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Business & Commercial Aviation Safety U.S. AIR FORCE Boeing B-17F-5-BO 41-24406 Under Control from its pylon, taking out the No. 4 en- Making sure your airplane is ready gine and some flight controls. The pilots definitely had their hands full; and yet for an approach and landing they were able to fly for 8 min., main- taining altitude and changing heading when they wanted. They began fuel BY JAMES ALBRIGHT [email protected] dumping almost immediately. But as they slowed the increasing angle of at- magine flying a B-17 deep into en- Aircraft icing? Asymmetric flaps? Hail tack (AOA) also increased drag, eventu- emy territory when a German ME- damage? Bird strike? Debris from an- ally overwhelming the thrust available 109 rams you, nearly slicing off your other aircraft on the runway? Or . until they ended up behind the power Ibomber’s tail. You’re still flying, still you get the idea. As a result of any such curve and outside their roll capability. proceeding, but will the airplane keep event, you may have doubts about the The crash that resulted killed the together as you finally limp back to base airworthiness of your aircraft. Should Boeing’s three crewmembers and a and then configure and slow for land- that occur, you may need to borrow a passenger in a jump seat, along with 39 ing? (Fortunately, for the crew who had page from military aviation: the control- people on the ground. to confront those circumstances on a lability check. Feb. 1, 1943, bombing mission, their Fly- ing Fortress lived up to its name and Consider the ‘Why?’ touched down safely.) Now fast forward and imagine your- There isn’t a lot written on self flying a business or commercial jet the subject of controllability when an Airbus A380 crosses your path checks. During my earliest just 1,000 ft. above. Countering the up- days in the U.S. Air Force, it set that follows takes every bit of your was a procedure we learned airmanship and physical strength to because many of the era’s return the airplane to straight and level aircraft were not as reliable flight. You suspect your aircraft may be as they could have been and bent. Well, as most readers know, you yet we did a lot of formation don’t have to imagine much, since that’s flying where the risk of a exactly what happened to the crew of a midair collision was always Bombardier Challenger 604 (D-AMSC) a consideration. So, we pi- on Jan. 8, 2017. lots talked about conduct- Or, what if your autopilot gives you an ing controllability checks aileron trim warning while you’re hap- and every now and then we pily crossing the ocean, and when you did them. But why would we disengage it, the airplane snaps into a need such a procedure these days when The estimated damage to El Al Flight 1862 roll? This happened to a Challenger 604 aircraft are built so much better and (from the Netherlands accident report). (C-GKTO) on Nov. 18, 2017, while flying our maintenance programs are more from Europe to Canada. The aircraft likely to find problems before they bite The accident report says, “Because rolled rapidly until extreme force was us when airborne? of the marginal controllability a safe applied. After an emergency landing in Consider El Al Israel Airlines Flight landing became highly improbable, if Ireland, a significant amount of water 1862, a cargo Boeing 747 that took off not virtually impossible.” That might be drained from the fuselage in an area from Amsterdam-Schiphol Interna- true. But there are a few things we can near control cables, so the operator sus- tional Airport (EHAM), Netherlands, on take away from this tragedy: (1) If the pected a water leak had caused a freez- Oct. 4, 1992. The aircraft was as heavy airplane is flying but continued flight is ing of the aileron trim mechanism. as it could have been under the condi- questionable, try to reduce gross weight Or, what about a lightning strike? tions when the No. 3 engine separated before reducing airspeed or increasing 36 Business & Commercial Aviation | February 2018 www.bcadigital.com Safety drag; (2) if faced with a loss of thrust hoc” troubleshooting and more apt to I asked Capt. Sullivan about the con- on one side, attempt to make turns into see just how controllable was their dam- trollability check and he was unequivo- the good engine(s) to improve roll-out aged aircraft. Maintenance procedures cal about its importance that day. “For capability; and (3) if you don’t have to have been improved to prevent another the QF72 accident, our electronic flight land immediately and controllability is case of the frozen MD-80 series stabi- controls were operating at an unknown in question, look for a sparsely popu- lizer jackscrew. But not all flight control level and I had serious concerns as to lated area where you can do a control- problems are mechanical in nature. their veracity and my level of control, lability check. On Oct. 7, 2008, Qantas Capt. Kevin especially close to the ground,” he said. Of course, this was a case where the Sullivan was flying an Airbus A330 that “Two uncommanded pitch-downs with problem was immediately recognizable came out of the factory with a computer no amplifying information from ECAM as a dire emergency where controllabil- design flaw that would only occur in a very [electronic centralized aircraft monitor] ity was at issue. But not all flight control rare set of circumstances. The design lim- meant we were in uncharted territory, problems present themselves so obvi- itation would only happen if a “data spike” so the control check confirmed flap op- ously. The case of Alaska Airlines Flight between an AOA transmitter and an air eration and appropriate control stick 261, for example, first appeared to be a data inertial reference unit (ADIRU) re- response, at altitude, prior to landing.” simple matter of troubleshooting to get peated itself in a 1.2-sec. window. The air- a failed system working again. craft series had logged 28 million flight Consider the ‘Why On Jan. 31, 2000, the crew of this Mc- hours without such an occurrence before Donnell Douglas MD-83 was faced with it happened to Flight 72. Not?’ and ‘How?’ what appeared to be a jammed stabilizer The electrical flight control system due to a faulty trim motor. In fact, the believed the aircraft was in a stall and If you have any doubt about your air- fault was a stabilizer jackscrew bare of over-speed condition simultaneously, craft’s airworthiness while in flight, lubrication that had ground many of the and pushed the nose over violently pressing on without taking steps to re- threads to its mating “acme” nut com- enough to throw a hundred passengers assure yourself might be an exercise in pletely off. The pilots worked with tech- and crewmembers in the cabin to the wishful thinking. Many Boeing manuals nicians on the ground to repeatedly try ceiling before hurling them back to the put it this way: “Troubleshooting beyond to break the jammed stabilizer free to floor again. The computers ignored Sul- checklist directed actions is rarely help- allow greater control for landing. When livan’s control inputs for a full 2 sec. be- ful and has caused further loss of sys- the stabilizer did break free, aerody- fore allowing him to return the aircraft tem function or failure. In some cases, namic loads caused it to dislocate from to straight and level flight. But then the accidents and incidents have resulted. the jackscrew and plunged the aircraft ADIRU did it again. The crew should consider additional into an uncontrollable dive into the Pa- The crew elected to divert to Royal actions beyond the checklist only when cific Ocean, killing all aboard. Australian Air Force Base Learmonth, completion of the published checklist We cannot fault the pilots for trying Western Australia (YPLM), all the while steps clearly results in an unacceptable everything in their power to trouble- unsure if their Airbus would continue to situation. In the case of airplane control- shoot and correct the flight control; allow them to control it over the wishes lability problems when a safe landing is CHRIS FINNEY a landing with a jammed stabilizer is of the computerized flight control sys- considered unlikely, airplane handling certainly a challenge. Few pilots have tem. Sullivan brought the airplane in evaluations with gear, flaps or speed had experience with controllability for a safe emergency landing after per- brakes extended may be appropriate. checks and guidance for the proce- forming a controllability check. Know- dure is rarely given by aircraft manu- ing the aircraft could be configured at a facturers. But we can speculate that safe altitude gave him the confidence to had these pilots known the procedure, attempt the landing from a controlled, they may have been less prone to “ad 3-deg. glidepath, fully configured. Airbus A330-303, VH-QPA 38 Business & Commercial Aviation | February 2018 www.bcadigital.com Safety In the case of jammed flight controls, changes slowly until a damage assess- υ⁳After the damage assessment and han- do not attempt troubleshooting beyond ment and airplane handling evaluation dling characteristics are evaluated, the the actions directed in the NNC [Non- have been done and it is certain that lower crew should formulate a sequential plan Normal Checklist] unless the airplane airspeeds can be safely used. In addition, for the completion of the flight. If airplane cannot be safely landed with the existing limit bank angle to 15 deg.
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