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Russia Intelligence” Be Conciliatory on the Gas Question N°59 - July 3 2008 Published every two weeks/International Edition CONTENTS DIPLOMACY P. 1-2 Politics & Government c Will Russia place its bets on Yulia Timoshenko? DIPLOMACY cWill Russia place its bets on What’s to be done? The famous question posed in his time by Lenin is back on the agenda and, Yulia Timoshenko? with regard to Ukraine, will become increasingly acute in Moscow. Ukraine is once again the Kremlin’s ALERTS main diplomatic concern. The expansion of NATO to the East, the future of the Black Sea fleet and cViktor Chernomyrdin gets Sebastopol, and, of course, the gas question count among the most sensitive issues seen from Moscow. Af- ready to leave. ter having got its fingers burnt during the “orange revolution” at the end of 2004, Russia carefully kept out FOCUS of Ukraine’s political jousting including during the political crisis in Kyiv in May 2007 and during the early cThe Supreme Court, the new general election of 30 September last year. The approaching presidential election (expected at the end of theatre of the Confrontation 2009 or beginning of 2010) and the geopolitical stakes affecting Ukraine being considered in Moscow as between Viktor Yushchenko matters of the country’s vital interests, it is very likely that Russia is once again seeking to influence the and Yulia Timoshenko destiny of its neighbour. P. 3-4 Business & Networks In this context, the visit of the Ukrainian prime minister to Moscow on 28 June and her talks with her FOCUS opposite number Vladimir Putin, were awaited with interest. It is well known that until now Russia had c The Vanco affair constantly snubbed Yulia Timoshenko, considering her as not very dependable and out of control, and de- ALERTS spite the ideological chasm separating the Ukrainian president and his Russian opposite numbers, had pre- c Towards a re-launch of ferred to deal with Viktor Yushchenko. This paradoxical approach by Moscow was noted during the gas production of the An-124? talks (Ukraine Intelligence n° 53 of march 27 2008). c Energoatom: Nedashkovsk’s surprise come-back It is obviously too early to say whether a change on the Ukraine question is taking place in Moscow, but c Odessa-Brody oil pipeline: it is evident that the tone of the public exchanges between Vladimir Putin and Yulia Timoshenko on 28 June Igor Kolomoysky in a pole position were incomparably warmer than those, for example, in February 2005. The Ukrainian prime minister dwelt heavily on the fact that her government would respect scrupulously the bilateral agreements concerning the Russian fleet in the Black Sea. With regard to NATO, Yulia Timoshenko reiterated that it would be the READ ALSO… Ukrainian people who would have the final word in a referendum. And Vladimir Putin showed himself to In “Russia Intelligence” be conciliatory on the gas question. The Russian prime minister came out in favor of a progressive price in- Last Issue crease whilst at the same time pointing out that the central Asian gas suppliers were seeking to establish ECONOMY world prices from 1 January (for Ukraine this would mean gas at $400/1,000 – compared to $179.50 now). c Private and public capita- He also congratulated the present Ukrainian government for having paid off the gas debt and called Yulia lists in search of new rules Timoshenko an “efficient and popular” leader. However there is no indication of the atmosphere at the talks of the game between the two heads of government that lasted twice as long as expected and took place without aides FOCUS or advisors. Objectively, several factors should lead Moscow to adopt a more open attitude towards Yulia c TNK-BP affair: an embarass- Timoshenko. The pragmatic and even opportunistic prime minister, who comes from Dnepropetrovsk and ment for Dmitry Medvedev who learnt Ukrainian after the fall of the Soviet Union, unlike Viktor Yushchenko does not see the eradica- ENERGY tion of the “Russian reality” in Ukraine as a mission. In the light of the persistent unpopularity of NATO in c RZhD breaks into the elec- the country, it is unlikely that Yulia Timoshenko will make it her battle horse even if she is surrounded by tricity sector convinced atlanticists like deputy prime minister Grigory Nemyria. cBTS-2 oil pipeline : Tokarev leads the dance From her perspective, if she wants to win the next presidential election Yulia Timoshenko desperately FOCUS needs a sign from Moscow on the gas question. Moreover, she will probably be tempted to let Viktor Yushchenko c Gazprom : 50 billion dollars take on the euro-Atlantic mantle that seems to be quite far removed from the aims fixed in 2005 (the Ger- in profits in 2009 ? man ambassador to Kyiv thus has just confirmed that no change should be expected on the MAP question during the meeting of NATO foreign ministers in December and it now appears obvious that no partnership SUBSCRIPTION agreements will be signed at the next Ukraine/European Union summit meeting in Evian on 9 September Print Edition next). (23 issues, airmailed overseas) €385 TTC It may be seen that there is no lack of reasons for closer relations between Moscow and Yulia Timo- shenko. The experience of 1994 (when the Kremlin backed the “pro-Russian” Leonid Kuchma, who did not Electronic Edition honor his commitments) and of 2004 nonetheless risk moderating Russian fervor. Sociology may also have (Print Edition + PDF + archives acess) a word to say: the latest opinion polls emanating from the highly serious Kyiv International Institute (KMIS) €440 TTC indicate a very big lead for Viktor Yanukovich against Yulia Timoshenko in the second round of the presi- dential election.d www.ukraine-intelligence.fr UKRAINE INTELLIGENCE Politics & Government ALERTS cc FOCUS 3 Kyiv City Hall : a most The Supreme Court becomes the new theatre timely fire While Leonid Chernovetsky, newly elected of the Confrontation between the President to head the Kyiv City Council to the great and the Prime minister displeasure of Yulia Timoshenko (Ukraine Intelligence No. 57 of 30 May 2008), once Hardly a day passes and another front opens in the merciless struggle waged over again showed his acumen as a tactician in the last few months between the Ukrainian president and prime minister. The most obtaining from the council – where theoreti- recent took place in the legal arena. The dispute was over a parliamentary bill pre- cally he does not hold a majority – the reap- sented by Viktor Yushchenko and supported by the Party of Regions that would radi- pointment of his right-hand man Oles cally modify the functioning of the Supreme Court. Dovgy as Chief Executive of the local admin- istration, a very curious incident occurred The choice of this “target” owes nothing to chance. In its edition of 13 October 2006, in the main offices of the public works de- Ukraine Intelligence informed its readers of the nomination of Vasily Onopenko at partment. Several offices located on the the head of the Supreme Court. A former minister of justice between 1991 and 1995, Khreshchatik in the city centre caught fire a former member of the United Social Democratic Party – from which he was later on Tuesday 24 June. As we write, the origin chased out by Viktor Medvedchuk – in 2002 and 2006 Vasily Onopenko was elected a of the fire is not known but, for Ukraine In- deputy of the Rada on the lists of Yulia Timoshenko. Since his elevation to the presi- telligence sources in Kyiv, chance is not an dency of the Supreme Court, little has been heard of him. The second reading of the element with regard to the nature of the parliamentary bill due to be debated in the Rada has nevertheless brought him out of documents that went up in flames (including his silence - first, in an open letter to Viktor Yushchenko and then at a press confer- driving licences) . It is known that one of the ence on 23 June. “You are asking the Rada to debate this bill without delay and you most sensitive aspects of Leonid Chernovet- indicate that you support the proposed approach to reform the legal system, review sky’s administration since 2006 involves the the Supreme Court’s prerogatives and reduce the number of its members . It is dif- attribution of property and land to ficult to understand your motivations when signing such a letter but, whether it be “friendly”organizations (Ukraine Intelli- from the legal, political, social or moral viewpoint, your position nevertheless cre- gence n°42 of october 11 2007). In August ates shockwaves”. Vasily Onopenko then accuses Viktor Yushchenko of “being inco- 2007 two armed men broke into the herent in implementation the reform of the legal system” and points to the (Presi- Bezradichi town hall and took away thou- dent’s) “collaboration with those working for the destruction of the legal system”. sands of property deeds and legal docu- ments concerning hundreds of hectares of This latter point is directed at the chairman of the Laws Committee of the Rada, building land near Kyiv. Sergey Kivalov of the Party of Regions, who was at the head of the central electoral commission during the autumn 2004 presidential election and had validated the re- 3 Viktor Chernomyrdin sults of the run-off that gave victory to Viktor Yanukovich. Basically Vasily Onopenko gets ready to leave contests the nomination – in conformity with the law – of court presidents by the Head Indeed, it is not the first time that it has of State and the announced marginalization of the Supreme Court in favor of four spe- been reported that Russia’s ambassador to cial jurisdictions (the Supreme Court of Conciliation, the Supreme Criminal Court, the Kyiv was ready to pack his bags.
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