International School of Helsingborg Christian Jorgensen. Grade 11 Historical investigation May 8th 2006 Total amount of words: 2000

“To what extent could be considered a successful mission?”

1 Table of contents A. Plan of the investigation…………………………………………………………………3 B. Summary of evidence……………………………………………………………………4 C. Evaluation of sources……………………………………………………………………7 D. Analysis………………………………………………………………………………….8 E. Conclusion and evaluation………………………………………………………………11 F. Bibliography…… …………….………………………………………………………..12

2 Plan of the investigation This historical investigation intends to answer the question: To what extent could Operation Carthage be considered a successful mission? The objective of the investigation is to make a historiographical assessment of the air operation carried out by the RAF in on 21. March 1945. It will evaluate the background and purpose of the mission, the achievements and effectiveness of the attack and the collateral damage inflicted upon civilians. A conclusion will be given contrasting the criteria of military success with that the demographic impact of the mission. For this purpose both primary and contemporary secondary sources will be consulted and assessed.

3 Summary of evidence

Before the operation In March 1944 the moved its Danish headquarter to the Shell House, in Copenhagen. During the fall of 1944 and the winter of 1945 the Gestapo led an aggressive policy to break down the Danish Liberation Council and great parts of the resistance movement1. The Danes pledged help to Britain, resulting in air attacks leading to the destruction of the Gestapo offices in Aalborg. The first plans for Operation Carthage, the code for an air attack on the Shell House in Copenhagen, were forwarded to England in December 19442, yet no answer came back. In February 1945 the Gestapo managed to arrest 80 persons involved in the resistance movement, and the situation became critical for the Danes3. The leader of the SOE in Denmark, Ole Lipmann, pledged Britain for help on March 10. 1945. The operation had secretly been planned since December 19444. It consisted of an attack by 18 Mosquitos and 28 Mustangs (as escorts) flying in three squadrons5. The pilots were brought in from France and Britain6. The flight route was from Norfolk to Copenhagen, crossing large German-occupied areas7. To avoid radar detection, the altitude over land was not to exceed 100 m and over water 5 m8. The archives of the Gestapo were to be bombed at 11.15. Gestapo held twenty-six prisoners (serving as a human shield) from the Danish resistance on the upper floor of the Shell House9. On March 19 the pilots were briefed on the mission during 11 hours. Due to bad weather the mission was postponed until March 2110.

1 [Ahlmann, Henrik. “Den Franske Skole: RAF'S angreb på Shellhuset 21.3.1945, En kortlægning af katastrofen på Frederiksberg og Vesterbro” Copenhagen 2005. p.14] 2 [Ibid. p.33] 3 [Ibid. p.16] 4 [Hove, Peder ”En dag i marts”. Gyldendal. Denmark 1988. p.45] 5 [Næsh-Hendriksen, C. and Kampmann, Ove. ”Shellhuset 21.-3.-1945” Fremads Fokusbøger Denmark 1964. p.35] 6 Specifically from the RAF base at Bentwaters. 7 This implied that the planes faced resistance from the anti-aircraft defences on the ground. An example of this was the anchoring of “several units of the German Fleet” in Copenhagen, such as the Nürnberg warship. [Embry, Bassil. ”Mission completed” Methuen and Co Ltd London. 1957. p.27]. 8 [Næsh-Hendriksen p.35] 9 The prisoners were being used by the Geheime Staatspolizei, Gestapo, as a human shield on the highest floor of the Shell House, to avoid the RAF from bombing the building directly [Næsh-Hendriksen, C. et. al. ”Årets største begivenheder i billeder” A/S Bogforlaget Dana-Fruens Bøge. 1943-1945. p.164] 10 [Ahlmann p.19]

4 The day of the operation The mission began at 8.35. The weather was very windy. Whilst flying over the North Sea, layers of salt accumulated on the cockpit windows of the airplanes, which reduced the visibility for the pilots11. At 10.40 the airplanes reached the coast of Jutland. The German radar system identified the squadrons and followed their path12. Whilst entering Copenhagen, visibility being very limited, pilot Kleboe: “hit one of the uprights on the bridge”13. He diverged from the squadron and released his two bombs on house nr. 106, 12 people died14. He and his navigator Hall crashed in a garage next to the French School. They both died immediately. The rest of the first squadron approached the Shell House at 11.15. The building was successfully bombed. It was not until 11.16 that the Danes, on their own initiative, started the air-raid warning. The German inefficiency delayed it by several minutes15. The second squadron came 10 km after the first. It took direction towards the fire at the French School, assuming that it was the Shell House16. The squadron leader managed not to bomb the school after realizing that it was the wrong target, but at least two of the other Mosquitoes did not17. The squadron leader bombed the Shell House instead. Squadron two managed to escape Copenhagen with no losses18. In the third squadron all airplanes except for the leader released their bombs near the school19.

Losses. • Four Mosquitos and two Mustangs. A total of 10 pilots20. Two Mosquitos were shot down over Northern Sealand. Two Mustangs were hit by the Nürnberg warship, anchored in the Copenhagen harbour, and crashed afterwards21. • Civilian losses in the neighbourhood surrounding and the inside the French school reached a total of 116 persons, whereof 87 were children22.

11 [Ibid p.90] 12 [Ahlmann p.21] 13 [Embry p.279] 14 House nr. 106, Soender Boulevard. [Hove p.103] 15 [Næsh-Hendriksen et. al. p.225] 16 [Ahlmann p.37] 17 [Hove p.110] 18 [Ibid. p.112] 19 [Ibid. p.122] 20 [Næsh-Hendriksen p.39] 21 [Hove p.112] 22 [Ahlmann p.137]

5 • Of the 26 prisoners in the Shell House, 8 were killed and 18 escaped23. 2 people were killed at the Institute of Technology24. • The Gestapo loss were first estimated to 75, but were later concluded as being 12525. Other writers argue that the number was estimated to 100-200, but that the official number was put to 75 by the Germans26.

23 [Ahlmann. p.148] 24 [Hove p.113] 25 [Ibid. p.151] 26 [Næsh-Hendriksen p.48]

6 Evaluation of sources Shellhuset 21/3-1945 is a collection of primary sources compiled by the survivors and partially edited by the prisoner Ove Kampmann on the tenth anniversary of the attack (1955). The purpose was to give a total account of the course of the events in one document27. The value of this source lies in the many eye-witness accounts of the attack and graphical material that adds many different angles to the description of the mission and its members. The scope of these accounts is a value because the people who contributed span from a Canadian pilot to a Danish prisoner. Another value is the usage of the document as a historical source in several other books28. The articles remain intact (no editor has changed them), which is a value. The limitations to the book are found in its variety of articles, because some views are excessively one-sided29 and are generally pro- Danish. The majorities of the articles have been written only few days after the 21. March and the authors may have been influenced by their contemporaries and the circumstances. En dag i marts written by Peder Hove is a novel from 1988 that addresses Operation Carthage from the perspective of an omniscient narrator. The purpose of the novel purpose is to provide a vivid description of the mission and give a solid recount of the attack minute by minute30. Hove himself was educated a pilot and some of the values include the depth of the chapters, that are very detailed in information. Since it is a secondary source it benefits from hindsight to evaluate what really happened. Limitations include the fact that it might have lost some accuracy when compiling lots of sources together (and it provides a pro-ally perspective). A contemporary source31 criticises it for having used an eye-witness report of a girl from the French School. The source argues that the girl’s description is contradictory and must therefore be false; this can have affected the accuracy of Hove’s novel32.

27 [Ibid. p.8] 28 Both Hove and Ahlman make explicit reference to this source. 29 The article from the illegal newspaper ’Information’ provides a description of the attack on the following day (22. March) is widely influenced by the joy felt by many non-Germans in Copenhagen. See [Næsh-Hendriksen p.24]. 30 Cover of the book, [Hove]. 31 Ahlmann’s “Den Franske Skole” was released in 2005, and has the benefit of hindsight. 32 [Ahlmann p.51-4]. The direct reference is made to the written recount of the girl, later published as a book: [Lyneborg, Elisabeth: Jeg var der 21. marts 1945. Chr. Erichsen, 1980]

7 Analysis The Gestapo’s policy in Denmark in 1944 and 1945 gave Lipmann few alternatives than to give the green light for the mission. The attack implied the deaths of the prisoners in the Shell, who were placed intentionally as a human shield, but not making a reprisal could cause the destruction of the entire resistance movement33. It must also be added that the prisoners were exposed to torture34, that ultimately could end with execution. This made the decision more viable. Operation Carthage proved difficult in part because the RAF had never made air-raids on a concrete building from such a low altitude in a highly populated area35. The pilots were mainly foreigners, and this means that the flight route can have been unfamiliar to many. The briefing lasted less than a day, and this meant that the pilots could have had their doubts. This should be regarded as a direct factor leading to the second and third squadron’s bombardment of the French School, where the wrong target was identified by the fire and smoke of Kleboe’s airplane. Furthermore, the low-altitude proved ineffective, since the squadrons were still identified by German intelligence36 and it resulted in 3 Mustangs crashing with seagulls37 and having to return home. The military assessment of success should consider the fulfilment of the mission versus the casualties suffered and the long and short-term consequences of the attack. Operation Carthage managed to destroy the target completely38, with such a precision that 70% of the prisoners serving as a human shield were rescued. This success could be regarded as a result of the planning, the German inefficiency and the skilful RAF-pilots. As evidence for the previous is the expected losses of Mosquito-planes, which were estimated to 22%39; the exact percentage of loss40. The time of the attack shows a thoroughly planned mission, since all the Gestapo archives were open at the time41. One could argue that the previous, in addition to the lack of air raid-warning by the Germans themselves, meant that the

33 [Næsh-Hendriksen p.32], [Hove p.27] 34 [Næsh-Hendriksen et. al. p.166-7] 35 [Ahlmann p.19] 36 [Hove p.61,86,87] 37 [Ibid. p.83] 38 [Christensen, Theodor. ”De Fem Aar” 1955]: http://195.231.246.70/agent/style/besat/Default.aspx?22691 visited on 21. March 2006 39 This figure is an estimate in an article written by major Svend Truelsen and Air-Field marshal Sir Basil Embry, both highly experienced men. [Næsh-Hendriksen p.38] 40 Out of the 18 Mosquitoes 4 were lost, which makes 22.2% of the total 18. 41 As stated in the summary of evidence, the time of attack was at 11.15, which meant that the archives were in use. [Ibid. p.36]

8 desired damage was inflicted. The attack threatened the city of Copenhagen with a fire. This was avoided42 and proves that the attack was done with a certain degree of precision. Contrasting the previous argument, the precision of the bombing can be questioned, since relatively few bombs actually hit the Shell House. Out of the total of 44 bombs available, only 8 hit the Shell House43; 6 bombs hit the part of the building with 5 prisoner cells out of the total 2244. Furthermore, the attack did not kill any German officers of a higher rang45, which could be regarded as the result of few bombings hitting the target. Supporting the previous is the disaster at the French School. Out of an estimated 273 total deaths46 the bombardment of the school meant that 1/3 of the total deaths were of infants compared to only 1/20 of pilots. The fact that Kleboe never saw the upright and then crashed near the school could be related to the limited visibility of the pilots, smaller than the area of a matchstick box47, being a consequence of the required low-altitude flying. One could argue that without the previous limitation the pilot Kleboe would not have crashed, and therefore the tragedy could have been avoided. The weather conditions of the day indicate that the decision to strike on that specific day was influenced by an impatient desire to complete the objective. Furthermore, the mission had already been delayed, and this could prove disastrous for the Resistance. By putting the attack in the context of a previous mission to destroy the headquarters of the Gestapo in Denmark, Operation Carthage was a co-factor leading to the collapse of the German repression in Denmark, because its success allowed a third mission to take place48. The Gestapo did not have the resources nor the time to recover fully, since Germany capitulated on 4. May 1945. The resistance movement could be considered to have profited from the mission, because several prisoners managed to escape alive from the Shell House (such as the co-editor of one source) and later returned to the movement. It is known that the Gestapo’s ‘bureau of

42 No sources mention any large-scale fire in Copenhagen on the day of the attack. 43 [Ahlmann p.194] 44 [Næsh-Hendriksen p.25-6] 45 [Ibid. p.48] 46 This number is the total estimate of the mission, considering both civilian and military deaths. It is widely discussed, since there can be no agreement upon the German losses, plus the losses at the Shell House are also discussed. For this number 125 German casualties were considered, 10 pilots, 8 from the Shell House, 14 from the surroundings in Copenhagen {out of which 2 children}, 116 casualties in the French school and the surrounding streets. 47 [Næsh-Hendriksen p.22] 48 “The third and the last attack on the Gestapo in Denmark was on the 17th April when we raided their headquarters at Odense” describes Air-chief marshal Sir Basil Embry, who flew as No. 3 in the formation against the Shell House. [Embry p.279]

9 translation’ was completely destroyed49. This meant that the censoring of illegal articles about the attack was limited. The lack of German air-reprisal during the mission50, and the military success must have added greatly to the morale of the British, since this showed the weakness of the Third Reich. Embry argues with apathy that the Danes accepted the losses with: “brave and stoic hearts”51, but the losses were staggering, and flowers are still being put next to the memorial.

49 [Ibid. p.49] 50 The Germans had not enough fuel to fly during the day [Hove p.86]. 51 [Embry p.279]

10 Conclusion Operation Carthage could be seen as successful to the extent that the military target was destroyed and the expected military losses were not surpassed. The mission added greatly to the battle against the German Army in the occupied Denmark, and it allowed a third and last reprisal to be made. Most importantly, the Gestapo was not able to conduct its large-scale purge on the Resistance. Contrasting this opinion, the mission was not totally successful to the extent that the number of unnecessary civilian losses was significant, and even though they were in their majority the consequence of one mistake and its further repercussions (Kleboe’s crash near the French school), innocent children made out the largest fraction of casualties in this struggle for liberation.

11 Bibliography Written sources. • Ahlmann, Henrik. “Den Franske Skole: RAF'S angreb på Shellhuset 21.3.1945, En kortlægning af katastrofen på Frederiksberg og Vesterbro” Copenhagen 2005 • Embry, Bassil. ”Mission completed” Methuen and Co Ltd London. 1957. • Hove, Peder ”En dag i marts”. Gyldendal. Denmark 1988 • Næsh-Hendriksen, C. and Kampmann, Ove. ”Shellhuset 21.-3.-1945” Fremads Fokusbøger Denmark 1964. • Næsh-Hendriksen, C. et. al. ”Årets største begivenheder i billeder” A/S Bogforlaget Dana- Fruens Bøge. Denmark 1943-1945.

Video footage. • Christensen, Theodor. ”De Fem Aar” 1955. [http://195.231.246.70/agent/style/besat/Default.aspx?22691] Visited on 21. March 2006

Online sources. Wikipedia: “Shellhusbombardementet”. [http://da.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shellhusbombardementet] Visited on 21. March 2006.

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