sporadic vs. permanent Sporadic vs. permanent

Source: Elaborated by author from Maihold, 2015.

Esteban Arratia Sandoval 234 REVISTA DE RELACIONES INTERNACIONALES, ESTRATEGIA Y SEGURIDAD

Thus, the more absent the State is from whose ultimate goal is to win the loyal- its territory or the poorer the services ty of the population. provided by it, the more susceptible will be the communities to depend That way, a political response adapted on criminal organizations that promo- to this phenomenon can’t be based te illegal economies to become their only and exclusively in the vigilance supporters. In contrast, “if these ser- and the application of the law in the vices are provided to the population classic sense or the enforcement of and their well-being is improved, this police – military operatives. Though will discourage citizens to collaborate the repressive element is a crucial in illegal activities for income and as component of the strategy, often it’s a result support for criminal organi- possible that it could be complemen- zations will be reduced, further hin- ted with other socioeconomic poli- dering penetration” (Felbab-Brown, cies, so that the dependence of the 2010, p. 12). It shouldn’t be forgotten populations breaks in relation to the that the development of criminal eco- criminal enclaves created by ANSA’s nomies is directly linked to the lack (Felbab-Brown, 2016). of alternative livelihoods in neglected areas. Generally, authorities perceive Under this logic, when it comes to these zones as sanctuaries for crimi- urban areas permeated by illicit eco- nals and show no interest in impro- nomic and violent crime and where ving the socio-economic situation for state presence is weak, governments their inhabitants. need to follow two interrelated ob- jectives: First, they must establish Following the above, Alda Mejias better their own physical presence. (2014) argues that in strong states In some cases, for example in Rio’s which respond effectively to the needs favelas (slums), that statement (or of their societies criminal groups can’t even insertion) of state authority may replace the authority. But in areas of require the physical retake of terri- social and political marginalization and tory controlled by violent non-state poverty in many Latin American cou- entities. In others, to establish such ntries, non-state actors often displace presence involves demonstrating that the state, gaining the loyalty of large the prevalence of physical power, if segments of society. For this reason, not actual monopoly of violence, lies Vanda Felbab-Brown (2011) suggests in the state apparatus and its enforce- that governments stop thinking about ment. Second, the government needs crime only as an aberrant social activi- to regain the population‘s loyalty in ty that must be eliminated, but rather those areas and away from criminal require conceptualizing institutional organizations, so its presence should response to violence as Competition not only be strong, but multifaceted in State-Making between public bodies and positive (Patterson & Blain, 2014, and Non-state Armed Actors (ANSA’s) pp. 61-62).

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Therefore, an appropriate policy option ting of two interrelated objectives: to to deal with the aforementioned pheno- achieve a better establishment of insti- menon must provide means of access to tutional presence and to regain the lo- public goods and services so that people yalty of population in areas controlled transfer their loyalty to the state, stren- by ANSA’s, highlighting its potential gthening the ties between the latter and deterrent against criminal organiza- citizens, and hence the links among the tions and demonstrating to society that population and ANSA’s weaken. State is stronger than them. In that vein, it’s useful to comment what re- In other words, the strategic parti- cently happened in Rio’s favelas where cipation of these ANSA’s affects the a fierce war between drug trafficking fundamental purpose of the State and organizations and the state, which has has political implications because they lasted for a quarter century, is in the act as competitive state-makings, un- process of profound transformation. dermining its functionality and legiti- This is due to the implementation of a macy. Thus, the more order, security, pacification policy by the Carioca’s go- and t providing of economic goods to vernment rescuing the Felbab-Brown win the hearts and minds of local po- thesis, designing this strategy as Com- pulation, the greater the possibility of petition in State-Making between go- becoming de facto proto-state rulers vernment and facções criminosas for with a high degree of political capital the population’s loyalty. (Felbab-Brown, 2011, p. 6).

However, socio-economic programs to Research design reduce violence aren’t a substitute for security. For this reason, prior to the re- This survey is based on a qualitative construction of state, a militarized ap- analysis which is grounded in a non- proach to security should be applied experimental design. In this particular to rescue that territory, breaking the case, we use a longitudinal approach, intimidating power of criminal organi- combining the use of three key instru- zations, restoring the state’s authority, ments: discourse analysis, to compre- and arranging it to the proper imple- hend the substantial logic behind the mentation of government programs pacification strategy; trends descrip- because, “it can’t enter an area domi- tion, to understand the main results of nated by [gangs] with assistance plans its implementation and; ex-ante – ex- of the Madre Teresa type, nor is it likely post contrast, to assess the impact of to encourage citizen participation in the UPP in the implementation of the places where drug trafficking has terro- above-mentioned strategy. In second rized society” (Villalobos, 2015). place, this investigation is based on a synchronic-diachronic study and, at In short, the success of Competition the same time, is an exceptional case in State-Making depends on the mee- (Gerring, 2007). In this sense, the fight

Esteban Arratia Sandoval 236 REVISTA DE RELACIONES INTERNACIONALES, ESTRATEGIA Y SEGURIDAD against criminal organizations in Rio From this perspective, Robert Muggah was executed by means of the im- (2016) views Rio as a fragile city be- plementation of a security policy that cause municipal authorities and their emphasized the military-police coo- institutions are unable or unwilling to peration as a substantial component provide basic services for its residents. of pacification including, at the same That is, the cities become brittle when time, a relevant and consistent socioe- the legitimacy, authority, and capacity conomic support to the civilians living of its institutions properly violate the in critical zones. basic functions such as guaranteeing the safety of citizens, property, infras- tructure, access to water, electrici- War in Favelas ty, and the preserving of basic rules, causing a break in the social contract. Closely related to the issues raised However, it’s clear that fragile cities not in the previous section, it should be necessarily lack of State presence, nor noted that the absence of State in fa- are ungoverned areas where therefore velas generated power vacuums that citizens rely on their own resources criminals covered opportunistically or other actors to meet their needs, in order to control and develop their creating a hybrid government system, operations when drug trafficking on order, and security. So, Rio was trans- a large scale took off in the South formed into a Cidade Partida (split city) American country, endangering the between asfalto (formal city) and fave- residents of these communities and, las (informal city). incidentally, questioning two state functions under a Weberian basic ma- The political transition in the country trix: territory control and maintain the that allowed it to return to democracy monopoly of violence within its bor- in 1985 coincided with an explosive ders. Following this logic, Rio’s Secre- increase in crime rates. This can be at- tary of Public Security, José Mariano tributed largely to the proximity of Bra- Beltrame argue: “favelas were islands zil with cocaine-producing countries where the state simply decided to such as Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru leave. Its residents were forgotten and (drug trafficking at that time experien- ignored, were cooked in a toxic juice ced a boom) creating favorable condi- of extreme poverty, domestic violence tions for distribution and transfer. Thus, and, since the late 80’s, the omnipo- facções criminosas began to capitalize tence of drug traffickers, who specia- this opportunity and took control of lized in abusing entire communities” many communities1 that were discon- (Glenny, 2012). nected, without access to city services

1 According to research conducted by Institute of Social and Political Studies (IESP) and State University of Rio de Janeiro (UERJ), 370 favelas (37% of total) remain under the control of drug traffickers. See: Goulart, 2013.

BEYOND PACIFICATION. COMPETITION STATE-MAKING IN RIO’S FAVELAS REVISTA - Bogotá (Colombia) Vol. 12 N.° 2 - Julio-diciembre 237 and basic infrastructure such as elec- gangs Comando Vermelho and Amigos tricity, sewage, and garbage collection. dos Amigos (Phillips, 2009). Regarding Added to this, these have been tradi- their war borders and the effect that tionally considered illegal settlements, episode generated on the local po- so they remain socially and politically pulation, Beltrame said that “in some remote from the decision-making are; Rio’s favelas, urban warfare is develo- such conditions of favelas transformed ped for territorial, economic, and so- them into ideal centers of operation cial control” (IISS, 2015, p.2). Often for facções criminosas. when a band leader dies or is captured by the police, rivals try to expand their In order to consolidate their power territory and invade the Boca do Fumo in these areas, criminal organizations (sale point) in communities dominated replaced the state providing security, by the criminal group. This fierce rival- economic support, and basic services ry has led to a deeply rooted animosity to their people. Assuming the role of between drug trafficking organizations Donos do Morro (owners of the hill), and the birth of schisms competing they established not only a territorial to maximize the benefits of drug tra- control, but also a social one, maintai- fficking in 763 Rio’s favelas, home to ning this parallel authority or criminal about 1/4 of the Carioca’s population governance based on extrajudicial vio- (Klaubert & Kruger,2014). lence used by each criminal organi- zation to punish those who break the There are four facções criminosas con- rules or resolve conflicts within their trolling favelas. The oldest of them is Co- domains (Grillo, 2014; Sampó & Tron- mando Vermelho (CV), which emerged coso, 2015). In other words, subjecting in the late ‘70s with the aim of mono- residents of communities to control polizing the Carioca’s drug trafficking. and forcing them to avoid crossing Then, in the mid-80’s Terceiro Coman- linhas vermelhas (red lines), drawn to do (TC) was born, violently disputing te- prevent interference from other crimi- rritories with CV, thus initiating an arms nal gangs in its territory. In fact, once race between the two commands for it establishes territorial claims and in possession of more efficient and lethal need of protection, one can only ac- weapons to make them able to ensure cess the settlements by force or by ob- control of Bocas do Fumo and its expan- taining the permission of the respective sion into other favelas (Sampaio, 2014). criminal organization. In the mid-90’s, a dissidence emerged that came into conflict with both cri- In October 2009, a helicopter with minal gangs: Amigos dos Amigos (ADA) four soldiers flying over Morro dos and Terceiro Comando Puro (TCP). The Macacos community was shot down fierce struggle for territory between by drug traffickers after police laun- the various criminal organizations, and ched an operation in the area to con- between them and the police, led to trol heavy fighting between criminal unprecedented violence levels that

Esteban Arratia Sandoval 238 REVISTA DE RELACIONES INTERNACIONALES, ESTRATEGIA Y SEGURIDAD resulted in a dramatic increase in the politically legitimated. Under this lo- number of fatalities in Marvelous City. gic, International Amnesty has raised Indeed, during the 90’s, the homici- awareness on the risk of the Carioca’s de rate reached a peak of 85/100,000 authorities participating, either by people (UCDP, 2016). However, it’s complicity or omission, in the establis- clear that confrontation involved three hment of a non-government in areas other actors: controlled by these groups noting that “so far, the government of Rio de Ja- First, there are the militias, defined by neiro has been far from fulfilling its sociologist Ignacio Cano (2012a, p. 15) responsibility to combat these vigilante as formed by former or active police groups, and this has reinforced their officers and characterized by the fo- sense of legitimacy” (Nuñez, 2010). llowing features of paramilitary groups: Militias wield significantly extensive • Rivaling facções criminosas in the clandestine support of authorities sin- territorial domain of communities; ce their operations are based mainly • Exert coercion among the popu- on political favors, maintaining direct lation living in the favelas through links with representatives of the legis- violence and extortion; lative and judiciary powers. Even they • Main motivation is financial gain; use their policies to influence state • Legitimated themselves as positi- elections connections, coercing favelas ve alternatives to drug trafficking residents to vote for certain candidates through the provision of services proposed by the militias. So those ille- such as order and sale of gas, priva- gal security forces whose power of ex- te transport system, and installation tortion and land area increased rapidly of underground cable TV or Inter- ended up having an increasing influen- net connection; ce on the local government act. In that • Their chain of command acts under vein, a report prepared by the Institu- high officials of State. te of Social and Political Studies notes that between 2005 and 2010 militias These illegal armed groups are another tripled the areas under their control in source of criminal violence, which da- Rio de Janeiro. Moreover, according to tes back to the ‘90s. At that time, the data provided by the Research Center militiamen expelled drug traffickers in on Violence, in 2013 the militias do- some communities, selling protection minated 41.5% of Rio’s favelas, while to residents and merchants in Rio’s fa- drug trafficking controlled only 56% of velas located mostly in the west of the them (Efe, 2013). city. Members of the police apparatus were always present in these groups, Accordingly, it is possible to observe but from the 90’s on they stopped me- that in the case of militias, there would diating between political interests and be a transversality between powers, a the favelas people, controlling them as synergy between formal and informal

BEYOND PACIFICATION. COMPETITION STATE-MAKING IN RIO’S FAVELAS REVISTA - Bogotá (Colombia) Vol. 12 N.° 2 - Julio-diciembre 239 institutions, becoming difficult to be but rather of criminal networks involv- distinguished, for example between ing community leaders, politicians, and the police and the militia. This is be- the police” (Arias, 2006, p.293). cause the police is perceived as a lesser evil militia compared to facções crimi- Proof of this is that facções criminosas nosas and this allow them to continue and militias charged at municipal and operating given that many of its mem- state candidates between US$35,000 bers were former colleagues. Similarly, and US$45,000 for campaigning on militias avoid clashes with the security their territory, and up to US$132,000 forces, unlike drug organizations, ge- to ensure the support of community nerating mutual acceptance and con- leaders in elections. Criminal groups tributing to strengthen the impression also create blacklists of applicants and that militia controlled favelas are safer conducted informal surveys, charging than those dominated by drug traffic- applicants according to the size of the kers. However, although the militias electorate. And while in the past crimi- prevent drug traffickers to install in nal organizations of political campaigns area under their domain, there are si- were profitable, according to O Globo, tuations in which, for a long and esta- the standards set by these organizations blished practice of patronage, some of are now more stringent, and the pheno- them, in case they don’t get the expec- menon has spread to areas that in the ted revenues, sell control of its territory past weren’t affected (Gurney,2014). to facções criminosas and they end up serving as protectors of criminal orga- Michael Misse suggests that dynamics nizations (Koonings & Koenders,2012). as described previously obey to politi- cal goods “produced in an asymmetric On the other hand, government and exchange, often compulsive, beyond the police, although sometimes consid- the interest that both parties have to ered actors, are two forces that exert do so. Its price depends simultaneously different types of control within favelas. on a political calculation and on a During the 80’s and 90’s, as economic correlation of forces to acquire eco- power of facções criminosas grew into nomic characteristics” (2015, pp. 79- communities, networks between AN- 80). Likewise, they can be produced SA’s and state authorities were created by the privatization of state powers by as well as with the police; even some a public official as is the case of co- politicians funneled resources from rruption, or simply the possession of favelas to end up at the hands of drug information, strength, power, or an- traffickers in exchange for votes. Links ything enough to force somebody into that remain in force, although less visi- exchange in a relationship of violence, ble, until today. In that sense, Desmond such as extortion. Arias argues that “the persistence of high levels of violence [in favelas] is not Finally, the police also plays a role as the result of the inability of institutions, a gravitating coercive apparatus that

Esteban Arratia Sandoval 240 REVISTA DE RELACIONES INTERNACIONALES, ESTRATEGIA Y SEGURIDAD is physically present in communi- tivated by complaints from neighbors ties and which attempts to meet the or ongoing investigations, emphasizing government’s agenda. Historically, the the element of surprise (Cano, 2016; security forces acted independently of Stewart, 2012). In other words, the the government in favelas, establishing previous strategy was the military op- connections with criminal groups to ob- eration, but weapons and drugs seizes tain individual benefits, that iss, there were soon replaced and the operation was no effort to combat facções crimi- had side effects: police deaths, bandits nosas as long as they paid off. Indeed, and neighbors victims of this confron- it’s estimated that up to 50% of the tation. That, in the end, only increased profits of drug trafficking organizations violence: “gangs began recruiting more were to police officers (Glenny, 2012). and more children soldiers, who initial- Thus, practices such as arrego (weekly ly only warned criminals when police payment from local traffickers to co- approached; and soon they had guns rrupt police to do not hinder the deve- and community residents saw certain lopment of their activities) became the romanticism in them, as protectors, but rule, while the attacks, shootings, and they were cruel” (Turati, 2012). Besides extrajudicial executions the exception. being extremely ineffective, this strategy stigmatized and victimized the people Even the police didn’t usually enter of the communities, the vast majority of favelas, but merely patrolled their pe- which didn’t belong to organized crime rimeter, leaving the population under groups, but they lived under the con- the rule of ANSA’s. This model of po- stant oppression. Consequently, favelas licing, which is basically a strategy of became not only the reason for the war, containment, reinforced the isolation but also the scene of conflict. of communities in relation to asfalto. Consequently, corruption practiced by In 2000, already subjected to reverse police officers who were involved in fa- the counterproductive outcomes ge- velas through the relationship of extor- nerated by this erroneous approach, tion and protection of drug trafficking, a new policy option emerged that was contributed to the inhabitants of these the direct antecedent of the current communities to have a negative per- anti-crime strategy: Police Grouping in ception regarding the police presence. Special Areas (Grupamento of Policia- mento em Areas Especiais, GPAE) crea- ted under the mandate of Governor UPPs... Challenging the Anthony Garotinho (1999-2002). As conventional response the name itself suggests, it was a poli- ce strategy for special areas, territories Historically, the strategy adopted by that were, at first, conquered by tra- Rio‘s government in favelas could be ffickers and then controlled by Special described as War on crime consisting Forces physically located in the area. on launching sporadic offensives mo- Unlike the approach described above,

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GPAE was carried out following these inception, to control a spatial area. guidelines: intolerance to the presen- Even he not even got to have a tenth ce of firearms circulating within com- of the territorial jurisdiction of their munities; intolerance to the presence successors: Pacifying Police Units (Uni- of youth in criminal activities of any dades de Polícia Pacificadora, UPPs) nature; and intolerance to the presen- ce of the police, military, or civilians The origins of pacification policy back in random acts of violence, abuse of when Rio de Janeiro was selected to power, or criminal practices (World host 2014 FIFA World Cup in October Bank, 2012). These pillars, retaken la- 2007, and as host of 2016 Olympics ter by the current approach, represent Games in October 2009. In this con- one of the major doctrinal adjustments text, the decision to bring peace to the applied in the Carioca police action. favelas desire coincided with the city administrators to enforce the promises Although the program began to made to Féderation Internationale de function successfully, drug trafficking Football Association and International was strong enough to continue ope- Olympic Committee in generating bet- rating, preventing violence in a terri- ter security for all people of the city, state tory tacitly controlled by the police. and country. Both sporting mega-events Unfortunately, this innovative project placed the Marvelous City on map of failed because it was carried out as an globalized and competitive cities. From initiative by a minority segment of the this perspective, celebration is an im- Military Police of Rio Janeiro without portant showcase to support the Rio‘s political and institutional support, competitiveness, showing their material which resulted in a degradation pro- and symbolic in order to attract foreign cess (Mendonça & Moulin, 2013). The investment flows resources. lack of uniformity in the coordination between civil and military police, and In addition to these events, two structu- between the state government and ral and cumulative factors contributed the municipality thwarted the efforts to promote the favelas pacification’s. to strengthen this initiative in public On the one hand, political-party har- security. Additionally, “its abrupt end mony existing between state and due to political charges, after the Ca- federal government allowed open rioca press denounced the governor a window of opportunity for Eduar- was tacitly accepting the continuation do Paes (2009-15) and Sérgio Cabral of illicit economies, though without (2007-14), Carioca’s mayor and gover- violence and without effective control nor respectively, unify criteria regar- of territory” (Misse, 2015, pp.83-84). ding public security and create the UPP Discredited without greater political program. On the other hand, political support, GPAE continue to exist as a climate of the time is: Eduardo Paes kind of mini-battalions local, but gra- and Sergio Cabral they belonged to the dually lost the ability, promised at its Brazilian Democratic Movement Party

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(PMDB), and former presidents, Lula From this perspective, what differen- Da Silva (2003-10) and Dilma Rous- tiates the new approach to War on seff (2011-16), were members of the crime is not the mere presence of the Workers Party, the closest allies of the State in favelas but a change of prio- PMDB (Ashcroft, 2014). This political rities, an example of what Benjamin alignment was very important to coor- Lessing (2010) defined as operational dinate financial, logistical and human decriminalization: reorientation of re- resources that would require the new pressive drug policy by operational strategy against organized crime. agents of the state forces, from the eradication of this illicit economy de- Thus, after trial and error, the veloped within communities towards Carioca’s authorities applied the les- minimizing violence, insecurity, and sons learned and chose to turn in a other negative externalities associated public security policy within the fa- with drug trafficking. This shift in prio- velas launching a new program: Pa- rities was explained by the State Se- cifying Police Units. However, one cretary of Public Security José Mariano wonders, how do UPPs differ from Beltrame during an interview with The other responses made earlier? Guardian as follows: “We can’t guaran- tee that we will put an end to drug tra- With the arrival in 2007 of former fficking, nor do we claim it [because] governor Sérgio Cabral and Security we would have a failed project. What Secretary Jose Mariano Beltrame (first we want is to break the paradigm of police career in the post), the new ad- territory controlled by traffickers with ministration dismissed the idea that war’s weapons” (Phillips, 2010). violence in the favelas was due to a problem of drug trafficking, criminal In strategic terms, the operational de- gangs, and availability of assault wea- criminalization gives the State a wide pons, and chose to understand it as a margin of maneuver to influence the matter of territorial control. If violence behavior of drug traffickers: “Today is stemmed power that allowed criminal clear that anyone who intends to use gangs control over communities, the drugs, the chemical dependent, will solution was to recover those spaces get drugs”, said Beltrame. “But the and restore them to state authority. guy who might be there selling them The UPP slogan ‘veio para ficar’ (came doesn’t have that power, that influen- to stay) resembles notions of a ‘break ce” (Lisaardy, 2011a). Politically spea- with history’ in Rio’s response to ur- king, the strategy of pacification is an ban informality and violence (Werling, alternative route found for untying 2014). Therefore, the area is configu- traffic and violence associated with it red as a strategic pillar for a pacifica- without having to face the dilemmas tion policy, allowing the playback of implicit in the option to legalize or sovereignty in terms of security and openly negotiate with criminals. The service provision. State and specifically its security for-

BEYOND PACIFICATION. COMPETITION STATE-MAKING IN RIO’S FAVELAS REVISTA - Bogotá (Colombia) Vol. 12 N.° 2 - Julio-diciembre 243 ces simply defined clear and rational effort to change the history of police manner priorities and acted consis- abuse in Rio. As the official website of tently with them. Consequently, UPPs the project states: represents a pragmatic choice to the failed War on crime, that from a con- Pacifying Police Units is a new mo- ceptual point of view, can be equated del of public security and police with harm reduction: it isn’t intended that promotes rapprochement bet- to eliminate the alleged root cause of ween population and the police, to- the ills, crime or drugs, but to mitigate gether with strengthening of social their adverse effects, such as violence policy in the communities. When and criminal control over communities recovering the zones occupied for (Turati, 2012). decades by drug traffickers and re- cently by militias, territories led by Under this logic, operational decrimi- the UPPs are peace communities nalization is most clearly perceived in (UPP, 2016). the virtual absence of clashes during occupations as they happened befo- In other words, it replaces War on cri- re the UPPs. After the occupation and me logics with a new approach based installation of the UPPs, clashes and on the permanent police presence and deadly incidents are no longer the rule an interactive community. And while and became exceptional situations. UPPs exist within traditional police ro- For example, according to Beltrame, les, this project grants great importan- regarding the invasion of Rocinha, the ce to the reconstruction of community Amigos dos Amigos stronghold: “The relations. All officers perform commu- result was fantastic. In less than two nity service as part of their routine, hours, Rocinha was fully occupied mainly teaching youth from music to without a single shot, and the inhabi- karate and computer sciences; it tries tants moved around the community in to transform the troubled relationship tranquility” (Koonings, 2014, p.140). between police and the community That statement sends the following (Morse, 2011). message: pacification is a success be- cause occupations are well planned In this direction, it’s necessary to point and organized; with a minimum of out that one key of the pacification poli- violence, are warmly welcomed by cy lies in the recruitment and training of neighbors who positively perceive the agents that make up the UPPs. Former State as returning to the favelas. Commander of the UPPs José Carvalho summarizes: “We needed fresh minds, Another aspect that distinguishes the not a Rambo. The old generation of po- new approach is the adoption of the lice was used to kicking doors and ope- principles of community policing in ning fire on the street” (Isacson, 2011). order to maintain and integrate agents In an effort to get rid of this institutional in favelas, representing an ambitious culture, only recently graduated from

Esteban Arratia Sandoval 244 REVISTA DE RELACIONES INTERNACIONALES, ESTRATEGIA Y SEGURIDAD the police academy were selected to meaning political capital on their favor, participate as members. Once accep- whose sustainability is highly depen- ted into the program, recruits undergo dent on their ability, by the state, to three weeks of training that includes continue earning the minds and hearts human rights, sociology, and meetings of the population. with UPPs commanders to exchange experiences, aiming to provide general From an organizational angle, it is wor- guidance on the status of the specific th to note that Sérgio Cabral launched favela in which each officer will ope- the first decree on this new project, rate. After this brief period of prepara- Decree 41.650 o Bola da PM n°012, in tion, UPPs officers are deployed. Thus, January 2009. This document provides the emphasis is placed on community in its section 3 that each operation de- policing rather than on the repressive pends on the UPPs and the doctrinally activity focused on combat. Indeed, Pacification Police Coordination (CPP), UPPs agents are much less visibly ar- whose commander reports directly to med; they don’t carry heavy weapons the general commander of the Military like those used by Special Police Ope- Police of Rio de Janeiro, and shall esta- rations Battalion (known as BOPE). blish the necessary links with the State Committee appointed by the governor. From that perspective, Joaquin Villalo- In other words, the UPPs are operati- bos explain: vely disconnected from the rest of the territorial structure of the Military Poli- To win the support of citizens, it is ce of Rio de Janeiro. Subsequently, Ca- essential the good behavior of [the bral unveiled Decree 42.787 in January security forces]. All errors, abuse 2011, nearly two years after the pre- of power, and corruption become vious document. This decree establis- operational difficulties, loss of infor- hes operational definition, objectives, mation, and risks for themselves [the criteria, and implementation of the pa- police]. Increasing the hostility of ci- cification process (Monroy, 2014). tizens, who in most cases can have forced relationships with offenders, Regarding the first aspect, the decree is a serious error (Villalobos, 2015). defines the Pacifying Police Units as a small police force that works exclusi- Therefore, the behavior is not only an vely on a community located in an ur- ethical or human rights issue; it is an ban area delimited by law. Each has its important component of operational own office and can have one or more efficiency. A better conduct of the for- bases. It also has a commander, body of ce corresponds more possibly with the officers, sergeants, and soldiers, as well building up of intelligence networks, as its own equipment, such as cars and greater intelligence, and more effi- motorcycles. The UPP program works ciency (Escoto, 2016). Ultimately, the on the principle of policing and has a strategy aims to build peace in favelas strategy based on partnership between

BEYOND PACIFICATION. COMPETITION STATE-MAKING IN RIO’S FAVELAS REVISTA - Bogotá (Colombia) Vol. 12 N.° 2 - Julio-diciembre 245 the population and public security ins- undermine the rule of law” (Monroy, titutions. UPPs act based on respect for 2014, p. 119). To better understand the culture and characteristics of each the selection criteria by the UPPs, oc- community, promoting dialogue and cupied favelas must use city bounda- encouraging the emergence of com- ries created by Institute de Segurança munity leaders. The program includes Publica (Public Security Institute, ISP). agreements and partnerships between Hence, Rio’s state is divided into four UPPs, government departments, the sections, each designated as Regiõ private and the third sector. Integrada de Segurança Pública (In- tegrated Public Security Region, RISP) About the second point, it states that (table 2). UPPs were designed with the following objectives: It can be seen in Figure 1 that, sin- ce its launch in Santa Marta favela • Recover state control over commu- in December 2008, the pacification nities under the influence of facções policy has notoriously favored RISP criminosas. 1. Between 2008 and 2010, 11 UPPs • Maintaining peace and security in were installed in RISP 1. From 2010 favelas to ensure socio-economic to 2012, 15 more were established development of their inhabitants. in the first quadrant, and between • Breaking War on crime logics in Rio 2012 and 2014 12 additional UPPs de Janeiro (Ashcroft, 2014). were located in the same section. In the same period, RISP 2 accu- Similarly, the decree ratifies the profi- mulated only 3 UPPs, two of which le of the target areas where the UPPs (Cidade de Deus and Batam) were are installed as follows: “Poor com- executed shortly after Santa Marta. munities with low institutional fra- Then, the third unit of UPP in RISP mework, high degree of informality, 2 was implemented in Vila Kennedy and ostensible and opportunistic ins- during May 2014, more than three tallation of armed criminal groups that years later. The last UPP was at RISP

Table 2. RISP’s Location RISP Location Rio´s touristic South Zone as well as Downtown and North Zone. The famous Copacabana, RISP 1 Crist Redeemer, Sugar Loaf, as well as both airports of the city are located in this area. This area encompasses the rest of Rio´s municipality, with upper class (Barra) as well as lower RISP 2 class (Bangú, Campo Grande) neighborhoods. RISP 3 To the north of Rio lie several municipalities of lower income commuters. This area includes Rio´s neighbour cities of Niterói, São Gonçalo, and several other RISP 4 municipalities further away from the city.

Source: Elaborated by author from Klaubert & Kruger, 2014.

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3, only one in this sector. Finally, it’s the 38 UPPs installed to date only 4 worth mentioning that RISP 4 hasn’t were implanted outside RISP 1 (see received any UPP. Consequently, of Table 3).

Figure 1. Number of UPPS installed per RISP, 2008-14 Source: Elaborated by author from Klaubert & Kruger, 2014

Table 3. UPPs installed, 2008-14 Favela Implemention Date RISP Santa Marta 12/19/2008 1 Cidade de Deus 02/16/2009 2 Batam 02/18/2009 2 Chapéu Mangueira e Babilônia 06/10/2009 1 Pavão-Pavãozinho e Cantagalo 12/23/2009 1

Ladeira dos Tabajaras e Cabritos 01/14/2010 1 Morro da Providência, Pedra Lisa e Moreira Pinto 04/26/2010 1 Morro do Borel, Casa Branca, Chácara do Céu, Indiana, Morro do 06/07/2010 1 Cruz, Catrambi Formiga 07/01/2010 1 Morro do Andaraí, Nova Divinéia, João Paulo II, Juscelino Kubitschek, 07/28/2010 1 Jamelão, Morro Santo Agostinho e Arrelia Salgueiro 09/17/2010 1 Turano 10/30/2010 1 Macacos 11/30/2010 1 Quieto, São João e Matriz 01/31/2011 1 Fallet, Fogueteiro, Coroa 02/25(2011 1 Prazeres, Escondidinho 02/25/2011 1 Morro São Carlos, Mineira, Zinco e Querosone 05/17/2011 1

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Favela Implemention Date RISP Mangueira 11/03/2011 1 Vidigal e Chácara do Céu 01/18/2012 1 Fazendinha 04/18/2012 1 Nova Brasilia 04/18/2012 1 Morro do Adeus/Morro da Baiana 05/11/2012 1 Alemão 05/30/2012 1 Chatuba 06/27/2012 1 Fé/Sereno 06/27/2012 1 Vila Cruzeiro 09/05/2012 1 Vila Proletária da Penha 09/05/2012 1 Rocinha 09/20/2012 1 Manguinhos 01/18/2013 1 Jacarezinho 01/18/2013 1 Barreira/Tuiti 05/22/2013 1 Caju 05/22/2013 1 Arará/Mandela 05/22/2013 1 Cerro-corá 07/25/2013 1 Lins 01/16/.2014 1 Camarista Meier 01/16/2014 1 Mangueirinha 24/02/2014 3 Vila Kenedy 05/23/2014 2

Source: Elaborated by author from UPP Official Website, 2016.

However, it’s natural to wonder why of formal employment and generates most UPPs focus on RISP 1. As indi- 33% of the Carioca’s Gross Domes- cated, RISP 1 mainly encompasses the tic Product. Addressing RISP 1, UPPs Southern area of ​​Rio de Janeiro, which ignore the state’s most violent areas. includes most of the tourist attractions Some experts recognize this bias in se- as Maracana Stadium, Crist Redeemer lection criteria stating that UPPs imple- and famous beaches as Copacabana mentation doesn’t cover the areas of and Ipanema (see Figure 1). In that greatest lethality, as Baixada Fluminen- sense, Ignacio Cano (2012b) argues se or the West, controlled by militias. that the vast majority of the UPPs are However, most favelas located in RISP located in the Southern zone since, 1 are controlled by facções criminosas although the region is inhabited by 7% who want to be closer to its main cus- of the population, it accounts for 50% tomers: foreign tourists.

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Figure 2. Map of Rio de Janeiro Source: International Amnesty, 2016.

Finally, legal framework provides a holistic view of the pacification process in the following steps (see Figure 3):

Figure 3. Stages of pacification process Source: Elaborated by author from Cabral 2011, Muggah, 2013 and Werling, 2014.

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Tactics. This phase is to regain territo- in order to pave the way for the arrival rial control over the areas submitted by of public and private services, seeking criminal groups. To achieve it, the Sta- the possibility that the community is te reports that public and early BOPE reintegrated into the city, even though invade a given favela to expel the nar- the program doesn’t intend to im- cos. BOPE entry represents the re-con- plement these services itself. In other quest of territory that has been under words, it is designed to set the stage for the enemy’s power. Significantly, the a subsequent phase called “shock of occupation is previously announced order”, in which business and proper- in order to avoid confrontation and ty relationships are formalized (Fisher, bands voluntarily leave the area or su- 2014). However, actual implementa- rrender their weapons (Muggah & Sou- tion is left in the air, without providing za, 2014; Nicoll, 2015). Even Carioca details on how the UPPs must enter or government itself refers to this strategy start their activities in the community. as Announced War, recognizing the Typically, this implementation inclu- development of an armed conflict in des the construction and occupation those territories, as well as an attempt of UPPs bases in strategic locations of to approach them more cautiously. occupied communities. The presence of the headquarters is crucial for the Stabilization. In the second step of the success of the strategy as without an BOPE invasion, the territory is stabili- established base in the favela, UPPs are zed, neutralizing the last resistance delegitimizing themselves as competi- cells of criminal gangs and they remain tive state construction. Even, the UPPs in the favela as long as necessary, crea- are usually installed in public buildings ting the conditions necessary to install that were abandoned or used by other the contingent of the UPPs. Howe- government agencies. There are cases, ver, this phase isn’t well defined, and however, as in Batam where the head- there’s no prescriptive description of quarters that houses the UPPs worked what should be or include. This spa- as a hideout for Comando Vermelho ce, open to interpretation, has allowed (Estévez, 2013). military intervention with National Se- curity Force troops, particularly in the Evaluation and monitoring. The final most populous and conflicting fave- phase of the process sets out to track las: Complexo do Alemao (composed course changes, aiming to continuously by 15 communities totaling 400,000 improve the program. Although this inhabitants) or Complexo do Maré step may be more influential to the (composed by16 communities where success and development of interven- 130,000 Cariocas live). tions, the decree doesn’t establish a mechanism of control over the paci- Implantation. The decree states that the fication process; and it doesn’t deter- third step is when the UPPs moves per- mine formal appropriate indicators for manently to the assigned community monitoring and evaluation for effective

Esteban Arratia Sandoval 250 REVISTA DE RELACIONES INTERNACIONALES, ESTRATEGIA Y SEGURIDAD management (Rodrigues, 2014). With- manent presence of State, including out doubt, this ruling has damaged the its law enforcement as well as linking generation of a comprehensive view the people to State via provision of of the process, not only by local com- public goods, services and legal eco- manders, but also by the policymakers. nomy –the essence of what popula- Consequently, with the lack of an eva- tion centric COIN is about (Bertetto, luation system, the project can’t adapt 2012; Felbab-Brown, 2013). to the demands, thus generating a long-term change. Since it’s known, COIN implies adopt- ing multiple measures, whether mili- From what was discussed above, we tary, economic, political, and social, can infer that the pacification process to delimit and turn the insurgency in- provides a solution to the crossroads effective (Garcia, 2010, p. 112). Due of thinking the state from the strong- to the fact that the gravity center of weak dichotomy, as a differential pre- the gangs in favelas, as well as in the sence and situational playback devices case of insurgencies, is the local pop- are revealed, in many cases illegal and ulation, it makes them vulnerable to informal. Through these devices, the the application of counter-insurgen- state strategically focus on some of its cy methodologies. Traditional COIN facets: repressive-militarist or provider- principles have been critical in the institutionalism (Monroy, 2014). strategy of Rio‘s Government, dem- onstrating that its value and efficiency Under this logic, it should be noted is preserved, even when used against that the pacification process has tac- criminal groups. tical fundamentals underlying Coun- terinsurgency (COIN), an aspect that Additionally, similarity of this strategy is clearly evident in how it faces the with the clear, hold, build approach as challenge represented by facções cri- described in the now famous Counte- minosas while ANSAs (Karim, 2014; rinsurgency Field Manual 3-24, is ob- Hoelscher & Norheim-Martinsen, vious (Daniel, 2015, p. 100). Indeed, 2014). The philosophy behind the Michael Burgoyne (2012) assessed pacification was articulated in docu- how effective are Counterinsurgency ments from the US Consulate in Rio, Field Manual 3-24 principles in their which, exposed by WikiLeaks, showed efforts against facções criminosas. that UPP “shares some characteristics The research results indicate that 10 with US counter-insurgency doctrine out of 12 guidelines contained in this and strategy in Afghanistan or Iraq” document proved to be useful in Rio, (Arsenault, 2012). Indeed, UPP is but need some doctrinal adjustments very counterinsurgency-like approach based on the identification of the gra- without it being called a COIN, but its vity center of these criminal groups logic and basic scheme are there: per- (see Table 4).

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Table 4. Evaluation of the effectiveness of the Counterinsurgency Field Manual 3-24 principles in the pacification policy

Government legitimacy + Rule of law + Unity of effort + Long-term commitment + Primacy of political factors / Use of force + Knowledge the environment + Small units + Intelligence driven operations + Learning and adaptation + Isolation from popular support + Support to host nation /

Source: Elaborated by author from Burgoyne, 2012.

Therefore, the main difference be- favoring the welfare and progress of tween the traditional COIN strategy local population. and the pacification process lies in their starting and final conditions. Between 2008 and 2014, 38 UPPs Thus, the causes of criminal violence have been installed in Rio, benefiting in Rio are socio-economic and cul- 1,500,000 people in 264 communi- tural, more than political-ideological ties, which amounts to a land area of 9,446,047 square meters (see Graphic as for insurrection. And, instead of 2). Judging from the figures, the paci- having as goal to strengthen the gov- fication policy applied in Marvelous ernment‘s legitimacy, as in a tradi- City seems to have achieved its main tional COIN, the expected result of objective: to regain state control over the pacification process is to inte- favelas under the influence of facções grate the communities to the asfalto, criminosas.

Figure 4. Level coverage of the pacification policy, 2008-14

Source: Elaborated by author from ISP, 2015.

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On the other hand, it is necessary to pacification process has had a signi- highlight that the pacification policy ficant impact in reducing homicides. first evaluated its success by the be- Between 2007 and 2014, the murder havior of crime rates in the interven- rate fell more than 65% in intervened tion communities. This parameter favelas. In fact, the homicide rate in used as its main objective, as descri- areas with UPPs was 7.4 deaths per bed by official documents, to reduce 100,000 inhabitants in 2014, repre- the levels of violence directly associa- senting a third of the verified rate in ted with criminal groups operating in 2008 (21.5), when the first occupation these areas. As shown in Figure 5, the took place.

Figure 5. Intentional homicide rate in UPPs zones, 2007-14

Source: Elaborated by author from ISP, 2015.

Similarly, Figure 6 show that the strategy, i.e., the UPPs has sheltered greatest impact was a substantial de- 60 lives annually per 100,000 inha- cline in the rate of police lethality bitants (Efe, 2015). So, those statistics and accounted for only 3.7 resistan- show that “UPP are in many ways a ce deaths (autos do resistência)2 per police pacification program before 100,000 inhabitants (20 cases) in pa- the approach prevailed [between se- cified areas during 2014, equivalent curity forces]: authorization to kill in to a reduction of 85% compared to favelas” (Vigna, 2015). that recorded in 2008, 25.2 (136 vic- tims). Based on these improvements, In the same way, Figure 7 shows that it is estimated that about 5,000 ki- between 2007 and 2014 there was a llings have been prevented since the sharp increase in the number of cri- introduction of the new anti-crime mes reported in the pacified commu-

2 Autos do resistência refers to homicides resulting from police intervention in the exclusion of unlawfulness and is invoked on the grounds of self-defense. Meanwhile, the responsible agents often argue that these deaths occur as a result of armed clashes. See: HRW, 2016, p. 48.

BEYOND PACIFICATION. COMPETITION STATE-MAKING IN RIO’S FAVELAS REVISTA - Bogotá (Colombia) Vol. 12 N.° 2 - Julio-diciembre 253 nities. Table 5 shows a breakdown in to intentional and unintentional in- this behavior in areas with UPPs bet- juries (40% of reports), threats (12%) ween 2007 and 2013, revealing that and drug trafficking (5% of cases) (ISP, the three largest increases correspond 2015, p. 5).

Figure 6. Resistance deaths rate in UPPs zones, 2007-14 Source: Elaborated by author from ISP, 2015.

Figure 7. Crime report rate in UPPs zones, 2007-14 Source: Elaborated by author from ISP, 2015.

Table 5. Crime reported before and after UPPs, 2007-13

Monthly rate (average) per 100,000 Average monthly cases for community Crime in each community Pre UPP Post UPP Pre UPP Post UPP Disappearances 0.32 0.71 3.60 6.92 Intentional injury 3.34 11.66 41.33 127.36 Domestic violence 2.17 8.47 27.12 84.66 Threats 2.30 7.97 29.45 99.24 Rape 0.14 0.37 1.35 4.84 Robbery 5.87 2.70 61.23 20.58 Pick pocketing 3.48 5.38 46.46 64.99 Drug related crime 1.91 5.83 24.13 63.93 Note: Bold italic numbers indicate increased incidence during period studied. Source: Muggah & Szabó, 2016.

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In relation to the above, a report pre- creating the so-called cockroach effect3. pared by the Laboratório de Análise da As expected, the installation of UPPs Violência examined to what extent the generated a millionaire prejudice to installation of UPPs affects crime rates criminal gangs who exploit drug traffic- recorded in communities, concluding king. In fact, a report by the Intelligence that while the pacification policy seems Department in 2009 revealed that only to have succeeded in reducing armed in the communities of the South, the violence, its impact on a wider series drug traffickers stopped receiving up to of crime rates becomes more irregular, R$1.8 million monthly (Efe, 2014). The- showing an upward trend. However, refore, as argue by Vanda Felbab-Brown it’s difficult to know why some crimes (2011), instead of achieving a spreading go up while others go down, and there ink-spot of security (with a zone of ​​effec- are two plausible hypotheses: tive public security steadily expanding), operating clearance as tactical interven- a) Increased reporting of crimes as a tions in the first phase of pacification result of the increased confidence process can become a game in which by intervened favelas residents violent crime and their negative exter- when going to the authorities or lo- nalities simply move to other areas with cal police without fear of reprisal. weak state presence. b) The Pacification process has un- dermined the authoritarian social According to Rio’s authorities, with the control and power structures of occupation of some of the largest fave- criminal groups, preventing them las, including Complexo do Alemao, in from applying their codes of con- 2010, Rocinha, in 2012; Lins, in 2013, duct, resulting in a real increase of and more recently Maré, in 2014, CV unarmed crimes and those derived and ADA fled to Chapadão and Pedrei- from domestic conflicts; this means ra, turning them into their new centers that common crime is replacing of operations. Particularly, Chapadão bigger criminal operations (Muggah has been christened New Alemão, re- & Szabó, 2016, p. 13). ferring to the Alemao slum complex, marked by an unprecedented vio- Similarly, it is worth to mention that after lence, which was occupied in 2012 their expulsion as a product of the appli- (Thompson, 2012; Belton, 2016). The cation of the pacification policy, facções CV now maintains a stronghold in Cha- criminosas were forced to move their padão while the ADA has established a illicit activities towards peripheral area, significant presence in Pedreira.

3 According to Bruce Bagley, the cockroach effect occurs when criminal organizations, to avoid detection by authorities, after the light has been turned on move from one municipality to another, from one city to another, from one country to another; or from one region to another in search of a better context to establish and carry out their criminal activities. See: Garzón (2013, p. 12).

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UPP Social… Securitization to the same services and opportunities of development? as the rest of the city.

The process of occupation is carried It’s pertinent to mention that the UPP on by the entry of UPP Social for the Social was launched in August 2010 purpose of coordinating the provision under the leadership of the munici- of goods and services in pacified areas pality of Rio de Janeiro through Insti- and integrating it to the asfalto. This tuto Pereira Passos (IPP) and with the phase was designed by Rio’s autho- help of the United Nations Human rities to coordinate social and urban Settlements Programme (UN-HABI- development interventions, with the TAT), two years after the first occu- explicit aim of ‘multiplying’ the im- pation. As pacification process, the pact of the pacification process. And socioeconomic counterpart is deve- represents an additional effort for pu- loped in three stages: blic security that is only part of the equation to reverse the exclusion in Starting with pre-implantation, this favelas; it is also necessary to crea- phase, a group of local engineers te necessary conditions for socio- goes around for a particular month economic development. It was also after the recovery of the territory influenced by similar projects imple- in the UPPs communities talking to mented as part of the counter-insur- associations, leaders, and residents gency operations in the Colombian to begin to identify the most urgent cities of Bogotá and Medellin, and demands. This step is followed by bears many similarities to the Natio- conducting a rapid participatory nal Solidarity Program in Afghanistan mapping, which provides a socio- (Foley, 2014). economic evaluation of each favela. Based on this initial diagnosis, it holds As indicated by Robert Muggah: “So- a UPP Social Forum in each of the mehow the notion of a UPP and UPP neighborhoods to discuss the main Social emerged by default rather than demands identified and possible so- by design” (Ramsey, 2014); without lutions, assisting representatives of this being a counterpart to the security all relevant municipal departments strategy, the UPPs alone will not contri- (health, education, housing, etc.), bute to the inclusion of communities, local leaders, the commander of the and despite the previous work of the local UPP, and the private sector. The UPPs in the recovery of territory, the results of these forums, including social component couldn’t exist. The- the list of applications, participants, refore, UPP Social program aims to and achieved agreements are made complete the pacification process, in- available to the municipal and state tegrating the areas taken over by UPPs, government. Finally, a team of local by promoting socio-economic develo- coordinators of the UPP Social (two pment, and allowing residents’ access or three, depending on the size of

Esteban Arratia Sandoval 256 REVISTA DE RELACIONES INTERNACIONALES, ESTRATEGIA Y SEGURIDAD the community) is set permanently in Elimination of geological risk. In 22 the communities, making daily visits of 38 areas occupied, R$239 million to mediate between the community, were invested in infrastructure. The government, and other providers of areas that received interventions were basic services. Andarai, Barreira do Vasco/Tuiuti, Ba- tan, Borel, Cerro-Corá, Cidade de Between 2010 and 2016, the Rio de Deus, Chapéu Mangueira/Babilônia, Janeiro government has invested a Complexo da Penha, Complexo do total of R$2.1 billion in this initiative, Alemao, Complexo do Lins, Escon- obtaining remarkable results in the fol- didinho/Prazeres, Fallet/Fogueteiro/ lowing areas: Coroa, Formiga, Macacos, Mangueira, Providência, Rocinha, Salgueiro, São Education. 232 Development Areas Carlos, São João, Turano, and Vidigal/ opened, 49 are in areas occupied by Chacara do Ceu. UPPs. They have generated 9,295 jobs in pacified communities since 2010. Dwelling place. Since 2009 it has in- Investment in the quality of education vested R$882 million, covering 53,000 has achieved that the Index Develop- households, urbanization programs as ment of Basic Education in the ter- Morar Carioca in 18 pacified zones. ritories with UPP undergone a great Only in Manguinhos, were 9,800 evolution. According to data from homes were built, and in Complexo 2009 and 2013, in the second seg- do Alemao other 15,500. ment, growth in this evaluation notes reached 24%. Public Services. For example, pub- lic lighting company RioLuz has Health. Coverage of Family Health earmarked R$20.5 million for the Strategy in the city increased from installation or upgrade of 20,965 lu- 3% in 2010 to 47.9% in 2016 and minaires. In fact, in zones as Chapéu is expected to reach 70% in 2017. Mangueira/Babilônia they had an in- However, in pacified areas this index crease of 210% in the number of new is now 73%. In 12 of the 38 favelas or upgraded points. Additionally, the occupied, coverage reached 100% Municipal Urban Cleaning Company (Borel, Chapéu Mangueira/Babilô- (Companhia Municipal de Limpeza nia, Formiga, Jacarezinho, Macaques, Urbana, COMLURB) invested R$15.27 Manguinhos, Pavão-Pavãozinho/Can- million in the installation of 302 con- tagalo, Providência, Rocinha, Santa tainers and the purchase of 282 vehi- Marta, São João, Tabajaras/Kids); and cles for logistics in garbage collection three already exceed 90% (Caju - in 20 communities intervened by UPPs 97%, Mangueira - 95% and São Car- (Rio+Social,2016). los - 92%). The goal for the end of 2016 is that 80% of the territories have However, the UPP Social isn’t only a achieved 90%. matter for public investment, as indi-

BEYOND PACIFICATION. COMPETITION STATE-MAKING IN RIO’S FAVELAS REVISTA - Bogotá (Colombia) Vol. 12 N.° 2 - Julio-diciembre 257 cated by Wikileaks; the US Consulate nificantly increased the cost of living in Rio reported in 2009 that the Gross in favelas once pacified; all residents Domestic Product of the city would must pay water bills, electricity, cable approximately increase to US$21 bil- TV and Internet services previously lion if the residents of pacified areas available for free or at minimal cost. were incorporated into formal econo- It should be remembered that prior to my (Halais, 2013). Under this logic, it the arrival of UPP Social, public ser- has been suggested that the pacifica- vices were supplied illegally by facções tion process intended to transform the criminosas thus representing a qualita- inhabitants of favelas into consumers, tive leap in terms of availability, access, being understood as the key that has and quality. allowed the expansion of provision of services to its residents (water, elec- Closely related to the above, Jailson da tricity, cable TV and Internet) and an Sauza, director of the Observatory of incipient regularization goal of integra- Favelas says: “When the UPPs arrived, tion of these territories into the city. more taxes, tariffs, and prices rose, the space has been re-evaluated, there is Similarly, it’s seen an unprecedented real estate speculation and that makes opportunity for the expansion of pri- life difficult for people because mar- vate initiatives because, although resi- kets fall behind the police” (Selvanaya- dents of the communities are poor, gam,2013). Even, a speculative boom companies see favelas as places of in- has been noticed when the news that creasing opportunity. There are several UPPs will be installed in any favela be- advantages in arrival at the pacified ar- gin to circulate. The housing market eas, particularly the media exposure of has been one of the biggest beneficia- their brands, the ability to expand its ries of the pacification policy; the price customer base and sales, and the possi- per square meter and rental housing bility of creating programs of corporate tend to increase dramatically in inter- social responsibility that can contrib- vened neighboring favelas and neigh- ute to community development, while borhoods at a higher rate than the rest strengthening their reputation as posi- of the city. For example, prices have tive agents in the Carioca society. increased by 50% in the pacified com- munities only 24 hours after the BOPE On the other hand, the promotion of raid (Lissardy, 2011b). socioeconomic development in favelas has generated mixed reactions on their A report prepared by Getulio Vargas residents for it does not only mean to Foundation in 2013 concluded that guarantee that they enjoy their rights, after the arrival of UPPs, rents in pa- but also the need to meet a series of cified favelas grew 6.8% compared to rigged obligations to formalization of the rest of the city (Griffin, 2016). In access to public services in pacified other words: “Rio is going through a communities. This situation has sig- huge real estate valuation, but in fa-

Esteban Arratia Sandoval 258 REVISTA DE RELACIONES INTERNACIONALES, ESTRATEGIA Y SEGURIDAD velas is higher, giving rise to what we policies to provide equal opportuni- have called the UPP effect” (Lissardy, ties and meet the basic needs of com- 2011b). However, it has been sugges- munities in order to restore the social ted that the recovery of favelas as Roc- contract between State and favelas re- inha where the houses are on average sidents, so that the nexus between the smaller and are home to more people population and criminal enclaves crea- than other communities, can bring ted by ANSAs break. In short, there are negative consequences, such as the two key variables in complex scenarios rampant growth of illegal settlements such as the ones analyzed in this work: externalities. State’s effective authority, accompa- nied by a provision of public goods and services reduce the scale and da- Conclusions mage capacity of the illicit economy.

The analysis of Rio’s experience allows Thus, Carioca’s authorities adopted the deriving of the following lessons for new premises and set realistic goals: the design of public security policies eradicate drug trafficking isn’t an attai- and prevention of violence in Latin nable goal. It is feasible to minimize America: the impacts of illicit drug markets and control exercised by facções criminosas Firstly, the pacification policy shows in communities. By replacing the pre- how policymakers recognized that tense of stopping traffic to end armed social, political, and economic exclu- criminal gangs control, policymakers sion is an ideal context in which cri- moved the debate on public security, me and violence are strengthened. taking it away from the War on crime It’s necessary to adopt comprehensi- approach and focusing it on the terri- ve approaches to ensure the success torialization of illicit economies. It’s of any public security strategy. This is therefore necessary to assume that re- particularly true in large urban areas ducing crime is only meaningful to the that have been victim of anarchy, cri- extent that it improves public security. me, and neglect by the State for deca- des, as in the case of Rio’s favelas. For Similarly, it’s necessary to adapt the this reason, policymakers have applied strategy to the nature of problem to be Felbab-Brown’s postulates and re- solved: policymakers determined that conceptualized their strategy against the violence was caused by the territo- facções criminosas as Competition in rial control exercised by criminal gangs; State-Making. therefore, the pacification policy focu- sed on the recovery of these territories. As previously noted, although repres- For example, the use of specific police sion is a critical component in go- models, such as community policing vernment response, often must be isn’t due to subjective assessments as complemented by socio-economic it enables control of territory rescued

BEYOND PACIFICATION. COMPETITION STATE-MAKING IN RIO’S FAVELAS REVISTA - Bogotá (Colombia) Vol. 12 N.° 2 - Julio-diciembre 259 by improving the relationship between Finally, a successful implementation the inhabitants of favelas and UPPs. of comprehensive strategies against crime involves acquiring a lasting In this regard, another difference of pa- commitment. For a mayor or gover- cification policy when compared with nor, talk to reverse the exclusion can previous policies should be highlight: generate substantial electoral political the realization of the social agenda af- gains. However, its implementation ter the police-military operations. The is extremely complex and requires creation of UPP Social program to be long-term planning; ability to obtain conducted after the phase of stabiliza- resources, persuade state institutions tion and recovery of territory is a great of various levels involved and invol- indicator of that change. Access to so- ve civil society organizations and the cial programs and social inclusion ini- private sector, while maintaining its tiatives that get multiplied in pacified support and commitment for a consi- communities due to a deconstruction derable period. of favelas as the site par excellence of crime. Therefore, implementing an in- clusive component after the repressive References one in the strategy is crucial for suc- Alda Mejías, S. (December 3th., 2014). cessful results. Un campo abonado para el crimen organizado. Foreign Affairs Lati- Fourth, the role of municipal autho- noamérica. Retrieved from http:// rities is essential. One can say that revistafal.com/un-campo-abonado- the best results are obtained when para-el-crimen-organizado-2/ municipal and state authorities are in charge. A skilled and creative local Arias, D. (2006). The Dynamics of management can make the differen- Criminal Governance: Networks ce between success and failure of a and Social Order in Rio de Janei- strategy since many of these plans in- ro. Journal of Latin American Stud- clude social services managed at the ies, 38(2), 293-325. local level; the leadership of munici- Arsenault, C. (January 4th., 2012). pal officials is indispensable. In addi- Counter-insurgency ‘improves’ Bra- tion, local authorities are best placed zil’s slums. Al Jazeera. Retrieved to understand the needs of the com- from http://www.aljazeera.com/ munity and to establish a dialogue indepth/features/2011/12/20111 with citizens. However, the effect is 2281252381901.html amplified when there’s harmony bet- Ashcroft, P. (March 22, 2014) History ween all levels of government as hap- of Rio de Janeiro’s Military Police pened in Rio with former Mayor Paes Part 3: Community Policing. Rio- and former Governor Cabral from the OnWatch. Retrieved from http:// central government. www.rioonwatch.org/?p=14055.

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Esteban Arratia Sandoval