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Computer Security Withdrawn NIST Technical Series Publication Warning Notice The attached publication has been withdrawn (archived), and is provided solely for historical purposes. It may have been superseded by another publication (indicated below). Withdrawn Publication Series/Number NIST Special Publication 800-25 Title Federal Agency Use of Public Key Technology for Digital Signatures and Authentication Publication Date(s) October 2000 Withdrawal Date September 13, 2021 Withdrawal Note SP 800-25 is withdrawn in its entirety. Superseding Publication(s) (if applicable) The attached publication has been superseded by the following publication(s): Series/Number Title Author(s) Publication Date(s) URL/DOI Additional Information (if applicable) Contact Computer Security Division (Information Technology Laboratory) Latest revision of the N/A attached publication Related Information https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/crypto-publication-review-project https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-25/archive/2000-10-01 Withdrawal https://csrc.nist.gov/news/2021/withdrawal-of-nist-special-pubs-800-15-25- Announcement Link and-32 Date updated: September 13, 2021 NAT'L INST. OF STAND & TECH NIST I lllDb M3LfiE7 P^BUCATIONS NIST Special Publication 800-25 Federal Agency Use of Public Key Technology for Digital Nisr Signatures and Authentication National Institute of Standards Kathy Lyons-Burke and Technology Technology Administration Federal Public Key Infrastructure Steering Committee U.S. Department of Commerce COMPUTER SECURITY rhe National Institute of Standards and Technology was established in 1988 by Congress to "assist industry in the development of technology . needed to improve product quality, to modernize manufacturing processes, to ensure product reliability . and to facilitate rapid commercialization ... of products based on new scientific discoveries." NIST, originally founded as the National Bureau of Standards in 1901, works to strengthen U.S. industry's competitiveness; advance science and engineering; and improve public health, safety, and the environment. One of the agency's basic functions is to develop, maintain, and retain custody of the national standards of measurement, and provide the means and methods for comparing standards used in science, engineering, manufacturing, commerce, industry, and education with the standards adopted or recognized by the Federal Government. As an agency of the U.S. Commerce Department's Technology Administration, NIST conducts basic and applied research in the physical sciences and engineering, and develops measurement techniques, test methods, standards, and related services. The Institute does generic and precompetitive work on new and advanced technologies. NIST's research facilities are located at Gaithersburg, MD 20899, and at Boulder, CO 80303. Major technical operating units and their principal activities are listed below. For more information contact the Publications and Program Inquiries Desk, 301-975-3058. Office of the Director Chemical Science and Technology • National Quality Program Laboratory • International and Academic Affairs • Biotechnology • Physical and Chemical Properties^ Technology Services • Analytical Chemistry • Standards Services • Process Measurements • Technology Partnerships • Surface and Microanalysis Science • Measurement Services • Information Services Physics Laboratory • Electron and Optical Physics Advanced Technology Program • Atomic Physics • Optical Technology • Economic Assessment • Ionizing Radiation • Information Technology and Applications • and Frequency' • Chemistry and Life Sciences Time • • Materials and Manufacturing Technology Quantum Physics' • Electronics and Photonics Technology Manufacturing Engineering Laboratory Manufacturing Extension Partnership Program • Precision Engineering • Automated Production Technology • Regional Programs • Intelligent Systems • National Programs • Fabrication Technology • Program Development • Manufacturing Systems Integration Electronics and Electrical Engineering Building and Fire Research Laboratory Laboratory • Microelectronics • Applied Economics • Law Enforcement Standards • Structures • Electricity • Building Materials • Semiconductor Electronics • Building Environment • Radio-Frequency Technology' • Fire Safety Engineering • Electromagnetic Technology' • Fire Science • Optoelectronics' Information Technology Laboratory Materials Science and Engineering • Mathematical and Computational Sciences^ Laboratory • Advanced Network Technologies • Intelligent Processing of Materials • Computer Security • Ceramics • Information Access and User Interfaces • Materials Reliability' • High Performance Systems and Services • Polymers • Distributed Computing and Information Services • Metallurgy • Software Diagnostics and Conformance Testing • NIST Center for Neutron Research • Statistical Engineering 'At Boulder, CO 80303. ^Some elements at Boulder, CO. NisT Special Publication 800-25 Federal Ageiicy Use of Public Key Technology for Digital Signatures and Authentication Kathy Lyons-Burke Federal Public Key Infrastructure Steering Committee COMPUTER SECURITY Computer Security Division Information Technology Laboratory National Institute of Standards and Technology Gaithersburg, MD 20899-8930 October 2000 U.S. Department of Commerce Norman Y. Mineta, Secretary Technology Administration Dr. Cheryl L. Shavers, Under Secretary of Commerce for Technology National Institute of Standards and Technology Raymond G. Kammer, Director Reports on Information Security Technology The Information Technology Laboratory (ITL) at the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) promotes the U.S. economy and public welfare by providing technical leadership for the Nation's measurement and standards infrastructure for information technology. ITL develops tests, test methods, reference data, proof of concept implementations and technical analyses to advance the development and productive use of information technology. ITL's responsibilities include the development of technical, physical, administrative, and management standards and guidelines for the cost-effective security and privacy of sensitive unclassified information in federal computer systems. This Special Publication 800 series reports on ITL's research, guidance, and outreach efforts in computer security, and its collaborative activities with industry, government, and academic organizations. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-25 Natl. Inst. Stand. Technol. Spec. Publ. 800-25, 33 pages (Oct. 2000) CODEN: NSPUE2 U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE WASHINGTON: 2000 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402-9325 Table of Contents 1. PURPOSE 1 2. BACKGROUND 2 3. ACCESS CERTIFICATES FOR ELECTRONIC SERVICES 5 4. USING THIS DOCUMENT 5 5. SUMMARY 6 Question 1. What are the benefits, direct and indirect, financial and non- financial, OBJECTIVE AND SUBJECTIVE, OF USING DIGITAL SIGNATURES FOR THE PROPOSED APPLICATION? 7 Question 2. How much will it cost to (a) either convert an existing electronic PROCESSING SYSTEM (THAT IS, A SYSTEM WHICH PROCESSES INFORMATION ELECTRONICALLY OR DIGITALLY) TO USE DIGITAL SIGNATURES, OR CONVERT AN EXISTING NON-ELECTRONIC PROCESS TO AN ELECTRONIC ONE USING DIGITAL SIGNATURES; AND (B) OPERATE SUCH A system after conversion? 9 Question 3. What are the risks associated with the use of public key technology FOR this application? 18 Question 4. How should the benefits determined in response to Question 1 be COMPARED TO THE COSTS ESTABLISHED IN RESPONSE TO QUESTION 2 AND THE RISKS discussed IN RESPONSE TO QUESTION 3? 22 Question 5. What are the critical implementation issues that an agency should consider as it seeks to implement and use a pki for digital signatures? 24 APPENDIX (1): DESCRIPTION OF PUBLIC KEY TECHNOLOGY AND THE PUBLIC KEY INFRASTRUCTURE 27 APPENDIX (2): DESCRIPTION OF PUBLIC KEY CERTIFICATES AND THE CERTIFICATION PROCESS 29 111 1. Purpose This guidance document was developed by the Federal Public Key hifrastructure Steering Committee to assist Federal agencies that are considering the use of public key technology for digital signatures or authentication over open networks such as the hitemet. This includes communications with other Federal or non-Federal entities, such as members of the public, private firms, citizen groups, and State and local Governments. Most public key technology applications for digital signatures provide for user authentication as well. However, public key technology can be used for user authentication only without digital signatures. Standards such as X.509 Version 3 (hitemational Telecommunication Union Recommendation X.509 (03/00) - hiformation technology - Open systems interconnection - The directory: public-key and attribute certificate frameworks) provide for that functionality. This document encourages the thoughtfiil use of public key technology by Federal agencies as set forth in guidance published by the Office of Management and Budget implementing the Government Paperwork Elimination Act (GPEA) (Public Law 105-277; Federal Register Notice, Volume 65, Number 85). GPEA requires Federal agencies, by October 21, 2003, to allow individuals or entities that deal with an agency the option to submit information or perform transactions with an agency electronically, when practicable, and to maintain records electronically, when practicable. The Act specifically states that electronic records and their related electronic signatures
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