EISA OCCASIONAL PAPER NUMBER 27, DECEMBER 2004
Realising effective and sustainable Introduction democratic governance in Southern Zanzibar has weathered many storms in Africa and beyond. the past, and I have no doubt that she will meet all difficulties that may assail her in the future. Long may she flourish and long may the happy relations which exists between the various communities 1 Towards an Understanding of continue. Claude Hollis, a British representative in Contemporary Conflict in Zanzibar during the 1920s wrote these Zanzibar words in an attempt to demonstrate that the African slaves in Zanzibar, very different from other slave colonies, lived in comfortable conditions provided for by their By masters; so much so that they had no reason to be hostile to those more privileged, Shumbana Karume presumably their slave masters, or even challenge the inequalities that the slave trade had created.2 Needless to say, this is a rather misguided and warped view held by many colonial officials of that time – a view that this author is glad to say, has been adequately disputed by various historical and political analysts of our time. Mbwiliza, for one, asserts that it is wrong to suppose that because the conditions of many slaves in Zanzibar were more tolerable than they had been during their journey to the coast – a journey that had entailed suffering and
misery for the slaves – and, because after their emancipation in the late 1800s3, there
ISBN: 1-919814-82-5 1 C Hollis, Zanzibar: Present conditions and ISSN: 1811-7449 interests, Journal of the African Society, XXVII, 1928-29. Quoted in J Mbwiliza, The birth of a © EISA, 2004 political dilemma and the challenges of the quest for new politics in Zanzibar, in T L Maliyamkono (ed), The Political Plight of Zanzibar, Eastern and Southern African Universities Research Programme, (ESAURP), TEMA Publishers Company Limited, 2000. 2 Mbwiliza, op cit. 3 Formal decrees prohibiting the sale, exchange and purchases of slaves were established by the - 1 - EISA OCCASIONAL PAPER NUMBER 27, DECEMBER 2004 had been a low number of applications for CUF.5 Ineffective governance and election emancipation submitted to the Zanzibar administration institutions also stand as courts, that slaves were in fact happy with significant proximate causes of political their servile status.4 While Claude Hollis’s conflicts and the complexities surrounding words were meant to contextualise the inter- these conflicts. On the other hand, other ethnic relations existing in Zanzibar in the analysts have gone further and proclaimed post-slave emancipation years, what is of the view that the recent political tensions are relevance here is his suggestion that rooted into long-term factors. In this case, Zanzibar will weather many of the their assessments usually link these conflicts difficulties it may experience in the future. to the ethnic divisions that resulted from a Indeed, these are charitable words and with number of historical factors: from the slave the recent political events in the isles they trade of which Zanzibar was at the centre, to have come to mean much more than they intermarriages between the different ethnic were originally intended. groups.6 Additionally, some analyses have further linked political conflicts to the Since the inception of political pluralism in political identities that came about as a Tanzania, Zanzibar – made up of the Unguja result of the British colonials’ exploitation and Pemba islands situated on the east coast of these ethnic divisions in the 19th and 20th of Tanzania – has experienced a number of centuries.7 Those studies that have political conflicts. These have mostly been endeavoured to explain the political tensions inter-party conflicts between the ruling in Zanzibar by understanding the political Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM) and the main identities and dynamics that the British had opposition party, the Civic United Front fostered during the colonial period, have (CUF). This conflict has continued to engulf provided an opening for a different the political arena in Tanzania and has explanation of political conflict. The become more violent than originally tendency had been to overlook the political anticipated or even imagined. The conflict legacy of colonialism. Mahmood Mamdani has been characterised by sporadic acts of in When Victims Become Killers8 affirmed violence. The shocking deaths of that the tendency for political historians to demonstrators in January 2001 were among explain political conflict in the period the acts which compelled the two warring following African independence was to parties to seek a resolution of the conflict. focus on political identities that had been Other acts prior to this included sporadic framed during the colonial period from bomb blasts in public places and cultural and market-based identities. But no indiscriminate detentions. one “historicised the political legacy of colonialism – the colonial state as an There have been several attempts, some institutional complex framed and set in more convincing than others, to understand motion particular political identities. No one the causes of such conflicts. Many of these tried to historicise race and ethnicity as have generated varied assessments; they fall between ‘proximate and long term’ 5 Inter-party conflict: CCM and CUF, in arguments (to borrow Mmuya’s phrase). Maliyamkono & Kanyongolo (eds), When With regard to proximate causes, power Political Parties Clash, op cit. struggles, personality differences and 6 A Talbot, Nyerere’s legacy of poverty and clashes of party ideologies have been repression in Zanzibar, World Socialist website, identified as the contributing causes of the
9 Ibid. 11 Amnesty International Report, Tanzania 10 See K. Matlosa & A Mushonga, “Healing Old human rights concerns relating to demonstrations Wounds: Elections and Conflict in Southern in Zanzibar, 2002; The bullets were raining, Africa”, Paper prepared for a workshop on Human Rights Watch Report 14(3) (A), April “Sharing Lessons: Elections and Conflict 2002; and Legal and Human Rights Managemen”, hosted by the African Centre for Centre/International Federation for Human the Constructive Resolution of Disputes”, Rights (FIDHI), Zanzibar wave of violence, Lilongwe, Malawi 21-22 January 2004. 2001. - 3 - EISA OCCASIONAL PAPER NUMBER 27, DECEMBER 2004 biased undertones of the various elections, the demonstrators demanded a investigative reports produced, whether by new and independent electoral commission, international human rights groups, the which had been the subject of major opposition or the Zanzibari government complaints after the elections.14 The CUF itself. That said, this account will provide as had also demanded constitutional reform much an impartial outlook and analysis of which it believed would facilitate all the that day’s events as possible, taking into demands it was making. consideration the different perspectives documented to date. Again, the accounts of the abuses vary depending on the source of the information. As already indicated, the exact numbers of International Human Rights assessments those killed and injured varied according to emphatically reported that demonstrators, who discharged the information, so much so which were in crowds of thousands,15 were that it has been easier to conclude that the mostly unarmed and walked peacefully real numbers remain unknown. On the one towards designated meeting grounds. It is hand, the two international human rights the police that were accused of grave reports, Amnesty International and Human misconduct for letting loose a “barrage of Rights Watch, both published conspicuously teargas, beatings, and shootings, sometimes distinct figures. One maintained that at least even firing without warning”.16 The abuse of 35 died and more than 600 were injured, the demonstrators did not end there: with claims that they had verified these following the assaults, the reports maintain numbers; the other stated that 22 had died.12 that security forces “rounded up hundreds in The government, on the other hand, claimed house sweeps characterised by looting, and that 21 people were killed, 82 injured and terrorising. Hundreds of demonstrators spent 352 arrested,13 while the CUF alleged that days in jail, often held without charge and 67 people were killed with hundreds injured physically abused while in custody”.17 and hundreds more mistreated and tortured. Many of these international reports maintain Fortunately many of the reports that there was no evidence that commissioned to investigate these events do demonstrators planned any violent action, not have contradictory accounts and and yet the official government reviews analyses of the reasons behind the report differently,18 as do several reports by demonstrations. Simply put, the CUF called local political analysts.19 Tanzanian officials for the protests to take place in opposition to say that the demonstrators tried to take over the 2000 election results and also in police stations and mount an armed resistance to the government’s refusal to rebellion. The police had, in fact, endured a hold new elections in Zanzibar. The number of physical abuses involving stone opposition had wanted the election exercise throwing, teargas and even beatings. In repeated after it had vehemently declared, retaliation they at first fired several warning with the support of various international shots into the air, which the crowds observers, that the elections had been disregarded. In addition, some of the local flawed. Besides the call for a re-run of the analysts’ interpretations of these events corroborate the government’s claims. For 12 Ibid. 13 A Joint Presidential Supervisory Commission 14 Tanzania Human Rights Report, 2002 issued and an Independent Commission of Inquiry were by the Legal and Human Rights Centre (LHRC). formed on 16 January 2002 to investigate the 15 The exact number of demonstrators was never January 2001 violence in Zanzibar. This recorded. All that has been said in relation to the commission was chaired by retired Brigadier number is that demonstrations were widely General Hashim Mbita, a former executive supported with thousands turning out to protest. secretary of the Organisation of African Unity 16 Human Rights Watch Report, op cit. (OAU) Liberation Committee. The commission, 17 Ibid. made up of an eight-person team, released their 18 Ibid; and Amnesty International Report, op cit. report to the government on November 2002. 19 Mmuya, op cit, p 32. - 4 - EISA OCCASIONAL PAPER NUMBER 27, DECEMBER 2004 example, Max Mmuya, a political analyst at when legitimate election procedures and the University of Dar es Salaam who was rules are absent. Elections can become even himself a witness to the events in Zanzibar more precarious, as the Zanzibar experience Town on 26 and 27 January, argues that shows, when they are deliberately victimised given the CUF action against the police by contending parties, and when they are during the demonstrations – with judged and interpreted differently, especially demonstrators throwing stones to provoke elections that do not result in regime them, blocking the police on the roads with transition or leadership alternation. For such boulders, and deploying other such elections, Bratton and Posner maintain that provocative measures – “it was not “various audiences; winning and losing, surprising to hear that marchers in Pemba domestic and international tend to apply had weapons ready to assault the police with different standards of judgment and the possible intention of wrestling fire interpretations of what constitutes ‘a free weapons from the police armoury at police and fair’ verdict”.22 As a result, as is often stations”.20 the case with such diverse interpretations, the verdict of elections and thereby the As shown above, the specificity and scale of meaning of elections is “a resource the abuses reported in the international manipulated by contending parties to human rights reports, the CUF and the promote their own interests”.23 For example, government’s versions, contradict each Bratton and Posner continue to assert that other. There is indeed evidence that some under such circumstances the “winner will demonstrators had planned to carry out deploy the informational and coercive violent actions and there is also evidence instruments of the state to reinforce their that the security forces reacted and cracked claim that they have received a mandate, down on the demonstrators in abusive ways. while losers try to undermine this assertion Needless to say, this was an ugly affair that by arguing that results were rigged or that left both sides (the CUF and the Zanzibar the electoral process was flawed”.24 As for government) embarrassed and apologetic, the international community – depending on forcing them to make several attempts soon for whom they are rooting among the after to provide redress with the aim of contenders and because continued project ensuring no such atrocities ever occur again. aid or balance of payments support is often contingent on a free and fair verdict – they Proximate Causes of Political Conflict further complicate the meaning of elections or interpretations of what constitutes a free Contested Elections of 1995 and 2000 and fair election. Elections are currently perceived as the most crucial process for the alternation of power. The debate on the status of elections has also Given the importance they occupy in a concerned itself with the trend among competitive political system and that there opposition parties to see elections as an are the only process responsible for illegitimate instrument for seeking power if distributing political power within society, it the incumbent party wins. Experience has is easy to see why election contestation, shown that outcomes of elections are not even if well managed, can be a highly always accepted by opposition parties; competitive and risky endeavour. As such, losing parties do not always concede defeat. elections are susceptible to fears of “political marginalisation; party retaliation or even a counter-democratic backlash”21; even more Roundtable on “Consensus on the Rules of Elections”, Luanda Angola 30-31 October 2002 22 M Bratton & D N Posner, A first look at 20 Mmuya, op cit. second elections in Africa, with illustrations 21 Dirk Kotze, “South Africa: Conflict from Zambia, in R Joseph (ed) State, Conflict Management in a divided society”, Department and Democracy in Africa, Lynne Rienner, 1999. of Political Sciences, University of South Africa, 23 Ibid. Pretoria. Paper presented at the EISA/KAF 24 Ibid. - 5 - EISA OCCASIONAL PAPER NUMBER 27, DECEMBER 2004
There is therefore a belief among opposition (ZEC) and those given by non official parties, taking into consideration the sources proved that the elections were processes and outcomes of some of the rigged.26 For the CCM, because it was not national elections conducted to date, that very clear how they had won the elections, it because elections do not always offer the made formal complaints of irregularities and possibility of winning political office for administrative errors to the ZEC. The CCM opposition parties, they must not be leaders in fact wrote a letter of protest to the regarded as the only instrument for seeking ZEC showing their “dissatisfaction on the power.25 As a result, whether or not conduct of the elections”.27 This section is elections have been conducted under ‘free not rejecting or confirming the claims but and fair’ conditions, losing opposition only considering the issues and analysing parties tend to resort to dubious tactics with how they led to the political crisis in the aim of undermining the election outcome Zanzibar. to serve their own purpose. This indeed has been the case in countries like Lesotho and Table 1: 1995 October presidential Mozambique. election results: Official and unofficial results
r 8
Much of the above scenario rings true for g 2 y o e l f n c c i a
i t n n Zanzibar. Elections in Zanzibar have been l
n c c e e a s i i o i t d r l f i l i f f c e t i manipulated by both warring parties to the s f u o n c f e f s e f e o n i r l e point where they have become the main h C e r t p O U D source of political conflict that is now Salmin Amour 165,271 157,351 -7,920 plaguing the isles. Both the 1995 and, to a (50.2%) (48.6% lesser extent, the 2000 elections contributed (CUF) 163,706 166,522 +2,81 to the violence that erupted in January 2001. (49.8%) (51.4%) 6 A closer look at each of the elections Majority 1,565 9,171 10,73 revealing the various dynamics that existed (CCM) (CUF) 6 Total valid votes 328,977 323,873 -5,104 will show how both the 1995 and 2000 Source: M Mmuya 2003, adopted from D G elections played their part in instigating the Anglin, Zanzibar Impasse and Commonwealth tensions that followed. Mediation, Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 2000. The 1995 general elections saw the CCM and CUF accusing each other of rigging the The CUF declared the CCM victory elections – each had different reasons for fraudulent and that the elections overall accusing the other. The elections, which were flawed and thus lacked credibility. The were the first multiparty presidential and CUF’s rejection of the results was made on parliamentary elections, saw the re-election the grounds that, first, the CCM had of Dr Salmin Amour of the CCM as impeded its organisational and campaigning president of Zanzibar. The re-election, efforts through harassments and other forms however, was won only by a small margin of political coercion and oppression.29 and thus resulted in a close win over the Second, the CUF criticised the ZEC’s CUF in the Zanzibar House of conduct of elections arguing that it had Representatives: Dr Salmin Amour won administered the elections somewhat with 50.2% to 49.8% for the CUF’s Secretary General, Seif Shariff Hamad. 26 The international community also concluded, Table 1 shows two sets of election results: given the narrow margin between the the official and the unofficial. For the CUF presidential candidates, that the results may have been inaccurate. the difference between those results given 27 by the Zanzibar Electoral Commission Chama Cha Mapidunzi letter, quoted in P J Kaiser, op cit. 28 Local and international observer groups 25 E Gyimah-Boadi, Ghana: The challenges of represent the non-official sources. consolidating democracy, in R Joseph (ed), op 29 R Sankore, Zanzibar: Democracy on shaky cit. foundations, Journal of Democracy, April 2000. - 6 - EISA OCCASIONAL PAPER NUMBER 27, DECEMBER 2004 chaotically. In the end the CUF, despite the from the 1995 elections. According to contradictory views expressed by Ahluwilia and Zegeye, the CCM international observer teams, not only “intimidated the opposition through the use rejected the election results and demanded a of police supervising the rallies. In addition re-run within six months, but also boycotted it denied the opposition access to the the House of Representatives (parliament). dominant government media and manipulated the campaign funding to their A pertinent issue to note here is that the advantage”.31 election process was plagued from the beginning by CUF complaints and its The CCM’s victory in Zanzibar was again general belief that a free and fair election declared fraudulent by the CUF, even was not possible. To add to the confusion though the ruling party gained a clear and thereby to the unacceptability of the majority in the House of Representatives election results, the international community and in the presidential elections. In fact, the believed that the CUF would gain victory in new CCM candidate, Amani Abeid Karume, both islands. When the results proved them won with 67% as opposed to Seif Shariff wrong, their refusal to endorse the election Hamad’s 33% of the votes, and CCM won results only managed to complicate further 34 of the 50 seats in the House of the contentious post-election discourse. Representatives in Zanzibar, giving the Furthermore, this indirectly encouraged the CCM a two-thirds majority. The CUF opposition party – which knew full well that nonetheless rejected the results with claims Zanzibar’s continued support for of electoral fraud. This time, the ZEC international aid was contingent on a free received much of the brunt of the CUF’s and fair verdict – to persist with its assertion accusations, leading to its admittance that that the elections were fraudulent. The there had been mistakes. As a result the international community’s rejection of the CCM was forced to order fresh elections in elections in the end led to many donors, 16 of the 50 constituencies in Zanzibar, mainly the European Union (EU), cutting which the CUF rejected as being inadequate aid to Zanzibar. This not only exacerbated since it had demanded that new elections be the political impasse as their palpable biases held in all the constituencies. The CUF further divided the two parties and pushed again ended up not only boycotting the by- them to extreme adversarial levels; it also elections but also the parliamentary led to the general deterioration of economic proceedings that took place after the and social conditions in Zanzibar during that elections. period. The case of the 1995 and 2000 elections in As anticipated, the 1995 elections – which Zanzibar demonstrates that elections were had polarised even further political life in indeed used as a battle ground by the CCM Zanzibar – affected the October 2000 and CUF. In essence, these two elections elections. It created an atmosphere which were manipulated by all parties in pursuit of ensured that both parties experienced a their self interests, not just the two warring further stalemate in the 2000 elections, parties but by the international community irrespective of the conduct or results of the as well. As such the adversarial and elections. In recognition of this, local confrontational approach applied by the analysts, prior to the elections confidently contending parties only succeeded in predicted “that [the] CUF would refuse to precipitating the conflicts. Consequently the recognise any elections which they would inter-party rivalry which began in modest judge not free and fair”,30 which was indeed, forms before the elections was transformed the case. Again, as in the 1995 elections, the into more overt political turmoil during CCM was accused of ‘unlevelling’ the pre- these elections; or, in the words of Marina election field, in ways not very different Ottaway, “the process of democratisation
30 Mmuya, op cit. 31 Ahluwalia & Zegeye, op cit. - 7 - EISA OCCASIONAL PAPER NUMBER 27, DECEMBER 2004 has made political tensions more acute in the democratic process”.36 Additionally, he many countries by destroying the maintains that in order to ascertain whether mechanisms that ha[d] regulated and kept or not the impact of political parties has conflict in check in the past”.32 Clearly this been positive or negative on the raises a broader concern regarding the democratisation process, one would need to longer-term impact of elections: that examine the “nature of the inter-relations of elections can in fact delay or, as the the various parties”.37 More often than not, Zanzibar case demonstrates, even reverse given the reality of the multiparty democratic progress. dispensation, inter-party relations tend to be contentious. As witnessed most recently, Inter-party Conflicts conflicts have in fact characterised the The political scene in Zanzibar in recent various aspects of inter-party relations in years has been marked by a number of Tanzania. intense inter-party stand-offs. Consequently many coherent perspectives and analyses Factors that explain the occurrence of such have been offered as an attempt to explain conflict are numerous. Many scholars listed the origins of these conflicts and their the following as the main sources of conflict effects on the democratisation process.33 between the CCM and CUF: arbitrary arrests Maliyamkono, for example, recognises that based on political grounds; detentions “political party conflicts are an integral part without trial; ideological differences; power of politics and that they feature in both struggles; and personality clashes.38 These single party and multiparty systems”.34 In a were also confirmed by the public as the survey conducted by Maliyamkono to gather main sources of inter-party conflicts in the views of the public to ascertain their Tanzania. Maliyamkono’s survey results understanding of the dynamics and indicated that a substantial majority of the implications of inter-party conflicts in respondents perceived power struggles as Zanzibar, many of the respondents agreed the most important cause of party conflicts with this perspective: that conflict between in Tanzania. The explanation given by the political parties is indeed natural. At least interviewees for choosing this category was 63% of the respondents were of the view their belief “that most African politicians that conflicts are “a normal phenomenon in make politics a career and view it as an politics”.35 Maliyamkono was nonetheless avenue for personal gain”, suggesting that quick to add that conflicts between political the struggle for power is therefore “likely to parties can only be “normal” provided that result in conflict, if contenders view public the rules that govern the interplay between office as the only source of personal gain”.39 contentious parties are fairly drawn and fairly administered. If this is not the case, Ideological or policy differences were also the antagonistic relations will set back the seen as an important factor contributing to democratisation process, because of the the existing tensions between the CCM and interplay between political parties and CUF, although many of the respondents, democratisation. Kanyongolo maintains that according to Maliyamkono, could not political parties, “ever since their genesis, clearly show how ideological differences have had a critical impact on the progress of have led to political conflicts on the isles. The reason for this, Maliyamkono argues, is 32 M Ottaway, Ethnic politics in Africa: Change and continuity, in R Joseph (ed), op cit. 36 E Kanyongolo, Inter-party conflict in Malawi, 33 Maliyamkono & Kanyongolo, op cit; S S in Maliyamkono & Kanyongolo (eds), op cit. Mushi, R S Mukandala and M L Baregu, 37 Ibid Tanzania’s Political Culture; A Baseline Survey, 38 ESAURP book, The Road to Democracy, 1998 2001. as quoted in Maliyamkono, The two in one state, 34 T L Maliyamkono, Inter-party conflict: CCM in Maliyamkono & Kanyongolo (eds), op cit. and CUF, in Maliyamkono & Kanyongolo (eds), 39 T L Maliyamkono, Inter-party conflict: CCM op cit. and CUF, L Maliyamkono & Kanyongolo (eds), 35 Ibid. op cit. - 8 - EISA OCCASIONAL PAPER NUMBER 27, DECEMBER 2004 because he believes there are no sharp frustration with the union revolves around ideological differences between the CCM their belief that it has not been politically, and CUF. Other scholars, however, have economically or socially beneficial to the indicated that policy differences and people of Zanzibar. This platform of disparities in party directives do indeed exist ideologies quite clearly is against everything and are widely recognised as contributing that the CCM stands for, politically and significantly to the current standoff between historically.44 No sooner was the CUF the parties’ leadership.40 The CUF’s manifesto made public, it was met with a manifesto, for example, has continually retaliatory response by the CCM which advocated for the denationalisation of land stated in its 1995 manifesto that the on the Zanzibar isles. It is basically CCM’s position on 1964 Revolution will advocating for a dismissal of the three-acre be to develop, guard, strengthen and honour the Revolution and to Recognise nationalisation programme that President th Abeid Karume implemented, from which the 12 of January 1964 as the day many Zanzibaris benefited.41 In addition when Zanzibar was liberated from colonial and Sultanate administration there have been other less popular policy and the day the legacy of those rules positions that the CUF has maintained was wiped out. Land will continue to be throughout. Its denunciation of the 1964 Government Property and the revolution is by far the least popular of its nationalised assets (plantation and party stance. The CUF firmly condemns the houses) will never be returned to the revolution on the grounds that it did not former owners before the Revolution.45 stand for the people of Pemba Island who mostly consider themselves Arabs, and Such opposing views and perceptions on accordingly believe that the revolution several of the islands’ monumental historical deprived them of their historical right as affairs – the Zanzibar-Mainland Tanzania Arabs to rule Zanzibar.42 The CUF has also Union, the 1964 Revolution, and the land over the years proclaimed its dissatisfaction nationalisation programme – make the with the structure of the union, and has possibility of reconciliation between the two made repeated calls for a referendum to parties even more difficult. The extreme decide on the future of the union.43 Its main adversarial positions over these issues,
40 T L Maliyamkono, Tanzania on the Move, 44 President Abeid Karume after the revolution of TEMA Publishers Company Ltd, Dar es Salaam, Zanzibar in 1964 redistributed land from the Tanzania, 1997. Arabs (pre-revolution owners) to the indigenous 41 Ibid. Africans. Before the revolution there were about 42 Maliyamkono, The two in one state, in 72 Arab land owners with 743 plantations. Maliyamkono & Kanyongolo (eds), op cit. Between 1964 after the revolution and 1974 land 43 The CUF is also protesting that the union as it was expropriated and distributed on the basis of stands is not equal; it is not a union between two three acres per person. The majority of those states but rather a union for Tanganyika because who received three-acre plots in Unguja and it is the United Republic of Tanzania that deals Pemba Island were mainly indigenous Africans with all union matters together with non union and Shirazis. Most recently, however, there have matters for Mainland Tanzania, whereas the been calls made by the CUF to return the land to government of Zanzibar deals with non union those who had it before it was distributed, who matters relating to Zanzibar isles only. This has were mostly Arab landowners. The calls for created a situation which according to the CUF reversing land expropriation, however, are not quite clearly benefits Tanzania Mainland more something that will ever be politically than Zanzibar, specifically over issues such as entertained by the CCM. Land to date has been foreign affairs, defence, communications, foreign the most visible and palpable fruit of the exchange, and higher education, which the union revolution, hence the CCM’s hard-line position government has control of. Consequently, they on this issue. are calling for a three-tier government which 45 The CCM Elections Manifesto 1995 issued by would create separate governments for the National Executive Committee of the CCM, Tanganyika and Zanzibar, including a federal Dodoma, 22 August 1995, item 40, pp 70-71. government for the union. Quoted in Mmuya, op cit. - 9 - EISA OCCASIONAL PAPER NUMBER 27, DECEMBER 2004 according to Mmuya, “imply complete loss reminds us that African leaders of that time or gain of what either side seeks … rather may have been overly optimistic in thinking than just a transfer of power from one that ethnic divisions could easily be regime to another”.46 In the case of the 1964 subverted. Ethnic divisions, according to Revolution, the ruling party’s position is her, were more than a poles apart from that of the CUF, such that passing phenomenon … and the Mmuya observes they “will cling to power increase in the number and violence of for fear of possible return to the pre open conflicts revolving around ethnic Revolution situation and retribution”.47 The or religious identities during the 1990s CCM in fact, views the revolution as an provide a strong reminder that communal identities are not a residue of “economic, social and political reform that the past, but a live force in today’s wrestled power from an Arab oligarchy and 50 48 politics. their British Colonial supporters”. This is unmistakably very different from the CUF, There is indeed considerable empirical which sees the revolution as a political evidence suggesting that ethnic identities are mistake. Besides the revolution, the union gaining strength; the re-emergence of matter is another contentious issue that Zanzibar’s political identities based on pre- represents loss or gain for either contending revolution ethnic divisions is but one of party. It is no secret that the CUF upon many cases providing such evidence. What gaining power will break away from the is more, Ottaway argues that the political union as it sees it as a politically and change under way in Africa – a change economically unfair arrangement; a view hailed as the process of democratisation – scorned by many CCM supporters, in has re-awakened the long dormant ethnic particular those ideologically in the same tensions. She establishes that: camp as Karume and Nyerere – the master- ethnicity is now more central than ever minds of the union. to the political process of many African countries, as political openings and Long-term Causes of Political Conflict multiparty elections have led to the formation of innumerable or covertly ethnic political parties.51 Following Africa’s independence from colonialism, identity politics and ethnic In the past African leaders had only just divisions seemingly became a thing of the succeeded in managing ethnic relations past for many newly independent countries. under the authoritarian institutions that African leaders saw ethnic nationalism as a guarded or organised their ‘civic threat to the state, among other things, and nationalism’ ideologies. In a sense, an considering the havoc that tribal and authoritarian system, according to Ottaway, religious rivalries had caused before, their made it possible for ethnic identities to rejection of ethnic identities was an subsist and for some ethnic minorities to understandable political choice. To say the dominate the authoritarian governments. least, the conditions of many of the newly The transitions to multiparty politics, independent countries at that time made however, disrupted these arrangements as such a rejection seem prudent. African states the ability to elect representatives during were weak and fragile and inhabited by elections, which were more often than not, citizens that identified more comfortably contested by ethnic parties, meant that with tribal groups than with the new political co-optation of ethnic leaders was no nationalism discourse their leaders were longer as easy or necessary as before.52 49 advocating. Marina Ottaway, however, This section will, therefore, seek to analyse the changing nature of ethnic politics in 46 Mmuya, op cit, p 27. Zanzibar. It will go as far back as the pre- 47 Ibid. 48 Ibid. 50 Ibid. 49 Marina Ottaway, Ethnic politics in Africa: 51 Ibid. Change and continuity, in R Joseph (ed), op cit. 52 Ibid - 10 - EISA OCCASIONAL PAPER NUMBER 27, DECEMBER 2004 revolution years to provide a descriptive communities began to emerge which analysis of the various ethnic formations and culminated in distinct ethnic divisions. groups, looking in particular at the political identities that emerged from the early ethnic It must be noted that before the populations formations which the British helped to of the islands became ethnically mixed and crystallise. More importantly, the effects of divided and while the islands were inhabited these political identities on voting patterns largely by the Shirazis, the term Shirazi did of the 1995 and 2000 elections will be not connote an ethnic identity: it was a term examined, arguing specifically that that suggested status more than anything. Zanzibar’s transition to democracy Michael Lofchie, a researcher in the 1960s, legitimised, or more precisely resurrected, noted that the Shirazi’s the contentious political identities that tended to look upon themselves as the existed earlier. With manipulation by some heirs of a rich cultural tradition political authorities these identities became concretely symbolised in ancient ruins more acute and played an influential role in and monuments. They know that the violent conflicts of 2001, which will generations of their forebears in sadly continue to threaten Zanzibar’s Zanzibar had adopted the Islamic faith and led an independent political life political stability for many years to come. centuries before the arrival of the
Omani Arabs.55 Origins of Ethnic and Racial Formations The early settlers of Zanzibar are said to have migrated from the mainland probably These memories which formed a group during the third and fourth centuries AD.53 identity were continually used by the These were mostly Bantu who began to Shirazis to set themselves apart from the shape the indigenous communities in mainland African community of Zanzibar Zanzibar. They established village who settled as slaves on the islands. Due to settlements along the western shores of both the introduction of a plantation economy in Zanzibar and Pemba, including the island of the second half of the 19th century, Zanzibar Tumbatu, creating three quasi ethnic groups began to indent slaves and as result became now known as the Wahadimu of southern a vibrant market for the slave trade. Many of and eastern Unguja, the Watumbatu of the slaves originated from Malawi, Tumbatu Island in northern Unguja and the Mozambique and eastern Congo, ethnically known as the Wanyasa, Wanyamwezi, Wapemba of Pemba Island. Their origin 56 may have been Bantu, but centuries of Wamakonde and Wayao. It was not only intermarrying with Persian immigrants and the slave trade that established early patterns visitors produced ethnically mixed of community divisions. The Arab communities in these settlements, known as colonisation of the Zanzibar islands in the the Shirazis because of their Persian identity early 1800s, which redefined the roles of the and culture.54 Arabs and Africans (the latter already divided among the Shirazis and descendants Over the years, between the 8th and 18th of African slaves), had also facilitated these centuries, other racial groups immigrated to community differentiations. Such then was Zanzibar. The early visitors included the racial historical base upon which group Hindus, Portuguese, Arabs and Persians. and community attitudes and differences With the arrival of each of these racial were built (see Table 2 below for the 1948 groups, including the introduction of the proportions of Arabs, Shirazis and Africans slave trade, patterns of differentiation within in Zanzibar).
53 H S Newman cited in Mbwiliza, The birth of a political dilemma and the challenges of the quest 55 Cited in K I Tambila, Aspects of the political for new politics in Zanzibar, in Maliyamkono economy of Unguja and Pemba, in T L (ed), The Political Plight of Zanzibar, op cit. Maliyamkono (ed), op cit. 54 Ibid. 56 Ibid. - 11 - EISA OCCASIONAL PAPER NUMBER 27, DECEMBER 2004
Table 2: 1948 Proportions of Shirazis, land which made Arab plantation owners Africans and Arabs economically secure.60 In addition the Arabs Unguja Pemba Protectorate in Pemba acted more like settlers than Community No. No. N o . colonialists and were basically peasants like % % % the Shirazi hosts, with similar rudimentary Shirazi 81,150 6 7 , 3 3 0 1 4 8 , 4 8 0 61 61.2 60.2 60.8 agricultural practices. In Zanzibar, African 37,502 1 3 , 8 7 8 5 1 , 3 8 0 however, because Omani occupation was 28.3 12.4 21.0 administered wholly via Zanzibar Town it Arab 13,977 3 0 , 5 8 3 4 4 , 5 6 0 produced very different patterns of social 10.5 27.4 18.2 and economic relations between the Arab Total 132,629 1 1 1 , 7 9 1 2 4 4 , 4 2 0 100 100 100 minorities and Africans. The Omani Arabs, Source: Journal of Modern African Studies, cited unlike their counterparts in Pemba, settled in by Tambila57 Zanzibar from the start as colonists and administrators, forcefully occupying most of Like Mamdani and Ottaway, Mbwiliza58 Zanzibar’s limited fertile land and ruling 62 also maintains that other factors over the island as colonial administrators. “contributed to the continuous reproduction of community attitudes” and thus entrenched Turning again to Ottaway, she substantiates and accentuated the racial, ethnic and this by asserting that it was possible for community differences. What then followed colonial powers to help shape these was the evolution of a political culture. The identities because ethnic identities are not clove plantations, for example, created two natural or primordial. Most often, according different segments of Zanzibari Shirazis: the to Ottaway, “ethnic identities are artificial one evolved into a community group located and not fixed and as a result can change a 63 in Unguja that resented the Arab great deal over time”. This can help to domination; and the other evolved into one explain why, as a result of manipulation by of tolerance and accommodation. The the British colonials and the Arabs, the difference in attitude between Unguja and Shirazis disintegrated, ending up with one Pemba Shirazis towards the Arabs, argues section in Pemba seeing themselves as part Mbwiliza, can be explained “in terms of the of a particular group “that was not differences the impact of that domination previously a part of their own or anybody 64 was felt in the two islands”.59 According to else’s consciousness”, and another section Mbwiliza, the impact of the clove in Unguja with completely different political plantations was felt more sharply in Unguja aspirations and more eager to use their than in Pemba. In Unguja, the Arab grievances against the Arabs. plantation owners were oppressive and preferred to impose their authority over the The British colonials on the other hand, local communities, whereas in Pemba the through their exploitation of the supposed Arabs were less authoritative, largely ethnic divisions to control Zanzibar, because colonial administrative structures accentuated these divisions further. They were weak in Pemba but most importantly deployed a number of politically because there was more high-quality arable unfavourable policies that privileged the Arabs over all the other ethnic groupings, 57 Ibid. 58 M Mamdani, op cit; M Ottaway, Ethnic 60 Ibid politics in Africa: Change and continuity, in R 61 D Mukangara, Race, ethnicity, religion, and Joseph (ed), op cit; Mbwiliza, The birth of a politics in Zanzibar, in Maliyamkono (ed), The political dilemma and the challenges of the quest Political Plight of Zanzibar, op cit. for new politics in Zanzibar, in Maliyamkono 62 M Lofchie, Party conflict in Zanzibar, Journal (ed), The Political Plight of Zanzibar, op cit. of Modern African Studies 1(2), June 1963, pp 59 Mbwiliza, The birth of a political dilemma and 185-207. the challenges of the quest for new politics in 63 Marina Ottaway, Ethnic politics in Africa: Zanzibar, in Maliyamkono (ed), The Political Change and continuity, in R Joseph (ed), op cit. Plight of Zanzibar, op cit. 64 Ibid. - 12 - EISA OCCASIONAL PAPER NUMBER 27, DECEMBER 2004 which among the Shirazis and Africans association. The African and Shirazi included Indians, Comorians and Goans65. associations, both established in the 1930s, The most widely cited policy by historians were for protecting the interests of groups involves the British handling of the food on the extreme opposite of the economic shortages during the First World War,66 ladder, mainly squatters and labourers. As which led to further disfigurations of with other associations elsewhere, many Africans into Shirazis and other ethnic became the foundation of political parties in groupings “in order to qualify for a better Zanzibar. The first to move into politics, share than that offered to Africans”,67 who encouraged by British promises of were at the bottom of the food distribution independence, was the Arab Association list. Since Arabs got more and better food which transformed into a political party rations, as well as other political favours, it known as the Zanzibar National Party (ZNP) was beneficial for Shirazis to identify in 1957. Before any of these social themselves as Arabs. The British continued associations moved into politics, it must be to entrench the various divisions and to noted that the racial differences between the alienate Arabs further from Africans by African and Shirazi associations had begun granting them more privileges, such as to form a complex web of power struggles, offering Arabs the bulk of arable land. These which later became more volatile and identities, however, remained rather porous disruptive. Lofchie observed in the 1960s and flexible throughout the better part of the how “throughout the post-war period these 20th century; they had begun to shape the associations contested bitterly over the political identities from which many allocation of the seats in the Legislative associations, first cultural and later political, Council”68 which managed to deepen the were subsequently born. split between these two communities.69
The Emergence of Political Identities The movement of these associations into Associations based on racial lines had racially based political parties was brought started forming as early as the 1930s. These about by the changes the British pledged to were the Arab, Indian, African and Shirazi introduce in the political system. As a result associations. The Arab and Indian many of the associations were no longer associations formed primarily to defend satisfied with the quest of protecting specific their commercial, financial, land ownership socio-economic interests but, encouraged by and political domination interests, the latter British promises of self-government and task being more relevant to the Arab independence, felt it necessary to transform into sovereign political identities. No time 65 Zanzibar became a British Protectorate in the was wasted. Following the constitutional th late 19 century. The British hence established amendments aimed at turning the Zanzibar political administrative centres beginning with isles into a sovereignty, all parties moved offices of the High Commissioner, and a towards self-governing and independent Zanzibar Protectorate Council (ZPC). The main entities. Lofchie and Campbell say that, at function of the ZPC was to act as an advisory board. Other councils were also later on first, parties encouraged by this new established. These included the 1926 Executive political development moved into politics Council (Exco) and Legislative Council (Legco). with multiracial promises and nationalist The Exco consisted of the sultan as the president ideas and aspirations, but this “nationalistic and the British resident as vice-president with the chief secretary. 66 See Tambila, and Mbwiliza, in Maliyamkono 68 Lofchie, op cit. (ed), T L. 2000. The Political Plight of Zanzibar, 69 The Legislative Council (LEGCO) was a Eastern and Southern African Universities government body established in 1926 to replace Research Programme (ESAURP), TEMA the Protectorate Council. It was led by the Publishers Ltd, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. British resident and consisted of 11 British 67 Mbwiliza, The birth of a political dilemma and official members and six unofficial members the challenges of the quest for new politics in appointed by the sultan; three Arabs, two Indians Zanzibar, in Maliyamkono (ed), op cit. and a European. - 13 - EISA OCCASIONAL PAPER NUMBER 27, DECEMBER 2004 consensus did not serve to forge bonds of have our tradition that we cherish. Our solidarity between the Zanzibaris”.70 Sooner loyalty to the throne (Sultan) is very than expected, the racial and communal great, and we have many other frictions that had remained dormant rose to traditions which have been handed to us the surface and each political party began to from generation to generation. To give a chance to half-baked immigrants identify itself distinctively with a particular (Africans) to have any say in our segment in society. political life is only to disrupt our heritage.74 The ZNP, for example, which was a coalition of the Arab association and the The African and Shirazi associations formed Nationalist Party of the Subjects of the into the Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP) at the Sultan (in Arabic Hizbul Watan Li Raiat insistence of Julius Nyerere who during his Sultan)71 was a party chiefly formed to visit to Zanzibar in 1957, succeeded in protect Arab aspirations. Although the party effecting an understanding between the two did for a brief period campaign on the parties. Following the cooperation, Abeid platform of Africa for Africans and claimed Amani Karume, who was president of the that it was non-racial and nationalistic, this African Association, was chosen as was purely a political gimmick. The ZNP president of the ASP and Thabit Kombo was was an Arab organisation and was supported chosen as secretary of the new union. Only by most members of the Arab community. a small group of the Shirazis joined the The Arab members within the party union, however. Always mindful of their membership ranks distinguished themselves identity and the deep mistrust they had of from the Africans by calling themselves Africans, Shirazis remained distant and not Hizbu and referring to Africans as Hizbu wholly supportive of the ASP. What Matope (muddy Hizbu).72 In fact, according followed then was party politics that to Campbell, the Arabs in Zanzibar had a reflected these suspicions and historical real fear of being “swamped by illiterate patterns of racial divisions with “regional Africans”73 and had no desire to let African variations in character and intensity, associations govern Zanzibar. Campbell, in particularly between Pemba and Zanzibar”.75 an attempt to substantiate this assertion, The birth of the Zanzibar and Pemba draws attention to a letter from the leader of People’s Party (ZPPP), for example, arose as the Arab association to Sir Hilary Blood a result of the tenuous relations between the who was preparing a list of Africans and Shirazis within the ASP. The recommendations for a new constitution. ZPPP was specifically designed for Shirazis The secretary of the Arab association wrote: who wished to avoid involvement with the … the principle that Zanzibar African-led ASP and had its base mainly citizenship should be safe-guarded among the Shirazi’s in Pemba. During the receives full support. We in this country elections of 1957, 1961 and 1963, party loyalty and voting behaviour was expressed
70 mostly through these three main political Lofchie, op cit, p 188. 71 The Nationalist Party of the Subjects of His parties: the ZNP, ASP and ZPPP. Highness the Sultan of Zanzibar was formed in 1955 by a small group of peasants in the village One can clearly see that Zanzibari politics of Kiembe Samaki. This party was at first from the beginning, survived on alliances of isolated from the mainstream of Zanzibar racially disparate groups, which political life but managed to gain some public unfortunately – in Lofchie’s words – “lent support and awareness after it formed a the party system in Zanzibar an cooperation with the Arab association and changed the party’s name to Zanzibar Nationalist Party (ZNP) in 1956 72 Maliyamkono & Kanyongolo, op cit, p 134. 74 Ibid, p 73, cited from Sir Hilary Blood’s 73 J Campbell, Multiracialism and politics in Report of the Constitutional Commissioner, Zanzibar, Political Science Quarterly 77(1), Zanzibar 1961, p 37. March 1962, pp 72-87 75 Lofchie, op cit, p 196. - 14 - EISA OCCASIONAL PAPER NUMBER 27, DECEMBER 2004 impermanent and unsettled quality”.76 The bodies that the British had established to act ASP, for example, drew its support as government advisory councils, for principally from the mainland and Shirazi example, had representation from all the communities (the Zanzibar segment); the major ethnic communities save the Africans. ZNP relied heavily for its support from the The Zanzibar Protectorate Council together Arabs and Asians; and the ZPPP, a faction with the executive and legislative councils that had split from the ASP, was designed in had members representing simply the Arab, particular to provide a voice for the Pemba Indian and European communities. It was Shirazis. Each party’s political solidarities only in 1946, 20 years after the councils were founded largely on ethnic fears. Both were created, that a decision was made to the ASP and ZNP appealed strongly to each reserve one seat for an African of its communities’ fears of the other party’s representative.80 The sultan, however, domination. While the ASP manipulated appointed a Shirazi who at that time was still African fears of Arab domination, for classified as an Asian by the British example, the ZNP did the same by administration. provoking Arab fears with threats of African domination. The campaign period of 1957 British favouritism of the Arabs was at its was therefore characterised by “widespread most glaringly obvious in the 1961 and 1963 communal prejudices” and highly elections. Following the ASP victory in the autonomous ethnic loyalties which 1957 election, with a sweeping win of five “engendered hatred and animosities that of the six contested seats, the British persisted long afterwards as an ineradicable administration continued to openly favour feature of competitive party politics in the Arabs by manipulating electoral Zanzibar”:77 an assertion that other scholars constituencies in all the subsequent unreservedly support. Mukangara notes that elections. This tactic ensured Arab electoral elections in Zanzibar will always be victories, which without question helped to contested along racial and ethnic blocs, after widen the rift between the parties. In 1960, all “it is a fact that divisions based on racial in response to the constitutional recommendations Sir Hilary Blood made in and ethnic identification are the most 81 enduring, and that they produce the most his report, the Legislative Council was hardened perceptions and positions when expanded to 21 seats but the local they are fused with politics”.78 administration authorities added an extra seat in the Stone Town area: a constituency Aspects of British Exploitation which was predominantly Arab and thereby The British, in all honesty, should bear some a ZNP stronghold. This was clearly an act of responsibility for Zanzibar’s political gerrymandering as the additional seat polarisation. Throughout the period under produced constituencies which each had which Zanzibar remained a British 1,393 and 1,077 voters, considerably less protectorate, its administration went to great than the average of 4,472 voters in other lengths to ensure that power stayed solely constituencies.82 Again in the June 1961 with the sultan. It did so by giving political elections the government created a twenty precedence to Arabs through instituting, third constituency in the south of Pemba, among others, government bodies that which happened to be a ZPPP stronghold. excluded African representation and As a result, in the June 1961 elections as constitutionally preserving the institution of well as the July 1963 elections, and despite the sultan.79 The representative legislative the ASP receiving more popular votes than
76 Ibid, p 200. and Southern African Universities Research 77 Ibid, p 207. Programme (ESAURP), TEMA Publishers Ltd, 78 D Mukangara, Race, ethnicity, religion, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. politics in Zanzibar, in Maliyamkono (ed), The 80 Maliyamkono & Kanyongolo, op cit. Political Plight of Zanzibar, op cit, p 43. 81 Sir Hilary Blood was the second constitutional 79 See A Ramadhan in Maliyamkono (ed), T L. commissioner. 2000. The Political Plight of Zanzibar, Eastern 82 Maliyamkono & Kanyongolo, op cit. - 15 - EISA OCCASIONAL PAPER NUMBER 27, DECEMBER 2004 the ZNP and ZPPP combined, the racial groups. Mukangara notes that “where ZNP/ZPPP coalition managed to form a the Arabic or semi Arabic population is government with more constituency seats higher”, as in Pemba and in the few (see tables 3 and 4). constituencies where it gained the majority in Zanzibar, “the votes for CUF tend to be Table 3: 1961 June election results proportionally higher” and the reverse is true Party Votes % Seats ASP 45,172 49.9 10 for the CCM. In Pemba, for example, the ZNP 31,681 35.0 10 CCM won in predominantly African ZPPP 12,411 13.7 3 constituencies.85 The above discussion Source: Maliyamkono and Kanyongolo, op cit, 2003. Table 4: 1963 July election results highlights that Zanzibari politics is Party Votes % Seats determined largely by racial loyalties that ASP 87,402 53.4 13 are certain to affect it for a long time to ZNP 47,943 29.3 12 ZPPP 25,610 15.6 3 come. Source: Maliyamkono and Kanyongolo, op cit, 2003. Dealing with Conflict Effects of Racial Divisions on Current Politics Zanzibar’s political crisis, it is important to In 1971, President Abeid Karume had note in this paper, has however, been predicted that the racial differences plaguing successfully managed. The first attempts the politics of the isles would not disappear were in June 1999 through a for another 50 to 60 years after the Commonwealth-mediated agreement, revolution. Not only have the racial popularly known as Muafaka I86. This differences become more salient since the agreement contained all in all 15 articles introduction of multiparty politics, the covering mostly contentious issues such: current CUF–CCM divide seems to parallel the racial divide of the pre-revolution • review of the constitution and electoral period, confirming Karume’s predictions.83 laws; In the 1957, 1961 and 1963 elections the • reform of the Zanzibar Electoral ZNP/ZPPP had dominated Pemba with a Commission (ZEC) and the judiciary; few strongholds of significant support in • compilation of a credible voters’ Zanzibar, most notably in Stone Town, register; while the ASP dominated Unguja Island • equal access to the media; and, like its opponent, had significant • free political activity; support in the South Pemba constituency. • independent assessment of CUF This electoral landscape seems to have compensation claims; replicated itself in the 1995 and 2000 • ending the CUF parliamentary boycott; elections, where the CCM – a product of the and 1977 ASP/TANU merger – dominated • giving the CUF two more parliamentary Unguja, with the CUF – arguably an seats. association of the ZNP/ZPPP coalition – performing outstandingly in Pemba and only Little attention however, was given to this barely gaining a foothold in Zanzibar accord until the January 2001 through the ZNP’s traditional strongholds of demonstrations, which forced political the Stone Town constituencies (Malindi and parties to initiate the second round of 84 Mkunazini). Another way of negotiations that resulted in the signing of demonstrating that party loyalties have not Muafaka II in October 2001. The agreement changed much since the revolution is by itself did not differ significantly from the examining electoral performance among first one; the content concentrated largely on reforms aimed at reasserting the rule of law 83 D Mukangara, Race, ethnicity, religion, and in Zanzibar. In any event, both peace politics in Zanzibar, in Maliyamkono (ed), The Political Plight of Zanzibar, op cit. 85 Ibid. 84 Ibid. 86 Swahili word literally meaning consensus - 16 - EISA OCCASIONAL PAPER NUMBER 27, DECEMBER 2004 accords (Muafaka I and II) addressed the 1999. Given the extent of the violence that two most powerful elements that combined occurred and the severe tensions that to form political conflicts in Zanzibar: racial prevailed thereafter, the political leadership identity and the political system. The was in disbelief and feared that if the former, as it was soon discovered, was much conflicts were not resolved they would more difficult to address as it is a persistent deteriorate to unmanageable levels. As such and intractable issue that is much less this aversion to continued conflict forced amenable to negotiation. The latter offered a both parties to seek redress. Other reasons more effective solution as the political include farsighted leadership, the bilateral conflict in Zanzibar needed at best to be approach employed, the agreement’s addressed from a governance standpoint. flexibility and the trust it evoked. It turned Together with the long-term out that the face-to-face negotiation multiculturalism that must be confronted in approach was a far better mechanism for one way or another, the manner in which the Zanzibar’s political conflicts as it not only violence of 2001 transpired suggests that reduced the possibility of distortion but Zanzibar’s transitional democratic ensured more local ownership. Political institutions need to undergo a major leaders also helped to make the accord a transformation. It is widely acknowledged success. Conflicts require far-sighted that appropriate democratic institutions such leadership and constructive management. as the electoral system, legislative bodies, Just as many conflicts are exacerbated by election administration and judicial leaders who inflame the tensions, conflicts structures, to name a few, are vital elements can be brought to an end with leaders who in forging an enduring settlement to political can put aside their differences and conflicts; provided of course that these sentiments and who also have the authority institutions and structures are developed and to do the same with their supporters. designed through fair and honest negotiation Additionally, the mutual trust and high processes.87 degree of flexibility that parties exercised during the negotiation processes helped to There is no doubt that Muafaka II has been produce the results it did. The importance an important step towards stability; its of trust cannot be overstated: negotiations successful implementation by some accounts demand a minimum of cooperative effort. ensures fair elections in 2005 and that Although it is issues that tend to be the focus because of it, political violence is now much of such negotiations, ultimately the success less likely. What reasons explain its depends on the actors and their trust in one success? After all, despite experiencing another.88 Similarly, the greater the some minor hiccups, the accord has received flexibility exercised by the actors; the much local and international praise on both greater the chance of success. In sum, all its contents and the commitment shown by these factors without reservation helped to Tanzania’s political leadership. Even increase the accord’s chances of success and opposition leaders who were at first progress – an initiative that has enhanced sceptical, have wielded to the powers of Zanzibar’s multiparty democracy in more Muafaka II and recognise the milestones that ways than originally imagined. have occurred as a result of its implementation. Conclusion
First, the context under which the agreement The paper has investigated the association was signed was very different from that of between Zanzibar’s political conflicts and decisive elements such as the colonially
87 framed political identities; the adversarial D Bloomfield and B Reilly, The changing nature of conflict and conflict management, in party relations and politically incompatible Harris & Reilly (eds) Democracy and Deep- rooted Conflict: Options for Negotiations, IDEA, 88 D Bloomfield, C Nupen & P Harris, in Harris Handbook Series, 1998. & Reilly (eds), op cit. - 17 - EISA OCCASIONAL PAPER NUMBER 27, DECEMBER 2004 views/policies of parties; and lastly but not Muafaka Accord, paper presented to a seminar least, elections themselves. Arguably there organised by the Norwegian Centre for Human are other additionally prominent factors, Rights in Oslo, Norway, April 2004. both proximate and long-term that can Human Rights Watch. 2002. The bullets were explain the current political stand off in raining, Human Rights Watch Report, 14(3)(A), April 2002. Zanzibar. This author however, chose to Illife, J, 1979 Modern History of Tanganyika, focus on the above arguments as each Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. element has uniquely helped to resurrect and Institute for Security Studies. 2001. African accentuate age old political conflicts in their Security Review, 10(3). own way. At the centre of the paper lies the Joseph, R (ed). 1999. State, Conflict, and supposition that the open conflicts in Democracy in Africa, Lynne Rienner Inc, Zanzibar revolve around ethnic and political Boulder London identities framed by colonial establishments. Kaiser, P J. 1999. Power, sovereignty, and The paper serves as a strong reminder that international election observers: The case of these identities are indisputably not a residue Zanzibar, Africa Today, 1 January 1999. Kelsall, T. 2003. Governance, democracy and of the past but a live force in today’s politics recent political struggles in Mainland Tanzania, of the isles. To this end, there is an implicit Journal of Commonwealth & Comparative suggestion that together with reforming the Politics, 7 January. transitional democratic institutions of the Legal and Human Rights Centre/International isles to which appreciable progress has been Federation for Human Rights (FIDHI) made under the Muafaka II agreement, the “Zanzibar: Wave of Violence - A fact finding post-conflict Zanzibar in addition, needs to report on Police Brutality and Election confront the ethnic conflicts which are so Mismanagement in Zanzibar", 5 June 2001. evidently rooted in the present. Kotze, D. 2002. “South Africa: Conflict Management in a divided society”, Department of Political Sciences, University of South Africa, References Pretoria. Paper presented at the EISA/KAF
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ABOUT THE AUTHOR Shumbana Karume is a Researcher at EISA
THE EISA M ISSION STATEM ENT To strengthen electoral processes, democratic governance, human rights and democratic values through research, capacity building, advocacy and other strategically targeted interventions.
ABOUT EISA EISA is a not-for-profit and non-partisan non-governmental organisation which was established in 1996. Its core business is to provide technical assistance for capacity building of relevant government departments, electoral management bodies, political parties and civil society organisations operating in the democracy and governance field throughout the SADC region and beyond. Inspired by the various positive developments towards democratic governance in Africa as a whole and the SADC region in particular since the early 1990s, EISA aims to advance democratic values, practices and enhance the credibility of electoral processes. The ultimate goal is to assist countries in Africa and the SADC region to nurture and consolidate democratic governance. SADC countries have received enormous technical assistance and advice from EISA in building solid institutional foundations for democracy. This includes electoral system reforms; election monitoring and observation; constructive conflict management; strengthening of parliament and other democratic institutions; strengthening of political parties; capacity building for civil society organisations; deepening democratic local governance; and enhancing the institutional capacity of the election management bodies. EISA is currently the secretariat of the Electoral Commissions Forum (ECF) composed of electoral commissions in the SADC region and established in 1998. EISA is also the secretariat of the SADC Election Support Network (ESN) comprising election-related civil society organisations established in 1997.
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EISA OCCASIONAL PAPERS CODE TITLE OP 1 M unicipal Elections in 1999, P. Roome, 1999 OP 2 An Overview of Local Government: M unicipal Demarcation Act 27 of 1998, R. Cameron, 1999 OP 3 An Analysis of the Legal Framework for Elections, Lisa Thornton, 1998 OP 4 Voter Registration & Demarcation in Local Government, B. Gerber , 1998 OP 5 South African Electoral Commission: The Old and the New, Glenda Fick, 1998 OP 6 An Analysis of the Constitutional and Legal Framework For Elections in the Local Government Sphere, D. Craythorne OP 7 Developmental Local Government and Local Economic Development, F. Khan, 1998 OP 8 Techniques of Public Participation in Local Government, Doreen Atkinson, 1997 OP 9 Issues of Representation in Local Government, Doreen Atkinson, 1997 OP 10 Local Government: A Review of Selected Legislation, Glenda Fick, 2001 OP 11 Conflict M anagement Programme Report: South Africa Local Government Election, August-December 2000, EISA AND IEC OP 12 Survey of Electoral Systems and Reform Imperatives in the SADC Region, Khabele M atlosa, 2003 OP 13 Impact of Democracy on Public Participation in the SADC Region, Claude Kabemba, 2003 OP 14 The OAU, NEPAD and the Promotion of Good Governance in Africa, John Akopari, 2003 OP 15 Democratic Consolidation and Political Parties in Lesotho, W ole Olaleye , 2003 OP 16 Party Systems in the SADC Region: In Defence of the Dominant Party System, Shumbana Karume, 2004 OP 17 Interrogating Challenges for Intra-Party Democracy in Southern Africa, Khabele M atlosa, 2004 OP 18 Political Parties and Governance in Zimbabwe, W ole Olaleye, 2004 OP 19 Ethnic Conflict in the Horn of Africa, Victor Shale, 2004 OP 20 Impact of HIV/AIDS on Electoral Processes in Southern Africa, Kondwani Chirambo, 2004 OP 21 Decentralisation, Development and Conflict: Challenges Awaiting Local Authorities in Lesotho, Victor Reatile Shale, 2004 OP 22 Democratisation, Dominant Parties, and W eak Opposition: The Southern AfricanProject, Chris Landsberg, 2004 OP 23 Election M onitoring and Observation in Nigeria and South Africa: A Decade Review, Adewale Banjo, 2004 OP 24 Mauritius Electoral Reform Process, L. Amédée Darga, 2004 OP 25 The Dominant Party System: Challenges for South Africa’s Second Decade of Democracy, Heidi Brooks, 2004 OP 26 Perspectives on the Role of Key Stakeholders in the DRC’s Political Transition By Claude Kabemba, 2004 To order or for a full list of publications contact publications@ eisa.org.za
EISA 2nd Floor, The Atrium 41 Stanley Avenue, Auckland Park 2092, South Africa P.O. Box 740, Auckland Park 2006, South Africa Tel 27-11-4825495 Fax 27-11-4826163 http://www.eisa.org.za/EISA/publications/publications.htm - 20 -