Chimpanzees Are Rational Maximizers in an Ultimatum Game Keith Jensen Et Al
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REPORTS sensitive to unfairness and punish proposers who Chimpanzees Are Rational Maximizers make inequitable offers by rejecting those offers at a cost to themselves, and knowing this, pro- in an Ultimatum Game posers make strategic offers that are less likely to be refused. Keith Jensen,* Josep Call, Michael Tomasello The ultimatum game has been used in dozens, possibly hundreds of studies, including 11 12 Traditional models of economic decision-making assume that people are self-interested rational various human cultures ( ) and children ( ). maximizers. Empirical research has demonstrated, however, that people will take into account Testing the ultimatum game on other species the interests of others and are sensitive to norms of cooperation and fairness. In one of the most would be an important contribution to the de- robust tests of this finding, the ultimatum game, individuals will reject a proposed division of a bate on the evolution and possible uniqueness of 6 monetary windfall, at a cost to themselves, if they perceive it as unfair. Here we show that in an human cooperation ( ). Chimpanzees are our ultimatum game, humans’ closest living relatives, chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), are rational closest extant relatives and engage in cooperative maximizers and are not sensitive to fairness. These results support the hypothesis that other- behavior such as group hunting, coalitionary 13 regarding preferences and aversion to inequitable outcomes, which play key roles in human social aggression, and territorial patrols ( ). Further- organization, distinguish us from our closest living relatives. more, in experiments they have been shown to coordinate their behavior (14) and to provide help (15, 16). However, there is ongoing debate umans are able to live in very large some degree, have concern for outcomes and about whether chimpanzees are sensitive to, and groups and to cooperate with unrelated behaviors affecting others (other-regarding pref- tolerant of, unfairness (17) or whether they Hindividuals whom they expect never to erences) (4) as well as a general concern for simply attend to their own expectations with no encounter again, conditions that make the stan- norms of fairness (7, 8). regard for what others receive (18). Additionally, dard mechanisms for cooperation unlikely (1), The benchmark test for examining sensitivity experiments have failed to reveal other-regarding namely kin selection (2) and reciprocal altruism to fairness and other-regarding preferences is the preferences when food was involved (19, 20) (3). Nevertheless, people help others, sometimes ultimatum game (9). In the standard version of other than to punish direct theft (21). Having at great personal cost. But people are not ob- the game, two anonymous individuals are as- chimpanzees play the ultimatum game would ligate altruists; they do not tolerate abuse of their signed the roles of proposer and responder. The address these conflicting findings on fairness and generosity. Not only will they punish or shun proposer is offered a sum of money and can negative reciprocity and allow direct compar- on November 17, 2015 individuals who free-ride or exploit them, they decide whether to divide this windfall with the isons to humans. will do so even if they themselves do not bene- responder. The crucial feature of the ultimatum In the current study, we tested chimpanzees fit from correcting the behavior of norm viola- game is that the responder can accept or reject in a mini-ultimatum game. The mini-ultimatum tors (4). The willingness both to cooperate and the proposer’s offer. If the responder accepts it, game is a reduced form of the ultimatum game to punish noncooperators has been termed strong both players receive the proposed division; if the in which proposers are given a choice between reciprocity (5) and has been claimed to be responder rejects it, both get nothing. The ca- making one of two pre-set offers which the uniquely human (6). To cooperate in these ways, nonical economic model of pure self-interest responder can then accept or reject (22). In one humans must be more than self-regarding ratio- predicts that the proposer will offer the smallest such study (23), there were four different games. nal decision-makers; they must also, at least to share possible and that the responder will accept In all games, the proposer had as one option an www.sciencemag.org any nonzero offer. This is not what happens. amount that would typically be rejected by a Although the specifics vary across culture and human responder as unfair, namely 80% for the Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology, Deutscher setting, the basic finding is that proposers proposer and 20% for the responder (8/2 offer; Platz6,D-04103,Leipzig,Germany. typically make offers of 40 to 50% and the proposer received the amount to the left of *To whom correspondence should be addressed. E-mail: responders routinely reject offers under 20% the slash and the responder received the amount [email protected] (10). These findings suggest that responders are to the right). In the 5/5 (fair) game, the proposer Downloaded from ABC food dish divider tray rope ends Proposer rods Responder Fig. 1. Illustration of the testing environment. The proposer, who makes the the proposer draws one of the baited trays halfway toward the two subjects. first choice, sits to the responder’s left. The apparatus, which has two sliding (B) The responder can then pull the attached rod, now within reach, to bring trays connected by a single rope, is outside of the cages. (A) By first sliding a the proposed food tray to the cage mesh so that (C) both subjects can eat Plexiglas panel (not shown) to access one rope end and by then pulling it, from their respective food dishes (clearly separated by a translucent divider). www.sciencemag.org SCIENCE VOL 318 5 OCTOBER 2007 107 REPORTS was faced with the choice of 8/2 versus 5/5. The cage in an L-shaped arrangement. The test ap- low rates (from 5 to 14% of the time). There other games were 8/2 versus 2/8 (unfair versus paratus, which was outside of the cages, had was a trend toward different rejection rates of 2 hyperfair), 8/2 versus 8/2 (no choice), and 8/2 two sliding trays. On each tray were two dishes 8/2 offers across the four games (Friedman’s c 3 versus 10/0 (unfair versus hyperunfair). Human with raisins, separated by translucent dividers: test = 6.643, P = 0.069). However, all paired responders rejected the 8/2 offer most when the one for the proposer and the other for the comparisons were nonsignificant, indicating that, alternative was fair (5/5 game), less when the responder (Fig. 1). Proposers would first choose crucially, chimpanzees rejected 8/2 offers equally alternative was hyperfair (2/8 game), even less one of the two trays by pulling it halfway to the often regardless of the alternatives available to when there was no alternative (8/2 game), and cages (as far as it would go); responders could the proposers (27). Moreover, this trend toward hardly at all when the alternative was for the accept the offer by pulling the proposed tray the rejections was in the opposite direction of the proposer to be even more selfish (10/0 game) remaining distance (via the rod which came into finding for humans (23). When proposers offered (23). The differential rejection of unfair out- reach only as a result of the proposer’s pull) or non-8/2 alternatives (available in all but the 8/2 comes across the games suggests that people are could reject it by not pulling at all within 1 min. game), responders accepted them differentially 2 not sensitive solely to unfair distributions (7) nor The responder’s acceptance led to both subjects across the games (Friedman’s c 2 test = 10.00, solely to unfair intent (24) but to a combination being able to reach the food in their respective P = 0.012). In line with the principle of self- of both (8). If chimpanzees are sensitive to un- dishes. Rejection led to both getting nothing, interest to accept any nonzero offer, responders fairness and are negatively reciprocal, they would because the experimenter would remove all rejected 10/0 offers (in which the responder behave like Homo reciprocans (25), whereas if food dishes after the trial ended. There were receives nothing) more often than 5/5 offers they accept any nonzero offer regardless of four games (as in the study described above), all [Wilcoxon T+ test = 28.00, n = 8 (1 tie), P = alternatives for the proposer, they will be more played within a single session: 2/8, 5/5, 8/2, and 0.016] and marginally more often than 2/8 offers like the hypothetical Homo economicus (26). 10/0—each versus 8/2. The order of games was [Wilcoxon T+ test = 15.00, n = 7 (2 ties), P = Subjects were 11 chimpanzees from a group- counterbalanced across subjects. 0.063]. Indeed, the only offers rejected by re- housed colony at the Wolfgang Köhler Primate The most important finding is that respond- sponders more than 0% of the time were 10/0 Research Center (27). The proposer sat to the ers tended to accept any offer. As can be seen in offers (one-sample t test t9 = 4.735, P = 0.001). In left of the responder, who was in an adjacent Fig. 2, responders rejected 8/2 offers at overall short, responders did not reject unfair offers when the proposer had the option of making a fair offer; Fig. 2. Offers made by Proposer Payoffs Responder they accepted almost all nonzero offers; and they proposers and rejections Game Offers Proposer Responder Rejections reliably rejected only offers of zero.