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Conflict Quarterly External Involvement in the Persian Gulf Conflict* by Nader Entessar "We will be the winner of this war [Iran-Iraq War] and no one should doubt its outcome." Ayatollah Khomeini1 INTRODUCTION The Middle East is perhaps the most volatile region in the world to­ day. Aj the same time, it is the most militarized region of the Third World and the scene of some of the most frantic arms transfers the world has ever witnessed. The combination of political volatility and militariza­ tion has made the region susceptible to cataclysmic changes with far- reaching implications for the West as well as for the Middle Eastern states themselves. The Iran-Iraq War is a clear manifestation of this reality. The con­ flict is ostensibly between the two Persian Gulf countries over land border territories and the Shatt al-Arab waterway. In actual fact, however, the parameter of the conflict has expanded beyond the geographic boundaries of Iran and Iraq. The participants in the Gulf conflict (direct and indirect players) have included such ideologically and politically diverse nations as North Korea and Israel, Libya and Syria, Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and small Gulf states of Kuwait, Oman and the United Arab Emirates, as well as the two super powers and France. The conflict has threatened to pit the United States against Iran in light of the latter's pronouncements regarding the closure of the Strait of Hor- muz through which over sixty percent of Japanese and Western oil sup­ plies flow. The Iran-Iraq War is also demonstrably different from other intra- Third World wars in terms of its destructiveness and unique alliance for­ mations. More than 200,000 people on both sides have been killed or wounded since the war's inception in September 1980, and over two million people have become homeless as a result of Iraqi shelling and aerial bombardment of Iranian cities. It appears that the conflict has molded itself along two axes of power: Iraq, supported by the conservative pro-Western Gulf states, Jor­ dan and Egypt, with peripheral support from the United States, and Iran, supported by "radical" Arab states of Syria and Libya, as well as by Israel, North Korea, and more recently, by the People's Republic of China. The role these countries have played in the continuation of the war, their motives and the reasons behind allying themselves militarily with the major belligerents in the war and how outside interference by 41 Fall 1984 other Third World countries has contributed to the prolongation of the war will be analyzed in this paper. THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION AND THE IRANIAN-ARAB TENSIONS The Islamic revolution, which overthrew the monarchy in Iran in 1979, introduced uncertainties to Iranian-Arab relations in general and to Tehran's relations with the littoral states of the Persian Gulf in par­ ticular. The Islamic Republic's religious overtones brought a new dimen­ sion to Iran's foreign policy — Pan-Islamism. Moreover, Iran's percep­ tion of its security changed dramatically. Former supporters of the Shah's regime, especially the United States, were not perceived to be ma­ jor threats to the country's stability. As a result, Iran's attitude toward the region was determined by the relationship of each country in the region toward the United States. The conservative pro-Western Arab regimes, particularly Saudi Arabia, began to view the new Iranian regime of Ayatollah Khomeini as a threat to their own stability. The Saudi royal family's claim to the leadership of the Islamic community was challenged by Ayatollah Khomeini on the grounds that the Saudi monarchy was cor­ rupt and morally incapable of acting as the guardian of Islamic holy places. Iranian officials were quick to point out King Fahd's overseas ex­ ploits and his reputation as a "playboy" when he was the Saudi crown prince just before King Khaled's death in mid-1982. Further, Pan- Islamic proclamations of Khomeini and his exhortations to the Arab masses to follow Iran's example by overthrowing their own "corrupt" government creating a united Islamic front against the "enemies of Islam" contributed to the already tense situation in the region. Marked by these underlying factors, Iranian/Arabian clashes have occurred on several occasions. First, in the annual haj (pilgrimage) to Mecca in 1981, Saudi police attacked some Iranian pilgrims who had demonstrated against the U.S. and Israel and who had propogated Khomeini's philosophy of revolu­ tion. In an exchange of letters with King Khaled, Khomeini vigorously protested the treatment of Iranian pilgrims by the Saudi police, saying that their only guilt was to downgrade "satanic" America and protest the occupation of Islamic holy places by Israel.2 The Saudis, on their part, called the fundamentalist theocracy in Iran "un-Islamic," while a Saudi Arabian broadcast named the Iranian rulers a "disgrace to Islam. They have wronged Islam and brought disrepute to its followers. In fact, the rulers of Iran have nothing to do with Islam."3 Regular, acrimonious exchanges between Iran and Saudi Arabia peaked once again during the 1982 and 1983 haj. The Saudis moved swiftly to arrest pro-Khomeini demonstrators and expell hundreds of Ira­ nian pilgrims, including Hojatoleslam Mohammad Hussein Musavi Khoiniha, Khomeini's personal representative and the supervisor of the Iranian haj delegation.4 Once again, Tehran accused Riyadh of acting on orders of "satanic America" and preventing millions of Moslem pilgrims from joining the Iranian delegation in denouncing U.S. policy in the Middle East. 42 Conflict Quarterly Another major point of contention between Khomeini's Iran and the Arab states is the often-made claim by the latter that Iran routinely intervenes in Arab domestic affairs by either inciting the local Shi'ite population or using "saboteurs" in an attempt to overthrow their regimes. In December 1980, Bahrain announced the arrest of a group of "plotters" who had allegedly been trained by Iranians to overthrow the Bahrain government and create an Islamic republic on that island. This claim was vehemently denied by Tehran. The announcement, never­ theless, "triggered a wave of anxiety in the region, [and] brought a massive expression of Arab support to Bahrain, for many years a target of occasional Iranian territorial claim."5 Iranian views on oil pricing and production policies have been another source of friction between that country and other oil producing areas of the Persian Gulf. The Khomeini regime has justifiably blamed Saudi Arabia for overproduction of oil and the creation of the current glut in the market. By branding the Saudi regime as "a puppet of the West,"6 the Iranian regime has endeavoured to isolate Saudi Arabia and reduce its influence on OPEC pricing and marketing decisions. Allocation of the production ceiling among OPEC s members — a move engineered in 1981 to maintain order in the pricing structure — was perceived by Iran to be disadvantageous to its position. Consequently, Iran has surpassed its quota of 1.2 million barrels of oil per day and is believed to be exporting between 2 and 2.5 million barrels per day. In the December 1982 OPEC ministerial meeting, Iran warned that OPEC pro­ duction quotas for each member country should be based on four fac­ tors: a country's oil resources, its need for foreign exchange, its popula­ tion, and the quantity of its petroleum exports in the past decade. The implementation of these proposals would be disadvantageous to the Arabs, especially the largest oil producer, Saudi Arabia. Iran's vast oil reserves, its continuing need for foreign exchange, its population of forty million and its position as the second largest OPEC oil producer before the revolution would all work in its favor. To counter Iran's demands, the Arabs engineered a move which bypassed the election of a new OPEC secretary general. Ironically, it was Iran's turn to have its representative occupy this seat. THE GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL In a move to contain Iran's regional influence the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) was established in 1981 by the conservative Gulf regimes of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Oman. The GCC was designed to coordinate the social and economic policies of these countries and further, to devise unified military and security programs.7 Although the ostensible military aim of the Gulf Cooperation Council was to coordinate security against possible internal and external subversion, the GCC was perceived by Tehran to be a pro- Western scheme directed against the Islamic Republic of Iran. While Iranian leaders took pains to reassure the Arab regimes that Iran had no territorial claims on them and that it sought friendly rela­ tions with all states that were not under "U.S. control" and were not 43 Fall 1984 "U.S. lackeys, like Egypt and Morocco,"8 the Iranian clerics cautioned the GCC that Tehran would not allow any country or group of countries to act as the policeman of the Persian Gulf. President Ali Khamanei warned the GCC members of Iran's determination to "crush" any exter­ nal plots against the country. In a broadcast on Radio Tehran, Dr. Ali Akbar Velayati, Iran's Foreign Minister, asserted: "As the strongest country in the region, we remind those who have ignored our presence that even the U.S. could not do anything against the will of our people."9 The Speaker of the Iranian Parliament went even further by stating: "All of you together do not even constitute a major city. Your plots are not a problem for the Islamic Republic of Iran."10 Nevertheless, the Iranian government was keenly aware of the potential military threat to the country's oil fields that might eminate from the GCC.

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