The Stockholm School, Ernst Wigforss and the Great Depression in Sweden: an Outline
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
067-092 Kragh.new_Layout 1 19/10/2012 9:35 π.μ. Page 67 3 The Stockholm School, Ernst Wigforss and the Great Depression in Sweden: An Outline Martin Kragh 1. Introduction In 1937, Swedish economist and liberal politician, Bertil Ohlin, pro- claimed the existence and relevance of a specific school in economics – the Stockholm School. 1 According to Ohlin, Swedish economists had early on analysed business cycle fluctuations using a dynamic method, an approach which in important ways had not only preceded but was also (in some respects) superior to Keynes’ General Theory of Employ- ment, Interest and Money .2 This view has later been much debated, and rightfully criticized, as too anachronistic, without however underesti - mating other important contributions by Swedish economists. 3 Further, the relative inaccessibility for foreigners to the major works by the Stockholm School due to language barriers has also added to the confusion. As was noted by Hansen, ‘The Stockholm School theory was [...] for a long time relegated to the status of an almost mythological doctrine, its major works inaccessible to non-Scandinavians, with Scandinavians mostly paying lip service only to an unknown god’. 4 1 B. Ohlin, ‘Some Notes on the Stockholm Theory of Savings and Investment I’, Economic Journal , 47, 1937a, pp. 53-69; and idem, ‘Some Notes on the Stockholm Theory of Savings and Investment II’, Economi c Journal , 47, 1937b, pp. 221-240. 2 J.M. Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money , London: Macmillan, 1936. 3 D. Patinkin, ‘On the Relation between Keynesian Economics and the “Stockholm School”’, Scandinavian Journal of Economics , 80, 1978, pp. 135-143. 4 B. Hansen, ‘Unemployment, Keynes, and the Stockholm School’, History of Political Economy , 13, 1981, pp. 256-277. 067-092 Kragh.new_Layout 1 19/10/2012 9:35 π.μ. Page 68 68 MARTIN KRAGH For a long time, perhaps the most accessible work on the Stockholm School in English was Brinley Thomas’ Monetary Policy and Crises .5 The foreword (not written by Thomas) may help to explain part of the mythology mentioned by Hansen. As was remarked, ‘Sweden is one of the world’s most civilized countries in the world. And in the field of economics, as in many other fields, both Swedish theory and Swedish practice are highly distinguished. Economists [...] seem, moreover, as a class, to have a better public reputation than elsewhere’. 6 About Sweden, one further learns, the recovery from the Depression was due ‘to internal action, based largely on the theories of Gunnar Myrdal, and executed with great political skill and economic insight by Ernst Wigforss, the brilliant Finance Minister in the Swedish Socialist government [...]’. A similar example is Irving Fisher, according to whom Sweden was an ‘oasis’ in the ‘desert of the world depression’. 7 Not in order to procrastinate and undermine this essay, but an instructive counterexample may be given by one of the participants in the Stockholm School, Erik Lundberg, who much later gave a slightly different interpretation of events. Strong economic growth in the 1930s, he argued, could be explained not so much by the implementation of new economic theories, as by the unplanned devaluation of the krona in September 1931. ‘The primary contribution by economic policy’, he noted, ‘was the fact that nothing really stupid was done, as in the US, France and other countries that stuck to the gold standard for too long’. 8 On the other hand, one may argue that ‘nothing really stupid was done’, because of the interaction between sound monetary thought and pragmatic policy. It is therefore still a relevant task to investigate the relation between economic thought and policy in Sweden during the interwar period. 5 B. Thomas, Monetary Policy and Crises. A Study of Swedish Experience , London: Routledge, 1936. 6 Ibid . 7 I. Fisher, Stabilised Money. A History of the Movement , London: Allen & Unwin, 1935. 8 E. Lundberg, Kriserna och ekonomerna [The Crises and the Economists], Malmö: Liber Förlag, 1984 . [ All translations from Swedish are my own.] 067-092 Kragh.new_Layout 1 19/10/2012 9:35 π.μ. Page 69 THE STOCKHOLM SCHOOL, WIGFORSS AND THE DEPRESSION 69 Development of economic thought in the interwar period was not isolated to any one specific country. However, economists who continued to work in their native languages were many – including the British (who only happened to be endowed with a language that would later be universal). The future direction of (macro) economics was not yet settled. Austrian economists such as Hayek wielded significant influence, not least on the Continent. In countries such as Poland and Germany there were Michal Kalecki and Carl Föhl, respectively, who both paralleled the work of Keynes. That their approaches today remain known primarily to specialists on the history of economic thought only is – apart from the language issue, since everyone read Keynes but not necessarily vice versa – perhaps indicative of the huge influence Keynes’ work would later command. This article attempts to shed some light on one of those European currents which now live only among antiquarians: the contributions by the Stockholm School economists. The purpose of this essay is to study the development of economic theory and policy in the interwar period. The response by politicians and economists alike to the Great Depression has traditionally been considered a case in point. 9 Simply put, there were nations which implemented Keynesian ideas as part of their official policy, and there were nations where these ideas did not find any role to play outside of academia (if at all). Whatever happened was a result of the interaction between economic thought, policy and political philosophy in each specific nation. Of interest here is the Swedish experience during the 1930s, with special emphasis on the Stockholm School and the theoretical contributions of Ernst Wigforss, for many years Minister of Finance for the Social Democrats. The first part provides some background on the economic development in the interwar period. This setting is important in order to assess the changing views on economic policy among economists and politicians alike, which started to gain momentum in the 1930s. The second part provides a short description of the actors in our story: the 9 P.A. Hall (ed.), The Political Power of Economic Ideas. Keynesianism across Nations , Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989 . 067-092 Kragh.new_Layout 1 19/10/2012 9:35 π.μ. Page 70 70 MARTIN KRAGH Stockholm School and Wigforss. The third part summarizes the main theoretical contributions by the Stockholm School, pointing out some similarities and differences with Keynes. The penultimate part shines some new light on the theoretical work by Wigforss, especially his views on depression and economic crisis. The last part concludes. 2. Economic development in the interwar period No ideas emerge in a vacuum, and the context of the interwar period is as important to the Swedish experience as anywhere else. Aggregate GDP growth during these years was robust with two exceptions: the W-shape recession, 1916-18 and 1920-21, and the U-shape recession, 1929-32 (see Figure 1). However, long-term evidence on performance cannot fully explain some of the most important changes that actually occurred. A complementary story is told on the micro level, where more systemic changes can be seen. The two depressions, albeit relatively short, had raised crisis awareness in banking and business. This trend stimulated FIGURE 1 Year-on-year GDP growth in Sweden, 1914-1939 Source : <http://www.historicalstatistics.org/> (Sweden). 067-092 Kragh.new_Layout 1 19/10/2012 9:35 π.μ. Page 71 THE STOCKHOLM SCHOOL, WIGFORSS AND THE DEPRESSION 71 consolidation and reduction in the number of market actors. As the Social Democrats rose to power in 1932-33, this policy also found political support. Larger entities were deemed more compatible with the counter-cyclical measures planned at the time. Dedicated funds, to be used in order to uphold production during recessions, were thought difficult to administrate with many small firms on the market. 10 The events leading to the Kreuger Crash in 1932 – arguably the largest financial swindle in Swedish history – and the related moratorium on German debt obligations in the same period put further pressure in this direction. So, the new economic policies in the 1930s came to be implemented in an also increasingly fragmented world. Perhaps more noticeable from our more recent experience (post-World War II) was the powerful deflation which followed the depression of 1920- 21, and then remained as a long-term phenomenon for close to 15 years. As far as policy was concerned, the overriding goal in the 1920s was price stability, achieved through the re-establishment of the gold parity. On 11 March 1920, as inflation was still raging, Eli Heckscher literally forced the Riksbank – via a newspaper editorial calling on the public to change their notes for gold – to increase the interest rate and thus offset the deflation process. One may speculate if such a sharp reduction in nominal wages had been possible only a decade later, not least considering how the deflation was followed by a far-reaching rationalization process contributing to higher unemployment in the short-term. As noted later by Lundberg, fixating the gold parity was ‘the sole, concisely expressed goal’ for economic development in the 1920s. 11 Thus, ‘It was not simply a means to achieve other ends, but an actual central end in itself.’ In 1924, Sweden became the first country in Europe to re-establish the gold parity. As the parity was set at a low level, the export sector was given a competitive advantage. Knut Wicksell was – a bit surprising, considering his otherwise radical stance – arguably the 10 H.