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Runway Excursion During Landing, Delta Air Lines Flight 1086, Boeing MD-88, N909DL, New York, New York, March 5, 2015
Runway Excursion During Landing Delta Air Lines Flight 1086 Boeing MD-88, N909DL New York, New York March 5, 2015 Accident Report NTSB/AAR-16/02 National PB2016-104166 Transportation Safety Board NTSB/AAR-16/02 PB2016-104166 Notation 8780 Adopted September 13, 2016 Aircraft Accident Report Runway Excursion During Landing Delta Air Lines Flight 1086 Boeing MD-88, N909DL New York, New York March 5, 2015 National Transportation Safety Board 490 L’Enfant Plaza, S.W. Washington, D.C. 20594 National Transportation Safety Board. 2016. Runway Excursion During Landing, Delta Air Lines Flight 1086, Boeing MD-88, N909DL, New York, New York, March 5, 2015. Aircraft Accident Report NTSB/AAR-16/02. Washington, DC. Abstract: This report discusses the March 5, 2015, accident in which Delta Air Lines flight 1086, a Boeing MD-88 airplane, N909DL, was landing on runway 13 at LaGuardia Airport, New York, New York, when it departed the left side of the runway, contacted the airport perimeter fence, and came to rest with the airplane’s nose on an embankment next to Flushing Bay. The 2 pilots, 3 flight attendants, and 98 of the 127 passengers were not injured; the other 29 passengers received minor injuries. The airplane was substantially damaged. Safety issues discussed in the report relate to the use of excessive engine reverse thrust and rudder blanking on MD-80 series airplanes, the subjective nature of braking action reports, the lack of procedures for crew communications during an emergency or a non-normal event without operative communication systems, inaccurate passenger counts provided to emergency responders following an accident, and unclear policies regarding runway friction measurements and runway condition reporting. -
Runway Safety Spring 2021 Report
Graphical NOTAM Interface For Improving Efficiency of Reporting NOTAM Information April 2021 Design Challenge: Runway Safety/Runway Incursions/Runway Excursions Challenge E: Optimizing application of NextGen technology to improve runway safety in particular and airport safety in general. Team Members: Undergraduate Students: Matthew Bacon, Gregory Porcaro, Andrew Vega Advisor’s Name: Dr. Audra Morse Michigan Technological University Table of Contents | 1 02 Executive Summary Runway excursions are a type of aviation incident where an aircraft makes an unsafe exit from the runway. According to the Ascend World Aircraft Accident Summary (WAAS), 141 runway excursion accidents involving the Western-built commercial aircraft fleet occurred globally from 1998 to 2007, resulting in 550 fatalities; 74% of landing phase excursions were caused by either weather-related factors or decision-making factors (Ascend, 2007). One mitigation strategy is training pilots how to interpret Runway Condition Codes (RWYCCs) to understand runway conditions. Recent developments such as NextGen and Electronic Flight Bags (EFBs) have improved the quality of weather condition reporting. However, Notices to Airmen (NOTAMs), the primary source of runway condition information and any other irregularities in airspace, are still presented to pilots in an inefficient format contributing to runway excursions and safety concerns NOTAMs consist of confusing abbreviations and do not effectively convey the relative importance of information. The team developed an Electronic Flight Bag (EFB) user interface that provides a graphical representation of NOTAM and weather information to improve how pilots receive condition changes at airports. The graphical NOTAM interface utilizes Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) to receive real time NOTAM updates. -
Punctuality Statistics Economic Regulation Group
Punctuality Statistics Economic Regulation Group Birmingham, Edinburgh, Gatwick, Glasgow, Heathrow, London City, Luton, Manchester, Newcastle, Stansted Full and Summary Analysis June 2008 Disclaimer The information contained in this report has been compiled from various sources of data. CAA validates this data, however, no warranty is given as to its accuracy, integrity or reliability. CAA cannot accept liability for any financial loss caused by a person’s reliance on any of these statistics. No statistical data provided by CAA maybe sold on to a third party. CAA insists that they are referenced in any publication that makes reference to CAA Statistics. Contents Foreword Introductory Notes Full Analysis – By Reporting Airport Birmingham Edinburgh Gatwick Glasgow Heathrow London City Luton Manchester Newcastle Stansted Full Analysis With Arrival / Departure Split – By A Origin / Destination Airport B C – E F – H I – L M – N O – P Q – S T – U V – Z Summary Analysis FOREWORD 1 CONTENT 1.1 Punctuality Statistics: Heathrow, Gatwick, Manchester, Glasgow, Birmingham, Luton, Stansted, Edinburgh, Newcastle and London City - Full and Summary Analysis is prepared by the Civil Aviation Authority with the co-operation of the airport operators and Airport Coordination Ltd. Their assistance is gratefully acknowledged. 2 ENQUIRIES 2.1 Statistics Enquiries concerning the information in this publication and distribution enquiries concerning orders and subscriptions should be addressed to: Civil Aviation Authority Room K4 G3 Aviation Data Unit CAA House 45/59 Kingsway London WC2B 6TE Tel. 020-7453-6258 or 020-7453-6252 or email [email protected] 2.2 Enquiries concerning further analysis of punctuality or other UK civil aviation statistics should be addressed to Tel: 020-7453-6258 or 020-7453-6252 or email [email protected] Please note that we are unable to publish statistics or provide ad hoc data extracts at lower than monthly aggregate level. -
Development of a Bayesian Belief Network Runway Incursion and Excursion Model
Proceedings of the American Society for Engineering Management 2014 International Annual Conference S. Long, E-H. Ng, and C. Downing eds. DEVELOPMENT OF A BAYESIAN BELIEF NETWORK RUNWAY INCURSION AND EXCURSION MODEL Lawrence L. Green Vehicle Analysis Branch (E401) 1 North Dryden Street (Mail Stop 451) NASA Langley Research Center, Hampton VA 23681 __________________________________________________________________________________ Abstract In a previous work, a statistical analysis of runway incursion (RI) event data was conducted to ascertain the relevance of this data to the top ten Technical Challenges (TC) of the National Aeronautics a nd Space Administration (NASA) Aviation Safety Program (AvSP). The study revealed connections to several of the AvSP top ten TC and identified numerous primary causes and contributing factors of RI events. The statistical analysis served as the basis for developing a system-level Bayesian Belief Network (BBN) model for RI events, also previously reported. Through literature searches and data analysis, this RI event network has now been extended to also model runway excursion (RE) events. These RI and RE event networks have been further modified and vetted by a Subject Matter Expert (SME) panel. The combined system-level BBN model will allow NASA to generically model the causes of RI and RE events and to assess the effectiveness of technology products being developed under NASA funding. These products are intended to reduce the frequency of runway safety incidents/accidents, and to improve runway safety in general. The development and structure of the BBN for both RI and RE events are documented in this paper. Keywords Runway Safety, Runway Incursion (RI), Runway Excursion (RE), Bayesian Belief Network (BBN) Introduction One focus area of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), enabled through the Aviation Safety Program (AvSP) of the NASA Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate and in cooperation with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), is to improve aviation safety. -
Time Departure FLIGHTS from SABİHA GÖKÇEN AIRPORT
Wings of Change Europe Master of Ceremony Montserrat Barriga Director General European Regions Airline Association (ERA) Wings of Change Europe – 13/14 November 2018 – Madrid , Spain Wifi Hilton Honors Password APMAD08 Wings of Change Europe – 13/14 November 2018 – Madrid , Spain Welcome remarks Luis Gallego CEO Iberia Wings of Change Europe – 13/14 November 2018 – Madrid , Spain Welcome to Madrid Iberia in figures Flying since Member of Three Business: Airline Maintenance 1927 3 Handing Employees Incomes 2017 €376 Operating profits 2017 17.500 €4.85 Billion (+39% vs 2016) What does Iberia bring to Madrid? 17,500 109 23,000,000 142 employees International aircraft destinations passengers 50% 5,5% 50,000 GDP Indirect Madrid Airport employees Our strategic roadmap The 2013 2014 2017 2012 future Transformation Plan de Futuro Plan de Futuro Struggling Transforming Plan Phase 2 for survival to reach excellence On the verge of Loses cut by half Back to profitability The most punctual airline bankruptcy in the world Four star Skytrax Highest operational profits in Iberia’s 90 years of history 2018 had significant challenges for IB. How are we doing? Financial People Results Customer Muchas gracias The Value of Aviation & importance of Competitiveness for Spain Jose Luis Ábalos Minister of Public Works Government of Spain Wings of Change Europe – 13/14 November 2018 – Madrid , Spain The European Commission’s perspective on the future of aviation in the EU and its neighboring countries Henrik Hololei Director General for Mobility & Transport European -
Chealander Testimony
Testimony of Steven Chealander National Transportation Safety Board before the Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee Aviation Operations, Safety, and Security Subcommittee U.S. Senate April 10, 2008 Good morning, Chairman Rockefeller and Ranking Member Hutchison. Thank you for allowing me the opportunity to present testimony on behalf of the National Transportation Safety Board. I am privileged to represent an agency that is dedicated to the safety of the traveling public. As you know, the Safety Board is charged with investigating aviation incidents and accidents, determining their probable cause, and making recommendations to prevent similar accidents from happening again. The Board is concerned about key safety issues including: runway incursions, runway excursions, icing conditions, fuel tank inerting, human fatigue, and maintenance of aircraft. The world’s deadliest runway incursion accident, which remains the world’s deadliest aviation accident, occurred in March 1977 when two passenger jumbo jets collided on a runway at Tenerife, Canary Islands, causing the deaths of 583 passengers and crew. The deadliest U.S. runway incursion accident involving two aircraft was a collision between a USAir 737 and a Skywest Metroliner commuter airplane at Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) in February 1991, which killed 34 people. Another accident, involving a Comair Bombardier CL600 that departed the wrong runway on August 27, 2006, killed 49 people in Lexington, Kentucky. The Safety Board has also investigated several other runway excursions including the accident involving a Southwest Boeing 737 that killed one person at Chicago’s Midway Airport. Runway Incursions On October 1, 2007, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) adopted the International Civil Aviation Organization’s definition of runway incursion. -
Runway Excursions Study
NLR-CR-2010-259 Executive summary A STUDY OF RUNWAY EXCURSIONS FROM A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE Report no. NLR-CR-2010-259 Author(s) G.W.H. van Es Report classification UNCLASSIFIED Date May 2010 Knowledge area(s) ) Vliegveiligheid (safety & security) Problem area on the European context. The Vliegoperaties Safety statistics show that study was limited to civil Luchtverkeersmanagement(A runway excursions are the most transport type of aircraft (jet and TM)- en luchthavenoperaties common type of accident turboprop) involved in Descriptor(s) reported annually, in the commercial or business Runway safety European region and worldwide. transport flights. Overrun Veeroff Description of work Results and conclusions Runway friction Causal and contributory factors The final results are used to RTO that may lead to a runway define preventive measures for excursion are identified by runway excursions. analysing data of runway excursions that occurred during the period 1980-2008. The scope of this report includes runway excursions that have taken place globally with a focus UNCLASSIFIED NLR-CR-2010-259 NLR Air Transport Safety Institute Anthony Fokkerweg 2, 1059 CM Amsterdam, UNCLASSIFIED P.O. Box 90502, 1006 BM Amsterdam, The Netherlands Telephone +31 20 511 35 00, Fax +31 20 511 32 10, Web site: http://www.nlr-atsi.nl NLR-CR-2010-259 A STUDY OF RUNWAY EXCURSIONS FROM A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE G.W.H. van Es This report may be cited on condition that full credit is given to NLR, the author and EUROCONTROL. This report has also been published as a EUROCONTROL report. This document has been given an NLR report identifier to facilitate future reference and to ensure long term document traceability. -
Aviation Investigation Report, Runway Excursion, Cargojet Airways Ltd., Boeing 727-225, C-GCJZ, Moncton, New Brunswick, 24 March
AVIATION INVESTIGATION REPORT A10A0032 RUNWAY EXCURSION CARGOJET AIRWAYS LTD. BOEING 727-225, C-GCJZ MONCTON, NEW BRUNSWICK 24 MARCH 2010 The Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) investigated this occurrence for the purpose of advancing transportation safety. It is not the function of the Board to assign fault or determine civil or criminal liability. Aviation Investigation Report Runway Excursion Cargojet Airways Ltd. Boeing 727-225, C-GCJZ Moncton, New Brunswick 24 March 2010 Report Number A10A0032 Synopsis On 24 March 2010, at 0120 Atlantic Daylight Time, a Boeing 727-225 aircraft (registration C-GCJZ, serial number 21854) operated as Cargojet flight 620, departed Hamilton/John Munro International Airport, Ontario, on a scheduled cargo flight to the Greater Moncton International Airport, New Brunswick, with 3 crew members on board. An Instrument Landing System approach was carried out and at 0307, the aircraft touched down on the 6150 foot long Runway 06. Following touchdown, the flight crew were unable to stop the aircraft prior to the end of the runway. The aircraft came to rest in deep mud, the nose wheel approximately 340 feet beyond the runway end and 140 feet beyond the edge of the paved runway end strip. A local fire department responded and arrived on-scene approximately 20 minutes after the aircraft departed the runway. The flight crew exited the aircraft using a ladder provided by the fire fighters. There were no injuries and the aircraft had minor damage. Ce rapport est également disponible en français. Table of Contents -
Review of Dedicated Low-Cost Airport Passenger Facilities
REVIEW OF DEDICATED LOW-COST AIRPORT PASSENGER FACILITIES FINAL REPORT Prepared for Commission for Aviation Regulation Dublin, Ireland 11TH MAY, 2007 DOCUMENT CONTROL SHEET Client: Commission for Aviation Regulation Review of Dedicated Low-Cost Airport Passenger Project: Job No: JC27014A Facilities Title: Final Report Prepared by Reviewed by Approved by ORIGINAL Name Name Name DARRELL SWANSON ANDY CARLISLE ANDY CARLISLE PETER MACKENZIE-WILLIAMS Date Signature Signature Signature 12.03.07 Darrell Swanson Peter Mackenzie-Williams C:\Documents and Settings\TEMP\Local Settings\Temporary Internet Files\OLK1BB\CAR LCC Benchmarking Draft Final Report Path and Filename 03-05-07.doc Prepared by Reviewed by Approved by REVISION Name Name Name PETER MACKENZIE-WILLIAMS ANDY CARLISLE ANDY CARLISLE Date Signature Signature Signature 04.05.07 Peter Mackenzie-Williams Path and Filename Prepared by Reviewed by Approved by FINAL Name Name Name DARRELL SWANSON ANDY CARLISLE ANDY CARLISLE Date Signature Signature Signature 11.05.07 Darrell Swanson Path and Filename This report, and information or advice which it contains, is provided by Jacobs Consultancy solely for internal use and reliance by its Client in performance of Jacobs Consultancy 's duties and liabilities under its contract with the Client. Any advice, opinions, or recommendations within this report should be read and relied upon only in the context of the report as a whole. The advice and opinions in this report are based upon the information made available to Jacobs Consultancy at the date of this report and on current UK standards, codes, technology and construction practices as at the date of this report. Following final delivery of this report to the Client, Jacobs Consultancy will have no further obligations or duty to advise the Client on any matters, including development affecting the information or advice provided in this report. -
Check-In Am Bahnhof Und Fly Rail Baggage
1/8 Check-in am Bahnhof via Zürich und Genève Check-in à la gare via Zürich et Genève Check-in alla stazione via Zürich e Genève Check-in at the railstation via Zürich and Genève Version: 26. Januar 2011 Legend HA = Handlingagent SP = Swissport, DN = Dnata Switzerland AG, AS = Airline Assistance Switzerland AG, EH = Own Handling R = Reason T = Technical, S = Security, O = Other reason WT = Weight Tolerance Y = Economy-Class, C = Business-Class, F = First-Class * = Agent Informations Infoportal/Airlines Check-in ok Restrictions Airline, Code Check-in Einschränkungen/Restrictions WT HA R Y = 2 Adria Airways JP ok SP C = 3 Aegean Airlines A3 ok 2 SP Aer Lingus EI no SP O Aeroflot Russian Airlines SU no SP S Aerolineas Argentinas AR ok 2 SP African Safari Airways ASA ok 2 DN Afriqiyah Airways 8U no DN O Air Algérie* AH ok No boardingpass 0 SP Air Baltic BT no SP T Not for USA, Canada, Pristina, Russia, Air Berlin* AB ok Cyprus; 0 DN not possible for groups 11+ Air Cairo MSC ok 2 SP AC 6821 / 6822 / 6826 / 6829 / 6832 / Air Canada AC no SP T =ok Air Dolomiti EN ok 2 SP Air Europa AEA / UX ok 2 DN Not from Zürich; not for USA, Canada, AF ok* 2 SP T Air France* Mexico; no boardingpass Air India AI ok 2 SP Air Italy I9 ok 2 DN Air Mali XG no SP O Air Malta KM ok 3 SP Y = 7 Air Mauritius MK ok Not from Zurich SP C = 10 Air Mediteranée BIE ok 2 DN Air New Zealand NZ ok 2 SP Air One AP ok 2 SP Air Seychelles HM ok Not from Zurich 3 SP Air Transat TS ok 2 SP Alitalia AZ no SP/DN T American Airlines AA no SP T ANA All Nippon Airways NH ok 2 SP Armavia -
Reducing the Risk Runway Excursions
MAIN MENU Report . Reducing the Risk of Runway Excursions: Report of the Runway Safety Initiative . Appendixes Reducing the Risk of RUNWAY EXCURSIONS REPORT OF THE RUNWAY SAFETY INITIATIVE This information is not intended to supersede operators’ or manufacturers’ policies, practices or requirements, and is not intended to supersede government regulations. Reducing the Risk of RUNWAY EXCURSIONS REPORT OF THE RUNWAY SAFETY INITIATIVE Contents 1. Introduction 4 1.1 Definitions 4 2. Background 5 3. Data 6 Reducing the Risk of 4.0 Common Risk Factors inRunway Excursion Events 9 RUNWAY EXCURSIONS 4.1 Flight Operations 9 4.1.1 Takeoff Excursion Risk Factors 9 REPORT OF THE RUNWAY SAFETY INITIATIVE 4.1.2 Landing Excursion Risk Factors 9 4.2 Air Traffic Management 9 TABLE OF CONTENTS 4.3 Airport 9 1. Introduction .......................................................................................................................................................................... 4 1.1 Definitions ................................................................................................................................................................. 4 4.4 Aircraft Manufacturers 9 2. Background .......................................................................................................................................................................... 5 4.5 Regulators 9 3. Data ................................................................................................................................................................................... -
FY 2021 Southwest (ASW) Regional Runway Safety Plan
FY2021 Southwest (ASW) Regional Runway Safety Plan COMMITTED TO CONTINUOUSLY IMPROVING SURFACE SAFETY. www.faa.gov ATO Safety and Technical Training Executive Summary In response to the agency goal and follow up to is a fluid and dynamic document which will be the National Runway Safety Plan, the ASW Runway evaluated and modified as events warrant. Safety Plan serves as a roadmap with regional Runway Safety Program FAA Order 7050.1B runway safety emphasis for FY2021. prescribes the FAA Runway Safety Program and FAA Safety Management System (SMS) The members of the Regional Runway Safety establishes policy, assigns responsibility, and TABLE OF 04 Governance Council (RSGC) and the Regional delegates’ authority for ensuring compliance with CONTENTS Runway Safety Program Manager(s) (RSPMs) this order within each organization. will determine the impact and resources. This 06 Regional Runway Safety Plan (RRSP) Methodology ASW Executive Roster ASW Runway Safety Team Rob Lowe Darren Fields ASW Regional Administrator ASW Runway Safety Program Manager 07 FY21 RRSP Initiatives and Safety Assurance Lisa Ryan Heather Peet ASW Deputy Regional ASW Runway Safety Program Manager Administrator Safety Risk Management (SRM) Andy Atchley 08 Director, Central Service Center Ignacio Flores Director, Airports Division Safety Policy Southwest Region 10 Frank McIntosh Director, Air Traffic Services Central Service Area 11 Safety Promotion Randall Burke Director, Technical Operations Services Central Service Area 13 Appendices 4 Southwest (ASW) Regional Runway Safety Plan FY21 Southwest (ASW) Regional Runway Safety Plan FY21 5 FAA Safety Management National Runway System (SMS) Safety Plan Objectives The FAA Order 8000.369B, Safety Management A main function of the SMS is to collect and System, advances safety management by analyze relevant data that identifies the factors moving toward a process-oriented safety that constitute acceptable risk.