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Congressional Record—House H11761 November 1, 2000 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD Ð HOUSE H11761 FURTHER MESSAGE FROM THE Israel but to destabilize the Middle cise in its terms and we have followed SENATE East and eventually to harm America it strictly. It does not include missile A further message from the Senate and its allies. and nuclear-related cooperation with by Mr. Lundregan, one of its clerks, an- Well, Mr. Speaker, we now have Iran,'' in other words allowing it, ``nor nounced that the Senate has passed found an unbelievable revelation. In does it include conventional arms without amendment bills of the House 1995, unbeknownst to anyone in this transfers to other state sponsors of ter- of the following titles: Congress despite our Constitution that rorism.'' H.R. 5110. An act to designate the United says that no one, including the Presi- b 1745 dent, can negotiate a treaty without States courthouse located at 3470 12th Street Listen to what Secretary Albright in Riverside, California, as the ``George E. the advice and consent of the Congress, Brown, Jr. United States Courthouse''. Vice President AL GORE arranged for a went on to say. ``Without the Aide Me- H.R. 5302. An act to designate the United secret memorandum with the Prime moire,'' without this document that States courthouse located at 1010 Fifth Ave- Minister of Russia, Viktor GORE negotiated privately, Russia's nue in Seattle, Washington, as the ``William Chernomyrdin. conventional arms sales to Iran would Kenzo Nakamura United States Court- Mr. Speaker, I will include for the have been subject to sanctions based on house''. RECORD articles and direct quotes from various provisions of our laws.'' H.R. 5388. An act to designate a building Following is the excerpt from the proposed to be located within the boundaries this memorandum which I am holding of the Chincoteague National Wildlife Ref- up in front of me. memo: uge, as the ``Herbert H. Bateman Education MOSCOW JOINT STATEMENT OF MAY 10, 1995 We have also upheld our commitment not and Administrative Center''. to impose sanctions for those transfers dis- (4) Russia will terminate all arms-related The message also announced that the closed in the Annex to the Aide Memoire. transfers to Iran not later than 31 December The Annex is very precise in its terms and Senate recedes from its amendments to 1999. The United States will continue not to we have followed its strictly. It does not in- the bill (H.R. 4846) ``An Act to establish engage in any arms-related transfers to Iran. clude missile and nuclear-related coopera- the National Recording Registry in the * * * * * tion with Iran, nor does it include conven- Library of Congress to maintain and (6) In light of the undertakings contained tional arms transfers to other State Spon- preserve sound recordings that are cul- in the Joint Statement and this Aide Me- sors of terrorism. turally, historically, or aesthetically moire, the United States is prepared to take Without the Aide Memoire, Russia's con- significant, and for other purposes.'' appropriate steps to avoid any penalties to ventional arms sales to Iran would have been subject to sanctions based on various provi- f Russia that might otherwise arise under do- mestic law with respect to the completion of sions of our laws. TRANSFER OF RUSSIAN TECH- the transfers disclosed in the Annex . So now we have the Secretary of NOLOGY TO ISRAEL'S ENEMIES Mr. Speaker, what does this memo- State acknowledging publicly in a let- The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. randum, signed by AL GORE, our Vice ter that we got declassified, thank PEASE). Under the Speaker's an- President, and Viktor Chernomyrdin goodness we have a media that is will- nounced policy of January 6, 1999, the say that was not given to anybody in ing to stand up and expose this kind of gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. this Congress? It is a joint statement action, while the Congress was working WELDON) is recognized for 60 minutes called the Moscow Joint Statement of in good faith to stop proliferation of as the designee of the majority leader. May 10, 1995. It talks about Russia's ob- technology to Iran, Vice President AL Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. ligations to stop proliferation of tech- GORE was allowing that technology to Speaker, I rise tonight to share with nology to Iran specifically. Let me flow to Iran and never told the Con- our colleagues some very startling in- read section 4. gress. formation and some information that ``Russia will terminate all arms-re- Mr. Speaker, this is outrageous. This should concern every citizen in Amer- lated transfers to Iran not later than 31 is unconstitutional. This is immoral. ica but also every citizen in Israel be- December 1999. The United States will Because we through one person, and he cause Vice President AL GORE has continue not to engage in any arms-re- is not the President and he is not the caused increased danger to the security lated transfers to Iran.'' Congress, through one person, our and safety of every man, woman, and Number 6: ``In light of the under- country allowed Iran to receive tech- child living in Israel today. takings contained in the Joint State- nology from Russia that is covered That is a pretty bold statement. Why ment and this aid memoir, the United under our arms control agreements do I make that? Is it because the elec- States is prepared to take appropriate with Russia which no individual has tion is on Tuesday? No. It is because of steps to avoid any penalties to Russia the right to overtake or to supersede. what this Congress has just learned. that might otherwise arise out of do- Yet Vice President GORE did it. Every The greatest threat to Israel's security mestic laws with respect to the com- Member of Congress, Democrat and Re- is the transfer of technology from Rus- pletion of the transfers discussed and publican, needs to ask the question of sia to Israel's enemies, Iran and Iraq disclosed in the annex.'' the Vice President, who do you think especially, and Syria and Libya. The Vice President on his own, with- you are? The President could not even For the last 10 years, this Congress, out informing anyone in this body or do this without the advice and consent with bipartisan votes, has worked dili- the other body, arranged for a secret of the Congress, to arrange a secret gently to stop the transfer of tech- deal with Viktor Chernomyrdin that deal with his friend Viktor nology to Iran because Iran's goal is to said to Russia they could continue to Chernomyrdin that allowed for 5 years annihilate Israel and to do it with sell technology to Iran which directly Russia to continue to transfer tech- weapons of mass destruction, missiles, has increased the threat to every man, nology to one of Israel's boldest and weapons of mass destruction involving woman, and child living in Israel and most aggressive enemies. chemical biological or nuclear agents. every one of our allies that are within Mr. Speaker, tonight we are going to But Iran or Iraq do not possess that ca- the range of Iran's weapons of mass de- expose this in detail. We are going to pability. They have got to buy it. They struction. talk about the policies of this adminis- have got to acquire it. And to add insult to injury, Mr. tration. Before I yield to my good Mr. Speaker, over the past 8 years, Speaker, there was a classified memo friend and colleague, I want to say one we have worked with this administra- that our Secretary of State sent to the final point. 1992 was the start. When tion in what we thought was a good- Russian foreign minister in January of Boris Yeltsin stood atop that tank out- faith effort to stop proliferation. I have this year. I want to quote from this side the Russian White House in Mos- been down in the White House twice in memo. I am quoting the U.S. Secretary cow, with tens of thousands of Russians personal meetings with the Vice Presi- of State Madeleine Albright. This is to around him announcing he was throw- dent along with colleagues from the the Russian foreign minister. ing off Communism, that the Soviet House and the Senate where we talked ``We have also upheld our commit- Union was disbanding, he waved a Rus- specifically about stopping technology ment not to impose sanctions for those sian flag and an American flag and he from flowing to Iran because Iran will transfers disclosed in the Annex of the declared that Communism was dead use this technology not only against Aide Memoire. The annex is very pre- and a new strategic partnership. That VerDate 01-NOV-2000 02:30 Nov 02, 2000 Jkt 089060 PO 00000 Frm 00045 Fmt 4634 Sfmt 0634 E:\CR\FM\A01NO7.033 pfrm01 PsN: H01PT1 H11762 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD Ð HOUSE November 1, 2000 was in 1992. Russia and America to- sentiment, as the gentleman says, and institutions committed to the rule of gether. look at that chart that shows the anti- law, that they stop selling weapons to This was the scene last fall in down- American sentiment among the Rus- the Chinese, Iranians and other poten- town Moscow, Mr. Speaker, as tens of sian people. It is at its highest point tially dangerous states and dismantle thousands of Russians stood outside of since the fall of the Soviet Union. Rus- their spy facility in Lourdes, Cuba. our embassy throwing paint at our em- sia continues to be a major proliferator Contrary to the view of this adminis- bassy, firing weapons at our embassy of weapons of mass destruction and, tration, the Russian Government does and burning the American flag.
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