Cornell International Law Journal Volume 41 Article 9 Issue 1 Winter 2008 Brave New World: Neurowarfare and the Limits of International Humanitarian Law Stephen E. White Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cilj Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation White, Stephen E. (2008) "Brave New World: Neurowarfare and the Limits of International Humanitarian Law," Cornell International Law Journal: Vol. 41: Iss. 1, Article 9. Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cilj/vol41/iss1/9 This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Cornell International Law Journal by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more information, please contact
[email protected]. Brave New World: Neurowarfare and the Limits of International Humanitarian Law Stephen E. Whitet Introduction ..................................................... 177 1. DARPA's Brain-Machine Interfaces and Human Assisted Neural Assistance Programs .............................. 179 11. The Use of Brain-Machine Interfaces in the Context of International Criminal Law .............. 186 III. Novel Issues of Law That Brain-Machine Interfaces Raise in the Context of International Criminal Law ............. 192 IV. An Argument for Enlarging the Scope of Command Responsibility ............................................ 205 C onclusion ...................................................... 210 Introduction For the past several years, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), the military research and development agency tasked with maintaining U.S. military technological superiority, has engaged in research on direct neurological control of weapon systems.1 Although international law does not create a per se prohibition on the use of these weapons, the potential misuse of such weapons radically challenges tradi- tional notions of criminal responsibility by effacing the distinction between thought and act.