PARTICIPATION IN VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATIONS
AND STATUS INCONSISTENCY
by
JOSEPH MATHIJS PETER KNAPEN
Candidaat, University of Tilburg, 1967 Doctorandus, University of Tilburg, 1970
A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
in
THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES
Department of Anthropology and Sociology
We accept this thesis as conforming
to the required standard
THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA
October 1981
(c) Joseph Mathijs Peter Knapen, 1981 In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission.
Department of Anthropology and Sociology
The University of British Columbia 2075 Wesbrook Place Vancouver, Canada V6T 1W5
Date November 28, 1981
nF-fi 17/19) i i
ABSTRACT
While it is an established fact that participation in voluntary organizations varies directly with social status, the more complex issue of the relationship between the pattern of individuals' rank positions in several status hierarchies and participation still remains unsettled.
The purpose of this study is to reexamine Lenski's proposition that status inconsistency is an obstacle to participation in voluntary organizations. The reasoning behind this proposition is that people who have inconsistent, or unequally evaluated, statuses are often exposed to disturbing experiences in social interaction. They react to those experiences with a tendency to avoid or withdraw from certain forms of social intercourse, such as participation in voluntary organizations. It is therefore hypothesized that persons with inconsistent statuses have fewer memberships and are less likely to hold office in voluntary organizations than individuals whose statuses are consistent.
The hypotheses are tested in a secondary analysis of survey data for samples of employed adults in two Canadian cities. The status dimensions are education, occupation, and income. Several status inconsistency variables are used, each defined in terms of different combinations of ranks on a pair of status dimensions. The analysis is guided by the assumption that a status inconsistency effect may be conceived as due to statistical interaction between the constituent status variables. Such effects might be present when an additive model of the relationships between two status variables and a given participation variable proves to fit the data inadequately.
The analyses, using a dummy-variable multiple regression format, reveal that differences between observed values on the participation variables and the values predicted by a model of additive status effects are generally small and do not show the patterns expected under the hypotheses. Moreover, a nonadditive model, which includes a status inconsistency variable in addition to the two status variables from which it is formed, fails to explain even a moderate amount more variance in the dependent variables than the corresponding additive model. These results suggest that inconsistency between achieved socioeconomic statuses has no appreciable effect on membership or office-holding, over and above the effects of the status variables themselves.
The conclusion is that the proposition of a negative association between status inconsistency and participation in voluntary organizations is not supported by the data of this research. It is suggested that these negative findings may be explained in part by dubious assumptions in the status inconsistency argument so far as it relates to participation and by methodological problems associated with identifying status inconsistency effects. However, the idea that frustrating and unpleasant social experiences may adversely affect participation in voluntary organizations is^ sensible and deserves further investigation. i v
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
ABSTRACT ii
LIST OF TABLES vii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS x
INTRODUCTION 1
The Research Problem 1
Purpose and Scope of the Study 3
Synopsis of the Thesis 5
CHAPTER 1 VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATIONS:
FUNCTIONS AND PARTICIPATION 7
Voluntary Organizations Defined 8
Voluntary Organizations and Social Structure 12
The Mass Society Perspective 13
The Pluralist View 16
Personal Consequences of Participation for Members 19 Voluntary Organizations in Modern Urban Society: An Appraisal 21
Extent of Membership ." 21
Active Involvement 24
Internal Operation of Organizations ,26
Concluding Remarks 27 V
Page
CHAPTER 2 THEORETICAL ARGUMENTS 31
Determinants and Conditions of Participation
in Voluntary Organizations 31
Status Inconsistency and Participation 37
The Concept of Status Inconsistency 37
Effects of Status Inconsistency: Findings from Previous Research 47 The Hypotheses 52
CHAPTER 3 METHODOLOGY 55
Data Sources and Samples 55
Measurement of the Variables 59
Dependent Variables 60
Independent Variables 69
Methods of Analysis 74
The Core Problem: Isolating the Effects of Status Inconsistency 74 Status Inconsistency Effects as Statistical Interaction 81
General Strategy in Data Analysis 85
CHAPTER 4 RESULTS OF THE ANALYSES 89
Status Inconsistency and Membership
in Voluntary Organizations 90
The Port Alberni Sample 90
The Vancouver Sample: Men 105
The Vancouver Sample: Employed Women 116
Summary 122 vi
Page
Status Inconsistency and Holding Office
in Voluntary Organizations 125
Findings for the Three Samples 126
Summary 141
CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 143
Conclusions 143
Some Reasons Why the Anticipated Effects
of Status Inconsistency Were Not Found 147
Problems in Defining Status Inconsistency ..... 148
The Unknown Factor: Experience of Stress 152
Withdrawal Only as a Last Resort 158
Methodological Retrospection 162
Analysis Model Appropriate? 162
The Problem of Multicollinearity 167
The Effects of Socioeconomic Status on Participation 173 Conditions of Participation: A Concluding Note 178
LIST OF REFERENCES 186
APPENDIX 197 vi i
LIST OF TABLES
Table Page
1. Number of Memberships in Voluntary Organizations for Port Alberni and Vancouver Samples (Percentages and Summary Statistics) 63
2. Number of Offices Held in Voluntary Organizations for Port Alberni and Vancouver Samples (Percentages and Summary Statistics) 68
3. Dummy-Variable Regression Analyses of the Number of Memberships in Voluntary Organizations on Education and Occupation: Additive and Nonadditive Models (Port Alberni Sample) 94
4. Observed Mean Number of Memberships and Deviations from Means Predicted Under Model of Additive Status Effects, by Educational and Occupational Status (Port Alberni Sample) 96
5. Summary of the Effect of Education-Occupation Status Inconsistency on Membership (Port Alberni Sample) . 100
6. Dummy-Variable Regression Analyses of Number of Memberships on Pairs of Status Variables: Additive and Nonadditive Models (Vancouver Sample: Men) .... 107
7. Observed Mean Number of Memberships and Deviations from Means Predicted Under Model of Additive Status Effects, by Pairs of Status Variables (Vancouver Sample: Men) 108
8. Summary of the Effects of Three Types of Status Inconsistency on Membership (Vancouver Sample: Men) 113
9. Dummy-Variable • Regression Analyses of Number of Memberships on Education and Occupation: Additive and Nonadditive Models (Vancouver Sample: Employed Women) 120 vi i i
Table Page
10. Observed Mean Number of Memberships and Deviations from Means Predicted Under Model of Additive Status Effects, by Educational and Occupational Status (Vancouver Sample: Employed Women) 121
11. Summary of the Effect of Education-Occupation Status Inconsistency on Membership (Vancouver Sample: Employed Women) 121
12. Dummy-Variable Regression Analyses of the Proportion of Respondents Holding Office in Voluntary Organizations on Education and Occupation: Additive and Nonadditive Models (Port Alberni Sample) 133
13. Observed Proportions Office-Holders and Deviations from Proportions Predicted Under Model of Additive Status Effects, by Educational and Occupational Status (Port Alberni Sample) 134
14. Summary of the Effect of Education-Occupation Status Inconsistency on Office-Holding (Port Alberni Sample) 134
15. Dummy-Variable Regression Analyses of the Proportion Office-Holders on Pairs of Status Variables: Additive and Nonadditive Models (Vancouver Sample: Men) 135
16. Observed Proportions Office-Holders and Deviations from Proportions Predicted Under Model of Additive Status Effects, by Pairs of Status Variables (Vancouver Sample: Men) 136
17. Summary of the Effects of Three Types of Status Inconsistency on Office-Holding (Vancouver Sample: Men) 138
18. Dummy-Variable Regression Analyses of the Proportion Office-Holders on Education and Occupation: Additive and Nonadditive Models (Vancouver Sample: Employed Women) 139 ix
Table Page
19. Observed Proportions Office-Holders and Deviations from Proportions Predicted Under Model of Additive Status Effects, by Educational and Occupational Status (Vancouver Sample: Employed Women) 140
20. Summary of the Effect of Education-Occupation Status Inconsistency on Office-Holding (Vancouver Sample: Employed Women) 140
21. Associations Between Measures of Socioeconomic Status and Participation in Voluntary Organizations for Port Alberni and Vancouver Samples 198
22. Associations Among Measures of Socioeconomic Status for Port Alberni and Vancouver Samples 199
23. Zero-Order Correlations, Means and Standard Deviations of Measures of Status, Degree of Status Inconsistency, and Participation (Port Alberni Sample. N=513) 200
24. Zero-Order Correlations, Means and Standard Deviations of Measures of Educational and Occupational Status, Degree of Status Inconsistency, and Participation (Vancouver Sample: Men. N=398 approximately) 201
25. Zero-Order Correlations, Means and Standard Deviations of Measures of Educational and Income Status, Degree of Status Inconsistency, and Participation (Vancouver Sample: Men. N=392 approximately) 202
26. Zero-Order Correlations, Means and Standard Deviations of Measures of Occupational and Income Status, Degree of Status Inconsistency, and Participation (Vancouver Sample: Men. N=384 approximately) 203
27. Zero-Order Correlations, Means and Standard Deviations of Measures of Status, Degree of Status Inconsistency, and Participation (Vancouver Sample: Employed Women. N=137) 204 X
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
To the members- of my advisory committee - George Gray,
Henry Hightower, Martin Meissner, and Reg Robson - I express my thanks for guiding me with their expertise, critical commentary, and patience to the completion of this dissertation. I am particularly grateful to Martin Meissner and George Gray, who successively acted as research supervisors and have been very generous in providing advice and encouragement. I also want to thank them for making the data available that were used in the research.
An invaluable contribution to this work has been the support in many ways of Brigitte Knapen. 1
INTRODUCTION
A striking facet of the social structure of urban industrialized society is the existence of numerous and diverse voluntary organizations. Such groups include, for example, civic and charitable organizations, recreational, hobby, and sports clubs, fraternal lodges, occupational associations, and a vast array of special-interest groups.
The importance of voluntary organizations for individual participants and for society as a whole has long been recognized. By participating in voluntary organizations individuals find a social context in which to pursue leisure activities; they get access to resources and information, and they have an opportunity to make new and more social contacts.
Further, inasmuch as voluntary organizations promote collective interests of members, they are a means to get things done. At the macro-level of social organization the significance of these groups lies in their capability to integrate individuals in their local community and to mediate between them and larger social units.
The Research Problem
Although participation in voluntary organizations is relatively extensive, a large part of the Canadian adult population does not belong to any of these groups, and there are many members who do not take an active part in their 2
organization. Given that this form of social participation has major consequences for the social system and for individuals, it
is important to know its determinants and to understand the
conditions under which people are likely to become involved in
voluntary organizations.
It is a firmly and empirically ascertained fact that
participation in voluntary organizations is related to social
status. In general, a person is more likely to be a member of a
voluntary organization, to be an active participant, and to be
an officer or committee member to the extent that he or she is,
among other things, better educated, has an occupation with
higher prestige, earns a higher income, and has a more highly
evaluated ethnic background. But since people occupy
rank positions in several dimensions of social status, the
question was posed as to whether the relations among their
positions on the various status dimensions may perhaps have
something to do with the way they think, feel, and behave. In
particular, it has been suggested that individuals having
statuses that are inconsistent (or poorly crystallized,
incongruent, imbalanced--other labels that have been used to
denote the same phenomenon) have difficulty in establishing
rewarding patterns of social interaction and as a result tend to
withdraw from voluntary social relationships, such as
participation in voluntary organizations.
This argument, which was first advanced and empirically
examined by Lenski (1956b) 25 years ago, appeared to at least
have the potential to significantly increase our ability to 3
account for variation in participation in voluntary organizations and to raise sociological understanding of that phenomenon above the level of encyclopaedic, knowledge. Up to now, however, this promise has not been fulfilled. For in several other attempts to establish that status inconsistency has an unfavourable impact on participation the hypothesis has not escaped unscathed. The findings from previous research are mixed and contradictory.
The problem addressed in the present study, then, is once again: Is status inconsistency a condition that inhibits individual participation in voluntary organizations?
Specifically, the research question is: When we take into account the effects of the status variables themselves, do individuals with inconsistent statuses belong to fewer voluntary organizations and are they less likely to hold office than status consistent individuals?
Purpose and Scope of the Study
As already said, a satisfactory answer to those questions on the basis of empirical research has so far not yet been given. Yet the concept of status inconsistency is one of the most intuitively compelling in social stratification theory, and the argument linking inconsistency with participation has some plausibility. It seems premature to dismiss it as invalid or to conclude that research on this topic' is no longer useful or necessary. In this situation it is desirable to try to strengthen the theoretical basis of the status inconsistency 4
argument, to keep searching for solutions to the methodological problems involved, and to subject the hypothesis of a negative relationship between status inconsistency and participation in voluntary organizations to further empirical tests.
The main purpose of the present investigation is to extensively retest the above hypothesis and to assess the merits of the status inconsistency argument as a sociological explanation of differences in participation.
In the title of the dissertation, "participation in voluntary organizations" is intentionally placed before,"status
inconsistency". By putting the two components in that order I have meant to indicate that this study originates in an interest
in the problem why some people participate in voluntary
organizations while others do not, and more specifically in the
social conditions that inhibit or facilitate this behaviour. But
the study does not purport to provide a general explanation of
formal social participation. Its scope is much more limited, for
it deals with only one such possible explanatory variable, to
wit, the degree of status inconsistency. Nor is it, on the other
hand, my intention to carry out a comprehensive test of status
inconsistency theory. Status inconsistency has been used to
explain differences in a wide variety of individual behaviours
and attitudes. But this study examines the implications of the
status inconsistency argument for only one particular type of
behaviour, namely, participation in voluntary organizations. 5
Synopsis of the Thesis
In Chapter 1 the starting-points of the study are outlined with a discussion of some of the functions voluntary organizations have been said to perform. These claims are evaluated in the light of available empirical evidence on the extent and nature of participation in these groups in modern
North American societies.
Chapter 2 begins with a brief look at the ways sociologists have tried to account for the variation in participation. Then the status inconsistency concept is discussed and the main arguments concerning the relationship between inconsistency and participation are presented. Drawing upon these and upon the results of previous research I have formulated four hypotheses to be tested.
This testing involves a secondary analysis of existing data, and Chapter 3 describes the data sources and samples.
Further, the operationalization of the dependent and independent variables is outlined and the analytic strategy adopted in the research is introduced and discussed. Ample room is made for a discussion of the methodological difficulties typically encountered in this kind of research, particularly the problem of separating the effect of status inconsistency from status effects.
Chapter 4 contains the results of the analyses. It is unavoidably data-intensive, since the number of analyses is large and there are many results to present. These show that status inconsistency has no appreciable effect on membership and 6
office-holding in voluntary organizations separately from the effects of status per se.
In Chapter 5 the conclusions are stated and the implications drawn out. The major conclusion is that as far as participation in voluntary organizations is concerned an explanation in terms of status consistency and inconsistency is unnecessary and unparsimonious. Reasons for the lack of support for the hypotheses are sought in some dubious assumptions in the status inconsistency argument. But the possibility of serious methodological shortcomings is also considered. The chapter and the study are concluded with a suggestion for further research into the conditions of social participation. 7
CHAPTER 1
VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATIONS: FUNCTIONS AND PARTICIPATION
What are voluntary organizations? Why study voluntary organizations? What is it about these groups that makes them socially significant and sociologically interesting? These questions form the starting-point for a general discussion in the first part of this chapter of the main concepts and perspectives in sociological thinking about the roles of voluntary organizations in the social structure of society and
in the life of individuals.
To what extent voluntary organizations can and actually do perform the various functions attributed to them in social theory is assessed next. This appraisal is based on existing empirical information about the extent and quality of participation in voluntary organizations. Part of the vast literature of sociological research in this area is briefly reviewed.
These introductory observations do not directly bear upon the research problem proper. They serve to sketch the broader context within which the social and scientific relevance of the research problem can be assessed. 8
Voluntary Organizations Defined
A voluntary organization is commonly defined as a private group of persons, more or less formally organized, which exists to serve some common interests of the members or to pursue a
specific goal, and in which membership, participation, and withdrawal depend upon the individual's own choice. Such a group
is nonprofit and its members are usually not paid for their activities (see, for example, Axelrod, 1956; Sills, 1968:362-3;
Smith and Freedman, I972:viii). For a clear comprehension of the phenomenon of voluntary organization it is useful to examine
this definition more closely.
One of the problems in defining voluntary organizations concerns the precise meaning of the term "voluntary".
Voluntariness is typically thought to be incompatible with physical or legal coercion, ascribed status, and the need to
earn a living. That is, organizations in which membership is mandatory or acquired through birth or determined by direct
economic remuneration are not voluntary. On the positive side,
voluntariness is generally held to involve a relatively high degree of discretion and freedom of choice.1
How these criteria should be interpreted and applied in
order to distinguish voluntary from involuntary organizations is
1 It should be pointed out that the adjective "voluntary" refers primarily to the behaviour of individuals and only in a derived sense to organizations. Strictly speaking, this term applies to the organization while acting essentially as members. 9
a matter in dispute. For instance, there is the question as to whether or not trade unions and other work-related associations and churches should be included in the category of voluntary organizations. Furthermore, as Rose (1965:392-3) has noted, the
stipulation that the essential, defining characteristic of voluntary organizations is that entrance, exit, and involvement
rest on the individual's free choice, makes the above definition virtually tautological, since "voluntary" implies free choice.
The notions of voluntariness and freedom of choice also
imply that a person makes an individual and conscious decision
to join a particular voluntary organization, after having
weighed the advantages and disadvantages of such an action.
However, an individual's "free choice" is always limited to a
greater or less extent by social pressures. These social
pressures are of three major types: (a) the opportunity
structure, which affects choice by presenting a limited number
and variety of alternatives open to the individual; (b) direct
personal influence of significant others—parents, children,
spouse, friends; (c) the values, norms, and sanctions of society
and its subgroups which bias a person's choices (Palisi, 1968).
The voluntary character of behaviour and of organizations is
restricted by these social pressures in that they influence or
even compel people to • join and take part in voluntary
organizations. It has been suggested that voluntariness
therefore is a matter of degree, something that is best
conceptualized as a continuous dimension rather than as a
dichotomy (see Rose, 1965:392; Smith et al., 1972:163-5). Thus, 10
it becomes an empirical matter to determine whether and to what extent a person's participation in voluntary organizations is voluntary.1
Voluntariness is only one of several dimensions implied in
the voluntary organization concept. When voluntary organizations are contrasted with formal organizations that are nonvoluntary
(particularly, businesses, corporations, government agencies),
the following criteria, each of which is a variable, seem to be essential.
1. Voluntary organizations are those organizations in which
affiliation, participation, and resignation are optional,
in the sense that these actions depend to a large extent on
the choice and decision of the individual, rather than
being mandatory^or coerced.
2. Membership is obtained and maintained by meeting certain
minimal conditions, usually payment of dues and sharing a
common orientation. Specific performance, such as regular
attendance, is usually not a condition for retaining
1 Palisi went a step further and argued that "since individuals and groups are always influenced by social group pressures, there is no free choice, there is no voluntary behavior, and finally, there are no [formal voluntary organizations]" (Palisi, 1968:400). He proposed to replace the concept of voluntariness by the concept of differential social force. It is difficult to see, however, that this substitution of an admittedly vague notion by another equally hazy notion leads to a better understanding of voluntary organizations and voluntary participation. Palisi's standpoint is dictated by his unnecessarily narrow definition of voluntariness, while he uses "social force" in a very broad sense. "Voluntariness" means the absence of any social force, which in turn is defined as any factor that influences a person to behave in a certain way and is not the product of rational choice. 11
membership.
3. The majority of members do not receive payment for their
part-time activities in the organization; they participate
as volunteers.
4. The coordination and control of the activities of the
members are in principle democratic, rather than
autocratic.
5. Voluntary organizations are established to serve and promote
primarily the interests of their membership or some segment
of society, rather than those of owners.
Voluntary organizations come in many different types and in large numbers. Examples are political and civic groups (such as rate payers associations), health and charity organizations
(such as the Kinsmen Rehabilitation Foundation), fraternal and veterans societies (such as the Masons and the Royal Canadian
Legion), ethnic associations (such as the Italian-Canadian
Club), parents associations (such as parent-teacher associations), educational and hobby clubs (such as the power
squadron and a pigeon-racing club), sports and recreational clubs (such as a Softball or a bowling club), cultural organizations (such as the Vancouver Historical Society), professional and business associations (such as the Canadian
Sociology and Anthropology Association and the Jaycees), churches and church-related groups (such as the men's or women's club at a church). 1 2
Voluntary Organizations and Social Structure
Sociological interest in voluntary organizations emanates
from what may be considered to be the distinctive task of
sociology: the analysis of the social organization of groups,
formal organizations, communities, and societies.1
The social organization of a community, and of modern urban
society in general, is built to a large extent through formal organizations. This is not to deny that the informal social
relationships between family members, relatives, friends, or neighbours are basic elements of community social structure. But a large part of a person's social life takes place in formal organizations, be it in school, work-organization, hospital, army, prison, or in voluntary organizations. This last type of
formal organization as one of the loci of individual involvement
in organized social life is what concerns us here.
A prominent proposition in sociological thinking about the meaning and significance of voluntary organizations asserts that
they serve to integrate individuals into their local community and the larger society (see Litwak, 1961; Babchuk and Edwards,
1 The term "social organization" is used to refer to the relatively stable patterns of social relations, as expressed in regular interaction and communication, of individuals and other social units within a given social system. In this sense the term is almost synonymous with social structure. It is distinguished from "formal organization", i.e., a group in which the activities of individual members and various subgroups are coordinated by formally stated rules that govern the relations between incumbents of specifically designated positions and that define the roles they are expected to perform in the pursuit of explicitly formulated goals. 13
1965). However, voluntary organizations have not always been viewed in such a favourable light. As a review of the literature shows, over the years there has been a remarkable reversal in the way sociologists have interpreted the role of these groups in the social organization of community and society.
The Mass Society Perspective
Early social theorists regarded the proliferation of formal voluntary organizations in their modern form as an indication of the emergence of mass society. A central theme in the writings of Durkheim, Toennies, Simmel, Park, Wirth, and others concerns the transformation of a simple homogeneous traditional society with a "natural" consensus and solidarity into a modern, heterogeneous and highly differentiated society, and the consequences of this transition for the social order of the new, urbanized society.
It was suggested that the increase in the scale of social organization—brought about by increasing division of labour, accelerating geographical and social mobility, expanding range of transportation and communication--was accompanied by a breakdown of the primary-group structure of society. In this view, kinship, the church, neighbourhood, and local community have lost their importance as sources of social integration and mechanisms of social control. There is instead a greater dependence upon and involvement in formal secondary groups,
including voluntary organizations, which serve as substitute for
the intimate and integrating bonds of kinship and friendship. 1 4
This shift from primary ties to secondary and segmental
interaction with larger numbers of people was also taken to mean
that social relationships were becoming more impersonal,
instrumental, superficial, and transitory.
The speculations by these social theorists about modern
urban society and its emergent ways of life, and especially the
bleak picture of disintegration and isolation associated with
living in large cities, were not supported by the findings of
empirical studies done in cities, since the late 1940's. Careful
ethnographic and survey research into the social participation
of city residents showed the persistence of informal social life
in urban areas.1 Close relations with relatives, friendship
ties, and contacts with acquaintances—who may live either in
the neighbourhood or more likely elsewhere in the city—continue
to be very important for most urbanites. The people involved in
these social networks may be dispersed throughout the city and
the social bonds linking them may be less plainly visible in the
city than in a small town or village, there is no convincing
evidence that such informal social relationships are absent or
less close.
Similarly, there has been little by way of empirical
support for the thesis that involvement in formal secondary
groups is incompatible with maintaining strong primary group
relations. If anything, these two modes of social participation
1 A summary of this body of research appears in Greer (1962:89- 97). See also Craven and Wellman (1973) and Kasarda and Janowitz (1 974) . 15
appear to support and reinforce each other. Members of voluntary organizations tend to have more numerous ties with relatives, friends, neighbours, and fellow workers than do nonmembers
(Axelrod, 1956; Reigrotzki, 1956:184-9; Allardt et al., 1958).
Conversely, individuals rich in kinship and friendship resources belong to more voluntary organizations and participate more actively in these groups (Booth, 1972). Besides, as we now know, voluntary organizations play a much more limited role in the social life of people than was assumed by the early theorists of urban society.
This relative lack of participation in organized social life beyond the narrow confines of kinship and friendship was deplored by many sociologists and political scientists of the period after the second world war. Then the prevailing view, in contrast with the earlier conceptions, was that voluntary organizations are powerful integrative forces that prevent the slide towards a mass society.
The mass society concept is a logical extension of the depiction of the modern large city as a dense and heterogeneous, settlement where detachment from primary groups, individual isolation, and anonymity are the typical qualities of life
(Wirth, 1938). Isolation or atomization is also what characterizes, at the individual level, the mass society. On the structural level, its basic feature is the virtual absence of autonomous secondary groups--or the lack of participation in them where they do exist--that lie between the individual and his primary groups on the one hand and large bureaucratic 16
structures with great power on the other. In Wilensky's words:
On the one side stands the individual in his narrow circle of kin and close friends, immersed in his parochial concerns, with an almost bucolic contentment, retreating from a world of multiplying crises, grown too complex. On the other side stand a powerful state and the great mass organizations of the city—corporation, political party, trade union— centrally controlled by officials and an active minority, as distant from the rank-and-file as the media of mass communication. And nothing stands between. (Wilensky, 1960:560. Emphasis added).
Such a structural vacuum, it was frequently argued, poses a serious threat to the stability of the society and its democratic system. A basic hypothesis of mass society theory is that individuals who are isolated, who are poorly integrated
into community and society, and who are cut off from the administrative structures whose policies and decisions affect them, will be the most susceptible to the appeal of totalitarian
ideologies and will become the prime targets for mobilization and manipulation by leaders of extremist mass movements
(Kornhauser, 1959).
The Pluralist View
One of the major bulwarks against the development of an atomistic mass society is the existence of a multiplicity of
independent secondary groups to represent the many divergent
interests in society. According to this so-called pluralist perspective, a layer of secondary groups, of which voluntary organizations are the major example, forms a diversified 1 7
intermediate level of social organization filling in the space between individuals and society. In that sense, voluntary organizations are "interstitial" (Booth, 1975; Edwards and
Booth, 1973:5). They connect and intersect with the major institutional structures of society (the family, religion, education, the economy, the polity) and form the linkages between these institutions and individuals. As mediating mechanisms voluntary organizations therefore are a crucial factor in the social and political integration of society.1
From such a point of view Rose (1965:418-24), for example, has ascribed the following functions to voluntary organizations.
First, they distribute influence and power at the grass-roots level and counteract the trend towards centralization and consolidation of power in large political and economic organizations. Second, voluntary organizations contribute to the education and socialization of their members by helping them understand how social, political, and economic processes operate
1 The social and political significance of voluntary organizations were already recognized by de Tocgueville and Durkheim. De Tocqueville ([1835] 1954) argued that private, voluntary, special-interest groups provide a check and counterforce against the growing power of centralized government in modern societies. He saw voluntary organizations as indispensable for the preservation of individual freedoms and the maintenance of a stable democratic society. Durkheim (1957) stressed that individuals cannot relate themselves directly to such large entities as communities and society. Their social integration into society requires the existence of intermediate subgroups small enough to allow direct interaction among most members of these groups. He suggested that in modern industrialized society occupational associations are particularly suited to fulfil these mediating and integrating functions. 18
in society. In addition, they provide a training-ground for future social and political leaders (see also Hausknecht,
1962:10; Lipset et al., 1956:69-92). Third, voluntary organizations are parapolitical in nature and are potential action groups. As such they can be powerful agents of social change and innovation. But they may equally be a reactionary force trying to maintain the status quo and -to preserve traditional social institutions. Fourth, the existence of a variety of voluntary organizations leads, through overlapping memberships, to cross-pressures which decrease the probability of severe social conflict along a single line of cleavage in society. Membership in several organizations means segmental participation and limited commitment to each group. Such weak interpersonal ties across group boundaries establish intergroup relations, which promote tolerance and which are the bases of macrosocial integration (see also Blau, 1974:623).
Following a slightly different and more recent approach, one might say that participation in voluntary organizations involves a person in a social network of interaction and communication (Curtis and Jackson, I977:chapter 8; Craven and
Wellman, 1973). In contrast with the small and close-knit networks of primary ties with kin and friends, a network based on formal social participation relationships is loosely knit but extensive. That is, the ties between the members of the net are generally weak and there are many more indirect links.
Viewed from the angle of the social organization of the community, such large loose-knit communicative networks with 19
many indirect ties are important because they connect a great number of individuals, groups, and larger collectivities with one another. They establish channels of (potential) communication and influence between these social units and can thereby serve to integrate them and to coordinate their activities. The significance of multiple organization memberships is that they create links between several separate networks. A person who belongs to two or more voluntary organizations connects the members of each group to those of the other, and is therefore instrumental in expanding the range of network connections that is available to them.
As an important part of the community's communication network voluntary organizations can be used to mobilize people
for collective action when some issue presents itself that is of concern to the community or a segment of it. By participating in voluntary organizations individuals also obtain access to the various resources (information, services, funds) that flow through this network. The more extensive the network linkages based on overlapping memberships in organizations of different types, the greater the number and diversity of people who can be
reached and the wider the range of resources that are available.
Personal Consequences of Participation for Members
In discussions of the role of voluntary organizations a distinction is often made between the functions of these groups
for the social structure of the larger social system and the 20
consequences of participation in voluntary organizations for the members themselves (see Babchuk and Edwards, 1965; Sills, 1968).
From a social-psychological perspective voluntary organizations are considered important because they are a source of social and emotional support for their members and give them a sense of identification with a small, meaningful group. Social interaction within the context of voluntary organizations provides the basis for friendship and acquaintanceship among members. These networks of informal social relations within the organization
can be postulated to be a mechanism that performs functions similar to those performed by the existence of voluntary associations within the context of the larger society, to wit, to facilitate the integration of the member into the association and thereby into the larger system as well (Cutler, 1973:144).
Furthermore, as Hausknecht (1962:119) has suggested, participation in voluntary organizations can extend a person's social horizon beyond the narrow circle of relatives, close friends, and neighbours. It provides opportunities for broader and more diverse social experiences, and hence for "self- realization" .
Participation in voluntary organizations may also have "the function of social and economic advancement" (Rose, 1965:423).
Membership of social clubs in particular is often a means to enhance one's prestige, to come into contact with influential people, or to create and maintain business relations. 21
Another benefit said to accrue to members of voluntary organizations derives from the educational function mentioned earlier. Participation in the activities of the organization gives members an opportunity to acquire organizational skills and to develop leadership qualities.
Voluntary Organizations in Modern Urban Society: An Appraisal
The various arguments reviewed above contain rather idealized conceptions of what voluntary organizations ought to be and to do in a plural and democratic society. To what extent do these idealizations correspond with the facts? There now exists a considerable amount of empirical information that enables us to assess whether voluntary organizations do indeed perform the diverse functions attributed to them by social theory, and mass society/pluralist theory in particular. The factors that are pertinent to such an appraisal include (a) the extent of membership in voluntary organizations; (b) the degree of involvement by members in these groups; and (c) the characteristics and nature of the organizations themselves. A brief look at some of the empirical evidence as it relates to these issues is in order.
Extent of Membership
If voluntary organizations are so important for the integration of individuals into the larger society and for the 22
preservation of a stable democratic system as the pluralist thesis stipulates, then surely membership in voluntary organizations should be frequent and widespread. This appears not to be the case, however. Data from national sample surveys conducted in the United States and in Canada between 1954 and
1968 indicate that at the most about half of the adult population (between 36 and 51 per cent) in each of the two countries belonged to voluntary organizations other than trade unions and that no more than one-third of adult Canadians and
Americans were members of more than one voluntary organization.
The figures are higher, of course, when union membership is taken into account. In Canada between 55 and 64 per cent of the respondents reported membership in voluntary organizations including unions, while the membership rates for samples from the United States hovered around 55 per cent. The percentages of persons who belonged to two or more organizations ranged from 21 to 36 per cent (see Wright and Hyman, 1958:287; Hausknecht,
1962:23; Hyman and Wright, 1971:195-6; Almond and Verba,
1963:302; Curtis, 1.97 la: 1 54-7, l97lb:874-5; Frizzell and Zureik,
1974). These national estimates of the extent of membership in voluntary organizations are generally in line with the findings from several local studies (see Axelrod, 1956; Zimmer and
Hawley, 1 959; Curtis and Jackson, 1977:192f f). Warburton
(1969:81-2), for instance, found that 46 per cent of his sample of adults from the Greater Victoria area did not belong to any voluntary organization except possibly a work-related organization (i.e., union or professional association). Only 27 23
per cent of the respondents were members of more than one voluntary organization.
For countries outside , North America even lower rates of membership in voluntary organizations have been reported (e.g.,
Booth, 1975; Curtis, 1971a, 1971b; Almond and Verba,
I963:chapter 11; Reigrotzki, 1956:164).
I should immediately add, however, that the evidence from the various national and local surveys is not uniform.1 To illustrate, Babchuk and Booth (1969) reported that 80 per cent of their panel of Nebraska respondents belonged to at least one voluntary organization, and almost half of them (46 per cent) were members of three or more organizations. They also noted that discrepancies in the membership rates reported in various studies are probably in part ^due to differences in the way voluntary organizations were defined and to different techniques of sampling, data collection, and analysis.2 However, there is little disagreement about the fact that membership, involvement, and office-holding in voluntary organizations are class-biased in favour of members of the higher social strata.
1 Much of this research literature has been reviewed by Smith and Freedman (1972:chapter 5) and Smith (1975).
2 Babchuk (1973) has pointed out that most surveys of participation in voluntary organizations are probably biased toward underestimating membership rates because of the exclusion of certain groups of the population (the young, the aged) and also because of such problems as interpretation of questions and recall by the respondent. 24
Active Involvement
Even more than membership per se, the degree to which members are involved in their organization is of importance for assessing the integrative function of voluntary organizations and for determining whether members actually receive the benefits participation is alleged to provide. When studies of voluntary organizations have focused on this aspect they generally found that the majority of organization members participate in a rather erratic manner. They pay their dues, but otherwise are not very actively involved in the organization.
The proportion of members who attend meetings regularly, who sit on committees, or who hold office usually is small (Axelrod,
1956; Warburton, 1969:84-7; Greer, 1962:91). And it is this minority who, together with elected officers and the hired staff, in effect "run" the organization.
What do these research findings of the studies cited here and many others imply for the evaluation of the roles of voluntary organizations in contemporary North American societies? Since large segments of the population are not affiliated with voluntary organizations and only a minority of those who do belong are active participants, it would appear that voluntary organizations are not nearly as important instruments of social integration, mediation, and diffusion of power as is envisaged in the pluralist ideal. Further, the fact that multiple organization membership is relatively rare means only limited possibilities for cross-pressures - through overlapping memberships. Consequently, the effectiveness of 25
voluntary organizations in mitigating social and political conflicts and in reducing the risk of lasting cleavages in society may be exaggerated. Besides, it is not a priori evident that participation in voluntary organizations always has a salutary influence in terms of promoting stability and moderation. What makes that assumption questionable is the tendency of people to join those voluntary organizations and other interest groups whose objectives are in accord with their own. The existence of a multiplicity of such groups, each pursuing its own limited interests, therefore means also competition and strife for advantage. These processes, in turn, may increase the possibility of conflict and divisiveness.
Another point of criticism follows from the overwhelming evidence that participation in voluntary organizations, irrespective of whether it is mere membership or active involvement or leadership, is positively associated with social status. Since this is true, it is difficult to see how voluntary organizations make a significant contribution to the education and socialization of the population; people of lower social status, those who can gain the most from participation in voluntary organizations (learning social and organizational skills, comprehension of social and political processes, opportunities for social mobility, access to resources, and so on) frequently are not members. Whatever personal benefits and advantages result from participation, they are not distributed uniformly throughout society (Hausknecht, 1962:122-3; Warburton,
1969:95). 26
Internal Operation of Organizations
Finally, how far it can be maintained that voluntary organizations are arenas for self-government by their membership and places for training and practice in democracy depends not only on the extent to which members seize the opportunity for active participation, but above all on the prevalence of democratic processes in the organizations themselves. Like any other kind of formal organization, voluntary organizations tend to develop bureaucratic and oligarchic characteristics as they grow older and become larger. The internal structure of an organization reflects the demands and pressures from the environment in which the organization has to operate. It is logical, then, that professionalization and bureaucratization, which are so widespread in modern industrial society, are also manifest in voluntary organizations, especially the larger, more powerful ones. At the sa'me time, in most organizations the average member participates little and is willing to leave the responsibility for the routine functioning of the organization to the leaders and a handful of active members. This, coupled with the influence of the above factors, contributes to the development of oligarchy (Michels, [1915] 1958; Lipset et al.,
1956) .
Bureaucratic and professional leadership, oligarchic control, and "plebiscitary membership" (Greer, 1962:105) in many voluntary organizations are serious' impediments to the healthy functioning of democratic processes in such groups. For critics of the mass society and pluralist arguments this situation has 27
been reason to question the efficacy of voluntary organizations as a counter-influence to the massifying tendencies in modern industrial society. Indeed,
voluntary associations may themselves have structural characteristics parallel to those identified by mass society theorists at the societal level and thereby actually serve to reinforce rather than to mitigate the alienative consequences ascribed to mass society (Cutler, 1973:143).
Concluding Remarks
The moderate rates of membership, low levels of active involvement, and oligarchic tendencies in voluntary organizations, which empirical research has revealed, have given cause for a more cautious and more critical assessment of the role of voluntary organizations. Thus, Hausknecht (1962:chapter
7) concluded his study with the somewhat pessimistic observation that in the past voluntary organizations may have performed the political and social functions traditionally attributed to them by social theory—namely, maintaining an "informed citizenry", distributing power and influence, contributing to political socialization and to crystallization of interest and opinion, bringing about social innovation and reform, promoting "human fellowship"--, but that their significance in these areas has declined in contemporary North American societies.
This is accentuated by the fact that the state and its administrative subsidiaries have steadily taken over the responsibility for the handling of major issues and problems 28
that in former times were left to the care of voluntary organizations. Similarly, large centrally-controlled private organizations with their expert apparatus have often displaced the small and less strongly organized voluntary groups as the accepted spokesmen for various interests (Mayntz, 1960;
Rossides, 1966:32-6). And yet these government agencies and national private organizations may also stimulate the formation and maintenance of local voluntary organizations. In order to operate successfully within local communities and neighbourhoods, the external agencies need to have points of contact with the residents of those areas. Local voluntary groups are used as channels of communication, as means to distribute and organize resources, and as mechanisms of social control (Taub et al., 1977).
Although there are good reasons for questioning 1 the most pretentious claims of the social and political pluralists about the functions of voluntary organizations for society and individuals, we should not lose sight of the fact that there is also empirical support for some of the hypothesized consequences of participation in voluntary organizations. It has been shown that participation influences political attitudes and encourages political activity. Persons who belong to voluntary organizations are more likely to have a feeling of political potency, to be interested in and informed about political matters, and to vote in elections (see Almond and Verba,
I963:chapter 11; Lipset et al., I956:chapter 5; Olsen, 1972;
Curtis and Jackson, 1977:209-14; Reigrotzki, 1956:176-80; Greer 29
and Orleans, 1962) .
In a more general sense, participation in voluntary organizations increases contact with and factual knowledge of the local community and the larger society, and it stimulates awareness of social problems and involvement in civic services.
In short, participation is part of a "configuration of linkages" between the individual and his social environment (Hausknecht,
1966:chapter 6; see also Allardt et al., 1958). As was mentioned earlier, there is evidence that membership in voluntary organizations results in personal friendships with other members
(Curtis and Jackson, 1977:193; Kasarda and Janowitz, 1974) and is positively correlated with informal social participation in general (Axelrod, 1956; Reigrotzki, 1956:184-9). And Phillips
(1967) found that both formal and informal social participation are associated with positive feelings and happiness.
In conclusion a few remarks about the connection of participation in voluntary organizations with leisure. This issue is seldom explicitly treated in theoretical discussions of the functions of voluntary organizations. Participation in voluntary organizations is a form of organized leisure activity.
This is most obvious in the case of sport and hobby clubs, fraternal lodges, social clubs, and so forth. The main purpose of these so-called expressive voluntary organizations is to meet the recreational and leisure needs of their members. But instrumental associations (such as social service organizations and action groups), whose objectives and activities are primarily directed outside the group itself toward the society
/ 30
or some segment of it, also have a leisure character in the sense that they make demands on the discretionary time of the participating members.1 It may be that voluntary organizations are no longer able or suited to perform the same social and political functions as they have done for the last two centuries. But these groups, in their multitude and variety, provide the arenas in which people can express their leisure and they are undoubtedly an important part of the social organization of modern urban society.
Not everyone, however, is affiliated with voluntary organizations, as we have seen. A large proportion of the
Canadian population belongs to such groups, but there are also many people who are nonparticipants. Which factors determine participation and what are the conditions under which individuals become involved in these groups? It is this issue of the determinants and conditions of participation in voluntary organizations that forms the wider context and provides the specific problem of this investigation.
1 On the classification of voluntary organizations according to their functions and objectives along an instrumental-expressive dimension, see Gordon and Babchuk (1959) and Jacoby and Babchuk (1963) . 31
CHAPTER 2
THEORETICAL ARGUMENTS
Determinants and Conditions of Participation in Voluntary Organizations
It is well-documented that individual participation in voluntary organizations is not distributed uniformly throughout society. Some segments of the population are more likely to be joiners than others. Similarly, certain organization members are active participants,'while others are hot. In fact, the bulk of sociological reseach on formal social participation has been concerned with the question: what kind of people join and participate actively in voluntary organizations, and what kind of people do not belong, or if they do, are nominal members only?
One could take the view that such differences are basically the result of people's differing personalities and needs; that those who participate in voluntary organizations do so to satisfy a "need for affiliation". Such a psychological explanation in terms of preferences and dispositions of
individuals overlooks the many social background characteristics and social structural factors that affect participation in 32
voluntary organizations.1
Sociologists have typically approached the problem of differential participation by examining membership, involvement, and leadership in relation to sociodemographic and role characteristics of individuals. The list of these variables is long and varied. It includes, for example, age, sex, physical ability, ethnicity and race, education, religion, length of residence in the community, mass media exposure, influences of significant others, and so on. And the number of empirical studies in which such individual social characteristics have been examined as possible determinants of participation is too large even to mention. Besides, it is unnecessary to discuss the . findings of those investigations in great detail here, since extensive reviews and summaries of that body of research literature are available elsewhere (e.g., Payne et al., 1972;
Smith and Freedman, !972:chapter 6).2 An exception must be made
1 This remark is not intended to suggest that social factors are the only influences on participation or that this form of behaviour is not also affected by psychological and social- psychological factors. On the contrary. It is more than likely that the impact of social factors is often mediated by personality traits, individual capacities and dispositions, and attitudes. See Mulford and Klonglan ' (1972), Reddy and Smith (1972), and Smith and Freedman (1972:173-5) for reviews of the literature on psychological determinants of participation in voluntary organizations.
2 The review by Payne et al. (1972) is of added value because it contains a synopsis of the major hypotheses about the relationships between social background variables and participation in voluntary organizations that have been tested and confirmed in empirical research (mainly in the United States) up to 1971. These propositions are rated in terms of strength and direction of the relationships and according to the consistency with which the relationship has been found. 33
for the relationship between social status and participation in voluntary organizations. This issue has direct relevance for the theoretical argument to be presented shortly and for the interpretation of the results of this study.
No other variable has been used more often to explain differences in participation, and no other individual attribute has more consistently been found to be related to various measures of participation than social status. Membership, attendance, and office-holding all become more frequent as the level of socioeconomic status increases, regardless of whether education, occupation, income, or some composite index are used to measure this variable (see, for example, Hodge and Treiman,
1968; Hodge, 1970; Hyman and Wright, 1971; Curtis and Jackson,
1977:chapter 8).
The type of voluntary organization people belong to also varies with status. Persons of lower socioeconomic status are most likely to belong to trade unions, fraternal societies, recreational clubs—organizations whose objectives are concrete and directly related to the personal interests of members and which provide immediate and practical benefits. In contrast, persons from the middle and upper socioeconomic strata tend to join voluntary organizations that have more abstract and intangible goals, particularly, civic and social service groups, cultural organizations, social clubs, and professional and business associations (see Mayntz, 1960).
The evidence from empirical research on the effects of socioeconomic status as well as other social rank 34
characteristics points in the same direction: "Healthy middle- aged, highly educated, native born, white-collar, and upwardly mobile members of the labor force belong to more formal voluntary groups than persons in other categories" (Booth,
1972:187). Social status, in its various forms, is an important determinant of participation.
Although participation in voluntary organizations is evidently related to many different background characteristics and social attributes of individuals, our understanding of these relationships remains fragmentary. To some extent this can be attributed to an overriding concern with the empirical identification of individual determinants and correlates of participation rather than with developing explanations that are informed by theory. Thus, despite the wealth of data accumulated in this area of sociological research over the years, we still
"have little more than a vast number of empirical correlations, a series of largely isolated hypotheses (or rather "hunches"), and a lot of loose ends.
However, there exists a certain amount of research work that has moved beyond the basic stage of demonstrating associations between participation and specific individual characteristics, and has tried to offer more profound explanations for the variation in participation in voluntary organizations. Generally speaking, these explanations share a focus on the social conditions and structural factors that facilitate or hinder participation. What makes these studies stand out from the kind of research referred to above is the 35
concern to provide at least some theoretical argument as to why and how these conditions can be expected to make it easy or difficult for people to join and become involved in voluntary organizations.
The study by Allardt and his associates (1958) illustrates this approach. They hypothesized that successful and rewarding participation in a given form of leisure activity leads to more participation in that activity and to participation in more activities. They found that the respondents (young people aged
10 to 29) who took part in a wide range of leisure activities
(such as reading books and periodicals, going to dances and movies, involvement in gangs and peer groups, visiting) were more likely to belong to a voluntary organization and to hold multiple memberships than those with a narrow range of act ivit ies.
How the temporal dimension of human activities affects opportunities for social participation has been investigated by
Blakelock (i960) and Gray (1975). In both studies it was found that shift workers participated less in voluntary organizations than non-shift workers. This difference is related to differential opportunities for such participation. These opportunities are a function of the degree in which a person's time schedule matches the scheduling of- community leisure activities, including the activities of voluntary organizations.
Shift workers operate on a time schedule that is out of phase with the modal time schedule of the community. This condition of
"temporal marginality" .reduces their chances to participate in
/ 36
organized social life.1
There is yet another dimension to the relationship between work and social participation. As Meissner (1971) has shown, the technical and social features of industrial work influence workers' activities away from the job. When a worker is confined to a fixed work area, when his work activity is paced by machine or production line, when his job tasks are functionally dependent on the work of others, he has little discretion over the arrangement of his work. High technical constraints also curtail or inhibit on-the-job social contacts between workers.
Individuals who for a long time have experienced a high degree of technical constraint and/or social isolation in their work, tend to avoid activities outside working-hours for which social and discretionary skills are required, such as for active participation in voluntary organizations.
An argument in a similar vein is that chaotic experiences in worklife are bound to carry over into other spheres of activity and specifically have an adverse impact on social participation. People whose work histories are punctuated by disorderly job changes (Wilensky, 1961) or by frequent or long periods of unemployment (Pope, 1964) are likely to have lost a great deal of their motivation, self-confidence, and skills to
1 Besides shift workers there are other categories of people whose opportunities for participation in voluntary organizations, and for a normal social life in general, are constrained by time or scheduling problems. An obvious example are married women who are employed but who also shoulder the bulk of household duties. 37
actively engage in social contacts with others. As a result,
they tend to participate less in voluntary organizations than
persons with orderly careers or with steady employment
throughout their worklives. A certain amount of stability and
order in one's life is a necessary condition, it seems, for
involvement in various forms of social participation.
Finally, the relationships between participation and
individual status characteristics acquire a completely new
dimension when the configuration of a person's various statuses
is taken into account. Participation in voluntary organizations,
it has been argued, varies not only with differences in status,
but also with differences in the degree in which the
rank positions an individual, occupies in several status
hierarchies are in line with one another, that is, are
consistent.
Status Inconsistency and Participation
The Concept of Status Inconsistency
In complex societies each person occupies a multiplicity of
social positions, some of which are ranked relative to other
positions in a given dimension of social evaluation or
inequality. Together the several dimensions of social rank
define a multidimensional status or "stratification space"
(Hope, 1975). Individuals are located in this status space in
'terms of their rank positions on each of the component 38
dimensions of status.
This multidimensional view of social stratification—which originates in the work of Max Weber—raises the important question of the relationships among the different status hierarchies and among individuals' rank positions in them.
Different types of status tend to reach a common level over time, so that- an individual's rank on one status dimension coincides with his or her ranks on other status dimensions
(Benoit-Smullyan, 1944:160). Such a state of "status equilibrium" is a matter of degree, however, since it is always being disturbed by processes of social mobility and social change. At any given point in time there are individuals whose ranks in several status hierarchies are imperfectly matched, or misaligned. That is, they hold high rank on one status dimension and low rank on another. "Theoretically it becomes possible to conceive of a non-vertical dimension to individual or family status--that is, a consistency dimension." (Lenski, 1954:405).
Status consistency is present when an individual's rank positions on several vertical status dimensions are comparable, that is, are at the same horizontal level. Its converse, status inconsistency, is defined as the extent to which there is inequality or imbalance among the ranks an individual holds on the various dimensions of status.
That distinct beliefs, values, and patterns of conduct are associated with different rank positions in each of the major status hierarchies is an insight firmly codified in the body of sociological knowledge. Whether the degree of inconsistency 39
among a person's several statuses "would be capable of accounting for some of the variance in . . . behavior which is left unexplained by traditional methods of stratification analysis", as Lenski (1954:405) expected, is still an issue of debate. When Lenski's now classic article appeared, however, the concept of status inconsistency seemed promising enough to touch off a whole new line of research attempting to explain differences in various forms of behaviour and attitudes by reference to this nonvertical aspect of status.1
The status inconsistency argument as developed by Lenski,
Jackson, and others states that the occupying of inconsistent rank positions on several different status dimensions is a source of stress for the individuals concerned and leads to distinctive behavioural and attitudinal responses which represent attempts to reduce the stress. These reactions may
1 For an account of the origin and early theoretical development of status inconsistency, see Demerath (1965:129-135). As mentioned above, this concept can be traced to Weber's view of social stratification as multidimensional, i.e., as ordered along three theoretically separate hierarchies: class, status (social honour), and power. A quarter of a century later Benoit- Smullyan (1944) introduced the notion of status equilibration to describe the interrelationships between what he saw as the basic types of status: economic status, political status, and prestige status. Both Weber and Benoit-Smullyan were concerned primarily with the consequences of multiple imperfectly correlated stratification dimensions for the social structure of societies, rather than for individual behaviour. It was Hughes' (1945) discussion of the "dilemmas and contradictions of status" that focused specifically on the problems of status ambiguity for the individual. Lenski (1954) then followed up on these ideas with an empirical examination of the consequences of status inconsistency, or lack of "status crystallization" as he called it. Lenski's paper was the stimulus to the subsequent proliferation of status inconsistency theory and research. 40
take the form of, for instance, political liberalism, prejudice, social isolation, and psychosomatic illness.
Lenski's original interpretation of the relationship between status inconsistency and individual behaviour was that persons whose statuses are inconsistent occupy an ambiguous position in society and, as a result of the conflicting role demands placed upon them, are likely to be exposed to "social experiences of an unpleasant or frustrating nature" (Lenski,
1954:412).
Jackson (1962), attempting to explicate the psychological processes intervening between the structural condition of status inconsistency and individuals' reactions to it, suggested that the basic problem underlying social ambiguity and unsatisfactory social relations is that of conflicting expectations. Each status position carries with it normative expectations regarding the behaviour of the incumbent of that position" and the behaviour of the people with whom he or she interacts. When a person has statuses that are inconsistent, the expectations he has of other people, others have of him, and he has of himself will often be in conflict. Jackson then argued that these conflicting expectations result in frustration and uncertainty, which in turn lead to psychic stress. Frustrations are likely to result from status inconsistency because the inconsistent individual is unable or unwilling to fulfil the expectations of other people, while these others do not satisfy his demands on them. Furthermore, in such a situation both the status inconsistent person and his or her interaction partners will 41
feel uncertain as to what they can rightfully expect of each other and how interaction should be conducted. The result is that the status inconsistent's social relationships become unpleasant, his self-image becomes less stable, and his stress is heightened.
In later writings on the subject, Lenski based his argument about the disturbing consequences of status inconsistency for the individual on the postulate that "men are strongly motivated by self-interest" (Lenski, 1967:298; see also 1966:26-31,87). In interaction situations self-interest implies trying to establish for oneself the most favourable social identity possible. This means that a person who holds high rank on one status dimension and low rank on another will prefer to think of him- or herself in terms of the higher status. He will expect the people with whom he interacts to also define him according to his highest status and to accord him the deferential treatment that befits that rank position. However, these others too are concerned to maximize their own social identities. It may be to their interest to reject the inconsistent's status claims and to treat the person on the basis of his lower status. The result of all this is that individuals whose statuses are inconsistent will be frustrated in their status aspirations and suffer embarrassments and disappointments. Thus, as Lenski's basic thesis states,
persons with a low degree of status crystallization are more likely to be subjected to disturbing experiences in the interaction process and have greater difficulty in establishing rewarding patterns of social interaction than others (Lenski, I956b:459). 42
One way in which inconsistent individuals may react to this interactional stress, Lenski suggested, is to withdraw from social intercourse.
In addition to social isolation a wide variety of other behaviours and attitudes have been related to status inconsistency, testifying to the great appeal this concept has had for sociologists as an explanatory variable.1
Although there is an intuitive plausibility to the idea that status inconsistencies may have important consequences for behaviour, work in this area has from the start been beset by problems and has received considerable criticism on empirical, conceptual, and methodological grounds. The main thrust of the methodological attacks was directed at the measurement of status inconsistency and the empirical identification of its effects.
Critics have pointed out that most studies failed to show that status inconsistency is operating independently of vertical status. Many so-called inconsistency effects may simply be due to the direct effects of the individual status variables from which the status inconsistency measure was constructed (see
Mitchell, 1964; Hyman, 1966; Duncan, 1966; Blalock, 1966, 1967a,
1967b; Hodge and Siegel, 1970). This is a particularly penetrating criticism to which I shall return later.
1 An enumeration of the many behavioural and attitudinal responses supposed to be consequences of status inconsistency, and also extensive references to that research literature, can be found in Wilson and Zurcher (1976). See also Geschwender (1967) for detailed reviews of the older empirical studies on the effects of status inconsistency. 43
Status inconsistency research has also been criticized on the ground that the empirical evidence with regard to the hypothesized relationships between status inconsistency and various dependent variables is inconclusive and often conflicting. For almost every type of behaviour and attitude that has been related to status inconsistency there are findings suggesting strong inconsistency effects, trivial effects or none at all, and positive as well as negative effects. Besides, the results of older (pre-1964) studies, which generally reported support for hypotheses of status inconsistency effects, have come to be viewed with renewed suspicion because of the absence of proper controls for effects of the status variables themselves. Since status inconsistency apparently has so little explanatory power, some critics have concluded that there is no need for this concept in sociological theory (Kenkel, 1956;
Treiman, 1966; Laumann and Segal, 1971; Olsen and Tully, 1972;
Jackson and Curtis, 1972).
Finally there is the criticism that the theoretical foundation of the status inconsistency argument is inadequately specified, and that this may account for the confusing and conflicting results of status inconsistency research. The chain of reasoning by which status inconsistency is linked to its hypothesized consequences involves many assumptions and inferential leaps. For example, it is assumed that inconsistent statuses mobilize conflicting expectations and that objective, observer-defined status inconsistency is accompanied by disturbing and stressful experiences. It is further assumed that 44
this stress leads to certain forms of stress-reducing behaviour, such as withdrawal from social interaction. But these subjective factors and intervening social-psychological processes usually remain unmeasured and their relationships with both status inconsistency and its behavioural outcomes are seldom examined empirically (Geschwender, 1967; Stehr, 1968; Box and Ford, 1969;
Meyer and Hammond, 1971).
As a result of these criticisms, several modifications were introduced into the status inconsistency argument. One of these refinements followed from the recognition that
it would seem desirable increasingly to focus research on the consequences of particular patterns of status inconsistency . . . rather than upon the consequences of status inconsistency as indicated by some overall measure. (Lenski, I956a:36. Emphasis added).
Different patterns of status inconsistency--for instance, a combination of high educational status and low income status as opposed to low educational status but high income status--may give rise to different, even opposite, reactions. Failure to differentiate between them could easily obscure the relationship between a measure of status inconsistency and a given dependent variable. Likewise, most researchers now distinguish between inconsistencies that involve an individual's ranks on the dimensions of ascribed (e.g., ethnicity) and achieved (e.g., occupation) status (see, for instance, Goffman, 1957; Jackson,
1962; Broom and Jones, 1970; Olsen and Tully, 1972). 45
A different typology of status inconsistency patterns, based on the analysis of statuses in terms of investments and rewards, was proposed by Geschwender (1967). He tried to explain, within an integrated theoretical framework, the various behavioural and attitudinal consequences.of status inconsistency identified in previous research. Geschwender suggested that the theory of cognitive dissonance expanded with postulates from the theory of distributive justice could serve that function. His argument is based on the assumption that people define their educational and ethnic statuses as investments and their occupational and income statuses as rewards. It is further assumed that people believe that the rewards a person receives should be proportional to the investments, a belief that is based upon the perception of the connection that normally exists in society between the two qualities. Geschwender argued that status inconsistency is a situation in which reward and investment statuses do not match. It leads to the development of dissonance among simultaneously held cognitions. Cognitive dissonance is an emotionally upsetting state which produces tension in the individual. Persons whose investments exceed the rewards received--for example, high ethnic or educational status combined with low occupational or income status—are underrewarded. Their sense of justice is violated and they will feel angry because of the insufficient returns on their investments. Overrewarded status inconsistents, the opposite type, have received higher rewards than what is believed to be fair and just for their investments: their educational or ethnic 46
status is low while they have high occupational or income
status. They will experience guilt.1 People will react in certain ways to reduce the dissonance created by status
inconsistency. These reactions take the form of coping or
noncoping responses. Coping responses include prejudice, upward mobility striving (trying to raise the lower status), and
attempts to change society and its status system. Noncoping
responses include social isolation, serious symptoms of stress,
and suicide. From these assumptions Geschwender then derived a
number of predictions about particular behavioural reactions to
specific patterns of status inconsistency, including the two
patterns mentioned above (see Geschwender, 1968; Broom and
Jones, 1970; Wilson and Zurcher., 1976 for applications).
Geschwender's work is one of several attempts to integrate
the status inconsistency argument and other "theories of social
consistency" with each other and with the cognitive consistency
theories in social psychology (Taylor, 1973; Hornung, 1977). On
the methodological side, Blalock (1967a) has pointed out the
formal similarities between the theoretical formulations on the
effects of status consistency, social mobility, status
integration, and on structural or compositional effects. All
1 House and Harkins (1975:400) have offered a different interpretation of the relation between education-occupation inconsistencies and feelings of stress. Individuals with high occupational and low educational status may feel "overloaded", because their training, ability, and expectations do not match the demands of their jobs. On the other hand, persons whose educational status is higher than their occupational status should feel under-utilized or "underloaded". Both overload and underload may produce stress. 47
these social consistency formulations can be expressed by the same multiple regression model. Others have extended this strategy to demonstrate the formal and methodological parallels between the sociological theories of social consistency and the social-psychological theories of cognitive consistency (Taylor,
1973; Taylor and Hornung, 1979). 1
Effects of Status Inconsistency: Findings from Previous Research
Lenski (1956b) had argued that status inconsistent individuals are frequently exposed to disturbing experiences in their interaction with other people and labour under unsatisfactory social relationships. Lenski did not have the data to test this hypothesis directly. But he reasoned that the denial of rewards in interpersonal relations will lead status inconsistents to withdraw or shy away from social interaction where possible, so as to diminish the frequency and impact of the unpleasant social experiences which arise from the inconsistency among their statuses. Such withdrawal and avoidance, if they occur, are most likely to manifest themselves
1 Taylor included among the social consistency theories, besides the status inconsistency thesis, certain formulations of social mobility, the Gibbs-Martin theory of status integration, and the Blau-Davis principle of structural or compositional effects. Hornung added to this list various social exchange formulations such as distributive justice (Homans), social equity (Adams), and the theory of status value (Berger and associates). The cognitive consistency theories include Osgood's attitude congruity, Heider's structural balance, and Festinger's dissonance formulations. See Taylor (1973), Hornung (1977), and Taylor and Hornung (1979) for details and references. 48
in the area of relatively discretionary and voluntary relationships, that is to say, with respect to informal social contacts with friends, neighbours, and fellow workers away from work, and with respect to participation in voluntary organizations.
Using data on informal association with neighbours and co• workers (off the job) and on membership and involvement in voluntary organizations, Lenski constructed an index of the degree of participation in voluntary relationships. On the basis of this index he categorized each respondent as a social isolate or an active participant. He found that the percentage of isolates was larger among persons characterized by status inconsistency than among those with consistent statuses.
Further, status, inconsistents were less active than status consistents in the voluntary organizations which they had joined five or more years ago. This inactive state of long-standing organizational ties was taken as evidence of the inconsistents' gradual and partial withdrawal from social relationships.
Finally, compared with status consistents, respondents whose statuses were inconsistent less often initiated and maintained membership in voluntary organizations for sociable reasons (the expectation of pleasurable interaction with others; a desire to meet new people and to make new friends).
Since Lenski's study there have been several other attempts to test his hypotheses about the unfavourable impact of status inconsistency on social participation. As is the case for so many other substantive areas to which the status inconsistency 49
argument has been applied, these studies have generally produced conflicting and confusing results. Bauman (1968), for example, presented data suggesting that middle-class individuals with inconsistent statuses are more likely to have satisfactory social interaction than persons with consistent statuses. This finding of course contradicts a central assumption in Lenski's argument, namely that status inconsistency leads to unpleasant and strained social relationships. What is more, another analysis of the same data failed to produce evidence of a negative association between status inconsistency and participation in voluntary organizations (Bauman, 1968:49).
Geschwender (1968) hypothesized that, compared to status consistents, persons whose statuses are inconsistent tend (a) to have fewer memberships in voluntary organizations, (b) to show a lower level of participation, and (c) to hold fewer offices and positions in these organizations. He also predicted that status inconsistents would be less likely to use their free time in a sociable manner. Both hypotheses received moderate support from the data. The negative association between status inconsistency and participation was particularly strong with respect to voluntary organizations of the expressive, social type, but was less evident for instrumental voluntary organizations. As for the effects of specific patterns of status inconsistency, underrewarded inconsistents were found to belong to voluntary organizations, to be active participants, and to hold offices and committee posts less frequently than status consistent respondents. Individuals with inconsistencies between their 50
occupational and income statuses—the so-called "reward inconsistents"—also tended to withdraw from social life. For other types of status inconsistents the differences with status consistents were less clear.
Hodge (1970:203-4) reported results of a multiple regression analysis which showed that status consistency is positively related to number of memberships in voluntary organizations, although the net effect of educational status was much larger than that of status consistency.
The most extensive test so far of status inconsistency theory has been carried out by Jackson and Curtis (1972; see also Curtis and Jackson, I977:chapter 8). The findings of their study did not support hypotheses about negative effects of status inconsistency on participation in voluntary organizations. They concluded that any inconsistency effects almost always disappear when the separate effects of the status variables are properly controlled.
A conspicuous gap in status inconsistency research is the paucity of efforts to investigate the consequences of status inconsistency for the behaviour and attitudes of women. But this is not an exceptional situation. The study of social stratification in general has for the longest time neglected women and has concerned itself almost exclusively with the processes and patterns of status attainment and social mobility among men.
Of course, in the last ten years or so interest in the status of women has grown dramatically. As a result, there has 51
been a rapid increase in the number of publications dealing with
the educational, occupational, and income attainment of women, with the vertical mobility of women, and with the differentiation of the stratification system, by sex (i.e.,
sexual stratification). Examples are the studies by Tyree and
Treas (1974), Treiman and Terrell (1975), Guppy and Siltanen
(1977), Blishen and Carroll (1978), Wolf and Fligst.ein (1979).
But this recent trend to devote more attention to women's
experiences--both in their own right and as they compare with
those of men—has not yet been extended to status inconsistency
research. In this area almost all studies have restricted their
samples to men or have used combined male-and-female samples.
Analyses that are focused specifically on women are rare (see
Hodge, 1970, for an example). The present research attempts to
fill that gap, in part at least, by examining the relationship
between status inconsistency and participation in voluntary
organizations separately for a subsample of women. Since that
issue has hardly been explored to date, it is difficult to say
what to expect of this relationship. Should we assume that
status inconsistency has a different effect on the participation
of women than on that of men? What little evidence bearing on
this question there is suggests that this is not the case. Hodge
(1970:203-4), examining the relationships between status
inconsistency and various measures of personal and social
integration, including membership in voluntary organizations,
found the patterns of these relations to be quite similar for 52
men and women.1
Since there also is nothing in the status inconsistency argument itself that suggests that inconsistency affects the participation of women in a different way than that of men, it will tentatively assumed that the basic hypothesis predicting a negative effect of status inconsistency on participation in voluntary organizations holds true for women as well as for men.
The Hypotheses
Taken together, the mixed and conflicting results of the studies reviewed in the preceding section prevent a definitive conclusion about the validity of Lenski's original proposition that status inconsistency is negatively associated with participation in voluntary organizations. Evidence from recent and better analyzed research seems to suggest that this supposed inconsistency effect is not present. However, the remaining ambiguity on this point may be further reduced by subjecting the status inconsistency hypothesis to more empirical tests.
Therefore, this research addresses the question once again:
Do individuals who occupy rank positions that are inconsistent actually participate less in voluntary organizations than
1 Jackson (1962:478) initially reported marked differences between the responses (symptoms of stress) of men and women to education-occupation inconsistencies. However, a re-analysis of the same data failed to produce evidence that status inconsistency effects varied by sex (see Jackson and Burke, 1965:561). 53
individuals whose ranks on several status dimensions are consistent? The two main hypotheses are as follows:
(1) After taking into account the separate effects of the status variables, persons with inconsistent statuses have fewer memberships in voluntary organizations than persons with consistent statuses.
(2) After taking into account the separate effects of the status variables, persons with inconsistent statuses are less likely to hold office in voluntary organizations than persons with consistent statuses.
A second question is whether there are differences in the effects of specific types of status inconsistency on participation. More specifically, this problem concerns the effects of two opposite patterns .of inconsistency involving statuses that can be regarded as investment and reward. In one particular version of the status inconsistency argument it is proposed (cf. Geschwender, 1967) that individuals who have made large educational investments but have received small rewards in terms of occupational or income status, are particularly prone to withdrawal into social isolation, since these underrewarded inconsistents will be angered by their deprivation and perhaps see themselves as failures. On the other hand, individuals with low educational investment but high rewards will experience only a mild form of dissonance; they have achieved some measure of success despite their educational handicap. Thus, overrewarded status inconsistents should be less inclined to avoid, or withdraw from, participation in voluntary organizations than underrewarded inconsistents, 54
The secondary hypotheses, concerning the relationships between specific types of sharp status inconsistency and participation in voluntary organizations, are as follows:
(3) After taking into account the separate effects of the status variables, underrewarded status inconsistents have fewer memberships in voluntary organizations than overrewarded status inconsistents. (But both underrewarded and overrewarded inconsistents have fewer memberships than status consistents).
(4) After taking into account the separate effects of the status variables, underrewarded status inconsistents are less likely to hold office in voluntary organizations than overrewarded status inconsistents. (But both are less likely to be office-holders than status consistents).
The operationalization of these hypotheses is described in
Chapter 4 in connection with the presentation of the research findings. 55
CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY
Data Sources and Samples
The data analyzed in this study come from two sample surveys conducted by researchers at the University of British
Columbia in 1965 and 1971.
The first set of data was taken from Meissner's survey of gainfully employed adults in Port Alberni, a small industrial community on Vancouver Island.1 In 1965, when the survey was taken, the population in the Port Alberni area was approximately
20,000. Forty-five per cent of the working adults were employed by a large forest-products processing company, the largest single employer in the area.
The just published city directory was used to draw a random sample from all persons employed by the company and a separate random sample" from those persons who, were working elsewhere.
Three times as many company employees as other working adults
1 Actually the study area encompassed not only the city of Port Alberni but also the adjacent areas. For the sake of brevity, however, I shall refer to this survey and the sample by the name of the principal city.
/ 56
were selected, because the primary objective of the study was to determine the conditions and consequences of industrial work in large production organizations characterized by a variety of technical processes and levels of technology. As a result of this oversampling of company employees, the target sample consisted largely of male workers with manual jobs who were paid an hourly wage. Only a few women and self-employed persons were included in the sample, while people without paying jobs--the young, the retired, housewives—were excluded altogether.
Interviewing was done by trained graduate students in May and June of 1965. The structured interview schedule contained questions about the social and technical organization of work, work histories, leisure activities, participation in voluntary organizations, and voting in four past elections. Interviews were completed with 239 company employees and 69 persons working elsewhere. This total of 308 respondents constituted 78 per cent of the target sample.
To correct for the oversampling of company employees, the responses of the 69 working adults not employed by the company were weighted by a factor of 4, so that in the analysis the distributions would correspond to those found in the sampling population. Sample size after weighting totals 515.1
1 A research chronicle giving details of the sampling and weighting procedures, data collection, and data processing is part of Meissner's (1967) report. 57
The second data set came from the Vancouver Urban Studies
Project.1 The main objective of the research was to explore how the participation of urban residents in a variety of social activities is affected by the urban socio-ecological environment. Information was gathered on individual and household characteristics, the nature of work, leisure activities, informal social relations with relatives, friends, neighbours and fellow workers, participation in voluntary organizations, voting in several elections, housing characteristics, and residential mobility.
The study used a multistage, purposively stratified, unequal cluster, random sampling design. The first step involved the purposive selection of eight residential areas in Greater
Vancouver (i.e., the city of Vancouver plus surrounding suburban municipalities) that were characterized by different combinations of socioeconomic status and stage in the family life-cycle. For example, one residential area chosen represented a "social area" (Bell, 1969) with a high concentration of young married couples with low socioeconomic status. The next step was to randomly select households within the stratified sample areas. By means of the 1970 city directories eight separate lists of all households within the selected areas were compiled.
From each of these enumeration lists an initial sample of
1 The principal investigators were George Gray, Scott Meis, Jack Scheu, and Kathie Storrie. The following description of the sampling and data collection procedures was taken largely from Scheu's (1975) dissertation. 58
households was randomly drawn. To be eligible for inclusion into the sample a household had to consist of at least one married couple of which one or both spouses were full-time employed at the time of the interview.. Upon establishing the eligibility of a household, the interviewers then selected husband and wife as respondents.
Interviews were conducted by interviewing teams composed of a male and a female graduate student. Husband and wife were simultaneously but separately interviewed in their home by an interviewer of their own sex. A total of 822 interviews were completed during the interview period from July 1971 to February
1972. The 411 married couples for whom usable data were obtained represent a response rate of 58 per cent.
The sampling design in the Vancouver study has restrictive implications for the generalizability of findings based on these data. Since the primary sampling units--the eight residential areas—were purposively chosen on the basis of nonrandom, ecological citeria, one cannot legitimately generalize results beyond the households of the sampled residential areas to the entire population of Greater Vancouver. A further limitation arises from the purposive exclusion of certain categories of people from the sample, most notably unmarried, divorced or separated persons, children, and married couples in which both husband and wife were unemployed or retired.
The data from the Port Alberni study that were used in testing the status inconsistency hypotheses pertain to the entire weighted sample of 515 respondents. But the sample of 59
married couples from Vancouver was subdivided by sex, and data
for men and women were analyzed separately. Of the subsample of wives only the 139 gainfully employed women were included in the analysis. This restriction was imposed by the choice of occupation as one of the status variables from which measures of
status inconsistency were constructed. Assigning occupational
status to women who do not work outside the home for pay would create analytical problems, as I shall explain later..
The actual size of the working sample in a given analysis was affected by missing data and the way in which these were handled. In all analyses, respondents for whom information on any of the relevant variables was not available were excluded.
As a result of such listwise deletion of. missing observations,
the sample size varied somewhat from one analysis to another.
The actual number of cases on which a given analysis was based
is reported with each table.
Measurement of the Variables
How participation in voluntary organizations was
operationalized will be described first. Then follows an account
of the definition and measurement of the independent variables-
status and status inconsistency. 60
Dependent Variables
Participation in voluntary organizations was defined by two variables: (1) the number of voluntary organizations of which the respondent is a member, and (2) the number of official positions or committee memberships the respondent presently holds, or has held in the past, in these organizations.
Membership in voluntary orqanziations. The number of voluntary organization memberships held by a respondent from
Port Alberni was determined from answers to the following series of questions:
(a) Are you a member of a trade union, professional association, or a trade association? What is the name of the organization?
(b) Are you a member of a church or other religious group? What is the name of the church (group) you belong to?
(c) Of what other groups are you a member? Sports, fraternal or civic organizations, clubs, recreation, PTA, and so forth. What is the name of the group?
(d) Are there any other groups you belong to?
Respondents in the Vancouver sample were asked:
(a) Are you a member of any professional societies, trade associations or unions? Would you name them? Probe: Are you a member of any other organizations that are primarily for people in your line of work?
(b) Are you a member of a church or a religious group? What is the name of the church or group?
(c) Are you a member of any (other) groups, clubs, or associations such as: 1. sports, recreation, and hobby clubs 2. fraternal, civic, and charitable organizations 3. social or cultural clubs and societies • 4. PTA and other children activity organizations 5. organizations of rate payers, tenants Would you name them? 61
The membership variable used in the following analyses does not include membership in trade unions. The existence of union shop clauses, which require workers to join a union as a condition of employment, raises doubts about the voluntary nature of union membership. Where unions are strongly represented and have considerable influence over the employment chances of workers, few can afford not to join. If union membership is indeed often compulsory, then including it in the sum of a respondent's memberships might attenuate the strength of status inconsistency effects, if any, on membership in voluntary organizations. For, as Lenski (I956b:459) has noted, it is unlikely that status inconsistency will lead people to stay away or withdraw from unions if this would jeopardize their job opportunities.1 For these reasons, unions were left out of consideration in counting the number of voluntary organizations to which the respondent belongs.2
1 Lenski (l956b:459) has also suggested, however, that persons with inconsistent statuses may actually be attracted to unions and become active members. The reason is that status inconsistency has been found to be associated with "leftist" political orientations and with preference for change in the social-economic and political organization of society. Since unions are often seen as catalysts of these changes, they could accommodate such orientations. For that reason too it is advisable to analyze union membership at least separately from membership in voluntary organizations.
2 About 65 per cent of the Port Alberni sample belonged to a trade union. Among the Vancouver respondents union membership was much less frequent: 27 per cent of the married men and only 11.5 per cent of the employed married women were members of a union. 62
Membership of a church or a religious group was included in
the sum of memberships in voluntary organizations. To be sure,
this is as much a point of controversy as is the inclusion or exclusion of trade unions. Church membership is usually omitted as involuntary because it is thought to be ascriptive--one is
"born into" the church of his or her parents. But it is doubtful
that this argument is still valid in present-day circumstances.
In modern society it is easier, for adults at least, to change
from the religious affiliation of one's parents, and many people
do so (Smith, 1975). This element of choice justifies the
inclusion of church membership.
The percentage distribution of the Port Alberni and
Vancouver samples by the number of voluntary organizations to
which the respondent belongs are given in Table 1. About 76
per cent of the respondents in the Port Alberni sample and 78
per cent of the married men in the Vancouver sample reported
membership in at least one voluntary organization. Half of the
Vancouver men and more than one-third (37 per cent) of the Port
Alberni respondents belonged to more than one organization.
After three memberships the distributions drop off rapidly,
indicating that membership of more than three voluntary
organizations is relatively jrare (10 to 14 per cent).
In comparison with the membership figures in these two
samples, which consist entirely or for the most part of males,
the picture for an all-female subsample is different. Among the
employed married women in the Vancouver sample 62 per cent
reported to be members of a voluntary organization, and this can 63
Table 1. Number of Memberships in Voluntary Organizations for Port Alberni and Vancouver Samples (Percentages and Summary Statistics)
PORT ALBERNI VANCOUVER
Number of Total Employed Memberships Sample Men Women
None 24. 1% 21.9% 38. 1% One 38.6 28.5 32.4 Two 12.4 21.4 16.6 Three 14.4 12.3 7.9 Four 6.2 5. 1 2.9 Five 1 .4 4.9 1 .4 Six 1 .5 3.9 0.7 Seven 0.6 0.5 0.0 Eight 0.8 1 .5 0.0
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% N (515) (407) (139)
Mean 1 .58 1 .92 1.12 SD 1 .54 1 .79 1 .24
Note: Membership in trade unions is excluded 64
be compared with the 78 per cent for the Vancouver men. Multiple membership was also less frequent among these women (30 per cent) than among their male counterparts (50 per cent).
These sex differences in the extent of membership are larger than those reported in some other studies (e.g., Curtis,
1971b: 874-5; Hausknecht, 1962:31-2; Babchuk and Booth, 1969;
Booth, 1972). This divergence -in findings may arise from the fact that my analysis was restricted to employed women.
Employment, status and membership in voluntary organizations are clearly associated in this sample of Vancouver women. Although not shown in Table 1, 75 per cent of the Vancouver women who were not employed belonged to a voluntary organization. For employed women this figure was 62 per cent, as we have just seen. Therefore, when all women were considered together, regardless of their employment status, the percentage members was only slightly smaller than that for the male subsample (70 versus 78 per cent). That employed women are less likely than not-employed women to join and participate in voluntary organizations can probably be attributed to the greater demands that the combination of domestic chores and an outside job makes on their time.
Considering that trade unions were excluded, one has to say that membership in voluntary organizations is extensive among
Vancouver and Port Alberni respondents. The proportions of individuals who belong to one voluntary organization or more,are generally larger than those reported for local and national 65
samples in other Canadian studies.1 A point to keep in mind, however, is that such differences between findings of various
studies probably are largely due to differing research procedures. For one thing, estimates of the extent of membership
in voluntary organizations are affected by the format and the
context of the questions through which information on this
subject is elicited (Wright and Hyman, 1958:32; Hausknecht,
1962:127-9; Babchuk and Booth, 1969:32; Smith, 1975:250). The
interview schedules used in the Port Alberni and Vancouver
surveys contained several detailed items on membership and
involvement in voluntary organizations. This may have had the
effect of facilitating recall by the respondents, so that fairly
complete and accurate accounts of participation were obtained
(Curtis, 1971b). Furthermore, the high rates of membership found
here undoubtedly also reflect the composition of the samples. As
mentioned, both studies deliberately omitted certain categories
of people from their sampl.es—children, unemployed and retired
people, persons who were single, separated, or divorced, and so
forth. These restrictions would also tend to increase membership
rates in comparison with samples that are more representative of
the total population of a place or the country as a whole.
1 See, for example, Curtis (1971a, 1971b), Warburton (1969), Frizzell and Zureik (1974). Some of the findings on single and multiple memberships from these studies were mentioned in Chapter 1. 66
Holding office in voluntary organizations. The second participation variable is the sum of all past and present offices and committee memberships held in voluntary organizations. Office-holding was chosen as a measure of the individual's involvement in the affairs of the organization. As was suggested earlier, a behavioural criterion of participation, such as attending meetings or holding office, is more relevant for evaluating the alleged mediating role and integrative functions of voluntary organizations than mere membership. A person who holds office is highly visible to other members of the organization and occupies a central position in the chain of communication. Such a leadership role therefore is of importance in the formation of social networks within the organization as well as in establishing links with other groups. Office-holding is also a more specialized form of participation than attendance; it requires greater communication skills and ability to coordinate with members and with other officers.
There is no reason, of course, to exclude trade unions from this variable. Although membership may often be compulsory, actual participation in union activities obviously is voluntary, and members are under no obligation to hold office in their union.
To determine office-holding members of the Port Alberni sample were asked, for each voluntary organization in which they reported membership:
(a) Do you hold any kind of position? How would you describe it?
(b) Are you a member of any committee? What is it called? 67
(c) Have you ever had a position, or have you been active in any other way before? What was it?
In the Vancouver survey the following questions were asked about each organization of which the respondent was a member:
(a) Do you hold any kind of position or are you a member of any committee?
(b) Have you ever held a position or been a member of a committee before?
Table 2 shows the percentage distributions of number of offices held in voluntary organizations. Office-holding is quite common among the respondents from Port Alberni and the men in the Vancouver sample: about 50 per cent reported to hold or to have held one or more official positions in voluntary organizations. Even more remarkable is the large percentage of
Port Alberni respondents with more than two present or past offices. In sharp contrast with the relatively large proportions of office-holders in these two samples is the 25 per cent of employed married women from Vancouver who were or had been officers of a voluntary organization. This is half the percentage that was found for the Vancouver men.1
1 Data presented by Booth (1972:189) show that male-female differences in office-holding vary with the type of voluntary organizations. He found that men dominated the leaderhip of instrumental voluntary organizations (e.g., professional and business associations, community action groups), while women were more likely than men to hold office in expressive organizations (such as church-related groups and recreational organizations). 68
Table 2. Number of Offices Held in Voluntary Organizations for Port Alberni and Vancouver Samples (Percentages and Summary Statistics)
PORT ALBERNI VANCOUVER
Number of Total Employed Offices Held Sample Men Women
None 47.0% 49.6% 74.8% One 18.3 29.9 20.2 Two 11.7 13.9 5.0 Three 8.5 3.2 0.0 Four 6.4 2.0 0.0 Five 2.1 0.7 0.0 Six or more 6.0 0.7 0.0
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% N (515) (411 ) (139)
Mean 1 .52 0.83 0.30 SD 2.19 1.11 0.56
Note: Number of offices held is the total number of past and present offices and committee memberships in all voluntary organizations, including trade unions 69
Independent Variables
Measures of status. The definition in itself of status
consistency and its converse, status inconsistency, does not
prescribe how these concepts should be measured, nor does it
stipulate which status dimensions should be used in the
construction of a status inconsistency measure. Yet, as Lenski
(l956a:368) has noted, one cannot assume "that any combination
of status variables when put together to form a measure of
status consistency, or crystallization, will yield the same
results."
Lenski (1954, 1956b) himself selected education,
occupation, income, and ethnicity as the basic status
hierarchies, and most subsequent researchers have used the same
variables of a subset of them. Although the criteria are not
always explicitly stated, the choice of these status dimensions
seems to be guided by the following considerations, other than
the availability of data. In North American societies
occupation, education, income, and ethnicity (1) are important
bases for the social distinctions that people make in their
associations with one another; (2) they mobilize strong
behavioural expectations and demands; (3) there is a degree of
consensus in the population concerning the ranking of positions
along these status dimensions; (4) there exists some consensus
that certain status combinations are normal and/or appropriate
(see Lenski, 1954, 1956b; Goffman, 1957; Jackson and Curtis,
1968:135-136). 70
The status dimensions chosen for analysis in this study are education, occupation, and income—the basic components of achieved socioeconomic status. The statuses of a respondent were defined operationally as his or her relative positions in these three status hierarchies. Each hierarchy was represented by a simple ordinal variable with three ordered categories: low, medium, and high status. The measures of these status variables and the choice of the cutting-points were slightly different in the analyses based on the Vancouver data and those based on the
Port Alberni data.1
In the Vancouver study education was measured as the last type of full-time schooling the respondent had attended and the number of years attended there. The three levels of educational status were defined as follows:
low educational status = less than completed high school
medium educational status = completed high school
high educational status = attended university.
Occupational status was originally measured by a 17- category classification of occupations corresponding to the
Hollingshead Occupational Status Scale (see Bonjean et al.,
1 The division of each status dimension into three levels had to be done, of course, within the limitations of the categories into which the data were originally coded. But an important consideration in defining low, medium, and high rank on any given status variable was to choose these cut-off points in such a way as to ensure that there were enough cases in each status category. That the cutting-points on the education and occupation measures differ for the Vancouver and Port Alberni data is a reflection of the different composition of the two samples. 71
1967:441-8). For men, the categories were collapsed into three levels of occupational status as follows:
high occupational status = executives and proprietors of large concerns, and major professionals; managers and proprietors of medium-sized businesses, and lesser professionals
medium occupational status = administrative personnel of large concerns, owners of small independent businesses, and semi-professionals; clerical and sales workers, technicians, and owners of little businesses
low occupational status = skilled, semi-skilled, and unskilled manual workers.
Because the same division of the occupational status dimension would have created too small a high status category for the employed women, the cutting-point between high and medium occupational status was lowered somewhat:
high occupational status = executives and proprietors of large concerns, and major professionals; managers and proprietors of medium-sized businesses, and lesser professionals; administrative personnel of large concerns, owners of small independent businesses, and semi-professionals
medium occupational status = clerical and sales workers, technicians, and owners of little businesses
low occupational status = skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled manual workers.
Income status was determined from the respondent's personal income in dollars in 1970. Cut-off points to define the three levels of income status are:
low income status = $7,999 or less
medium income status = $8,000 to $13,999
high income status = $14,000 or more. 72
In the analyses based on data from the Port Alberni study only education and occupation were used as status dimensions because data on income were not available.
Education was measured as the last grade finished in school. The original five categories of this variable were collapsed into three levels of educational status as follows:
low educational status = grade 8 or less
medium educational status = some high school (grades 9-11)
high educational status = completed high school or more.
Occupational status was determined from a five-category classification of occupations according to the level of skill.
The categories were combined to give three levels of occupational status as follows:
high occupational status = professionals and managers; technical, clerical, and sales personnel
medium occupational status = skilled manual workers
low occupational status = semi-skilled and unskilled manual workers.
Measurement of status inconsistency. Now that the status dimensions to be used in the operationalization of status inconsistency have been chosen, the next problem is how to construct a measure of status inconsistency.
In the older status inconsistency research this problem was typically handled in one of two ways. In one procedure the cumulative percentage distribution for each status variable is computed. The midpoint of the percentile range for each category or interval of a given variable is the score assigned to respondents falling in that category or interval. A measure of 73
dispersion of the respondent's percentile scores on the various
status variables is computed to give his or her status consistency score, (e.g., Lenski, 1954, 1956b; Demerath, 1965;
Bauman, 1968). The alternative procedure is that the status variables are trichotomized and cross-classified; the
"distances" between the rank levels on different status variables are used to derive a status inconsistency variable
(see Jackson, 1962; Geschwender, 1968). Whatever the measurement
technique, the sample is then divided into groups of respondents with status combinations differing in degree of inconsistency.
The operational-izat ion of status consistency and
inconsistency in this research conforms to the latter, rank- difference procedure. Status variables were considered two at a
time. As we have seen, each variable was divided into three
ordered categories or status levels. Thus, cross-classification
of a pair of status variables produced a matrix of nine
different status combinations. Each status combination was then
classified as consistent, moderately inconsistent, or sharply
inconsistent—depending upon the difference between the rank on
one status variable and the rank on the other status variable.
Together these three categories form the "degree of status
inconsistency" variable and they were defined as follows:
status consistency = the combinations of ranks that are the same: high, medium, or low rank on both status variables (HH, MM, LL)
moderate status inconsistency = the combinations of ranks that differ by only one rank-step: medium rank on one status variable in conjunction with either low or high rank on the other status variable (ML, MH, LM, HM)
sharp status inconsistency = the combinations of ranks that 74
differ by two steps: high rank on status variable A and low rank on status variable B, or vice versa (HL, LH) .
In addition to this general measure of degree of status inconsistency I have distinguished two specific forms or patterns of sharp status inconsistency, namely underreward and overreward. They are discrepancies between two statuses one of which represents an investment and the other a reward. The operational definitions of these two forms. of sharp inconsistency are as follows. Overrewarded status inconsistents are the respondents who held low rank on the dimension of educational status but high rank on either the occupational or income status dimensions—the rewards they have received exceed their investments. Underrewarded status inconsistents are the respondents who combined high educational status with either low occupational status or low income status—their investment is greater than the rewards received.
Methods of Analysis
The Core Problem: Isolating the Effects of Status Inconsistency
The proper test of the status inconsistency hypothesis requires that one controls for the effects of the status variables from which the status inconsistency measure is constructed. It is well known that education, occupation, income, as well as other indicators of status are related to participation in voluntary organizations. Before one. can claim 75
to have found a status inconsistency effect, one must show that this "effect" is not due merely to the effects of one or more of the constituent status variables.
The older status inconsistency studies by Lenski and others can be criticized for having failed to accomplish this. By
simply comparing dependent variable scores for categories of persons with consistent and inconsistent statuses, without adequate controls for status differences, these studies may have confounded apparent status inconsistency effects with the effects of the status variables themselves. Because of this methodological flaw, which was first exposed by Mitchell (1964),
the results of status inconsistency research before 1964 have come to be regarded with suspicion.
In reply to Mitchell's criticism, Lenski (1964) set forth a different analytical technique, which would make it possible to
determine whether status inconsistency has an effect on a
dependent variable over and above the effects of the individual
status variables. In Lenski's revised procedure two
trichotomized status variables are cross-classified to form a
3x3 table in which the cell entries are the percentages of
respondents with a particular characteristic, for example,
belonging to voluntary organizations... The sum of the percentages
in any pair of consistent cells of the table (e.g., high-high
and low-low) are compared with the sum of the percentages in the
corresponding pair of inconsistent cells (high-low and low-
high). If the relationship between the status variables and the
dependent variable is strictly additive, the two sums should be 76
equal.1 If the sum of the percentages in the inconsistent cells differs from the sum in the consistent cells, then the two status variables interact in their effects on the dependent variable. According to Lenski, such an interaction effect may be identified with the presence of a status inconsistency effect:
"in statistical terms, my hypothesis is that inconsistencies in status generate an interaction effect" (Lenski, 1964:326).
Hyman (1966) has shown that Lenski's "comparison of sums" technique does not quite succeed in separating the effect of status inconsistency from the effects of the status variables in terms of which the inconsistency variable is defined, and may sometimes even lead to erroneous interpretations.
This point is illustrated by the hypothetical data in the table below, in which there are two dichotomized status variables and the figures in the body of the table represent percentages for the dependent variable (Hyman, 1966:121).
Status A High Low
High 30 80 Status B Low 10 60
It can be readily seen that the sum of the percentages in the
high-high and low-low cells is equal to the sum of the
1 This is the same as saying that the size of the percentage differences between the rows should be the same regardless of columns, and vice versa. There is likely to be some difference between the two sums or percentage differences due to errors in sampling, measurement, and 'so forth. 77
percentages in low-high and high-low cells (90 per cent). Using
Lenski's criterion we would conclude that there is no statistical interaction between the two status variables and that status inconsistency effects therefore are absent in these data. When we examine the table more closely, however, a different interpretation presents itself: A low/B high inconsistency has a positive effect on the -dependent variable, while the opposite pattern of A high/B low inconsistency has a negative effect. (Both status variables would be negatively associated with the dependent variable). Because the effects of the two status inconsistency patterns are of the same magnitude
(amounting to 35) but opposite in direction, they exactly cancel. In this case Lenski's procedure indicates no interaction and hence the absence of status inconsistency effects while in fact there are such effects.
But it is also possible that the status variables themselves are associated in opposite directions with the dependent variable. If status variable A is negatively and status variable B positively related to the dependent variable, then the simple combination of these effects accounts for the obtained results. Inconsistents with low status on A but high status on B combine statuses that are the most favourable for the behaviour in question. They therefore show "a higher percentage than the consistents, who combine the most predisposed status with the least predisposed status. Because the A high/B low inconsistents combine the two least predisposed statuses they have the lowest percentage. In short, the figures 78
in the table could have been produced by the additive effects of the individual status variables alone, which make it only appear that there are status inconsistency effects of opposite sign.
Both interpretations, in terms of either opposite status
inconsistency effects or opposite status effects, are quite plausible. But they cannot be distinguished empirically with the comparison-of-sums technique. The reason, according to Hyman, is that it does not take into account the nature of the associations between the status variables and the dependent variable.
Similar ambiguities of interpretation occur when Lenski's procedure reveals the existence of statistical.interaction in a given set of data. Blalock (1967b:305-7) gives an example that clearly demonstrates that in this case too there are many alternative ways of breaking down the results into additive and
interaction components, depending on what the size and,/or
direction of the associations of the status variables and of
status • inconsistency with the dependent variable are assumed to
be.
The crux of the problem illustrated above is that the same
data are equally consistent with, and therefore will not by
themselves discriminate between, explanations that attribute
variation in the dependent variable to (1) additive effects of
the status variables taken separately, or (2) the effects of
status inconsistency, or (3) a combination of main status
effects and status inconsistency effects (see Hodge and Siegel,
1970; Hodge, 1970; Jackson and Curtis, 1972; Curtis and Jackson, 79
1977:136-8).
As Blalock (1966, 1967a, 1967b, 1967c) has made clear, this difficulty is a special case of the more general methodological
problem of identifying coefficients in systems of recursive
linear equations.1 An identification problem arises when there
are too many unknowns for solution, as is the case when one of
the independent variables is an exact mathematical function of
some of the other independent variables. When status
inconsistency is defined as an exact function of the difference
between two status variables (i.e., there is no error term in
the equation for the status inconsistency variable), there are
only two pieces of empirical information available on each
respondent but one is trying to estimate the coefficients for
three variables. In a set of simultaneous equations involving
these three variables there are infinitely many sets of values
for the regression coefficients that would satisfy the
equations. On the basis of the data one cannot distinguish among
the countless possibilities. This means that it is impossible to
uniquely identify the effects of the variables.
The same problem arises when the data are presented and
analyzed in cross-tabulations. Ordinarily one would try to
establish that there is a separate status inconsistency effect
1 Blalock (1966, 1967a) has shown that the identification problem is not peculiar to the analysis of status inconsistency data, but is likely to be encountered also in the testing of hypotheses about effects of social mobility, the status integration theory, and in the analysis of structural and compositional effects, all of which have substantive and formal similarities with the status inconsistency argument. 80
by showing that within categories formed by the cross- classification of, for instance, educational status and occupational status the dependent participation variable varies with differences in the degree of inconsistency. But because status inconsistency is completely specified in terms of educational status and occupational status, it is logically
impossible to hold the status variables constant and at the same time vary the inconsistency variable. The reason quite simply is that
within a category formed by the conjunction of a status from each of several dimensions there can be no variation in the configuration of statuses. Thus, within-category variation in attitudes or behavior could not possibly be explained by within-category variation in status configuration - there is none. (Hodge and Siegel, 1970:515. Emphasis in original).
The implication of this problem is that one cannot by purely empirical means isolate status inconsistency effects from
the main effects of the status variables. In order to achieve
identification and to determine the magnitudes of the various
effects it will be necessary to place a priori restrictions on
some of these effects, thereby reducing the number of unknowns.
One way of doing this is to make assumptions about the size
and/or direction of the status effects or the status
inconsistency effects. For example, one could assume a priori
that one of the status variables has no effect on the dependent
variable, or one might specify the sign of the status effects.
This is the strategy proposed by Hyman (1966). Another
possibility is to make assumptions about the effect of status 81
inconsistency itself: whether or not the direction of the inconsistencies (high-low or low-high) makes a difference for their effects on the dependent variable.
In addition to the above solution Blalock (1966:55-8;
I967a:799-801) has discussed a number of other ways to handle the identification problem. But he has also remarked that none of them is likely to yield entirely satisfactory solutions. The problem is that some of the assumptions in these proposed solutions are unrealistic (e.g., that the effect of one or the other status variable is zero) and all of them depend for their justification on a much more rigorous specification of the status inconsistency argument.
Nevertheless, there is a relatively simple way of testing for the existence of status inconsistency effects while adequately controlling for the effects of the separate status variables. Before describing this method, it is useful to explain more fully the conceptual and methodological developments that followed on the recognition of the difficulties in interpreting the results of status inconsistency studies.
Status Inconsistency Effects as Statistical Interaction
An important point to recognize is that the conceptualization and measurement of status inconsistency effects have undergone a change in the course of the debate.
Following Lenski (1964), many researchers have subsequently treated status inconsistency effects as statistical interaction 82
between two or more status variables.
Interaction, or nonadditivity, refers to the state of affairs where the relationship of a dependent variable with a
given independent variable depends on, or varies with, the values or categories of some other independent variable(s).
Hypotheses of status inconsistency effects imply that the effect
of one status variable on the behaviour or attitude in question
is not the same across all levels of the other status variable,
and vice versa. If one assumes that the status variables have
additive effects, so that they affect the dependent variable
independently of each other, then the existence of statistical
interaction can be taken as an indication that a status
inconsistency effect may be present.
However, we are cautioned against simply equating
interaction effects with an inconsistency effect. As already
mentioned, Hyman (1966) noted the possibility that there are
status inconsistency effects in a given set of data but no
statistical interaction (when high-low and low-high
inconsistency patterns have opposite effects). And Blalock
(1967b, 1967c) has pointed out that interaction among the status
variables may occur for many other reasons than inconsistency
effects (such as, for instance, measurement and specification
errors). Thus, although the presence of interaction can help
uncover status inconsistency effects, it may be difficult to
determine how much and which part of it can be attributed to
inconsistency. 83
Nevertheless, statistical interaction between the status variables that are used to define status inconsistency has become the basis for deciding whether or not there is an effect of status inconsistency on a given dependent variable over and above the effects of the status variables themselves.
Specifically the strategy in recent status inconsistency
research has been to first test the adequacy of a statistical model that assumes the effects of the separate status variables
to be strictly additive. Deviations of the observed dependent
variable scores from the predictions of this additive model
point to statistical interaction among the status variables. A
status inconsistency effect may be inferred if a model that in
addition to the main effects of the status variables also allows
for interaction, representing status inconsistency effects,
explains more variance in the dependent variable than the'simple
additive model. Basically this approach follows the principle of
parsimony: stay with the simple interpretation of the empirical
results in terms of only additive status effects if it works
almost equally well as the more complex interpretation in terms
of a special status inconsistency effect.
This method of analysis was first described and
demonstrated by Duncan (1964, 1966:90-5). It was subsequently
used in several studies of status inconsistency effects (for
example, Jackson and Burke, 1965; Treiman, 1966; Broom and
Jones, 1970; Jackson and Curtis, 1972; Olsen and Tully, 1972;
Hornung, 1977). This is also the approach adopted in this
research. 84
Despite the fact that it has been widely applied and has
introduced more refined statistical techniques in status
inconsistency research, this method has not ended the dispute over which is the proper way to analyze status inconsistency data. On the contrary. Hope (1975, 1978) argued that Duncan's
statistical design—called the "square-additive" model1 by
Hope—is inappropriate as a means for testing hypotheses of
status inconsistency effects.
His major point of critique is that this model. is a misrepresentation of the theoretical formulation as set out by
Lenski in his papers of 1954 and 1956. According to Hope, Lenski
originally conceived status inconsistency as a difference
between general social status and various specific aspects of
status. The general or overall status dimension represents the
shared effects of the specific status variables, and status
inconsistency is defined as deviations from this vertical
dimension of general status. However, the conception of status
inconsistency that informs the square-additive model - is
completely different: status inconsistency is identified with
statistical interaction between the separate status variables
and the general status dimension has disappeared altogether.
1 This name refers to the characteristic arrangement of the dependent variable scores (means or proportions) in a square table formed by the cross-classification of two status variables. The square-additive model is a nonlinear variant (involving the use of multiple classification analysis or dummy- variable regression analysis) of the linear additive model presented by Blalock (1966, 1967a; see also Lenski, 1964). Hope's criticisms apply to both kinds of additive model. 85
Hope contends that the square-additive model is an alternative to Lenski's status inconsistency theory and as such cannot serve as a test of that theory.
Hope further objects that the square-additive model, as the statistical basis for testing hypotheses of status inconsistency effects, is biased against the detection of such effects. So, it is not surprising that when data are analyzed with this method, a model positing only additive status effects is usually found to give a good fit.
General Strategy in Data Analysis
To test for the effects of status inconsistency on participation in voluntary organizations a two-stage analytic strategy was followed. The first step was to assess whether a strictly additive model involving only the main effects of the
individual status variables provides an acceptable fit to the data.
An additive model of the relationships between a dependent variable Y and two independent variables X^ and has the general form
Y = a + b-, X-, + bz X2 + ey ( 1 )
The coefficients b-| and b£ express the separate effects of X-) and X2 on Y. For example, suppose that the dependent variable is
the number of memberships in voluntary organizations and that
the X's represent educational status and occupational status.
The additive model then states that an increase in educational 86
status (X-| ) also increases, by a certain quantity bi , the number of memberships and that this increase will be the same regardless of what the level of occupational status (X2) is.
Likewise, the effect of occupational status on membership is independent of the effect of educational status.
This model of additive status effects represents the null hypothesis in testing the alternative hypothesis that over and above the separate effects of the status variables there is also a negative status inconsistency effect. On the basis of the additive model regression equations were formed for predicting values on the dependent participation variables from the independent status variables. If the values predicted by the additive regression equation closely match the observed values, then the variation in the dependent variable can be attributed to the simple sum of the separate effects of the individual status variables (and to residual effects due to "error"). The model of additive status effects would be adequate to account for the differences in participation and there is no need to postulate a status inconsistency effect.
Substantial and systematic differences, however, between observed and predicted values indicate that the relationships of the status variables with the dependent participation variable are not strictly additive, but that the statuses interact in their effects on participation in voluntary organizations, which could indicate a status inconsistency effect. This means that a different, nonadditive model may be required. 87
The second step, then, was to consider a model that explicitly allows for interaction among the status variables to represent status inconsistency effects. Such a non-additive model may be written as
Y = a + b1X1 + b2X2 + b3(X1,X2) + eY (2)
This model includes terms for the main effects of X-i and X2 as well as a term for the effect of interaction between these two variables, denoted by the expression (X<|,X£).1 Translated in terms of our example, Model (2) asserts that in addition to the separate effects of educational status and occupational status on membership, there is also an effect due to their particular combinations, that is, status consistency or inconsistency.
The crucial question is whether such a nonadditive status inconsistency model has greater explanatory power than a strictly additive model of status effects only. If, by adding an interaction term for status inconsistency effects to the additive model, we are able to explain a larger proportion of the variance in the dependent variables, we may conclude that a genuine status inconsistency effect is at work and not merely status effects. But if Model (2) does not explain at least a moderate amount more variance in participation than does
Model '(1 ) , then the model of additive status effects will be
1 This model is called a nonadditive model because it contains an interaction term representing the nonadditive effects of X^ and X2. But strictly speaking this model is still additive in form since the interaction term is added to the equation. 88
retained because of its greater simplicity and parsimony. In that case the conclusion will be that status inconsistency has no appreciable effect on participation in voluntary organizations, net of the effects of the status variables themselves.
The actual analysis was done by multiple regression with dummy variables. This procedure makes it possible to separate
the effect due to interaction between the status variables from
the main effects of the statuses taken separately. It also allows us to determine whether a status inconsistency model
explains enough additional variance in participation to justify accepting it instead of the model of additive status effects.
The dummy-variable regression technique and the specific
regression equations used in the analyses are described in
greater detail in the next chapter. 89
CHAPTER 4
RESULTS OF THE ANALYSES
This chapter divides into two major parts. The first part
reports on the results of the analyses of the relationship between status inconsistency and membership in voluntary organizations. In the second part the results on status
inconsistency and office-holding are presented. Within each part
I examine successively the findings for the respondents from
Port Alberni, for the men in the sample of married couples from
Vancouver, and for employed women in the Vancouver sample.1
The general features of the analytical strategy were
outlined in the preceding chapter, but the details of the
technical procedures have yet to be described. This will be done
in the section below, in which the Port Alberni data are
scrutinized for evidence of status inconsistency effects on
membership in voluntary organizations.
1 In these analyses I am not concerned primarily with differences between the three samples per se, but rather with the presence and direction of status inconsistency effects in each of the three data sets. 90
Status Inconsistency and Membership in Voluntary Organizations
The test of the status inconsistency hypotheses started from the assumption that the status variables used to operationalize status consistency and inconsistency affect membership and office-holding in voluntary organizations independently of each other and in an additive way. I then looked for indications that this model of additive status effects failed to provide an acceptable fit to the patterns of variation in participation. Such inadequacy would show up as large differences between the actually observed levels of participation and those predicted on the basis of additive effects of the status variables.
The Port Alberni Sample
Dummy-variable multiple regression. To construct the equations for predicting values on the measures of participation multiple regression with dummy variables was used. The specific procedure is as follows. Each category or level of the trichotomized status variables was converted into a separate binary-coded variable. On each of these so-called "dummy" variables respondents were given a score of 1 if they were in that particular category of the status variable. Otherwise a score of 0 was assigned. Thus, the education variable generated three new variables representing low, medium, and high educational status. A person with a university degree, for 91
instance, received a score of 1 on the dummy variable for high educational status and a score of 0 on the two dummies for low and medium educational status. Similarly, respondents were assigned scores of 1 and 0 on the three dummy variables created from the different levels of occupational status.1
The multiple regression equation for predicting the mean number of memberships from educational status and occupational status after conversion into dummy variables is as follows:
M = a + b1 Em + b2 Eh + b3 Om + b^ Oh (3) where M = the predicted mean number of memberships in voluntary organizations, Em = the dummy variable for medium educational
status, Eh = the dummy variable for high educational status,
Om = the dummy variable for medium occupational status, Oh = the dummy variable for high occupational status, a = the regression constant, and the bi = the unstandardized partial regression coefficients associated with the dummy status variables.
1 Dummy-variable regression analysis has the advantage that it does not require interval-scale measurement and makes it possible to use regression techniques with ordinal and nominal data. Furthermore, it avoids' the restrictive assumption of conventional regression analysis that the relationships between the independent variables and the dependent variable be linear. The dummy variables created from the categories or values of the original independent variables are nominal, and therefore noncontinuous and unordered (Taylor, 1973:1198,1201). This feature allows the regression coefficients associated with the dummy-variable predictors to conform to any nonlinearity that may be present in the data. Suits (1957), Cohen (1968:427-32), Miller and Erickson (1974), and Myles (1978) have given expositions, in greater or less detail, of the dummy-variable regression technique. 92
Note that the dummy variables for low educational status and low occupational status have been left out of the regression equation. This was done to avoid exact linear dependence and to ensure that unique estimates of the regression coefficients could be obtained.1
These omitted categories, however, are indispensable for interpreting the effects of the dummy status variables in the
equation. The partial regression coefficents, b'L , measure the net effects of the dummy variables for the two other levels of educational status and occupational status. These effects are expressed as deviations, positive or negative, from the dependent variable score predicted for cases in the omitted low status category. Thus, regression coefficient b<| in Equation (3) is interpretable as the net difference in the predicted mean number of memberships for respondents who have medium educational status and the predicted mean for respondents with low educational status. The effects of the two omitted dummy variables are collected in the regression constant a.
Respondents with low status on both the dimension of educational
1 For any given case, the sum of the scores on the three dummy variables created from a particular status variable is equal to one. The value for the third dummy variable is completely determined by the first two dummies. Because of this dependence among the variables the inclusion of all three dummy variables would make the set of normal equations for estimating the regression coefficients unsolvable. To obtain unique solutions it is necessary to place restrictions on the equations. This may be done by omitting one of the dummy variables for each independent variable, which is equivalent to pre-assigning the value of 0 to the regression coefficient for that particular dummy variable (cf. Suits, 1957). 93
status and the dimension of occupational status form a joint reference category against which the effects of medium and high status are compared and interpreted.
The values of a and the b's obtained from the ordinary least-squares solution of the above regression equation, using the Port Alberni data, are given in column 1 of Table 3.1 With these figures substituted in Equation (3) we can compute the predicted mean number of memberships in voluntary organizations for the various combinations of ranks on the dimensions of educational and occupational status. For example, the mean number of memberships predicted from the additive regression equation for Port Alberni respondents with medium educational status and high occupational status is 1.16 -
.079 + 1.023 = 2.10. The predicted mean for individuals with low rank on both status dimensions is just 1.16, the value of the regression constant. In that case the other coefficients are all zero, as the dummy variables for medium and high educational and occupational status would have the value 0. In a similar way, predicted values of the membership variable were computed for each of the other groups of respondents with a distinct combination of educational status and occupational status.
1 Table 23 in the Appendix presents the matrix of zero-order correlations and the means and standard deviations for all the variables that were used in the dummy-variable regression analyses based on the Port Alberni data. The computer routine used to solve the regression equations in this and subsequent analyses i-s the standard multiple regression program in SPSS (Nie et al., 1975). 94
Table 3. Dummy-Variable Regression Analyses of the Number of Memberships in Voluntary Organizations on . Education and Occupation: Additive and Nonadditive Models (Port Alberni Sample)
Unstandardized Regression Coefficients (standard errors in parentheses) Independent Variables Additive Nonadditive Model Model
Education: Grade 8 or less * *
Grade 9-11 -.079 -.070 (.150) (.160)
HS compl or more .455 .425 ( . 188) (.189)
Occupation: Semi- & unskilled * *
Skilled . 1 20 .161 ( . 155) (.158)
White collar 1 .023 1 .036 (.168) (.168)
Status Consistency: Consistent *
Moderately inconsistent . 103 ( . 143)
Sharply inconsistent .518 (.261)
Regression constant 1.160 1 .063
R2 . 1 35 . 1 42
N 513 513
* Dummy variable omi tted from regression equation 95
The predicted mean number of memberships were then compared with the observed means in the corresponding cells of the (two- way analysis of variance) table formed by the cross- classification of the two status variables. By examining the deviations of the observed means from the predicted means we can determine whether the additive regression equation is adequate to account for differences in mean number of memberships between status consistent and status inconsistent respondents or whether a different model is called for.
Deviations from additive predictions. The left-hand portion of Table 4 contains the observed mean number of memberships in voluntary organizations for the nine categories of Port Alberni respondents with different combinations of educational status and occupational status. The cells on the main diagonal of the table represent the consistent status patterns. Sharp inconsistency is represented by the two cells in the upper right and lower left corners of the table. The remaining four cells represent status combinations that are moderately inconsistent.
The first thing to notice is the positive association of the dependent variable with each of the two independent status variables.1 The row means and column means show that the mean
1 Although education and occupation are positively related with membership in voluntary organizations, these associations are weak. Somers' d coefficient computed for a 3x2 table of educational status and membership is only +.09, and +.14 for occupational status with membership. When measured by gamma the degree of association is somewhat higher: +.24 and +.37 respectively (see Table 21 in the Appendix). 96
Table 4. Observed Mean Number of Memberships and Deviations from Means Predicted Under Model of Additive Status Effects, by Educational and Occupational Status (Port Alberni Sample)
Observed Mean Number of Memberships Observed Minus (N's in parentheses) Predicted Means
EDUCATIONAL STATUS EDUCATIONAL STATUS OCCUPATION Row STATUS Low Medium High Means Low Medium High
Low .97 1 .22 1 .90 1.17 -.19 +.14 +.28 (98) (91 ) (21 ) (210)
Medi urn 1 .45 1.15 1 .50 1 .33 +.17 -.05 -.24 (55) (65) (28) (148)
High 2.75 1 .95 2.64 2.37 +.57 -.15 0.0 (16) (63) (76) (155)
Column means 1 .30 1.41 2.26 1 .58 (169) (219) (125) (513) 97
number of memberships increases with an increase in the level of educational or occupational status respectively. The main differences in the mean number of memberships occur between respondents who hold high rank on the dimension of educational status (completed high school or more) and those with medium or low educational status (less than completed high school), and between,respondents with high occupational status (white collar) and those with medium or low occupational status (blue collar).
Further, if we look at the entries on the diagonal running
from the upper left to the lower right corners of the table, we
see that the means become larger as we move from the group with consistent low statuses to the group with consistent high
statuses. And there are also clear differences between these means and the means in the other cells of the table.
The question of primary importance, however, is whether the
variation in the mean number of memberships for groups with
different education-occupation status patterns could have been
produced by a simple combination of the separate effects of the
two status variables. That is, do the nine means in the cells of
the table exhibit an additive pattern? If they do, they will
closely match the means predicted from the additive regression
equation. But if there is statistical interaction among the
status variables,' and hence a status inconsistency effect, then
the additive regression equation will yield predictions of the
mean number of memberships that differ from the observed means.
It is now clear what constitutes evidence for or against
the hypotheses. The null hypothesis of additive status effects 98
will, be rejected if considerable differences exist between the
observed means in the cells of the table and the means predicted
by the additive regression equation. The alternative main hypothesis is that status inconsistency has a negative effect on membership over and above the effects of the status variables defining it. In operational terms this means that respondents
with inconsistent statuses have, on the average, fewer memberships than expected under the assumption of additive
status effects. Thus, empirical support for this status
inconsistency hypothesis hinges on large and negative
differences between the observed mean number of memberships and
the mean predicted by the additive regression equation in those
cells of the table that represent status inconsistency.
The figures in the right-hand half of Table 4 are the
differences between the observed means and the predicted means.
Overall, these differences, or deviations from additivity, are
moderate at best, although they are fairly large in the two
crucial cells representing sharp inconsistency between
educational status and occupational status.
It is not only the size of the deviations that is relevant,
however. We must also consider the direction in which the
observed means deviate from the predicted means. When the
observed mean is larger than the predicted mean, the deviation
has a positive sign. On the other hand, a negative sign
indicates a smaller-than-predicted mean. Surprisingly, the
deviations for the two sharply inconsistent groups are positive,
precisely the opposite of what was expected. The positive 99
deviations suggest that in the Port Alberni sample individuals with sharply inconsistent educational and occupational statuses have, on an average, more memberships in voluntary organizations than would be expected if the effects of education and occupation were strictly additive.
Deviations of the observed from the predicted means in a direction contrary to what the status inconsistency hypothesis implies also occur in several other cells. Respondents who hold low rank on both status dimensions, and whose statuses therefore are consistent, belong to fewer voluntary organizations than predicted. And in two of the four cells representing moderate status inconsistency the observed mean is larger than the predicted mean. In fact, only moderate inconsistency at high status levels--high status on one dimension and medium status on the other—is associated with deviations of the expected sign.
These surprising findings about the size "and the direction of the deviations from additive predictions are brought out more clearly in Table 5. It shows the weighted observed and predicted mean number of memberships for the three groups of respondents differing in degree of status inconsistency.1 There is hardly
1 Each observed cell mean in the 3x3 table was multiplied by the number of cases in that cell. The weighted cell means were aggregated across the cells representing status consistency, moderate status inconsistency, and sharp status inconsistency. Each sum was divided by the total number of cases in the cells over which the summation was done. This yielded the weighted observed mean number of memberships for each of the three ordered categories of the inconsistency variable. The same procedure was followed for the means predicted from the additive regression equation. 100
any difference now between the observed and predicted means for the categories of respondents whose educational status and occupational status are consistent or moderately inconsistent.
However, the mean number of memberships observed for respondents with sharply inconsistent statuses deviates from the mean predicted on the basis of the model of additive education and occupation effects; and this observed mean- is larger, not smaller, than the predicted value.
Table 5. Summary of the Effect of Education-Occupation Status Inconsistency on Membership (Port Alberni Sample)
Mean Number of Memberships Degree of Status Inconsistency Observed Expected Difference N
Cons i stent 1 .55 1 .64 -.09 239
Moderately inconsistent 1 .50 1 .48 + .02 237
Sharply inconsistent 2.27 1 .86 + .41 37
This finding also has implications for the validity of the hypothesis that the two opposite forms of sharp inconsistency between educational status and occupational status differ in
their negative effect on membership in voluntary organizations.
The secondary hypothesis was that underrewarded status
inconsistents have, on an average, fewer memberships than do overrewarded status inconsistents. Translated in operational
terms of our testing strategy this means that the negative 101
deviation for the group of respondents with high educational status but low occupational status (upper right corner of
Table 4) should be larger than the negative deviation for respondents with low educational but high occupational status
(lower left corner of Table 4). The fact that both deviations are positive invalidates the hypothesis, even though their size is different for the two groups, and the smaller positive deviation for the underrewarded inconsistents suggests that, net of the separate effects of educational and occupational status, this type of sharp inconsistency is associated with a lower mean number of memberships than the opposite type—overrewarded status inconsistency.
A status inconsistency model. The fairly large differences between observed and predicted means in the two cells for sharp status inconsistency give cause for considering the possibility that there is statistical interaction between the status variables and hence that status inconsistency does have an effect on membership in voluntary organizations. The question is whether this effect is important enough to warrant abandoning the model of additive status effects in favour of the more complex nonadditive status inconsistency model.
One criterion for assessing the importance of status inconsistency in determining participation in voluntary organizations is the ability of status inconsistency to explain variation in the dependent variables over and above the variation that can be explained by the status variables
/ 1 02
themselves (see Broom and Jones, 1970; Olsen and Tully, 1972;
House and Harkins, 1975; Hornung, 1977). Adopting this criterion of net explanatory power we ask that the addition of the status inconsistency variable as a predictor to the baseline model of additive status effects increase, by at least a moderate amount, the proportion of variance explained in membership in voluntary organizations.
With a view to that issue a nonadditive model of status
inconsistency effects was constructed. This alternative model differs from the additive status effects model in that it
includes a separate interaction term for status inconsistency effects in addition to terms for the additive effects of the
status variables. By expanding Equation (3) with dummy variables
for degree of status inconsistency we obtain the dummy-variable
regression equation representing the nonadditive status
inconsistency model:
M = a + b-) Em + b2 Eh + b3 Om + b^ Oh + bs Dm + b^ Dh (4)
In this equation Dm stands for the dummy variable representing
combinations of educational status and occupational status that
were defined as moderately inconsistent. Dh is the dummy
variable for sharp inconsistency between the two statuses. The
partial regression coefficients b$ and b^, measure the separate
effects of moderate and sharp status inconsistency,
respectively, on membership in voluntary organizations, net of
the main effects of education and occupation. Here too, the
effects of the two inconsistency levels 'are expressed as 103
deviations from the mean number of memberships predicted for the omitted category of status consistent individuals.
The last column in Table 3 shows the results of the ordinary least-squares regression of memberships on education, occupation, and inconsistency between these two statuses. It is noteworthy that the regression coefficients associated with moderate and sharp status inconsistency are positive, although on the basis of the hypothesis we would expect them to be negative. However, this finding is hardly a surprise in view of what the first part of the analysis has revealed. It merely confirms that, if anything, status inconsistency tends to
increase rather than decrease the mean number of memberships.
How large an increase in the proportion of variance
explained in membership accrues from the addition of the dummy
status inconsistency'variables to the regression equation? This
can be determined by comparing the values of the coefficient of multiple determination R2 for Equation (3) and Equation (4). A
difference between the R2's represents the increment in the
proportion of variance explained that can be attributed solely
to the effects of the status inconsistency variables included in
Equation (4) but not in Equation (3). The R2 values associated
with the two equations are shown in the last row of Table 3.
They indicate that the additive regression equation explains
13.5 per cent of the total variance in the number of memberships 104
in voluntary organizations.1 The nonadditive regression equation explains 14.2 per cent of the variance. In other words, the status inconsistency model, combining terms for the main additive effects of educational and occupational status with a term for interaction between these variables, accounts for 0.7 per cent more of the variance in memberships than the strictly additive model of the effects of educational status and occupational status. This increase in explained variance of less than one per cent is too small, by any standard, to attribute considerable explanatory power to the status inconsistency variable.
In short, from the pattern of differences between observed and additively predicted means for groups of status consistent and inconsistent respondents it at first looked as though education-occupation status inconsistency is associated, but positively, with membership in voluntary organizations. Upon closer examination, however, this apparent status inconsistency
1 That education and occupation additively account for no more than 13.5 per cent of the variance in memberships may be something of a surprise in the light of the well-documented relationship between social status and participation in voluntary organizations. This finding will be discussed in the next chapter, but in the present context it is a secondary matter. What counts in evaluating a particular model is not the absolute proportion of variance in the dependent variable that the model is able to explain, but rather its explanatory power in comparison with some other model. In other words, with the analytical strategy adopted here "the crucial question is not how much of the total variation can be explained, but whether a regression equation including terms for status inconsistency explains significantly more of the total variance in [participation] than one restricted to terms for the status variables themselves." (Broom and Jones, 1970:994. Emphasis added) . 105
effect proved to be extremely weak, since it adds very little to the proportion of variance in memberships already explained by the additive effects of educational status and occupational status alone.
Further discussion of these findings is postponed until we have had the opportunity to look at the outcomes of the other analyses. In the next section the analysis of the relationship between status inconsistency and membership continues with the examination of results obtained for the Vancouver samples. After that, data bearing on the relationship between status
inconsistency and office-holding, the second measure of participation in voluntary organizations, are presented. The
report on the remaining results can be brief. The analyses proceeded along the same lines as described and illustrated above, and there is rto need to repeat the details of the analytical procedures. The only major variations concern the
independent and dependent variables that were entered into the
analyses; they will be noted and explained at the appropriate
points in the text.
The Vancouver Sample: Men
Three tests of the hypotheses linking membership in
voluntary organizations and status inconsistency were performed
with data from the sample of Vancouver men. Level of income was
used as a third measure of social status, in addition to level
of education and level of occupation. Each test relates the
membership variable to a pair of status variables and to the 106
status inconsistency variable constructed from them.1
The results of the three analyses are shown in Tables 6, 7, and 8. Although it may look complicated, Table 6 has the same structure as the earlier discussed Table 3. Now we are dealing, however, not with one but with three pairs of dummy-variable
regression analyses, one pair for each of the three problems.
Column 1 gives the results of the regression of memberships on education and occupation, based on the model of additive status effects. In column 2 are the coefficients for the nonadditive
regression equation, which includes dummy variables for moderate and sharp inconsistency between educational status and
occupational status in addition to the status variables
themselves. Likewise, the next two columns present the solutions
of the additive regression equation with education and income
(column 3) and of the corresponding nonadditive equation with
status inconsistency variables (column 4). Finally, columns 5
and 6 contain the results of the two regression analyses in
which occupation and income are the status variables.2
1 An analysis involving all three status variables at once proved to be unfeasible. Simultaneous cross-classification of education, occupation, and income creates 27 categories several of which contained only a few cases or none at all. It would be difficult to draw any firm conclusion from findings based on such small numbers of observations, since the possibility of random fluctuations in the data is so large. Therefore, only the results of the analyses with two status variables at a time are reported.
2 The corresponding tables with zero-order correlations, means, and standard deviations of the variables used in each of the three analyses are given in the Appendix (Tables 24, 25, and 26) . 1 07
Table 6. Dummy-Variable Regression Analyses of Number of Memberships on Pairs of Status Variables: Additive and Nonadditive Models (Vancouver Sample: Men)
Unstandardized Regression Coefficients Independent (standard errors in parentheses) Variables A-f NAn A NA A . NA
Education: HS not completed * * * *
Completed HS .389 .361 .470 .426 ( .207) ( .217) ( .196) (.205)
University .698 .628 .891 .848 ( .218) (.233) ( .195) (.203)
Occupation: Manual * * * *
Admin-cler-techn .286 .357 .250 .195 ( .210) (.230) ( .201 ) ( .205)
Exec-manager-prof 1 .501 1 .571 1 . 127 1 .069 ( .233) (.248) (.226) (.226)
Income: Under $8000 * * * *
$8000 - $13999 .220 . 1 67 .129 .254 ( .212) ( .228) ( .220) ( .226)
$14000 & more 1 .816 1 .868 1 .483 1 .491 ( .245) (.251) ( .269) ( .271)
Status Consistency: Consistent * * *
Moderately -.144 .059 -.314 inconsistent (.192) (.183) ( . 169)
Sharply -.235 -.294- .524 inconsistent (.327) (.321) ( .507)
Regression constant .963 1.016 .883 .916 .935 1 .039
R2 .223 .225 .280 .282 .293 .303
N 398 398 392 392 384 384
-|- Additive model n Nonadditive model * Dummy variable omitted from regression equation 108
Table 7. Observed Mean Number of Memberships and Deviations from Means Predicted Under Model of Additive Status Effects, by Pairs of Status Variables (Vancouver Sample: Men)
Observed Mean Number of Memberships Observed Minus (N's in parentheses) Predicted Means
EDUCATIONAL STATUS EDUCATIONAL STATUS OCCUPATION Row STATUS Low Medium High Means Low Medium High
Low 1 .07 1.14 1 .00 1 .08 +.11 -.21 -.66 (81 ) (21 ) (7) (109)
Medium 1.11 1 .73 2.09 1 .53 -.14 +.09 +.14 (64) (45) (32) (141 )
High 2.46 2.86 3.16 2.97 0.0 +.01 0.0 (26) (35) (87) (148)
Column means 1 .30 2.00 2.77 1 .94 (171 ) (101 ) (126) (398)
EDUCATIONAL STATUS EDUCATIONAL STATUS INCOME Row STATUS Low Medium High Means Low Medium High
Low .96 1.10 2.00 1.11 +.08 -.25 +.23 (45) (20) (8) (73)
Medium 1.17 1.51 1 .95 1 .47 +.07 -.06 -.04 (95) (55) (55) (205)
High 2.32 3.50 3.60 3.30 -.38 +.33 +.01 (25) (26) (63) (114)
Column means 1 .28 1 .94 2.78 1 .93 (165) (101) (126) (392)
(continued) 109
Table 7. (continued)
Observed Mean Number of Memberships Observed Minus (N's in parentheses) Predicted Means
OCCUPATIONAL STATUS OCCUPATIONAL STATUS INCOME Row STATUS Low Medium High Means Low Medium High
Low .91 1 .08 2.67 1.14 -.03 -.11 +.61 (34) (26) (6) (66)
Medium 1 .04 1 .49 1 .96 1 .46 -.02 +.18 -.23 (70) (80) (54) (204)
High 3.00 2.26 3.65 3.30 +.58 -.41 +.10 (4) (27) (83) (114)
Column means 1 .07 1 .56 2.97 1 .95 (108) (133) (143) (384) 1 10
Turning now to Table 7 we can see that in this sample of
Vancouver men too there are clear differences in the mean number of memberships for the various categories of respondents with different combinations of ranks on a given pair of status dimensions, be they education and occupation, education and
income, or occupation and income (see the left-hand half of
Table 7). The question is whether these differences in membership can be attributed to the additive effects of the two
status variables involved, without recourse to a special status
inconsistency effect.
The evidence bearing on this question is contained in the
right-hand half of Table 7. The figures shown there certainly do not force the conclusion upon us that the model of additive
status effects is clearly inadequate to account for the variation in the data. For that, the differences between the
observed cell means and the cell means computed from the additive regression equations are generally too small and the
patterns of departures from additivity too unsystematic.
Yet it is also true that the largest deviations in the majority of cases are found in those cells that represent
extreme inconsistency between ranks on the two status dimensions
considered in any particular analysis. A closer examination of
the findings for the six sharply inconsistent groups therefore
is in order.
The direction in which the observed means deviate from the
predicted means says something about the nature of any
relationship between status inconsistency and membership in 1.11
voluntary organizations. The hypothesis is that status inconsistency has a negative effect on membership. To be congruent with the hypothesis the means in the status inconsistent cells must be smaller than the additive regression equation predicts, that is, the deviations for the sharply inconsistent groups should be negative. However, the evidence on this point is mixed: half of the deviations in the sharply inconsistent cells have a positive instead of the expected negative sign.
A discrepancy also appears in the findings about the hypothesized difference in the negative effects of the two forms of investment-reward inconsistency. Looking at the figures in the top panel of Table 7 we see that the mean number of memberships is smaller than predicted (-.66) for the category of men with the inconsistent combination of high educational status and low occupational status, while there is no difference between the observed and predicted means for inconsistents who have low educational status but high occupational status. If
sharp inconsistency between education and occupation status does have an unfavourable impact on membership, it seems to affect
persons who are underrewarded indeed more severely than
overrewarded inconsistents.
However, when, income status is the reward dimension and
educational status the investment dimension, the pattern is
completely different. Men with high education status but low
income status--the underrewarded inconsistents--have, on the
average, more memberships than predicted by the additive 1 12
regression equation. The opposite inconsistency type of low educational status and high income status is associated with a smaller-than-expected mean number of memberships. Not only is this ' result incongruent with the hypothesis that sharp inconsistency has a greater negative impact on membership for underrewarded than for overrewarded individuals, it also means that the effect of underrewarded inconsistency in this case is not negative at all, but positive.1
A note of caution must be added. Most of the cells representing sharp status inconsistency contain only a few cases. Since the means for those cells were computed on a small number of cases, the possibility of random fluctuations is quite large. This factor should be taken into account in the interpretation of the size and sign of the deviations for the sharply inconsistent groups.
A more stable if less detailed picture emerges" when the means are aggregated for groups of consistent, moderately inconsistent, and sharply inconsistent men. Table 8 shows that, where combinations of educational status with either occupational or income status are concerned, the deviations of
1 The distinction between overrewarded and underrewarded forms of inconsistency does not apply when occupation and income are the status variables. In the investment-reward terminology these two statuses are reward dimensions. Therefore, persons with sharply inconsistent occupational and income statuses may be called "reward inconsistents" (Geschwender, 1967). However, the argument about the differential impact of opposite types of reward inconsistency on participation is not as strong as in the case of investment-reward inconsistencies. And as the third panel of Table 7 shows, any effect is the same for both types of occupation-income status inconsistency. 1 1 3
Table 8. Summary of the Effects of Three Types of Status Inconsistency on Membership (Vancouver Sample: Men)
Mean Number of Memberships Degree of Status Inconsistency Observed Expected Difference N
EDUC/ iTIONAL STATUS AND OCCUPATIONAL STATUS
Consistent 2.06 2.00 +.06 213
Moderately inconsistent 1.72 1.78 -.06 1 52
Sharply inconsistent 2.15 2.29 -.14 33
EDUCJ ^TIONAL STATUS AND INCOME STATUS
Consistent 2.17 2.16 +.01 1 63
Moderately inconsistent 1.69 1.65 +.04 196
Sharply inconsistent 2.24 2.47 -.23 33
OCCUINATIONA L STATUS AND INCOME STATUS
Consistent 2.30 2.19 +.11 1 97
Moderately inconsistent 1.48 1.67 -.19 1 77
Sharply inconsi stent 2.80 2.20 +.60 1 0 1 1 4
the observed means from the predicted means for sharply
inconsistent groups are reduced in size. In both these cases an additive model appears to give a fairly good overall fit to the observed means in the three categories of status consistency and moderate.and sharp inconsistency. Such is not the case, however, when the status dimensions are occupation and income. What is particularly striking here is the large difference between the weighted observed and predicted means for men in the category of
sharp status inconsistency. The positive sign means that
individuals whose occupational and income statuses are extremely
inconsistent have, on an average, more memberships than is predicted under the assumption that the effects of the two
status variables are strictly additive. Once again, the
implication of this finding is that sharp status inconsistency
tends to promote instead of hinder membership in voluntary
organizations. It remains to be seen, however, whether this
large deviation from additivity can be taken as firm evidence
that an inconsistency effect involving occupational and income
statuses does indeed exist.
The proportion of variance in memberships in voluntary
organizations explained by the additive effects of education,
occupation, or income—taken two at a time—varies between .223
and .293 (see Table 6). Consider what happens to the squared
multiple correlation coefficient R2 when each strictly additive
equation is expanded with interaction terms representing the
effects of inconsistency between the two statuses in question. 1 15
The solutions of these nonadditive regression equations are given in columns 2, 4, and 6 of Table 6. When the R2's associated with these equations are compared with the R2's
obtained for the corresponding additive equations, it can be
readily seen that the addition of the status inconsistency variables to the basic equation did not produce, in any of the
three analyses, even a moderate increase in the proportion of
variance explained relative to what the additive effects of the
status variables themselves are able to explain. The largest
improvement in R2 was only .01, or 1 per cent; this was obtained
by including dummy variables for moderate and sharp
inconsistency between occupational and income status in the
regression analysis. The amount of additional variance in
memberships that could be explained by status inconsistency when
this is defined in terms of education and occupation or
education and income was a trivial two-tenths of one per cent in
both instances.
Clearly, then, status inconsistency as measured here has
very little explanatory power of its own once the independent
effects of the component status variables have been taken into
account. These findings merely underline what the earlier
examination of the deviations of observed means from additive
predictions revealed, namely that status inconsistency has no
appreciable effect on membership in voluntary organizations net
of the effects of status per se. In terms of the criterion of
incremental explanatory power as well there is no evidence that
a status inconsistency model is better suited than a strictly 1 16
additive status effects model to account for differences in the mean number of memberships among groups of men with different status patterns.
The Vancouver Sample: Employed Women
The analyses performed so far were based on data from samples that consist either exclusively or for the most part of male respondents. It is true, the Port Alberni sample does include women, but their number (86) is too small to be treated as a separate group in the analysis.
We now turn to an examination of the relationship between status inconsistency and membership in voluntary organizations among women. The data for this analysis once again come from the
Vancouver Urban Studies Project and pertain to the spouses of the men who were considered in the preceding analyses. However, the analysis is limited to those married women who were gainfully employed. The reason for this restriction is the difficulty of ascertaining relevant status characteristics for women who do not work outside the home for pay. Specifically,
the problem concerns the occupational status of women commonly designated as housewives.
Although housework, or "housewifery", is usually not
regarded as an occupation and therefore is routinely excluded
from occupational status or prestige scales, it would be quite appropriate to treat housework as an occupation having at least medium social rank (Eichler, 1977:155-8). Assigning medium
occupational status to not-employed women for their role as 117
housewife and including them in the analysis creates a problem, however. Since employment status is clearly associated with the dependent participation variables, the proper way of testing the
status inconsistency hypotheses on the female subsample would be
to control for the effect of this variable and to conduct
separate analyses for women who are employed and those who are
not. In a separate analysis of housewives, however, occupational
status would not be a variable but a constant: every respondent has the same medium occupational status. That status
characteristic could then not be used in constructing an
inconsistency measure. On the other hand, if no distinction is made between housewives and employed women, the analysis would
be hampered by another undesirable consequence of the inclusion
of housewives. Since housewives constituted approximately two-
thirds of the total female sample, the number of women with
medium occupational status would be very large relative to the
number of women in the high and low status categories.
Another way to deal with the problem is to attribute to
not-employed women the occupational status of their husbands.
The underlying assumption is that a housewife does not possess
social status of her own but derives it from her husband's
status. I decided not to follow this procedure here because it
is inappropriate for at least two reasons. First, although it
cannot be denied that the husband's occupational status reflects
upon the social status of his housewife-wife, it appears also
that "the housewife occupation itself possesses some independent
status and that derived and independent status interact with 118
each other." (Eichler, 1977:164).
The second objection stems from the nature of the status variables that were used in this research. In every other analysis thus far only dimensions of achieved status were considered. If husband's occupation were taken as indicator of
the occupational status of a housewife this would be a deviation
from the pattern of comparing only the respondents' achieved
statuses. This is so because occupational status of the husband, an achieved status characteristic, becomes a measure of ascribed
status when it is assigned to the wife: a status not obtained
through the woman's own achievements but derived from her husband's activities.
In short, the inclusion of women who are not employed presents difficulties for the analysis when we wish to use
occupation as one of the basic status dimensions in the
operational definition of status inconsistency. Therefore, the
analysis was restricted to gainfully employed (and married)
women. Further, the only status variables considered are
educational status and occupational status.1
The procedure for identifying status inconsistency effects
is familiar by now. As before, the analysis started with
evaluating the goodness-of-fit of a regression model that posits
additive effects of the status variables on the dependent
variable.
1 Income was not used as a status dimension in this analysis because information on personal income of the employed women was incomplete and its reliability questionable. 119
The first column of Table 9 shows the solution of. the
regression of voluntary organization memberships on education and occupation for the 137 employed married women in the
Vancouver sample.1 The mean number of memberships actually found
for each of the nine subgroups of women with different combinations of educational status and occupational status are
given in Table 10. It also shows the signed differences between
these observed means and the means predicted from the additive
regression equation. There is not much pattern to these
differences: positive and negative deviations are scattered
throughout the table. However, some of the largest deviations
from additive predictions occur in the cells representing
moderately inconsistent status patterns. The observed mean
number of memberships for those women who have a sharply
inconsistent combination of low educational status and high
occupational status is smaller (-.29) than would be expected if
the effects of these two status variables were additive.
Unfortunately, in this subsample there were no respondents with
the opposite pattern of high educational status and low
occupational status. This also makes it difficult to evaluate
the secondary hypothesis about the difference in the negative
effect of underrewarded and overrewarded inconsistencies on
membership in voluntary organizations.
1 See Table 27 in the Appendix for the matrix of correlations, means and standard deviations of the variables involved in the regression analyses. 1 20
Table 9. Dummy-Variable Regression Analyses of Number of Memberships on Education and Occupation: Additive and Nonadditive Models (Vancouver Sample: Employed Women)
Unstandardized Regression Coefficients . (standard errors in parentheses) Independent Variables Addit ive Nonadditive Model Model
Education: HS not completed * *
Completed HS .117 .027 (.198) ( .235)
University 1 .274 1 .097 ( .292) ( .358)
Occupation: Manual * *
Clerical & sales . 1 57 .180 (.257) (.265)
Exec-manager-prof .854 1 .056 (.309) (.373)
Status Consistency: Consi stent *
Moderately inconsistent .013 (.207)
Sharply inconsi stent -.521 ( .517)
Regression Constant .548 .576 —
R2 .289 .296 •
N 1 37 1 37
* Dummy variable omitted from regression equation 121
Table 10. Observed Mean Number of Memberships and Deviations from Means Predicted Under Model of Additive Status Effects, by Educational and Occupational Status (Vancouver Sample: Employed Women)
Observed Mean Number of Memberships Observed Minus (N's in parentheses) Predicted Means
EDUCATIONAL STATUS EDUCATIONAL STATUS OCCUPATION Row STATUS Low Medium High Means Low Medium High
Low .79 .25 • • • .59 +.24 -.42 (14) (8) (0) (22)
Medium .69 .78 2.29 .87 -.02 -.04 +.31 (35) (37) (7) (79)
High 1.11 1 .92 2.53 1 .97 -.29 +.40 -.15 (9) (12) (15) (36)
Column means .78 .95 2.45 1.12 (58) (57) (22) (137)
Table 11. Summary of the Effect of Education-Occupation Status Inconsistency on Membership (Vancouver Sample: Employed Women)
Mean Number of Memberships Degree of Status Inconsistency Observed Expected Difference N
Consistent 1.18 1.19 -.01 66
Moderately inconsi stent 1 .05 1 .00 + .05 62
Sharply inconsistent 1.11 1 .40 -.29 9 1 22
On the whole, the model of additive status effects appears
to be compatible with the data on membership, as Table 11 shows.
The weighted predicted means for the consistent and moderately
inconsistent groups of women match the observed means reasonably well. True, there is a negative difference of moderate size for
the category of women with sharply inconsistent education and
occupation statuses, but it pertains to only nine cases.
Column 2 of Table 9 shows the results of the regression in
which education and occupation as well as degree of status
inconsistency were included as independent variables. The
addition of terms for moderate and sharp status inconsistency to
the regression equation increases R2 from .289 to .296. This
means that educational status and occupational status additively
account for 28.9 per cent of the variance in memberships held by
these women, while status inconsistency explains an additional
0.7 per cent.
In this sample of employed women too, status inconsistency
does not have a marked impact on membership in voluntary
organizations over and above the separate effects of educational
status and occupational status which make up the inconsistency
type.
Summary
Before moving on to the next problem it may be useful to
recapitulate the main features and results of the analyses up to
now. 123
The principal hypothesis tested in this part of the research was that individuals with inconsistent statuses have fewer memberships in voluntary organizations than individuals whose statuses are consistent, taking into the account the differences due to the effects of the status variables themselves. That testing was extensive: a total of five analyses were performed, which involved three dimensions of socioeconomic status, three kinds of status inconsistency, and data from different samples.
The analysis started in each case from a simple additive model, one which states that membership in voluntary organizations is affected by two status variables independently of each other. Behind this is the conception that a status inconsistency effect, statistically speaking, is a consequence of ' interaction between the status variables that define the inconsistency variable. An indication that such effects may be present is the inability of the additive status effects model to adequately account for the variation in membership by status.
In three of the five analyses the baseline additive model provided an acceptable fit to the data. The mean number of memberships predicted from the additive regression equations for the various categories of respondents with distinct status combinations matched the observed means reasonably well. Further evidence of the absence of status inconsistency effects was the finding that nonadditive regression equations, which explicitly contain interaction terms for status inconsistency effects in addition to terms for the main effects of the component status 1 24
variables, explained hardly more variance in memberships than the corresponding additive regression equations. The increase in
R2 was .002 in two cases and .007 in the third, indicating an improvement of less than 1 per cent in the amount of explained variance.
In the two other analyses—involving the Port Alberni sample (education and occupation) and the sample of Vancouver men (occupation and income)—the additive model appeared less suited to describe the differences in mean number of memberships among groups of persons with different status combinations. What is especially interesting here is that the deviations from additivity, although relatively large in the sharply inconsistent groups, did not exhibit the pattern that should have been found if status inconsistency had indeed the unfavourable impact on membership the hypothesis assumes. The nature of the deviations suggests that any^ effect of the types of status inconsistency in question is a positive one. However, such effects proved to be extremely weak. The addition of status
inconsistency variables to the additive regression equations reduced the proportion of variance in memberships left unexplained by the additive effects of the component status variables by only a minute fraction (.007 and .010).
On the whole, then, these findings are sufficient ground to
reject the first hypothesis, which states that status
inconsistency has a negative effect on membership net of the effects of status per se. 125
Nor do the data lend support to the hypothesis that the
"underreward" type of status inconsistency is a more serious hindrance to joining voluntary organizations than is the opposite type of "overreward". The deviations of observed from predicted means either differed little between categories of
individuals characterized by these two types of sharp status
inconsistency or seldom differed in the way conform to the hypothesis.
Status Inconsistency and Holding Office in Voluntary Organizations
Although status inconsistency evidently makes practically
no difference in so far as membership is concerned, it is
conceivable that it does have a definite, unfavourable impact on
socially more demanding forms of participation, such as
attending meetings or holding office. Office-holding, as an
indicator of active involvement in the organization, is of
particular importance in the present context. A person who holds
office has to communicate and coordinate with members and other
officers. By virtue of his or her position an officer or
committee-member is also highly visible to other people inside
and outside the organization. If individuals with inconsistent
statuses have difficulty in establishing rewarding patterns of
social interaction and consequently tend to avoid social
situations in which they may be subjected to unpleasant
experiences, while office-holding precisely requires frequent 126
interaction with others, then we may expect that status inconsistents are less likely to hold office in voluntary organizations than persons with consistent statuses.
Findings for the Three Samples
The relationship between status inconsistency and office- holding in voluntary organizations was examined in five analyses parallel to those dealing with membership. Of course, the dependent variable was different, but in all other respects— samples, measures of status and status inconsistency, analytical techniques—the analyses were the same. The results of these analyses are presented in Table 12 up to Table 20 inclusive (see also the tables in the Appendix). But before pointing out the main patterns in these data I should explain what kind of dependent variable we are dealing with here and how the various quantities obtained in the statistical analyses should be interpreted.
Office-holding, it will be recalled, was originally measured as the total number of official positions and committee memberships that the respondent held or had held in voluntary organizations. However, the distributions of the samples on this variable were extremely skewed to the right, even more than on the membership variable (see Table 2). Therefore, number of offices held was converted into a new variable with only two categories: office-holding and not office-holding. This dichotomous categorical variable was then dummy-coded in the way described earlier--1 for office-holding, 0 otherwise--and in 127
that form used as the dependent variable in an ordinary least- squares regression analysis.1
Application of regression techniques in this case is defensible, because under one-zero coding of the dichotomous dependent variable the proportion of cases falling in the category coded 1 (the proportion office-holders) is also the mean of the distribution. Therefore, the values predicted by the multiple regression equation can be interpreted: they are the expected proportion of cases in the category "office-holding", given placement in a particular joint category of the independent dummy variables. Accordingly, the partial regression coefficients indicate the net effect of a given dummy independent variable expressed as a net increase in the expected proportion of office-holders relative to the proportion expected for the omitted categories.
1 Methodologists generally frown upon the use of ordinary least- squares regression with dummy dependent variables. The reason is that a dependent variable which has only the values 0 and 1 will not be normally distributed nor generally have constant variance at each level of the independent variables. Violation of these assumptions makes estimates of the regression coefficients and tests of significance based on the F-statistic questionable; a more appropriate alternative is log-linear analysis (Knoke, 1975). Or, if one wishes to apply regression techniques to a dichotomous dependent variable, it is recommended to use a modified version of ordinary least-squares regression, such as the Grizzle-Starmer-Koch technique, which is based on a generalized' (weighted) least-squares routine (see Swafford, 1980; Kuechler, 1980). In the present case, however, regression analysis was used as a descriptive tool, not as a means to make statistical inferences beyond the samples. That the usual regression assumptions of homoscedasticity and normal distribution of the dependent variable were not met has no consequences for the interpretation of the quantities produced by the regression analyses.
/ 128
From the figures in the first column of Table 12 we see that, for instance, the predicted proportion of office-holders among Port Alberni respondents with high educational status and medium occupational status is .399 + .242 + .042 = .683. We can compute in a similar way the proportions of office-holders expected for all other combinations of educational and occupational status.
The figures in the cells of the 3x3 tables formed by cross-classifying two status variables represent (1) the
observed proportions of office-holders among the respondents
characterized by one of the nine distinct status combinations,
and (2) the differences between these observed proportions of
office-holders and the proportions predicted by a regression
equation in which the two independent status variables are
assumed to have strictly additive effects. As before, a negative
difference indicates that the observed proportion of office•
holders among respondents with a particular status combination
is smaller than one would expect on the basis of additive status
effects. A positive difference means a larger-than-expected
proportion of office-holders.
One might notice (see Tables 13, 16, 19) that the
differences between observed and predicted proportions of
office-holders are generally smaller than the differences
between observed and predicted mean number of memberships. This
may be somewhat misleading because the smaller size of the
deviations does not necessarily mean that for office-holding
there is a closer match between observed and predicted values 1 29
and that the model of additive status effects is more adequate
to explain differences in office-holding than in membership.
That the deviations from additive predictions are generally
smaller for office-holding is to a large extent a consequence of
the fact that we are dealing with proportions. The values of a proportion can range between zero and one, whereas the upper
limit of the range of values that a mean can take on is
undefined. Since a proportion has a smaller range of possible
values than a mean, the observed and predicted values as well as
the differences between them tend to be smaller for proportions
(office-holders) than for means (number of memberships).
Consider the deviations in the ten cells representing
various kinds of sharp inconsistency between education,
occupation, and income status (Tables 13, 16, and 19). The main
findings about the size and sign of the deviations from
additivity can be summarized as follows: (1) Only in four of the
ten cells did the observed proportions of office-holders deviate
by a moderate margin (.169 to .423) from the proportions to be
expected if the effects of the status variables were additive.
Deviations from additive predictions were very small or
nonexistent in the other cells. (2) Only in three cells was
there a negative deviation, that is, the observed proportion of
respondents who ever held office was smaller than predicted by
the additive regression equation. In six cells the deviations
were positive.
Perhaps the most interesting finding is this. The four
largest deviations also happened to be positive, so that in 130
those instances the observed proportion of office-holders exceeded the predicted proportions. We can restate this finding by saying that the probability of a person holding office in voluntary organizations when his or her educational status and occupational status (Port Alberni sample) or his occupational
status and income status (men in the Vancouver sample) are
sharply inconsistent is greater, not smaller, than expected under the assumption of additive effects of these status variables. Therefore, if we were to infer from these deviations—moderate in size at best—that status inconsistency
effects qua statistical interaction are present, then it would have to be considered as evidence against the , hypothesis of
negative status inconsistency effects on office-holding.
Furthermore, there is no support in these data for the
hypothesis that underrewarded status inconsistents are even less
likely than overrewarded status inconsistents to hold office in
voluntary organizations. In all three samples there is hardly
any difference in the magnitude of the deviations for categories
of respondents with opposite types of sharp inconsistency, no
matter whether these involve combinations of education status
and occupation status or combinations of education status and
income status.1
1 Only when the status variables are occupation and income is there a considerable difference in the size of the deviations for the two types of sharp inconsistency. The positive deviation for the Vancouver men who have low occupational status in conjunction with high income status is twice as large as that for respondents with high occupation status but low income status. 131
As for the explanatory power of status inconsistency, the main finding is that here too measures of status inconsistency explain very little additional variation in the dependent variable once the additive effects of the status variables have been taken into account. This becomes evident when the R2 values associated with the additive regression equations containing only two status variables as predictors are compared with the
R2's for the corresponding nonadditive equations in which also
interaction terms for status inconsistency effects were included
(Tables 12, 15, and 18). For the entire set of analyses, the
largest increment in the percentage of variance explained in office-holding that could be realized by adding dummy status
inconsistency variables to the pair of status variables already
in the regression equation was a mere 1.6 per cent. That figure was obtained in the case of the employed married women from the
Vancouver sample, where status inconsistency was defined in
terms of educational status and occupational status.
The increases in R2 that resulted from the inclusion of
status inconsistency variables in the additive equations were
generally slightly larger for office-holding than for
memberships. But it should also be noted that the proportion of
variance in office-holding that could be explained with either a
strictly additive model of status effects or a nonadditive
status inconsistency model was quite small: none of the ten
regression analyses yielded an R2 value larger than .08. The
smaller R2's can be attributed, in part, to the fact that
ordinary least-squares regression was used with a dichotomous 1 32
dependent variable.1
1 When number of offices held was used as the dependent variable, the R2 values were slightly higher than those reported here for the dummy office-holding variable. But it still remains true that the same independent status and status inconsistency variables explain a larger proportion of the variation in membership than in office-holding, regardless whether the latter is measured as a discrete interval variable or as a dichotomy. 1 33
Table 12. Dummy-Variable Regression Analyses of the Proportion of Respondents Holding Office in Voluntary Organizations on Education and Occupation: Additive and Nonadditive Models (Port Alberni Sample)
Unstandardized Regression Coefficients (standard errors in parentheses) Independent Variables Additive Nonadditive Model Model
Educat ion: Grade 8 or less * *
Grade 9-11 .046 .069 (.051) (.053)
HS compl or more .242 .224 (.063) (.063)
Occupat ion: Semi- & unskilled * *
Skilled .042 .067 (.052) ( .053)
White collar .141 . 148 (.057) (.056)
Status Consistency: Consi stent *
Moderately inconsi stent -.008 ( .048)
Sharply inconsi stent .221 (.088)
Regression constant .399 .372
R2 .069 .081
N 513 513
* Dummy variable omitted from regression equation 1 34
Table 13. Observed Proportions Office-Holders and Deviations from Proportions Predicted Under Model of Additive Status Effects, by Educational and Occupational Status (Port Alberni Sample)
Observed Proportions Office-Holders Observed Minus (N's in parentheses) Predicted Proportions
EDUCATIONAL STATUS EDUCATIONAL STATUS OCCUPATION Row STATUS . Low Medium High Prop. Low Medium High
Low .367 .440 .810 .443 -.032 -.005 +.169 (98) (91 ) (21 ) (210)
Medium .436 .508 .643 .507 -.005 +.021 -.040 (55) (65) (28) (148)
High .750 .571 .750 .677 + .210 -.015 -.032 (16) (63) (76) (155)
Column prop. .426 .500 .736 .532 (513) (169) (219) (125) /
Table 14. Summary of the Effect of Education-Occupation Status Inconsistency on Office-Holding (Port Alberni Sample)
Proportion Of f ice-Holders Degree of Status Inconsistency Observed Expected Di f ference N
Consistent .527 .545 -.018 239
Moderately inconsistent .498 .510 -.012 237
Sharply inconsi stent .784 .597 + . 187 37 1 35
Table 15. Dummy-Variable Regression Analyses of the Proportion Office-Holders on Pairs of Status Variables: Additive and Nonadditive Models (Vancouver Sample: Men)
Unstandardized Regression Coefficients Independent (standard errors in parentheses) Variables A-f- NAn A NA A NA
Education: HS not completed * * * *
Completed HS . 1 04 .119 .090 .087 ( .064) (.067) (.063) (.066)
University .084 .116 .094 .091 ( .067) (.072) ( .062) (.065)
Occupat ion: Manual * * * *
Admin-cler-techn .020 -.046 -.021 -.013 ( .065) (.071 ) ( .065) ( .066)
Exec-manager-prof . 1 29 .098 .085 .078 ( .072) (.077) ( .073) (.073)
Income: Under $8000 * * * *
$8000 - $13999 .075 .071 .067 .097 ( .068) (.073) (.071) (.073)
$14000 & more .214 .218 .183 .205 (.078) (.080) (.087) (.088)
Status Consistency: - Consistent * * *
Moderately .052 .004 -.005 inconsistent ( .059) (.059) ( .055)
Sharply .112 -.023 .305 inconsistent ( . 101 ) ( . 102) (.164)
Regression constant .415 .393 .349 .351 .394 .366
R2 .036 .040 .041 .041 .038 .047
N 402 402 396 396 388 388
-f- Additive model n Nonadditive model * Dummy variable omitted from regression equation 136
Table 16. Observed Proportions Office-Holders and Deviations from Proportions Predicted Under Model of Additive Status Effects, by Pairs of Status Variables (Vancouver Sample: Men)
Observed Proportions Office-Holders Observed Minus (N's in parentheses) Predicted Proportions
EDUCATIONAL STATUS EDUCATIONAL STATUS OCCUPATION Row STATUS Low Medium High Prop. Low Medium High
Low .395 .571 .571 .440 -.020 +.052 +.072 (81 ) (21 ) (7) (109)
Medium .391 .467 .531 .447 -.004 -.032 +.052 (64) (45) (32) (141 )
High .615 .657 .604 .618 +.071 +.009 -.024 (26) (35) (91 ) (152)
Column prop. .427 .554 .585 .510 •(171) (101 ) (130) (402)
EDUCATIONAL STATUS EDUCATIONAL STATUS INCOME Row STATUS Low Medium High Prop. Low Medium High
Low .356 .450 .375 .384 +.007 +.011 -.068 (45) (20) (8) (73)
Medium .421 .509 .527 .473 -.003 -.005 +.009 (95) (55) (55) (205)
High .560 .654 .657 .636 -.003 +.001 0.0 (25) (26) (67) (118)
Column prop. .424 .535 .585 .505 (165) (101 ) (130) (396)
(continued) Table 16. (continued)
Observed Proportions Office-Holders Observed Minus (N's in parentheses) Predicted Proportions
OCCUPATIONAL STATUS OCCUPATIONAL STATUS INCOME Row STATUS Low Medium High Prop. Low Medium High
Low .382 .346 .667 .394 -.012 -.027 +.188 (34) (26) (6) (66)
Medium .443 .450 .556 .475 -.018 +.010 +.010 (70) (80) (54) (204)
High 1 .00 .556 .644 .636 +.423 0.0 -.018 (4) (27) (87) (118)
Column prop. .444 .451 .612 .510 (108) (133) (147) (388)
t 138
Table 17. Summary of the Effects of Three Types of Status Inconsistency on Office-Holding (Vancouver Sample: Men)
Proportion Office-Holders Degree of Status Inconsistency Observed Expected Difference N
EDUC;^TIONA L STATUS AND OCCUPATIONAL STATUS
Consistent .498 .522 -.024 217
Moderately inconsistent .507 .488 +.019 1 52
Sharply inconsistent .606 .534 +.072 33
EDUC;VTIONA L STATUS AND INCOME STATUS
Consi stent .527 .527 0.0 1 67
Moderately inconsistent .485 .482 +.003 196
Sharply inconsi stent .515 .534 -.019 33
OCCUI3 ATIONAL STATUS AND INCOME STATUS
Consistent .522 .528 -.006 201
Moderately inconsistent .480 .488 -.008 177
Sharply inconsistent .800 .518 +.282 10 139
Table 18. Dummy-Variable Regression Analyses of the Proportion Office-Holders on Education and Occupation: Additive and Nonadditive Models (Vancouver Sample: Employed Women)
Unstandardized Regression Coefficients (standard errors in parentheses) Independent Var iables Additive Nonadditive Model Model
Educat ion: HS not completed * *
Completed HS .036 .061 (.081 ) (.095)
University .267 .287 (.119) ( . 145)
Occupation: Manual * *
Clerical & sales .031 .008 ( . 105) ( . 108)
Exec-manager-prof. .014 .015 ( . 126) ( . 152)
Status Consistency: Consi stent *
Moderately inconsistent .110 (.084)
Sharply inconsistent -.024 ( .210)
Regression Constant . 1 69 . 1 20
R2 .046 .062
N 1 37 1 37
* Dummy variable omitted from regression equation 1 40
Table 19. Observed Proportions Office-Holders and Deviations from Proportions Predicted Under Model of Additive Status Effects,. by Educational and Occupational Status (Vancouver Sample: Employed Women)
Observed Proportions Office-Holders Observed Minus (N's in parentheses) Predicted Proportions
EDUCATIONAL STATUS EDUCATIONAL STATUS OCCUPATION Row STATUS Low Medium High Prop. Low Medium High.
Low .214 . 1 25 • • • .182 +.045 -.080 (14) (8) (0) (22)
Medium .200 .189 .714 .241 0.0 -.047 +.247 (35) (37) (7) (79)
High .111 .417 .333 .306 -.072 +.198 -.117 (9) (12) (15) (36)
Column prop. .190 .228 .455 .248 (58) (57) (22) ( 1 37)
Table 20. Summary of the Effect of Education-Occupation Status Inconsistency on Office-Holding (Vancouver Sample: Employed Women)
Proport ion Of f ice-Holders Degree of Status Inconsistency Observed Expected Di f ference N
Consistent — .227 .270 . -.043 66
Moderately inconsi stent .290 .234 + .056 62
Sharply inconsistent .111 .183 -.072 9
/ 141
Summary
The objective of this second set of analyses was to examine
the relationship between status inconsistency and active
involvement in voluntary organizations as measured by office-
holding. In all essential respects the results of these analyses
were parallel to those obtained earlier concerning the
relationship between status inconsistency and membership.
The basic model of additive status effects gave the least
satisfactory fit to the data in the same two cases as before:
when the status variables were education and occupation (Port
Alberni sample) or occupation and income (men in the Vancouver
sample). Another point of similarity here was that the observed
proportions of office-holders among persons with sharply
inconsistent 1 statuses were larger than expected under the
additivity assumption. Office-holding seemed to be favourably
affected, if indeed at all, by status inconsistencies of the
above kind. In the three other cases the observed differences in
the proportion of office-holders between groups of individuals
with different status patterns could be adequately represented
in terms of additive effects of the two status variables under
consideration.
The similarity in the findings on office-holding and
membership extends, as a matter of course, to the second stage
of the two-pronged analytical strategy, in which ' the net
explanatory power of a nonadditive model of status inconsistency
effects was assessed. If status inconsistency really has an
effect, even a positive one, on office-holding, then its 1 42
inclusion as an independent variable in the additive regression equations should have produced at least a moderate increase in the proportion of variance explained in office-holding over and above the proportion explained by the additive effects of the two status variables from which the status inconsistency variable was constructed. This did not happen. Increments in R2 were very small: from .009 to .016 in three of the five analyses, and virtually nil in the other two. In the light of these results it is difficult to maintain that there is a genuine status inconsistency effect on office-holding, net of the effects of status itself.
The findings in this part of the research, therefore, do not support the hypothesis that individuals with inconsistent statuses are less likely to hold office in voluntary organizations than are status consistents. This conclusion holds for the secondary hypothesis too; there was no evidence that underrewarded status inconsistents are even less likely than overrewarded inconsistents to be office-holders. 143
CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
Is status inconsistency a condition that discourages participation in voluntary organizations? That is the main question this study has sought to answer. Specifically this involved trying to determine whether status inconsistency has a negative effect on membership and office-holding in voluntary organizations in addition to any effects of social status per se. The results of the foregoing analyses indicate this is not the case. What remains to be done is to state the conclusions that can be drawn from the research findings and to set out their implications.
Conclusions
1. The first and principal conclusion is that the research hypotheses are not supported by the data. By implication, the argument that leads to these hypotheses is open to question.
2. In particular, status inconsistency has no appreciable and systematic effect on participation in voluntary organizations separately from the effects of the component 144
status variables themselves.
3. Education, occupation, and income—the status variables from which status inconsistency measures were constructed—all are positively associated with participation.
4. A nonadditive model of status inconsistency effects that allows for interaction among the status variables is unnecessary to explain differences in participation by.status.
5. To describe how social status affects participation it is sufficient to posit an additive model stating that the status variables exert their effects independently of each other.
6. However, the ability of such models of additive status effects to account for variation in participation is less than impressive. In various regression analyses the additive effects of two status variables explained only moderate to small portions of the variance in memberships and office-holding.
A ffew comments that may help define the scope of these conclusions are in order. It is not asserted that no relationship exists between status inconsistency and participation. Strictly speaking that conclusion is not warranted by the results of the analyses. The conclusion more precisely is that once the effects of the status variables themselves on participation are taken into account there evidently is no special effect due to status inconsistency. What the results show is that the data do not discriminate between two alternative explanations: one which sees the participation of individuals affected by their rank positions on a pair of status dimensions but such that the effect of one status is 145
independent of the effect of the other, and one which posits a nonadditive status inconsistency effect in addition to the separate effects of the component statuses. In fact both models are equally adequate, or inadequate for that matter, to account for the patterns of variation in the two forms of participation studied here.
However, the status inconsistency explanation is rejected because it is not necessary and therefore unparsimonious. The nonadditive model of status inconsistency effects is both conceptually and statistically more complicated than the model of additive status effects only. Selecting the status inconsistency model, rather than the additive status effects model, therefore cannot be justified on the ground that it provides a simpler explanation of participation. Justification for such a choice would have to be found in superior explanatory power. But the status inconsistency model fails on this point as well; it does not enable us to explain variation in participation much better and more completely than a simpler model of additive status effects. Without this empirical pay-off there is no need nor warrant for the complexities introduced by the status inconsistency concept, no matter how interesting and intuitively reasonable it may be.
In assessing the research results and the conclusions drawn from them one should be aware of their limited range. The only kind of status inconsistency considered in this study is that defined by simultaneously held ranks on dimensions of achieved socioeconomic status. Had the analyses included other forms of 1 46
status and status inconsistency, for instance combinations of achieved and ascribed statuses, the results would perhaps have been different. Another point to bear in mind is that these findings and conclusions are based on data for respondents from two specific commmunities; they cannot simply be generalized beyond the Vancouver and Port Alberni samples.
On the other hand, this investigation does not stand alone in its inability to find convincing evidence of status inconsistency effects. The results of this study are generally in line with those of other recent status inconsistency research in which the additive status effects model was used as the baseline for testing status inconsistency hypotheses. As such these results add to the already substantial body of negative evidence about the effects of status inconsistency on various kinds of behaviour and attitudes (for example, Jackson and
Burke, 1965; Treiman, 1966; Broom and Jones, 1970; Olsen and
Tully, 1972; Jackson and Curtis, 1972; Curtis and Jackson,
1977:113-5).
In the remainder of this chapter I shall elaborate the conclusions and the findings that led to them. In doing so I shall draw out their implications for the status inconsistency argument, especially so far as it relates to participation in voluntary organizations; for the relationship between participation and social status; and for future research into the conditions that may promote or discourage participation. 147
Some Reasons Why the Anticipated Effects of Status Inconsistency Were Not Found
What may account for the lack of empirical support for the hypotheses that status inconsistency has a negative effect on membership and office-holding in voluntary organizations? Part of the answer to that question most probably lies in the argument itself: some of the assumptions and premises by which the concept of status inconsistency is connected with its hypothesized correlates may be questionable, perhaps even wrong.
As any other attempt to determine the consequences of status inconsistency for behaviour and attitudes the present investigation required a number of assumptions. Among them the three following seem to be particularly relevant for the explanation of the research results and they therefore deserve closer examination.1 The first of these assumptions underlies the measurement of the independent variable, status inconsistency. It is assumed that objectively defined status inconsistency coincides with the respondent's own evaluation of the relationship between his or her statuses. The second assumption concerns the processes intervening -between status inconsistency and its behavioural outcome. It is assumed that individuals with inconsistent statuses actually experience interactional stress and unsatisfactory social relationships.
1 Many more assumptions than the few singled out here for a brief evaluation are involved in status inconsistency theory. For critical discussions, see the articles by Box and Ford (1969), Meyer and Hammond (1971), and Hartman (1974). 148
The third assumption has to do with the individual's response to
status inconsistency and the stress generated by it. Avoiding
social contact with other people where possible is not the only,
or even a very likely, way in which status inconsistents may try
to deal with the disturbing consequences of status
inconsistency. The hypothesis that status inconsistency leads to
nonparticipation in voluntary organizations, as a manifestation
of this tendency to withdraw from social life, implies the
assumption that other stress-avoiding or stress-reducing
mechanisms have been unsuccessful or are not available.
The important point is that these assumptions were not
empirically verified, as they usually are not in status
inconsistency research. One possible reason, then, for not
finding the hypothesized negative association between status
inconsistency and participation is that any or all of the
assumptions are invalid. Another possibility is that the
procedures used to measure status inconsistencies and to test
for their effects on the dependent variables are inadequate. In
what follows these theoretical and methodological issues are
developed a little further and brought to bear upon the results
of this research.
Problems in Defining Status Inconsistency
The first assumption listed above draws us into the dispute
over the role of what has been called "subjective", or
respondent-defined, status inconsistency as opposed to
"objective", or researcher-defined, inconsistency. As was 149
mentioned in Chapter 2, a major point in the criticism levelled at status inconsistency research is the charge that it has
neglected to focus on the subjective aspects of status
inconsistency, even though the processes assumed in the various
formulations of the theory are clearly subjective. One of the
issues involved is: should the investigator rely upon the
individuals studied rather than himse-lf to define what
constitutes consistency and inconsistency? In the typical
research study in which an objective approach to measuring
status inconsistency is employed, as is the case here, it is the
researcher who determines a respondent's rank position on each
status dimension and who decides whether the various statuses
are consistent or inconsistent. Thereby it is implicitly assumed
that the measurement operations by the researcher parallel the
subjective processes by which the respondents themselves
perceive their rank positions and evaluate their status
patterns.
However, this assumption may be false. What the researcher
defines as consistent and inconsistent status combinations does
not necessarily correspond with what respondents consider
consistent and inconsistent, a point that several writers have
made (for example, Mitchell, 1964:317; Malewski, 1966:303-4;
Stehr, 1968:96; Box and Ford, 1969:195-7; Nelson, 1973112-5). It
therefore is imperative, according to these critics, to rely
more directly upon the respondents and ask them whether they
themselves regard their status patterns as consistent or 150
inconsistent.1 Stehr (1968) and Nelson (1973) have argued that such a subjective measure based upon the individual's perception and evaluation of the relationships between his or her various statuses is a more adequate indicator of status inconsistency than the conventional objective measures.
A number of researchers have empirically examined the relationships between objectively and subjectively defined status inconsistency, with results that seem to lend support to these subjectivist criticisms and suggestions. For example,
Starnes and Singleton (1977) found that in general there was little relationship between objective status inconsistency measures and various subjective indicators of inconsistency.
Also, the more subjective the measure, that is, the more the respondent himself was allowed to decide whether or not his statuses were inconsistent, the smaller the correlation with the objective measures. In another study (Stehr, 1971:45-6) it was found that only 20 per cent of the respondents who perceived their statuses as inconsistent were also classified as inconsistent with a conventional objective status inconsistency measure.
1 Measures of subjective status inconsistency vary according to the degree in which respondent's perceptions and judgements enter measurement operations. But a typical operationalization of subjective or perceived inconsistency, for instance between occupational status and income status, would involve questions of the following sort: "Think of people who have jobs about as highly regarded as yours. Would you say that most people who have jobs with about that much prestige have much higher, somewhat higher, about the same, somewhat lower, or much lower incomes than you have?" (Starnes and Singleton, 1977:257). 151
These findings suggest the possibility of a serious measurement error. By following the objective approach to measuring status inconsistency I may have classified some respondents as status inconsistent who themselves would consider their statuses as consistent, while on the other hand certain objectively consistent individuals might think of their statuses as inconsistent. This means, Stehr (1968:98; 1971:46) would suggest, that the status inconsistency measures used here are probably invalid and that this may explain why the hypothesized effect of status inconsistency on participation was not found.
How plausible this explanation is cannot be definitively answered here. The data available for this research did not permit the inclusion of subjective aspects of status inconsistency in the analyses. It therefore is difficult to decide on empirical grounds whether subjectively defined status inconsistency is a more adequate predictor of nonparticipation in voluntary organizations than is objective, researcher-defined inconsistency. Nevertheless, it is doubtful that the use of a subjective indicator of status inconsistency would have produced substantially different results. This doubt is prompted by another major finding from the study by Stehr (1971). To analyze the effects of status inconsistency on socio-political behaviour and attitudes he used a subjective as well as an objective measure of inconsistency. As already said, there was little empirical correspondence between the two inconsistency measures.
But also, and this is interesting, neither proved to be related to the social and political variables in question. Evidently, 152
the kind of inconsistency measure—objective or subjective--made no difference to the kind of result Stehr obtained. This suggests that it is probably not so much any invalidity of the objective status inconsistency measure as the explanatory weakness of the concept of status inconsistency itself that is responsible for the absence of substantial and systematic status inconsistency effects. Whereas differences in status obviously affect the patterns of association between people, the consistency or inconsistency of a person's statuses may not be as significant and meaningful an issue in the experience of social actors as the status inconsistency argument asserts.
Perhaps there is truth in the observation that "sociologists studying status inconsistency may have imposed upon their subjects concepts which have little meaning for them" (Starnes and Singleton, 1977:264).
The Unknown Factor: Experience of Stress
The second assumption concerns the process or mechanism that intervenes between status inconsistency and its hypothesized behavioural or attitudinal correlates. The status inconsistency argument, regardless of its specific formulation, is guided by the assumption that the effect of status inconsistency on individual behaviour and attitudes is mediated by the experience of stress. In the present case of the relationship between inconsistency and participation this central assumption takes the form of postulating that individuals whose statuses are inconsistent frequently 153
experience discomfort and frustration in interpersonal relations, which in turn leads them to withdraw from social interaction. Therefore it is "not status consistency objectively defined but rather strain subjectively experienced that is directly related to certain strain reducing behavior patterns of the individual." (Stehr, 1968:96. Emphasis added). However, interactional stress or dissatisfaction with social relations, the subjective experiences which are presumed to form the link between status inconsistency and stress-reducing behaviour in the form of a retreat from social life, were not measured in this research. Instead I have related status inconsistency directly to the dependent participation variables, thereby making the usual assumption that the (objective) inconsistency measure is simultaneously an indicator of the intervening state—the experience of stress (Stehr, 1968:96). Without empirical information on the matter we cannot be certain that respondents whose statuses were defined as inconsistent do in fact experience stress in interpersonal relations to a greater extent than individuals with consistent status patterns. The point is that this assumption too may be erroneous, or dubious at -least. Such a conclusion would find some support in the results from Bauman's (1968) study, one of the few attempts to empirically test the proposition that status inconsistency leads to unsatisfactory social interaction. Contrary to what he hypothesized, Bauman found that status inconsistent individuals experienced unsatisfactory social interaction less often than did status consistents. Bauman suggested that this unexpected
/ 1 54
finding could be explained by the fairly high rates of mobility and inconsistency that existed in the areas from which his sample came. The significance of this interpretation lies in the contextual perspective it implies. To what extent and in what way status inconsistency influences individual behaviour depends in a great measure on the status arrangements in the communities in which individuals live and ultimately on the stratification system of the society at large (Curtis and Jackson, 1977:16). It is unlikely that a person whose statuses are inconsistent will find this particularly stressful and will experience serious interactional problems if many other people in his social environment have inconsistent statuses. As Blalock (I967a:799) has remarked, Lenski's status inconsistency thesis does not explicitly stipulate that it is the rarity of status inconsistency which causes individuals characterized by it to experience stress; but one may justly say that the assumed connection between inconsistency and stress becomes rather tenuous if status inconsistency turns out to be a relatively common and widespread phenomenon (Treiman, 1966:653).
Status inconsistency is certainly not exceptional among the respondents in our samples. In terms of a simple consistent- inconsistent dichotomy, 53 per cent of the respondents in Port
Alberni have inconsistent ranks on the dimensions of education and occupation status (see Table 5). Similarly, about half of the men in the Vancouver sample exhibit some kind of status inconsistency—the figure varies between 46 and 58 per cent, depending upon the paired combinations of education, occupation, 1 55
or income status (see Table 8). Fifty-two per cent of the employed women in the Vancouver sample are inconsistent in their educational and occupational statuses (Table 11). Extreme status inconsistency, of course, characterizes a much smaller number of respondents in each group: between 3 and 8 per cent.
These figures probably are fairly representative of the proportions of status inconsistents in the populations from which the samples were drawn. In fact one should not be surprised to find that many adults in Vancouver and Port Alberni show status inconsistency of one type or another. In a complex and highly differentiated society as Canada is nowadays, the system of social stratification at the level of the society and at the community level is not very rigid or highly crystallized.
The various dimensions of social rank are only loosely related, as indicated by the fact that empirical correlations between status variables (between present ranks on two different status dimensions as well as between present and past ranks on the same status dimension) often are moderate at best.1 This means that rates of status inconsistency and vertical mobility in the society at large and in specific communities tend to be fairly high.
Moreover, these two indicators of the flexibility of stratification systems stand in a cyclical relationship to one another. Vertical mobility increases the frequency of status
1 This certainly applies to the degree of association between the socioeconomic status variables in the Port Alberni and Vancouver samples (see Table 22 of the Appendix). 1 56
inconsistency, while inconsistency often leads to increased
mobility (Goffman, 1957:279-80; Hartman, 1974:719). A person
whose rank positions in several status hierarchies at a given
time are consistent creates an imbalance between his ranks when
he moves up or down in one status hierarchy. On the other hand,
a person whose statuses are inconsistent may try to achieve
_ consistency by changing one of his statuses, that is, by
becoming socially mobile. The latter case suggests that status
inconsistency is often only temporary (such as for the business
executive whose education does not match his occupational status
and who is working towards a university degree) or the normal
situation in certain stages of an adult's life or career (as in
the case of the resident physician whose present relatively low
income will increase substantially once he starts private
pract ice).
If it is correct that for many--perhaps even most--adults
there exists, at one time or another and for shorter or longer
periods, an inconsistency between their various statuses, then
there is also good reason to believe that status inconsistency
is seldom the profoundly disturbing experience it is alleged to
be--except perhaps when the inconsistency is extreme and/or
lasting or permanent. So, status inconsistent individuals may
not be severely hindered in their social relationships or have
greater difficulty in establishing rewarding patterns of social
interaction than status consistent persons.
In this connection it is relevant to point to another
possibly important condition for a relationship between status 157
inconsistency and the experience of stress. Whether status inconsistency actually generates conflict and stress in interpersonal relations would seem to also depend, to a great extent, on how much value social actors place upon having statuses that are consistent and how much importance they attach to considerations of status and prestige in general (Broom and
Jones, 1970:999-1000). One might further argue (Laumann and
Segal, 1971) that status-minded persons probably show greater sensitivity to the status-linked behaviour and attitudes of others and should therefore be more inclined to find status inconsistency stressful than individuals who are less concerned with status and the consistency of their various statuses. It may be that in Canadian society concern with such matters is less pervasive and less pressing than sociologists tend to believe. Perhaps we cannot assume that status and status consistency—at least not when it concerns education, occupation, and income—have great salience in the experience of individuals in our two communities. If that is so, then the embarrassments, humiliations, and other disturbing social experiences that are presumed to result from such status inconsistencies may be exaggerated.1
1 This point has been made by Seeman (1977) for hypotheses regarding the effects of social mobility. He is critical of the status-centered theorizing in American sociology and the reluctance of many sociologists to abandon established notions about the significance of status change and the centrality of mobility-mindedness in contemporary American society, despite the lack of convincing evidence to sustain such convictions. 1 58 '
Likewise, one can have his doubts about other status assumptions implied in status inconsistency propositions.
Particularly, "it is scarcely a universal law of human interaction" (Broom and Jones, 1970:1000) that a status inconsistent individual prefers to think of him- or herself in terms of the higher status while others have a tendency to treat him or her in terms of the lowest status. It may be reasonable to assume that social actors are interested in creating and maintaining a favourable identity; it does not necessarily follow that they will in all interaction situations try to gain acceptance in terms of their highest social rank and that they always will react to a status inconsistent individual on the basis of his lowest rank. This would require the additional assumption that people have a desire for high status as a first- order priority, ranking above all their other goals (Box and
Ford, 1969:192), an assumption which is obviously unrealistic.
For these reasons, then, it is doubtful that status inconsistent individuals run a constant risk of being rebuffed, embarrassed, affronted, and frustrated in their interactions with other people.
Withdrawal Only as a Last Resort
But even if a person's statuses are correctly defined as inconsistent, and even if such a person does experience interactional stress and discomfort as a result of the inconsistency, it is possible that he or she does not respond to the experienced stress in the supposed manner, namely by 159
withdrawing or shying away from certain forms of social interaction, such as participation in voluntary organizations.
The reason is that there are other ways in which individuals can avoid or reduce the stresses and conflicts that are assumed to follow from having inconsistent statuses.
It has been noted by Lenski himself (1954:412; I956b:460) and by others (e.g., Goffman, 1957; Geschwender, 1967; Hyman,
1967) that withdrawal into social isolation is a rather drastic reaction to the stressful consequences of status inconsistency, in that it severs the person's ties with the community. But as
Geschwender (1967:169) has argued, attempts to avoid or diminish stress will move from the simple to the complex, from the mild to the extreme. It follows, then, that witdrawal from social interaction is likely to occur only when, other, less drastic modes of avoiding or reducing status inconsistency-induced stress are not possible or did not have the desired effect.
Among these alternative stress-avoiding and stress-reducing mechanisms is vertical mobility. Individuals experiencing interactional stress as a result of status inconsistency may attempt to achieve consistency among their statuses, and thereby eliminate the source of their difficulties, by raising the lower status to the level of the higher status when opportunities for social mobility exist (Malewski, 1966:305-6). Unlike ascribed status (e.g., race, ethnicity, sex), achieved statuses such as education, occupation, and income can be changed. This means that inconsistent ranks on various dimensions of achieved status can often be brought into line with each other through status 160
change, that is to say, through individual vertical mobility.
This method of reducing stress is usually not possible, however,
when the inconsistency is between ascribed statuses only and is
less likely to be successful with inconsistencies involving a
combination of low ascribed status and high achieved status.
Although mobility may be an effective strategy to reduce stress
resulting from inconsistency among achieved statuses, it usually
requires a long period of time and considerable effort.
However, the conditions of life in modern society provide
status inconsistent individuals with several other options which
allow them to get around the problems associated with
inconsistency more quickly and with greater ease. It has been
suggested that the high degree of social differentiation and the
frequency of social and geographic mobility in modern society
enable people to compartmentalize the separate areas of their
social lives, make it easy for them to segregate their
audiences, and allow them considerable latitude in constructing
"biographies" to suit the various situations in which they find
themselves. Under those circumstances status inconsistency is
likely to elicit responses in the form of redefining the meaning
and salience of certain statuses, concealing low status(es),
•playing different roles based on different sjtatuses, and even
adopting a new self-image (Box and Ford, 1969:193-4; Goffman,
1967:280-1; Treiman, 1966:653; Hyman, 1967:395). These avenues
for dealing with interactional stresses produced by status
inconsistency would be easier to follow and would have better
chances of success, once again, in the case of achieved statuses 161
than with more visible, ascribed statuses.1
In short, another explanation why status inconsistency was found to have no appreciable effect on participation in voluntary organizations may be that people with inconsistent statuses generally manage to sidestep or alleviate the stressful consequences of status inconsistency by means other than withdrawal from social interaction. Such a drastic and noncoping reaction to status inconsistency will most probably be shown only by those status inconsistent individuals who for various reasons have not succeeded in avoiding or diminishing stress by simpler and more measured responses and who have resigned themselves to it that they are unable to change the condition that is the cause of their unpleasant social experiences. Since by this line of reasoning status inconsistency results in withdrawal from social life only in a limited number of cases, one should perhaps not expect this relationship to show up very clearly in data from broad samples such as those used for the analyses here.
1 That it is easier to avoid or reduce stress when the inconsistency is between achieved statuses than when an ascribed status and an achieved status are involved may be a reason why ascribed-achieved status inconsistencies have more often been found to have effects (e.g., Jackson, 1962; Broom and Jones, 1970). This underlines Kenkel's (1956) comment that one should not expect status inconsistency effects to occur irrespective of the nature of the status variables involved. It further implies that the use of only achieved statuses may have reduced the chances of finding status inconsistency effects. 1 62
The upshot of the remarks made here and in the preceding sections is this. Perhaps it is true that in some circumstances status inconsistency is stressful and leads to withdrawal from social participation for some individuals. But to make accurate predictions of status inconsistency effects it is necessary to specify more precisely the conditions under which a difference in rank positions on several status dimensions is perceived as inconsistency, this inconsistency results in the experience of stress, and the various possible reactions to this stress are likely to be activated.
Methodological Retrospection
Analysis Model Appropriate?
No other aspect of status inconsistency research has evoked as much controversy as its methodology. Indeed, the criticisms on this point often are so fundamental and the problems raised therein so difficult to resolve that the researcher cannot but wonder whether the results of his or her investigation are perhaps affected to an unacceptable degree by methodological shortcomings.
As noted above, the definition and measurement of status inconsistency have figured prominently in the dispute. But the logic and method of analyzing status inconsistency data have even more often been the focus of criticism. In Chapter 3 these criticisms were reviewed at some length, from Mitchell's (1964) 163
exposure of the inadequate control for status effects in older status inconsistency studies, to Hope's (1975, 1978) contention that subsequently introduced procedures to isolate and identify inconsistency effects have put status inconsistency research on the wrong track. In particular, analytical procedures built around the square-additive model (Duncan, 1964, 1966) and the linear additive model (Blalock, 1966, 1967a; Lenski, 1964) were criticized by Hope on the grounds that these models misrepresent
Lenski's original status inconsistency formulation and are inappropriate as ways of testing for the existence of inconsistency effects. That most empirical analyses in which these procedures were used have found status inconsistency to have only negligible effects or no effect at all on the behaviour or attitude under investigation is therefore beside the point. The crucial implication is that if Hope's criticism is justified, my negative findings about any effects of status inconsistency on participation might at least partly be due to the choice of an unsuited analytical design, namely the square- additive model.
Instead of the. square-additive model Hope (1975) proposed the "diamond-additive" model, which in his view does adequately represent Lenski's status inconsistency theory and can be used to test it. The structure of this model is expressed in a diamond-shaped table, which results from the 45-degree rotation of the conventional square inconsistency table. The cell entries in the body of the diamond table are the same as in the square table, but the meaning of the vertical and horizontal axes--the 1 64
rows and columns—is different. In the square each axis is a status dimension and the row means and column means show the effects of the two status variables on the dependent variable.
The horizontal axis in the inconsistency diamond on the contrary is a dimension of general social status (the sum of the separate status variables). Therefore, the column means show the effects of overall status. The vertical dimension is status inconsistency (the difference between the two status variables) and the row means show the effects of different degrees and direction of status inconsistency.
What makes Hope's approach to analyzing status inconsistency (and social mobility) data radically different from the Lenski-Blalock and Duncan procedures is that it starts with a single dimension of general social status rather than with separate specific status dimensions which are assumed to affect the dependent variable independently of each other. The status inconsistency equation in Hope's model includes a term for the sum of the two status variables as the general status dimension plus a term for the difference between the status variables as the status inconsistency dimension. If this equation explains considerably more of the variance in the dependent variable than the equation consisting of only the general status variable, then a status inconsistency effect has been demonstrated.
House (1978) has parried Hope's attack on the square- additive and linear additive models with a critique of the method of analysis proposed by Hope. It has two major flaws, 165
according to House. First, the diamond-additive model yields evidence of an inconsistency effect whenever the two status variables have unequal effects on the dependent variable.1 This redefinition of a status inconsistency effect as a simple difference in the effects of two status variables is completely out of step with the sense in which the term is now commonly understood and used by sociologists, namely as statistical interaction between status variables (i.e., as a difference between differences). Besides, it makes inconsistency effects so commonplace that they are trivial; almost all status variables have somewhat different effects on a given dependent variable.
Thus, almost every attitude or behaviour that is affected by various aspects of status would also be affected by status
inconsistency. Therefore, Hope's diamond model is not useful for the analysis of status inconsistency effects, and his criticisms of the conventional additive models do not challenge the negative evidence obtained in analyses in which these models were applied.
House and Hope agree, however, that the difference between
the square and diamond models is not so much statistical as conceptual. In fact, the basic issue in the controversy is how
status and status inconsistency effects should be conceived.
1 House (1978:441) has shown that the unstandardized partial regression coefficients in the status inconsistency equation
[Y = B1(X-]+X2) + B2(X1-X2)] in Hope's system can be derived from those in the basic • additive status effects equation
(Y = b-i Xi + b2X2) in the square-additive model. For example, it can be shown that B^ = (b>|-b2)/2. 166
That is also apparent from what House regards as the second major flaw in Hope's diamond model: the assumption of a single dimension of general social status. To control differences in vertical status when assessing the effect of status inconsistency means, in Hope's interpretation, that one should control differences in rank on this general status dimension.
House points out that composite dimensions of general status appear to have lost their empirical utility. Evidence of recent social stratification research certainly does not support the notion that a single general status dimension forms the basis of the stratification system of society, at least not of contemporary societies in North America. For example, Curtis and
Jackson (1977:315) concluded from their study that "behavior is not shaped by position on some general dimension of rank ... .In their effects on various individual attitudes and behavior, the rank dimensions seem to act separately and not via some general dimension." (See also Hodge,' 1970; Hodge and
Siegel,l970; Curtis and Scott, 1979:12-4).
Would the results of this investigation have been different, and in particular is it likely that nontrivial and
interpretable status inconsistency effects would have been
found, if the analyses had followed the method proposed by Hope?
Hope's critical observations about the square-additive model
have undeniably demonstrated that there are shortcomings in the
type of analysis performed here. Also, his different but
imaginative approach to analyzing inconsistency (and mobility)
data and his call to put theory before analysis must be taken
/ 167
seriously. But it is not immediately obvious that the diamond- additive model is better suited to test for the presence of status inconsistency effects than is the square-additive model.
A comparative analysis in which both these models are applied to the same set of data would probably go a long way to answer the above question.1 This much is clear, however. The matter will be difficult to settle because ultimately the point at issue, as noted above, is how status and status inconsistency should be conceptualized. It is in this area above all that further work is needed, by clarifying the basic concepts and by specifying the nature of the additive and nonadditive effects as well as the conditions under which they can be expected to occur.
The Problem of Multicollinearity
It is no doubt correct that the analytical strategy followed in this research is by design a rather conservative test for status inconsistency effects (Hope, 1975, 1978; House,
1978). Pitting the nonadditive status inconsistency model against the simpler model of only additive status effects the analysis clearly places the burden of proof on the former. This conservatism, however, may have been unintentionally augmented
by a frequent and potentially troublesome concomitant of
1 ' In this context it is perhaps significant that Hope's diamond model has not found wide application in status inconsistency research, or at least the results of any studies in which data were analyzed with the diamond model have not yet found their way into the sociological journals. 168
multiple regression analysis: intercorrelations among the independent variables, or multicollinearity.
When two or more predictors in a multiple regression equation are highly correlated with each other, the standard errors of the regression coefficients will be quite large and estimates of the partial regression and correlation coefficients will be unstable, varying considerably from one sample or from one independent replication to the next. The higher the degree of multicollinearity the more susceptible to the effects of sampling error and the less reliable estimates of the coefficients become.1 This can easily cause misleading
interpretations, particularly if on the basis of the partial regression coefficients one attempts to make inferences about the relative importance of the various independent variables in determining a given dependent variable (see Blalock, 1963).
It has been argued (Althauser, 1971; Broom and Jones, 1970)
that multicollinearity is apt to be a problem in analyses
involving a nonadditive regression equation which contains
interaction variables in addition to the separate variables from which they are constructed. Regression models of this kind are
frequently used in status inconsistency research. When the
effect of interaction between variables is represented by a
product term, the correlation of the interaction variable with
1 In the extreme case, when the independent variables are perfectly correlated, the regression coefficients cannot be identified uniquely. Multicollinearity, as Blalock (1963:264) has pointed out, is therefore a special case of the identification problem, mentioned earlier in Chapter 3. 169
the individual variables will usually not be zero, may . in fact be substantial. These intercorrelations among the independent variables in the nonadditive equation have as result that the partial regression coefficient associated with the interaction variable tends to be depressed relative to the estimated coefficients for the individual variables.
It- was not the purpose of the analyses in this study to assess the relative effects of social status and status inconsistency. Therefore, if the partial regression coefficients for the interaction variable representing status inconsistency would be smaller than otherwise due to multicollinearity, this
in itself need not pose a serious interpretation problem.
However, what happens to this interaction coefficient also has
implications for evaluating the explanatory power of the nonadditive status inconsistency model relative to that of the additive status effects model, based on a comparison of the proportion of variance in the dependent variables that each of
the competing models is able to explain. The multiple correlation coefficient R is a function of the partial
regression coefficients; depression of the regression
coefficient for the interaction (i.e. status inconsistency)
variable limits the increase in R2 that can be achieved by
adding this variable to the two status variables already in the
regression equation. As Gordon explains,
the multiple correlation increases only a trivial amount with each new variable, reflecting the fact that little new information is being added; that the multiple correlation cannot decrease indicates that the common predictive value is conserved, although it 1 70
does get spread out over more and more regression coefficients, each becoming smaller and smaller as new redundant variables are fed into the problem. (Gordon, 1968:595).
In other words, if the independent status and status inconsistency variables in the nonadditive regresssion equations are highly intercorrelated, this may be a reason why the status inconsistency model explains only little more variance in participation than the model of additive status effects.
How much multicollinearity is there in our regression analyses? For one thing, the trichotomized status variables are correlated with each other, but this is to be expected since they all represent dimensions of socioeconomic status. On the other hand, associations between education, occupation, and
income are only moderately strong, with values of Kendall's
Tau b ranging between +.32 and +.47 (see Table 22 in the
Appendix). This too is as it should be given the relatively high
rates of status inconsistency in the Port Alberni and Vancouver
samples. (As noted earlier, high correlations between the status
variables would point to a fairly rigid social stratification
system, with little status inconsistency and vertical mobility).
However, the status variables, and the status inconsistency
variables as well, were entered in the form of dummy variables
in the regression equations and it are the intercorrelations
among these dichotomous independent variables with values of 1
and 0 that actually determine to what ''extent multicollinearity
is a problem in these analyses. The relevant data are given in
the Appendix tables 23 up to 27 inclusive, which contain the 171
zero-order correlation matrices for the various regression analyses reported in Chapter 4.
There are three distinct sets of correlations to be considered. First, the correlation between two dummy variables which together represent a particular status or status inconsistency variable; for example, the correlation between medium and high educational status or between moderate and sharp status inconsistency. These correlations were negative. This cannot be otherwise because the set of dummy variables created from a trichotomized status or status inconsistency variable represents mutually exclusive categories. Membership in a given ordered category of the original variable, say high education, necessarily means nonmembership in any other category (medium or low education, but the dummy for the low category of each variable is omitted) (Cohen, 1968:429). The strength of the correlation between such (1,0) dichotomies depends upon the size of each membership group (the category with value 1) and the total sample size.1 In our analyses two-thirds of these correlations were low (< .30) to moderate (< .50) and the
remainder substantial (> .50).
1 The product-moment r (i.e., the phi coefficient) between two binary-coded (1,0) dummy variables Xj_ and Xj is
rfj = - V ni nj /[ (n-nL ) (n-nj )]
where nj. and nj are the number of cases in the "1" category of each dummy variable and n is the total sample size (Cohen, 1968:429). 1 72
Second, the correlation between two dummy variables, each of which represents a category or level of a different status variable; for instance, high educational status and medium occupational status. These correlations were generally low, although the high status levels were moderately correlated.
Third, the correlation between two dummy variables, one of which represents the degree of inconsistency between rank levels on two status variables and one of which represents a level on either status variable; for example, between high occupational status and sharp education-occupation status inconsistency. With a few exceptions correlations between dummy status variables and the dummy variables for moderate and sharp status inconsistency were not strong. Nor is there any particular reason why they should be. It is inaccurate to assert that the independent variables are "by definition" intercorrelated and that the problem of multicollinearity is "built into" status
inconsistency research (Broom and Jones, 1970:995, 999). This may be correct when the interaction variable for status
inconsistency is the product of two or more status variables; but when the variables are expressed in dummy-variable form, it
is an empirical, not a definitional matter whether and to what
extent the status and status inconsistency variables are correlated. In our regression analyses these independent
variables are mostly weakly, sometimes moderately correlated.
Moreover, it is precisely the advantage of multiple regression
analysis that it is able to handle such intercorrelations among
the independent variables. * 173
Considering that the dummy independent variables were not highly correlated we should not be unduly concerned about multicollinearity-caused distortions in the results of the regression analyses, particularly in so far increments in R2 are concerned. Nevertheless, it is advisable to bear in mind when assessing the results reported in Chapter 4 that even lesser degrees of multicollinearity in certain situations have been
shown to cause problems, which are not always recognizable by
large standard errors and/or substantively unlikely regression coefficients (see Blalock, 1963; Gordon, 1968; Althauser, 1971).
The Effects of Socioeconomic Status on Participation
A major conclusion of this study is that we need not posit
nonadditive models of status inconsistency effects in order to
explain observed differences in participation among categories
of people with different status patterns. Rejection of a status
inconsistency explanation as unnecessary _ implies that, until
there is proof to the contrary, an additive model is considered
appropriate for representing the effects of several status
variables on participation. That is to say, the effects of
educational, occupational, and income status are generally
independent of each other.
However, this conclusion must be qualified immediately.
Although the relationships between socioeconomic status
variables and participation can be most simply and
parsimoniously represented by an additive model, it is also 174
clear that the explanatory power of such models is not exactly overwhelming. As we have seen in the preceding chapter, the five regression analyses in which number of memberships was regressed on two status variables at a time yielded R2 values ranging from
.135 to .293 (see Tables 3, 6, and 9). With the additive regression equations for office-holding we obtained R2,s that were even considerably smaller: between .036 and .069 (see
Tables 12, 15, and 18). These values are within the range of the proportions of variance in participation that social status is usually found to be capable of explaining.1 They do mean, however, that more than 70 per cent of the total variance in memberships and upwards of 93 per cent of the variance in
office-holding remained unexplained by the additive effects of
the status variables.
1 It is worth mentioning that the R2 values found here for memberships and office-holding in voluntary organizations are almost the same as those reported by Curtis and Jackson, although their regression analyses included a larger number of status variables as predictors. Using data for adult male household-heads from six different American cities they found that the proportion of variance in the number of memberships that could be explained by regressing this participation variable on 17 status variables—including education, occupation, and income--varied between .25 and .39. The 17 variables additively accounted for between 10 and 17 per cent of the variance in office-holding (Curtis and Jackson, 1977:132; chapter 8). Another study of which the findings on this point are parallelled by the findings of this research is Hodge's. In an analysis based on data from a sample of residents of a suburban county adjacent to Washington, D.C., Hodge (1970:190) found that four socioeconomic status variables (education, occupation, income, father's occupation) accounted for about 15 per cent of the variance in the number of memberships of both men and women (see also Hodge and Treiman, 1968). 175
This rather modest performance of education, occupation and income in explaining variation in participation can no doubt be ascribed in part to flaws in the measurement of these variables.
Still apart from random errors, the measures of the three status dimensions are relatively crude, while in addition, the choice of the cutting points for high, medium, and low status on each dimension is somewhat arbitrary. As for the participation measures, the membership variable was skewed and the office- holding variable was treated as a dichotomy; with this kind of dependent variables the level of explanation possible also is likely to be reduced.
Further, the large proportions of unexplained variance also
reflect that participation in voluntary organizations is affected by many other factors besides education, occupation, and income which we're not measured' and were not explicitly entered in the regression analyses. They include other status variables as well as nonstatus variables. Some of these omitted
factors are known to be associated with participation (see
Chapter 2) but were left out of these analyses because they were
not immediately relevant to the purpose of this investigation.
Others may be related to participation but are not known.
But the most interesting reason why the status variables
additively explained only modest portions of variance in
participation is directly related to status inconsistency
itself. Curtis and Jackson (1977:15-6) have argued that when
rates of status inconsistency and social mobility in society or
a given community are high, as indicated by low to moderate 176
correlations between the status dimensions, the effects of social status on individual behaviour and attitudes will be weakened. Status differences become translated into differences in behaviour and attitudes through various mechanisms: felt deprivation or satisfaction, status-related expectations and prescriptions, patterns of association between individuals of the same status. But when status inconsistency occurs
frequently, so that there exists a relatively low level of
status rigidity, these mechanisms for transmitting status effects into behaviour will not work as cleanly. For instance,
someone low on a given status dimension may feel less deprived
if he or she is compensated by high status on another dimension.
Conversely, satisfaction with high rank in one respect is
perhaps reduced by low rank in another.
Finally, the widely reported positive nature of the
relationship between socioeconomic status and participation in
voluntary organizations was also evident in the data analyzed in
this study. Individuals with high educational, occupational, or
income status belonged to more voluntary organizations and were
more frequently office-holders than persons with low rank on any
of these status dimensions (see Table 21 in the Appendix). The
positive association between achieved socioeconomic status and
formal social participation can be interpreted in terms of
resources and motives. Joining a voluntary organization and
holding office require the ability to communicate and exercise
authority, access to social contact networks, financial
resources, and are motivated by norms and values about social 177
interaction, pressures from work organization and the community, and other social (status-related) expectations. It can be argued that high rank on the dimensions of education, occupation, and income status provides more of these resources and skills and inculcates such motivation to a greater degree than low social status (Curtis and Jackson, 1977: chapter 8).
In summary, the effects of educational, occupational, and
income status on membership and office-holding in voluntary organizations were additive, positive, and moderately strong.
What this pattern of effects, combined with only moderate correlations between the status variables, implies for the distribution of formal social participation through the communities can be argued along the lines suggested by Curtis and Jackson (1977:327-9). That the status variables all had a positive effect means that individuals high on all three status dimensions participate more in voluntary organizations than
individuals occupying all low rank positions. But it is
unlikely, given the other conditions, that the communities are
sharply divided according to differences in socioeconomic status
into an actively participating camp and a nonparticipating camp.
First of all, education, occupation, and income had only
moderate effects on membership and office-holding, explaining
relatively small amounts of variance in these variables. People
holding high rank on a given status dimension were not markedly
different with respect to participation from people low on that
dimension. 1 78
Further, because the effects of the status variables were additive, low rank in one respect may be compensated by high rank in another. Additivity implies that the participation level of someone with low rank on one dimension of socioeconomic status but high rank on another dimension will be somewhere between the participation level of persons with low status on both dimensions and that of individuals with high status on both dimensions.
Finally, given that the status dimensions were not strongly correlated with each other, many people in fact do combine low
status on one dimension with high(er) status on another dimension, that is, they have inconsistent statuses.
Consequently, there are large numbers of individuals who exhibit
similar, moderate levels of participation.
Under these circumstances, then, one may expect
participation in voluntary organizations to be spread gradually
throughout the communities, without sharp differences in
participation by socioeconomic status.
Conditions of Participation: A Concluding Note
So far as this study has been able to determine, status
inconsistency is not a serious hindrance to participation in
voluntary organizations. This in itself is a useful piece of
information but it does not substantially enhance our knowledge
and understanding of the social factors that do hamper or
facilitate participation. To say that more work needs to be done 179
in this area is both a cliche and a truism. Besides trying to
identify as yet unknown determinants of participation we should continue with reexamining and retesting already existing propositions on the conditions of participation. Of particular
interest among the latter are a pair of arguments which state
that individual participation in voluntary organizations is
unfavourably affected by disorderliness of work history
(Wilensky, 1961) and past unemployment (Pope, 1964). They are
relevant in the present context because they resemble in several
respects the argument linking low levels of social participation
to status inconsistency.
Guided by the view that the quantity and quality of social
relationships, and consequently the integration of individuals
in community and society, are partly a function of cumulative
experiences in the economic order, Wilensky (1961) investigated
the relationship between orderliness of work history and social
participation. In modern industrial society most adults more or
less frequently change jobs, occupations, employers, and
industries during their worklife. The sequence of jobs occupied
over time constitutes a person's work history. The work history
is orderly to the extent that it fits the model of "career",
that is, "a succession of related jobs arranged in a hierarchy
of prestige, through which persons move in an ordered (more-or-
less predictable) sequence" (Wilensky, 1961:523).
An orderly career, according to Wilensky, fosters strong
work attachments, gives stability and continuity to a person's
worklife, and leads to the development of a "life plan". These 180
qualities are instrumental in binding individuals to community and society and this bond will be reflected in wide social participation. For the same reasons, but then the other way
round, a disorderly work history in which successive jobs or
occupations are neither functionally related nor hierarchically
ordered is accompanied by a gradual decline in the vitality of a
person's social life. Wilensky suggested that workers whose work
history is orderly participate more in voluntary organizations
than workers with disorderly work histories, a hypothesis
generally supported by his data.
An obvious source of disorderliness of the work history is
unemployment. It is well known that being out of a job
interferes with an active social life. But what about any long-
term consequences? Do the short-term effects of unemployment
perhaps cumulate? These are questions Pope (1964) asked; in
particular, he tried to determine whether the experience of
recurrent or extended unemployment in the past leaves permanent
marks and continues to have an adverse effect on the informal
and formal social participation of workers long after their re•
employment.
Pope's argument, similar to Wilensky's, is that a stable
job, or a_t least job changes under control of the worker,
provides continuity and security in one's life. This allows the
worker to develop a long-range perspective and broader
interests, which stimulate wide participation in the social life
of the community. Unemployment, on the other hand, is an
unsettling experience, accompanied by loss of financial 181
resources and prestige and perhaps even by feelings of shame.
The embarrassments in consequence of their joblessness may lead unemployed persons to retreat from social life. A vicious circle develops of declining motivation to seek contact with others, dwindling social skills and increasing uneasiness in social
situations, further isolation, and so on. The more frequent and prolonged the periods of unemployment or temporary lay-off, the more lasting the consequences of reduced motivation to interact
with other people and of weakened confidence in one's ability to
conduct social intercourse.
Pope hypothesized that workers who in the past underwent
long or repeated periods of joblessness have, even after
regaining employment, lower levels of participation in voluntary
organizations than workers who have enjoyed steady employment
throughout their worklives. The results of Pope's study showed a
moderate, negative association between cumulative economic
deprivation (through involuntary loss of work) and
participation.
These summaries, however brief they may be, should be
sufficient to bring the main point to the fore: there are
several points of similarity between the disorderly work history
and economic deprivation arguments and between these two and the 182
status inconsistency argument.1 At the root of each argument lies the notion that a certain amount of order and predictability in a person's life, both in his own experience and in the perception of others, is necessary for developing and maintaining satisfactory social relations and hence for participation in voluntary organizations. An inconsistent status pattern, a disorderly work history, and unemployment are all forms of psychological and social discontinuity. All three circumstances are thought to lead to the same behavioural response: a tendency to withdraw into isolation and in particular a retreat from social participation, informal as well as formal.
But the similarity among the three theoretical formulations goes further than that; it extends to the dynamics underlying the relationships between each of the objective conditions and social participation. The effects of status inconsistency, disorderliness of work history, and unemployment on participation in voluntary organizations are assumed to be
1 This is yet another instance of the status inconsistency argument being related to other theoretical formulations. In Chapter 2 it was. noted that several authors (Blalock, 1967a; Taylor, 1973; Hornung, 1977) have pointed out the substantive as well as formal and methodological similarities between the status inconsistency argument and other theories of social consistency (social mobility, status integration, structural or compositional effects, distributive justice, and theory of status value). I have also mentioned attempts to show the similarities between these social consistency theories and social-psychological theories of cognitive consistency (structural balance, attitude incongruity, cognitive dissonance), and to integrate the two classes of theory (Geschwender, 1967; Taylor, 1973; Taylor and Hornung, 1979). 183
mediated by similar social-psychological mechanisms and processes, namely conflicting expectations and definitions,
relative deprivation, unstable self-esteem, discomfort in social
situations and various other forms of stress, disruption of
interpersonal relations, decreased skills at communication and
interaction. In other words, individuals with inconsistent
statuses or with a work history punctuated by unpredictable,
random job changes or by recurrent joblessness are thought to
keep away or withdraw from voluntary organizations for the same
reason: being subject to unpleasant and stressful experiences,
which diminish their motivation to seek contact with other
people and lessen their ability to successfully conduct social
interaction, thereby discouraging them from participating in
voluntary organizations.
As mentioned, Wilensky and Pope found empirical support for
their hypotheses. Both disorderly work history and past
unemployment were moderately and negatively associated with
participation in voluntary organizations, at least among certain
categories of workers (the better educated, higher-income, and
relatively younger persons). On the other hand, the results of
this research indicate that status inconsistency has no
appreciable impact on participation (net of the effects of
status). This divergence of the disorder1iness and economic
deprivation hypotheses on the one side and the status
inconsistency hypothesis on the other as to their empirical fate
is somewhat puzzling in view of the similarities among the
arguments that give rise to them. 184
Perhaps chaotic experiences in the labour market, in the
form of disorderly job shifts and unemployment, are much more disruptive of a person's life, with cumulative and far longer
lasting adverse effects on participation, than is status
inconsistency (except when it is extreme and/or permanent). But
it is also possible that the evidence provided by the results of
the original studies by Wilensky and Pope is not as conclusive
as appears at first sight. Particularly Wilensky may have
contaminated the test of his hypotheses by using an orderliness-
of-career measure that does not distinguish analytically between
the vertical progression of jobs (i.e., upward occupational
mobility) and the horizontal succession of jobs within the work
history (Meissner, 1967).
What is more, the propositions of Wilensky and Pope have
received considerably less attention in the literature than
Lenski's status inconsistency argument and far fewer attempts at
replication of these studies or retests of the hypotheses have
been made. Yet these propositions must be subjected to further
and closer examination if we are to obtain definite answers to
the questions raised above. A promising approach would be to
retest all three propositions on the same body of data. Crucial
to such a simultaneous test is that the data include information
on interactional stress and other subjective experiences, so
that it is possible to measure the assumed intervening
mechanisms and to analyze their relationships with both the
dependent and the independent variables. 185
Earlier in this chapter it was suggested that the assumed relationships between the structural condition of status inconsistency and experience of interactional stress and between this stress and the tendency to withdraw from social participation are questionable, and that this may be one reason why the hypothesized negative effects of status inconsistency were not found. Likewise, there may be questions about the assumed links in the chain of objective condition - subjective experience of stress - behavioural response in the disorderliness of work history and economic deprivation arguments. The main point is that these intervening processes and mechanisms cannot be assumed; they must be empirically demonstrated. In order to increase our knowledge of the conditions of participation it is desirable that we develop theories that clearly specify their causal structure and explicitly state the conditions under which objective factors like disorderly work history, unemployment, and status inconsistency result in nonparticipation or lead to withdrawal from participation. Unless we know more about the undefined and unmeasured constructs and relationships in these theories it will remain difficult to pass a decisive judgment on their validity as explanations of participation in voluntary organizations. 186
LIST OF REFERENCES
Allardt, Erik, P. Jartti, F. Jyrkila and Y. Littunen 1958 "On the cumulative nature of leisure activities." Acta Sociologica 3:165-72.
Almond, Gabriel A. and Sidney Verba 1963 The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Althauser, Robert P. 1971 "Multicollinearity and non-additive regression models." Pp. 453-72 in H. M. Blalock, Jr. (ed.), Causal Models in the Social Sciences. Chicago: Aldine.
Axelrod, Morris 1956 "Urban structure and social participation." American Sociological Review 21:13-8.
Babchuk, Nicholas 1973 "The future of the sociology of leisure: the case of voluntary organizations." Society and Leisure 5:149-54.
Babchuk, Nicholas and Alan Booth 1969 "Voluntary association membership: a longitudinal analysis." American Sociological Review 34:31-45
Babchuk, Nicholas and John N. Edwards 1965 "Voluntary associations and the integration hypothesis." Sociological Inquiry 35:149-62
Bauman, Karl E. 1968 "Status inconsistency, satisfactory social interaction, and community satisfaction in an area of rapid growth." Social Forces 47:45-52.
Bell, Wendell 1969 "Urban neighborhoods and individual behavior." Pp. 120- 46 in P: Meadows and E. H. Mizruchi (eds.), Urbanism, " Urbanization, and Change: Comparative Perspectives. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley.
Benoit-Smullyan, Emile 1944 "Status, status types, and status interrelations." American Sociological Review 9:151-61.
Blakelock, Edwin 1960 "A new look at the new leisure." Administrative Science Quarterly 4:446-67
/ 187
Blalock, Jr., Hubert M. 1963 "Correlated independent variables: the problem of multicollinearity." Social Forces 42:233-7.
1966 "The identification problem and theory building: the case of status inconsistency." American Sociological Review 31:52-61.
1967a "Status inconsistency, social mobility, status integration and structural effects." American Sociological Review 32:790-801.
1967b "Status inconsistency and interaction: some alternative models." American Journal of Sociology 73:305-15.
1967c "Tests of status inconsistency theory: a note of caution." Pacific Sociological Review 10:69-74.
Blau, Peter M. 1974 "Parameters of social structure." American Sociological Review 39:615-35.
Blishen, Bernard R. and William K. Carroll 1978 "Sex differences in a socioeconomic index for occupations in Canada." Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology 15:352-71.
Bonjean, C. M., R. J. Hill and S. D. McLemore (eds.) 1967 Sociological Measurement: An Inventory of Scales and Indices. San Francisco: Chandler.
Booth, Alan 1972 "Sex and social participation." American Sociological Review 37:183-92.
1975 "Voluntary association affiliation and national diversity." Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology 12:206-12.
Box, Steven and Julienne Ford 1969 "Some questionable assumptions in the theory of status inconsistency." The Sociological Review 17:187-201.
Broom, Leonard and F. Lancaster Jones 1970 "Status consistency and political preference: the Australian case." American Sociological Review 35:989- 1001.
Cohen, Jacob 1968 "Multiple regression as a general data-analytic system." Psychological Bulletin 70:426-43.
Craven, Paul and Barry Wellman 1973 The Network City. Research paper no. 59. Centre for 188
Urban and Community Studies, University of Toronto.
Curtis, James 1971a "Canada as a nation of joiners: evidence from national surveys." Pp. 147-64 in J. E. Gallagher and R. D. Lambert (eds.), Social Process and Institution: The Canadian Case. Toronto: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. 1971b "Voluntary association joining: a cross-national comparative note." American Sociological Review 36:872- 80.
Curtis, James E. and William G. Scott (eds.) 1979 Social Stratification: Canada. 2nd ed. Scarborough: Prentice-Hall of Canada. Curtis, Richard F. and Elton F. Jackson 1977 Inequality in American Communities. New York: Academic Press. Cutler, Stephen J. 1973 "Voluntary association membership and the theory of mass society." Pp. 133-59 in E. 0. Laumann, Bonds of Pluralism: The Form and Substance of Urban Social Networks. New York: Wiley.
Demerath, Nicholas J. 1965 Social Class in American Protestantism. Chicago: Rand McNally. Duncan, Otis Dudley 1964 "Residential areas and differential fertility." Eugenics Quarterly 1 1 :82-9. 1966 "Methodological issues in the analysis of social mobility." Pp. 51-97 in N. J. Smelser and S. M. Lipset (eds.), Social Structure and Mobility in Economic Development. Chicago: Aldine.
Durkheim, Emile 1957 Professional Ethics and Civic Morals. Transl. Cornelia Brookfield. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Edwards, John N. and Alan Booth (eds.) 1973 Social Participation in Urban SocietyCambridge, Mass.: Schenkman. Eichler, Margrit (with the assistance of N. Guppy and J. Siltanen) 1977 "The prestige of the occupation housewife." Pp. 151-75 in P. Marchak (ed.), The Working Sexes. Institute of Industrial Relations, University of British Columbia, Vancouver. 189
Frizzell, Alan and Elia Zureik 1974 "Voluntary participation: the Canadian perspective." Pp. 253-76 in D. H. Smith (ed.), Voluntary Action Research 1974. Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath.
Geschwender, James A. 1967 "Continuities in theories of status consistency and cognitive dissonance." Social Forces 46:160-71.
1968 "Status inconsistency, social isolation, and individual unrest." Social Forces 46:477-83.
Goffman, Irwin W. 1957 "Status consistency and preference for change in power distribution." American Sociological Review 22:275-81.
Gordon, C. Wayne and Nicholas Babchuk 1959 "A typology of voluntary associations.". American Sociological Review 24:22-9.
Gordon, Robert A. 1968 "Issues in multiple regression." American Journal of Sociology 73:592-616.
Gray, George A. 1975 "Differential effects of temporal constraints on organizational participation." Pacific Sociological Review 18:327-41.
Greer, Scott 1962 The Emerging City: Myth and Reality. New York: Free Press.
Greer, Scott and Peter Orleans 1962 "The mass society and the parapolitical structure." American Sociological Review 27:634-46.
Guppy, L. N. and J. L. Siltanen 1977 "A comparison of the allocation of male and female occupational prestige." Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology 14:320-30.
Hartman, Moshe 1974 "On the definition of status inconsistency." American Journal of Sociology 80:706-21.
Hausknecht, Murray 1962 The Joiners: A Sociological Description of Voluntary Association Membership in the United States. New York: Bedminster Press.
Hodge, Robert W. 1970 "Social integration, psychological well-being, and their socioeconomic correlates." Sociological Inquiry 40:182- 190
206.
Hodge, Robert W. and Paul M. Siegel 1970 "Nonvertical dimensions of social stratification." Pp. 512-20 in E. 0. Laumann, P. M. Siegel and R. W. Hodge (eds.), The Logic of Social Hierarchies. Chicago: Markham.
Hodge, Robert W. and Donald J. Treiman 1968 "Social participation and social status." American Sociological Review 33:722-40.
Hope, Keith 1975 "Models of status inconsistency and social mobility effects." American Sociological Review 40:322-43.
1978 "Diamonds are trumps: a reply to House." American Sociological Review 43:615-9.
Hornung, Carlton A. 1977 "Social status, status inconsistency and psychological stress." American Sociological Review 42:623-38.
House, James S. 1978 "Facets and flaws of Hope's diamond model." American Sociological Review 43:439-42.
House, James S. and Elizabeth B. Harkins 1975 "Why and when is status inconsistency stressful?" American Journal of Sociology 81:395-412.
Hughes, Everett C. 1945 Dilemmas and contradictions of status." American Journal of Sociology 50:353-9.
Hyman, Herbert H. and Charles R. Wright 1971 "Trends in voluntary association memberships of American adults: replication based on secondary analysis of national sample surveys." American Sociological Review 36:191-206.
Hyman, Martin D. 1966 "Determining the effects of status inconsistency." Public Opinion Quarterly 30:120-9.
1967 "The unpleasant consequences of rank inconsistency: suggestions for a reorientation of theory and research." The Sociological Quarterly 8:383-96.
Jackson, Elton F. 1962 "Status consistency and symptoms of stress." American Sociological Review 27:469-80. 191
Jackson, Elton .F. and Peter J. Burke 1965 "Status and symptoms of stress:. additive and interaction effects." American Sociological Review 30:556-64.
Jackson, Elton F. and Richard F. Curtis 1968 "Conceptualization and measurement in the study of stratification." Pp. 112-49 in H. M. Blalock, Jr. and Ann B. Blalock (eds.), Methodology in Social Research. New York: McGraw-Hill.
1972 "Effects of vertical mobility and status inconsistency: a body of negative evidence." American Sociological Review 37:701-13.
Jacoby, Arthur P. and Nicholas Babchuk 1963 "Instrumental and expressive voluntary associations." Sociology and Social Research 47:461-71.
Kasarda, John D. and Morris Janowitz 1974 "Community attachment in mass society." American Sociological Review 39:328-39.
Kenkel, William F. 1956 "The relationship between status consistency and politico-economic attitudes." American Sociological Review 21:365-8.
Knoke, David 1975 "A comparison of log-linear and regression models for systems of dichotomous variables." Sociological Methods & Research 3:416-34.
Kornhauser, William 1959 The Politics of Mass Society. Glencoe, 111.: Free Press.
Kuechler, Manfred 1980 "The analysis of nonmetric.data: the relation to dummy dependent variable regression using an additive saturated Grizzle-Starmer-Koch model." Sociological Methods & Research 8:369-88.
Laumann, Edward 0. and David R. Segal, 1971 "Status inconsistency and ethnoreligious group membership as determinants of social participation and political attitudes." American Journal of Sociology 77:36-61.
Lenski, Gerhard E. 1954 "Status crystallization: a non-vertical dimension of social status." American Sociological Review 19:405-13.
1956a "Comment on Kenkel's communication." Amer ican Sociological Review 21:368-9. 192
1956b "Social participation and status crystallization." American Sociological Review 21:458-64.
1964 "Comment." Public Opinion Quarterly 28:326-30.
1966 Power and Privilege: A Theory of Social Stratification. New York: McGraw-Hill.
1967 "Status inconsistency and the vote: a four nation test." American Sociological Review 32:298-301.
Lipset, Seymour M., M. A. Trow and J. S. Coleman 1956 Union Democracy: The Internal Politics of the International Typographic Union. New York: Free Press.
Litwak, Eugene 1961 "Voluntary associations and neighborhood cohesion." American Sociological Review 26:258-71.
Malewski, Andrzej 1966 "The degree of status incongruence and its effects." Pp. 303-8 in R. Bendix and S. M. Lipset (eds.), Class, Status and Power. 2nd ed. New York: Free Press.
Mayntz, Renate 1960 "Leisure, social participation and political activity." International Social Science Journal 12:561-74.
Meissner, Martin 1967 A Study of Work and Social Participation in an Industrial Community: A Preliminary Report. Department of Anthropology and Sociology, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, (mimeo)
1971 "The long arm of the job: a study of work and leisure." Pp. 362-77 in W. E. Mann (ed.), Canada: A Sociological Profile. 2nd ed. Toronto: Copp.Clark.
Meyer, John W. and Phillip E. Hammond 1971 "Forms of status inconsistency." Social Forces 50:91- 101. Michels, Robert 1958 Political Parties: A Sociological Study of" the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy (1915). Transl. Eden and Cedar Paul. Glencoe, 111.: Free Press.
Miller, Jerry L. L. and Maynard L. Erickson 1974 "On dummy variable regression analysis: a description and illustration of the method." Sociological Methods & Research 2:409-30. 193
Mitchell, Robert E. 1964 "Methodological notes on a theory of status crystallization." Public Opinion Quarterly 28:315-25.
Mulford, Charles L. and Gerald E. Klonglan 1972 "Attitude determinants of individual participation in organized voluntary action." Pp. 251-76 in D. H. Smith, R. D. Reddy and B. R. Baldwin (eds.), Voluntary Action Research 1972. Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath.
Myles, John F. 1978 "The use of nominal categories in regression analysis." Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology 15:97-101.
Nelson, Edward E. 1973 "Status inconsistency: its objective and subjective components." The Sociological Quarterly 14:3-18.
Nie, N. H., C. H. Hull, J. G. Jenkins, K. Steinbrenner and D. H. Bent 1975 SPSS: Statistical Package for the Social Sciences. 2nd ed. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Olsen, Marvin E. 1972 "Social participation and voting turnout: a multivariate analysis." American Sociological Review 37:317-33.
Olsen, Marvin E. and Judy C. Tully 7 1972 "Socioeconomic-ethnic status inconsistency and preference for political change." American Sociological Review 37:560-74.
Palisi, Bartolomeo J. 1968 "A critical analysis of the voluntary association concept." Sociology and Social Research 52:392-405.
Payne, Raymond, B. P. Payne and R. D. Reddy 1972 "Social background and role determinants of individual participation in organized voluntary action." Pp. 207-50 in D. H. Smith, R. D. Reddy and B. R. Baldwin (eds.), Voluntary Action Research 1972. Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath.
Phillips, Derek L. 1967 "Social participation and happiness." American Journal of Sociology 72:479-88. Pope, Hallowell 1964 "Economic deprivation and social participation in a group of 'middle class' factory workers." Social Problems 11:290-300.
Reddy, Richard D. and David H. Smith 1972 "Personality and capacity determinants of individual 194
participation in organized voluntary action." Pp. 277-98 in D. H. Smith, R. D. Reddy and B. R. Baldwin (eds.), Voluntary Action Research 1972. Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath.
Reigrotzki, Erich 1956 Soziale Verflechtungen in der Bundesrepublik: Elemente der sozialen Teilnahme in Kirche, Organisationen und Freizeit. Tuebingen: J. C. B. Mohr.
Rose, Arnold 1965 "Voluntary associations." Ch. 10 in A. Rose, Sociology: The Study of Human Relations. 2nd ed. New York: Knopf.
Rossides, Daniel W. 1966 Voluntary Participation in Canada: A Comparative Analysis. Toronto: Canadian Association for Adult Education.
Scheu, W. John 1 975 The Effects of Residential Opportunity Structures on Participation in Voluntary Associations. Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation. Department of Anthropology and Sociology, University of British Columbia, Vancouver.
Seeman Melvin 1 977 "Some real and imaginary consequences of social mobility." American Journal of Sociology 82:757-82.
Sills, David L. 1968 "Voluntary associations: sociological aspects." Pp. 362- 79 in D. L. Sills (ed.), International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences. Vol. 16. New York: Macmillan.
Smith, Constance and Anne Freedman 1972 Voluntary Associations: Perspectives on the Literature. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Smith, David H. 1975 "Voluntary action and voluntary groups." Pp. 247-70 in A. Inkeles, J. Coleman and N. Smelser (eds.), Annual Review of Sociology^ Vol. 1. Palo Alto: Annual Reviews I nc.
Smith, David H. and Richard D. Reddy 1972 "Contextual and organizational determinants of individual participation in organized voluntary action." Pp. 299-319 in D. H. Smith, R. D. Reddy and B. R. Baldwin (eds.), Voluntary Action Research 1972. Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath.
Smith, David H. , R. D.-'Reddy and B. R. Baldwin 1972 "Types of voluntary action: a definitional essay." Pp. 159-95 in D. H. Smith, R. D. Reddy and B. R. Baldwin 195
(eds.), Voluntary Action Research 1972. Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath,
Starnes, Charles E. and Royce Singleton, Jr. 1977 "Objective and subjective status inconsistency: a search for empirical correspondence." The Sociological Quarterly 18:253-66.
Stehr, Nico 1968 "Status consistency: the theoretical concept and its empirical referent." Pacific Sociological Review 11:95- 9. 1971 "Statuskonsistenz." Koelner Zeitschrift fuer.Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie 23:34-54.
Suits, Daniel B. 1957 "Use of dummy variables in regression equations." Journal of the American Statistical Association 52:548- 51 .
Swafford, Michael 1980 "Three parametric techniques for contingency table analysis: a nontechnical commentary." American Sociological Review 45:664-90.
Taub, R.T., G.P. Surgeon, S. Lindblom, P.B. Otti and A. Bridges 1977 "Urban voluntary associations, locality based and externally induced." American Journal of Sociology 83:425-42.
Taylor, Howard F. 1973 "Linear models of consistency: some extensions of Blalock's strategy." American Journal of Sociology 78:1192-1215.
Taylor, Howard F. and Carlton.A. Hornung 1979 "On a general model for social and cognitive consistency." Sociological Methods & Research 7:259-87.
Tocqueville, Alexis de 1954 Democracy in America (1835). 2 vols. New York: Vintage Books. Treiman, Donald J. 1966 "Status discrepancy and prejudice." American Journal of Sociology 71:651-64.
Treiman, Donald J. and Kermit Terrell 1975 "Sex and the process of status attainment: a comparison of working men and women." American Sociological Review 40:174-201. 196
Tyree, Andrea and Judith Treas 1974 "The occupational and marital mobility of women." American Sociological Review 39:293-302.
Warburton, T. Rennie 1969 A Survey of Social Participation in Greater Victoria. Social Sciences Research Centre, University of Victoria, British Columbia, (mimeo)
Wilensky, Harold L. 1960 "Work, careers, and social integration." International Social Science Journal 12:543-74. 1961 "Orderly careers and social participation: the impact of work history on social integration in the middle mass." American Sociological Review 26:521-39.
Wilson, Kenneth L. and Louis A. Zurcher 1976 "Status inconsistency and participation in social movements: an application of Goodman's hierarchical modeling." The Sociological Quarterly 17:520-33.
Wirth, Louis 1938 "Urbanism as a way of life." American Journal of Sociology 44:1-24.
Wolf, Wendy C. and Neil D. Fligstein 1979 "Sexual stratification: differences in power in the work setting." Social Forces 58:94-107.
Wright, Charles R. and Herbert H. Hyman 1958 "Voluntary association memberships ol American adults: evidence from national sample surveys." American Sociological Review 23:284-94.
Zelditch, Jr., Morris and Bo Anderson 1966 "On the balance of a set of ranks." Pp. 244-68 in J. Berger, M. Zelditch, Jr. and B. Anderson (eds.), Sociological Theories in Progress. Vol. 1. Boston: Houghton and Mifflin.
Zimmer, Basil and Amos H. Hawley 1959 "The significance of memberships in associations." American Journal of Sociology 65:196-201. 197
APPENDIX 198
Table 21. Associations Between Measures of Socioeconomic Status and Participation in Voluntary Organizations for Port Alberni and Vancouver Samples
Participation Variables (Y)
Status Membership Office -Holding Var iables Sample (X) Dy.x Gamma (N) Dy.x Gamma (N)
Port Alberni Educat ion + .09 + .24 513 + .18 + .36 513
Occupat ion + .14 + .37 515 + .16 + .31 515
Vancouver: men Educat ion + .14 + .40 407 + .11 + .21 41 1
Occupat ion + .17 + .48 398 + .13 + .25 402
Income + .20 + .56 392 + .16 + .31 396
Vancouver: employed women Educat ion + .17 + .37 1 39 + .13 + .34 1 39
Occupation + .24 + .49 1 37 + .07 + .19 1 37
Note: Association coefficients are Somers' d (asymmetric) and Goodman and Kruskal's gamma computed for a dichotomized participation variable (member, not member; office-holder, not office-holder) and a trichotomized status variable (low,medium, high status as defined in Chapter 3). 199
Table 22. Associations Among Measures of Socioeconomic Status for Port Alberni and Vancouver Samples
Coef f ic ients Pair of Sample Status Variables Tau b Gamma (N)
Port Alberni Education & Occupation + .36 + .53 513
Vancouver: men Education & Occupation + .47 + .67 402
Education & Income + .32 + .49 396
Occupation & Income + .46 + .69 388
Vancouver: employed women Education & Occupation + .33 + .52 1 37
Note: Association coefficients are Kendall's tau b and Goodman and Kruskal's gamma. Status variables were trichotomized into low, medium, and high status as described in Chapter 3. 200
Table 23. Zero-Order Correlations, Means and Standard Deviations of Measures of Status, Degree of Status Inconsistency, and Participation (Port Alberni Sample. N=513)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1 No. of memberships 1 .00
2 Held office .41 1 .00
3 Medium education -.10 -.06 1 .00
4 High education .25 .23 -.49 1 .00
5 Medium occupation -.10 -.03 .02 -.08 1 .00
6 High occupation .34 .19 -.03 .38 -.42 1 .00
7 Moderate incons. -.05 -.06 .42 -.27 .13 -.07 1 .00
8 Sharp incons. . 1 3 . 1 4 -.24 .21 -.18 .08 -.26 1 .00
Mean 1 .58 .53 .43 .24 .29 .30 -.46 .07
Stand, deviation 1 .54 .50 .50 .43 .45 .46 .50 .26
Note: With the exception of the first variable (number of memberships), all variables are dummy (0,1) variables. 201
Table 24. Zero-Order Correlations, Means and Standard Deviations of Measures of Educational and Occupational Status, Degree of Status Inconsistency, and Participation (Vancouver Sample: Men. N=398 approximately)
(1 ) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1 No. of memberships 1 .00
2 Held office .45 1 .00
3 Medium education .02 .06 1 .00
4 High education .31 .09 -.40 1 .00
5 Medium occupation -.17 -.09 . 1 1 -.14 1 .00
6 High occupation .44 . 16 -.03 .45 -.57 1 .00
7 Moderate incons. -.10 .00 .21 -.18 .46 -.23 1 .00
8 Sharp incons. .04 .06 -.18 -.07 -.22 .26 -.24 1 .00
Mean 1 .94 .51 .25 .32 .35 . 37 .38 .08
Stand, deviation 1 .79 .50 .44 .47 .48 .48 .49 .28
See note to Table 23. 202
Table 25. Zero-Order Correlations, Means and Standard Deviations of Measures of Educational and Income Status, Degree of Status Inconsistency, and Participation (Vancouver Sample: Men. N=392 approximately)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1 No. of memberships 1 .00
2 Held office .44 1 .00
3 Medium education .00 .04 1 .00
4 High education .32 .10 -.41 1 .00
5 Medium income -.27 -.06 .03 -.12 1 .00
6 High income .49 .16 -.04 .32 -.67 1 .00
7 Moderate incons. -.14 -.03 -.05 -.09 .48 -.35 1 .00
8 Sharp incons. .05 .01 -.18 -.05 -.32 .31 -.30 1 .00
Mean 1 .93 .50 .26 .32 .52 .29 .50 .08
Stand, deviation 1 .80 .50 .44 .47 .50 .45 .50 .28
See note to Table 23. 203
Table 26. Zero-Order Correlations, Means and Standard Deviations of Measures of Occupational and Income Status, Degree of Status Inconsistency, and Participation (Vancouver Sample: Men..N=384 approximately)
(1 ) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1 No. of memberships 1 .00
2 Held office .44 1 .00
3 Medium occupation -.16 -.08 1 .00
4 High occupation .44 .15 -.56 1 .00
5 Medium income -.29 -.06 .10 -.24 1 .00
6 High income .49 .15 -.15 .48 -.69 1 .00
7 Moderate incons. -.22 -.05 -.09 -.13 .31 -.29 1 .00
8 Sharp incons. .08 .10 -.12 .08 -.17 .04 -.15 1 .00
Mean 1 .95 .51 .35 .37 .53 .30 .46 .03
Stand, deviation 1.81 .50 .48 .48 .50 .48 .50 .16
See note to Table 23. 204
Table 27. Zero-Order Correlations, Means and Standard Deviations of Measures of Status, Degree of Status Inconsistency, and Participation (Vancouver Sample: Employed Women. N=137)
(1 ) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1 No. of memberships 1 .00
2 Held office .59 1 .00
3 Medium education -.12 -.04 1 .00
4 High education .48 .21 -.37 1 .00
5 Medium occupation -.23 -.02 .12 -.23 1 .00
6 High occupation .42 .08 -.10 . 42 -.70 1 .00
7 Moderate incons. -.05 .09 -.17 -.12 .18 -.14 1 .00
8 Sharp incons. .00 -.08 -.22 -.12 -.31 .44 -.24 1 .00
Mean 1.12 .25 .42 . 16 .58 .26 .45 .07
Stand, deviation 1 .23 .43 .49 .37 .49 .44 .50 .25
See note to Table 23.