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Hayek, Institutions, and Coordination: Essays in the History of Economic Thought and Methodology

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Hayek, Institutions, and Coordination: Essays in the History of Economic Thought and Methodology 1 UNIVERSIDADE DE BRASÍLIA FACULDADE DE ECONOMIA, ADMINISTRAÇÃO, CONTABILIDADE E GESTÃO DE POLÍTICAS PÚBLICAS DEPARTAMENTO DE ECONOMIA PROGRAMA DE PÓS-GRADUAÇÃO EM ECONOMIA Hayek, Institutions, and Coordination: Essays in the History of Economic Thought and Methodology Keanu Telles da Costa Brasília 2020 2 Keanu Telles da Costa Hayek, Institutions, and Coordination: Essays in the History of Economic Thought and Methodology Dissertação apresentada ao Programa de Pós- Graduação em Economia, da Faculdade de Economia, Administração, Contabilidade e Gestão Pública, da Universidade de Brasília como requisito parcial para a obtenção do título de Mestre em Economia. Orientador: Prof. Dr. Mauro Boianovsky Universidade de Brasília Faculdade de Economia, Administração e Contabilidade Departamento de Economia Brasília 2020 3 Keanu Telles da Costa Hayek, Institutions, and Coordination: Essays in the History of Economic Thought and Methodology Dissertação apresentada ao Programa de Pós-Graduação em Economia, da Faculdade de Economia, Administração, Contabilidade e Gestão Pública, da Universidade de Brasília como requisito parcial para à obtenção do título de Mestre em Economia. Orientador: Prof. Dr. Mauro Boianovsky Departamento de Economia, Universidade de Brasília Prof. Dr. Rodrigo Peñaloza Departamento de Economia, Universidade de Brasília Prof. Dr. Fabio Barbieri Departamento de Economia, Universidade de São Paulo – Ribeirão Preto Brasília 2020 4 5 Agradecimentos O motivo principal de minha preferência, e ao final de minha escolha, pelo programa de pós-graduação em Economia da Universidade de Brasília (UnB) se resume na oportunidade de poder partilhar, absorver e trabalhar com a principal referência latino- americana e uma das referências mundiais na área de história do pensamento econômico e metodologia, áreas de meu intenso e juvenil interesse desde os meus anos iniciais de formação. Desse modo, presto meus profundos agradecimentos ao meu orientador, Prof. Dr. Mauro Boianovsky, por tudo o que me proporcionou nos últimos dois anos de convivência. Mesmo com as naturais dificuldades e certa divergência de expectativas iniciais, o exemplo de dedicação, erudição, e scholarship que o Prof. Mauro sintetiza e expõe tão bem influenciou-me imensamente - é algo que sempre terei como referência em minha vida. O mero contato com um personagem de tamanho gradiente intelectual me trouxe enormes ganhos de troca nas mais diferentes esferas e sem dúvida contribuiu para o meu entusiasmo durante a realização da presente dissertação. O segundo motivo que me levou a escolher a UnB foi a capacidade do departamento de oferecer um treinamento teórico sólido nos core courses e as várias possibilidades adjacentes de pesquisa em matérias eletivas. Nesse sentido, uma matéria eletiva que muito me marcou foi a do Prof. Dr. Bernardo Mueller, o qual agradeço por transmitir a sua profunda seriedade acadêmica em temas transversais da profissão. Em um nível mais pessoal, agradeço ao Prof. Bernardo a considerável ajuda que me deu ao longo de nosso relativo breve contato. Agradeço aos dois membros da banca, Prof. Dr. Rodrigo Peñaloza e Prof. Dr. Fabio Barbieri, pelos comentários, sugestões e críticas. Em especial, agradeço os extensos e detalhados comentários do membro externo da banca, Prof. Fabio Barbieri, que muito contribuiu para uma melhor apreciação dos pontos frágeis dos argumentos levantados nos ensaios que formam a dissertação. Ademais, agradeço a indispensável assistência financeira na forma de bolsa de mestrado do Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico (CNPq), do Ministério de Ciência e Tecnologia. 6 Eu agradeço enormemente a Lucas Panico de Lara, a pessoa que talvez mais devo por tudo o que fez em minha causa em meu último ano de mestrado (2019). Se há algo pelo qual mereço algum e qualquer mínimo mérito nesse período, tal se deve a Lucas. Last but not least, eu não poderia deixar de mencionar a égide e suporte incomensuráveis que tive em meu ano final de graduação (2017) na Universidade Federal do Paraná (UFPR) e nos oito primeiros meses de mestrado (2018) de Ana Victoria Fantin Gonçalves, a que conheci e a que me amou. O que Ana me deu nos mais variados âmbitos de minha vida é muito mais do que eu poderia expressar nesse espaço – e muito mais do que talvez jamais poderei expressar em qualquer espaço. A levarei comigo até que a chama de minha vela se apague e o ator se despeça do palco. Obrigado. 7 8 CONTENTS I. COASE, HAYEK, AND THE INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF PRODUCTION AND EXCHANGE. I. PROLOGUE: THE YEARS OF HIGH CONTROVERSY. II. HAYEK, SOCIALIST ECONOMIC CALCULATION DEBATE, AND “THE NATURE OF THE FIRM.” III. COASE, LERNER, AND “THE PROBLEM OF SOCIAL COST.” IV. HAYEK AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF LAW AND ECONOMICS. V. EPILOGUE: TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS AS AN INSTITUTIONAL REACTION TO THE ECONOMIC CALCULATION DEBATE. VI. REFERENCES. II. JAMES M. BUCHANAN, EQUILIBRIUM, AND THE THEORY OF MARKETS. I. PROLOGUE: WHAT IS ECONOMICS? II. THEORY OF EQUILIBRIUM RESOURCE ALLOCATION AND THEORY OF MARKETS. III. WHAT SOME ECONOMISTS DO. IV. A(USTRIAN) TRADITION ON INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIAL EQUILIBRIUM. V. A LONDON TRADITION ON COST? COST, CHOICE, AND EQUILIBRIUM. VI. EPILOGUE: ECONOMICS IS WHAT ECONOMISTS DO AND ECONOMISTS DO WHAT THEY DISCOVERED IN THE PAST, BUT ECONOMICS SHOULD NOT BE (ONLY) THAT. VII. REFERENCES. III. EQUILIBRIUM, (SOCIAL) CHOICE, AND WELFARE: JAMES M. BUCHANAN ON SUBJECTIVISM AND ITS IMPLICATIONS. I. INTRODUCTION: ECONOMICS AND SUBJECTIVISM. 9 II. SUBJECTIVISM IN THE PURE THEORY OF GOVERNMENT FINANCE, SOCIAL CHOICE, AND WELFARE ECONOMICS. III. A SCIENCE OF CHOICE COMPUTATION OR EXCHANGE BEHAVIOR? SUBJECTIVISM, EQUILIBRIUM, AND COST. IV. SUBJECTIVIST ECONOMICS, EQUILIBRIUM, AND OPPORTUNITY COST. V. CONCLUDING REMARKS: A SUBJECTIVIST-CATALLACTIC- DISEQUILIBRIUM ECONOMICS. VI. REFERENCES. IV. A HAYEK AND KEYNES CONNECTION? VARIATIONS ON A THEME IN THREE ROUNDS. I. PROLOGUE. II. THE FIRST ROUND: HAYEK, KEYNES, AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF MACROECONOMIC THEORY. III. THE MISSING ROUND: HAYEK AND THE GENERAL THEORY. IV. THE SECOND ROUND: HAYEK, KEYNES, AND THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY ORDER. V. TOWARD RECONCILIATION AND BEYOND: THE HAYEK AND KEYNES CONNECTION. VI. EPILOGUE. VII. REFERENCES. V. ECONOMICS, KNOWLEDGE, AND IGNORANCE: THE CASE OF F.A. HAYEK AND T.W. HUTCHISON. I. INTRODUCTION. II. HAYEK ON THE EPISTEMIC NOTION OF FALLIBLE KNOWLEDGE, EQUILIBRIUM, AND THE COORDINATION PROBLEM. III. THE ROAD TO METHODOLOGY AND THE CONSTITUTION OF IGNORANCE IN ECONOMIC SCIENCE. IV. THE YEARS OF HIGH THEORY AND METHOD. V. HUTCHISON’S FIRST REACTIONS ON TAUTOLOGIES, THE NATURE OF ECONOMIC THEORY, PLANNING, AND UNCERTAINTY. VI. HUTCHISON ON THE SIGNIFICANCE AND BASIC POSTULATES OF ECONOMIC THEORY. 10 VII. A SPECIAL REFERENCE TO EXPECTATION, RATIONAL CONDUCT, EQUILIBRIUM, AND KNOWLEDGE. VIII. KNOWLEDGE AND IGNORANCE IN ECONOMICS. IX. KINDS OF IGNORANCE. X. CONCLUSION. XI. REFERENCES. 11 12 Coase, Hayek, and the Institutional Structure of Production and Exchange ABSTRACT. The multi-dimensional intellectual influence of Friedrich A. Hayek and the shared context at the LSE in the 1930s on Ronald Coase’s most famous theoretical contributions, especially concerning his general institutional emphasis, are investigated in detail in this essay. The same pattern of institutional reaction to the formal similarity proposition of general equilibrium theory is recognized in both authors. In particular, the economic calculation debate molded Coase’s transaction cost institutional argument in “The Nature of the Firm” (1937) and his account on the so-called Coase Theorem in “The Problem of Social Cost” (1960), the latter especially by the influence of his friend Abba Lerner. Coase’s 1937 article can only be put in context as a reaction to this debate. Such debate did not cause Coase to come with the transaction costs notion but it was the contextual environment in which he was dealing with and thus molded the argument and its implications. This contextual character of the transaction cost argument would play again a role in the welfare corollary theorem of the formal similarity proposition in “The Problem of Social Cost.” With zero transaction costs and given equal institutional alternative coordination capacity, the formal similarity proposition appeared. With zero transaction costs and given tradable property rights endowments, the allocation pattern will always be conducted to the highly social valued optimum independent of the initial allocation of property rights, the Stiglerian Coase Theorem appears and no real externality problem exists in this world. When positive transaction costs are considered, different legal arrangements have a major impact on the resource allocation. Coase’s institutional theory is a reaction to the institutional sterilization of neoclassical economics as exposed by the excessive focus on equilibrium states by general equilibrium theorists. This pattern can be identified both in the general economic coordination context (as exposed in the economic calculation debate) or in the Pigouvian tradition in welfare economics. Key-words. Ronald Coase, Friedrich A. Hayek, transaction cost, Coase theorem, institutions. JEL. B20, B31, I30. 13 14 I. PROLOGUE: THE YEARS OF HIGH CONTROVERSY The year is 1937. In a relatively short temporal spectrum and small spatial locus, many simultaneous challenging seminal ideas were arising at the center of economic theory, culminating in the publishing of Friedrich A. Hayek’s “Economics and Knowledge” (1937), Ronald
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