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170 Proceedings of the Society, 1956-57

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170 Proceedings of the Society, 1956-57 170 PROCEEDING E SOCIETYTH F O S , 1956-57. XI. BANNOCKBURN—23RD AND 24TH JUNE 1314. A STUD MILITARN YI Y HISTORY. BY GENERAL SIR PHILIP CHRISTISON, BT., G.B.E., C.B., D.S.O., M.C., D.L., B.A., F.S.A.ScoT. Much controvers s rageha y d ovee sitf thith ro e s decisive battln ei Scottish history, and over the numbers engaged in it. Until comparatively recently most historians were content to accept the "traditional" location in the neighbourhood of the Borestone, given by Nimmo in his History of Stirlingshire, 1771; Nimmo does not state his authority earliese th t tbu , appearanc prinn ei referencn i t Borestone th o et e John i s i n Mackay' JourneyA s through Scotland, publishe 1723n i e d H . says, "On my road, near a village called St Ringin remains the stone, whicn i h King Robert Bruce's standar famoue fixes th t dwa da s battlf eo Bannockburn." He does not say that the battle itself actually took place coursf thereo d ean , standard. s up wer t se e t borneno d ,an That very accurate historian, Lord Hailes, writing in 1779 after reading Barbou visitind an r grounde gth , specifically disagrees with Nimmo (Annals of Scotland, n, 42) and places the battle "on a field which had Stirling on the left, and the brook of Bannock on the right." An account of St Ninian's parish written about the same time as Mackay, place battl e Pelstrea e o. sth f th efurtheNE a e mth o rt (Macfarlane' milo s r eo s Geogr. Collections, i, 315). The early maps of the district, Adair 1682 and Pont 1608, show no site. I can find no evidence that would satisfy a soldier or an antiquary that the decisive battle, on 24th June 1314, took place about the Borestone. All evidenc e contrarye th problee th th o t asses d o s et i m an ,s i s fro statee mth - mentcontemporare th f so y writers frod an ,m military factors evidence th , e in favour of the sites suggested by Lord Hailes and in Macfarlane. As regards the numbers present, where many eminent and other historians have gone astray, the problem has been in trying to equate the numbers given by Barbour and other early -writers to the ground indicated by these early chroniclers. We now know the numbers were grossly exaggerated, though there is general agreement that the Scots were outnumbered in the ratio of on threo et footn ei , whil Englise eth completd hha e superiorit heavn yi y cavalry and archers. BANNOCKBURN—A STUDY IN MILITARY HISTORY. 171 Edwar I dsummoneI d 4000 levies from Irelan wriy db t dated 28th March 1314 (Parl. Writs, n, Div , 113i .21,54d an ) 0 from Englan Waled dan y sb summona s issued from Yor (Rot.27ty n ko hMa Scot., , 127I ; Fcedera, in, No. 482). The place of muster was Wark on the Tweed, and the date 10th June (Vita Edw. II, 201). The "covered" horse principae th , upom ar ln whic Englise hth h relied, were additional to and outside the call-up. They numbered between 2000 (Vita Edw. II) and 3100 (Abbot Bernard of Arbroath, contemporary). The "covered" horse consisted of nobles, knights and their men-at-arms, for the most part mounted in armour upon country-bred horses. These were covere "trappers,y db " flowing blankets bearin riderse gth ' emblems reachind an g nea grounde heavrth e Th y. horse capabl carryinf eo g armour in addition to the armoured knight had not yet been developed in England. In addition to those from England detachments were present from Normandy, Gascony, Picardy, Flanders, Guelders, Brabant, Holland, Germany, Pouty (Poitou), Aquitaine and Bayonne (The Bruce; Books of Pluscarden, IX, . e Englisxii)ch Th . h Army also included some Scots—Barbour says "a gret party"—who were at odds with Bruce. A medieval call-up seldom produced more than fiftr cenpe y t (Bain, Cal., Il) but in this case we may assume a slightly better figure, say 15,000— 17,000. These number maximue th e sar m which could have marched from Edinburgh to Falkirk in one day, as we know they did on 22nd June; a hot dusty marc t hmusi t have been. Som wagons0 e20 , half draw teamy nb f so eight oxen, hal teamy b f f fouo s r horses, carried spare weapon foodd an s , spare wheels, poles and axles, tents, treasure chests, and even furniture and noblee platth r esfo (Rot. Scot., 125-7; Vita Edw. , 206-7)II . They would have been spli brigadesamonn p u te t e g th r "batals o , s "a they were called, as otherwise a 20-mile supply column would have been very vulnerable would an , d have require enormoun da s guard. The Scottish Arm s composewa y f fouo d r brigades r "batalso , f o " infantry, certainly less than 6000 strong. There were only a few archers, from Ettrick Forest, and some 500 light horse. The Scottish infantry wore bacinea proteco t heade th t leathea , quilter ro d coat shielda , gloved an , s of plate to protect the hands that wielded the 12-ft. spear. An axe, sword or dagge s •wora persona s wa ra n l weapon n additioI . n there were th e "small folk," whose rent was less than ten pounds, and camp followers, perhaps some 200 l told0al , whom Bruc schiltrone th ef o kep t doubo sou n t t for lac traininf ko disciplined gan . ampld Brucha d e etimha combiner efo d training of the schiltron of spearmen, a hollow formation of no fixed strength, though 500 men formed a schiltron under Randolph. Probably two, three or four schiltrons working together would form a "batal." Mobility of a schiltron ovestron0 50 r g would have bee restrictedo nto . lessod Aftesa Falkirremarkablf e e no th th r d kan e victor Flemise th f yo h 172 PROCEEDING E SOCIETYTH F O S , 1956-57. infantry ove armouree rth d knight t Courtedsa , Bruce traine schiltrons dhi s to fight with mobility and mutual co-operation. The Scots relied on training, discipline and morale for victory, and the fact that nobles, knights, and common men fought democratically on foot sid sidy eb e mad cohesior efo leadershipd nan . Bruce had another great advantage. He was a very experienced commander in the field, one who enjoyed the respect and affection of his troops by reason of his successes. He proved himself a great general, by y standardan t Bannockburna , successfullm hi shale e W se l. y applying every one of those Principles of War, so many years later to be encoded by Napoleon and adhered to ever since by successful commanders. othee Edwarth generaln ro o hann s I pomde relieI d dth wa d ,an n pdan o chivalr largs hi f eyo host striking terror int opponents ohi f thaI . t failed there was always the devastating charge of the mass of the covered horse. His infantry can have had no time for any combined training. We shall seEnglise eth h breakin Principlee th l gal Warf so . The ten "batals" of the English Army assembled at Wark and marched p Lauderdalu y Soutrb e o Edinburgt a h (Bain, Calendar, . 365)IIINo , . Here supplies sent by sea were received at Leith. On 22nd June they marched to Falkirk, and next day set out for Stirling headed by a vanguard, probably of 400-500 horse, commanded by Hereford d Gloucesteran . This forc d Romaeol movine nth roay b g d testee th d strength of the Scots position known to be in the New Park covering Stirling (fig. 1). Bruc wiseld eha y withdraw thio nt s strong, prepared position from Woor To de somth e miles nearer Falkirk, without more than mounted patrol action. s choseHi n positio s welnwa l site r defencedfo . Marshy ground an d the gorge of the Bannock Burn covered the entry to the New Park by the Roman road, and Bruce had strengthened the position by digging camouflaged pits. wood—a e edge th th f eo n o s n arewa t I a unsuitabl actior efo cavalryy nb , turne e west e coulb i th t s a to d no t becaus thicf eo k enem n foresta d yan , daring to pass round it to the E. might -well present an ideal opportunity for attac grounn ko f Bruce'do s choice (The Bruce). After the well-known episode of the duel between Bruce and de Bohun, Scote th s drov Englise eth h vanguard back acros e Bannocsth k Burn ni disorder. Edward II then took the next logical military step, a strong turning movement pas lefte th t Scote flanth f sko (fig. 1) . This took afternooe placth n ei n under Cliffor Bowmond dan t with some 500 cavalry. This force moved along under the escarpment but was defeated Randolpy b commandeo hwh e Scottisdth h e significanvanTh . t facf o t this action was that Randolph's schiltron of spearmen proved impervious BANNOCKBURN—A STUD MILITARN YI Y HISTORY3 17 . charge Englise th th o f t eo h cavalry breao whict d kh ha offighe d fth an t flee, part to Stirling and the rest back the way they had come. This a voluntar t wano s e yresul th flightf Randolph't o t bu , n pressinme s g n counter-attaci n o k (The Bruce, xn, 132—3; Lanercost Chronicle, 225).
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