Pakistan Security Research Unit (PSRU) Research Paper 67 Illiberal
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Pakistan Security Research Unit (PSRU) Research Paper 67 Illiberal Democrats and the Marginalisation of Religious Minorities in Pakistan Ajay K. Raina 10 May 2013 About the Pakistan Security Research Unit (PSRU) The Pakistan Security Research Unit (PSRU) was established in March 2007 and relocated to Durham University on 1st April 2013. It serves as an independent portal and neutral platform for interdisciplinary research on all aspects of Pakistani security, dealing with Pakistan's impact on regional and global security, internal security issues within Pakistan, and the interplay of the two. PSRU provides information about, and critical analysis of, Pakistani security with particular emphasis on extremism/terrorism, nuclear weapons issues, and the internal stability and cohesion of the state. PSRU is intended as a resource for anyone interested in the security of Pakistan and provides: Briefing papers; Reports; Datasets; Consultancy; Academic, institutional and media links; An open space for those working for positive change in Pakistan and for those currently without a voice. PSRU welcomes collaboration from individuals, groups and organisations, which share our broad objectives. Please contact us at [email protected] We encourage you to look at the website available through: www.durham.ac.uk/psru/ Other PSRU Publications The following reports, papers, and briefings are freely available through the Pakistan Security Research Unit (PSRU): Report Number 3. Terrorism and the Macro-economy: Evidence from Pakistan. Report Number 2. Civilian Control and Democratic Transition: Pakistan’s Unequal Equation. Report Number 1. The Jihadi Terrain in Pakistan: An Introduction to the Sunni Jihadi Groups in Pakistan and Kashmir Briefings Numbers 1-66 including: Brief Number 59. An Analysis of Obama’s Af-Pak Goal and First Objective: Setting the Baseline and Prospects for Success Brief Number 60. Domestic Politics and Systemic Constraints in Pakistan’s India Policy Brief Number 61. The Limited Military Utility of Pakistan’s Battlefield Use of Nuclear Weapons in Response to Large Scale Indian Conventional Attack Brief Number 62. Getting Afghanistan Right Brief Number 63. Why Karachi is a Major Source of Instability in Pakistan? Brief Number 64. The arrest of Brig. Gen. Ali Khan and the influence of Hizb-ut- Tahrir in Pakistan Brief Number 66. The Siachen Glacier and Independent Arbitration. All these papers are freely available from: www.durham.ac.uk/psru/ 2 About the Author Ajay K Raina is based in the School of Political and Social Enquiry at Monash University in Australia. This work is drawn from a larger project dealing with religious minorities in Islamic societies. Abstract The central argument of this paper is that the illiberal particularities of the politics of two of Pakistan’s greatest leaders – Muhammad Jinnah and Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto – decisively shaped the emergence of an Islamic, constitutional, legal, political, and educational context in Pakistan in which religious minorities, not least Pakistan’s Christians, are marginalised and repressed. It argues that the means to address these problems are extremely limited, but that ways forward may be found in the detoxification of the public sector school’s curricula, and in the introduction of super-majority political arrangements in which minorities are more centrally placed within the electoral process. Keywords: Pakistan, Jinnah, Bhutto, Constitution, Christian, Minority, Religious. Illiberal Democrats and the Marginalisation of Religious Minorities in Pakistan It is a commonplace that minorities have not fared well in Pakistan: at ethnic levels, the protocols for distribution of social and economic goods have been consistently unfair; at religious or heterodox levels, this is further exacerbated by a regime of atrophied liberties and rights – an absence of the liberal basic of ‘equality’. This paper is about the latter class, the religious minorities, and although more specific references are to Christians, the conclusions, the author believes, hold in general.1 Also, this paper does not go into specific social and political conditions obtaining in Pakistan that militate against these minorities, but focuses only on laws, legislated through procedurally democratic processes under the so-called ‘modernist’ leaderships, that discriminate against minorities. The marginalisation of religious minorities in Pakistan is commonly attributed by contemporary scholars to the Islamisation project of General Zia-ul-Haq’s (r. 1977-1988).2 Prior to the Zia era, it is generally argued, Islam―inevitably, given the history of Pakistan formation―while being the principal social narrative informed the political discourse but did not overwhelm it. This paper deconstructs this discourse at the level of critical political leadership.3 Two ‘great’ leaders, Mohammad Ali Jinnah and Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, are chosen. They are considered great because they created nationwide cross-cutting political consensuses 3 across an ethno-territorially cleaved plural society at (and, for) the two instances of formation of Pakistan; first in 1947, in partitioned from British India on decolonization, and in 1971, as a consequence of the secession of East Pakistan, now Bangladesh.4 More importantly, both these leaders professed their belief in democratic governance on a Westminster model, albeit with a written constitution, with justly―as they variously interpreted the term―guaranteed liberal preconditions of equality, rights and liberties for all citizens. Clearly, these liberal conditions have neither been met at the substantive level of law nor at the procedural level of governance, partly explaining Pakistan’s poor performance as a state. Freedom House for 2012 rated Pakistan as only ‘Partly Free’ (status unchanged over decades) with a low index of 4 for Political Rights and a lower index of 5 for Civil Liberties, while Foreign Policy Magazine rated it as the 13th most failed state in the same year, just above Nigeria: its ‘Group Grievance’ index of 9.6 is worse than all but two other failed states.5 This index reflects, in part, the marginalisation of minority groups. This paper, within the proposed framework, tries to explore why. It will show that, in the case of Jinnah, the moral ontology was only limitedly liberal and, in the case of Bhutto, it was, in addition, flexible to the exigencies of ‘rule’. That is, a major reason, among possible others, for the marginalisation of religious minorities, is the liberal deficit of Pakistan’s “great” leaders and ideologues. 1. Jinnah and the Minorities The following excerpt from Jinnah’s presidential address to the first ever meeting of the Pakistan Constituent Assembly at Karachi on the 11th of August, 1947, is mandatorily quoted by scholars in support of the view that the founder’s vision for Pakistan was that of a state founded on liberal principles of universal individual―the ‘equal’ citizen―incorporation and ‘secularism’.6 You are free; you are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your mosques or to any other place or worship in this State of Pakistan. You may belong to any religion or caste or creed; that has nothing to do with the business of the State…We are starting in the days where there is no discrimination, no distinction between one community and another, no discrimination between one caste or creed and another. We are starting with this fundamental principle that we are all citizens and equal citizens of one State… [keep] that in front of us as our ideal and you will find that in course of time course of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense, because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as citizens of the State. 7 Given that the Pakistan formation discourse was centred on a Muslim identity narrative, and that the political welfare of that identity was the premise for, and the purpose of, the new 4 state, Jinnah, as this quote suggests, believed that Pakistan fulfilled the purpose and cancelled the premise: a liberal democratic state process would henceforth be the best guarantor of the political welfare and development of all the people; religious or community identities would recede from the public space and confine to their legitimate private sphere. Jinnah often reiterated this position, for example addressing the Parsi community at Karachi on Feb. 3, 1948, he said: ‘I assure you that Pakistan means to stand by its oft-repeated promises of according equal treatment to all its nationals irrespective of their cast and creed’.8 However, his liberalism had many twists. To another Parsi delegation in Quetta on June 13, 1948, he said: ‘I reiterate that you, like any other minorities, will be treated as equal citizens with all your rights and obligations so long as you are loyal to Pakistan,’ followed by the coup de grâce: ‘Minority communities must not by mere words but by actions show this that they are truly loyal and they must make the majority community feel that they are true citizens of Pakistan’.9 Equality, of citizens of a religious minority, now becomes conditional rather than absolute, and the onus of satisfying the conditionality is on the minority itself. Moreover, this is not as if an individual, in a court of law, is to prove her innocence against a charge of sedition or treason for which she is arraigned; it is a whole community arraigned in the majority’s court in which that majority is the judge, the