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51 Dirasat

Saudi Arabia and : The Border as a Catalyst for Cooperation Rabi II, 1441 - December 2019

Javier Bordón

Saudi Arabia and Iraq: The Border as a Catalyst for Cooperation

Javier Bordón 4 Dirasat No. 50 Rabi I, 1441 - November 2019

© King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies, 2019 King Fahd National Library Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Rakhmat, Zulfikar Chinas Efforts to Legitimize the Implementation of the Belt and Road Initiative in the Gulf. / Rakhmat, Muhammed Zulfikar. - , 2019

44 p ; 23 x 16.5 cm

ISBN: 978-603-8268-27-8

1- - Foreign economic relations - I-Title 337.5056 dc 1441/1423

L.D. no. 1441/1423 ISBN: 978-603-8268-27-8

Acknowledgements I would like to thank my family for being an unrelenting of love and support and joining me at every path I take. And I would like to thank the team at KFCRIS for welcoming me into their Center and sharing their invaluable expertise. Table of Contents

Abstract 6

Introduction 7

Formation of the International Border: A Dialogue between Nascent Polities and Shelving Disputes 9

Iraq in Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy (and viceversa) 12

Idiosyncrasy of the Border 18 Border Security 20 Trade and Mobility-Related Cooperation: Infrastructure and Customs 23 Nonenergy Trade 25 Transnational Oil Infrastructure 30 Electricity Grid Bonding 33 Hajj and Arba’aeen 36

Conclusion 39

References 40

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Abstract Saudi-Iraqi relations are imbued with a layered complexity featuring historical glimpses of pragmatic swapping and mostly overarched by confrontation, isolation, and sometimes, even mutual contempt. From 2014 onward, however, an emerging set of drivers at the international, domestic and decision-making levels, exacerbated by the factor of geographical proximity, has combined to sketch a new scenario, which frames the strategic steps in a nonlinear process of bilateral rapprochement. Among the various aspects in which deeper cooperative schemes are gaining momentum -some retrieved from past agendas and others involving outright innovation-, the present research deals with the singularity that derives from sharing a land border. Between political entities, the border receives the influx of mixed-motive games, which determines the transnational processes thereof. It is influenced by its comprising states the same way it exerts influence on them. After roughly thirty years of closure, the author will argue the Saudi-Iraqi border is undergoing a nondefinitive process of increasing permeability which, in turn, expands the prospects for cooperation. The first section the historical formation of the common border. The following section analyzes the changing nature of the relationship in recent years consistent with shifting attitudes in foreign-policy strategy. The third section, after a brief assessment of the unique character of the Saudi-Iraqi border, will unfold in several areas of cooperation in order to assess the current progress, challenges and opportunities for their realization and intensification: border security, cross-border infrastructure and regulation, trade, oil transport, electricity interconnection and religious . Introduction In accounts on Iraq, ‘sound the alarm’ and ‘foresee a new war episode’ are recurrent mottos as neglected issues or unintended miscalculations risk to spark both. The sequence of events unleashed in summer 2019 immediately raised concerns in that direction, as the US pressure on hardened, freedom of navigation and national critical infrastructure became subject to unprecedented threats; airstrikes, sanctions and cyberattacks targeted proxies and their positions; Abdul ’s government crumbled while struggling for security governance; and broad areas experiencing mounting popular unrest. A layered complexity colors Saudi-Iraqi relations, geographically exacerbated by the fact that “our neighbors are permanently situated by our side, we have to deal with them as they have to deal with us.”(1) For decades, the Saudi engagement vis-à-vis Iraq has been dominated by confrontation, isolation and sometimes even mutual contempt, rendering cooperative relations not only unattainable but also without the prospect of yielding any benefits. This deadlock underwent a dramatic turn during the past five years, as both the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Iraq began to identify uncultivated areas in which confidence and interdependence could be mutually reinforced; in a process facilitated by changes in the domestic and international realms and new readings of the different scenarios for foreign-policy practice. A key element receiving growing attention is the common 830-km international border. Between political entities, the border receives the influx of mixed-motive games(2) ranging from cooperation to competition, hence defining its evolving nature and management. Concurrently, the border imposes determinants to authority and the transnational processes thereof, as variously characterized by security, economic, legal, social, identity and other

(1) Turki Al Faisal bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud, “Saudi Arabia’s Foreign Policy”. Middle East Policy 20, no.4, Winter 2013: 37. (2) Beth Simmons, “Rules over Real Estate: Trade, Territorial Conflict and International Borders as Institution”, Journal of Conflict Resolution 49, no.º6, December 2005: 827.

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concerns. To put it simply, borders are both “an input (influencing aftermath processes) and an output (influenced by processes)”(3). The Kingdom decided to close its northern border in retaliation for Iraq’s invasion of and has maintained that position until recently. Under various circumstances, however, borders may be best viewed through Keohane’s instrumentalist definition: “international institutions that produce joint gains”(4). After several delays, the announcement of the first step toward the normalization of cross-border flows on 15 raises questions about the implications of the role of the border in the bilateral relationship and how changes may impact it, what areas of cooperation may materialize, how successful these endeavors might be and what obstacles they will encounter. In noting that the insights gained from this case study might not be directly comparable to studies of other international borders, the author conducted the research by posing an argument inspired by the literature,(5) but with a slight adjustment: A territorial boundary tends to be more permeable (while in compliance with the law) when it is taken for granted, implying the withdrawal of perceived interstate threats to authority. Primary evidence from international organizations, state institutions and experts on the field served as data for the formulation of statistical insights and the enrichment of the analysis through comments extracted from semi- structured interviews. Academic works, together with legislation, information from media platforms, reports by public agencies and records located in library archives made up the secondary sources. The analysis relied on data collected up until September 2019. It is important to note than the popular mobilization in Iraq starting in October may lead to a new political scenario, which could

(3) David Newman, “Contemporary Research Agendas,” in The Research Companion to Border Studies, ed. Doris Wastl-Walter (London: Routledge, 2012), 35. (4) Quoted in Simmons, “Rules,” 827. (5) Simmons, “Rules,” 843. affect the foreign-policy analysis though not necessarily the proposed areas of cooperation. The first section skims through the historical formation of the common border. The following section analyzes the changing nature of the relation consistent with shifting attitudes in foreign policy strategy. The third section, after a brief assessment of the border’s idiosyncrasy, will unfold in several areas of cooperation in order to assess the current progress, challenges and opportunities for their realization and improvement: border security, cross- border infrastructure and regulation, trade, transnational oil transport, electricity interconnection and religious pilgrimage.

Formation of the International Border: A Dialogue between Nascent Polities and Shelving Disputes In Jones’s systemic characterization on how international borders are formed, he distinguishes four technical, yet indissociably political, phases: allocation, delimitation, demarcation and maintenance(6). This model describes a sequential order much more entangled in practice. In the case of the Saudi- Iraqi border, the first two steps were only finalized forty years ago (see Chart 1).

Chart 1. Bilateral and Key Events Concerning the Border

1990: Border 1975: closure and 1915: Nejd-UK 1927: Administrative submission Friendship Treaty of split of Neutral of the Treaty (Treaty of ) Jeddah Zone to UN

1922: Treaty of 1930: Saudi- 1981: 2015: Muhammarah Iraqi Peace International Talks and Protocol of Treaty Frontier for Uqayr Treaty opening the border

(6) Donaldson and Williams, “Delimitation and Demarcation: Analysing the Legacy of Stephen B. Jones’s Boundary-Making”, Geopolitics, no.º13 (2008): 686.

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Map 1. Saudi-Iraqi Neutral Zone

Source: CIA, 1986

Source: Author. The proclamation of the Sultanate of Nejd coincided with the establishment of the . The incorporation of into King Abdul ‘Aziz al-Saud’s campaign in 1925 added fuel to a rivalry on national, territorial, historical, religious and familial grounds(7). In 1922, the Saudi- Iraqi international border became the first separation line to be drawn in the (see Map 1). The Treaty of Muhammarah and its appendix embodied the point of departure, as well as the source of inconclusive arrangements. Key provisions of the agreements: a) delineated the border from Bir Ansab to to the West, while conforming a Neutral Zone between Bir Ansab and the tri-border junction with Kuwait; b) and allocated the Muntafiq, Dhafir, Amarat and Iraqi tribes under Faisal I’s rule. Despite the fact that Faisal bin Hussein’s dynasty renounced over Hejaz(8), the looming claim over Kuwait remained a constant motive of contention for KSA. Partly due to the lack of incentives, a thorough delimitation remained elusive. In 1975, however, as Iraq briefly implemented a policy of détente, an agreement was concluded for the administrative division of the Neutral Zone. The resulting bisection in equal areas would later constitute later the separation line for this part of the border. The eight-year Iraq-Iran war inclined KSA to pragmatically engage with Iraq. During the early offensive in 1981, the international treaty for a lasting solution for the common border was signed. Spill-over concerns about the conflict installed the urgency for territorial certainty. Still, the treaty was confidential. The agreement abrogated the previous agreements and introduced minor allocation adjustments; codified the Neutral Zone’s division with a “line as straight as possible”(9); and laid down a joint demarcation plan. Two

(7) Hussein Ibish, “The Power of Positive Diplomacy: Saudi Outreach in Iraq since 2014,” Issue Paper 1, Arab Gulf States Institute in (2018): 3. (8) Ibish, ”The Power,” 3. (9) “International Frontier Treaty between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the of Iraq”, ratified February 4, 1982, Treaty Series, 1638: 88.

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accompanying protocols were intended to bring clarity to the operational control of the border authorities and the status of cross-border movements. The new border’s implementation was not always straightforward, although its geometry was consolidated and still remains intact, imbuing predictability as both states attempt to wield authority within their respective jurisdictions. As soon as 1982, Saudi Arabia had reportedly built a stripe of berms and trenches along the eastern half of the border(10). With a new interstate conflict on the horizon, Iraq decided unilaterally to withdraw from the international treaties with the Kingdom. Nonetheless, KSA submitted the 1981 accord to the United Nations (UN), rendering its publicity into the officially recognized boundary for the international community. Bilateral relations deteriorated at an accelerated pace and the underlying anxieties were fully confirmed with Iraq’s (11)in 1990 . Throughout the following years, securitization and hard-border policy can be expected to dominate the relationship, reflecting their geopolitical profiles and mutual understanding, but also domestic dynamics and the resulting counterpart’s perceptions.

Iraq in Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy (and viceversa) The current section offers a walkthrough of the two nations’ changing foreign-policy attitudes based on those breakpoints signaling strategic switches in an evolving environment, which have repercussions on the border’s development and, in turn, on cross-border affairs: a) 1991 ; b) 2003 US intervention in Iraq; c) 2014, amid Daesh’s territorial quest. Between 1990 and 2003, KSA was at the frontline of the international effort aimed ensuring that Iraq remained in isolation and curtailing behavior. This is the time span that confirmed the US as the indispensable pillar at

(10) CIA, “Saudi Arabia/Iraq,” February 1986, 5. (11) Ibish, ”The Power,” 4. the sub-regional security architecture: a reality increasingly undermined nowadays. After being the launching pad for the American forces, followed “a prolonged period of outright enmity and de facto warfare between Iraq and Saudi Arabia”(12). With conflict in its surroundings, the Kingdom molded its image as a promoter of stability, being a source of soft power reinforced in the upcoming years. The border closure in the post-Gulf War period was equally grounded on that commitment, resorting to concerns. Despite the severing of formal land communications, smuggling was endemic, and the Saudis often had to cope with Iraqi patrols crossing into national territory.(13) The US invasion of Iraq in 2003 unleashed a myriad of processes leading to a reconfiguration that, overall, scrolled the relation in the continuum into a deeper and more sharpened confrontation: The Iraqi political system underwent a sectarian reapportionment (muhasasa tabify), now dominated by Shia-coded formations, in which Saudi Arabia was perceived as a spoiler and a destabilizer.(14) The first years of occupation, when Iraq “became a playing field rather than a player”(15), advanced into the irrelevancy of the Sunni opposition, a weakening North American role, the entrenchment of unfavorable figures within decision-making institutions and the consolidation of structural links with Iran. In fact, complex ties -with Iran- pervaded and ramified specially after 2006, and subsequent game-changers such as the war on Daesh generally introduced more threads to the string; sociopolitical and paramilitary, but also to energy, consumption markets, media or religion. Amid rampant during Nouri al-Maliki’s term on the years up to

(12) Ibid. (13) and , “Saudi National Security: Military and security services-Challenges and Developments”, (working draft, Center for Strategic and International Studies, CSIS, May 2004): 47. (14) Middle East Institute Research Fellow Fanar Haddad, interview by the author, July 2019. (15) Gregory Gause III, “Saudi Arabia in the New Middle East,” Special Report no.º63, (Council on Foreign Relations December 2014): 16.

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2014, the stifling of constituencies to which Saudi Arabia could resort to and accusations of engaging in and fueling political dissent -especially in the Sunni-majority bordering areas, like the -, it was very unlikely that there would be the opportunity to reap any substantial benefit, even though the door was never fully closed. A multiscale convergence of factors, some hardly dissociable from each other, has enabled an unprecedented turn in the bilateral relation from 2015 onwards, bringing to the forefront the dialogue on the stagnated issue of the common border, which, in turn, has the potentiality to advance their respective agendas. These agendas depict asymmetrical standings in the regional system and a disparity of internal problems. While the Kingdom’s portfolio is prominently underpinned by a convex outreach that seeks to reverberate both at home and throughout the region, Iraq puts a stronger emphasis on an inward building that echoes its external stance. This paper will start by assessing those factors at the international level. Here, it is adamant to point at the strengthening effect of regional dynamics on domestic perceptions. After the 2011 uprisings, regional conflicts were mostly defined along sectarian lines, thus fueling a polarization process that rendered Sunni-Shia ventures seldom visible. Perhaps influenced by this dubious success, a new trend has surfaced that seeks to create greater distance between anti-Iranianism and anti-Shiism(16). Consequently, the re-positioning of the geopolitical imaginary downgrades the Shia-coded image of Iraq, which is normalized, and thus leaves room for Saudi Arabia to try to engage with a member of the Arab . Iranian projection comes to be countered through discourses linking to nation-state building, namely “around ideals of Iraqi- ness”(17). KSA’s strategy so far has relied on means of positive diplomacy

(16) Fanar Haddad, “The Waning Relevance of the Sunni-Shia Divide: Receding violence reveals the true contours of “Sectarianism” in Iraqi politics”, The Century Foundation (April 2019): 1. (17) Crisis Group, “Saudi Arabia: Back to ”, Middle East Report no.º186, (Crisis Group, May 2018): 2. and pulling incentives, reflecting a well-established practice in foreign policy. Furthermore, the common threat of Daesh brought both parties closer together, although Iran had a decisive upper hand in the military campaign against the group. Whether going through episodes of turmoil or de-escalation between KSA and Iran, the Iraqi state is likely to be caught in the middle, and hence balancing between powers fits with its current stabilization endeavor. The is playing a role in the rapprochement too, directly by encouraging top-level diplomatic meetings, and indirectly as its regional involvement acquires a more conditional nature. By the time Baghdad and Riyadh agreed to re-establish diplomatic relations, “Iran was the third largest exporter to Iraq…, the leading source of tourism revenue …, about one third of Iraq’s electricity is produced directly or indirectly through energy trade with Iran”(18), and loyalist organizations are well-entrenched. Nonetheless, Iraqi internal dynamics are perceived to display reasonable room for maneuver. First, enough time has passed for the distributional foundations of the political system to exhibit fault lines within the Shia bloc. In a multidirectional process involving leaders and communities(19), there is momentum for religious affiliations to be put on the back burner as more pressing issues mount up. In a recent survey, most rejected any interference on sovereignty and dismissed any further economic symbiosis with Iran(20). Perceptions on corruption are milder toward formations associated with the crackdown on Daesh and tasked with security, although the management of recent protests may deteriorate their image as well. The federal government shows a strong confidence deficit, which has been clearly exposed in the October protests, perhaps the largest since 2003 (see Chart 2).

(18) Nader Habibi and Omid Shokri Kalehsar, “Saudi Arabia’s Plan to Lure Iraq from Iran”, Atlantic Council, April 10, 2019. (19) Haddad interview. (20) ORB International, “Report Summary Pelican III: Iraq” (June 2019): 10.

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Chart 2. Iraqis’ Perceptions about Corruption

Corruption

67% 72% 54% 32% 19% 20% 13% 8% 25% 42% 57% 62% 98%

Daesh Shia Government Tribal Fighting Popular of Iraq Groups Mobilization Forces Not corrupt Corrupt

Unweighted N=939 Weighted n=939

Source: ORB International, 2019, ORB-International.com

Some governmental moves so far aim at constructing a sustainable governance, like the successive calls for the full integration of Hashd al- Sha‘abi in the security establishment(21). Nonetheless, a serious and sustained effort for reform is lacking in the areas of improving accountability and providing services and jobs. Indeed, it is Iraqis’ task to lay down the initiatives to counter well-entrenched grievances, but KSA has the will and capabilities for contributing to long-lasting reconstruction needs, albeit with the guarantee of some minimum yield. As the Iraqi state takes steps to open its economy to the diversification of partnerships, Riyadh has the potential to build trust and enhance interdependencies through cooperation. Changes among decision-making individuals also affect bilateral prospects. The main outcomes have been Saudi engagement not solely with the government, but also reaching out to Iraqi Shia figures and other community

(21) Saddam Faisal al-Muhammadi, Director of Legal Affairs Department at University, email communication with the author, August 2019. leaders and deploying novel channels for furnishing the relationship with some continuity. Al-Abadi’s election as prime minister in 2014, together with Muqtada al-Sadr’s distinguishable agenda led to a pragmatic opening KSA felt it can work with. Other political leaders, such as Ammar al- Hakim, albeit bonds with Iran, seem to remain committed to a balancing/ nationalist program. Despite the current risk of fall out and , Saudi Arabia has opened lines of communication with more coalitions than five years ago, which is imperative not to be perceived as interference. Meanwhile, constructive attitudes have stemmed from Muhammad bin Salman’s assessment that “the Iraqi army was the only guarantee against the expansion of ISIS and that these forces are led by Shiite and Sunni generals with American military education and not by Iranians”(22). For its part, Grand Sistani, the most prominent clerical figure in Iraq, endorses the need to keep foreign meddling on check while advancing the ’s transformation with the help of regional partners. A transactional rationale that may favor KSA. The most impending question involves the fate of Abdul Mahdi’s government. He took over the branch along with the promise of public administration reform and improvement of services, security and economy. The obvious shortcomings in this regard and Abdul Mahdi’s dilemma reflects the scenario in which KSA tries to participate: on one side, the need for structural changes in the light of crony capitalism and an overstretched public sector, and on the other, high political benefits at stake that reproduce the status quo. KSA has usually prioritized individual relationships over institutional engagement(23). An active diplomacy, at the highest, ministerial and technical levels, has progressively laid the lines for cooperation, and even acted as an

(22) Ronen Zeidel, “Iraq-Saudi Relations 2017-2018: Expectations and Limits”, Middle East Policy 25, no. 4, Winter 2018: 50. (23) Crisis Group, “Saudi Arabia,” 4.

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effective channel in circumstances(24). Thus steps favoring the institutionalization of the relation have come to exist and foster some degree of continuity. In addition to a growing number of memorandums of understanding (MoUs), some of which are intrinsically related to the land border, the Iraqi- Saudi Coordination Council “has achieved two top-level meetings so far”(25). The bilateral mechanics come in line with broader initiatives with the (GCC). Last April, a five-year was signed, covering key issues such as counterterrorism, trade-related communications and tourism(26). Many of these issues have something to do with the question of borders.

Idiosyncrasy of the Border Until very recently, the protracted closure of the Saudi-Iraqi border has been characterized by the definition and measuring of threats at the expense of room for joint gains. Border building has seen the Kingdom take a more proactive stance in border management throughout the years, while turmoil in Iraq has capped genuine border governance for a long time. Muqtada al-Sadr said: “These are all neighboring , what happens in Iraq affects them”(27). In Saudi Arabia’s case, this concern has normally manifested in upgraded versions for a secured, nonpermeable border. The 1990s witnessed the early progress toward a state-of-the-art system, although later momentums underscored its urgency as the nature of threats changed. In 2006, the major concern for KSA had shifted from a potential land invasion to the illicit flow of nationals to fight for the in Iraq, andtheir

(24) Arab News, “Iraqi PM and King Salman Discuss Aramco Attacks,” September 25, 2019. https://www.arabnews.com/node/1559701/saudi-arabia (25) al-Muhammadi email. (26) Abdel ‘Aziz Aluwaisheg, “GCC and Iraq seizing historic opportunity to engage”, Arab News, April 16, 2019. (27) Muqtada al-Sadr quoted in, Michael Kik “Exclusive interview of Iraqi Shiite leader Moqtada al-Sadr,” France24, June 16 2015, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HPOBjVnxhNk&t=2s foreseeable return. The Saudi Border Guard Development Program (MIKSA) planned to add to the existing capabilities “fences on either side of a 100-meter ‘no-man’s land’ containing concertina wire obstacles, ultraviolet sensors and night vision cameras with facial recognition and buried motion detectors. Command posts, helipads and observation towers [were] linked with access roads”(28). After several cost-related delays, the project followed the completed installation of “a razor-wire fence, thermal imaging and radar equipment”(29) starting in 2009 and coinciding with mounting violence inside Iraq. Roughly five years later, the rise of Daesh, with Anbar as stronghold, accelerated the pace to include a fiber-linked network of operation centers with unified command and control and tactically located rapid response teams(30). A couple of episodes showed a highly militarized border in 2014-2016, when Iraqi law enforcement was, according to reliable sources, on retreat from their boundary posts(31), while KSA deployed regular forces in an attempt to compensate for the lack of external insecurity. Despite a fragile recovery of state control over the territory, events that harm the desired predictability for the functioning of the border continue, which represents an obvious restraint for cooperation results to materialize. However, there has been a fundamental transformation regarding threats and perceptions briefly discussed above: The uncertainty does not arise primarily from interstate or inter-regime confrontation but rather from nonstate actors that both KSA and Iraq deem problematic (ie. terrorists) or for which there are prospects to re-accommodate (ie. popular mobilization units [PMUs]); or

(28) “Saudi Border Security Program: Saudi Border Guard Development Program,” Global Security. org, last modified May 20, 2017. https://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/world/saudi/miksa.htm (29) France24, “EADS wins high-tech border security contract”, 24, July 1, 2009. https:// www.france24.com/en/20090701-eads-wins-high-tech-border-security-contract- (30) For more on Saudi Arabia’s border capabilities, see: Gerstein et al. “Managing International Border: balancing Security with the Licit Flow of People and Goods”, Rand Corporation,2018 (31) Newstex, “ValueWalk: Saudi Arabia sends 30.000 Troops to Northern Border,” Newstex Global Business Blogs, July 3, 2014.

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from Iranian-linked elements in an evolving political spectrum where now, in effect the ‘ can be separated from the chaff.’ That said, the border can act as a catalyst because the territorial jurisdictions are well-defined and the respective authorities do not endanger each other. As a matter of fact, a common threat for both states can be an impulse for cooperative engagement too. The border, when taken for granted, can become more permeable, which needs to be accompanied by the examination of sizable gains. The next subsections will a number of (potential) areas of cooperation. We can anticipate several cross-cutting factors that entail foreseeable rises of the opportunity cost for the cooperative paths: corruption, insecurity and the Iranian footprint.

Border Security Border security is the thorniest realm for cooperation, given its penetration into the core of national sovereignty and persistent mistrust that would most likely prevent a prolonged mechanism from materializing unless backed with strong assurances, and even then we might expect actual coordination on a case by case basis. In spite of limited prospects, the geography of the border means it is complex to guard, and despite the improvement in KSA’s capabilities, which also brought indirect protection to Iraq against transnational terrorism, requires intensive maintenance and personnel. Precisely due to that, some degree of cooperation would have a positive impact. For its part, the Iraqi state has a vital interest in a secured border too: the of and are located relatively close to the terrorist infiltrations. And importantly for both, the sparsely populated Anbar province remains a complex challenge beyond conventional security approaches, given its strategic meaning for a post-Daesh environment(32).

(32) Chris Solomon, “After IS, Iraq Looks to ,” Global Risk Insights, June 1,2017. Some promising steps forward are already on display. Both countries signed a MoU concerning the exchange of intelligence on counterterrorism more than two years ago. Additionally, the first-ever meeting of the Committee on Political, Security and Military Affairs within the Coordination Council’s structure establishes a sound initiative, which seems to have brought about concrete outcomes, as exemplified by a new security cooperation agreement(33), although none have been made public. The most visible hurdle, in the light of various cross-border missile incidents, is finding a common ground on what offences should be effectively addressed and how accountability can be reassured. Bilateral visits have most likely tried to appease KSA’s fears, but nonetheless, if perceived inaction at the border continues, that will jeopardize Barham Saleh’s stance of trying “not to make Iraq pay for their own disagreements and conflicts.”(34) In that sense, unilateral efforts on border enforcement on the part of Iraq have to be revitalized and must appear both credible and serious, by, for instance, offering guarantees on permanent deployment of troops along the Arar route. Preferably this should involve PMUs that have undergone the cutting off of political or communal affiliations as endorsed by the Diwaniya order. The former must not be confused with the possibilities that community engagement might offer in the detection and interception of illicit cross-border flows. It is possible that Iraq may lack the resources, yet some sort of border externalization(35) on the Iraqi side might be compelling for both parts yet setting rigid firewalls around the notion of sovereignty; therefore, limiting actions to joint patrols or on-site training. Indeed, backing these initiatives with the broader compromise of economic cooperation would facilitate them

(33) Mina Aldroubi, “Saudi Arabia drafts security agreement with Iraq,”, July 31, 2019. (34) “Iraq President ’s full speech to the UN General Assembly,” PBS NewsHour, September 18, 2019. https://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=barham+salih+full+spe ech+un+general+assembly (35) For insights on border externalization, see Maribel Casas-Cortes, Sebastián Cobarrubias and John Pickles, “Good Neighbours make good fences: Seahorse operations, border externalization and extra-territoriality”, European Urban and Regional Studies 23, no. 3 (2016): 231.

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and present them as necessary. The construction of border communication centers might be less intrusive but more feasible at the operational level. Furthermore, each state could turn over its own experience from activities like the Container Control Programme of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the World Customs Organization (WCO), which seeks to “improve risk management, supply chain security and trade facilitation in seaports, airports and land border crossings”(36), and which would provide a basis for information sharing. This area of cooperation will probably pose the most acute distributional conflict -regarding who does what and to what extent- but it is a vital aspect for transiting from passive -permanent and immovable- to active fencing and border management.

Map 2. Arar and Jumaima Outlets

Source: Wall Street Journal, 2017.

(36) “The UNODC-WCO Container Control Programme,” accessed August 21, 2019. https://www. unodc.org/unodc/en/ccp/index.html Trade and Mobility-Related Cooperation: Infrastructure and Customs First, enhanced trade and mobility demand infrastructure and facilities in order to minimize transportation costs. Second, a refinement of customs regulations and operations designed for developing neglected businesses. And third, the borderlands must be included as spaces that have the potential to become international production centers(37) or strategic links in new supply chains. At the time of this writing, Jadida Arar is expected to become the first crossing point for commercial use in forty years (see Map 2). The map also depicts the hypothetical opening of Jumaima border post, which has raised speculation even though its official confirmation has not taken place. Jadida Arar may create a lifeline for Anbar province, whose Sunni-majority inhabitants have felt Saudi rapprochement excessively prioritized the allocation of resources to Iraq’s oil-rich south. A parliamentarian complained: “Let the Gulf states forget about Sunni politicians, but let them not forget our areas.”(38) Iraqi government plans place transportation and telecommunication as the fourth contributor to the economy after the oil, services and trade sectors(39). The first sector is projected to have a 95% private sector participation by 2022(40). It seems logistics is a feasible option to address low productivity and for unburdening a resource-drained state. In preparation for this, KSA has provided financial and technical support to the reparation and upgrading of the road to Jadida Arar. The Saudi company MASCO has implemented construction of a border compound comprising “a customs department, a hospital, a health center and a university”(41). In the same region, a different

(37) Rongxing Guo, Cross-Border Management: Theory, Method and Application (Belin: Springer- Verlag, 2015),302. (38) Crisis Group, “Saudi Arabia,” 17. (39) National Investment Commission, “Investment Map of Iraq”, (2019):19. (40) Ibid, 13. (41) Mina Aldroubi, “Iraq to establish permanent presence on Saudi border through compound construction”, The National, February 19, 2019.

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project involving Jumaima passage engendered expectations as early as 2013: the rehabilitation of the land infrastructure from Najaf into KSA that falls closer to Ha’il, Riyadh and al-Sharqiyah province. Customs operability and duties are a central precondition due to their enduring effects on the arrangement of the supply chain. As Hashem al- Marzouk, export analyst for Saudi electrical contractor firm al-Fanar, recounts: “Materials have to travel through Kuwait or Jordan, surging up transportation costs. Then, upon arrival at the Iraqi border, material and equipment have to stay 10 days on average there. It is a very slow process”(42). A number of measures seems to be underway. Iraq intends to become a member of the Transports Internationaux Routiers (TIR) convention, which KSA had joined in 2018. By doing so, both countries agree to a trade system of container-sealing and customs communications that makes checks in land transit almost incidental. TIR membership would also facilitate access to the GCC economies -all of which have subscribed to the convention. From the Kingdom’s perspective, Iraq membership in the TIR would allow KSA to maximize the system’s utility by easing land trade to , the European Union (EU) or . Another element under discussion is the implementation of a Single Window System, which is a cross-border structure that enables traders to submit license applications or customs declarations at a single site. The UN Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) describes the system’s many advantages(43), which ideally, coordinate not only bilateral procedures but also intrastate bureaucracy, an appealing prospect for both administrations. Regarding barriers, Riyadh’s intention to curb Iraqi hurdles to its goods saw growing improvement with concessions in April last year. These concessions alarmed Iran, to which Iraq alleged that the adjustment was necessary to abide by the

(42) Hashem al-Marzouk, Interview by the author, August 2019. (43) United National Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE), The Single Window Concept (Geneva: UN, 2003). principle of nondiscrimination in force(44). In 2017, Iraq became a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO), which mandates that the lowering of tariffs on a good must apply to every contracting party of that good. Arguably, the biggest challenge for Saudi traders at the border is what a willful Iraqi state might not be able to do: impede administrative corruption at a certain step, or even more worrisome, some sort of ‘taxation’ by armed groups in the context of a conflict sub-economy(45). Tackling these endogenous mechanisms remains a priority. Lastly, reports inform about proposals on creating a special economic zone along the border(46). If such a zone becomes reality, it would most likely attract national and international firms. Its implementation should ensure the incorporation of borderland labor and services, and hence, peripheral areas would benefit from such transnational development.

Nonenergy Trade The rapprochement is putting significant emphasis on trade, with a view of the border as a historical constraint with the potential to be transformed into a dynamizing factor. The juncture coincides with KSA’s holistic stimulus for a reorientation of its economic model, as pursued by the Vision 2030 plan. Iraq acknowledges the benefits of diversification away from hydrocarbons, however, urgent challenges subdue decision makers to the known oil ‘comfort’, thus growth targets have prioritized the sector(47). This aggravates the sensitive position of being the most oil-dependent country on Earth.(48) Newly launched

(44) “Iraq denies tariff cuts on Saudi goods,” Middle East Monitor, April 19, 2018. https://www. middleeastmonitor.com/20180419-iraq-denies-tariff-cuts-on-saudi-goods/ (45) Tim Eaton et al., “Conflict Economies in the Middle East and North Africa,” Chatham Report, June 2019: 34. (46) Raya Jalabi, “Iraqi PM Abdul Mahdi meets Saudi King Salman on first visit to Saudi Arabia,” , , 2019. (47) Iraq National Investment Commission, “Investment,”, 19. (48) Eaton et al. “Conflict Economies,”, 13.

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development strategies are attempting to sketch a picture with alternatives. An in-depth analysis of domestic economies is out of the scope of this research; but will be necessary to resort to them at some point. In theory, cross-border trade has the potential to exploit price and production-factor differences as well as to intertwine production stages so as to lead to advantageous economies of scale. Furthermore, higher exports tend to overlap with higher foreign direct investment (FDI) levels. At first glance, prospective trade is determined by the great similarity between their national economic structures: sharing a hydrocarbon-based export policy restricts what each might offer to the other’s market in a competitive fashion. Despite so, considerable, mutually positive synergies can emerge and creative solutions will prevail. Iraq-UAE trade is an illustrative example, as the latter has been the first destination of Iraqi nonoil exports. Another counterpoint is the broader long-standing conditions preventing from an enhancement of intra-regional trade. This paper has already discussed some of these factors (tariff and non- tariff barriers, insecurity, data exchange…), and authors like Saidi and Prasad(49) have identified others. KSA’s case is illustrative: Exports and imports with the Arab states that are not in the GCC account for 5% and 3.4% of the overall totals, respectively.(50) The author applied a simple gravity model, designed for predicting bilateral trade under the assumptions that it is proportional to the subjects’ economic size and inversely proportional to the distance between them, to KSA-Iraq case by using World Bank data(51). Potential total volume is estimated by, first, by multiplying each country’s (GDP) in current US$ (KSA: $782.5 billion US; Iraq: $225.9 billion US), and then dividing the

(49) Nasser Saidi and Aathira Prasad, “Trends in trade and investment policies in the MENA region”, (Background Note, MENA-OECD Initiative, November 27-28, 2018), 27-37. (50) Saudi Arabian Monetary Authority (SAMA), “54th Annual,”, 105-106. (51) World Bank, “GDP (current US$) data”, accessed August 15, 2019, https://data.worldbank.org/ indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD product by the distance in kilometers between capital cities (1.323km). The result was quite surprising: $100.99 billion US(52). This is a purely abstract model leaving aside the most pressing variables but it is an interesting exercise to show the enormous gap between actual bilateral trade and its maximum (if unrealistic) potential.

Chart 3. KSA Exports and Re-Exports to Iraq 1991-2018 (in million US$)

Source: UN Comtrade Database; elaborated by the author

Charts 3 and 4 show that bilateral exchange has been registering record levels. Saudi exports are nearing the 2009 peak, which was a byproduct of regime change in Iraq, the lifting of the majority of UN sanctions and Saudi Arabia’s ability to supply food and, to a much lesser extent, capital and intermediate goods for a neglected industry, decayed electricity and transport. Al-Maliki’s re-election and the global financial crisis damaging oil prices weakened the trend, which had been experiencing a surge since 2017. According to officials, the objective is to multiply trade more than 10 times in the next 10 years up to $6.1 billion US.(53)

(52) For example, Intra-EU trade, comprising twenty-eight countries, was $329.5 billion in 2018. (53) Mina Aldroubi, “Saudi-Iraqi trade to reach 23 billion Saudi Riyals within 10 years,” The National, February 20, 2018.

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Chart 4. KSA Imports from Iraq, 1991-2018 (in Million US$)

Source: UN Comtrade Database; elaborated by the author.

The variation of annual levels of Iraqi exports to KSA is obvious. The political factor brought about the major turn from less than $2 million US in exports in 2013 to about $12 million US in 2018. In the absence of assistance through competition policy or preferential access, it is not straightforwardly clear how Iraqi companies may penetrate KSA. Trade in services, particularly logistics, appears to be an unexploited niche that Saudis are favourable to, and it is predicted that: “A high number of (Iraqi) companies will be needed”(54). Construction labor is also said to be largely untapped(55). This would require some degree of liberalization, as services are traditionally subjected to protectionist policies in the Middle East. Turning to tradable goods, a limited number of raw materials and intermediate products might be exportable to KSA, where manufacturing and processing into later production steps is more cost-effective, as a notable aluminum import suggests(56). Iraq has reserves, too. Growing interest in those two commodities and derivative industries in Saudi Arabia, with successful enterprises such as Ma’aden,

(54) al-Marzouk, interview. (55) World Bank, Iraq: Systematic Country Diagnostic (Washington D.C.: World Bank,2017),56. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/542811487277729890/Iraq-Systematic-Country- Diagnostic (56) Aldroubi, “Saudi-Iraqi Trade.” could boost Iraqi exports and consolidate supply chains, perhaps combined with direct investment, or even through joint ventures, so Iraqi industry can also flourish.

Chart 4. KSA Imports from Iraq, 1991-2018 (in Million US$)

Source: UN Comtrade Database; elaborated by the author.

Chart 5 depicts the largely unchanged importance of final products in KSA exports to Iraq, specifically coming from agriculture, agroindustry, livestock and various ready meals. Dairy products received significant attention, however, at the time of writing, Saudi dairy producer Almarai had decided not to export to Iraq due to “issues with the government.”(57) The focus on consumer goods is favored by fiscal policy in Iraq, where the economy has been stifled by multifaceted transfers encouraging short-term demand. Additionally, the rationale has a two-fold meaning for KSA. On one hand, it has a geopolitical connotation involving the Kingdom’s desire to displace Iranian and Turkish dominance in the market. On the other hand, it may be

(57) al-Marzouk interview.

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seen as a political economy opportunity in line with Vision 2030, which states that the Saudi market suffers “from limited penetration of modern trade and e-commerce.”(58) Therefore, expansion into Iraq may become an external stimulus to introduce changes in that direction. Meanwhile, the second peak in capital goods, in 2017-2018, derives from vehicle and electrical machinery exports. In spite of representing only an early sign and not a trend, it is indicative that KSA might find profitable business if the Iraqi economy makes room for qualitatively higher consumption and the revamping of industry. In the shorter term, it is obvious that construction materials, especially for housing, is an area KSA could supply efficiently through cross-border trade. As a matter of fact, all of these efforts can benefit from a relatively general belief among Iraqis that the quality of Saudi products is better than other neighboring countries’(59). Notwithstanding that food-based trade is instrumental for an early phase of rapprochement, dilated import dependence may worsen state’s capability to allocate resources to investment in developing a productive economy, as public spending continues to be skewed toward subsidies and the labor market experiences distortions. At some point, KSA may be a crucial partner in revitalizing the agricultural sector, for example, with the procurement of cutting-edge systems.

Transnational Oil Infrastructure This area, if looked at through the lenses of conventional realist theories, calls for self-sufficiency albeit concomitantly slashes the prospects for stretching interdependencies toward cooperative frameworks that would displace inevitable conflicts to lower echelons within those schemes. Plans for the development of such infrastructure generated early enthusiasm but seem

(58) Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Vision 2030 (2016),57. (59) al-Marzouk, interview. to have returned to the drawer, in the light of reasons whose intricacy cannot be thoroughly covered here. These reasons include: The salient trends in the global markets -export shift to and less appeal of the Red Sea route-, KSA and Iraq’s positioning in those markets -the Republic could be a viable (not currently) competitor to oil leadership at the Gulf and OPEC(60)-, the existing international partnerships -Iraqi pipes to Turkey and Iran-, the complexity of oil geopolitics inside Iraq, including disputes between the federal government and the Regional Government (KRG) and friction over the allocation of rents; as well as problems with national infrastructures and the lack of alternative routes.

Maps 3 and 4. Iraq and KSA Major Oil and Gas Pipelines

Source: US Energy Information Administration (EIA), 2016; 2017.

The Iraqi Pipeline in Saudi Arabia (IPSA), which ceased to operate in 1990 as KSA redirected it to its East-West network, has gathered attention. Unfortunately, the infrastructure is only suited for transporting for raw- material and has become obsolete after years of nonmaintenance. In any case, Iraq has doubled production to 4.7 millions of barrels per day (mb/d) in ten years(61) and aspires to the exorbitant figure of 8 mb/d. The bottleneck of Shatt

(60) John Bowlus, “Pipeline Partners: Expanding and Securing Iraq’s Future Oil Exports,” (Policy Papers Series no. 2. Global Relations Forum, November 2015): 12. (61) Ibid, 20.

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al-Arab entails risks but projects like the Southern Iraq Integrated Project, which is designed to promote increased shipping capacity, seem to maintain momentum (see Maps 3 and 4). Despite the many and complex obstacles, there exists a narrow breadth for thinking of alternative paths. Iraq is trying to recover domestic refinement and facilities but the results so far are half-hearted and, more importantly, crude oil output is growing at a higher pace. Consequently, Iraq is unable to satisfy internal demand nor trade refined products at the international level, and is instead “spending 2-2.5 billion US$ per year to import”(62). Given KSA’s state-of-the-art capabilities, a two-way pipeline transporting crude in exchange for refined oil, along with the grant of a negotiated economic compensation, could alleviate those flaws. Creating cross-border interdependency, in the light of mounting tensions after aggressions such as the June and August attacks on hydrocarbon-related infrastructure, would serve as an incentive for Iraq to promote security and accountability searches, thus creating a more suitable atmosphere for the preemption of attacks on Saudi territory, despite the fact that the new facilities may create a new potential target as well. Adding to the oil-rich south, the governorate has developed the second set of oil fields. Through the national network, a part of Kirkuk’s production could be diverted to the south and then to a prospective Saudi- Iraqi infrastructure. A positive factor is the Kirkuk- pipeline already has lines for refined products, hence it would be more easily incorporated to the Saudi-Iraqi connection. On one hand, this would curb the virtual monopoly of the Turkish route in the north, but on the other hand, this would likely upset Russia too, since its state-owned firm Rosneft acquired a 60% stake in the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline(63). It would surely upset the KRG as well,

(62) Ibid, 29. (63) Simon Watkins, “Iraq’s Ambitious Oil Plan Faces One Major Problem,” Oil Price, June 3, 2019. https:// oilprice.com/Geopolitics/Middle-East/Iraqs-Ambitious-Oil-Plan-Faces-One-Major-Problem.html as handing oil management over to the federal government undermines the KRG’s most strategic revenue. Another hurdle for doing so is the final destination of the northern oil, Europe. Using the Red Sea route, due to its length and non-existent structures, would rise costs significantly. According to Bowlus, in spite of episodes of turmoil, Turkey has continued to be a reliable partner for energy flows(64) for KRG and Iraq. Overall, and besides the fact KSA can present itself as a stakeholder less interested in instrumentalizing its energy communications in times of geopolitical maneuvering, the numerous limitations render progress highly improbable. Recent developments hint at the practicality this sort of connections may have. For example, news in September confirmed KSA was importing 2 million barrels from Iraq to cover production gaps.(65) However, ad hoc measures are unlikely to crystallize long-term projects from scratch, particularly in a changing global environment.

Electricity Grid Bonding The novelty of renewable-based electrical networking cannot be fully grasped here, primarily because of the absence to this day of industrial-scale photovoltaic (PV) projects in Iraq for an accurate assessment of construction costs and the leap in energy-transition demands regarding systems and regulations, including the underpinning rationale in salient cross-border relations. Still, it can emerge as a dimension in line with the ‘friendliest’ practices the future of global energy awaits for us and, in parallel, a downgrading factor for alternatives currently deemed cost-effective but embedded with negative externalities. Iranian gas exports for electricity production in Iraq have come to be framed as ‘necessary evil’, insufficient for covering structural shortage but still more

(64) Bowlus, “Pipeline Partners,” 9. (65) McFarlane, Benoit Faucon and Summer Said, “Saudi Arabia looks to import oil in order to keep exports flowing”, Market Watch, September 19, 2019.

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efficient than oil-based generation. Accounting for 1.200 megawatts (MWs) in 2018, Iranian exports still could not cope with the 5.000-MW deficit(66), which stood at the roots of summer protests, which have since intensified beyond seasonal fluctuations and come to underscore transversal dissatisfaction. Development in Iraq, without stopping at the complexity of oversized subsidies, lacking infrastructure and energy-procurement skills, needs the revitalization of its electricity network. In 2011, the maximum net capacity for meeting a 15-GW demand was roughly 9 GW(67). Today, however, with almost every household relying on the national grid, demand is estimated at 22 GW and is increasing at dizzying speed, amounting to over 10% annually(68). According to the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business Index, access to electricity heads firms’ list of obstacles to private-sector development(69). Political dynamics and technological breakthroughs are starting to present renewable-energy sources as an unfaltering option for cutting average cost and deploying new export nodes: “solar PV is already on equal footing with oil-fired generation in terms of levelized costs of electricity(70). Both KSA and Iraq are among the top countries in terms of solar resources, which provides them with an enviable advantage worth weighing. Notwithstanding a long way ahead, KSA has upgraded its commitment to solar-power development, announcing investments of more than $350 billion US(71). Indeed, engaging in a national comprehensive strategy while extending participative quotas to neighboring partners would materialize assurances for an enduring position in world-energy leadership.

(66) Habibi and Kalehsar “Saudi Arabia’s Plan.” (67) IEA, Iraq Energy Outlook: World Energy Outlook Special Report (Paris: IEA, 2012): 30. (68) World Bank, Iraq Economic Monitors: From War to Reconstruction and Economic Recovery (Washington D.C.: World Bank, 2018): 26. (69) Ibid, 11. (70) IEA, “Iraq’s Energy Sector,” 48. (71) Anthony Diapola, “It’s Hard to Be the Saudi Arabia of Solar,” Bloomberg, December 16, ,2018 https://www.bnnbloomberg.ca/it-s-hard-to-be-the-saudi-arabia-of-solar-1.1184029 A window of opportunity has opened with the 300 MW-capacity solar-plant project in Sakaka, expected to be commercially operative by the end of 2020 and leading to reports about preferential trade with Iraq at a discount of US$21 per MW.(72) Saudi plans for 2030 include the construction of other four PV parks at some distance from the Iraqi border: Oaisumah, Rafha, Tabarial and Ourayyat.(73) Despite the fact that the routes under discussion mainly depend on transmission lines along the Gulf’s seabed or through Kuwait, a hypothetical grid community among several countries in the long term would presumably need infrastructure pertaining the land border, ideally high-voltage direct- current (HVDC) lines, known to reduce transport losses over long distances. If Saudi Arabia intertwines its national energy plans with a foreign-policy perspective it may be able to present itself as an energy-transition partner, not only to Iraq but to the broader region as well. In an international electricity- grid community based on renewables, where interconnections balance and re-allocate over and underproductions at convenience, the central actor is not the one owning resources but rather the one with the upper hand in grid management(74). Even if it is still incipient, KSA possesses better interconnection and generation capacities and more diversified energy mix than Iraq, and thus bigger chances for adopting a balancing role. In addition to lessening oil-trade competition, solar-grid ties feature several characteristics diminishing outright fallout: energy is difficult to store, interruptions are costly, the resource is not easily redirected and the reputational price of opportunistic behavior is high(75). Saudi-Iraqi rapprochement is capitalizing, first and foremost, on the latter’s

(72) Omid Shokri Kalehsar, “Iranian, Saudi Interests Conflict in Iraq’s Energy Market,”, Daily Sabah, April 17, 2019. (73) Saudi Arabia, Renewable Energy Project Development Office (REPDO), Overview of Saudi Arabia’s Renewable Energy Program (Riyadh: Ministry of Energy, 2019). (74) Gonzalo Escribano, “The geopolitics of renewable and electricity cooperation between and Spain,” Mediterranean Politics, February 2018: 7. https://doi.org/10.1080/136293 95.2018.1443772 (75) Ibid, 3.

35 36 Dirasat No. 51 Rabi II, 1441 - December 2019

reconstruction needs. Saudi Arabia can take advantage of emerging options for cultivating a fact-based friendly approach to the relationship while keeping certain room for maneuver, instead of limiting the focus to older mechanisms with well-known flaws.

Hajj and Arba’aeen The annual pilgrimage to and embodies one of the Five Pillars of and is required to be performed by every Muslim, at least, once in a lifetime. Due to its special significance for both societies and states, it is a unique geopolitical tool. Saudi Arabia has received accusations in this regard,(76) suggesting a ‘politization of Hajj,’ whereas the chance to attend Hajj can be an instrument for cooptation and corruption for foreign governments on their population. The issue of the Iraqi hujjaj is still a sensitive topic that demands further dialogue and can consolidate as a positive asset in the rapprochement. While conducting this research, the author intended to analyze the evolution of Iraqi hujjaj arrivals, means and, most importantly, border-crossing points throughout several decades. More recent statistics, however, are difficult to access, thus hinting at security concerns that ought to be gradually removed. According to the KSA Ministry of Interior’s statistics available at King Saud University(77), for a long time -at least until 1987, the latest found source-, most Iraqi pilgrims traveled by land. Until 1979, the majority crossed through the al- outlet approximately 5km south of the KSA-Kuwait Neutral Zone. That same year, virtually every crossing happened through al- Ruqi outlet, at the tri-vertex point between Kuwait and the KSA-Iraq Neutral Zone. From then on, due to the outbreak of the Iran-, the biggest flow diverted to the Arar checkpoint, while smaller numbers crossed through al-

(76) Bachar El Halabi, “Saudi neighbours accuse Riyadh of politicizing Hajj pilgrimage,” France24, August 14, 2018. (77) Saudi Arabia, General Directorate of and , Annual Pilgrims Statistics (1970-1981, 1984-1985, 1987). Ruqi and al-Jumaima until the closure in 1990; after that time, KSA agreed to open the border at Arar annually for Hajj. Today, the means of transport for Hajj have radically changed, which affects Iraqis as well. In 2019, by far the majority of pilgrims came by air (94%), followed by land (5%) and sea (1%).(78) A proper answer to those shifts in the bilateral relation has been the inauguration of Baghdad-Jeddah flights and initial talks for a line connecting to Najaf. However, thousands of Iraqis still take the land route. In fact, almost half of Iraqi hujjaj do so. In theory, the quota system for Hajj assigns 1.000 vacancies for every 1 million Muslim citizens to each country(79). The quota is also partitioned according to the means of arrival: In Iraq’s case, 60% by plane and 40% by road. Therefore, the journey for Hajj through the land border retains great importance. Khalid al-Attiyah, the head of Iraq’s Supreme Commission for Hajj and Umra, has emphasized “the desire of pilgrims who prefer the road because of its many advantages and benefits.”(80) The Arar outlet, due to its distance from densely populated areas in Iraq, is not totally convenient. Re- opening of al-Jumaima is a feasible addition as well as the rehabilitation of the historical Hajj route of Darb Zubaydha (Baghdad-Najaf-Mecca). Helping individuals with limited resources to perform the pilgrimage, in return, would potentially build a more positive image of KSA among Iraqi southerners. The size of the quota has been an issue of contention as well. As it remained based on 2013 census, for several years it did not register any demographic growth. By 2018 the quota was readjusted to 38.000 though, and in August, KSA agreed to increase the quota to 50.000: This was a significant improvement and a sign of good faith. The higher number of Iraqis, the easier their journey

(78) Saudi Arabia, General Authority for Statistics, Statistics for Hajj, (Riyadh: General Authority for Statistics,2019), 40. (79) Ibrahim Saleh, “Saudi Arabia raises quota for Iraqi pilgrims by 24%” (), Anadolu Agency, April 19, 2019. (80) Iraqi Supreme Commission for Hajj and Umra Website (n.d.), accessed 27 July, 2019. http:// www.hajj.gov.iq/

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and the warmer their welcome, the more effective will be KSA’s soft-power exercise. Public disclosure of Iraqi hujjaj data is an opportunity too: it will allow the dissemination of analysis on mutually constructive experiences. The rapprochement has also arisen discussions concerning religious pilgrimage on the other side of the border: the Shia Arba’aeen and al-Ziyarat to Karbala. In his visit to KSA, al-Sadr reportedly suggested easing Saudi Shias pilgrimage to Iraq as a means for reconciliation(81). Again, al-Jumaima seems to be the soundest communication line that does not involve crossing other national territories. The persistent fear is elements among them might consolidate in an Iranian fifth column(82). Consequently, the prospect of facilitating movement to Iraq, where Saudi pilgrims could be exposed to radical ideas that might lead to subversion and terrorism, raises national security concerns. To lessen the risk, KSA could employ ways to extol the virtues of Ali al-Sistani’s guidance and his marjayia. Additionally, there is mistrust regarding the passivity might show toward such radical activities. Past operations, like the arrest of Bahraini zawars who were chanting in protest of ’s government during Arba’aeen(83), might be some sort of assurance against the politization of the pilgrimage on the Iraqi side. Following in the steps of the late King Abdullah, who promoted wasatiyya and wataniya, “the new Saudi leadership promotes patriotic and nationalist rhetoric, [with] the nation associated with [a] long and millennial history and no more to exclusively the cradle of Islam”(84). The challenge, therefore, is how to integrate a religious-minority identity into a unifying national sense of belonging that serves as cushion to the former; this, requires acknowledging that sectarian marks will not simply fade away.

(81) Crisis Group, “Saudi Arabia,” 7. (82) Toby Matthiesen, “A Saudi Spring? The Shi’a Protest Movement in the Eastern Province 2011- 2012,” Middle East Journal 66, noº4, (Autumn 2012):632. (83) Haddad interview. (84) Fatiha Dazi-Héni, “How MBS is rethinking Saudi ,” ISPI Commentary, (May 2019): 5. Furthermore, KSA understands the touristic and commercial importance of Najaf and Karbala. The assistance of Saudi Shia pilgrims would furnish a business presence with legitimate interests there and incentivize a sense of received acceptance among those nationals.

Conclusion This paper has dealt with the idiosyncrasy of the Saudi-Iraqi border as a relational element between modern states, whose role displays a reciprocal interaction with an array of multidimensional processes and, as such, embodies a potential catalyst for cooperation. As international and domestic political contexts and decision-making elites transit through changes among material and perceived threats, the border becomes a long-neglected vector that, albeit not systematically, is appealing for conducting the interstate rapprochement. Although conflict is virtually impossible to avoid, it can be transferred into cooperative frameworks where uncertainty can gradually dissipate through effective negotiation. Nowadays, though, uncertainty in the KSA-Iraqi relation threatens to skyrocket and stakes remain high as Iraq faces a wave of massive protests unseen since 2003, mostly concentrated in Baghdad and the Shia-majority south, that have left hundreds of death and thousands injured and pushed Abdul Mahdi’s government against the wall while the two largest parliamentary blocs, Sairoon and Fatah, weigh options to come off well. The worst scenarios forecast a new political and economic paralysis, or even worse, the outbreak of nation-wide violence. Unless the degree of stability undergoes a 180º turn -which may lead to a new hostile context for KSA-, the areas of potential cooperation concerning the border are likely to remain. As the threshold for demands to the political class has increased amid protests, it is evident any structural reform in Iraq will need to address, avoiding doing more harm than good, the sources of that popular discontent.

39 40 Dirasat No. 51 Rabi II, 1441 - December 2019

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About the Author

Javier Bordón is a Spanish student currently enrolled in the second year of the Master’s degree in Geopolitics and Strategic Studies at III University of Madrid. He earned his BA in International Relations at Complutense University of Madrid and was awarded with a one-year Erasmus+ scholarship at Metropolitan University of Prague, Czech Republic. He has written several articles and reports for digital media and private entities, as well as research articles for the Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies. His academic interests comprise cross-cutting topics related to the Middle East and North Africa, mostly focused on geopolitics, foreign policy and conflict analysis. His working languages are Spanish and English, and he is learning Arabic. In summer 2019 he was a research assistant intern at the King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies (KFCRIS).

King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies (KFCRIS)

The KFCRIS is an independent non-governmental institution based in Riyadh, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The Center was founded in 1403/1983 by the King Faisal Foundation (KFF) to preserve the legacy of the late King Faisal and to continue his mission of transmitting knowledge between the Kingdom and the world. The Center serves as a platform for research and Islamic Studies, bringing together researchers and research institutions from the Kingdom and across the world through conferences, workshops, and lectures, and through the production and publication of scholarly works, as well as the preservation of Islamic manuscripts. The Center’s Research Department is home to a group of established and promising researchers who endeavor to produce in-depth analyses in various fields, ranging from Security Studies, Political Economy, African Studies and Asian Studies. The Center also hosts the Library which preserves invaluable Islamic manuscripts, the Al-Faisal Museum for Arab Islamic Art, the Al-Faisal Institute for Human Resources Development, the Darat Al-Faisal, and the Al-Faisal Cultural Press, which issues the Al-Faisal magazine and other key intellectual periodicals. For more information, please visit the Center’s website: www.kfcris.com/en

P.O.Box 51049 Riyadh 11543 Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Tel: (+966 11) 4652255 Ext: 6892 Fax: (+966 11) 4659993 E-mail: [email protected]