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Russia and the European Union SECRETARIAT WORKING PARTY TASK-FORCE "ENLARGEMENT" THE COORDINATOR JF/bo Luxembourg, 25 October 1999 Briefing No 14 RUSSIA AND THE EUROPEAN UNION (Second update) * The views expressed in this document are not necessarily those held by the European Parliament as an institution. INTRANET: http://www.europarl.ep.ec/enlargement INTERNET: http://www.europarl.eu.int/enlargement EPADES: epades\public\elargiss PE 167.734/rév.2 Or. FR EN EN The briefings drafted by the European Parliament Secretariat's Task Force on Enlargement aim to present in a systematic, summary form, the state of discussions on the various aspects of enlargement of the Union and the positions adopted by the Member States, the applicant countries, and European institutions. Briefings will be updated as the negotiations progress. The following briefings have already been published: Number Title PE No Date Languages 1 Cyprus and membership of the European Union 167.284/rev.4 18.03.99 All 2 Hungary and the enlargement of the European Union 167.296/rev.2 01.02.99 All 3 Romania and its accession to the European Union 167.297/rev.2 26.02.99 All 4 The Czech Republic and the enlargement of the European Union 167.335/rev.3 18.10.99 All 5 Malta and the relations with the European Union 167.350/rev.3 01.07.99 All 6 Bulgaria and the enlargement of the European Union 167.392/rev.3 11.10.99 All 7 Turkey and relations with the European Union 167.407/rev.2 17.06.99 All 8 Estonia and the enlargement of the European Union 167.409/rev.1 08.10.98 All 9 Slovenia and accession to the European Union 167.531/rev.1 08.02.99 All 10 Latvia and enlargement of the European Union 167.532/rev.2 27.09.99 All 11 Lithuania and enlargement of the European Union 167.533/rev.2 12.01.99 All 12 Poland and accession to the European Union 167.587/rev.2 03.03.99 All 13 Slovakia and accession to the European Union 167.609/rev.2 20.08.99 All 14 Russia and enlargement of the European Union 167.734/rev.1 23.02.99 All 15 The institutional aspects of enlargement of the European Union 167.299/rev.1 21.06.99 DE-EN-ES -FR-IT 16 Controlling and protecting European Union finances with a view to enlargement 167.330 09.03.98 DE-EN-ES-FR-IT 17 Environmental policy and enlargement 167.402 23.03.98 DE-EN-ES-FR-IT 18 The European Conference and the enlargement of the European Union 167.410 03.04.98 DE-EN-ES-FR-IT 19 Budgetary aspects of enlargement 167.581 12.04.98 DE-EN-ES-FR-IT 20 Democracy and respect for human rights in the enlargement process of the EU 167.582 01.04.98 DE-EN-ES-FR-IT 21 Enlargement and Economic and Social Cohesion 167.584 08.05.98 DE-EN-ES-FR-IT 22 Statistical Annex on Enlargement 167.614/rev.5 06.07.99 EN 23 Legal Questions of Enlargement 167.617 19.05.98 DE-EN-ES-FR-IT 24 Pre-accession strategy for enlargement of the European Union 167.631 17.06.98 DE-EN-ES-FR-IT 25 Cooperation in the area of justice and home affairs in the enlargement process 167.690/rev.1 30.03.99 DE-EN-ES-FR-IT 26 Women's rights and enlargement of the EU 167.735 14.07.98 DE-EN-ES-FR-IT 27 Enlargement and Agriculture 167.741 03.09.98 DE-EN-ES-FR-IT 28 Switzerland and Enlargement 167.777/rev.1 08.03.99 All 29 Enlargement and Fisheries 167.799 12.10.98 All 30 Common foreign and security policy and enlargement of the European Union 167.822/rev.1 26.07.99 DE-EN-ES-FR-IT 2 PE 167.734/rév.2 Number Title PE No Date Languages 31 Security and defence and enlargement of the European Union 167.877 30.10.98 DE-EN-ES-FR-IT 32 The European Economic Area (EEA) and the enlargement of the EU 167.887 17.11.98 DE-EN-ES-FR-IT 33 The PHARE Programme and the enlargement of the EU 167.944 04.12.98 DE-EN-ES-FR-IT 34 The Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and the enlargement of the EU 167.962 04.12.98 DE-EN-ES-FR-IT 35 The industrial policy and the enlargement of the EU 167.963/rev.1 24.06.99 DE-EN-ES-FR-IT 36 Agenda 2000 and the accession process to the EU 168.008/rev.1 10.06.99 DE-EN-ES-FR-IT 37 Enlargement and external economic relations 168.062/rev.1 08.09.99 DE-EN-ES-FR-IT 38 The role of the European Parliament in the enlargement process 168.065 27.01.99 DE-EN-ES-FR-IT 39 The social aspects of enlargement of the EU 168.115/rev.1 01.07.99 DE-EN-ES-FR-IT 40 Nuclear safety in the applicant countries of Central an Eastern Europe 168.257 22.03.99 DE-EN-ES-FR-IT 41 Public opinion on enlargement in the EU Member States and applicant countries 168.296 22.04.99 DE-EN-ES-FR-IT 42 The Russian minority in the Baltic States and the enlargement of the EU 168.307 03.05.99 DE-EN-ES-FR-IT 43 Energy policy and the enlargement of the EU 168.394 10.06.99 DE-EN-ES-FR-IT 44 The transport policy and the enlargement of the EU 168.459 28.07.99 DE-EN-ES-FR-IT To obtain copies of the above briefings, please contact: Mrs E. Deguffroy, Luxembourg, SCH Room 602, Tel. (352) 4300-22906 / fax: (352) 4300-29027 Task Force on Enlargement, Brussels, LEO 06D119, Tel. (32 2) 284 2381 / fax: (32 2) 284 4984 Task Force on Enlargement, Strasbourg, IP2 447, Tel. (33 3) 8817-4408 / fax: (33 3) 8817-9059 INTRANET: http://www.europarl.ep.ec/enlargement INTERNET: http://www.europarl.eu.int/enlargement EPADES: epades\public\elargiss 3 PE 167.734/rév.2 BRIEFING ON RUSSIA AND THE EUROPEAN UNION CONTENTS Page I. THE POLITICAL FRAMEWORK 7 A. The Russian government crises of 1999 - background 7 B. The wave of terrorism in Russian cities and the start of military action against Chechnya 7 C. Preparations for the elections 8 D. The crisis of power 9 II. THE ECONOMIC SITUATION 10 Summary 10 The initial period (1992-94) 10 The later period (1995-99) 10 Recent developments 11 Structural reform 11 Economic policy 12 III. THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION 13 A. Russia and the IMF: relations clouded by misuse of funds 13 B. Russia in the G8 14 C. European security: relations between the Russian Federation and NATO frozen following NATO action in Kosovo 15 IV. RELATIONS WITH THE EU 16 A. Cooperation between the European Union and the Russian Federation 16 The role of the European Parliament 19 B. EU enlargement and relations with Russia 19 C. Relations with the Baltic States as potential EU members 20 Borders 20 Russian minorities in the Baltic States 21 I. THE POLITICAL FRAMEWORK A. The Russian government crises of 1999 - background 1999 was a year of great political instability during which the President of the Russian Federation, Boris Yeltsin, sacked one prime minister after another as a way of compensating for his repeated absences from the presidency on health grounds. On 12 May 1999, Boris Yeltsin announced that Yevgeni Primakov had resigned from the post of prime minister to which he had been appointed on 11 September 1998. Although the President was grateful to Primakov for stabilising the situation in the country, he was critical of his lack of initiative and the slow progress of economic reforms. There are also other explanations for this resignation: the failure of Russian diplomacy in the Kosovo crisis and Primakov’s growing popularity, which made him a potential candidate for the 2000 presidential elections. Primakov had also supported the Russian judiciary which had opened inquiries into misuse of funds and financial dealings carried out by Boris Berezovski, the Kremlin’s ‘éminence grise’. The Interior Minister, Sergei Stepashin, well known for his hard line during the 1994-1995 war in Chechnya, was then appointed Prime Minister. The appointment coincided with the Duma’s rejection of the procedure to dismiss the Russian President. Far from having the desired effect, the vote on the five grounds for dismissal, in particular genocide against the Russian people, the war in Chechnya in 1994 – 1995 and the break-up of the USSR, failed to gain the two-thirds majority needed to set the dismissal process in motion. However, Stepachin only stayed three months as Prime Minister. On 9 August he was sacked following events in Dagestan, where Chechen forces were carrying out incursions onto Dagestan territory in support of rebellions. The Russian President proposed Vladimir Putin, head of the Secret Service, for the post of prime minister. On 16 August he was installed by the Duma, which had shrunk from engaging in a trial of strength with Boris Yeltsin within four months of government elections. The new Prime Minister promised to re-establish order and discipline in Russia, to make the army worthy of respect once more and to provide financial support for the military-industrial complex. He proved adept at ‘more aggressive’ diplomacy and at using ‘hard economic measures’ to defend Russian minorities abroad.
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