“To What Extent Could Operation Carthage Be Considered a Successful Mission?”

International School of Helsingborg Christian Jorgensen. Grade 11 Historical investigation May 8th 2006 Total amount of words: 2000 “To what extent could Operation Carthage be considered a successful mission?” 1 Table of contents A. Plan of the investigation…………………………………………………………………3 B. Summary of evidence……………………………………………………………………4 C. Evaluation of sources……………………………………………………………………7 D. Analysis………………………………………………………………………………….8 E. Conclusion and evaluation………………………………………………………………11 F. Bibliography…… …………….………………………………………………………..12 2 Plan of the investigation This historical investigation intends to answer the question: To what extent could Operation Carthage be considered a successful mission? The objective of the investigation is to make a historiographical assessment of the air operation carried out by the RAF in Copenhagen on 21. March 1945. It will evaluate the background and purpose of the mission, the achievements and effectiveness of the attack and the collateral damage inflicted upon civilians. A conclusion will be given contrasting the criteria of military success with that the demographic impact of the mission. For this purpose both primary and contemporary secondary sources will be consulted and assessed. 3 Summary of evidence Before the operation In March 1944 the Gestapo moved its Danish headquarter to the Shell House, in Copenhagen. During the fall of 1944 and the winter of 1945 the Gestapo led an aggressive policy to break down the Danish Liberation Council and great parts of the resistance movement1. The Danes pledged help to Britain, resulting in air attacks leading to the destruction of the Gestapo offices in Aalborg. The first plans for Operation Carthage, the code for an air attack on the Shell House in Copenhagen, were forwarded to England in December 19442, yet no answer came back. In February 1945 the Gestapo managed to arrest 80 persons involved in the resistance movement, and the situation became critical for the Danes3. The leader of the SOE in Denmark, Ole Lipmann, pledged Britain for help on March 10. 1945. The operation had secretly been planned since December 19444. It consisted of an attack by 18 Mosquitos and 28 Mustangs (as escorts) flying in three squadrons5. The pilots were brought in from France and Britain6. The flight route was from Norfolk to Copenhagen, crossing large German-occupied areas7. To avoid radar detection, the altitude over land was not to exceed 100 m and over water 5 m8. The archives of the Gestapo were to be bombed at 11.15. Gestapo held twenty-six prisoners (serving as a human shield) from the Danish resistance on the upper floor of the Shell House9. On March 19 the pilots were briefed on the mission during 11 hours. Due to bad weather the mission was postponed until March 2110. 1 [Ahlmann, Henrik. “Den Franske Skole: RAF'S angreb på Shellhuset 21.3.1945, En kortlægning af katastrofen på Frederiksberg og Vesterbro” Copenhagen 2005. p.14] 2 [Ibid. p.33] 3 [Ibid. p.16] 4 [Hove, Peder ”En dag i marts”. Gyldendal. Denmark 1988. p.45] 5 [Næsh-Hendriksen, C. and Kampmann, Ove. ”Shellhuset 21.-3.-1945” Fremads Fokusbøger Denmark 1964. p.35] 6 Specifically from the RAF base at Bentwaters. 7 This implied that the planes faced resistance from the anti-aircraft defences on the ground. An example of this was the anchoring of “several units of the German Fleet” in Copenhagen, such as the Nürnberg warship. [Embry, Bassil. ”Mission completed” Methuen and Co Ltd London. 1957. p.27]. 8 [Næsh-Hendriksen p.35] 9 The prisoners were being used by the Geheime Staatspolizei, Gestapo, as a human shield on the highest floor of the Shell House, to avoid the RAF from bombing the building directly [Næsh-Hendriksen, C. et. al. ”Årets største begivenheder i billeder” A/S Bogforlaget Dana-Fruens Bøge. 1943-1945. p.164] 10 [Ahlmann p.19] 4 The day of the operation The mission began at 8.35. The weather was very windy. Whilst flying over the North Sea, layers of salt accumulated on the cockpit windows of the airplanes, which reduced the visibility for the pilots11. At 10.40 the airplanes reached the coast of Jutland. The German radar system identified the squadrons and followed their path12. Whilst entering Copenhagen, visibility being very limited, pilot Kleboe: “hit one of the uprights on the bridge”13. He diverged from the squadron and released his two bombs on house nr. 106, 12 people died14. He and his navigator Hall crashed in a garage next to the French School. They both died immediately. The rest of the first squadron approached the Shell House at 11.15. The building was successfully bombed. It was not until 11.16 that the Danes, on their own initiative, started the air-raid warning. The German inefficiency delayed it by several minutes15. The second squadron came 10 km after the first. It took direction towards the fire at the French School, assuming that it was the Shell House16. The squadron leader managed not to bomb the school after realizing that it was the wrong target, but at least two of the other Mosquitoes did not17. The squadron leader bombed the Shell House instead. Squadron two managed to escape Copenhagen with no losses18. In the third squadron all airplanes except for the leader released their bombs near the school19. Losses. • Four Mosquitos and two Mustangs. A total of 10 pilots20. Two Mosquitos were shot down over Northern Sealand. Two Mustangs were hit by the Nürnberg warship, anchored in the Copenhagen harbour, and crashed afterwards21. • Civilian losses in the neighbourhood surrounding and the inside the French school reached a total of 116 persons, whereof 87 were children22. 11 [Ibid p.90] 12 [Ahlmann p.21] 13 [Embry p.279] 14 House nr. 106, Soender Boulevard. [Hove p.103] 15 [Næsh-Hendriksen et. al. p.225] 16 [Ahlmann p.37] 17 [Hove p.110] 18 [Ibid. p.112] 19 [Ibid. p.122] 20 [Næsh-Hendriksen p.39] 21 [Hove p.112] 22 [Ahlmann p.137] 5 • Of the 26 prisoners in the Shell House, 8 were killed and 18 escaped23. 2 people were killed at the Institute of Technology24. • The Gestapo loss were first estimated to 75, but were later concluded as being 12525. Other writers argue that the number was estimated to 100-200, but that the official number was put to 75 by the Germans26. 23 [Ahlmann. p.148] 24 [Hove p.113] 25 [Ibid. p.151] 26 [Næsh-Hendriksen p.48] 6 Evaluation of sources Shellhuset 21/3-1945 is a collection of primary sources compiled by the survivors and partially edited by the prisoner Ove Kampmann on the tenth anniversary of the attack (1955). The purpose was to give a total account of the course of the events in one document27. The value of this source lies in the many eye-witness accounts of the attack and graphical material that adds many different angles to the description of the mission and its members. The scope of these accounts is a value because the people who contributed span from a Canadian pilot to a Danish prisoner. Another value is the usage of the document as a historical source in several other books28. The articles remain intact (no editor has changed them), which is a value. The limitations to the book are found in its variety of articles, because some views are excessively one-sided29 and are generally pro- Danish. The majorities of the articles have been written only few days after the 21. March and the authors may have been influenced by their contemporaries and the circumstances. En dag i marts written by Peder Hove is a novel from 1988 that addresses Operation Carthage from the perspective of an omniscient narrator. The purpose of the novel purpose is to provide a vivid description of the mission and give a solid recount of the attack minute by minute30. Hove himself was educated a pilot and some of the values include the depth of the chapters, that are very detailed in information. Since it is a secondary source it benefits from hindsight to evaluate what really happened. Limitations include the fact that it might have lost some accuracy when compiling lots of sources together (and it provides a pro-ally perspective). A contemporary source31 criticises it for having used an eye-witness report of a girl from the French School. The source argues that the girl’s description is contradictory and must therefore be false; this can have affected the accuracy of Hove’s novel32. 27 [Ibid. p.8] 28 Both Hove and Ahlman make explicit reference to this source. 29 The article from the illegal newspaper ’Information’ provides a description of the attack on the following day (22. March) is widely influenced by the joy felt by many non-Germans in Copenhagen. See [Næsh-Hendriksen p.24]. 30 Cover of the book, [Hove]. 31 Ahlmann’s “Den Franske Skole” was released in 2005, and has the benefit of hindsight. 32 [Ahlmann p.51-4]. The direct reference is made to the written recount of the girl, later published as a book: [Lyneborg, Elisabeth: Jeg var der 21. marts 1945. Chr. Erichsen, 1980] 7 Analysis The Gestapo’s policy in Denmark in 1944 and 1945 gave Lipmann few alternatives than to give the green light for the mission. The attack implied the deaths of the prisoners in the Shell, who were placed intentionally as a human shield, but not making a reprisal could cause the destruction of the entire resistance movement33. It must also be added that the prisoners were exposed to torture34, that ultimately could end with execution. This made the decision more viable. Operation Carthage proved difficult in part because the RAF had never made air-raids on a concrete building from such a low altitude in a highly populated area35.

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