The Transformation of Quantity Into Quality: Critical Mass in the Formation of Customary International Law
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
WORSTER_JCI(2).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/23/13 12:16 PM THE TRANSFORMATION OF QUANTITY INTO QUALITY: CRITICAL MASS IN THE FORMATION OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW William Thomas Worster* I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................... 2 A. Application of Sociological Studies to International Law .......... 6 II. CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW .................................................... 8 III. CRITICAL MASS ................................................................................. 10 A. Equilibrium States ..................................................................... 11 B. Phase Transitions ....................................................................... 12 C. Phase Transitions in Social Phenomena ................................... 14 D. Phase Transition Points ............................................................. 16 E. Phase Transitions in Customary International Law ............... 20 IV. THEORIES OF COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR .............................................. 24 A. Microlevel Theories .................................................................... 25 B. Macrolevel Theories ................................................................... 27 C. Synthesis and Agent-Based Modeling ....................................... 29 V. Using Critical Mass to Understand Customary International Law .................................................................... 35 A. Content of the Norm ................................................................... 35 B. The Role of Networks in Forming and Diffusing Information and Norms ........................................................... 38 1. Structure of Networks ......................................................... 40 2. Diffusion and Conformity Within Networks ...................... 41 3. International Networks ....................................................... 45 C. The Role of the Individuals Within the Networked System .... 55 1. Assessing Influence ............................................................. 62 2. Specially Affected States ..................................................... 62 VI. CONCLUSION .................................................................................... 76 * Lecturer, International Law, The Hague University of Applied Sciences, The Hague, The Netherlands; Research Director, International Law, Bynkershoek Institute; LL.M. (Adv.) in Public International Law, cum laude, Leiden University, Faculty of Law, Leiden, The Netherlands; J.D., Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology, Chicago, Illinois; B.A., Modern European History, University of Kansas, Lawrence, Kansas. 1 WORSTER_JCI(2).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/23/13 12:16 PM 2 BOSTON UNIVERSITY INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol 31:1 ABSTRACT The formation of customary international law has long been criticized for its lack of a clear methodology, characterized by an ambivalent relationship with state consent. This article is an attempt to combine international law with the sociological study of critical mass in collective decision-making of groups, with an ultimate goal of opening a dialogue on how customary international law can be both consensual and non- consensual. Critical mass is the study of incremental, quantitative changes in a system that, at some point, produces a bursting qualitative change in the system. In sociology, this study examines such phenomena as epidemics, markets, fashions and social networking, and has identified several characteristics of systems likely to experience critical mass change. Drawing the parallel with customary international law, the existence and interplay of certain factors suggests whether a customary international law is more or less likely to exist based on the available and observable state practice. Those factors include the role of the rule in the international community, functioning of networks among states for international governance, and the behavior of “specially interested” states, better understood as specially influential. By synthesizing and re- imagining these existing ideas in the context of critical mass, we can reach a more nuanced view of the interrelation of consent and non- consent to customary international law. I. INTRODUCTION The formation of customary international law has long been criticized for its lack of a clear methodology, characterized by an ambivalent relationship with state consent. Although customary international law seems to be entirely a creature of state consent (after all, it is based on actual practice), in reality, the fit with state consent is loose at best. Unable to move forward, the study of the formation of customary international law appears to have largely reached an impasse.1 Yet, 1 See, e.g., Andrew T. Guzman, Saving Customary International Law, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 115, 123-31 (2005) (criticizing customary international law’s shortcomings as a legitimate legal theory); see also Gregory Shaffer & Tom Ginsburg, The Empirical Turn in International Legal Scholarship, 106 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 11 (2012) (“This source of international law [customary international law] has been subject to much theoretical speculation and critique, but relatively little empirical work examines the extent and manner in which norms of customary international law (or, for that matter, general principles of law) are WORSTER_JCI(2).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/23/13 12:16 PM 2013] THE TRANSFORMATION OF QUANTITY INTO QUALITY 3 states still appear to support and apply customary international law as a source of law, so we are faced with an awkward situation of embracing a source of law that we do not understand well. This article is an attempt to bring into international law a sociological perspective and vocabulary of critical mass to attempt to open a dialogue about how a practice with normative effects can be both consensual and non-consensual. The sociological perspective and its vocabulary can bring new insight into the phenomena and perhaps even change our understanding of it, changing even the very factors and criteria we apply in a legal analysis to reach a conclusion. The analysis that this article proposes is that of critical mass in phase transitions, coming from the hard and soft sciences, particularly the study of sociology. This language is not entirely new to discussions on customary international law.2 Where it has been mentioned, usually used to inform debates. Many believe that reference to customary international law is in decline, but whether the decline is only a relative one in relation to treaties — and not an absolute one — has not been empirically assessed. We thus need more empirical analysis of how customary international law is formed and has effects.”) (internal citations omitted). 2 See, e.g., DAVID J. BEDERMAN, CUSTOM AS A SOURCE OF LAW 172 (2010) (“[T]he objective proof of a practice has really boiled down to generalized evidence of a certain Michael J. Glennon, How International Rules Die, 93 GEO. L.J. 939, 969 (2005) (referring to the formation of customary international law as reaching a “tipping point”); Steven R. Ratner, Is International Law Impartial?, 11 LEGAL THEORY 39, 57 (2005) (“[C]ustomary international law . is the law that develops over time as states act in a certain way out of a sense that the behavior is not merely good policy but legally required (the notion of opinio juris). A rule requiring states to undertake a particular act ‘crystallizes’ when some critical mass of states engage in the behavior with the sense of obligation.”); norm’s consistent observance by a critical mass of community participants over a statistically significant period.”); Edward T. Swaine, Rational Custom 36 (John M. Olin Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 167), available at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/files/167.ets_.rational-custom.pdf (citing George W. Downs, Enforcement and the Evolution of Cooperation, 19 MICH. J. INT’L L. 319, 322 n.8 (1998) (“In the early stages of an international practice, states might conceivably migrate from one solution to the other in search of a critical mass.”)). For the mixed use of critical mass and other terminology, such as “consensus,” see Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, State Regulation of Sexuality in International Human Rights Law and Theory, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 797, 811, 835, 841, 873 (2008), who notes that: Although purely domestic and unilateral acts in many states are creating a consensus to recognize such human rights, . [i]t remains clear that there is no consensus that sexual minorities are entitled under international human rights law to freedom from arbitrary discrimination. In Europe, it is clear that the view WORSTER_JCI(2).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/23/13 12:16 PM 4 BOSTON UNIVERSITY INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol 31:1 merely in passing, the implications of the science of critical mass theory have not been fully explored. Critical mass can be a loose concept to simply describe the accumulation of small actions that result in large shifts in collective behavior. But critical mass is also an empirically- based scientific study that attempts to assess how those small changes result in large changes. This article seeks to delve more deeply into the technicalities of critical mass and into the insights that result from applying this study to the formation of customary international law. In short, this article examines situations where the quantitative growth and dispersion of a certain norm or other legal fact at some point results in a qualitative shift