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SHAPE HISTORY

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SHAPE 57 /67

DISTRIBUTION NO. OF COPIES OSACEUR 2 O DSA C EUR I OCOFS 1 OAIRDEP 1 ODNA 1 ODCLA 1 ODCPO 1 SP ASST INTAF 1 OSECY 1 ACOS PANDA 1 ACOS INTEL 1 ACOS PANDP 1 ACOS OPS 1 ACOS LOG 1 ACOS CANDE 1 CH BUDFIN 1 CH PID 1 PANDA (Central Registry) 2 Historical Section 2 Total 22 DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED

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FOREWORD

The History of SHAPE is being prepared in a series of volumes of which the first three cover the periods of command of Generals

Eisenhower, Ridgwayt and Gruenther. Volume I, for the Eisenhower' Command, and Volume II, for the Ridgway Command, have been issued. Volume III, which covers the Gruenther Command, is in draft form.

Beginning with General Norstad1 s Command (end-1956), the History of SHAPE has been undertaken on a calendar year basis. This volume covers SHAPE History for the year 1957, and is being published simultaneously with the SHAPE History for 1958. Both volumes, which previously existed in draft form, are being issued to make available to members of the SHAPE Staff background information that is often needed for a valid recommendation or decision.

Published volumes of the SHAPE History for 1959 and for the period 1960-1965 have been distributed within the SHAPE Staff and are available through the SHAPE Central Registry and Records Section, PANDA Division, SHAPE.

Comments and suggestions for improvement of SHAPE Histories may be brought to the attention of the Historical Section, Office of the Secretary of the Staff, SHAPE.

Brigadier General, US AF Secretary of the Staff

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SHAPE HISTORY 1957

INDEX

Page

CHAPTER I. 1 Review of General Norstad's Assumption of Command as SACËUR and Official Visits 1 SACEUR1 S Mission, Responsibilities and Powers . . 2 Allied Command Europe 3 Major Subordinate Commanders 3 The SHAPE Staff 4 SACEUR1 s Force Situation 5 Impact of Events in Hungary and the Suez Area . . . 6 Problems of the Air Defense of NATO Territory . . 7 Communications Problems 8 Intelligence Problems 8 Logistics Problems 9

CHAPTER II: POLICY and DIRECTION. 12 The Political Directive - Review of Proposals and Development of the Directive 12 The Political Directive - Final Version 16 Revision of Strategy Documents: MC 3/5(Final), MC 48(Final), MC 14/l(Final) 19 SGN's International Planning Teams' Reviews and Revisions 20 Review by Major NATO Commanders and National Military Authorities 23 Approval of New Policy Documents by the NAC ... 24 Alert Measures - Background 25 Negotiations with National Authorities on Alert Measures 26 SACEUR's Required Alert Measures - SHAPE/76/56 28 The Standing Group Report on SACEUR's Alert Measures - MC 67 (Revised) 29 DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED New Negotiations with National Authorities on Alert Measures . . 30 SACEUR's Emergency Defense Plan 1957 34

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Page SACEUR's Atomic Strike Plan 34 Atomic Planning Policy 35

CHAPTER III: FORCES. 37 General Appraisal Based on 1956 Annual Review . . 37 Basic Responsibilities of SACEUR's Shield Forces and Strike Forces 39 Problems of Centred. Europe Shield Forces .... 40 Echelon System for Shield Ground Forces 41 Annual Review Planning Guidance in 1957 43 The Results of the 1957 Annual Review 44 Military Committee Assessment of Annual Review, 1957 45 SACEUR1 s Combat Effectiveness Report 1956 ... 45 Special Problems - British Reduction in Forces . . 48 SACEUR's Statements to NAC on UK Withdrawal . . 50 Discussion of UK Reduction within the Western Eu- ropean Union 52 British White Paper on Proposed Withdrawals ... 52 SACEUR's Statement to the Standing Group on UK Withdrawals 54 Discussion in NATO Council of UK Withdrawals . . 55 Belgian Reduction of Military Service . 55 Presentation of Proposals by MOD Belgium .... 56 Consideration of Belgian Proposals by the NATO Council 57 Build-up of the German Forces 59 Proposed Strength Goals and Turnover Dates ... 60 First Turnover of German Troops 61 Integration of German Air Force into ACE .... 61 The Schleswig-Holstein Problem . 62 Ground Atomic Delivery Forces 64 Year End Assessment 66

CHAPTER IV: The ACE MINIMUM FORCE STUDY, 1958-63. 68 Planning Guidance - General . 68 Planning for the German Accession to NATO. ... 69 ACE Capabilities Plan 1957 69 NATO Political and Economic Guidance ...... 69 Forces Available to SACEUR for Implementation of Strategic Concept 70 DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED SACEUR's 1960-62 Study 71 Divergencies of SACEUR and SA OLANT Force Posture Studies 71

ii Briefing the Council after Soviet Satellite Launching and ICBM Claims 105 Cost of Maintaining ACE Forces 106 NAC Questions on the Minimum Force Study. ... 107 Mr. Spaak's Analysis of the Minimum Force Study's Impact on Planning Ill SACEUR1 s Replies to Questions raised by ChairmanNAC 113 Changes in Infrastructure Programs 114 Reactions of Major Subordinate Commanders . . . 116 Briefing Teams Visits to MSCs 117 Progress of MC 70 120 SHAPE Representatives Meeting with SGN in Washington D. C 121 SGN Consolidation of SACEUR, SACLANT and CINCHAN Studies (Preparation of MC 70) . . . . 121 Validity of MC 14/2 (Revised) in Preparation of MC 70 123

CHAPTER V: TRAINING. 124 SACEUR's Terms of Reference Concerning Training 124 SHAPE Staff Duties Concerning Training of ACE Forces 124 Training Aims and Objectives of Exercises in Allied Command Europe 125 Commanders' Exercises Reports 126 Planning for Exercise STRIKE BACK 127 Modification of Exercise STRIKE BACK 127 Exercise Counter Punch. 128 ConclusionsdrawnfromCOUNTERPUNCH . . . . 130 , » Recommendations made after COUNTER PUNCH - ! Communications 131 ! ExercisePLAYBACK 131 V Exercises BLUE ICE, BLIND EYE, and BROWN JUG 132 Exercise DEEP WATER 133 CPXVII 134 Air Defense/Atomic Strike Exercises 136 Discussions on Conducting Combined Joint Atomic and Air Defense Exercises 137 Establishment of Special Weapons Course at Oberammergau 138 DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED ACE Readiness Test Program Proposals 139 Annual NATO Training Conference 140

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Page NAC Action on the SACEUR and SACLANT Force Studies 73 Re-Examination and Revision of Strategic Concept and Minimum Military Measures Documents ... 73 Planning and the Annual Review 74 Review of Infrastructure Programs Based on New Force Posture 74 Discussions of SGN with Major NATO Commanders on Guidance Based on pattern of Forces Study . . 75 Issuance of Provisional Guidance to Nations .... 78 Revision of Force Study 79 Effect of British Reduction of Forces on 1960-1962 Papers 80 WEU Views on Concepts of Forces Posture .... 81 Assessment of Force Requirements Papers .... 82 ACOS PANDP's Report on Force Requirements Study 83 General Norstad Gives Gviidance for the Study ... 85 Assumptions for the New Studies 86 Deterrent Capabilities of SACEUR's Forces .... 87 Objectives and Priorities of Requirements 89 Continuation of Annual Review 90 DCPANDP Guidance 90 NAC Request for Replies by SACEUR to WEU Questions 90 SHAPE Staff Actions 91 SACEUR's Briefing of NAC at SHAPE 92 Questions by the National Representatives & SECGEN 93 Questions Raised by National Authorities of France and Germany 95 Progress of ACE Minimum Force Study 96 SACEUR's Appraisal of Minimum Force Study Development 97 New Concepts of ACE Tasks - Delay in Progress . . 97 DCPANDP Proposals for Completion of Forces Study 98 DCPANDP Recommendations Concerning MSCs ... 99 Distribution of the Study 99 Progress Report on the Minimum Force Study by ACOS PANDP 99 SACEUR's Directives for Revisions 100 Briefing for Individuals Concerned in the Study ... 101 The Minimum Force Study for ACE 1958-63 is

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Land Training Areas - Central Region 141 The Vogelsang - Elsenborn Training Area ... . 143

CHAPTER VI: COMMAND STRUCTURE & ORGANIZATION. 144 General Background 144 Responsibilities of SACEUR and His Commands. . . 144 Command Structure in the Center 145 Assignment of General Speidel to LANDCENT ... 151 Assignment of Combat Group Bl 152 Allied Naval Command in the Baltic . 154 Land Boundary in Schleswig-Holstein 160 The Turkish Straits Problem ..-..' 161 Joint Command and Operations Centers 162 PersonnelReductions 164 Personnel Requirements Program 168 Personnel for Air Defense and Early Warning ... 170

CHAPTER VH; LOGISTICS & INFRASTRUCTURE. 172 Part I: Logistics. Introduction 172 Planning - SACEURts Responsibilities 173 Logistic System Allied Command Europe 174 Logistic Policy and Guidance 177 The Logistic Implications of the Minimum Force Study 178 Replacement, Modernization and Standardization of Equipment 180 Strategic Reserves and Reinforcement Units .... 180 Nuclear Weapon Logistics 181 Specific Naval Maintenance and Support 181 Specific Air Force Maintenance and Support .... 181 Principal Logistic Problems 182 POL - The Suez Crisis 182 TheNATOPipelineSystem 185 Part II: Infrastructure. Introduction 189 Infrastructure and Allied Command Europe 189 SACEUR1 s Responsibilities 190 NATO Common Infrastructure Programs before 1956 191

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V Financing the Forward Scatter System - EighthSlice 193 Early Warning Radar System - Advance Approval 194 The Tactical Airfields Problem - Eighth Slice . . 195 The Eighth Slice Infrastructure Program is Approved 197 The Ninth Slice Infrastructure Program 198 Supplementary Ninth Slice Recommendations . . . 200 Progress in Construction of Airfields ...... 201 FuturelnfrastructureProvision 202 The Tenth Slice Infrastructure Program 204 The Problem of Infrastructure Costs . 205 Projects Considered for Suspension 205 Interim Conclusions from 1958-63 Posture Study . 207 Positions of Overruns 207 Implications of Minimum Force Study ...... 209 Problems of Budget Forecasting 210 The Position at the End of 1957 213

CHAPTER VIII: COMMUNICATIONS. 214 Introduction 214 The Long-Range Early Warning System 215 SHAPE Planning for the Early Warning System . . 215 Council Approval of Early Warning Infrastructure . 217 Problems of National Viewpoints Concerning Specifications 217 National Differences of Opinion Reconciled .... 219 Situation at End-1957 220 Radar Data Processing and Transmission .... 221 Electronic Countermeasures . . 222 Communications-Electronics Personnel 223 The Forward Scatter System 225 The Development of the Forward Scatter System . 228 (Note on the United States Funded Portion) .... 232

CHAPTER IX: INTELLIGENCE. 233 Introduction 233 SACEUR's Peacetime Intelligence Requirements . . 233 The Wartime Requirements 236 The Soviet Threat ." 238 Examination of ACE Intelligence System 239

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CHAPTER X: AIR DEFENSE« 243 Introduction 243 SHAPEStudiestheProblem 244 Plan for the Integration of Air Defense 247 The Forward Missile Interceptor Zone 250

APPENDIX A to Chapter I. 252 Key Officers at SHAPE, 1957 252

APPENDIX A to Chapter in. 254 Background on Force Statistics 254

APPENDIX B to Chapter III. 260 Chronological Outline of Force Statistics 260 DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED

yii NATO CC^iOEOTiAL SHAPE 57/67 NATO SE^ftET"-

CHAPTER I

Review of General NorstadfB Assumption of Command as SACEUR and Official Visits. General Lauris Norstad, USAF, assumed command of Allied Command Europe (ACE) and the title of Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) from General Alfred M. Gruenther on 20 November 1956 at brief ceremonies on the grounds of the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE). General Gruenther, the retiring commander, had served as SACEUR since 11 July .1953 and for the greater part of that period General Norstad had served as his Air Deputy.^ General Norstad's first remarks upon assuming his command were indicative of his strong belief in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. "I pledge myself to this task, " he stated. "I believe in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and in the unity of free and equal peoples for which it stands. I believe in our task of assuring peace on just and lasting foundations. I believe in our people - the men and women of this command - and in their devotion to the cause that we all serve. With their help - with your help - (2) I look to the future with confidence." Immediately following his assumption of command, General Norstad began a series of visits to the nations which contributed forces to his command, speaking with national authorities and leaders and addressing public gatherings in some of these countries. His first official series of visits included trips to his major subordinate commands, Headquarters Allied Forces Northern Europe, Kolsaas (Oslo) on 29-30 November; Headquarters Allied Forces Mediterranean (Malta) and Headquarters Allied Forces Southern Europe, DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED (1) Details of this ceremony are contained in SHAPE Press Release 56-39, 20 Nov 56. (2) Address by General Lauris Norstad at SHAPE Handover Ceremony on 20 Nov 56. 1 NATO CONFIDENTIAL ({ SHAPE 57/67 ^^NATO SEÊEJEï^

Naples (Italy) on 3-4 December; and Headquarters Allied Forces Central Eu- rope, Fontainebleau (France) on 6 December. On 27-31 January 1957, Gene- ral Norstad visited the United States; on 11-13 February, the United Kingdom; on 14-16 February, Italy; on 18-20 February, the Netherlands; on 25-28 Febru- ary, Belgium and Luxembourg; on 7-8 March, Turkey; on 13-14 March, Den- mark; on 19-21 March, Germany; on 25-27 March, Portugal, and on 29-30 April, Greece.

SACEUR's Mission, Responsibilities and Powers. The most recent official statement from NATO authorities setting forth SACEUR's Responsibilities and Powers in Peace and War had been issued on 7 July 1955 by the Military Committee of the North Atlantic Treaty Orga- (3) nization. The sum total of the responsibilities assigned to SACEUR comprised, in effect, his overall mission. This mission can be stated in general terms as: To keep the peace in Western Europe and, failing that, to defend Western Europe successfully against attack. In peacetime SACEUR must prepare his command for wartime operations. This involved diverse and complex responsibilities in the fields of military training and combined exercises; wide logistic responsibilities unaccompanied by requisite powers of control; extensive responsibility for military planning at all levels and for development of recommendations to both the nations and to NATO in matters of strength, combat effectiveness, infrastructure, and organization. The nature of SACEUR's Terms of Reference demanded that he maintain close liaison with national authorities of the nations contributing forces and resources to his command; that he coordinate fully with each of these nations in any matters in which these nations could have an interest; that he DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED keep his superiors fully informed of all his activities in the many fields of

(3) MC 53(Final), 7 Jul 55: Revised Terms of Reference for the Supreme Allied Commander Europe. NATO CONFIDENTIAL NATO ^SECRET

activity in which his headquarters engaged; and that, in dealing with his own major subordinate commanders, he exercise a close control over their activities.^ SACEUR did not object to the tendency of his official instructions to limit his freedom of action. The very nature of the alliance, of which his command was the military manifestation, decreed that voluntary compliance by thenations. rather than forced obedience to directives would, in the long run^produce the more effective result, even thoughJLLmight in th*-R>ir>rt tajçrn appear wasteful of time.

Allied Command Europe. The geographical area for which SACEUR was militari Iy responsible covered land and ocean areas from the northernmost tip of Norway to the Eastern borders of Turkey. This area, generally known as Allied Command Europe, comprised four geographical regions each under command of a (5) major subordinate commander to SACEUR.

Major Subordinate Commanders. In Northern Europe, the Commander-in-Chief Northern Europe (CINCNORTH) commanded Allied Forces located in Norway and Denmark and in the waters thereof. Lieutenant General Sir Cecil Stanley Sugden, UK Army, served as CINCNORTH during the period of this report. His headquarters were located at Kolsaas, Norway, near Oslo. Command in Central Europe came under the Commander-in-Chief Central Europe (CINCENT) and was vested in General Jean Valluy, French Army, with headquarters located at Fontainebleau, France.

(4) For detailed information as to the scope of SACEUR1 s Responsibilities

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The Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Southern Europe (CINCSOUTH) located at Naples, was Admiral Robert P.M. Briscoe, US Navy. Inthe Mediterranean, Admiral Sir Guy Grantham, RN, served as Commander-in- Chief Allied Forces Mediterranean (CINCAFMED) at the beginning of this period but was replaced on 4 April 1957 by Admiral Sir Ralph Edwards, RN. Admiral Edwards relinquished his appointment owing to ill-health on 17 September 1957, and was replaced, in an acting capacity, by Vice-Admiral B.I. Robertshaw, RN. Admiral Sir Charles Lambe, RN, was appointed as CINCAFMED, and took up this appointment on 11 November. Headquarters of CINCAFMED were located on the island of Malta. Each of the major subordinate commanders was in turn served by his own subordinate commanders for air, ground or land forces as appropriate.^

The SHAPE Staff. To enable him to carry out the missions and responsibilities with which he was charged, SACEUR was served by an integrated and international staff, organized along functional lines, located at his headquarters (7) near Rocquencourt.

(6) See Charts, 20 Nov 56 - 1 Dec 57. (7) See Chart, for organization of SHAPE Staff. The strength of the SHAPE Staff including breakdown by rank and nationality is set forth quarterly in "Allied Headquarters Strength Report, " SH-AG-2. When General Norstad assumed command, SHAPE had assigned officers numbering about 400; other ranks about 400 and about 120 civilians. This did not include Hq Command and Support Troops Personnel of which there were about 125 officers, 1400~other ranks and 30 civilians. These personnel were assigned from 12 different nations. Significant changes had been made in the structure of the SHAPE Staff just prior to General Norstad's appointment as SACEUR. For details see GO # 8, 14 Sep 56; GO # 9, SHAPE, 14 Sep 56 DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED SD 10-1, SHAPE, 18 Sep 56, and Ltr, subj: SHAPE Reorganization, AG 4030 PA, 8 Oct 56. SACEUfLtS Force Sltuatibn,

Whèri General Norstad became! SACEURj neither the ground, Seai not àïr forces available tot carrying but Iiis missiori had attairied the magnitude bf equivalent fighting value already deter mined to be ëssential for the implénientation of the MC 48 Concept and Forward Strategy. Although the öerman Governmeht had indicated that it planned to provide a significant Cbntributioh to NATO defense hy the end of 1957* the full contribution from Germany^ it appeared, would not be available Until sometime after 1959. 1The results of the 1956 Annual Review indicated a marked decrease in the number of Army units which SACEUR Could expect to be combat-ready bn M-day. Withdrawals of forces, together with some r eor ganizationj had depleted the army forces in the Centrai Region of Allied Command Europe to the extent that CINCENT had expressed grave doubts as to his ability to carry out his assigned mission. Naval forces, including maritime aircraft, available to SACEUR had not by November 1956 attained the required levels, and the forecast for the future was no brighter because of the inadequacy of naval replacement programs in many of the countries. Although

the air forces available to SACEUR were still below the required levels, (8) progress had been made toward reaching the agreed goals. The effectiveness of army forces available to General Norstad continued to improve, and had improved since the preceding year, but there were still major deficiencies in training. Personnel and equipment shortages posed major problems. The navy forces were in a mixed situation with the larger navies improving but the smaller navies deteriorating, because of materiel obsolescence, increasing age of equipment, and personnel difficulties. The majority of NATO air forces available to SACEUR fell below the desired standards of readiness, to the extent that the overall air capability of SACEUR was considered to be below the level that the number of assigned

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(8) This evaluation is based upon SGM-791-56, 21 Nov 56, Memorandum for the Stahding Group Liaison Office, subj: The Military Posture of NATO.

5 \ - , i assigned aircraft in a combat-ready status, and there was a growing shortage of spare parts for front line aircraft, deficient supply and logistics (9) system, and a lack of technical personnel. SACEUR's immediate superiors, the Standing Group,took note of these various deficiencies and called upon member governments, saying "Urgent action is necessary to reconstitute the army elements rf the Shield forces in Allied Command Europe.... Urgent action is rrcui:-ed of all member governments to improve the state of aircraft readiness and aircrew readiness to eliminate a critically developing situation in front line aircraft, with emphasis on logistic and supply systems, technicians and the procurement of spare parts.... Action is required of many member governments to increase the war reserve levels of POL, including jet fuel, ammunition and operational equipment and spare parts to a 30 day level, as an interim measure..,. Action is required of all member governments to improve the effectiveness of army units, particularly M-day and First Echelon major units.... Action is required of all member governments to rectify the personnel deficiencies in their armed forces, particularly as regards technicians and speciali sts."(10) Impact of Events in Hungary and the Suez Area. Events in Hungary and in the Suez area in late 1956 imposed strains upon the entire NATO Alliance, and revealed flaws in the political arrangements and relationships existing therein. At the same time, the NATO military structure was subjected to considerable tension and revealed certain areas of weakness. Within SHAPE and Allied Command Europe these weaknesses were watched very carefully, and steps were taken under General Norstad1 s direction to remedy them within his power to do so. Some of the deficiencies were within SHAPE, some were external and beyond

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED (9) For statistics and details of all forces assigned or earmarked to SACEUR at the date of General Norstad1 s assumption of command, see Forces Chapter. See also Chapter on Training for further details of his forces. (10) SGM-791-56, 21 Nov 56.

6 GOT© CQM-IOEEfHMJ SHAPE'S control. Some had a purely military aspect, while others had political implications. Throughout 1957 General Norstad and the SHAPE staff concentrated on strengthening the areas of weakness which were disclosed within his headquarters and within his command.

Problems of the Air Defense of NATO Territory. In late November 1956, unidentified aircraft overflew Turkey, greatly alarming national and NATO authorities in Europe. The weaknesses in the existing early warning system were highlighted by this overfly, although they had been recognized since the establishment of Allied Command Europe. The delay in correcting these faults was caused by the fact that air defense was fundamentally a national responsibility. In many areas it had been developed only through US military aid, and had resulted in programs over which SHAPE had little or no control. Even had invading aircraft been -VJ > detected by the early warning system, it is probable that the air forces of ACE could have done little to have stopped a mass enemy aerial attack. During the crisis it became apparent that ACE had less than 100 all weather fighter aircraft that would come under SACEUR's control in an emergency. In Norway, Turkey, and Greece control radars were inadequate to deal with the potential threat. It was apparent also that SHAPE'S Air Defense Division was unable to make a quick computation of the total capability of air defense equipment in ACE. A weekly record was maintained of the available combat ready aircraft of assigned forces, but this did not include interceptor aircraft of the national air defense agencies, since SACEUR had no responsibility for these forces. A great deal of uncertainty existed in the minds of both national and NATO representatives as to who was responsible for acting in the event of unauthorized intrusion into the air space of Allied Command Europe. Prircipally, this uncertainty stemmed

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED from a lack of rules of engagement to which all nations agreed. ^ ^ (11) The sources on which this discussion of SHAPE deficiencies is based are SHAPE/PP/324/56, 20 Dec 56, w/encl. and Appendix I to SHAPE/ 40/57, 19 Feb 57. 7 W^PQIIiigwm Communications Problems. Many deficiencies in the communications within SHAPE and Allied Command Europe were highlighted in this same period. For instance, Standing Group policy held that traffic of interest to national supporting commands must be addressed through the MODs of the NATO nations concerned for appropriate national dissemination. SHAPE and SACLANT had always disagreed with this policy, feeling that unacceptable delays wovild occur if addressees such as USCINCEUR, USAREUR and CINCUSAFE could Aot be advised directly in an emergency when the matter of disseminating H-hour and R-hour arose. There was no priority given to SHAPE communications to the Standing Group which normally were routed through US channels via USAREUR. Duringa period of emergency, these communications would be included in the normal flow of national traffic with no special priority. It was also evident that additional peacetime leased circuits had to be procured in order to meet the minimum wartime requirements for both the Atomic Strike Plan and early warning before the forward scatter system became operational. In case of emergency, many NATO Headquarters, especially SHAPE and CINCNORTH, would not be able to handle the increased flow of messages and the manning of additional circuits with the peacetime personnel which were available.

Intelligence Problems. Particularly deficient in the period of crisis was the intelligence operation throughout ACE. There was at SHAPE among the staff a general lack of knowledge of the situation, and the staff had to rely on newspaper reports, rumours and surmise. SACEUR's Chief of Staff, General Schuyler, commenting on this situation, stated that "the paucity of intelligence during DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED the Hungarian revolt was most frustrating and nerve-racking, and to be perfectly frank it seemed at times that most of our information was derived

x ' " KftTV ^ fiFrn ft SHAPE 57/67 NATO SECRET NATO CONFIDENTIAL -itom press and radio reports." He pointed out, however, that it must be kept in mind that it required a good deal of time to process thoroughly evaluated intelligence,- and that the national staffs which were SHAPE'S only real source of intelligence, were not compelled to disclose to NATO information which might jeopardize their own national security, vital interests, or intelligence systems.

Within SHAPE itself it was apparent that the Intelligence Division was not organized to function smoothly in an operational role for any considerable period of time. The Intelligence Division was designed primarily as a planning agency and not as an operational division. Among the problems which it encountered was a lack of officers qualified to handle intelligence operations, and a considerable problem in the language area. Ninty-five per cent of the intelligence received at SHAPE was written in English and it developed during this period that those officers and other ranks assigned to Intelligence Division who were not proficient in that language made little c ontr ibuti on. ^ ^ ^

Logistics Problems. It was also evident that the logistics system was inadequate to function if the emergency had developed to a more serious stage. There were major logistics problems throughout ACE in the fields of transportation, construction, POL and supply. There was, for example, a lack of agreement on the specific war time role of international agencies in coordinating inland surface transport, except in the Northern Region. There was no agreement on the organization or procedure for establishing ocean shipping priorities. Supply and maintenance problems included an extremely low combat ready rate and shortage of skilled technicians to support air operations. Within O (12) See Intelligence Chapter for fuller explanation of this and other Intelligence problems. DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED

NATO CONFIDENTIAL NATO SECREt NATO CONFIDENTIAL

the Army sphere, all nations had 80% or more of their authorized equipment, with the exception of Italy, Portugal and Turkey, but only in Canada, the UK and the US were there no major deficiencies in reserves of ammunition and equipment. Reserve deficiency existed in the broad categories of combat vehicles and communications equipment. Airfields to support ACE provided for only a limited degree of dispersion at the squadron level and the majority of the airfields where squadrons were deployed could not provide the normal refuelling and re-arming. None of the NATO POL or ammunition storage facilities for NATO naval forces was complete. The situation with regard to POL was particularly serious. Because there had been a lack of any agreed concept for control, some completed POL lines in the NATO POL system could not be operated, and a severe handicap existed in the vital coordination between construction and operation phases of putting this system into effect. A serious deficiency in plans for the distribution of POL lay in the lack of adequate supplies of portable pipeline, mobile and overfill equipment to extend, augment or replace permanent facilities which had been programmed in NATO infrastructure. The existing equipment was wholly inadequate for wartime requirements. Although the POL stock status on hand was generally satisfactory, (13) some countries were critically short of Mogas and of jet fuel. The ability of SACEUR's forces to carry on combat operations could not be considered adequate if the problems encountered during this crisis were to extend into wartime operation. The Air Operations Center did not have enough people to operate adequately over a 24-hour period, and lacked certain equipment, particularly for communications. The order of battle maintained in the SHAPE situation room was found to be below the necessary

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED standards, and there was a great deal of confusion at the working level of the staff as to the procedure for passing from a peacetime to a wartime headquarters status, had this been necessary. One of the questions that (13) See Logistics Chapter for mor10 NATe informatioO CONFIDENTn on these logistic! AC s problems. TT ATfl 11 I H I 1 arose was the actual mission of the war headquarters operational echelon and its relationship with the rear headquarters and subordinate commands. Another typical question concerned where the personnel should report for duty in the event the SHAPE Headquarters was destroyed outside normal working hours; and what the succession of command would be in the event SACEUR and SHAPE Headquarters were early casualties. Some national authorities failed to clear with SACEUR the withdrawal of combat elements which had been committed to SACEUR's war plans. Many members of the SHAPE staff were unaware of the implications of the various alert measures, or even in some cases of the existence of such measures.

The problems and weaknesses described above represent only a part of the many difficulties which arose as General Norstad assumed command as SACEUR. A fuller discussion of each of these problems and the steps which were taken to solve them will be found in the appropriate chapters of this 1957 History. DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED

11 ^m »im WATO CONFIDENTIAL CHAPTER II

POLICY and DIRECTION

SACEUR was the instrument of NATO military power in Western Europe. The authorities and standing instructions under which he carried out his functions and responsibilities were supplemented from time to time by specific instruction in limited fields and by changes in the overall policy during 1957.

The Political Directive - Review of Proposals and Development of the Directive. By far the most important single source of new guidance received by General Norstad during his first year as SACEUR was the Political Direc- tive, approved and issued by the North Atlantic Council in December 1956. Lord Ismay, Secretary General of NATO, reported in November 1956 that the Council had devoted many meetings to the preparation of a directive to the military authorities "based on the latest assessment of trends and implications of Soviet policy." He stated that this report "should form the basis of a review of the forces which should be maintained by NATO. This paper will be discussed with the military authorities and submitted for consideration at the forthcoming Ministerial meetings."^ SACEUR and his staff took every opportunity to observe informally the development of this document within the framework of the civilian structure at the Palais de Chaillot. The paper, as it was being developed in successive drafts, underwent many changes owing to national views and comments and to some extent to the views and comments forthcoming from the NATO military authorities, including SACEUR.

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED (1) CM(56)41 NATO CONFIDENTIAL 12

NATO Wû COMftDENïlAL SHAPE 57/67 naTO SSSRS^

In late November, about ten days before the directive was scheduled for consideration at Ministerial meetings, the SHAPE staff presented to General Norstad a detailed analysis of the latest draft of the Political (2) Directive then existant. This draft was to be considered by the Permanent Council at its meeting on 30 November. The SHAPE staff analysis prepared for General Norstad pointed out that some of the features, undesirable from SACEUR's standpoint, which had appeared in an original draft by the UK authorities, had been made more acceptable. The SHAPE staff officers held that it was questionable whether at that particular time of change in international positions it was advisable to issue a Political Directive at all. "The long range effect of the Hungarian revolt and unrest in the other satellite s on the NATO nations is not clearly deter- minable at this time, ..." the report stated. "It is questionable, " SHAPE planning officers said, "that many NATO nations are presently anxious to reduce their defense forces, and therefore it would seem unwise to issue a political directive which apparently has that as its objective. Further, a new political directive might indicate a lessening of resolve in support of NATO and thereby weaken the Alliance." In this connection, it was known that some national authorities were considering limiting the Political Direc- tive to a specific time period, since it would have to be based only on the situation as it was currently known. The directive in its current form still contained a requirement for a fully effective nuclear retaliatory force for NATO defense and as a major deterrent to Soviet aggression. The directive also, required Shield Forces to be able to deal with "infiltrations, incursions and local actions" without (2) This document in its evolution underwent considerable change and SHAPE comments on this particular version, the sixth draft, were DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED in some cases invalidated by this change.

13 NATO 1OrtirdUtNTIAL SHAPE 57/67 NATO SECRET

recourse to nuclear weapons. On the other hand, the Shield Forces were required to be prepared to react quickly with nuclear weapons to any type of aggression. SHAPE officers were in some doubt if these forces possessed this dual capability on any large scale, or even if they could achieve it. "If the intent here, " the report stated, "is to have the Shield Forces prepared to handle minor police actions (such as suppression of guerrilla forces), then there would appear to be no problem; however, in the future as the Shield Forces are modernized and rely more and more on nuclear weapons, it would appear that they would be unable to engage in a major military action without use of nuclear weapons."

The SHAPE staff was extremely wary of any wording which would in any way tend to inhibit immediate retaliation with nuclear weapons against large scale attack. The statement in this draft that "the decision to use nuclear weapons would in each case be a matter for governments, " roused the opposition of SHAPE planners who supported a Standing Group view that any attempt to clarify this question could lead to a political decision which could limit severely the military commander's authority in the first hours of an emergency. This draft of the directive stated that account would have to be taken of a possible need for certain NATO countries to use their NATO forces elsewhere. While SHAPE could not deny this, and certainly the eventuality had occurred already in several instances to the detriment of SACEUR's defensive strength, the SHAPE staff did point out that "forces required for SACEUR have always been based on the minimum levels for the accomplishment of SACEUR's mission. Thus there was no cushion to permit withdrawals without seriously affecting the capability of Allied Command Europe." The SHAPE officers said that if their planning must take into account the possibility of such withdrawals, provision must be made for replacing these forces by calling up reserves on the Continent, by moving elements of SACEUR's stra- DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED tegic reserve from North American or Great Britain to the Continent, or by NATO CONFIDENTIAL SHAPE 57/67 NATO -SECRET — ".-.Lv. 7:.:-.1.

increasing the number of peacetime units available to SACEUR. As another criticism of this draft directive, the SHAPE analysis pointed out that the directive said it would be "probable" that an attack would be preceded by a period of acute political tension and other warning signs which would allow the NATO nations to get ready for a coming assault. SHAPE knew of no factors which supported this "probability" and asked that the statement be softened by substitution of the word "possibility."

Again fearful of the Political Directive as an instrument of reducing the state of readiness and effectiveness of SACEUR's forces, the SHAPE staff objected to the inclusion of a phrase describing the Shield Forces as being maintained at "appropriate standards of readiness." "The wording of the sentence on Shield Forces could well allow member nations to re- evaluate their contributions and to reduce their ready forces below the mini- (3) mum required to maintain the security of Allied Command Europe." When the proposed political directive^to the NATO Military Authorities came before the Military Committee at its meeting in Paris on 6 December, General Norstad was present and recommended to the Committee certain changes which he believed should be made to the document. He recommended a re-wording which pinned down specifics of instances such as hostile local actions, infiltrations and incursions by the Soviets or their Satellites, so that the document would indicate more clearly that it was referring to instances

of a type which did not necessarily call for the use of nuclear weapons. Th(4e) Committee agreed with the amendments which General Norstad proposed. The Permanent Council then met all of SACEUR's objections to the directive insofar as wording and innuendo were concerned. And, in consequence, the SHAPE staff analysists agreed that the Political Directive "is generally acceptable to Allied Command Europe as guidance for the development of forward planning." (5)

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED (3) Brieffor SACEUR, Political Directive, 28 Nov 56, w/Tab 2, sixth draft Political Directive, C-WP(56)6. (4) MC 15th Session, 8 Jan 57. (5) Brieffor SACEUR, Political Directive, CM(56)138, 10 Dec 56. MATfD CO NATO ^fieiTET NTIAL

The Political Directive - Final Version. The Political Directive as finally approved by the North Atlantic Council consisted of two main parts. The first part was a rather succinct but frank discussion of the possibilities which lay open to the Soviets in furthering their aims through military means. .The men who had studied the problem and who had prepared this paper were convinced, of course, that the Soviet's eventual aim was World domination, and that they were opposed to Western ideologies with every means at their disposal to achieve this end, except in those cases where the means threatened destruction of their own system. The Soviet continuing main objective, so far as NATO was concerned, was to undermine support in the Western nations and to cause the dissolution of NATO. ^

While the ability of the Soviets to launch a nuclear war was admitted, the conclusion contained in this analysis was that the Russians, fearing and understanding the consequences to themselves of any general nuclear war, regardless of who launched it, would not, in view of Western ability to retaliate, knowingly start a nuclear war. The possibility was not discounted that a change in situations might lead to such an eventuality, and fhat there was certainly a danger of a general^arïsing from a miscalculation on the part of the Russians. If they felt the West was vacillating and weak and would not retaliate with nuclear weapons, or if they felt that the West was about to launch an attack with nuclear weapons, the Russians of course might take the fatal step. In the case of conventional arms, the Soviets also were aware that a war starting with conventional arms would very likely develop into a general war that would lead to a nuclear exchange. The study group had concluded that there were several ways in which the Soviets conceivably might use nuclear arms to obtain certain of their

(6) C-M(56)l38, 13 Dec 56, DirectivetotheNATOMilitaryAuthoiities in the NAC. Part I, Analysis of Soviet Intentions; Part II, the Direc- DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED tive.

16 WATO CONFIDENTIAL needs. If, for instance, they estimated that NATO would not use nuclear weapons against them except in retaliation, they might use their superior conventional forces in a general attack against all NATO nations. This could stem from a weakness or division, assumed or actual, within the Western Bloc. In the same vein, the Soviets might launch local attacks against certain NATO nations. They might judge that countries not belong- ing to NATO but on its periphery could be attacked with conventional forces without retaliation from the West. The Communist Bloc could possibly act in support of armed insurrection or guerrilla activity within non-Communist countries. Other more likely possibilities were that the Soviets might inter- vene in order to further political, economic and military ends, in any case where countries outside the Soviet Bloc were weakened by unstable political developments. Certainly the recent experience in Hungary showed that Russia was capable of taking extensive military measures to retain its control over its Satellites, and that this type of action could produce an explosive situation.

The second part of this document, which was the actual directive, re- defined the basic aim of the NATO Alliance to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of the peoples of the NATO countries. It pointed out that to this end, NATO's defenses had been established, and that a potential aggressor must be shown forces so organized, disposed, trained and equipped that they would discourage beyond any doubt an attack upon them, even an attack made with superior numbers and the advantage of surprise. The directive then stated that a review of NATO defense planning was required in order to determine how, within available resources, NATO's defensive effort and the effort, of each individual nation could best achieve the most effective pattern of forces. The directive stipulated that to defend and deter against Soviet aggression, NATO must have a fully effective nuclear

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED retaliatory force, and that the land, sea and air forces of NATO must be designed so that they could defend NATO territory and carry out certain

17 IT*!*,* IPAiL

specific functions which the directive listed. Among these functions were: to contribute to the deterrent to aggression and prevent external intimida- tion by establishing and keeping up evidence of the military effectiveness of NATO's defenses; to deal with hostile local actions, infiltrations and incursions and the like whenever they occurred; and to contain the attack without any attempt to make a major strategic withdrawal, within the concept of a forward strategy, until the strategic counter-offensive using counter - nuclear weapons had achieved its objective. The directive stated very plainly that it was assumed that British, Canadian and US forces would continue to be stationed in ACE.

While the directive was in broad terms, it could be interpreted clearly as far as SHAPE'S or SACEUR's forces were concerned. It stated that the Shield Forces must be capable not only of responding quickly with nuclear weapons, but must also bel able to deal with local attacks made with conventional weapons without necessarily using nuclear weapons. Control of the decision to retaliate, however, remained with the governments, not with SACEUR. The recent events in Hungary and in the Middle East, were reflected very clearly in the directive. The directive pointed out that while NATO defense planning was limited to the defense of the Treaty area, account must be taken of the dangers which might arise because of developments outside that area. This became even more apparent when the political directive stated that account must be taken in planning for the most efficient organization and equipment of NATO forces, of the possible need for some NATO countries to use forces which had been assigned to NATO to meet defense commitments elsewhere. In the past, France had withdrawn forces committed to SACEUR from the Center sector. Italy had re-stationed some forces. The directive pointed out that any such withdrawals should be "harmonized with the primary importance of protecting the NATO area." DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED The importance of establishing as quickly as possible some satisfactory

MAT© ©©WŒM1M18 L

NATO ODCRBgi form of alert and early warning was unda:scored when the directive stated that the consequences of attack on NATO without warning were such that those NATO forces and facilities directly relating to early warning and the nuclear retaliatory action must be kept in constant readiness at all times. The governments were directed to take into account, in deciding on the allocation of their total resources, the rising costs of new weapons, and the need for economic resources to deal with the Soviet threat in all its aspects without endangering their economic stability, which in itself was an essential element of their security. The military authorities were advised that they should assume for planning purposes that few, if any, NATO countries could be expected to make any substantial increase in the proportion of their resources devoted to defense.

Revision of Strategy Documents: MC 3/5(Final), MC 48(Final), MC 14/l(Final). Because the Political Directive contained the statement that the defense planning of NATO needed to be reviewed, the military authorities of NATO began in early 1957 carrying out an extensive examination of their existing policies for defense. Military documents which laid down the defense policy at the beginning of 1957 were MC 3/5(Final). The Strategic Concept for the Defense of NATO, 3 December 1952; MC 48(Final) and MC 48/l(Final). The most Effective Pattern of NATO Military Strength for the Next Few Years, dated 22 November 1954; and MC 14/l(Final) dated 9 December 1952. The Military Committee directed the Standing Group to carry out a review of these documents in coordination with appropriate military authorities. The International Planning Teams of the Standing Group began at once this review and revision. It was decided that the documents in the MC 14 series and MC 48 series would be re-done and that they would supersede previous papers on the subject of strategy and defense concepts. DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED A preliminary draft of the paper which was proposed to replace MC 14/l was prepared by the Standing Group planners in early January. It was for-

19 NATO CONFIDENTIAL NATO gSGRCT'

warded to the Major NATO Commzinders, including SACEUR, in order to develop their views and ideas on the subject. The Standing Group, while not bound by regulation to do so, definitely wished SACEUR's views to be reflected in the fined, product. SACEUR, more than any other person in NATO, would have to "live with" the documents on strategy and the other authorities could not, in fairness, overlook his thinking in preparing this (7) revision of major defense policy.v

SGN's International Planning Teams' Reviews and Revisions. On 17 January, this first paper, entitled IPT 131/36, The Overall Strategic Concept for the Defense of the NATO Area, was sent to SACEUR asking for his comments and its return to the Standing Group as soon as possible. The draft of IPT 131/36 was reviewed by the SHAPE staff and, on 9 February, the Standing Group was told that SACEUR considered the document "sound overall strategic guidance for the defense of NATO. " However, certain changes in the document were recommended. SHAPE asked the Standing Group to insert a clause reading "NATO has no intention of limiting its reaction to a general attack by the Soviets and in such a case plans to use nuclear weapons from the outset." Again, SHAPE suggested a wording which better defined SACEUR's concept of force structure by saying, "NATO forces must be primarily organized, trained and equipped to carry out their mission of defense of NATO territory. At the same time^it^mujtjbe recognized that some forces of the NATO nations may be required to retain the flexibility to permit action to meet limited military situations short of general war ) outside the NATO area."^ One suggestion for a change in wording by SACEUR brought a query from one of the nations and resulted in a fuller explanation of its reasoning

(7) IPT 131/36, 17 Jan 57, SGM 59/57, 17 Jan 57. DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED (8) Radio,, SHAPE to SGN, SH 40358, 9 Feb 57. by the SHAPE staff. SHAPE had requested that, in describing the defense aims of the Alliance, the words "as far forward as possible" be deleted, and that also the phrase "to maintain order on the home fronts" be added to another portion of the papers. French authorities were puzzled by the reasoning behind these suggestions, and on 18 February, SACEUR undertook to explain to the Standing Group the reasons for making them. The deletion of "as far forward as possible" was deemed necessary and important. "In the early days of Allied Command Europe, " the Standing Group was told, "when our resources were meager and we were just getting organized, our strategy was based on the concept of defending as far forward as possible. However, as time went on and our resources and experience increased, we became able to carry out our full mission which is to defend all of NATO territory and its people. Our forward strategy concept is based on that principle and to qualify it by any statement such as "as far forward as possible" would be a retrograde step. Considering the various nations which comprise Allied Command Europe, such as Germany, any strategy which does not call for the defense of all (9) NATO territory would be unacceptable.m "Our reason for recommending the insertion of "and to maintain order on the home fronts" is that the maintenance of order and the ability to cope with 5th column activities, saboteurs, commandos, parachutists, etc., in any future war would be of critical importance." The responsibility for this task was briefly alludéd to in the draft paper, but SACEUR believed that the paper should include, as one of the basic principles of defense, the fact that Nationsd Authorities would take necessary steps to deal with this problem. A portion of this paper, dealing with Area Planning Guidance, after further revision by the Standing Group was sent to SACEUR on 11 March,

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED this time entitled IPT 131/36 (Revised) (Draft Appendix). SACEUR concurred with the guidance contained in this part of the basic document, but suggested changes in wording to preclude any misunderstanding that the concept for the (9) Radio, SHAPE to SGN, SH 40364, 18 Feb 57. defense of Western Europe envisaged any large scale counter-offensive against the Soviet Union; and to emphasize that the nuclear capability and deployment of the 6th Fleet made the Mediterranean equally important as an area from which sea-based nuclear striking power would be launched/*^

The Standing Group had not seen fit to remove the terms "as far forward as possible" from the revised draft of MC 14/2 (Revised) or from its sister document MC 48/2, and on 1 April SACEUR again explained that under the terms of the North Atlantic Treaty he was responsible for defending all of the territory of Allied Command Europe. In all political guidance which he had received, including the latest Political Directive, this fact has been stressed. "Our objective, " he said, "is no less than to protect the whole of NATO territory and to use this generalization 'as far forward as possible' is a retrograde step when considered against our acknowledged forward strategy The overall. Strategic Concept could not, of course, be altered without changing or at least re-examining the measures which would be necessary to carry out the concept. Accordingly the Standing Group sent to SACEUR, several weeks after the first document had arrived, a draft of the study on such measures which was labelled 178/70 (Draft). It was intended that this draft report when placed in final form should be issued as MC 48/2. The (12) Standing Group asked that SACEUR review and return this draft. ' A detailed appraisal of the document was sent back to the Standing

Group on 1 March suggestin(13g numerou) s changes in wording in order to avoid possibl»e misinterpretation/

(10) Rad, SHAPEto SGN, SH 40379, 1 Apr 57. (11) Ibid. (12) SGM-104-57, 5 Feb 57. (13) Ltr, SHAPE Comments on IPT 178/70 (Draft): "Measures to Implement the Strategic Concept, " 1 Mar 57, to SGN, w/encls SHAPE 48/57 and SHAPE 49/57, Mar 57. MC 48/2 was sent to the nations for their comments on 15 March. DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED SHAPE 57/67 NATO " SECftÊÇ-

Review by Major NATO Commanders and National Military Authorities. The two policy papers in draft form had been sent, not only to the Major NATO Commanders, but had been reviewed also by national military authorities, particularly at a meeting of the Military Representatives Com- mittee on 21 March. As a result of the comments received from the commanders and the national military officials, the Standing Group drew up a compilation of suggested changes to the documents for presentation to the Military Committee. On SACEUR's objection to inclusion of 'as far forward as possible1 the SGN took a middle course, telling the Military Committee, for whom their compilation was intended, "In view of the NATO-wide familiarity with this term, the Standing Group reserved on this point, desiring to draw it to (14) the attention of the Military Committee. "v ' At a meeting of the Military Committee on 6 April, the two documents in question came up for discussion and examination. Air Marshal Constantino was present in Washington D. C. as SACEURTS representative. All points at issue were discussed fully and resolved either by compromise or by complete agreement. SHAPE'S objection to "as far forward as possible, " while discussed at length, was not fully accepted, and in the final document approved by the Committee, the phrase, surrounded by euphemistic modifiers, was retained. At the conclusion of these discussions, the Military Committee approved MC 14/2 (Revised) and MC 48/2 as amended and agreed to forward them to the North Atlantic Council for its consideration. (For complete record of these discussions see MC 16th session, 29 April 1957, pages 5-13). At the conclusion of the actions in the Military Committee, the Chair- man thanked the Standing Group for the expeditious way in which it had handled this matter and stated that the method followed had enabled the non-Standing Group nations to become familiar with the papers and to express their national DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED views at an early stage.

(14) MCM-3-57, 2 Apr 57, and MCM-5-57, 2 Apr 57, both addressed to the Military Cmttee and dealing with MC 14/2 (Revised) and MC 48/2 respectively. mm coimDEmmi

Approval of New Policy Documents by the NAC. The North Atlantic Council met on 10 May 1957 and approved the new policy documents on the Overall Strategic Concepts for the Defense of the NATO area and the Measures to Implement the Strategic Concept. In approving these documents, however, the Council agreed that such approval was without prejudice to the right of any national delegation at a later stage to ask for reconsideration of any part of the documents in question. All delegations except those of Iceland and Luxembourg participated in the discussion. Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark and Norway all favored some reservation in approving the papers. The other eight repre- (15) sentative8 were prepared to approve the papers as written. Typical of the type of reservation which was raised was that of the German representative, who announced that on behalf of his Government he would agree to these documents but that this agreement was given under the assumption that the Shield Forces would be not less than the 30 divisions required by SACEUR, and that there would be no change in the contributions envisaged to the Shield by the individual countries. He stated that if General Norstad's study should conclude that the Shield Forces needed to be increased, nothing in these documents should stand in the way of doing so. The Netherlands representative pointed out that the question of the relative importance of deterrent forces and Shield Forces was still unsettled, despite lengthy debate in the past. The wording of MC 14/2' however gave the impression that the point had been settled. The US representative pointed out that the Political Directive was the controlling document for all studies being made, including SACEUR's Mini- mum Force Study, He felt that the wording in the two documents being considered was in consonance with the political directive, and in particular he could not see how SACEUR's study based on the Political Directive could DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED clarify a point on which the Council itself was uncertain. He stated US approval of the document.

(15) Rad, SGREP to SGN, dtd 10104524 Z LOSTAN 2050, 10 May 57. NATO AJCfetU1 - MAJQ G®m®BmM=i The representative of the Standing Group who was present at the meeting pointed out that it was urgent to approve fliese documents as written in order that the current studies by commanders could proceed on the basis of these two documents. He, too, emphasized that these two documents were written within the framework of the Political Directive, and that the Council should not attempt to alter them. In reporting on the meeting to the Standing Group, General de Chassey, SGLO, stated: "My feeling is that some members of the Council expect that SACEUR's study will not only resolve purely military problems, but even revise the strategic concept. Further, it appears that the Council regards present MC 14/2 and 48/2 as interim documents only which may require revision in the light of future discussions after receipt of SACEUR's study."

Alert Measures - Background. Western Europe had lived since about 1947 in constant and growing danger of invasion and seizure from the East. The price of cooperative defense involved more than money. It involved in many cases the yielding of certain national prerogatives and even some aspects of national sovereignty. This yielding was done normally in almost direct proportion to the intensity of the danger, or at least the appearance of the danger. In no way was this more evident than in the efforts made by SACEUR to establish certain definite and workable rules for preliminary actions and precautionary steps in an Alert System. When the defense strategy had been examined thoroughly under General Gruenther in 1953 and 1954, one of the greatest weaknesses revealed was the lack of any firm system of alerts which would allow SACEUR's forces to get into position for an impending enemy attack. The Capabilities Plan 1957 judged this to be one of the major areas of risk and weakness, and the accompanying Program recommendations urged that the matter be studied DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED to see what could be done. MC 49, the end product of SACEUR's Capabilities

25 Mm ümx ^mi nato shelter"

Plan, stated: "Surprise will be a major factor in any future war involving NATO, and the degree of surprise attained by the enemy could greatly influence the outcome of the war. The ability of NATO to withstand and react to the first blow will depend on the extent to which our forces are in effective alert status at the time of the enemy's surprise attack." Even before the publication of this document, however, SACEUR had set up a formal alert system which was published in February 1954.^*^

Negotiations with National Authorities on Alert Measures. The North Atlantic Council had directed SACEUR to negotiate through his Major Subordinate Commanders with national authorities to seek their agreement to the implementation of these measures on the declaration by an authorized NATO commander of a Simpl e or Reinforced Alert. This formal system in itself was weak and could not possibly support the strategy envisaged in the "New Approach" documents. For instance, even though valid intelligence information forecast a surprise attack, the political climate at the time might preclude putting the formal alert system into effect. There were other drawbacks too, but basically the formed, alert system was valid only for conditions of mounting tension. A Simple Alert would be put in effect to make sure that the two Alerts which could possibly follow would be carried out promptly. Under the conditions of Simple Alert, certain personnel would be recalled to active duty to ensure combat effectiveness in some units, security measures against surprise attack, the deployment of forces required for early warning, preparation of demolitions, and the security of vital points. There were also other actions under this Simple Alert. The Simple Alert normally would be called throughout Allied Command Europe only after approval of the Governments had been obtained through the Permanent Representatives to the Council. DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED (16) SHAPE/70/54, 12 Feb 54,

-WrtTO CFiCIlBIi— However, if the emergency were sufficiently extreme and the delay might endanger his forces, SACEUR would declare a Simple Alert in his area of responsibility, as could his M^jor Subordinate Commanders within theirs. The next stage in the Alert System, the Reinforced Alert, which called fpr achieying the maximum possible preparations to meet and counter a So- viet attack, could not be executed secretely. Typical of the actions under a Reinforced Alert would be the evacuation of selected non-combatants, the deployment of air, ground and naval forces to their battle positions, mobilization of many combat units, the withdrawal of stock piles from advance areas, etc. Just as the Reinforced Alert was stronger than the Simple Alert, so were the provisions for calling it. Normally, a Reinforced Alert could be called only after Governments had approved such action through their Permanent Representatives to the Council. In the event, however, that the situation appeared so urgent as to preclude obtaining prior approval through the Council, SACEUR might in consultation with the Standing Group and with the approval of the individual Governments concerned, put into effect a Re- inforced Alert or specific measures of this alert either throughout his entire command or in the affected areas, as necessary. The final type of alert was not one which was precautionary or preliminary in nature, but a General Alert which would mark the outbreak of hostilities. In this case, SACEUR's operational plans would be carried out. When the problem of alerts had been considered by the Council in July 1953, the following actions had been taken. The Council has approved the Standing Group document SG 129/4(Final) as amended, as a basis for negotiations between the Supreme Commanders and their national authorities. They had agreed that during such bilateral negotiations the Supreme Com- manders would have to act in accordance with the Standing Group document since they had no other instructions, but certain members of the Council were not able yet to endorse this procedure officially. The Council reserved DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED the right to re-examine the document after they had received the Standing

27 Group report on the outcome of negotiations between Supreme Commanders (17) and the National Authorities.

SACEUR's Required Alert Measures - SHAPE/76/56. The position in November 1956 then, during the time of the Suez and Himgarian crises, was extremely indefinite. The alert measures required by SACEUR and which had been laid down in SHAPE/76/56 were still under negotiation with many of the governments concerned. In fact, SACEUR had received final acceptance of his measures only from Canada. No final response had been received fr om Turkey; the US had accepted with minor reservations; and the remaining nations expressed reservations of varying nature and importance. Until the expiration of the "resefve powers" in Germany the Ambassadors of France, the United Kingdom and the United States remained responsible for implementation, in conjunction with the German authorities, of SACEUR's alert measures.

The Standing Group, only five days before General Norstad assumed command, addressed the Council in the strongest terms pointing out the great need for workable and effective alert measures. The Standing Group told the Council: "In the light of the international situation, Standing Group urges members of the Council concerned to exert pressure on their respective national authorities to complete negotiations in Allied Command Europe, (18) Allied Command Atlantic, and Channel Command alert measures." Shortly before General Norstad became SACEUR, SHAPE prepared and presented to the Standing Group a Military Alert System. This system would affect directly only military forces, could be put into effect by military oommanders, and would not depend on prior negotiation and agreement. Under this system, the NATO commanders could declare through calling an Alert that they believed a situation existed where an enemy attempt at DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED (17) C-M(56)125, 15 Nov 56. (18) Ibid. iiviL \l JX-: L ^vL 28

Ti *iTn innnrT I lyyyay vAiv; i!,Yd\ ' iiY SHAPE 57/67 NATO SECRET^

surprise attack was imminent or that an attack had actually started, but which for valid reasons could not be met by SACEUR's formal alert system. The measures which SHAPE prescribed were only military actions which would resemble routine field exercises and maneuvers. Briefly, there were two stages in the proposed military alert system: first, the Orange Alert, the so-called precautionary stage in which if sufficient warning were received, certain military actions could be taken. Pene- tration of the radar screen or a similar urgent warning would result in declaring a Scarlet. The ACE counter-surprise military alert system was outlined in detail, including the definite steps which would be taken under each phase of an alert. This document was sent to the Standing Group on 22 October 1956, with the request that it be approved and that SACEUR be authorized to establish this system in conjunction with his Major Subordinate Commanders and in coordination with national authorities. He emphasized that this system was complementary to the Formal Alert System which he (19) was still attempting to negotiate with national authorities.

The Standing Group Report on SACEUR's Alert Measures - MC 67(Revised). After examining SACEUR's proposal, the Standing Group prepared a report in the form of Document MC 67(Revised) and presented it to the Mili- tary Committee on 4 December. Meanwhile the events in Hungary and Suez had greatly heightened the urgency and need for a workable Military Alert System. The Military Committee recommended to the Council that it approve SACEUR's proposals with the reservation that the Military Alert System should be applicable only to assigned or earmarked forces. General Norstad, who was present when the Military Committee considered MC 67, pointed out that the events of the last few weeks had made it far more urgent that action be taken to establish a recommended system, and he urged that the Committee

(19) Ltr, to Chairman SGN, subj: ACE Counter-Surprise Military Alert DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED System, 22 Oct 56, with 2 Enclosures.

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NATO JLEGR-ET"

approve this document. Virtually all the national Chiefs of Staff who were present commented on this Alert System, some of them wishing to retain the power to call an alert within the National Ministries of Defense. Another viewpoint was that only SACEUR, SACLANT and CHANCOMTEE should be authorized to call an alert. General Norstad pointed out that to limit the 4 authority for ordering an alert even to the Major Subordinate Commanders would be unduly restrictive. He felt that there should be some circumstances where authority could be delegated at a lower level, even down to Army Groups or ATAFs. This, of course, could be decided in negotiations with the nations which were called for in MC 67.

New Negotiations with National Authorities on Alert Measures. The Military Committee decided not to submit the document to the Council for approval, and approved it as amended. They asked SACEUR to begin direct negotiations with the national authorities. On 17 January 1957, General Norstad directed his Major Subordinate Commanders to carry on negotiations with the appropriate national authorities in order to establish a Counter-Surprise Military Alert System, and to submit the results to him by 1 May 1957. The Appendix to MC 67 was to be used as a guide for the negotiation of agreements. In addition, the military authorities who were empowered to order implementation of the various measures were to be clearly defined. Introduction of the whole system or any part of it would be facilitated by the ACE Intelligence Watch Condition (NATO Intelligence Watch Condition, AO 2231, 27 Nov 56), which might make it possible to decide as to the degree of alert to be applied/*^ The Council had stated in the past that: "The nature and extent of political guidance to NATO Commanders in event of armed aggression against NATO cannot be defined in advance. Rapid procedure should be established

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED (20) Memorandum, subj: "Counter Surprise Militeury Alert System, 17 Jan 57, AG 1210/1 PANDP. MATO TONFiIDENTIAL MAT© '(DONRDENTIALT SHAP E 57 / 67 NATO — S^GRTET"

whereby NATO Commanders can obtain this guidance quickly. The Standing Group or the appropriate Supreme Allied Commander concerned should seek this guidance from the Permanent Representatives to the North Atlantic (21) Council through the Secretary General.,,v The negotiations carried out by Major Subordinate Commanders with national authorities got under way at once.. However, only CINCSOUTH and CINCAFMED met the dead-line. On 20 May General Norstad pointed out to Generad Valluy that this was causing him some concern, but was told that he could not expect a reply until 1 July because of difficulties which had been encountered during the negotiations. CINCNORTH was almost a month late with his reply. ^ ^ On 23 July, representatives of the MSCs met at SHAPE at a meeting conducted by DCPANDP. At this time it was determined that as a result of negotiations which had been carried on, most of the national authorities agreed

to delegate authority to declare the Orang(23) e and Scarlet Alerts to SACEUR and his Major Subordinate Commanders. The US Authorities were prepared to delegate this authority only to SACEUR as a NATO Commander, and reserved the right to have the Counter Surprise Military Alerts declared for US forces by USAREUR and USAFE. The Italian Authorities wanted the Counter Surprise Military Alerts declared by SACEUR or CINCSOUTH to be transmitted to the forces, including the assigned forces, through them, which would cause unacceptable delay. SHAPE would have to negotiate with the US and Italian Authorities in order, if possible, to achieve a policy more in accordance with the requirements of an emergency, situation. (21) SG 129/4(Revised Final), para 6, quoted in C-M(56)125, 15 Nov 56. (22) Memo, DCPANDP from ACPANDP, 29 May 57, PANDP 1210/1 ; Rad, CINCENT to SACEUR, PPCE 11251, 17 May 57; AFNORTH 1210 OPS, 27 May 57. (23) AG/l 2IO/I PANDP, 23 Jul 57, MemofromGenGazin, sub j:'lRe suit s of DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED the Negotiations carried out by MSCs in Conjunction with their own Subordinate Commands and the National Authorities as regards Counter Surprise Military Alert System. .31 TOTO CONFPENTilAr NATO -CTTTTR TTT As regards the forces stationed near the Iron Curtain, the delegated authority granted to SACEUR and CINCENT should, in case of extreme urgency, (that is to say, in the event of the radar screen being crossed by a formation of enemy bombers), be extended to the Commanders of the ATAFs, Army Groups and equivalent Naval Commanders, who, in this single case, should be authorized to proclaim the Scarlet Alert for all troops under their command. Similar powers should be delegated to the Commanders, specified by name, of Air Forces, CATAC^or Air Divisions stationed near the Iron Curtain who, in the event of an atomic attack, could protect their units only by sending their aircraft into the air.

The German Authorities were concerned about the situation which might arise as a result of the declaration of one of the Counter-Surprise Military Alerts by some national commanders without coordination through CINCENT or SACEUR. Further negotiations on this point would have to be carried out, with the support of SHAPE if necessary, in order to ensure that, in an emergency, the same alert stage be decreed throughout the territory of the Federal Republic. As a result of a recommendation by CINCENT, the decision was made that certain preliminary measures which could be continued for weeks or even months in the event of tension, should be superimposed upon the Counter- Surprise Military Alert System. It was decided to propose that these measures, which were preliminary to the Counter-Surprise stages, would be called "State of Military Vigilance." The State of Military Vigilance would not be another alert stage, but a military condition, during which certain simple measures, adapted to military procedures and to local geographical conditions, would be implemented by the commands which previously had worked them out. The purpose of the State of Military Vigilance was the alerting of the armed forces so as to enable them easily to meet an emergency situation, by applying as quickly as DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED

•CATAC= Commandement Aerien Tactique. There were two of these, one of which is assigned to NATO and the other retained under French control. SHAPE 57/67 NATa

possible any of the stages of the Formal Alert System or of the Counter- Surprise Military Alert System. In the event of tension, the State of Mili- tary Vigilance would be declared by SACEUR for the assigned forces, and he would recommend that it be applied by the National Authorities to the earmarked and national forces if these authorities had not already taken this step themselves. Authority to declare the State of Military Vigilance could be delegated by SACEUR to the Major Subordinate Commanders.

Other decisions included the determination that a single Alert Book, called "SACEUR Alert System, " which would contain matters relating to the State of Vigilance, the Counter Surprise Military Alert System, the Formal Alert System and appropriate annexes, would be published. While it was obviously necessary that SACEUR's Alert System be tested during exercises, certain difficulties arose in the North and in the Center. In the North, it would be necessary to operate on a national basis since there were virtually no assigned forces in Norway or Denmark. In the Center, any exercising of this system during maneuvers would require the approval of national Chiefs of Staff for combined exercises, the approval of the appropriate ministers for any crossing of frontiers, and the obtaining of permis- sion for the airforces to deploy at airfields in France which were at the present time reserved. It was decided at this meeting that SHAPE would write to the Standing Group asking for approval of changes to the Military Alert System which SHAPE had proposed in October 1956, and after receiving this approval would write to MODs and MSCs sending them a final draft for the State of Military Vigilance and Counter-Surprise Military Alert System. The Major Subordinate Commands would send to SHAPE recommended changes to the Formal Alert System, proposed improvements to the book on "SACEUR Alert System" and, in addition to certain more detailed measures, would list the authorities to whom they wished the SACEUR Alert System book to be sent. DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED SACEUR's Emergency Defense Plan 1957. Following precedent, SACEUR in 1957 prepared and maintained plans to defend Allied Command Europe, using those forces and weapons immediately available, in event a surprise attack should be launched by the potential eriemy. 'This plan, the Emergency Defense Plan (EDP), had been issued in July 1956 to become effective 1 January 1957. The general situation which it was designed to meet was one under which war was forced upon the NATO nations by acts of aggression of the USSR and/or her Satellites during 1957.^^

The EDP was specific and detailed. The forces which were expected to be available to SACEUR were set out broadly in the first section, but itemized in later sections of the plan. This included assigned forces, external forces and certain national forces. The mission of Allied Command Europe was to "Defend the area of Allied Command Europe so as to provide essential protection and control of areas and LOCs of vital importance; provide protection of Allied mobilization and reinforcement preparatory to sustained defense and/or subsequent offensive operations; and conduct an air offensive and such other offensive operations as forces available will permit, to attain allied objectives." The mission of each of the major subordinate commanders was defined in the plan and the detailed tasks of each were also stated. The section on Atomic Warfare, Annex C, set out the concept and procedures for this warfare.

SACEUR's Atomic Strike Plan. In order to provide for the optimum use of atomic weapons by his forces in the operations envisaged in SACEUR's Emergency Defense Plan 1-57, SACEUR had issued on 17 August 1956 his Atomic Strike Plan 1-57, to become effective 1 January 1957. Set forth in the basic plan were the task

(24) EmergencyDefensePlan, SACEUR 1957, SHAPE/500-1/56, 15 Jul 56; with Corrigenda. DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED LVZA.: Lv L reorganization, the mission, the concept of atomic operations, the tasks assigned and to be performed and information on logistic matters. Annexes to the plan carried more specific planning information, dealing with special strike forces, targets , reconnaissance, electronics, communications and regional commanders' plans. Changes, based on new information and regional commanders' plans, were issued to the basic plan throughout the year. Seven (25) major changes were issued in 1957. In order to avoid the issuance of a completely new Atomic Strike Plan each year, SHAPE decided in 1957 to drop the year designation from the Atomic Strike Plan (ASP) and to make changes only to the basic plan; each change to the basic plan would be shown by putting a slant and new number after ASP, i.e. ASP/l, ASP/2, etc. Regional plans in effect during 1957 would remain in effect until 30 June 1958. Major Subordinate Commanders were told to prepare and submit new atomic plans to SHAPE for review by 1 February 1958. These new plans would become effective on 1 Jvily 1958 and remain in effect for a one-year period. (2,(.)

Atomic Planning Policy. When atomic planning began at SHAPE or at least when atomic planning was first authorized at SHAPE, steps were taken to introduce atomic planning policies for command levels below SHAPE. In 1954, when these policies were established, ACE was seriously restricted by the number of atomic weapons available and great centralization of control was called for. Early in 1957 in view of the greater number of weapons, more adequate delivery forces and the expansion of ground forces since that date, General Norstad decided to have this basic policy reviewed. Because much of the

(25) 1957 Atomic Strike Plan of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, SHAPE/172/56. AG 6430 AD, with changes 1-7. Primary responsibility for preparing and maintaining this play lay with the Air and Special Operations Division, SHAPE. DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED (26) COFS Minutes, SEC 2030, 16 Oct 57, para 5g. SHAPE 57/67 NATO SECRET

basic information was still restricted to US armed forces, he directed three senior American officer« to make the initial study, which would then be reviewed and published by the SHAPE staff. The officers, who began their work at SHAPE in late February, were: Major General Lee, CG FOURATAF;

Major General Cooper, G3 CENT AG; and Rear Admiral Yeomansl Deputy ^ STRIKFORSOUTH. During the course of their review these officers visited the Major Subordinate Commands of ACE and certain component commands. As a result of the investigations conducted by these officers, --the "Three Wise Men" as they became known locally-- certain changes were made to the ASP, particularly in those portions granting authority for release of atomic weapons. DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED

36 in- iTT).-xv-; j vi —SiECftET FORCES

General Appraisal Based on 1956 Annual Review. Successful defense of NATO territories, regardless of the adequacy of planning and other types of preparation, could be mounted only if the nations provided sufficient, adequately trained forces located in the proper place at the proper time. Since the inception of Allied Command EXirope the forces problem had been one of the most serious with which the Allied Commanders had had to contend. For various reasons, mainly economic, since the beginning of ACE in 1951, the nations had never furnished those forces which SHAPE believed were required. Nor had the situation changed in 1957. In fact, the situation in some aspects had deteriorated.^ In a report at the highest NATO level following the conclusion of the I956 Annual Review, NATO authorities found grave inadequacies in existing NATO forces. All the member governments had based their defense planning on the directives and concepts contained in MC 48. This, of course, provided for a build-up of forces on the general order of magnitude forecast in the 1956 planning goals established by the 1953 Annual Review. To be added to this was an appropriate contribution from Germany and an integrated atomic

(1) For detailed recapitulation of Ground and Air Force Uiiits Assigned, Earmarked or Earmarked for Assignment on Mobilization to SACEUR as of 1 January 57, see SHAP E/1311157 and SHAPE/13/2/57. For Strength totals of forces assigned, earmarked or earmarked for assignment on mobilization to SACEUR see SHAPE/252/56, SHAPE/253/56 SHAPE/252/57 and SHAPE/253/57. Detailed information on Manpower, Personnel in Uniform, Military Ser- vice and Reserve Mobilization may be found in Semi-Annual Manpower Digests, AG 1110 PA, 1 Oct 56 and 1 Oct 57. Strength and Composition of Headquarters through Allied Command Europe is reported in detail in Allied Headquarters Strength Report DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED (Reports Control Symbol: SH-AG-2) issued periodically.

37 - NATO JLCIUL1T ~ :d

capability. NATO authorities found that the ground, sea and air forces in early 1957 were inadequate to enable the Commanders to defend NATO's area. This was particularly true in the Central Region of Allied Command Europe where, owing to withdrawal of French forces, there had been a marked decrease during 1956 in the number of army M-day units available to fight in case of invasion. There were serious shortages in naval forces, and there were considerable deficiencies in the air forces. Although the German authorities had said they would provide a significant contribution to the NATO forces by 1957, the full number of NATO forces from Germany was not expected to be ready until 1959 or even later. Some progress towards establishing an integrated atomic capability for Allied Command Europe had been made.

NATO military authorities concluded after appraising available forces that the nations should give first priority to improving the effectiveness of their control and reporting systems for air defense; that they must reconstitute on an urgent basis the army elements of the Shield Forces in Central Europe; forestall the deterioration of the navies; and improve the aircraft and air crew situation. It was intended that forces of Allied Command Europe would deter war and, failing that, would defend all of NATO territories. ThePolitical Directive defined the need for "...forces which are so organized, disposed, trained and equipped that he (the enemy) will conclude that the chances of a favorable decision are too small to be acceptable, and that^atal risks would be involved if he launched or supported an armed attack, even with superior numbers and the advantage of surprise." The SHAPE interpretation of the mission of SACEUR's forces, contained in the Minimum Force Study, set forth three tasks: (1) to protect NATO's offensive striking power - the weapons, the installations and the guidance systems of the nuclear strike forces; (2) to join in the nuclear counter-offensive that would destroy the enemy's

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED to , ability and will pursue general war; (3) to hold the enemy forces until the

38 ACE nuclear counter-offensive had registered its full effects, and mean- (2) while to keep open the sea approaches.

Basic Responsibilities of SACEUR's Shield Forces & Strike Forces. The basic tasks required of the army, navy and air forces in being were to retaliate with a strong atomic counter-offensive force; to provide early warning and alerts; to maintain an effective air defense; and to ensure a proper Shield. The defense of Western Europe demanded forces that were highly diversified, mutually supporting, and capable of both nuclear and conventional action. SACEUR envisioned his ready forces as being constituted under two major categories according to essential tasks. These two categories, the Shield forces and the Strike forces, were mutually dependent and had over- lapping functions. The Shield forces, for instance, far from being passive, were designed like the Strike forces for a vigorous forward strategy. Both had air, land and sea components. Reduced to its simplest terms, the Shield was a barrier of soldiers, tanks, ships, andsug£orting aircraft that would constitute a positive defense in time and space. Its mission would be to hold until the atomic counter-offensive, launched at the first alarm, had so damaged the invading forces, their lines of communication and their reserves^ that their main attack would be halted. The Shield then, taking advantage of_ the blows inflicted by the air counter-offensive, would force the enemy from NATO's borders" SACEUR believed that the Shield forces played a very valuable role within the deterrent, since they were equipped not only to give warning of attack, but actually to meet the attack and force the enemy to deploy and, most important, to force the enemy to decide if he actually wanted to risk the consequences of general war. In limited actions such as peripheral attacks, the Shield forces were intended to repel any attempted invasion short of a DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED major Soviet effort. (2) SHAPE/154/57, p.16; See details of this in Chapt. IV. 39 ML N^UNCLföSIFIED CtTA T3TT K7/A7 . , INA iU ^JljkjicET NATO UNCLASSIFIED The Strike forces were those forces having the prime function of launching an immediate nuclear counter-blow against the enemy's military structure throughout SACEUR's zone of responsibility. These forces would act in concert and in coordination with such external nuclear forces as the US Strategic Air Commeuid and the UK Bomber Command. It was essential that the Strike forces be maintained a,t utmost readiness and that they meet certain definite qualifications such as dispersal throughout ACE, have prompt access to nuclear warhead stockpiles, be able to mount immediate effective counter attacks regardless of damage from the enemy's opening blows, and be able to make maximum use of surface-to- surface missiles from land and sea launching sites.^

Problems of Central Europe Shield Forces. The greatest need for ground forces for the Shield existed in Central Europe. The last estimate of the number of ground forces that would be needed in Central Europe to carry out the forward strategy using a minimum Shield backed by reserves that could be brought to battle readiness within a few days« called for 30 M-day divisions, supported by adequate ground atomic delivery forces. General Gruenther, shortly before his departure, had determined that it would not be possible to implement a true forward strategy before December 1959 because the essential forces would not exist before that date. Factors affecting the implementation of the forward strategy were the build-up of German forces, the return of French forces from North

(3) For a full understanding of what each of these forces or types of forces entailed, their composition and their missions, consult SHAPE/l54/57 and SHAPE/l 54/1/57, Volumes 1 and 2 of the Minimum Force Study 1958-63. See also Memorandum of Conference, General Norstad with senior SHAPE officers, 23 Apr 57. See also General Norstad's remarks following CPX VII, SHAPE/SEC/7/57, pp. 6-7. DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED

IJNCLASSIFiEiX > - J'V/ ! \ I . 1 :A : L L „..! J, rniö ctd«lCLASSiF,ED SHAPE 57/67 NATO

Africa, the extent to which the other nations were able to meet their established force goals, and the provision of adequate atomic ground delivery fore es. At the beginning of 1957 the United States had five divisions located in Germany; the United Kingdom had two infantry divisions, two armoured divisions and one infantry brigade under Northern Army Group in Germany, and had earmarked in the United Kingdom one infantry brigade group, giving a total of 77, 000 men in Germany. France had two infantry divisions in Ger- many, and planned to return three other divisions from North Africa by the end of 1957. In Holland, the Netherlands had one infantry division; Belgium had one infantry and one armoured division in Germany; and the Canadian Government had assigned one infantry brigade to Germany.

General Norstad told the Standing Group in January 1957 that he had on hand in Central Europe six 280 mm gun battalions, five Honest John rocket battalions, and six Corporal guided missile battalions. The Commander of Allied Forces Central Europe, General Valluy, was seriously disturbed about the weakness of his ground units. The French government had withdrawn three complete divisions, considerably reducing the Btrength of a force that,even before, was insufficient. He felt his remaining divisions were less effective than they should be. He stated that the twelve so-called M-day divisions, some of which were seriously lacking in adequate equipment and specialists, would not be ready in time, nor would they be strong enough to prevent the enemy from capturing large areas of NATO territory in Western Europe. At the time, only the five American divisions could be considered as combat-ready.

Echelon System for Shield Ground Forces. Within the Shield forces, ground forces were judged in three categories. Prior to 1954, divisions had been rated as M-day divisions if they were ready for combat immediately, M+15 if they could be brought to combat effective- DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED ness in fifteen days, M+30 or M+90, and so forth. However, as an outgrowth

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of the 1957 Capabilities Plan, it had been decided that a more valid means of evaluation was required, and an Echelon system had been established, This system, which was used in establishing requirements in the Minimum Force Study 1958-63, designated ground forces ready on M-day as either (5) First Echelon Forces or Second Echelon Forces.

(5) SHAPE/450/54 defined the Echelon System as follows: M-day Forces are required to be ready for battle at all times. They must have such a high standard of readiness that they could, on D-day fight effectively against a surprise enemy attack and one which is de- livered with atomic support. Corps, divisions and supporting units in this category must be kept at all times at such a strength in manpower and equipment that they could fight effectively without undergo- ing any mobilization procedure. These are the troops which will have to take the first shock of an enemy onslaught in an atomic age; they must therefore be highly trained and highly disciplined.

First Echelon Post M-Day Forces include divisions and support units which must be immediately available to back up the active M-day forces. These divisions, having completed a rapid mobilization, must then be ready to be moved at once into the battle area, and be capable of entering the battle without further training. It follows that divisions in this category must have an adequate regular content at all times, must be so organized that they can do what is required of them on mobilization and must be brought up to operational strength every year with reservists and must then, f possible, carry out a minimum of four weeks training.

Second Echelon Post M-Day Forces include divisions and support units that require further training after mobilization. Plans must ensure that they can be rapidly mobilized. They must then be capable of being moved to areas in the rear of the battle from where they could continue their training under realistic conditions. In cases of extreme emergency, it might be necessary to use them on defensive tasks before their training was completed. Such divisions must have a regular content in peace which is adequate for their role after mobilization. They must be brought up to operational strength with reservists and trained as divisions as frequently as national considerations will allow, which should, if possible, be at least two weeks every year, and should normally never be less than one month in every two years. DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED

42 NATO UNCLASSIFIED MÄ3 U UV^rlüt!

NATO SEGftfTT^

Annual Review Planning Guidance in 1957. Land Forces. When SHAPE issued its Planning Guidance for the Annual Review to the nations during March and April 1957, the individual nations were told what SHAPE believed to be the proper direction for development of their forces. Particularly significant, however, above and beyond specific suggestions made to each nation, were the comments which accompanied SACEUR's communication to national governments. Commenting on the land forces, SACEUR stated that it was to be expected that as improved weapons systems were introduced in NATO land forces in quantity, changes in the internal structure of major units and the pattern of support forces might be required. As firm availability dates of new weapons became known, and a country's ability to absorb such weapons was shown, re-evaluation of a country's land forces could be effected. In the area of reorganization of land forces, SHAPE wished to stress the need for evolutionary development and careful planning. Premature streamlining of land force units without compensating modern equipment to provide an increase of mobility, firepower and communications, could result in daigerous weaknesses developing in Shield forces. Nations were requested to discuss with SHAPE

and Major Subordinate Commanders any planned modification of their land (6) force structure. Naval Forces. Insofar as naval forces were concerned, it was impossible to pin down the exact number of ships which represented the optimum naval force, and SHAPE in its studies was able only to give an indication of the trend and the order of magnitude of naval strength. The guidance which SHAPE gave to the nations in the Spring of 1957 had not been coordinated with the naval commanders, SACLANT and CINCHAN. The greatest problem, and one which was attacked with some vigour later in the (6) SHAPE/76/57, AG 1100 OT, 3 Apr 57. Planning Guidance issued each DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED nation for the 1957 Annual Review may be seen in files maintained by AG Central Records and by Programs Division, Annual Review Branch, SHAPE.

43 GOTO COaVlFilOEMTOL' year, was the problem of obsolescence of many ships, particularly in the smaller navies. Air Forces. The air forces presented a very special situation. The organization, re-equipment and rehabilitation of air forces was a matter which SHAPE felt would require *he maximum of coordination and effort to effect an orderly program in the attainment of the new posture without sacrificing combat potential during the transition period. The problems inherent in the introduction of new and advanced weapons systems would require the closest coordination between national and ACE military authorities in the development and execution ofplans to attain the new posture. Negotiations and agreements between nations might have to be made for the training of personnel and, where necessary, these should be arranged as soon as possible. The acquisition of suitable technically trained personnel in sufficient numbérs to ensure a capability to operate new, higher per- f formance aircraft and complicated missiles, was likely to prove difficult and plans should be made at once to meet requirements on schedule. Logistics. Insofar as logistics was concerned, SHAPE recommended that all nations build up reserves of equipment in all classes of supply along the lines of MC 55, which was then being revised by the Standing Group.

The Results of the 1957 Annual Review. The replies received as a result of the Annual Review Questionnaire were consolidated by SHAPE and the International Staff, and these replies, together with comments, were incorporated in a Report to the North Atlantic Council. Most governments found it possible to give provisional force goals for 1959 and planning goals for i960, in addition to firm goals for 1958. The Report noted that the figures for 1959 and i960 were of limited significance in view of the imminent publication of MC 70, but pointed out that (7 the firm goads for 1958 would not be affected by the Minimum Force Study. DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED

(7) Details of procedure and of SHAPE schedule in connection with AR 1957 is set out in PR/2100/AR-54/57, 25 Jul 57, and Annex I thereto. The report concluded that while ground, sea and air forces were still inadequate to assure the successful accomplishment of the mission of defending the NATO area, the over-all strength of the military forces of the Alliance showed a perceptible improvement as compared with the situation at the end of 1956.^

Military Committee Assessment of Annual Review 1957. The Military Committee concurred in the basic considerations and conclusions of the report and drew the attention of the North Atlantic Coun- (9) cil to the inadequacy of the NATO forces.

SACEUR's Combat Effectiveness Report 1956. Because of the great diversity of his forces, their wide-spread geographical location, and many other factors, it was extremely difficult for SACEUR to evaluate the quality of his forces. However, shortly after he became SACEUR, General Norstad, following a custom established by his predecessors, rendered to the Standing Group a report on forces assigned to his command and earmarked for assignment to his commandj'^ His report was based on criteria which had been established within SHAPE from the standards set up by MC 55, from reports from the individual nations, and from his Major Subordinate Commanders, from national replies to the 1956 Annual Review Questionnaire, and to a lesser extent from the personal observations and estimates of his staff and himself.

(8) C-M(57)143 dated 9 Dec 57. Part I is the Report on the 1957 Annual Review. Section II deals with the Military Considerations and includes assessments on the situation regarding forces and their fighting potential. C-M(57)l 50 dated 9 Dec 57 gives a summary of the NATO nations' force goals in tabular form. (9) MC 39/9 (Final Decision) dated 13 Dec 57. (10) SHAPE/15/57, AG 1101 OT, 9 Mar 57, SACEUR's Combat Effectiveness

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED Report 1956.

45 NATO hJbtj^gy- "1,1 "f'lA '"iIrT^rV-TYrv—n mto

The status of his forces had been affected by the decrease in the number of M-day army units, by the delay in the build-up of German forces, by the Middle East crisis and the accompanying petroleum shortage, and the continued lack of logistic equipment and reserves. All these things had served to reduce the combat effectiveness of his forces.

On the other side of the ledger, SACEUR felt that some trends were encouraging, particularly the growing public realization of the need for effective NATO forces and the recognition by the national military authorities that their national forces must be modernized and adapted to nuclear war. He saw also encouraging signs of an increased combat readiness in specific fields. For instance, a large number of his air force units had been re-equipped with modern' aircraft, communication facilities and the early warning system were progressing in a positive manner. Land Forces. The M-day units available in the Center decreased in 1956 as noted above. In the face of a land power deficiency, Belgium had changed one of its M-day divisions to post-M-day. The French Government had sent three M-day divisions from the Continent to North Africa. The German M-day divisions were delayed in activation. Theequipment reserves and the logistic support for many national units were judged to be insufficient for sustained combat operations. Encouraging signs, however, indicated an increase in M-day units by the Germans, the re-constitution of some French forces on the continent, and an increase in the Italian M-day units. Without dwelling on the first and second echelon post-M-day forces, General Norstad noted that only 7% of the first echelon and 55% of the second echelon major units were up to standard. SACEUR told the Standing Group: "I do not place undue emphasis on these figures because true battle potential cannot be assessed entirely in figures... Weaknesses in the post-M-day forces stem from the low rate of recall of reservists for training with units, shortage of equipment and re- DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED serves, weak regular elements, and an unpractised command and staff." GOT© GOftFZDsOTÜÄtÖ 46

IUTO {jÜJUI-ET NATO C0j\'F2ÖENTIAL SHAPE 57/67 NATO SEGft-ET- iviufl^

SACEUR was under no illusion that his léuid forces in their present state could easily overcome any surprise attack. But he felt that this low status of his ground troops was temporary and that improvement would come in all the areas. He stressed the need for evolutionary development and careful planning in building ground forces of the future, and he expressed concern that premature reorganization of the major units without increasing their mobility and firepower would weaken his Shield forces. He announced his intention to continue to ask the nations to consult him and his major commanders at the early stages of any plans for modifying their land force structures.

Air Forces. There were many aspects of ACE air forces which concerned SACEUR, but he believed the overall effectiveness of his air forces had improved during the year before he assumed command. "Many of the air force units of ACE, " he reported, "are still below the standard required for effective and sustained operation at short notice." Naval Forces. Progress had been made in improving the D-day readiness of his naval forces, and many encouraging signs, such as modernization and reconstruction in some navies, had taken place. He pointed out the seriousness of the problem of obsolescence of naval vessels of the smaller nations, but at the same time complimented the nations for the training of their personnel. "The personnel are of a high order, but the ships and weapons with which they are asked to fight generally leave much to be desired," SACEUR said. In concluding his report, SACEUR pointed out that a surprise attack with nuclear weapons still constituted a dangerous threat to the nations within his area of command. Should the deterrent fail, the primary task of «ill NATO forces must be to survive the initial attack and to retaliate immediately, and he urged that all nations concentrate on training their forces, that alert measures be practised, and that every effort be made DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED

IMATO (»WRDENTIÄL 47 ' NATO SHAPE 57/67 ™fl„Ä SSGRrfi^- MATO CONFIDENTIAL'

to prepare for a surprise attack.^ ^

Special Problems - British Reduction in Forces. Perhaps the development which most threatened the attainment of a Shield force sufficient to carry out SACEUR's mission was the 1957 British proposal to reduce its force contribution to ACE. Not only did this threaten to detract materially from the strength, but it threatened also to establish a precedent and possibly to encourage other nations to follow a similar pattern. In addition, this proposal had been one of the major factors in causing the re-appraisal of strategy and forces required which was directed by the Coxincil and which took the form of the 1958/63 Study.^^ The British Government announced on 24 January that it intended to change its defense policy and to re-organize and re-shape its armed forces in such a way as to achieve a substantial reduction in the defense spending. A statement on this matter containing certain justification for the action was given to the North Atlantic Council by the Permanent Representative (13) of the United Kingdom on 14 February 1957/ ' The British Government proposed to reduce its forces from 77, OOO men and officers to about 50, 000. It proposed, however, to earmark from the strategic reserve support in Great Britain a tactical headquarters and two infantry brigades totalling 5, 000 officers and men which could be sent to

(11) SHAPE/15/57, AG 1101 OT, 9 Mar 57, Ltr from SACEUR to SGN, Combat Effectiveness Report, ACE 1956. SACEUR submitted in Oc- tober 1957 a report on the progress which had been made in his command toward implementing the requirements of MC 48/2. As part of this report he included an interesting, although brief, evaluation of the current status of his forces including such factors as Atomic Capability, Abilityto survive Atomic attack, and Readiness. See SH/171/57 for this report. (12) See Chapter IV, SHAPE History 1957. (13) Document C-M(57)18, 14 Feb 57, subj: Re-Organization of UK Armed Forces. DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED

48 MATO CONFIDENTIAL SHAPE 57/67 NATO S£GRfiT

the Continent by air in the event of an emergency. Equipment for these two infantry brigades would be left in Germany. The slash in strength of 2nd Tactical Air Force, then 33 squadrons of 466 aircraft, was to be quite considerable, and it would leave the 2nd ATAF with 18 squadrons of 216 aircraft. In addition to reducing its strength on the Continent, it also intended to reduce its light bomber force from 160 to 80 aircraft. The British Government intended to complete this reduction by the end of March 1958, and would withdraw the flotillas stationed on the Elbe and Rhine Rivers, further affecting the naval forces assigned to SACEUR.

On 22 February, General Norstad presented to the Council his evaluation of the effects of the British reduction, and a copy of his views was transmitted to the Western European Union. In this appraisal, he emphasized the effects of these reductions on the military capabilities and the increased risk to the security of Western Europe. General Norstad reiterated the mission of his command, stating that only recently it had been re-affirmed in the Political Directive, which in addition to endorsing the Forward Strategy concept, stressed the importance of strong, ready, and nuclear armed Shield forces. SACEUR reminded the Council that he and his staff had been developing a plan for the 1960-62 period, calling for certain minimum forces. His plan called for a Shield of ready ground, air and sea forces with certain reserves which must be adequate to hold in the forward areas until nuclear retaliation could take effect. SACEUR had no quarrel with the way in which the British Government had decided to reorganize the 50, 000 men which it would have remaining if the cuts were made, although he said: "I view with serious concern any reduction of this magnitude, " and it would cause a considerable short-fall from the forces required by the plan he was then hoping to have approved. Theearmarking from the strategic reserve of the division headquarters of

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED the two brigades, General Norstad admitted, was significant and helped off-set the deficiency on the Continent, but if these forces were both stationed in Germany they would bolster SACEUR's M-day forces and could 49 .COMP*"— I NATO SEGftEfr

also be considered to be available to the UK in the event of an emergency elsewhere. The timing of the UK plan gave him considerable concern since it reduced his forces at a time before the full German contribution would be available, and before any significant atomic capability would exist in his ground forces on the Continent. He felt that if the British were to postpone their planned reduction until the end of 1959 when both the German contribution and the nuclear weapons delivery capability would be becoming more effective, the effects of the troop withdrawals would not be so noticeable. Because of .the way in which the British intended to effect their air force reduction and because of the deployment of ACE atomic capabilities, SACEUR did not feel that the reduction within the air force would be sufficiently great to seriously jeopardize the defense concept. The withdrawal of the Elbe and the Rhine flotillas would not greatly effect the operational facilities of his command establishment since the responsibilities of the Elbe flotillas would be taken over by the German navy. However, SACEUR concluded that "...The proposed withdrawals can be accomplished only at the cost of increasing risk to our security. Although the degree of this risk cannot be assessed precisely, it must be viewed with concern." The modifications which he had suggested and which would implicate the effects of the present proposals, were phasing the reductions into the calendar year I959, and stationing on the Continent part of the strategic reserve, rather • . . . ^ ^ . - (14) than stationing it in Great Britain.

SACEUR's Statements to NAC on UK Withdrawal. These comments by SACEUR were circulated to members of the NAC. On the afternoon of 22 February he met with the Council to present orally his further views and to answer questions asked him by the Council. He pointed out that the strategy which had been developed for the defense DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED (14) Msg, SACEUR to SGN, SHAPE 34079, 22 Feb 57. • of Central Europe, for example, called for a ready force of 30 D-day divisions, and he emphasized that the development of new weapons already had been taken into account in the establishment in this minimum, therefore it could not be reduced without risk simply by arguing that new weapons would replace man-power. This, he said, would be double counting. SACEUR stated that the could not say categorically that the proposals made by the UK would cause the success or the failure of his command in the case of war, but he was worried by the proposals. He expressed the thought that while he was concerned by the UK proposals, he would be in- finitely more concerned if these lead to a type of chain reaction, and a number of other countries proposed similar reductions. He admitted that this was not a problem for him to solve since if such a reaction did occur, there could be no question of implementing his defense plans. The various members of the North Atlantic Council who were present gave their views on the proposal.' The German representative said that his Government was gravely disturbed, in fact to an extent greater than the current publicity in the press would indicate. His Government, he said, had gone so far as to offer to take steps to defray part of the expense of maintaining the forces in Germany. He pointed out that the German armed forces in Central area (12 divisions) could not be counted on before 1959 or i960. The Belgian representative noted that the size of each national contribution inevitably affected the degree of command or leadership which each country exercised, and he wondered, in case the United Kingdom reduced its forces substantially, if it was prepared to see the degree of leadership it enjoyed proportionally reduced. He compared the contribution by the Benelux countries of four divisions with the three under-strength divisions which would remain in Europe if the British plan were carried out. He endorsed strongly General Norstad's suggestion that the time phasing of DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED the reduction should be extended.

•two miwmm&h 51 EOT© COWRDENTpa! SHAPE 57/67 NATO REGRET

Other national representatives expressed similar views, recognizing the economic facts that had moved the British action, but none the (15) less deploring the trend/ .

Discussion of UK Reduction within the Western European Union. Following receipt of SACEUR's views, the Western European Union discussed the proposed reductions and recommended to the NAC that a new overall review of the resources of the Alliance be made. The WEU further recommended that after the initial reduction of 13, 500, no further reductions be made until discussions were held in the WEU in October 1957 in light of further review. The Council of the WEU on 18 March issued a statement indicating that seven governments of the Council would recommend to the NAC, of which they were all members, that they study urgently certain proposals by Chancellor Adenauer of Germany. These proposals called for a new overall review of the resources of the Alliance which would cover military requirements and defense aims, Relationships between conventional and atomic forces and weapons, and other broad questions. (See Chapter IV for SHAPE participation in this review.) In the meantime, the UK Govern- ment, pending the result of this review by NATO, would carry out the plans already confirmed for 1957-58, keèping in mind SACEUR's views. This would mean essentially a reduction of 13, 500 men of which the vast majority would be administrative and anti-aircraft troops. Any further deductions and the question of the location of the "strategic reserve" of 5, 000 men, referred to in SACEUR's earlier report, would be decided in October 1957 (16) after further discussions within the WEU.

British White Paper on Proposed Withdrawals. On 4 April 1957 the British Government issued a White Paper outlining DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED its future policy on defense and defending its proposal. The British Govern- (15) C-R(57)ll, 26 Feb'57, Record of a meeting of the NAC with SACEUR.

(U) C-M(S7)41. 31 M„ 57mTO e0MF1DgfÄ - , ment said that the over-riding consideration in all military planning must be to prevent war rather than to prepare for it. While recognizing that Britain must provide her fair share of the armed forces needed for the ground defense of Europe, the paper concluded that the armed strength of the three services of the UK could be reduced by almost 30% by the end of 1962 by having a smaller force on an all-regular footing, and ending national service as soon as possible. Reaction to the British Paper by the North Atlantic Council was quite strong and markedly critical of the British proposal. Considerable concern was expressed as to the extremely dangerous psychological repercussions that might result in other member countries, and fear was expressed that the reduction of British forces by approximately 50% would force further (17) British withdrawals from the Continent/ ' As part of the Annual Review process during 1957, SHAPE sent to the UK its Planning Guidance. This guidance was received with some reserve by British authorities who pointed out to SACEUR on 29 May that the guidance did not take into account the reductions in UK planned contributions to NATO forces. "The United Kingdom is not at present in a position to make any useful forecast of force goals other than those already announced to the North Atlantic Council" SACEUR was told/18^ On 29 May 1957 the United Kingdom representative to the Council presented another statement to the Council stating that certain other changes in assigned and earmarked naval forces would have to be made. These changes were being made because of economic pressures which in the view of the British Government necessitated certain reductions and re-shaping of the British armed forces. These were not of the same magnitude as the

(17) CR(57)21, Summary Record of a Meeting of the Council .. 4 April 1957, dated 6 Apr 57 (NS) (18) Rad, DEF 1047, SCO IN 3046, 29 May 57. DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED

V - - l»\u. v., „ 53 " '

-NATO SHXRK-T (19) reductions in army and air forces already discussed with the Council/ '

SACEUR's Statement to the Standing Group on UK Withdrawals. The Staading Group was directed to advise the North Atlantic Council as to the impact on NATO military posture of these proposed reductions in naval and maritime air contributions by the UK. On 11 June the Standing Group asked SACEJR for his comments with respect to the impact of these reductions on his command. SACEUR told the Standing Group several weeks later that the UK reduction proposals came at a particularly difficult time since the SHAPE Annual Review teams were already with the nations discussing guidance for 1962 forces. This reduction would have its main impact on the Medi- terranean area where the problem of obsolescence in the smaller navies was already at a critical stage. His great concern was, however, that this disquieting trend might be followed by other member nations of the Alliance, thus leading to a "fatal weakening of the total forces necessary to guarantee the security of NATO. " "As you are aware, " SACEUR told the Standing Group, "I am convinced that the Shield forces, no less than the atomic retaliatory forces, must exist in sufficient strength during peacetime to permit them to play their full role in the deterrent as well as to carry out their defensive mission in the cHtical early days of a possible war. Insofar as ACE is concerned, the full brunt of UK cutbacks..,, would have to be borne by my naval shield forces, seriously weakening their combat potential." In assessing the impact these reductions would have on ACE, SHAPE had compared those forces from the Minimum Forces 1958-1963 Study estimate of UK requirements with the end-1959 contribution forecast in the

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED See CR(57)34, 29 May 57, Annex - Revised Assignment of Naval Forces and Maritime Air Forces to SACEUR's Command. '>.7 ' *»• , ' " ry, J\1 ,\a U .. J. :„\. L JL-JL'-Î

NftTn gff cittrr * ^ , " .. • / -,] NÄtÖ ' SÊC&&Ê-' ~

British statement given to the Council on 29 May. Only D-day forces had been considered. The Standing Group was given a detailed accounting by category of the shortfalls that would result from these reductions. "In summary, " General Norstad told the Standing Group, "I must conclude that the naval reductions up to 1959 proposed by the UK will have an adverse effect on my ability to carry out my present naval tasks in the (20) Mediterranean."

Discussion in NATO Council of UK Withdrawals - CR(57)72. In early December 1957 the matter of a reduction of United Kingdom forces committed to NATO was raised again by the UK Representative to the Council. He recalled earlier discussions on the matter and the compromise solution that beyond the 13, 500 men reduction, no cut would be made until later in 1957 in light of a review that the WEU Council asked the North Atlantic Council to undertake. The UK Representative pointed out that the NAC had not completed this review, nor was it likely to be completed for several months. In the meantime, the UK Government considered it imperative that a decision about the second slice of UK force reductions should be taken. Her Majesty's Government were prepared to keep 55, 000 men in Germany until March 1959 if acceptable arrangements were made to meet local costs. The UK Government needed to know the answer to this by the middle of January 1958. At the conclusion of its meeting, the Council agreed that selected experts would meet in Paris soon to consider the claim of the British (21) Government that local costs be met by another power,

Belgian Reduction of Military Service. The NATO policy regarding term of military service had established (20) Rad, SCO OUT 36924, 28 Jun 57; General Norstad had earlier, on DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED 27 May, expressed these same views in a letter to Sir Richard Powell, Permanent Secretary, UK MOD. (21) CR(57)72. 55 VI''V^ 1C^-.y - vu j, ... '"VV--J; ;

SHAPE 57/67 NATO SEGRET^"

a principle that the period of compulsory military service for all nations should be a minimum of 18 months. On 22 May 1957 the Belgian representative to the Council informed the other nations that his country was consulting SACEUR for assistance in.studying a method of decreasing the term of service for conscripts to 15 months. He claimed that Belgium would compensate for this action by increasing the rate of voluntary en- listment of regulars. Council members expressed grave concern, stating that a chain reaction might result. The Secretary-General pointed out that decisions of this kind could not be made unilaterally but only with all the other members of the Alliance, otherwise the Alliance would break up. There was some support for the Belgian proposal when the United Kingdom representative pointed out that a professional army was more efficient than a conscript army, total numerical strength being equal, and that the (22) Belgian announcement should be welcomed rather than condemned. '

Presentation of Proposals by MOD Belgium. The Belgian Minister of Defense visited SHAPE on 23 May and explained to General Norstad and his staff officers the specific proposals of the Belgian Government with regard to reduction of national service. Ge- neral Norstad directed Major General Carter, Chief of OANDT Division, to examine all the implications of this matter and on 27 May Major General Carter visited Brussels where he conferred with the Belgian authorities. On 29 May General Norstad wrote to the MOD Belgium expressing

(22) NATO Policy on length of national military service is set out in DC 25 and in C-M(54)100, Annex to Report on 1954 Annual Review, 20 Nov 54, which states: "It has been laid down as a basic military principle that the period of compulsory military service should be a minimum of 18 months to 2 years according to the conditions of the respective countries." See STAND 1978, SGNto SGREP, for excellent statement on this

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED matter and for SGN attitude.

NATO .^H-gff-^ his concern over the possible reduction of military service, and asking that his views be brought to the attention of the Belgian Parliament and that, if possible, a decision on this matter be delayed until after MC 70 had been acted on by the Council.

M. Spinoy«, Belgian MOD, replied on 3 June to General Norstad's letter, defending the stand taken by his Government and referring to actions in the previous year by the Federal Republic of Germany in reducing its period of servide to 12 months. He stated, further, that "recent decisions of the British Government" had focussed Belgian public attention on the (23) national service situation.

Consideration of Belgian Proposals by the NATO Council. The North Atlantic Council on 5 June 1957 directed its military authorities to consider the implications of the Belgian proposal to reduce the term of national service. The Standing Group asked SACEUR for his opinion. He pointed out first that the action proposed by the Belgian Go- vernment was at variance with the established policy. He pointed out also that in connection with his examination of strategy and force patterns for hi s command, he was examining the question of minimum length of national service in light of new weapons. If the Belgian proposal were implemented in the near future it would pre-judge the results of his examination. "At this time, " he stated, "the contemplated Belgian action cannot be justified on a military basis." He did not feel that the Belgian plan to introduce additional regular personnel would fully compensate either in quantity or quality for the loss of at least 3 months of regular training, and he feared that a significant reduction in the general level of effectiveness of M-day units woiild result. "My most serious concern, however, " General Norstad continued, "has to do with the probable effect of this sudden Belgian action DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED (23) Ltr, SACEUR to MOD Belgium dtd 29 May 57; Ltr, MOD Belgium to SACEUR dtd 3 Jun 57.

57 "" " - --,.. • • / s V , , • • ^-NATO flni'7H II1Tra- " '' ' on other nations contributing forces to my command - the so-called chain , reaction. I have already received a number of indications that other NATO countries, particularly those close to Belgium geographically, would find it most difficult to resist parliamentary pressure to follow Belgium's example." He believed that the overall cumulative effect could be very serious, perhaps even disastrous, weakening what he termed "our essential military strength." General Norstad urged strongly that every effort be made to persuade the Belgian Government to withhold any final decision on this proposal until his force studies had bëen submitted and carefully reviewed.

The Standing Group forwarded General Norstad's views to the Council, endorsing them to the full, and sending along a complete historical background of this delicate problem of national military service. After considering the views of the Standing Group and particularly those of General'Norstad, the NAC directed that M. Paul-Henri Spaak, Secretary-General and Chairman of all meetings of both the permanent and ministerial sessions of the NAC, send a letter to the Foreign Secretary of Belgium setting forth its views. In essence, Mr. Spacik told his government on behalf of the Council that it was extr emely doubtful of the whole procedure. Military authorities still maintained that the 18 months term of service was necessary; and the Council was particularly desirous that the Belgian Government took no action until the examination of the military situation of the forces of the Alliance as a whole could be completed. The Belgian Government replied that after examining the views of the Council, it felt it must reduce the term of service at the earliest possible moment from 18 to 15 months, but would not make any further move until October. The changes to be made in the organization of the Belgian forces, the Belgian Government insisted, would in no way prejudice the outcome of General Norstad's study and the Belgian Government would not DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED

T ^

TTi'iTd IFriL LI « countenance any falling off of the Belgian contribution to the Atlantic defense. ^^ In October 1957 the Belgian Government reduced the term of compulsory military service from 18 to 15 months.

Build-Up of the German Forces. t>\ Since 1954 SACEUR's Forward Strategy had been based on the assumption that German forces would be made available in the Center. German authorities had stated that they would raise an army of 460, 000 men of whom 380, 000 would be in field forces assigned to SACEUR. These ground troops would be allotted to 1 2 divisions (6 infantry, 4 armored and 2 unspecified), and would be supported by strong active combat support units, but would have restricted active logistic support. The Germans had stated also that they would raise an air force comprising 20 wings with 1320 tactical aircraft and the necessary material, technical and administrative support. A navy of 35, 000 men comprising numerous small vessels, including 12 destroyers, 4 motor torpedo boats and similar craft, was also to be assigned to SACEUR's command. In replying to the Annual Review Questionnaire 1956, the German Government had given these proposed force goals to complete the build- up of its forces. Soon after General Norstad became SACEUR, the German Defense Minister, Mr. Strauss, visited SHAPE and in a statement changed

(24) The Belgian decision on this matter is set forth quite clearly in a statement by the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Belgian Parliament on 18 June 1957. This statement is contained in NATO document PO/57/717 dated 19 June 1957. See also: SCO IN 2718, 22 May 57; SCO IN 3430, 7 Jun 57; SCO IN 3512, 10 Jun 57; SCO IN 3792, 14 Jun 57; SCO IN 3896, 19 Jun 57, and SCO IN 4228, 26 Jun 57. DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED

59 ^ATO COSVJFfIDEMTiM3 NNTfT "rrnrr the goals which had been established and gave new goals for 1957 only/

Proposed Strength Goals and Turnover Dates. Mr. Strauss in his statement said that the strength originally intended to be achieved by end 1956 had been set at 96, 000 men, but it would actually reach only 70, 000 men because of lack of accommodation space. He said that in 1957 the Federal Republic of Germany intended to call up at least 135, 000 men, of whom 85, 000 would be assigned to armed forces. The intention was to activate during 1957 three motorized infantry divisions, two armored divisions, one mountain division, one airborne division, and support and supply units. All of these divisions, however, would be under strength. The overall strength of the army forces by end 1957 would reach 91, 000 men. The major air force units which would be formed during 1957 included two transport squadrons; one interceptor day fighter squadron; and three fighter/bomber squadrons. These latter would be employed as operation training units and would be assigned to NATO only in an emergency. Certain naval staffs and squadrons of mine-sweeper s and destroyers would also be activated or established during 1957. At the beginning of April 1957, 48, 000 men were in the German Army and seven divisions had been activated although the strength varied from only 30% to 70% of their war-time establishment. Following the transfer of control of the first formation of German forces to ACE on 1 April 1957, General Heusinger, Chief of the German Armed Forces Staff, notified SACEUR that certain formations would be formally assigned to his command effective 1 July 1957. The ground forces included three army corps Jbeadquar t er s, three infantry divisions

(25) PR 2100 AR-8/57 entitled Annual Review Germany 1957, dtd 12 Mar 57 DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED NMR Germany 1264/56 - Statement of the German Defense Minister, 27 Nov 56. Background brief for SACEUR - Build-up of the German Forces, 3/153/6. _ wätobfr confidenïïâ b of two combat groups each, and naval forces in addition to those already assigned to include headquarters of Commander, Naval Forces Baltic, and one mine-sweeping squadron. These forces, although not fully effective, were being assigned on the basis of an agreement which had been ^ made between SHAPE and the Federal Republic of Germany in August 1956. ^ This agreement provided that because of the importance of strengthening ^ defenses in the Center, German forces would be assigned at the earliest possible date even though at the time of their assignment they had not reached fùll combat effectiveness. The German authorities stressed that even though these forces were assigned, they would be handicapped by the need to re-assign personnel for new units and to temporarily detach personnel for training purposes.

First Turnover of German Troops. ^ On 5 July 1957 in a formal ceremony in Marburg, Germany, command ft i. * V/of the first forces of theFederal Republic of Germany to be assigned to

v O^- '(.SHAPE was turned over to General Norstad. This turnover included the first three divisions of German troops to join NATO forces and a flotilla of mine-s we ep er s. L. Prior to the actual assignment of German forces to NATO the Ger- man Government notified SACEUR that, in the event of an emergency, certain of its forces could be immediately made available to him. These forces, although not at full combat strength, would be used to advantage in emergency, and on 23 January, General Norstad sent to CINCENT and 'V (27) CINCNORTH details of how to secure these forces should the need arise.

Integration of German Air Force into ACE. At the game time, the German Government placed before SHAPE its

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED proposals for integrating the German Air Force into ACE. SACEUR

(26) Ltr from General Heusinger to SACEUR, 11 Jun 57. (27) SHAPE/10/57, 23 Jan 57, w/encl. AnnextoMODGermanyIVAl 706/56 ,-. , ' .. V\~ ' • • =V'': 1 >N • :. :

WA1I1U JlilCjKiLI replied to these proposals by urging that every effort be made by Germany to attain a complete build-up of air strength at the earliest possible date, and told German authorities that the planned composition of the German Air Force (for details of this plan see letter NAI 98/111/56 Str. Geb., 8 Sep 56) and the schedule for build-up (see letter, NMR/D/1195 1 56, 17 Nov 56) were in general accord with SHÄPE's planning for the ultimate composition of Air Forces Central Europe, with one exception. This exception was in the field of reconnaissance aircraft where SACEUR believed the tactical reconnaissance capability of the planned German Air Force should be increased, probably at the expense of IDF capability.

•The German Air Force would have to fit into the scheme then being laid for Air Defense of Europe (see Air Defense Chapter) and the future organization of the ATAFs. "Since there will be time in which to resolve the details of this matter, " German officials were told, "you should proceed as planned and through your close coordination with AIRCENT we can realize beneficial uniformity of effort toward a strong Allied Air Force for Central Europe.'^28)

The Schleswig-Holstein Problem. The problem of whose forces should defend Schleswig-Holstein had long been a thorny one. During 1957 certain developments made it even more so. Since 1947, the Danish Government had maintained forces in the German province of Schleswig-Holstein. These forces were assigned to SACEUR in 1951, but the law permitting its forces to be kept there was to expire on 15 May 1957. On 19 February 1957, CINCNORTH informed SACEUR that he had learned that the Danish Government planned to withdraw its forces from Sc hie swig-Hol stein not later than 15 November 1957, asking only for a six-months renewal of the Danish law to allow this.

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED (28) Litr, Organization of the German Air Force and its integration into ACE, SHAPE/12/37, 21 Jan 57, sgd Schuyler. General Sugden told General Noratad that although German forces were ultimately scheduled to take over this vital portion of his responsibility, he had no assurance that they would be prepared to accept this commit- ment by 15 November 1957. He could not agree to a Danish withdrawal on that date for military reasons. He asked General Norstad to begin negotiations with the Danish and German authorities to find out at what date (29) the German forces could take over the defense of Schleswig-Holstein. Denmark did extend the Defense Bill to permit its forces to be stationed in Schleswig-Holstein until mid-November, but at the same time indicated a strong desire to withdraw Danish forces from Germany at that time. In addition, the United Kingdom stated that it intended to withdraw the British forces which were then located in Schleswig-Holstein during the first three months of 1958. Learning of this, General Norstad directed

CINCNORTH to confer with the MODarms yo f Denmark and Germany to determine the time at which the GermanAvould be able to take over the responsibilities then assigned to the combined Danish/British forces in the area. By June the results of these negotiations thad been forwarded to SACEUR and had been thoroughly evaluated by the staff. They pointed to the ines- capable fact that Germany did not intend to take over responsibility for the area in time to permit withdrawal of Danish and British forces as planned. Accordingly, on 27 June 1957 General Norstad addressed the Ministers of Defense of the UK, Denmark and Germany, pointing out to them the considerable risks which would be involved if these withdrawals were carried out prematurely. He told them that the combined Danish and UK forces then in Schleswig-Holstein, while small, were vital to the defense of both Schleswig-Holstein and Jutland. Because of its size this force could only contribute to a delaying action by covering important demolitions, but if German forces were added, it would allow a true forward DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED strategy. A withdrawal as proposed by the two countries at this time would

(29) Jladio, AFN 14*/CS, 19 Feb 57.

-N TO pjfnrfl 1,1 reduce the defensive capability significantly in this important area until German forces were fully operational. It was true that in numbers the proposed German forces would soon be greater than the number of troops then in the area. However, the German troops would not for some time possess a sufficient standard of training, would not be adequately equipped, and would lack sufficient staff, signal, reconnaissance and logistics sys-' terns to carry out any except limited operational tasks. Generad Norstad pointed out that in the event of a premature withdrawal of assigned forces' the demolition plan could not be carried out if the area were attacked. Ground contact and liaison with CINCNORTH and CINCENT would be dis- rupted and the command and communications for forces in Schleswig-Hols- tein would be inadequate.

He recommended strongly that the MODs of the United Kingdom and Denmark grant an extension of time for their forces to stay in Schleswig- Holstein and that the Minister of Defense of Germany develop a plan which would enable the complete assumption of authority by German forces in Schleswig-Holstein by 15 April 1958.^3°^ As a result of General Norstad's appeal in this regard, the UK and Denmark did approve keeping their respective forces in Schleswig-Holstein until 15 April 1958, and the MOD Germany stated that his nation would be (3T ready to assume responsibility for defense of the area on 15 April 1958.v - '

Ground Atomic Delivery Forces. The introduction of modern weapons delivery systems into his Shield forces was a matter which SACEUR considered extremely urgent. To off- set both the shortages of ground forces and to meet the increasing Soviet

(30) SHAPE/138/57, 27 Jun 57, "The Military Situation in Schleswig- Holstein." (31) Rad, LOSTAN 2247, 30 Oct 57; Ltr, SACEUR to Chairman SGN, DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED 30 Aug 57; Rad, SACEUR to MOD Germany, SH 39455, 31 Oct 57.

M i:. . y t/i'.'- NATO^-SEUIHrr NATO natSfECREo comroemmT • l

capability in new weapons, action continued throughout 1957 to bring about the introduction of Ground Atomic Delivery Forces. I In late 1955 SACEUR had asked the Standing Group to approve requirements for Ground Atomic Delivery Forces for Allied Forces Southern Europe and additionally that these authorities "take appropriate action toward fulfillment of these requirements." The Standing Group had approved these requirements in principle and had asked SACEUR to submit ground (32) atomic delivery requirements for the remainder of his command. With the submission by CINCENT and CINCNORTH of their estimates of types and numbers of ground atomic delivery forces that they would require to defend their sectors, SHAPE forwarded to the Standing Group a consolidated request for fulfillment of these requirements. These had been

formulated from EDP concepts and had been projecte(33) d to include a forecast for support of the Capabilities Plan ACE 1957.v ' General Norstad, in forwarding his request, said significantly: "It is recognized that there are many legal, political and logistical problems to be solved in translating the requirements of ACE into a truly integrated atomic delivery capability for all ground forces." In reply to General Norstad1 s request for ground atomic dèlivery forces, the Standing Group told him that while his letter provided a valuable contribution to planning for integration of nuclear fire support into NATO « ground forces, it was impracticable to act on this letter. The forthcoming re-examination of force structure made it desirable, the Standing Group said, that SACEUR's requirements for atomic delivery forces be handled as an integral part of his overall Minimum Force Structure. (34)

(32) SHAPE/465/55, 3 Dec 55, and SGM-708056, 15 Oct 56. (33) For detailed listing of these requirements and other backbround, see SHAPE/14/57, 25 Jan 57, Ltr to SGN, Requirements for Ground Atomic Delivery Forces, Allied Forces Central Europe and Northern Europe. It should be borne in mind that the Minimum Force Study DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED 1958-63 and MC 70 produced somewhat different requirements. (34) SGN/155/57, 1 Mar 57. nato confidential The existing unrest in the Middle East and the growing Soviet threat in that area impelled SACEUR to press for specific ground atomic forces in Western Turkey. He asked the Standing Group on 25 March to request the United States to deploy to the Turkish Straits area one HONEST JOHN battalion with technical and service support units from the United States and with security and special purpose troops from Turkey. From a military point of view this force would increase the security of a most vulnerable portion of the southeast flank of ACE and would have desirable psychological advantages. This request from SACEUR did not in any way change the requirements already stated for two HONEST JOHN and two (35) CORPORAL, battalions for defense of Western Turkey/ '

Year End Assessment. Following his first year as SACEUR, General Norstad was able to report slight improvements in some aspects of his combat forces situation, although he did not minimize in any way to the Standing Group the seriousness of the deficiencies which continued to remain unsolved. In the North and in the South, there had been during 1957 some improvement in the development of land forces. Reorganization had brought about this slight better- ment, but in these areas much substantive improvement would have to be made. In the South, particularly, a serious weakness was noted in the lack of a ground nuclear capability in the area of the Turki sh Straits. Bdh quantitatively and qualitatively, thé Center forces fell short of the goal. The substantial reduction of British forces, actual and planned,, and the failure of the French Government to provide scarcely one half of the M-day divisions promised, were primary causes of weakness. And the five German divisions assigned during 1957, of the twelve required, had not had time to become fully trained and combat ready. DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED (35) Ltr, Ground Atomic Support Command for Defense of Turkish Straits, SACEUR to Chairman SGN, 25 March 1957. mro GQMmzmAL

With regard to his air forces, General Norstad reported, "There has been a considerable improvement during 1957 in the overall combat effectiveness of the Air Forces. The modernization program, started in 1956 and continued throughout 1957, has increased the combat potential • • • U ' ' of air units."

'. - ' Commenting'on his naval-strength, SACEUR pointed out the adverse effects of obsolescence which, while being reduced slowly, still remained a serious hindrance to full combat effectiveness of navies contributing to ACE defense. Calling for greater efforts to attain full effectiveness in al^areas, General Norstad said!, "I hope that national authorities will make an ever incrêasing effort_to improve the standards of organization and training of their military forces and of their logistic sys.tems, BO that each nation can make its maximum contribution to the ACE mission. In particular I emphasize the need for progress in the field of alert, dispersal and sur- 1{36 vival measures. Our first obligation is to make the most of what we have. "

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED (36) SACEUR's Combat Effectiveness Report 1957, SHAPE/20/58, 1 Mar 58, w/Ltr of Transmittal.

MÂTOTOMFflOlMïilÂL1 NATO BM^ITBT SHAPE 57/67 N -, Ti ' ^; , • •_ -T1I'' ' j '* I-J ?

inîÂ^^S v^ill '.Li 'l : ; . L^ :• CHAPTER IV

The ACE MINIMUM FORCE STUDY - 1958-1963

Plamning Guidance - General. The North Atlantic Council provided the military authorities of NATO with political, economic and strategic guidance and established the bounds within which military planning might proceed. Whenever the Council acted upon military subjects or recommendations, the NATO military authorities viewed such actions as providing guidance in respect to the sufficiency and acceptability of the matters in question. The summation of such actions built up a framework for further progressive planning.^ The framework of guidance existing when General Norstad assumed command had been established by Council action on the successive Annual Reviews; by the resolution setting forth the frames of reference for ensuing Annual Reviews; by actions such as that taken in C-M(55)120, which set forth procedures to facilitate defense planning; and by further actions as examplified by C-R(52)31 (action on MC 3/5 "Strategic Concept for Defense of the NAT Area") and C-R(52)34 (action on MC 14/l "Strategic Guidance"). ^ Basic guidance stemmed also from the North Atlantic Treaty, the Greece Turkey protocol of 1951, and the London and Paris Agreements of 1954. While the overall mission of the NATO military authorities, to deter aggression and to defend the NATO area, had remained unaltered over the

(1) C-M(56)104, 28 Aug 56. (2) C-M(55)l20, 6 Dec 55, Draft Resolution on Defense Planning; C-R(52)31, 3 Dec 52, Summary Rebord of Meeting 3 Dec 52; MC 3/5(Final), 3 Dec 52, Strategic Concept for the Defense of the NAT Area; C-R(52)34, 11 Dec 52, SummaryRecordofMeeting, 11 Dec 52; MC 14/1 (Final), 9 Dec 52, NATO Strategic Guidance. (These documents are available in AG Central Records, SHAPE). DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED IAPEL57/67

iIY „ M u ci' ^ ^ years, certain significant changes in guidance had resulted from successive decisions or resolutions of the Council. As a result of Council Resolution C-M(53)166, the military had been directed to plan in terms of the most effective pattern of military strength within the resources which it was anticipated might be made available. These were the planning goalsfor 1956 as approved in the 1953 Annual Review. (3)

Planning for the German Accession to NATO. Planning for the German contribution had been directed by the Military Committee in C-M(53)166 in 1953, and confirmed by the Council in 1954. This contribution, added to the order of magnitude of forces already indicated and taken together with an integrated atomic capability, had permitted the change to the Forward Strategy concept which was reflected in MC 48, approved by the Council in 1954.^

ACE Capabilities Plan 1957. The most significant planning action taken at SHAPE since its inception had been the development of the ACE Capabilities Plan 1957, begun in mid- 1953 and published in 1954. This study, which contained numerous major policy recommendations, had been based largely on the assumption, for the first time, that atomic and nuclear weapons would be employed. It had defined nine major campaigns and had set out the forces which would be needed to fight these successfully.

NATO Political and Economic Guidance. In its most recent restatement of fundamental NATO political and

(3) C-M(53)166, 10 Dec 53, and C-M(53)165 are Draft Resolutions on the 1953 Annual Review.

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-Y , - -J NATO com NTiAL m economic guidance, contained in C-M(55)120 and C-M(56)51, the Council had directed the military to concentrate on the moat effective pattern of forces, consistent with the principles and objectives outlined in the MC 48 series, practicable within the level of the resources likely to be available for defense. The Council also stated that it would tell military authorities of any significant changes in the level of resources likely to be available as a result of changes in the political or economic situation. Inthe absence of advice from the Council that changes in the political or economic situation had taken place, the military authorities had adhered to the concepts of the (5) MC 48 series papers in all planning.

Forces Available to SACEUR for Implementation of Strategic Concept. On the day following General Norstad1 s assumption of command as SACEUR, he received from the Standing Group a re-statement of the position of NATO's military forces/6^ The Standing Group reviewed the military requirements to implement the existing strategic concept and reported on the progress that had been made in fulfilling these requirements. They felt that certain basic defense requirements would remain valid regardless of any changes in the strategic concept which might result from expected political guidance. The Council had established three requisites for the implementation of the MC 48 concept. These were: the build-up of forces to a general order of magnitude not lower than the 1956 planned goals established in the 1953 Annual Review; an appropriate contribution to NATO forces by the Federal Republic of Germany; and an integrated atomic capability. None of these had been fully attained. Neither the ground, sea nor air forces available to General Norstad had attained the magnitude or equivalent fighting value determined to be essential to the implementation of the MC 48 concept and the Forward DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED (5) C-M(56)104, 28 Aug 56. (6) SGM-791-56, 21 Nov 56; see also SG 184/7, 14 Dec 56, Appendix A, SGN evaluation of SACEUR's Emergency Defense Plan.

NATO CONFID Strategy. Although the German Government had indicated plans to provide a significant contribution to NATO defense by the end of 1957, the full contribution from Germsuiy was not expected to be available until after 1959. The 1956 Annual Review showed a marked decrease in the availability of army M-day units in Allied Command Europe, Withdrawals of forces together with some reorganization had depleted the army forces in the Central Region to the extent that CINCENT had grave reservations regarding his ability to carry out his assigned mission in case of war. The naval forces had not attained the required level, and the forecast for the future was not particularly bright. Although air forces available to SACEUR were still below the required levels, progress had been made towards achieving the agreed goals. The atomic capability of the forces available to SACEUR had improved considerably. Requirements for a ground delivery capability had been drawn up for the Southern Command, and the Northern and Central Commands were preparing similar studies. Implementation had already begun in the South. This capability was, of course, in addition to forces retained under national command, with which SACEUR's plans were coordinated.

SACEUR's 1960-62 Study. In 1956 the SHAPE Staff had made a study of the military situation which would likely exist in the years 1960-62, and had estimated as closely as possible the number and types of troops and resources which would be required. This study had been sent to all appropriate military commanders, to the na- (7) tions involved, and to SACEUR's superiors in Washington/ '

Divergencies of SACEUR and SACLANT Force Posture Studies. The Standing Group, upon examining SACEUR's Force Posture Study and a similar study by SACLANT, had determined that there were certain

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED differences in basic concept which had to be resolved before these studies could be accepted by the Council as the basis for any definite action. These

(7) SHAPE/231/56, 28 Sep 56, Force Posture Allied Command Europe 1960-62

ammmm 1 ^ COsmiC J TOP StCRET NATCL CO® DENTÏÂL ^ Iw^fît I

differences in concept were as follows. SHAPE had only considered the period from i960 to 1962, but SACLANT had projected his study forward to 1967, a factor which made comparison of the two studies extremely difficult, SACLANT had visualized various types of war, ranging from cold war through limited war, to general nuclear war. In this light, he believed that the nations of NATO, both in their national and their NATO roles, must maintain flexibility to react with or without employment of nuclear weapons. SACEUR, on the other hand, envisaged only a general nuclear war and stated that whether or not the Soviets utilized nuclear weapons, NATO must do so from the outset.

A second variation sprang from the different points of view which the two commanders entertained on the general nuclear war. SACEUR foresaw a war of two phases in which organized military operations would not go beyond 30 days and the initial phase would be decisive. SACLANT, on the other hand, though visualizing a war of two phases, did not consider that the first phase would necessarily determine the outcome. He believed that whether or not the first phase was decisive, it might not be apparent at the time. These conflicting views, of course, produced a difference in emphasis. While SACEUR emphasized D-day and first echelon forces, SACLANT tended (8) to emphasize the forces for both phases. When the Standing Group met with the Major NATO Commanders in Paris on 4 December 1956, these differences in concept came under discussion. SACEUR told the Standing Group that he did not believe these divergencies which they had pointed out were so great as might appear. He felt that they were placing too narrow an interpretation upon his study and expressed willing- ness for his staff to work with SACLANT's Staff in an attempt to reconcile any differences. SACLANT agreed that the two studies could certainly be reconciled. CINCHAN's representative who was present stated that his commander

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED 1,%) SGM-706-56, Memo for Members of the Military Committee, 16 Npv 56, Long Range Pattern of Forces Studies of SACEUR and SACLANT.

•I, had deliberately delayed preparation of a parallel paper to those of SACEUR and SACLANT until the new Political Directive had been received from the Council. But he insisted that the trend apparent in the two papers already prepared was disturbing to him because of the weight given to weapons other than naval. He stated that always in history, from the days of Carthage, the (9) side which commanded the sea eventually prevailed.

NAC Action on the SACEUR and SACLANT Force Studies. The North Atlantic Council decided that because these differences in concept were unresolved, the force studies of SACEUR and SACLANT would not be approved, but would be returned to the military authorities for appropriate resolution of the differences. Decisions made at the Major NATO Authorities' Meetings in December 1956 had a great influence on the planning at SHAPE during 1957. The Politi- cal Directive which was issued was of such a nature that a complete review of the strategic concept (MC 14 series) and the minimum military measures necessary to implement the concept (MC 48) had to be undertaken.^

Re-Examination and Revision of Strategic Concept and Minimum Military Measures Documents. In addition, the military force objectives established at Lisbon in 1952 and country contributions to these force objectives established annually in the Annual Review process, had to be re-examined. On 3 January the Standing Group told SACEUR that they were going to revise the strategic concept and minimum measures documents and that, based on his revised forces posture paper, they would recommend the essential forces posture called for by the minimum measures. They were pressing forward with this work on an urgent basis, but anticipated that some phases DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED (9) Minutes, Mtg of SGNwithMajor Commanders, 4 Dec 56, SG 311thMtg, STSC 800/56. (10) See Chapter II, Policy and Direction. of the studies could be undertaken simultaneously. The Standing Group dêàir'èd to have both MC 14 and MC 48 as revised ready for consideration by the Coun- cil toward the end of February, and to have the revised forces posture papers in the hands of the national authorities by late Spring. Obviously, NATO civil and military authorities were going to have to take further action in view of the revision of NATO defense planning, and to revise their own national defense programs in line with the new guidance which would undoubtedly be forthcoming< « (H) The Standing Group felt that a forecast of national contributions for several years in the future was required. The Council, of course, would determine how this forecast would be obtained and assessed, and whether or not any change in the Annual Review procedures would need to be made.

Planning and the Annual Review. The nations of Allied Command Europe had not been given new SHAPE guidance for the 1956 Annual Review. Certain countries in preparing the 1956 Annual Review did not submit force goals beyond 1957 and were therefore having to re-examine their later goals. Other countries had submitted force goals for 1958 and 1959 which had been in excess of the actual requirements set forth in the SHAPE 1960-1962 study. This stemmed from the lack of guidance by NATO military authorities on force goals for the years after 1957. On 16 January SACEUR told the Standing Group that a number of coun- (12) tries had already asked for guidance as soon as possible. '

Review of Infrastructure Programs Based on New Force Posture. The adoption of a force posture envisioned in the 1960-1962 studies would affect infrastructure programs immediately. The review of these programs was pressing and urgent. They could, however, only be carried out if

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED (11) STAND 1789, 3 Jan 57. See Chapt II for discussion of IPTs and SHAPE'S participation in this matter. (12) SH/33242, . SHAPTO 1387, 16 Jan 57, SACEUR to SGN. all plans for the build-up of forces were based on the same force posture. SACEUR considered that the best available basis for the necessary guidance was his current force posture study. He realized that the revision of the basic policy documents then going on would affect the posture paper to some extent. But he felt that the outline of the study would remain valid and that the revision would not be so great as to invalidate substantially any guidance which might be issued from it. "If the present lack of military guidance is allowed to continue, " he told the Standing, "it will have a detrimental effect on the build-up and effieiency of military forces assigned and earmarked for NATO. It is considered vital that some guidance may not be as firm as we would like. Otherwise confidence in NATO military leadership may be adversely affected." He told ;the Standing .Group that he was planning to advise each nation of the tentative breakdown of the forces required from it, on the basis of his 1960-1962 Force Posture Study.*13'

Discussions of SGN with Major NATO Commanders on Guidance Based on Pattern of Forces Study. The Standing Group asked Major NATO Commanders, including SACEUR, to come to Washington to discuss the matter, and on 4 February 1957 in Washington D. C. , they exchanged views and certain decisions were reached. SACEUR told the Standing Group that he was proposing to issue his basic guidance for the Annual Review on or about 15 March. He intended to base this (14) guidance on the Pattern of Forces Study for 1960-62. Even though this study had not been approved, SACEUR felt that he must use it as a basis for furnishing guidance to the nations. It represented the best judgement of the SHAPE Staff at the moment. Further, SACEUR said that unless he followed this procedure, he would lose time on important in- DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED frastructure projects which he could ill afford. He told the Standing Group

(13) Rad, SACEUR to SGN, SHAPTO 1387, 16 Jan 57. (14) Minutes of Mtg of SGN with Major Commanders, 4 Feb 57. NATO Xûï •mijENTIAL SHAPE 57/67

guidance to the nations. To do otherwise would, he told them, not reflect his best judgement and it would involve a waste of time, effort and money. There was no intention to press the Standing Group for approval of his I96O-62 Study, nor of the procedure which he proposed to follow. He would merely use that study in the normal course of events, unless the Standing Group instructed him not to do so. SACLANT, while appreciating SACEUR's decision and his desire for rapid and decisive action, felt that certain difficulties might arise if both he and SACEUR used their studies for furnishing guidance to the nations. There had been, as pointed out previously, divergent views on strategic matters and divergent conclusions. It was possible that the nations would be faced with two separate requirements and concepts of future wars, and would be in a quandary. As an alternative solution, SACLANT urged the Standing Group to accelerate its work in an attempt to translate the Political Directive into a Strategic Directive to the Major NATO Commanders, which would be used in lieu of the Forces Studies as a basis for furnishing guidance to the nations. Further discussion of this matter by the UK Representative on the Stand- ing Group developed that before MC 14/2 (Revis ed) and MC 48/2 could be issued as authoritative documents, the nations would have to agree unanimously to them, both in the Military Committee and in Ihe Council. Unfortunately all the nations were deliberately avoiding reaching conclusions until they learned the views of everyone else. The UK Representative pointed out that if the proper procedure were followed, the nations could not possibly be furnished official firm guidance by the Major NATO Commanders until after the Military Com- mittee meeting which would be held to approve MC 14/2 (Revised) and MC 48/2, which would not take place before late March/(15 ) The UK Representative also pointed out that the objectives of all concerned DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED (15) This meeting actually took place on 6 April.

NATO CONFIDENTIAL6 were the same, namely to provide the various nations with agreed guidance in order that they might be in a position to develop their national plans. The Standing Group fully recognized the logic of SACEUR's arguments, but felt that the point at issue was of such importance that it could not be left to each commander to issue firm final guidance to nations based on his own interpretation of the strategic concept. The French Representative stated that no matter how much the Standing Group desired to do so, it could not accelerate the processes involved in approving the official revisions of policy papers necessary. Therefore, he felt that the Standing Group should not prevent Major Commanders from issuing interim guidance to nations provided that before such action were taken, the Standing Group should have received all national comments on the drafts of MC 14/2 (Revised) (IPT 131/36 Draft) and that these comments had been reconciled. SACEUR told the other NATO officials that he was in complete agreement that any guidance which he should issue to the nations would be of a provisional nature. He agreed also in principle with what Admiral Wright had said, that guidance should not be issued on different bases. This would, of course, be a very serious matter if Allied Command Europe were attempting to increase its forces. Since however SACEUR was actually proposing to advocate some reductions, he did not want to tell nations to build up forces and later have to tell them that these forces were not required. He felt that there was a danger of lack of confidence in NATO military planning at the moment, and he was also in no doubt that the nations were currently considering military reductions. HE felt that it was very, very important to tell the nations what he thought was required at once, otherwise a year's delay might result. SACLANT then stated that if national commmts on IPT 131/36 (Draft) could be reconciled in time, he would have no objection to the issuance of

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED guidance to nations by SACEUR and would himself do the same. General Norstad, however, said that regardless of whether these comments had been nato confidential

reconciled by 1 5 March, he was going to issue guidance to the nations unless the Standing Group instructed him not to do so. The UK Representative pointed out that it was necessary to face up to the fact that if national comments revealed serious differences of opinion, the Standing Group would be forced to tell SACEUR to defer the issuance of such guidance while it attonptedto reconcile these national views. It was possible, although unlikely, that the final reconciliation of these views might invalidate SACEUR's Pattern of Forces Study to a considerable extent/1 ^

Issuance of Provisional Guidance to Nations. SACEUR concluded by saying that if there was by 1 5 March 1957 an agreed version of IPT 131/36 (Draft), he would obviously be required to base his guidance to the nations on this draft; otherwise, he did not feel that the Political Directive Substantially altered the conclusions of his Minimum Forces Study for Allied Command Europe. After further discussion within the Standing Group, the Major NATO Commanders were authorized to issue provisional guidance to the nations on or after 15 March 1957, unless they had been instructed not to do so prior to that date. Major Commanders were directed to base their guidance on the existing Pattern of Forces Study, modified as necessary in light of any development in the new Political Directive and also on the new report on the overall strategic concept for the defense of the NATO area when that report was offi- (17) cially issued as MC 14/2/ '

(16) SACEUR's Pattern of Forces Study 1960-62, having been based on military requirements as the SHAPE staff saw them, could not actually be invalidated by failure of the nations to agree. It merely meant that while the conclusions of this study could be perfectly valid, the nations would not agree to.reach the force requirements established by the study. (17) The Political Directive, Part I, was prefaced with a section entitled "Soviet Intentions." In this regard it is interesting to note that since the

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED days of General Ridgway's command as SACEUR, it had been the SHAPE basic policy to base all planning, not on enemy intentions, but on enemy capabilities. ./...

78 NATO CONFIDENTIAL Revision of Force Study. The Standing Group, aware of the timé problems involved in preparing estimates of forces with changing directives being introduced, directed SACEUR to use the draft studies of the IPT papers, destined to replace MC 14 and MC 48, as a basis for preparing his new force studies. On 8 February they told him that the documents in question, dealing with the Strategic Concept and Essential Measures, would when approved by the Council form the military guidance upon which his force posture would be based. But in order that his recommendations on force posture could reach it as soon as possible, the Standing Group asked that SACEUR begin formulating at once a recommended force posture for his command, using the successive drafts of the papers (IPT 178/70 and IPT 131/36) as preliminary guidance. "The Standing Group realizes, " he was told, "that you will not be able to submit your final recommendations until MC 14/2 and MC 48/2 are approved, but it is felt that much useful work could (18) be accomplished now.1- SACEUR was requested to compute quantitative force requirements by Service and Major Subordinate Command where appropriate, and to cover the period 1958-1962 as a minimum. He might, if he wished, extend this study

,1,,, In discussing the proviso contained in the Political Directive which dealt with possible local attacks, the Chief of Staff, SHAPE, told the assembled Chiefs of Staff of Major Subordinate Commands on 19 February: "They (the NAC) have added the proviso that we must be prepared to deal with local incursions and small attacks without necessarily resorting to nuclear weapons. We must keep that in our minds: we must continue to look at our forces to make sure that they are capable of handling this problem. It is sometimes a little difficult to understand what the Council did have in view when they talk about "local incursions". To us, it appears very probable that any local attack or local incursion any place in SACEUR's area, in NATO areas, will in all probability lead to a general war despite our efforts to localize it, which is what the Coun- cil wants us to do." - Semi-Verbatim report of General Schuyler's meeting with Chiefs of Staff of Subordinate Commands, 19 Feb 57. (18) SGM-105-57, 8 Feb 57. DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED

GOSMIC TOP ~ "SECRET jL^j ..

further than 1962, but they wanted a readily discernible posture for 1962 in any event. Time phasing of forces, where feasible, was recommended. "Since the exact timing of Council action on MC 14/2 and MC 48/2 cannot yet be determined, " he was told, "the Standing Group is as yet unable to establish a deadline date for submission of your forces posture papers. In view of the urgency involved, however, it is probable that no more than two weeks will be available to you, after Council approval of MC 14/2 and MC 48/2 to finalize your studies. The Standing Group desires that these new studies not be given national distribution until released by the Standing Group."

On 12 March, ACOS PANDP issued his instructions to the Staff for revision of the 1960-1962 study. He pointed out that CM(56)138, the Political Directive, and the latest available drafts of the IPT papers, which were in actuality drafts of new MC 48 and MC 14 papers, indicated that no substantial alteration of the final force tabs of the 1960-1962 paper would be necessary. "Moreover, " he said, "the work accomplished in developing national guidance for the AR 1957 cycle should provide an adequate basis for the time phasing which must be incorporated in the new study. Nonetheless, the organization, 1(19) drafting and coordination of the new study will constitute a major task... "

Effect of British Reduction of Forces on the 1960-1962 Papers. As it developed, certain events taking place concurrently changed the picture quite radically, and "revision" of the 1960-62 paper took on a different aspect. The factor which most changed the situation was the decision announced by the United Kingdom on 14 February 1957 to reduce the strength of its forces located on the mainland of Ehirope and placed under control of SACEUR. The full effects of this decision on SHAPE planning did not become apparent for nearly a month after the announcement,^^

(J9) Memo, for all divisions, Revision of ACE Force Posture Study 1960-62,

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED 12 Mar 57, sgd ACOS PANDP. (30) See Chapter III, Forces, for discussion of British Réduction of Forces.

—- , • • y >• \ V- • r _ LX - • :80 v - - SACEUR had been asked for his evaluation of the British intention to reduce their forces, and had furnished such an evaluation to the North Atlantic Council and through them to the Western European Union (See Forces Chapter). The latter body, on 18 March, after considering the opinions expressed by its own members and the views of SACEUR, called upon the NAC to study urgently certain proposals made by Chancellor Adenauer of Germany calling for a new overall review of the resources of the NATO Alliance, covering: a) Military requirements and defense aims; b) Relationship between conventional and atomic weapons; c) Relationship between modern armament and economic and financial resources; d) Common production of modern weapons. Pending the result of such a review, the government of the United King- dom would go ahead with its plans for 1957 and 1958 but would take into acoount General Norstad's views. In effect, this meant a reduction of only 13, 500 men, (21) of which the vast majority would be administrative and anti-aircraft troops.

WEU Views on Concepts of Forces Posture. Following this decision by the Western European Union, Professor Halstein, German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, appeared before the NAC on 28 March and explained in greater detail why the WEU had reached the decision to call for a full military review of the structure. The main effect of Halstein's expose.was to raise certain broad but penetrating questions which by their very nature underscored either a general misunderstanding of SACEUR's earlier plans or an actual incompleteness in these plans. The German official called for a study by General Norstad which would set forth his concepts of the Shield Forces with particular attention given to the necessity to increase defense expenditures to include the new and expensive weapons. While the WEU in a compromise solution thus agreed to a reduction of DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED 13, 500 men of the full 27, 000 men reduction which the British Government _ (21) Annexto C-M(57)41, 21 Mar 57. 81 proposed to make, they proposed that General Norstad study the implications of any further reduction and that his recommendations be submitted to the Council and the WEU for a decision in October 1957. This solution was based on proposals originally made by the Federal Republic of Germany. The German Government had been very concerned about the adverse effects of the withdrawal of British troops feeling that the withdrawals might result in further withdrawals by the other nations. The French Government also was concerned because at the time of the Paris Agreements in 1954, it had insisted that the British leave four divisions on the Continent as a safeguard. On 12 April 1957 the North Atlantic Council engaged in a lengthy discussion on how SACEUR should be directed to respond to the proposals made by the WEU. It was stressed that General Norstad was being approached in this matter in two different capacities, first as Supreme Allied Commander Europe, and secondly as a highly qualified and well-known expert in this field. The second aspect was for psychological reasons. The Council, after much discussion, finally agreed that the nations wishing to ask questions should send them to the Secretariat of the Council who would circulate them among all delegations, and if no delegation raised any objection to any question within (22) a week, that question could then be submitted to General Norstad/

Assessment of Force Requirements Papers. At nearly the same time, the NAC decided that MC 14/2 (Revised) and MC 48/2 would be approved as soon as possible. They would then be sent to Supreme Commanders with instructions to assess their Minimum Force Re- quirements. The three force requirements papers were due in the hands of the Standing Group fourteen days after approval by the Council of the strategic guidance papers. Finally, the Standing Group on receipt of these three force

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED requirements papers would amalgamate them into one paper for submission

(22) C-R(57)23, 12 Apr 57. to the Council. This paper would be called MC 70 and would be available in June. The Council asked the Chairman of the SGN to approve this timetable. He said that this timetable would have been correct if the Council had not decided to ask General Norstad for the additional study in connection with the German proposals. General Norstad could not put his force requirements paper into final form until he had completed work on the new study asked for by the Council, since he would have to ensure that there was no inconsistency in the two papers. Again, the Standing Group could not complete MC 70 until it had carefully examined General Norstad's new study. For these reasons it was likely that there would be some delay in the issue date originally planned for the MC 70. The SGN Chairman assured the Council that the military authorities would do their utmost to see that the dçlay, if delay there had to be, (23) was as short as possible. The actions of the Council and of the WEU had already been noted at SHAPE. And General Norstad had been closely involved in discussions with national authorities on these problems. Maj. General Gazin, ACOS PANDP, sent to the Chief of Staff on 18 April a proposed outline setting forth the procedures which he felt should be followed and the objectives achieved in creating the new studies which would be required/2^

ACQS PANDP's Report on Force Requirements Study. Development of the outline for the proposed study, Major General Gazin stated, had been on the assumption that not more than three months time would be available for preparation. "The amount of new work which can be

(23) C-R(57)24, para 27, 28, dtd 16 Apr 57. (24) Memo for the COFS thru DCP AN DP, ACE Minimum Force Study 1958-63,

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED 18 Apr 57, sgd Gazin (Action Officer: Col. Stilwell). C-M(56)138 (Final), 13 Dec 56, Part 1, undertaken is minimal, " he said, "and we are therefore limited largely to utilizing pertinent projects already prepared or in process of preparation." Time limitations would preclude any detailed coordination with regional commanders, although the "broad lines of approach" could be coordinated. It was obvious that the PANDP Division Chief felt this new effort should be aimed at justifying the forces which would be asked for and "the decision as to whether or not a particular subject is included should hinge on its contribution to that justification." Because the expansion of the 1960-62 Study was being caused by the nations in the center, he believed that "first priority must go to the Central Area." The latest analysis of Soviet intentions and general policy showed a definite possibility of their launching attacks using only convertional weapons or local attacks of various kinds. And the organization, equipment and deployment of forces must, in the study, be examined for adequacy to deter or deal with aggression other than general war. "The core of the problem, " he told the Chief of Staff, "is to clarify the inter-relationship of Strike and Shield Forces and the relative strengths of each. Implicit in this is explaining that nuclear and non-nuclear weapons systems are not mutually independent, but rather complementary capabilities to be integrated into a single force structure." The materials available for use in the new project included the subsi- diary studies stemming from the original 1960-62 Force Posture paper; • Exercise SOLVENT; Elements of the ACE 1957 Capabilities Plan; and Costing (25) and Analyses Studies undertaken by the Programs Division/ '

(25) Operation SOLVENT, a series of War Games to examine a number of operational situations which might arise in Global War and in conflicts short of such a war, was conducted by the Strategic Planning Staff during the first half of 1957. Many of the concepts which emerged from Operation SOLVENT were incorporated in the Minimum Force DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED Study. SHAPE divisions participated in the aspects of Operation SOL- VENT which were appropriate to their anticipated wartime role.

Major General Gazin proposed that the study consist of a basic document which would be essentially the Minimum Force Study, and a series of annexes elaborating on the basic document. A complete list of suggested annexes and the divisions responsible for their preparation was forwarded to the Chief of Staff. It was suggested that the study could be prepared and coordinated at the Staff level by 15 August.

General Norstad Gives Guidance for the Study. On 23 April, SACEUR called together his key planning officers and in a lengthy and extremely significant session, laid down certain rules which were to be followed in preparing the studies which would now be required. At the same time he outlined his personal views on some of the major problem (26) areas which faced him and all NATO authorities. ' General Norstad opened the meeting by stating that he accepted the paper which Major General Gazin had submitted as a reasonable method of approach to the revision of the 1960-62 Studies and that he approved it as guidance for further basic study of the problem. In the subsequent discussion, however, he demonstrated quite clearly that he did not in fact agree with all the provisos of the memorandum, particularly that portion which prescribed only a "minimal" amount of new work. He told the staff officers present that he did not want the new Minimum Force Study directed to giving specific answers to any specific question. The study should, instead, provide him with an authoritative basis for answering any questions which might come from the nations. The answers would depend on his judgement, no natter how the study was directed. Only he could formulate the answer s, but he must have the study as a proper basis for his judgement in éach case.

(26) Memorandum for Record, sub: Conference of SACEUR with Key Officers, DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED 23 Apr 57. SHAPE 57/67 Co0Mlo SËGRÊl? Ni \ fO u 0NyN'VO^.^ ' :.

SACEUR stated that, had the matter of the British reduction of forces not arisen, it would have been possible to have continued with the 1960-62 force study and to have put it in final form; With this new development, however, another basic study, similar to the Allied Capabilities Plan 1957 made in 1954, would have to be made. HE had no objection to the staff using the old study as the basis for the new basic study. But he wanted each field of study and each aspect of every problem examined again, from the very beginning. If the study made in 1954 was still valid for the years 1960-62, for instance, that would be completely acceptable, "If you want to crib the whole thing, " General Norstad stated, "that is quite all right with me -- providing you have given it that basic consideration and find that it is still correct in 1957 for the period 1960-62," SACEUR emphasized that he was not directing a verdict, but he felt that the results of the study would not differ greatly from the concepts already developed and that no significant modification was going to be requited.

Assumptions for the New Studies. SACEUR said that the new studies must be based upon assumptions, and the basic assumption was that the deterrent was the key to the defense of Western Europe. Another fundamental assumption must be that the retaliatory forces, which would form part of the deterrent, were effective. One of the points which was going to have to be explored thoroughly and "from scratch" was the degree of effectiveness of the retaliatory forces and whether their effectiveness had increased or decreased. SACEUR placed one hundred percent dependence upon the effectiveness of the retaliatory forces because he believed they were really first class forces. General Norstad then turned to the basic importance of the Shield Forces. The countries of Western Europe joined together in NATO for their defense,

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED and to them, particularly the continental countries, defense meant something very specific. In this view the task was not the simple, academic or theori.fc»c/>/ one of fighting a war against the Russians. To the Continental, it meant preventing NATO territories and people from being overrun. And unless the fifteen NATO nations modified the treaty that would have to remain the objective and the mission of SACEUR. The retaliatory forces alone, no matter how good, could not accomplish that objective. Without the Shield Forces, SACEUR could not give assurance that, in the event of war, enemy forces would not be able to overrun NATO territory and peoples, whether on D-day, D-plus-3, or D-plus-30. The concept under which the Shield Forces had been planned and the basis on which SACEUR had worked in the past was that "the least that we must do is the most that we should do." General Norstad stated that that concept was still valid and would be used. The forward line must be held and the NATO territories and people saved from being overrun. He believed that, within the economic perimeters which had been set by the nations, this was about as much as he could plan on doing.

Deterrent Capabilities of SACEUR's Forces. General Norstaid did not object to his planners thinking about possible exploitation in case of war --but the forces and means of exploitation were beyond the scope of the present problem and study. NATO was not generating forces for exploitation. The Shield Forces were raised to hold the forward line for a sufficient period of time to allow the operations of the retaliatory forces to take effect and to turn the tide in favor of NATO. General Norstad noted that this aspect of the Shield Forces was an old one, but that now he felt there was a new aspect also, and one not generally understood. This new aspect was the contribution which the Shield Forces actually made to the deterrent, which he believed to be the important function of these Shield Forces. General Norstad declared that the NATO nations had reached a point in

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED their preparedness - and had in his opinion reached it several years previously- which made the cost to the Soviets of a World War III so great that they would tJ t;" -ti not make a deliberate decision to go to war, The Soviets knew that NATO had the capability of destroying them if they should go to war, a capability which had existed for several years and would continue to exist. The posses- sion by the Russians of a similar capability did not change the significance of this fact in General Norstad1 s opinion. No matter how great a capability the Russians had, the absolute quality of the NATO deterrent still existed. And there was little to be gained by saying "we will destroy the other side too." The inequality was that the Russians were the only ones, so far as NATO was concerned, who would start a war; NATO nations would not. SACEUR pointed out that he believed that a deliberate, cold-blooded decision to start a war had now become, at least for the present and in the foreseeable future, an impossibility. The only chance now of war would come through ignorance, error, or as the result of hot-headed treatment of a small incident that got out of hand. Thus the line dividing NATO nations from the Soviet Union and its Satellites was the most dangerous and sensitive line in the world. It must, General Norstad told his staff officers, be defended in some reasonable force. If the Russians made the mistake of pushing or probing across the line, they must run into force. In principle, they would run into force and bounce off the line, which would give them a chance to take a closer look and realize that they were on the verge of starting World War III, in which they would be destroyed, if they continued their probing. This was the basic importance of the Shield Forces as a part of the deterrent. General Norstad deplored the use of such terms as "plate glass window" and "trip-wire" in this connection. Even though he had perhaps coined the first phrase himself, it had been misinterpreted and defined in a different light than he had hadin mind. In other words, mere warning of an attack was not enough. The force to stop the attack and give the enemy time to change

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED hi s mind, must exist on the spot.

., V-^V >". Y«V ^L' À 'O-VJ J 88

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I • : V - General Norstad envisioned that time! was working on the side of NATO. If the NATO nations provided sufficient Shield Forces and kept the enemy from making the fatal error, war would not occur. And any comparison of 1945 through 1949 with 1957 would show that the NATO nations were definitely in a much better situation on the latter date. The staff was warned by General Norstad that the time had now come when they were going to have to be spe: cific in providing him with estimates of the duration of any future war. He wanted to be able to say to the Council, in October or later, just how long the fight would probably be. If he did not provide a specific time period, the nations would demand one, as they had a right to do.

Objectives and Priorities of Requirements. From his observations at CPX VII and from talking with other NATO military authorities, General Norstad had concluded, he told his staff, that specific decisions were going to have to be made on the tasks to be done. CINCHAN had made a very eloquent plea against the establishment of exclusive and narrow priorities. General Norstad had agreed, but pointed out that certain things were going to have to be done first. If they were not done first there would be no cause to worry about what happened afterwards - there would not be any afterwards. General Norstad stressed that the plan must cover the first phase adequately, based on broad guidance already available and specifics which he would discuss with his staff as necessary. Subsequent phases must be considered, but survival of the first phase was the big thing. First phase requirements would have an important bearing on subsequent phases. Such questions as the relative importance of strategic reserve divisions in the United States would have to be decided, for instance. General

N0rstad wanted the staff to prepare the study without compromise. He wanted no economic or political judgements from the staff, just facts. He would DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED always be available for consultation with the staff, and he wanted nothing hidden or obscured by compromise. If differences of opinion arose between staff groups, General Norstad stated that he personally would resolve them. This paper would not be a strict requirements study but would take into account requirements and capabilities, using the rules already established for as sumptions as to forces which could be generated. When asked if SHAPE planning was to be coDdinated with other commands, he replied that other commands would be kept informed but not asked for coordination.

Continuation of Annual Review. General Norstad stated, in reply to another question, that the Annual Review would be continued. Although inadequate, the Annual Review was the best thing available. He would take this up with individual nations if necessary to persuade them that the Annual Review must be continued. He directed that the subordinate commanders be kept informed ai*d be asked for comment and advice while the study was in progress, not after it was completed. If matters of broad principle came into dispute between SHAPE staff and the commands, they should be brought to him for resolution.

DCPANDP Guidance. Air Marshal Constantine, DCPANDP, called all the planning officers concerned into a conference on 25 April and issued them his own guidance. At this meeting it was agreed that the annexes to the plan would deal only with ACE problems. SACLANT and CINCHAN would be informed of the work being done and would be consulted as appropriate where coordination of national contributions to SACEUR's naval forces were concerned.

NAC Request for Replies by SACEUR to WEU Questions. On 26 April 1957, General Norstad was formally instructed to prepare replies for the Council answering questions raised by the WEU, particularly

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED concerning military requirements and defense aims and the relationship between conventional and atomic weapons. In preparing these replies, he

nato confidentf

G IT • /

was instructed to take into account the military aspects of the relationship between modern armaments and economic and financial resources in the light of the general policy of the Alliance as approved by the Council. He was told also to take into account the explanation of the WEU1S decision which had been made by Professor Halstein. It was anticipated, of course, that other questions would be sent him through the Council. The Standing Group instructed General Norstad to submit his replies simultaneously to them and to the Council in order that the Council could commence studying them without delay. The Standing Group understood that SACEUR's replies to the Council directive would be contained in the newest Minimum Force Study, and that owing to these new conditions just imposed, this Minimum Force Study would be delayed for three or four months. With specific regard to the Minimum Force Study, the Standing Group stated that all of the studies by all Major NATO Commanders should define the commander's main mission and task; define the assumptions from which the force requirements were generated; and contain the force requirements either by country or, if not possible, by area command. General Norstad and the other commanders were asked to submit their Minimum Force Studies to the Standing Group not later than 1 September 1957.'27»

SHAPE Staff Actions. The preliminary form of the study and the accompanying annexes were set out by Air Marshal Constantine in a memorandum to the SHAPE Staff on the same day. The basic document was intended to comprise three main chapters -- The Concept, Force Criteria, and Force Structure. The Summary

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED (27) Memofor SACEURfrom SGN, SGN-279-57, 26 Apr 57. of ACE Pattern of Forces Required and the,Force Tabs would be included in the last chapter. The Annexes, fourteen in number, A through N, were (28) enumerated and assigned to divisions of primary interest/ '

SACEUR's Briefing of NAC at SHAPE. On 28 May 1957, the North Atlantic Council visited General Norstad at SHAPE. After briefing these officials on the general military situation, General Norstad emphasized certain factors which he felt affected his current study on minimum forces. He reviewed for them the command structure of ACE and the essential directives to him which were contained in the political directive-. He re-stated his mission and emphasized that the deterrent portion of his mission required the use not only of the retaliatory forces and the Shield, but the will to use them. Outlining for these authorities his relationship with SAC and similar external forces, General Norstad presented in detail the atomic forces which were available to him. And he demonstrated with charts the disposition of his airfields which made it impossible for the Soviets, even by surprise attack, to eliminate the ACE capability to retaliate (29) and destroy them/ With specific reference to the Shield, General Norstad re-emphasized that it was an integral part of the deterrent. It must bridge the gap in time between the outbreak of hostilities and the attainment of the full effect of the retaliatory forces. He told the Council that he was thinking in terms of weeks. The Shield, besides its other functions, assisted the retaliatory forces by protecting the electronic guidance facilities needed by the lattar. General Norstad impressed upon the Council the important fact that NATO had the ability to destroy any specific target it wished in Russia. The potential enemy's knowledge of this fact would prevent him from starting a war, except through miscalculation.

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED (29) Memo from DCPANOP to Divisions, sub: ACE Minimum Force Study 1958-63, 26 Apr 57, PAWDP 12409, w/enclosure. (29) Msg 281730z LOSTAN 2070, 28 May 57.

iiBimiurf Tôt* fftfl'B ITfr General Norstad told the visiting Council members that he foresaw no drastic or revolutionary changes as a result of the forthcoming Minimum Force &udy, and that he felt there would be nothing comparable to the very significant changes which had come out of the 1957 Capabilities Study« But he advised them that if they wished to reduce forces, they must think about removing from the Political Directive some of the tasks set forth therein. He added that he did not see how any of these tasks could be removed.

Questions by the National Representatives and SECGEN. In opening the question period, SACEUR pointed out that he now had less than half the forces in Central Europe which he considered necessary to implement the forward strategy on the line he contemplated holding. He also stated that the guidance which he had issued for the 1957 Annual Review was based on 1960-62 thinking and not on MC 48, and that it therefore included future trends and force requirements which he felt were inevitable. He expressed great confidence in the validity of his guidance as issued. The Belgian Representative asked why, since the Shield was presently a theoretical and not a real thing, should we not reduce it to something attainable.-- SACEUR answered that with the return of French units and with the German contribution he would have something near 30 divisions, and he believed he could still meet the goal. He said that the 30 divisions force was ridiculously small and was acceptable only with the integration and use of nuclear weapons. He declared that the price to pay for any reduction was too great. He pointed out that Europe might not be the first area subjected to nuclear attack and that in the meantime NATO could not accept the over- running of countries like Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany. He added that maintenance of necessary forces was not a "convenient" business, that this would be the worst time to reduce forces since it seemed to him NATO

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED was not winning the political battle. Every country could probably do twice as much as it was currently doing for defense.

93 / SHAPE 57/67 ÜÜÜM1U "TOP ^SEC \ • • ' • /

The Portuguese Representative asked what would happen in the event of the outbreak of war before the building up of 30 divisions. SACEUR answered that he could not hope to carry out the forward strategy as contemplated, but would do the best he could with full use of nuclear weapons. He again referred to the gradual improvement resulting from French and German action. The Netherlands Representative asked if ACE could rely on the employment of external forces such as SAC and UK Bomber Command. SACEUR replied that he had assurances of such employment from the US and that his position in this respect was as strong as his confidence in the two countries involved. The Netherlands Representative also posed the constitutional question as it affected the use of nuclear weapons on the outbreak of war. SACEUR replied that he felt this was largely an academic.question and that NATO would use the necessary weapons even before formal declaration of war. The Secretary General asked if SACEUR's view of the interrelationship of the retaliatory and Shield portions of the deterrent was agreed in by other military authorities, NATO and national. SACEUR answered that general agreement was expressed in MC 48, agreed to be all nations, that he knew of no opposition, but that the specific emphasis on the importance of the Shield as a part of the deterrent was particularly a per sonnai view of his developed during the last six months. The Secretary General also asked if nations could continue to reduce the number of divisions required by increasing their firepower capability. SACEUR answered that he had already taken the new weapons into account. NATO had reached a position where there could be no more drastic reductions in strength because of increased nuclear firepower. The Secretary General asked how best to answer the fear of many nations that they could not afford to have both nuclear and non-nuclear forces. SACEUR answered that the cost was high and that it would increase, but he DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED pointed out that gross national products had been increasing without a corresponding increase of defense budgets, and he thought this might provide part of the answer. ^^^^^SEF^-ÏÏ«. «^«»«^H«^ '."» Finally, the Secretary General asked for a clarification of NATO's t position with respect to the use of atomic weapons. SACEUR answered that it was not decided beyond the provision of MC 48, which granted authority for planning on the use of atomic weapons at the outset. The Greek Representative asked SACEUR to confirm the Field Marshal's contention in CPX VII that the Soviets could not surprise ACE with a general attack. General Norstad replied that while the Soviets could attack without warning, he believed that in event of their deliberately initiating hostilities we woxild probably be able to detect indications of their intentions. The Norwegian Representative asked if there had been any significant Soviet redeployment within the past six months. SACEUR answered that there had been none except in Hungary. The Norwegian Representative also asked if the flow of intelligence was now satisfactory to SACEUR; SACEUR replied that although there had been a general improvement due to cooperation by national authorities, his answer was still negative as applied to current day- to-day intelligence. He added that he felt he was furnished the best strategic intelligence (long-term Soviet capabilities} available to the Western Powers.

Questions Raised by National Authorities of France and Germany. The questions raised by the WEU and Dr. Halstein were augmented during May by additional questions from the German Government and from the French Government. Typical of the type of questions asked of General Norstad were * the following: "Could General Norstad make a comparison between the non- atomic forces which have been estimated as necessary for the defense of NATO following the Lisbon Conference and the 'modern' forces now deemed necessary for the 1960-65 defense program;" and, "Is it possible to contem- plate withdrawing certain so-called conventional armaments from the 'modern* forces of the three Services ? If so, which items could be withdrawn ?"

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED (30) RDC/174/57, 6 May 57, A complete list of all these questions is contained in Memo from General Gazin to Divisions, sub: ACE Minimum Force Study 1958-60, 20 Jun 57.

(COSMIC TOP SECRET Progress of ACE Minimum Force Study, The preparation of the basic study and its annexes got under way immediately. By early June a report on the progress of the Minimum Force Study was rendered by Air Marshal Constantine, and at the Chief of Staff's meeting on 5 June, he stated that in the interests of the study he proposed to hold a periodic progress meeting to ensure that there were no bottlenecks. He proposed to hold the first meeting on 18 June, and asked that Oivisbn Chiefs come in person. When the Military Committee met in Paris for its 17th Session, General Norstad, along with the other major NATO commanders, appeared before the Committee to tell them of his progress on the Minimum Force Study. On 10 July he explained to the Committee that certain factors had been introduced which had changed the general form, the scope and the substance of his study, particularly the responsibilities imposed on him by the Council of the WEU and the NATO Council. What was now expected of him was a study which would provide a basis for answering the most pressing and difficult questions in the field of military requirements, such as, for example, the relationship between conventional weapons and the so-called new weapons. He stated that this study would be considerably larger and far more comprehensive than was originally contemplated. It was hoped, however, that the 1 September deadline set by the Standing Group could be met. General Norstad told the members of the Military Committee that while he did not wish to prejudge his study, or to give the impression that any firm conclusions had yet been reached, he expected neither any drastic change or shift in the balance of forces, and certainly no vast reduction in requirements. No new factors had been introduced and the basic assumptions remained unchanged. The Political Directive certainly did not reduce the size of the task. Indeed, while the Directive had assigned him no new missions, some missions were re-empha- (31)

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED sized which had been almost forgotten since 195) or 1952.

(31) MC 17th Session, 29 July 57. SACEUR*a Appraisal of Minimum Force Study Development. During the past eight months SACEUR had re-examined the requirementp for the so-called Shield Forces. It appeared that these requirements were, if anything, more firmly supported than they were in earlier years. And he reiterated his personal conviction of the value of the Shield as an essential part of the deterrent. He said that the presentations to be made toward the end of 1957 would really hinge on that particular point as the most significant new development of the present study. General Norstad said that he hoped to present a briefing on his study to the Military Committee and to the Council in such a way as to make it possible for them to consider the merits of this particular function and to decide that it should or should not be carried out. He felt that NATO had long since passed the point where requirements could be assessed and then Arbitrarily reduced, because it.would be impossible to carry out the assigned tasks if there were any further whittling away. He believed that the minimum basic structure had now been reached.

New Concepts of ACE Tasks - Delay in Progress. Air Marshal Constantine called the Staff Officers who were primarily concerned with the preparation of the Minimum Force Study to a meeting on 11 July, at which he examined in detail the current status of the study and attempted to determine the major problems lying ahead. At this meeting, it was developed that PANDP had evolved a new concept of thé tasks of Allied Command Europe, originally Annexes B and C. It was now proposed to develop a paper which would reflect SACEUR's strategic appreciation or ComiiBnder1S Estimate. Co-laterally, this paper would address itself to the major questions posed by the Council and the national authorities, questions which were not dealt with elsewhere in the study. An example of such a question was that of the relationship between nuclear and non-nuclear arms. Progress on the study was not up to the schedule which originally had DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED been proposed by PANDP. Particularly, the annex covering the Defense of V- > y

Land Frontiers was lagging behind, probably the most important annex insofar as the questions which had been posed by the Council were concerned. The general lag in completion of the earlier annexes to the Minimum Force Study threatened to reduce the time available for translating these annexes into specific force requirements and for developing the logistic and financial implications.

DCPANDP Proposals for Completion of Forces Study. Air Marshal Constantine had emphasized for all the divisions concerned what still needed to be done, and their specific responsibilities. He assigned to PANDP Division the task of coordinating contents and developing, in conjunction with the Adjutant General, the administrative details for organizing, assembling, and reproducing the Study. Air Marshal (Konstantine proposed to the Chief of Staff for approval a number of actions and required arrangements. He proposed a timetable « setting forth dates by which both initial and final drafts of the basic document and of each annex should be prepared. This provided for completion during August in most cases, and in no case later than 15 August. He recommended a method of handling the study by the Command Echelon, suggesting that SACEUR should concur generally with the contents of Annex B (The Strategic Appreciation of Commander's Estimate), which would be forwarded not later than 5 August, and that SACEUR should of course specifically approve the basic document. Additionally, he felt that the Command Echelon should be briefed on the main points of the other annexes. This briefing would take at least four hours, and be given by a briefing team from the staff between 15 and 23 August. He recommended that the Chief of Staff should, as a minimum, read the annexes on air defense, nuclear delivery forces, defense of land (32) frontiers, and force requirements/

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED (32) Memo for Chief of Staff, 15 Jul 57, sub: Minimum Force Study, sgd H. A. Constantine, DCPANDP. Action Officer: Col. Stilwell; w/Engl. - 1 Timetable.

.. V J W- DCPANDP Recommendations Concerning MSCs. Air Marshal Constantine told General Schuyler that the action officers had followed SACEUR's guidance given on 23 April and had sought advice and counsel as required from knowledgeable officers within the subordinate commands. They had also carried on considerable liaison with respect to certain annexes. As a further measure, DCPANDP proposed that the Major Subordinate Commanders be acquainted through formal presentations with this very important document. Although time might not allow full familiari- zation with it and comment from these key officers, he felt that after 15 Au- gust briefings should be given to them and to their principal planners by the SHAPE staff.

Distribution of the Study. As to the distribution of this Minimum Force Study, Major General Gazin would recommend distribution within ACE and adjacent NATO commands. The Standing Group, of course, had already directed simultaneous transmittal to themselves and to the Council. Air Marshal Constantine proposed to ask the Standing Group what distribution, if any, should be made to MODs. There was some question as to whether the pattern followed in sending the 1960-62 Force Posture Study to the MODs was still valid since the eventual publication of MC 70 might have altered the circumstances. On 26 August the Standing Group informed the North Atlantic Council that because of "practical difficulties", SACEUR's study would be delayed. And they further pointed out that this would cause a delay in receipt by the Council of comments of their constitutional military advisers on SACEUR's (33) replies to French and German questions and on production of MC 70.

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED Progress Report on the Minimum Force Study by A COS PANDP. At a meeting which General Schuyler held with all Division Chiefs on

(33) Rad, DEF 928578, SGN to SGREP, 26 Aug 57. 22 August, Major General Gazin, ACOS PANDP, gave a detailed accounting of the status of the Minimum Force Study, with particular emphasis on the influence of SACEUR in directing certain portions of the study. General Norstad was following closely the actions of the staff in preparing this • (34) project.

SACEUR's Directives for Revisions. Chapters 1 and 2 of Volume 1 had been approved in principle by SACEUR, but he directed that this portion be rewritten for greater clarity and particularly to bring out the importance of the Shield Forces in line with his expressed views. He had also directed a new chapter added to Volune 1 to summarize main conclusions drawn from different annexes and from which the main points to be included in the letter to the Standing Group would be extracted. General Norstad felt that there were three main points which must be brought out by his study and which must be emphasized and made perfectly clear by his staff in writing the document. First, he wished a clear and lucid comparison presented, in terms that would be unmistakably appreciated, of the economic costs of the military machinery shown as necessary in the study as opposed to the military risks which would exist if this machinery were not made available. His second requirement was for a vivid analysis of the need for vigilance and readiness and the actual state of that vigilance. Thirdly, General Norstad wished brought out his opinions and thoughts about the necessity of balancing forces for economic reasons. General Norstad had also directed certain actions after having reviewed some of the major annexes in draft form. He expressed concern at the "over- killing" factor which appeared in Annex B, Nuclear Strike Forces. The same

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED (34) See Verbatim Record of COFS Mtg with Division Chiefs, 22 Aug 57, for details of this direction,

10 v'i?t t J '4 NATO CONRDENTIAL In .¾ I i "over-killing" or over-abundance of atomic capabilities also existed in the level of nuclear delivery means shown in Annex C, Defense of Land Frontiers. But General Norstad felt that the lack of flexibility of ground delivery systems obliged him to have an abundance of means beyond those which would at first appear adequate. General Norstad had also studied the remainder of the annexes and directed certain action on each of them. The divisions responsible for preparing the annexes were directed to complete them in final draft and to submit them to DCPANDP by 24 August.

Fined editing of these annexes for style, consistency and elimination of duplication wovild be accomplished by a task group headed by Colonel Griffith, working under the immediate direction of DCPANDP. On 11 September, General Schuyler told his division chiefs that most of the annexes of the Minimum Force Study 1958-63 were in the final stages of drafting and would be ready for reproduction very shortly. There would be two volumes: Volume 1 would contain five chapters dealing with general philosophy, plus the force tables; and Volume 2 would consist of seven supporting annexes going into greater detail in support of generalities covered in Volume 1. The same number of copies of both volumes would be produced, but only very limited distribution would be made of Volume 2, which would probably be one of the most sensitive documents ever produced by this headquarters. The Major Subordinate Commander» would be briefed on this study on 16 September; the Chiefs of Staiff of the NATO Countries on 18 September; (35) and the NATO Council on 2 October, * '

Briefing for Individuals Concerned in the Study. All responsible officials within the headquarters were agreed that in DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED order that the Minimum Force Study should be fully understood by those

(35) Minutes of the COFSMeeting with Division Chiefs, 11 Sep 57. • I individuals who would either be affected by* or who would themselves affect, the concepts and provisions of the study, detailed briefings should be set up. Accordingly, this briefing phase assumed greater and greater importance during late summer and early autumn. On 16 September, Major Subordinate Commanders visited SHAPEwhere they were briefed on the Minimum Force Study. Two days later, Chiefs of Staff of all NATO countries were given a similar briefing, and on 2 October the Permanent Representatives of the NAC came to SHAPE where the study was explained to them in great detail. At his meeting with the Council, General Norstad followed the same line of briefing which he had used in briefing the national Chiefs of Staff. He pointed out to them however that while his study contained the basis for replies to the German and French questions raised in connection with the WEU problem of UK reduction of forces, it did (36) not contain the specific answers to these questions. The reactions of the Chiefs of Staff and the Permanent Representatives were, in general, favorable. Some nations, however, were concerned with the force recommendations made in the study which indicated that they would have to provide certain costly new forces or, in some cases, reduce forces which they wanted to keep. There was also concern over the proposed reduction of the existing 2nd Echelon Divisions whose equipment was considered to be adequate for the present and which could be employed by the nations on national tasks.

The Minimum Force Study for ACE 1958-63 is Published. The Minimum Force Study for Allied Command Europe, 1958-1963, was issued on 1 October 1957. The aim of the study was defined as: "To determine the minimum force with which Allied Command Europe could carry out its mission through 1963 and to plan the necessary transition DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED (36) Rad, SGREP to SGN LOSTAN 2208, 2 Oct 57. ÇÛS&IIC . TQEL -SFTRATRN

beginning 1958." The study consisted of two volumes as planned, the Basic Study in Volume 1, and the Annexes in Volume 2. The distribution of Volume 2 was much more limited than that of Volume 1, because of the sensitivity of the information contained in the annexes. Whereas a total of 250 English and 120 French copies of Volume 1 were produced and distributed to NATO authorities and to the nations of NATO as well as to the SHAPE Staff, only (37) ~ 70 English and 22 French copies of Volume 2 were distributed.

Resumes of Contents of Vol. 1 by Chapters, and Vol. 2 by Annex Titles. As finally produced, Volume 1 contained five chapters. Chapter I, The Threat, set forth the comparative nuclear positions of the NATO nations and the Soviet Bloc; an analysis of the Soviet capabilities over-all and the possible courses which aggression against NATO might take. These latter included, aside from a general war, certain possibilities in the field of limited aggression such as incursions and infiltrations and local attack. Chapter II, A Shield for NATO, discussed, without naming it so, SACEUR's mission to prevent war, if possible, but if war occurred, to win it. The Central Strategy, based on the deterrent, set forth the philosophy in the two cases of general war or limited aggression. The second half of this chapter defined the need for ready forces and the functions of both the Strike Forces and the Shield Forces. In this connection, General Norstad's conception of the Shield Forces as a part of the actual deterrent was emphasized. Chapter III, Certain Measures Required, included a study of critical margins; the necessity for adequate warning of attack; and introduced two concepts which were to take on greater importance within SHAPE in coming months. These concepts or principles, first mentioned here, were those of DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED

(37) SHAPE/154/57 and SHAPE/154-1/57, 1 October 1957. SrtAFü, StIOt UOfiMic rem

(38) Graduated Readiness and Collective Balanced Forces. Chapter IV presented the assumptions on which the Pattern of Forces in the study was based, and then presented in summary the Force Totals, by command, by nation and by service for ACE which had been developed within this pattern. The Summary, Chapter V, was addressed, in part at least, to national authorities, and long-term considerations included a call for a long-range cost plan as a logical complement of the long-range force plan. Ths concluding paragraph of Volume 1 stated: "In developing this force, Allied Command Europe has been guided by two facts: First that our strength depends on the economic health of the NATO nations; second, and paramount, that much of the hope for peace and freedom depends upon the accomplishment of the NATO mission -- to prevent war, but, if attacked, to defend our peoples and territories." Volume 2, the annexes, comprised in final form: Annex A - the Soviet Threat; Annex B - the Nuclear Strike Forces; Annex C - Defense of Land Frontiers; Annex D - Air Defense of NATO Europe; Annex E - Defense and Exploitation of the Sea Areas of Allied Command Europe; Annex F - Logistics Implications; Annex G - Programming Implications. The first volume, the Basic Study, contained mainly a philosophical discussion and analysis of SACEUR's mission, and means and methods of accomplishing that mission. It attempted to synthetize military thought into terms understandable to the layman. In many instances, the laymen at whom this was aimed were national civilian officials of considerable influence poli- tically, but of limited experience militarily. Without full understanding of SACEUR's needs and of the reasons underlying his requirements, the full support of these officials might not be forthcoming. On the other hand, the study had to be sufficiently "Professional" to capture and hold the attention

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED of the professional military men in NATO and particularly the National Staffs.

(38) For Details of further action taken on these two matters in 1957 see

i^^^-tfrr'rairn PT nato conf

The assumptions on which the pattern of Minimum Forces was based had been requested by the Standing Group« Although seven assumptions were listed in Chapter IV, Pattern of Forces 1963, three of these were particularly significant and had the greatest influence on the study. It was assumed, for example, that SACEUR's forces would be equipped with operational new equipment and weapons systems, including a nuclear delivery capability whenever required. The peak requirements would be determined by the critical opening phase of any war, and the minimum force would be computed on the minimum task to defend, not to advance and occupy any territory. The introduction of ground nuclear delivery units into the ACE arsenal and of air-to-ground missiles allowed certain reductions in manned aircraft and some types of anti-aircraft artillery. Counterpart of the discussion of nine campaigns which had been set forth in the ACE Capabilities Study 1957 was Annex C, Defense of the Land Frontiers, whieiudi-scussed the__fitrategy_for defending each of the areas charged to ^SACEUR^__. Programming, wherein SHAPE undertook to examine the cost of the military forces as it would affect the nations, was set out. The study was based on limited data available through Annual Review Questionnaires.

Briefing the Council after Soviet Satellite Launching and ICBM Claims. The Soviet announcement of their succèssful launching of an earth satellite and their claim that they possessed an ICBM raised speculation in some quarters of NATO as to the validity of the ACE Minimum Force Study. General Norstad met with the Permanent Representatives of the North Atlantic Council on 22 October to discuss this particular aspect of the study, and remained to answer questions which were asked of him by the Council members. DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED

./... AG 1240/2 P AN DP, 31 Dec 57, "Collective Balanced Forces Study, " and PANDP 1240/1, 10 Oct 57, "Study on Graduated Readiness."

NÄT0 CONFiDcNTlAjT He drew the attention of the Council to the opening paragraph of Chapter I of the study which stated that the growth of the nuclear capabilities of both sides was the most important single factor governing NATO planning through 1963, and he pointed to Annex A of the study which stated that by mid-1963 at the latest Soviet forces could have operational numbers of ICBMs of high performance characteristics. He assured all present that the study had been based on these assumptions, and that nothing had occurred which would require a revision or modification of either the assumptions or the study. ^ ^

Cost of Maintaining ACE Forces. The cost of forces called for by the Minimum Force Study was somewhat higher than that of maintaining current ACE assigned or earmarked forces of Continental European countries. Aside from the capital expenditure involved, the cost of maintaining these new forces would be some 10 or 15 percent higher. General Norstad pointed out to the members of the Council, some of whom had expressed concern over these costs, that the Political Directive had been approved in December 1956. It had amplified the directives to the Military Authorities on their missions and had, at the same time, drawn attention to the need for preserving the economic strength of the Alliance. General Norstad felt that his task was to determine the means necessary to carry out the missions charged to him by the Council. It was not, however, his responsibility to provide those means. In the past the problem of balancing stated requirements and availabilities had been approached by applying fixed standards to all forces, without reference to location or mission. SHAPE intended now, however, to take into account the special tasks to be performed by individual units of a country's forces, and would assist nations in defining these special tasks and in deciding what new equipment was necessary to DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED carry out these tasks. It might be possible to make reductions in capital required through this means.

(39) C-R(57)64, 25 Oct 57, STSC 12^5^ -Limited Distribution^-

* • ' ' ; ',. x.'Sr A . . . WATO CONFjDE-WTMI106 " ~ - In the past, each nation had balanced.its force requirements against its resources, often with the assistance of SHAPE. This procedure, General Norstad felt, should be continued and expanded, with nations bringing forward particular problems, such as deficiencies or discrepancies, to SHAPE. The basis of the examination would be, as in the past, SHAPE recommendations concerning priority of tasks and formations. The program as a whole should be presented to the Council through some process similar to the Annual Review, so that the Council could weigh the importance of the deficiencies. SHAPE wotiid have to interpret ihe deficiencies in terms of the effect on the tasks which* as a consequence, the command might not be able to carry out.

General Norstad emphasized, in concluding his prepared remarks, that the political, scientific and technical developments of the past few weeks did not necessitate any modification of his study, - and while he was aware that a gap might exist between force goals and apparent resources, this gap would have to be evaluated in terms of the overall risk involved.

NAC Questions on the Minimum Force Study. Following General Norstad1 s remarks, virtually all members of the Council expressed their thanks to him for the excellent preparation of the Minimum Force Study, and all agreed that it was an exceptionally detailed and convincing piece of work. The individual members made certain points and expressed some views on behalf of their governments, and a number of questions relative to the study and the concept behind the study were asked of Generad Norstad. TheBelgianRepresentative, for instance, commented that in .analyzing the functions and needs of the Shield, emphasis had been laid on the necessity for presenting a convincing appearance of effectiveness. The underlying

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED assumption, he said, was that there was a need to equip the Shield Forces with the new tactical nuclear weapons, and his Government considered that this should be the basis for determining the contribution of the Western Euro- pean countries. Belgium was glad to see tfcje emphasis which the study had SHAPE 57/67 OGWWfP"1

NATO CONFID&iv s SAIL

placed on the necessity for a high measure of integration in air defense. The Belgian Representative also praised the concept of collective balanced forces, pointing out that it had existed from the early days of the Alliance, and that the revival of this concept in the report had wide implications. He said that his military authorities were ready to discuss with SHAPE how this principle could be applied in bringing about a greater specialisation of functions and a closer integration of forces. At the same time, he warned that the idea of balanced forces was not compatible with any withdrawal of national forces to meet commitments outside of NATO, and that it must be recognized that as of integration/forces became more complete, the effect of such withdrawals on NATO defense would be extremely serious. He asked General Norstad to explain to him the role of the international division which had been brought up when the representatives met at SHAPE on 2 October. His second question, in the infrastructuré field, Was "What would be the implications for the infrastructure program of the contemplated wider distribution of new tactical weapons among the Shield Forces ?" The French Representative expressed the approval of his government in the general lines of the Minimum Force Study, but he brought up some points which were of concern to his Government and which had been examined in the study. He said that the countries were being asked to spend a great deal of money on early warning and communications systems, merely in order to gain a few minutes, or even seconds, of advance notice. Since this was so, it was essential that this slight gain should not be lost through ddays caused by the lack of immediate availability of atomic warheads. Since France was one of the nations which had been forced from time to time to withdraw heavy numbers of men and much equipment from Continental Europe to meet threats elsewhere, the French delegate was particularly concerned with what the effect of the new DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED forces program would be, and whether over and above the extra cost of maintaining these forces, they would have to face the additional expenditure of meeting their non-NATO commitments. This was particularly true of the NATO CONFIDENTIAL equipment, since General Norstad's report called for highly specialized types which would probably not be adaptable to operations in other areas. He felt it might be possible to develop multi-purpose types of equipment. This indicated a need for a new effort towards coordination and standardization, and he agreed with the Belgian Representative that the infrastructure program would have to be drastically revised in the light of the new concept. The Italian member of the Council praised the report, and made the point that in order to achieve economy in providing the latest weapons to the European members of the Alliance, production of these weapons should wherever possible be performed in Europe. He agreed wholeheartedly in the importance of establishing an integrated air defense. Norway's Representative on the Council drew attention to the reference to "graduated readiness." He stated that this principle was encouraging to him because in the past the countries had felt sometimes that standards were V being applied too rigidly over the whole NATO area, and that conclusions in the combat effectiveness reports issued to SACEUR over the past few years had been unduly pessimistic. His government, he said, would welcome more details as to how nuclear weapons could be more widely distributed among the Shield Forces, and he raised two questions regarding the comparative capabilities of the NATO and Soviet Bloc. Referring to a statement in Chap- ter 1 of the study, that NATO would continue to have the advantage in weapons and delivery systems, and of course geography, he asked whether the assumption stated later in the report that the Soviets would have 700 submarines by 1963, some of them equipped with nuclear missiles, would not tend to nullify NATO's geographical advantage. He pointed out also that the report, while granting the Sovietbt capability for ICBMs by 1963, claimed that these missiles would not be likely to tilt the military balance of power against NATO. General

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED Norstad had told the Council that the most important point was that the Soviets knew that NATO had the ability to destroy them if attacked, and that the actual MATO confidential

SHAPE 57/67

The Norwegian Representative said he thought that the two statements were perhaps somewhat contradictory, and he believed that if the deterrent were effective as a deterrent, NATO could not expect any military advantage by using it. General Norstad replied immediately to the last point by quoting from the report a section which pointed out that the growth of nuclear capabilities I on both sides was the most important factor in planning through the period, and that the period would see an evolution toward a complete nuclear footing. The same section had analyzed the various missile systems which would be available to both sides. He pointed out that at no time had the study minimi- zed the Capabilities which the Russians would attain, that Annex A of Volume 2 had even mentioned the Soviet intention to launch an earth satellite in 1957, and that Western scientists had given full credit in this study to the Soviet fortes for their probable increase in nuclear capability. Nevertheless,. the study concluded, and General Norstad agreed, that in spite of Soviet, advances the military balance would not swing against the West during the planning period. He continued to believe that the ICBM announcement by the Soviet Government would not be sufficient to disturb the balance of power. The consensus at the meeting showed clearly that the Council was disappointed that the Standing. Group consolidation of the Major NATO Com* mandera* force studies -MC 70- was going to be delayed. The United Kingdom Representative, however, pointed out that the issues involved were extremely vital and were too large to permit a hasty and partial study. He said that he was glad to hear General Norstad say that he felt an Annusd Review process would be necessary to reconcile needs and costs. His own government's view at this time was that two stages wotild be necessary. First, would be a fact- finding process which could not begin until MC 70 was ready and had been con- DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED sidered by the NATO Governments. He suggested that perhaps a special fact-finding group could be setup using members of the international staff * who normally worked on the AnnualcR^^^ai^somi^NATO representatives. • ^^ ^Oj h • ' ' Thi8 grqup wôula negotiate with countries tp see what the problem areas were and how far the requirements emerging from the reports established by the Supreme Commanders and from MC 70 could be met without disturbing existing national policies. The Canadian Representative stated his GovernmenttS support for asking the Standing Group to provide a preliminary comment on the studies during the Ministers1 discussion of defense problems at the coming December meetings in Paris. The necessary measures to meet these requirements were, of course, a matter for collective NATO action. When MC 70 had been presented to the Council, the most useful procedure would probably be for Defense Ministers only to discuss its conclusions and recommendations in detail, but the preliminary discussion at thé Ministerial Meeting in December would serve to bring.the attention of the Foreign and Finance Ministers to the general implications of the need for adequate defense forces. He felt that after the meeting of the Defense Ministers, the most practical approach would be to have bi-lateral talks between the Supreme Commanders and appropriate countries, which could then be followed by an adapted Annual Review procedure. The Standing Group Representative who was present told the members of the Council that the Standing Group would be able to give some preliminary comments on MC 70 by December, which would include a status report of the document, the broad aspects of the document, and the main items ^yrhich would eventually require action at the Council level and/or by national authorities.

/ ^r. Spaak's Analysis of the Minimum Force Study1S Impact on Planning. Mr. Spaak, Chairman of the Council, said that there appeared to him tp be three salient points emerging both from the report and from the present DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED discussion. These were: a) the new developments in general strategy; b) the needs of SACEUIU— c) Sbw governments were to meet $hese needs. " /// . . .V M. Spaak recalled that the 1954 Study, MC 48, had fixed the strategy of the Alliance. At that time NATO authorities had stated that the West would be forced to use nuclear weapons to resist aggression even if attacked by only conventional weapons. As for the present report, it drew the definite distinction between general war and situations which fell short of this, and the Chairman asked whether this distinction implied a fundamental departure from the 1954 directive. He said he found it personally difficult to differen- tiate between a limited and a general war within the NATO area. Turning to SACEUR's requirements and the means for meeting these, he noted that the report established categorically the overall requirements both for the Shield and the deterrent. The question as to how these requirements could be met was one of great urgency which governments should consider now. . His impression was that there was some slight decrease in numbers of the forces now planned but that this was balanced by a great increase in fire power through the development of tactical nuclear weapons. The fundamental question was who should supply these arms to the forces and by what means. Extremely difficult financial and economic problems were involved and, although he agreed that these were not within the competence of SACEUR, he wotild welcome his views. The primary preoccupation of most members of the Council was the modification in the weapons program called for in the report, since it implied an enormous effort in the coming years. As regards the procedure to examine and implement the recommendations of the report, M. Spaak thought that this would have to be determined later. It appeared to be generally agreed that the report would be discussed by the Ministers in December, when some preliminary comments would be available from the Standing Group. It was clear that na final decisions could be taken before MC 70 had been presented. A meeting of Defense Ministers to consider

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED UC 70 when it was available appeared to him a very useful suggestion. With ^ttgard to the questions raised by the WEU, he pointed out that there were

IrWt aspects of the matter. Th&e was on the one hand the specific question relating to the United Kingdom forces, and on the other a number of questions involving the whole problem of NATO defense. On the specific question, he thought it should be possible to provide the elements of a reply to the WEU but that the broader questions should be reserved for further study by NATO.

SACEUR's Replies to Questions Raised by Chairman NAC. General Norstad replied first to the Chairman's question on whether there had been a change in the strategic concept enunciated in 1954 in MC 48 and envisaging a NATO response with atomic weapons to any aggression on NATO territory. General Norstad stated that, although many of the fundamental principles of MC 48 were still valid, there was one significant change which affected NATO strategy. At the time the 1954 Study was made, the West had, if not a monopoly of atomic weapons, at least a very great superiority. This superiority was ejected to last through 1957. Under these conditions, the West could plan on using atomic weapons against any threat. However, by 1963, or even before, both sides would have the ability to destroy the other with massive atomic attacks, and NATO at that time could not rely on massive atomic retaliation as the sole means of dealing with every situation. The main difference between the present study and that of 1954, the ACE Capabilities Plan 1957, was that we were now planning to provide adequate response to a situation short of a general war with means less than massive retaliation. NATO's object was to prevent war -all war, large and small. He feared that a limited war in a critical NATO area could not be restricted. It must be our object, therefore, to prevent such a limited war from starting. The fact that NATO could clearly cope decisively with a limited offensive would go a long way towards preventing it. Otherwise, each time that there arose the threat of a limited war or minor offensive operation,

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED the NATO countries and the Council would be faced with the difficult decision of whether to employ massive retaliation. Turning to the question raised by several members as to how atomic

113 weapons could be made available, General Norstad said that this was a matter beyond his competence but on which, nevertheless, he held strong views and had made strong recommendations. It was his belief that these weapons could be made available and that the requirements could be met in the relatively near future, without too much difficulty. As he had said before, it was not his concern whether any individual country possessed atomic weapons or not. It was, however, his business to^see that the forces placed at his disposal had the necessary weapons to carry out their tasks. A wider distribution of nuclear weapons among these forces was needed. He had tried to work out in principle certain proposals as to how the military requirements might be met -though not necessarily the political requirements- without involving changes in countries' laws or in existing regulations. These proposals were based on the existence of what was in effect a NATO stockpile of atomic weapons. He would emphasize that, even tinder the present system, atomic weapons did not belong to individual units. A central control and supply system to ensure that the missiles could be brought to the delivery units with sufficient speed already existed, and he considered that it could be extended without raising questions of ownership.

Changes in Infrastructure Programs. Several representatives had raised the question of infrastructure. He agreed that the new study would imply changes in the infrastructure programs as at present approved. During the last year, as a result of trends developed in the study, certain infrastructure projects had in fact already been modified and work on others stopped. Acceptancè of the implications of his report would mean stopping work on about 20 airfields. This might effect a saving of about L> 50 million. The expenditure necessary for missile infrastructure DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED up to 1963 would probably be about LllO million. The problem of how this addtionnal expenditure should be financed fell outside the competence of the military authorities, but common financing appeared to be the only solution, since the concentration of missiles in certain areas would mean that the burden of cost would otherwise be very unevenly spread. Concerning standardization, he said that the military favored the maximum reasonable standardization. There were difficulties because no means existed for integrating production capacity. Turning to the suggestion by the French Representative that an effort might be made to develop equipment capable of performing several different functions, he thought that there was not much scope for reducing costs in this way. Greater, rather than less, specialization was required. To achieve versatility, top level performance for particular functions would have to be sacrificed. It appeared more likely that economies could be achieved through specialization rather than through versatility. For example, a light weight strike fighter had been developed under the aegis of SHAPE and several types were now being tested. He hoped that the result of these tests would be standardization and procurement of the aircraft which had the best performance. During the past four years, he had repeatedly stressed the importance from the military point of view of an assured source of military equipment. One way to achieve this would be coordination of European production capacity. No single European country was in a position to produce, on an economic basis, aircraft to meet its own requirements. No other way existed of meeting the new, or indeed the old, requirements for aircraft and missiles • » from European production at a reasonable cost other than by coordinated production programs. As for NATO's geographical advantage, he emphasized that the map showed that a destructive attack could be launched on the Soviets from all 360 of the compass. The Wpst was developing an Early Warning System which in due course, when the studies now under way had been completed, would

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED IXO doubt be capable of dealing also with guided missiles. This would eliminate the danger to the West of simultaneous surprise attacks on our world- v4de base complex. He therefore tended to believe that the advantage of SHAPE 57/67 MMttiüli j^f.i

• fei u

geography would still lie with the West in 1963 and might even be enhanced in the future. Turning to the question of cost, the Supreme Commander said that perhaps his study had tended to over-emphasize his preoccupation with this problem. He must emphasize, however, that there was only one fixed point - the tasks to perform. In the last analysis cost ceilings must accommodate themselves to these tasks. This, however, was a decision for the Council. He had done his utmost to cut the costs in assessing his minimum force requirements, but he, as Supreme Allied Commander, had not and could not accept costs as the controlling factor in establishing force goals. He had set out what in his judgement were the minimupti forces necessary to preserve the peace and to protect the people of NATO. In carrying out his study he had done his utmost to relate the forces to the tasks which were required of them by the Cotincil. His report raised a number of major problems and he personally hoped that at least some of these would be discussed by Ministers at their meeting in December, and indeed that decisions on some of them could then be taken. In conclusion, General Norstad emphasized the need for the Alliance to present an appearance of strength and of unity. During the past four years there had been divergencies of approach to certain problems and these divergencies had been apparent. Now was the time to show the world that NATO |Bd a common purpose toward which all its members were working. The prime need of the moment was to reach decisions on the broad objectives. Only when these decisions had been reached should detailed discussion begin at to how the force levels required could be achieved.^^

factions of Major Subordinate Commanders.

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED On 30 October, when General Schuyler held his conference with the Cfc^efs of Staff of Major Subordinate Commands, he informed them that

(4^ C-R(57)64, 25 Oct 57. SHAPE briefing teams would be coming to their headquarters to brief them

on the study. Air Marshal Constantinef DCPANDP, would head the team visiting AFSOU TH and AFM ED, and Major General Gazin, ACOS P AN DP, would take the SHAPE team to AFNORTH and AFCENT. Representatives from Programs and Logistics Divisions as well as from the appropriate regional planning sections of the Operational Plans Branch of PANDP would be on these teams. The object of the briefings was to familiarize the officers of these commands with the study and to attempt to answer any of their questions concerning local problems pertaining to the study. General Schuyler asked that the audience at each briefing be as large as possible, since the more officers familiar with the details of the study, the better the implementation would be.^^

Briefing Teams Visits to MSCs. The team headed by Major General Gazin visited AFNORTH on 5 No- vember and AFCENT on 14 November. Air Marshal Constantine took a team to AFSOUTH on 20 November and to AFMED on 22 November.^42^ in the discussion which followed each of the briefings, a considerable number of questions and comments were raised by the local commanders or

(41) Minutes, COFS Meeting with Chiefs of Staff of MSCs, 30 Oct 57. (42) The SHAPE Officers who actually presented the Minimum Force Study in the Major Subordinate Commands consisted of Colonel Griffith, Colonel Stilwell, both US Army; Colonel Borreill, French Army; Co- lonel Cramer, German AF; and Captain Lewis, Royal Navy. In addition to these officers, representatives from OANDP, PROG, LOö and Operational Plans Branch of PANDP, were present at all briefings. The latter did not participate in the briefing, but were available during the question period in case their specialized knowledge was required. Colonel Griffith and Colonel Stilwell alternated in discussing the philosophy of the Study as in Chapters I, II and III of Vol. 1. Colonel Borreill

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED presented the land battle, stressing the specific geographical area being visited. Colonel Cramer discussed Strike forces and the covering air defense. Captain Lewis presented the naval operations and logistics implications, and finally one of the American Army officers, Colonel Grif- fith or Colonel Stilwell, then presented Force Tabs. ' ( • . - «2** r .. . .,. * ÎIT'* U1'V''• ••'• their staff officers. In most instances, SHAPE representatives were able (43) to provide the necessary amplification or clarification/ ' AFSOUTH. At AFSOUTH Headquarters, in Naples, the bulk of the post-briefing discussion centered on the problem of contingency planning for situations short of general war. However, the representatives of LANDSOUTH also questioned the role of 2nd Echelon land forces. This was a very vital issue to all three countries of the Southern European Command. The situation was complicated by the fact that neither the Minimum Force Study nor the national authorities were fully objective on the subject of 2nd Echelon forces. The Minimum Force Study did not cover the rear area security need a nor did it take into account national requirements for sustaining the prescribed level of forces throughout the intensive period of count er-combat. Although the security of rear areas and provision of replacements for the Shield Forces was a national responsibility, SHAPE recognized that it needed to arrive at a better appreciation of what these requirements were, if it were to provide sound guidance in the development of national'military plans. These national plans were widely divergent, and most of them wholly out of step with the nuclear age. The AFSE staff noted .the absence of any reference to the initial employment of strategic reserve (ready ground force units located in North America). AFMED. The conclusion of the briefing in Headquarters AFMED was marked by several points of issue raised by officers of that command. CINC- AFMED noted that there seemed to be a lack of attention in the study to the latter states of any general war. He pointed out that his command had a responsibility not shared by other regional commanders to keep open the sea lanes for

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED resupply of the Mediterranean nations immediately following any nuclear

(43) The following paragraphs are based on Memo for .DCPANDP, Sub: Major Problem Areas Uncovered During Briefing Trips to Subordinate Com- mands, 27 Nov 57, sgd by Maj.Gen. Gazin, PANDP 1240. V ,i '• V ' '• \ . - ' - V- • I .-

attack. He did not propose that this necessarily required additional forces, but he did suggest that it indicated a need for closet- planning and liaison with SACLANT since he faced the same problem in another area« Another problem which bothered officers of this command was that of destroying enemy VLF stations (long-range transmitters for the control of the submarine fleet). Plans for doing this had not been included in the Strike Campaign or the Campaign for defense/Exploitation of Sea Areas* AFNORTHi In the Northern command« SHAPE briefers found themselves questioned on employment of 2nd Echelon Oroutid Forces in that area, and on the level of AFNE Naval Forces» The question with regard to the ground forces was whether or not they should be considered as part of the Shield or should be committed to internal security tasks« And some of the NAVNORTH staff felt that the study contained naval forces in excess of those which would be required in their region. AFCENT. Considerable discussion was engendered at the briefing ôf the Commander and staff in the Center. The LANDCENT fltâff criticised the study in that it did not cover the requirements for subsequent operations) nor were they fully satisfied with the explanation of the SHAPE philosophy« The SHAPE briefing team was asked whether SHAPE had studied the question of how best to provide unit replacements to ground force unitB. Cen- ter authorities felt that depots must contain similar Units to those committed to combat so that any destroyed organisation could promptly be replaced in kind. An interesting point was raised by NAVCËNT, who pointed out that the study showed lower minesweeper requirements for the German Navy than were actually allowed by the Paris Agreement. German naval authorities feared that their government might use this as a reason for reducing the naval

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED budget. Plans for using air defense aircraft in the initial nuclear strikes, caused General Chassin to demand that these aircraft be reserved for their designed task, especially in the first three days of war; otherwise, he charged, the air defense battle would be lost. One of the purposes of the Minimum Force Study - a secondary purpose surely from the military standpoint - had been to furnish SACEUR with a basis for answering the questions posed in the Spring of 1957 by nations of the Western European Union and by Or. Halstein. However, although the study1 did provide such a basis, the nations were apparently in no hurry for specific answers or felt that the study by itself provided the information which they required. At any rate, no nation referred to the matter during the discussions of the Council in November, nor asked for any such answers. Accor- dingly, although the PANDP Division did prepare specific answers to each question, the Chief of Staff and DCPANDP decided not to forward these answers until a definite request were made by the nation concerned. Major General Gazin was told by Air Marshal Constantino to keep this compilation of answers at hand in case General Norstad should be called upon for the information at short notice/44^

Progress of MC 70. It had been decided that the Minimum Force Studies

(44) Memo for ACOS PANDP, sub: ACE Minimum Force Study 1958-63, 18 Nov 57, sgd: AM Constantine. . . <

f YVv .'<'<-> TXff--!"" n Ï..J 120 The Standing Group proposed, and the Secre.tary-General agreed, that a progress report on MC 70 be presented instead at the December meetings. This progress report would include a status of MC 70 at that date, broad aspects of MC 70, and main items which might eventually require action at Council Level and/or by national authorities.. Admiral Denny, Chairman of the Standing Group, visited Paris in October and asked, at that time, that a SHAPE Planning Team, fully familiar with the Minimum Force Study, come to Washington D. C. to discuss the (45) draft study with the Standing Group planners/

SHAPE Representatives Meeting with SGN in Washington D. C. At the invitation of the Standing Group, a team of planning officers from SHAPE, headed by Major General Gazin, flew to Washington D. C. in early November. These officers, all of whom had been closely involved in the preparation of the SHAPE Minimum Force Study, went to Washington to discuss certain aspects of that study with the Standing Group planners who (46) were in the process of trying to develop MC 70/ '

SGN Consolidation of SACEURf SACLANT and CINCHAN Studies (Preparation of MC 70. The Standing Group felt that SACEUR was too optimistic in assuming that the Soviets would still have to use the heavy bomber for strategic air operations in 1963. They felt that by that time, the guided missile would be carrying out the role of the heavy bomber in the Soviet arsenal. Major Ge- neral Schweizer, ACOS INTEL, explained, upon his return from Washington, that although in preparing the intelligence annex to the Minimxun Force Study he had based his estimates upon the Standing Group basic intelligence document, SG I6I/IO, it had been necessary to project the estimates to 1963, DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED

(45) Minutes of COFS Mtg w/ Chiefs of Staff of MSCs, Tab A, ACE Minimum Force Study 1958-63, PANDP 1240, 30 Oct 57. (46) Verbatim Record, COFSMeeting with Division Chiefs, 20 Nov 57. two year8 beyond the period covered by the basic guidance paper. He did not feel that SHAPE had been in error in crediting the Russians with greater numbers of bombers and less missiles than the Standing Group now beleved would be the case. It was simply that the Russian launching of two "Sjputniks" had aroused later speculation that the Soviet Bloc would be able to replace bombers with missiles much faster than had been believed when the Minimum Force Study had been prepared. General Schuyler summed up the problem succintly by telling Major General Schweizer on 20 November: "Our trouble was that we wrote it before the Sputniks went up." The Standing Group was apparently not going to try to reconcile the divergent views contained in the studies of SACEUR, SACLrANT and CINCH AN,, but would merely register these various points of view which differed mainly because of the varying missions and geographical location of the commands. As requested by the North Atlantic Council, the Standing Group prepared a report on the progress which was being made in consolidating the Minimxim Force Studies of the Major NATO Commanders and presented this report at the December meetings in Paris. The purpose of preparing MC 70 was defined as "to present the North Atlantic Council with an appreciation of the Minimum Essential Forces required to implement the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Strategic Concept derived from the tasks.of the Military Authorities by the Political Directive for the period ending 1 January 1963." The Standing Group also wanted it clearly understood that MC 70 would present force requirements; not plans for military operations. They proposed that the Coxincil address itself, in its policy examinations, not to the separate studies prepared by its three commanders, but to the consolidation. When completed, therefore, MC 70, would be used by all NATO and national military authorities and

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED Major NATO Comzxanders as a basic military document. The Military Com- mittee would, in this paper, clearly lay down for the use of Major NATO Commanders, in preparing later military plans, the latest intelligence available;

• > v. •• \ Vv-yj „L'a. i 122 ' 1 • Jr : • > -uy-ji -^..^1-1 u/- a strategic appraisal; the missions, tasks and responsibilities; and appropriate minimum force requirements. "MC 70 is being produced by the Mili- tary Committee after a detailed examination of the Commanders' studies, ensuring that there are no omissions nor overlaps, nor misconceptions, " (47) the Standing Group's report stated. '

Validity of MC 14/2 (Rev) in Preparation of MC 70. Apparently some doubt had arisen among authorities in some nations as to the validity of the strategic concept contained in MC 14/2 (Revised), the latest statement of the concept. The Standing Group felt this might stem from a belief by these authorities in the possibility of a nuclear stalemate and/or of a limited war concept. The Standing Group refuted these possibilities and in support of their stand, quoted the appropriate section of MC 14/2 (Revised). They asserted that they and the Major NATO Commanders after consultation had agreed that this concept was still valid and that they intended .to complete the development of MC 70 on this basis. The report defined clearly and in detail the requirements which constituted the best definition of a minimum force. In order to accomplish its mission, such a force must meet certain conditions, some of which were significant to SACEUR's situation. These main conditions were: basic intel- ligente; early warning; graduated readiness; an alert system; operational intelligence; an active integrated air defense system in peace and war; an appropriate command control organization; and appropriate manpower and logistic support. The Standing Group included a long analysis of air defense also/**^ In conclusion, its report stated: "It is hoped that MC 70 will be available to the Military Committee in February and to the North Atlantic Council soon

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED after."

(47) SGM-779-57 (Revised), 9 Dec 57, Memofor SACEUR, sub: Progress Report on Minimum Essential Force Requirements - MC 70. (48) See Section, Plangigg Chapter. Air Defense. CHAPTER V

TRAI NING

SACEUR'B Terms of Reference Concerning Training. SACEUR was charged by his terms of reference with the organization and training of his forces into an effective integrated force, to include the exercizing of these forces in maneuvers after consultation, as appropriate, with the national authorities concerned. In addition he was assigned "direct control over the higher training of all forces assigned to his command in peacetime and the inspection of training of all forces assigned to his command. Furthermore he should be given facilities by the nations to inspect the training of those cadre and other forces within the area of Allied Command Europe earmarked for his command."^

SHAPE Staff Duties Concerning Training of ACE Forces. In order to carry out this important training function, SACEUR maintained an Organization and Training Division to coordinate training and to supervise the systems, of training inspection throughout Allied Command Europe. SHAPE supervised and directed the training of major military formations throughout Allied Command Europe by observing training and passing on to appropriate authorities recommendations for improving the state of readiness of forces. By far the major contribution to the training throughout Allied Command Europe lay in the various exercises and maneuvers held under

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED supervision of SHAPE and of MSCs.

(1) MC 53 (Final), 7 Jul 55; Revised Terms of Reference for the Supreme Allied Commander Europe.

1*24 F^ » IfV ...... , • • ; 7 , I • .. " • • r( ' -,

SHAPE 57/67 NATO SECRET

Plans for the training which took place in 1957 had been Bet out broadly by General Gruenther in 1954. At that time, making a three-year forecast, General Gruenther told his major subordinate commands that while it was not possible to make precise plans for the future, he would give them the main features of the year 1957 training period. There would be the usual CPXin late April 1957. Full-scale land, sea and air maneuvers would be held in the Northern Command, if possible in conjunction with some of . SACliANTtS forces and the Northern elements of the Central Command. The Southern Coinmand would stage a combined maneuver with the Mediterranean Command. In the Central Command, priority would be given to testing of the air defense systems of Central Europe including, General Gruenther hoped, that of the United Kingdom. The final integration of the German forces into the structure of ACE would take place in 1957. General Gruenther concluded saying, "In 1957 there is also a continuing need for theater-wide air maneu- (2) vers to test all aspects of atomic operations."1 '

Training Aims and Objectives of Exercises in Allied Command Europe, As background for all exercises in ACE, SHAPE had issued in 1956 a training directive which stated that the aim of all exercises was to achieve the maximum training value for the arm or arms of the service for which the exercise was designed. In some exercises, the objectives would stress the training of air forces, and the army and navy participation would be tailored to support the attainment of air force objectives. This position, of course, would be reversed when exercises were designed primarily to train either land or sea forces. The general objectives of the SHAPE-sponsored Joint Atomic Exercises were the testing of the ASP and the implementation of its current SOPs. Such exercises would normally have a surprise

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED (2) AG 1702 OT, 18 Nov 54, sub: The Broad Pattern of Higher Training 1955 to 1957. » 1

. • . -. > W-. - - 125 attack setting, beginning on D-day, with the air counter-offensive receiving the greatest emphasis. SHAPE-sponsored Joint Atomic Exercises would have priority and precedence over all other exercises held in ACE. The regional commanders would be responsible for determining objectives and training appropriate to their requirements in regional exercises, whether they were to be linked to or totally separate from the Joint Atomic Exercises/3^

Commanders' Exercises Reports. Before and after all exercises and maneuvers, commanders were required to submit certain reports to SHAPE in order that SHAPE in turn might develop its Allied Command Europe Exercise and Maneuvers schedule, and that it might report to higher authority on the results and observations resulting from the exercise. SHAPE required four reports on NATO exercises: a. A tentative forecast of exercises. b. A detailed brief of planned NATO exercises. c. A preliminary report. (4) d. A final report/ '

(3) AG 2333 OT, 7 May 56, Training Directive No 18. (4) AG 3950, 16 Dec 57, Training Directive No 19. For a complete recapitulation of all exercises held within ACE during the period 20 Nov 56 to 31 Dec 57 the reader may consult Periodic Re- ports to the Standing Group issued quarterly during the year. File references are PR 51, SH 46/57, 28 Feb 57; PR 52 AG 2210 SEC, 15 May 57; PR 53 AG 2210 SEC, 8 Aug 57; PR 54 AG 2210 SEC, 30 Oct 57; PR 55 AG 2210 SEC, 28 Jan 58. These documents also contain information on national exercises. See also Allied Command Europe Exercise and Maneuver Schedule 1957-58, 4 Jun 56, as amended by Itr of 6 May 1957. DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED Throughout the year SHAPE observers attended exercises held in the various commands as well as observing the training of national units in national exercises. Planning for Exercise STRIKE BACK. It had originally been intended that the general atomic exercise for 1957 should be called Exercise STRIKE BACK. In mid-January representatives of the Major Subordinate Commanders and of SACLANT and CINCHAN visited SHAPE so that the arrangements for the exercise, particularly the public information procedures, could be coordinated. At that time the NATO Council had not been apprised of the magnitude of the exercise plan which the Standing Group intended to present to them in February. It was fully recognized at SHAPE that the political implications of such an exercise might be great and the public relations aspect, particularly, must be very carefully handled/5^

Modification of Exercise STRIKE BACK. The North Atlantic Council insisted that if Exercise STRIKE BACK were i to take place it should take place not earlier than 15 October 1957. They reasoned that too much significance would be attached to an exercise of the magnitude of STRIKE BACK at the time of an election in Western Germany, and the political unde sir ability of abnormal air activity in Western Germany close to its election time, was highly evident. SHAPE accepted the Standing Group suggestion for a compromise by scheduling a series of separate exercises with individual names which in some cases would run concurrently between 19 and 28 September 1957. It was stated that the press releases would be passive and would avoid the impression that the series of exercises were linked by an overall concept, and that such aspects of the exercises which would cause political concern would either be modified or eliminated. SHAPE definitely did not want to postpone the exercise, since ACE was concerned over possible adverse weather con-

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED ditions, the calling up of reserves, and the disruption of training schedules.^

(5) SEC 2032, Minutes of COFS Mtg, 9 Jan 57. (6) SEC 2030, Minutes of COFS Mtg, 22 Feb 57. Exercise Counter Punch. Following a visit by SACEUR's representatives to the Standing Group in March 1957, it was agreed that SHAPE would recommend continuation of Exercise STRIKE BACK with operational changes under the new name of COUNTER PUNCH, This new exercise contemplated attacking no targets in (7) Germany because of the election which coincided with the exercise date/ Scheduled for 19 through 21 September 1957, COUNTER PUNCH was designed to test, to practice and to evaluate the current plans, policies and procedures of SACEUR and his Major Subordinate Commanders for employing nuclear weapons in defense of Allied Command Europe, The 1956 Atomic Exercise had brought to light many deficiencies in the atomic employment and all training officials were agreed that it was necessary to put to the test the ability of SACEUR's forces to react quickly and effectively against any enemy surprise attack. Exercise instructions for COUNTER PUNCH were issued to (8MSCs) , to nations and to appropriate unit commanders on 25 February 1957. ' The political situation was such in other parts of Europe that it was decided to curtail or ßt least to modify parts of the exercise in order to avoid

undesirable political reactions. In the Center, for instance, all aircraft (awer) e ordered to keep above 21, 000 feet in flying missions during the exercise/ ' The four major aims of COUNTER PUNCH were: a. To test the plans for. using the full potential of the conventional weapons aircraft in support of the Atomic Strike Plan in a joint effort to destroy the , I enemy's air and atomic capability, p1 • ——— {7) SEC 2030, Minutes of COFS Mtg, 13 Mar 57. In view of political implications, detailed public relations policies were issued for this exercise --see

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED SH 37669, 6 Aug 57. (0) See ACE Joint Atomic Exercise Instructions COUNTERPUNCH, AG 1730.2 AO, 25 Feb 57, for complete instructions. {«> Radio, SACEUR to COMAIRCENT, SM 35589, 27 Apr 57. This documents gives an interesting picture of the negotiation between SACEUR and his major commanders in preparing for such exercises as COUNTER PUNCH. b. To test plans for meeting the over-all reconnaissance requirement of air and ground commanders through assigning specific reconnaissance missions to aircraft flying on co-lateral tasks. c. To test current plans for timely reconnaissance needed by SACEUR's Scheduled Airfield Program and the Regional Surveillance Airfield Program. d. To test the air forces' capability in direct support of ground forces during the first 72 hours of hostilities, with regard to atomic attacks, conventional strikes, and reconnaissance. The setting of play for COUNTER PUNCH assumed that in early 1957 relationships between NATO Ehiropean countries and unidentified aggressor countries had deteriorated to a point where hostilities threatened, and SACEJR had been authorized to put into effect his counter surprise military alert system. The intelligence scenario was supplemented when national authorities a8well as SHAPE began sending pre-planned intelligence messages two days before the beginning of the exercise, thus enabling the commanders to build up a situation at the end of D-I which dictated the dispersion of theirforces. Aggressor forces were assumed to be located in the USSR and Satellite States. Actual flying by friendly aircraft was, of course, performed over equivalent targets and missions of air delivery weapons located within ACE. Every attempt was made to plan the exercise sorties so as to provide the maximum benefit to air defense forces throughout ACE. In addition to the land, naval and air forces assigned or earmarked to SACEUR, forces employed in COUNTER PUNCH included elements of the US Strategic Air Command and the UK Bomber Command, and air forces from Belgium, the Netherlands and France. While all air forces participated on a live basis, land and naval forces had the option of participating either on a live or a CPX basis. However, these latter forces were required to assist in the joint prq>aration of regional exercise plans to man the JCOCs as required

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED under SACEUR's ASP 1 /57, and to put into play all ground atomic delivery forces. Originally it had been planned to include a large amount of low level flying in COUNTER PUNCH. However, political implications, particularly the elections in the Federal Republic of Germany, made it necessary to ell* minate this low level flying. Planning for COUNTER PUNCH was hampered to some degree by delayed preparation of exercise atomic plans* Perfor- mance of the exercise was hampered particularly by communications diff- culties. There were delays in handling and transmitting operational data as well as in processing and disseminating the large amount of Information produced by the r econnaissance aircraft.

Conclusions drawn from COUNTER PUNCH, The main conclusions drawn from COUNTER PUNCH were: Communications : The principle of using conference circuits was ex* tended during COUNTER PUNCH to the Northern, and Southern Regions of ACE. Whereas this type of circuit (telephone) in the Center Region served very well, the Southern circuit (teletype) was not reliable. In both Northern and Southern Regions lack of familiarity with the specialized procedures involved caused trouble. Communications with both the Sixth Fleet in the South and STRIKFL TLANT in the North Region left much to be dedred.

Intelligence: Intelligence data Wasi in dome cases, submitted too late to be of value in the play of the exercise. Operations: Although the dedred tempo of the exercise was not fully achieved except in the Central Region, the Major Subordinate Commands considered COUNTER PUNCH to be the best planned and executed Joint Atomic Exercise to be held to that date, A considerable amount of useful data was provided by a SHAPE questionnaire, designed for the purpose of examining in detail specific operational problems and providing SHAPE with factual data

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED that could be analyzed, assessed, and used in determining weaknesses Itt both the exercise and the atomic strikè plan. Analysis of theexerciae indicated that a high degree of pre-arranged planning had been achieved* However, there was room for further improvement in reconnaissance* In particular, greater efficiency was needed in the timely execution of reconnaissance tasks Lto meet the speed of execution required by the Atomic Strike Plan. Much useful data was obtained on the problem of assessing the air forces' ability to provide Army Commanders with the air support needed during the first 72 hours of war. The problem was scheduled for further examination in the next Allied Command Europe Joint Atomic Exercise. The analysis of COUNTER PUNCH emphasized the basic principle that thorough knowledge of concept and procedures is essential to any successful operations. This fundamental requirement was re-emphasized to all associated with implementation of SACEUR's Atomic Strike Plan.

Recommendations made after COUNTER-PUNCH - Communications. Recommendations to alleviate one of the major deficiencies brought to light in COUNTER PUNCH - Communications- were: a. Conference circuits, telephone or teletype must be provided and used constantly in peacetime, to ensure an adequate state of training of both Oper- ations smd communications staffs associated with its use in time of war. b. The problem of reliable radio communications to STRIKFLTLANT, from a propagation in Northern area aspect, was being studied by SHAPE Air Defense Technical Center. The 9th Slice high-power SSB radio infrastructure project would provide satisfactory communications to the 6th Fleet. In addition, a project for the procurement of low power SSB radio equipment for back-up and conference communications with 6th Fleet was prepared for presentation to the MBC.^^

Exercise PLAY BACK. Making use of the heavy volume of communication1 between the headquarters of ACE which took place during Exercise COUNTER PUNCH, SHAPE DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED (10) Briefing Folder for COFS Conference, 30 Oct 57, Red Tab B.

131

NATO "SÎËCRSL^ J- M «>

staged a communications exercise in October 1957 which was designated Exercise PLAY BACK, designed to practise the SHAPE Operational Echelon and its supporting communications in the SHAPE war headquarters site. Its purpose was two-fold: first, to test the SOP for the SHAPE operational echelon for moving into and operating from the war headquarters site; and second, to test communications in the war headquarters site. A 12-hour period was selected from the preceding Exercise COUNTER PUNCH, and all messages transmitted and received during this period were played back. This permitted the use of the setting, plans, and the weapons and procedures used during COUNTER PUNCH. The SHAPE operational echelon was alerted, brought to SHAPE, moved to the war headquarters site, and functioned according to the SOPs which had been established. The exercise lasted approximately 24 hours!* ^

Exercises BLUE ICE, BLIND EYE and BROWN JUG. When Exercise STRIKE BACK was converted to Exercise COUNTER PUNCH and a series of smaller exercises set up, the exercises in the North were divided into three separate components. These exercises were BLUE ICE, BLIND EYE, and BROWN JUG. BLUE ICE was a three-service exercise with two sides participating. It was sponsored and directed by CINCNORTH and took place in Northern Norway from 23 to 28 September 1957. BLIND EYE, also sponsored by CINCNORTH, was a small scale sea and maritime air maneuver held in the Skagerrak and Southern Norway during thesame period. In Denmark, AFNORTH sponsored and carried out from 19 to 25 September an amphibious maneuver known as BROWN JUG. Major conclusions drawn from these related exercises were: the Northern European Command Communications system was inadequate to carry the great ldad of signais, even though it was reinforced by national equipment, DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED which would not be available in an emergency; and the work of intelligence

(11) For instructions issued on Exercise PLAY BACK, see AG 1730.3, 16 Aug 57; and SCO OUT 37550, 31 Jul 57.

132 mm mmx-xm. NATO COMDENTWL NAT© SECRET

staffs showed that much greater knowledge of procedures and intelligence

training was required. CINCNORTHf as a result of this exercise, told SHAPE that he needed additional signal personnel, units and equipment and that his intelligence staff at all levels needed more training.

Ebcercise DEEP WATER. In Southern Europe a joint and combined large-scale land, sea and air maneuver known as Exercise DEEP WATER was held in AFSOUTH's area under the direction of CINCSOUTH from 23 to 28 September 1957. The aims of Exercise DEEP WATER were to practice the implementation of a SACEUR Strategic-Reserve Force in a delaye<| setting from D+ 39 to D+43, to practise the commanders and staffs in exercising control of their units, topractise liaison between the services and, of course, to practise all personnel and

staffs in the function of their assigned duties. ( Following exercise DEEP WATESl it was determined ttyrouph critique that the . communication s system in Southern European Command did not support the concept of a war in the P+40 setting; that, as in the Northern Command, all intelligence staffs lacked training and were unfamiliar with proper oper- •• ; V- • ; ational procedures; and that certain logistics procedures would have to be developed or improved. CINCAFMED directed a large scale Mediterranean-wide exercise set in the first week of any future war. Jhis exercise was held from 5 to 12 May 1957, primarily to test the alert measures and the emergency defense plans of CINCAFMED and his subordinate commanders in the event of a war with only 48 hours warning, and to exercise his forces in carrying out their duties in the first eight days of this war. CINCAFMED reported that while his alert measures were generally implemented in a satisfactory manner, there were a number of deficiencies in mine warfare, in submarine operation, in anti-

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submarine warfare, and in Navy control of shipping.

(12) MC 43/5, 14 MaMÄTy 58, ÜAnnexe eû^^DÉ'MTs A through EÂ. 133

j4ATfr= SFTajjggr 1 "Y 'Xi"^ JVJ1 :. I i FL.

CPX VH. CPX VII was held under the direction of Field Marshal Montgomery, Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe, at SHAPE from 15 April to 18 April 1957. The exercise was attended by the NATO Council and senior members of the International Staff, by members of the Standing Group, by the Chiefs of Staff of all the nations of the Atlantic Alliance, by the Sapreme Commander and selected senior officers of Allied Command Atlantic, by the Allied Com- manders-in-Chief and senior officers of Channel Command, and by regional CommaLnders-in-Chief and other senior officers of Allied Command Europe. The purpose of the exercise was to study the pattern of forces required by the NATO countries for the year 1966. The exercise was not restricted to discussion of the requirements for unlimited nuclear war only. The forces necessary for limited and cold war activities were also considered. The provision of one airborne or air-transportable international division under SACEUR's command, for "Fire Brigade" duties, was recommended. The Higher Military Structure of NATO, the organization of NATO Commands, and Command boundaries, were also discussed.^ Following the conclusion of CPX VII on 18 April, Field Marshal Mont- gomery, as was his custom,addressed the officers assembled from throughout ACE. He discussed the problem of the missile, citing its advantages and disadvantages. He Said that the piloted aircraft was at present and in the foreseeable future the only means by which real accuracy with bombard- ment could be obtained. "Don't let us give up all our air power until we have an accurate and reliable missile - which is not in sight yet," Field Marshal Montgomery made some rather startling observations in pointing out the need for reorganization in NATO. He claimed that the DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED Standing Group, for instance, should have an international chairman and that it should be brought to Paris rather than remain in Washington. He called for

(13) AG 1700 OT, 2t6 Feb 58, Report on NATO Exercises 1957.

134 UMO a centralized air force command over all air missile arms of the Western Alliance. He questioned the boundary between SACLANT and the Channel

Commauidl saying that the Channel Command should probably be responsible for the narrow water s and SACLANT for the great ocean. He suggested that perhaps Denmark should be included in the Central Command, and that operations in the Turkish Straits and the Black Sea should be the responsibility of CINCSOUTH. Going further, he suggested that perhaps the NATO Council should abolish the Standing Group and organize a Supreme Commanders' Committee. Field Marshal Montgomery warned against attacking Russia with land forces. He forecast that intensive war would be carried on by submarines and that the side with the greatest capacity to sustain losses and to reorganize woxxld in the end prevail in any future war. The nations of Europe, the Field Marshal said, needed to carry out a fundamental re-design of their military machines which would make them ready to fight on D-day, not on D+lO or D+l5. The Field Marshal concluded by saying" "I would abolish the Military Committee, the Standing Group, and' the Military Representatives Committee. I would abolish Channel Command / as an independent NATO Command, and organize that area as a sub-command of SACLANT - thus having one Supreme Commander in charge of all the sea areas of NATO except the Mediterranean. As for the Mediterranean itself, I would make it one naval command under one commander-in-chief, instead of the curious set-up we have there at present. I would give each Ambassador on the NATO Council in Paris an inter-service team of advisers. I would order that SACEUR and SACLANT form a Supreme Commanders Committee, jointly responsible for all military advice to the NATO Council and for all operational planning. The NATO Council would then get its advice from (14) Commanders with power to act." DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED (14) DSAC 1705/7/ 18 Apr 57, Final Address by DSACEUR at CPX VII.

. * 7- 135

NATO &1UJ&ÉT r:/.. . ..

Air Defense/Atomic Strike Exercises. COMAIRCENT, on 9 May 1957, recommended that the Joint Atomic Ex- ercise be held oAly every other year and that an Air Defense Exercise be held in the alternate years. SHAPE did not feel this arrangement would be satisfactory.^ ^ COMAIRCENT then recommended that the Joint Atomic Exercise and the Air Defense Exercise be combined each year, with emphasis alternating betweèn atomic strike and air defense. SHAPE had conducted a study on the necessity of holding an atomic exercise as well as requiring the subordinate ' commanders to hold an annual air defense exercise within their regions. This study concluded that there was a continual requirement for the two exercises. When the matter was brought to the attention of General Norstad, he strongly * stated his belief that a requirement for an annual joint: atomic exercise existed

as well as a requiremen16t for subordinate commanders to conduct an annual ai*r defens,, e exercise• . ( ) As the result of a letter from COMAIRCENT on 19 July, however, the SHAPE staff was directed to prepare a complete study on the problem of combining an air defense exercise with a joint atomic exercise in 1958. This study concluded that although SACEUR's exercise schedules for 1958 and 1959 placed a heavy load on the Major Subordinate Commanders, holding joint atomic exercises at regional level every year was essential to the preparedness of NATO Europe. Combining these two exercises in order to assist the training load of the MSCs would lessen their value to an unacceptable degree. This study, with its conclusions, was forwarded to CINCENT on 29 Au- gust with a statement that General Norstad agreed with the conclusions of the .,Udy.''7'

(15) Ltr COMAIRCENT to SHAPE, AAFCE, OTR 1252/1412 "Program of Major Exercises, " 9 May 57; Ltr SHAPE to COMAIRCENT, same title, AG 1730 OT 14 Jun 57. DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED (16) Rad SHAPE 37844, 14 Aug 57. For SHAPE Policy on Air Defense Exercises see AG 1730, 20 Apr 57, w/Appendix A. (17) Ltr to CINCENT, AG 1730 OT, 29 Aug 57 w/enc. Air Defense Exercises 1958. mw* ftT^ -VV.; SHAPE 57/67 -NATO SfiGftBT^ 1

On 29 October 1957, COMAIRCENT came to SHAPE to discuss with t SACEUR and his key planning officers the subject of combining the annual joint atomic exercise and the annual air defense exercise. Following this meeting, General Norstad changed his position and directed that unless within 30 days an examination of the problem showed some important reason to the contrary, the air defense and atomic strike exercises would be combined in 1958. The Air and Special Operations Division, in conjunction with Air Defense Division and OANDT Division, was directed to carry out this examination. The Major Subordinate Commanders were asked to submit their requirements for an air defense exercise by 5 September to enable SHAPE to amalgamate the majority of these requirements in the joint atomic exercise. The questions to be examined were mainly: - should the atomic exercise apply to all Major Subordinate Commands or only to the Center -should the atomic strike exercise be given priority and -what would be the terms of reference for future>exercises. ^^

Discussions on Conducting Combined Joint Atomic And Air Defense Exercises. On 27 November 1957, a meeting was held at SHAPE to discuss the feasibility of combining the joint atomic and air defense exercises in 1958. Air Vice Marshal McGregor, Assistsuit Chief of Staff, Air Defense Division, served as the chairman. He opened the conference by stating that originally it had been intended for SHAPE to hold only an annual joint atomic exercise and for the regipns to organize their own air defense exercises. There had been some strong criticism of this by the regions, mainly by COMAIRCENT on financial grounds, which had resulted in a proposal by COMAIRCENT that the air defense and atomic strike exercises be combined. SACEJR had directed that this be done if possible. The conference had been called to work out what DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED (18) Memorandum for Record, "Joint Atomic & Regional Air Defense Exercise, " 29 Oct 57, signed Constantine. DCPP/477/57. - M f 1 . :. A *• ".T ^ " "" * " * -TTH

J \? , .. .- - • - ' •*»/«,*. 137 IU -SiLUKtiT difficulties there were, and to formulate means of solving these difficulties.

1 COMAtRCENT s proposals were that the combined:exercises be .held annually, but that the emphasis on ärdefense and on the ASP be alternated, starting in 1958 on air defense. After a detailed examination of the problem by representatives of all the Major Subordinate Commands, General Norstad directed that the 1958 exercise would be conducted as a combined joint atomic and air , , • (19) defense exercise. On 25 November 1957, SHAPE issued to the Major Subordinate Com- manders a policy statement amplifying existing directives on the simulated use of atomic weapons in maneuvers and exercises. This directive had been developed as a result of maneuvers and exercises conducted within Allied Com- 2 mand Lu rope. ( °)

Establishment of Special Weapons Course at Ober ammergau. With the increasing emphasis on atomic warfare, .the shortage of trained atomic warfare instructors for NATO had to be resolved. CINCSOUTH on 5 April told SHAPE that he lacked trained weapons analysts and other officers. To overcome this he recommended that a course be established at Ober ammergau, and that lesson plans used there be distributed for use in NATO schools. In June 1957, SHAPE announced the establishment of a four-week NATO nuclear weapons employment course at Oberammergau. While this course was primarily meant to provide replacements for US weapons employment officers

(19) AG 1730/1 AD, 5 Dec 57 - Minutes of meeting at SHAPE 27 Nov 57. Rad SHAPE 39844, 20 Nov 57. (20) AG 1780 OT, 25 Nov 57, Play of Atomic Weapons in Maneuvers and Exercises. For additional detailed information see: Current SACEUR EDP; Current SACEUR ASP; SACEUR Atomic Standard Operating Pro- cedures, AG 2333 ÜT, Training Directive No 17, "Reports on Exercises and Maneuvers, "12 Feb 54; ACE Stamdard Data for Joint Atomic Exercises; AG 2333 OT, Training Directive No 19, "Reports on Exer-

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED cises and Maneuvers, 4 May 56; AG 1780 PID, Public Information Policy, 11 May 55.

m iwQ CONHOEWiniU MJirn Oiri-P mm CONFIDENTIAL SHAPE 57/67 NATO" SEGItET

at that time working on the international staffs, officers graduating from t this school could be incorporated into the staffs in other positions but used as instructors on atomic warfare on a part-time basis. It was planned that this special course would produce about 160 graduates each year. All information on nuclear weapons employment which had been released to NATO by the United States was distributed to NATO staffs. SHAPE had, however, no authority to distribute atomic data to national staffs and schools. This could be obtained, however, if authorized through bi-lateral arrangement* (21) with the United States/ '

ACE Readiness Test Program Proposals. Since the beginning of SHAPE, planning had been based on the assumption that the enemy would launch any attack on ACE with little or no warning and that he would be able to achieve a certain degree of surprise. The paramount factor in successful retaliation to enemy attack would be the readiness of SACEUR's forces to react promptly and swiftly.. SACEUR, therefore, was determined that the readiness posture of his military forces should be as great as possible. While progress had been achieved in raising the readiness posture of forces, many areas still required further improvement, and continued practice and exercise were obviously needed. During 1957 SHAPE began to develop a program of tests for improving the readiness posture of forces, and on 12 November forwarded certain proposals to the MSCs. The first Readiness Test Program which SHAPE proposed was designed for participation of only the air forces of ACE, both land based and sea based, in their retaliatory role and with either conventional or atomic weapons. This was not because SHAPE failed to recognize the great need for readiness in land and naval forces, but because it was considered

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED (21) SHAPE Training Directive No 20, 27 Jun 57; and Briefing Folder for COFS Conference, 30 Oct 57, Blue Tab N.

139 nato confidential ^MATO nrrp TTT SHAPE 57/67 NATO—SEÉÀER

jfdèire practical to gain experience in testing air defenses before launching t the readiness test program for the other forces. The intention was eventually tb integrate all types of forces into an ACE-wide readiness test program. The SHAPE concept of a readiness test program called for testing of three main aspects: survival during initial aggression, atomic retaliation, and conventional weapons and reconnaissance operations. These concepts were developed in some detail and forwarded to the Major Commanders for their comment and study and further elaboration with a view to determining specific items which should be included in proposed teBts or initial tests. SHAPE particularly wanted comments from the Major Commanders on the scale of the initial program and the rate at which it should be expanded to include all echelons of command; the frequency and duration of each test; the means of integrating readiness tests into normal training and scheduled operational activities to reduce interference; financial implications; and national reactions. The MSCs were asked to submit before 1 December their reaction to the tests, some evaluation of national reactions and recommendations on various aspects of the tests. A meeting would be held at SHAPE early in 1958 (22) to consolidate all the proposals from the MSCs.

Annual NATO Training Conference. The Standing Group appointed SACEUR to chair and coordinate the Annual NATO Training Conference for 1957, which was to be held in the Palais de Chaillot from 10 through 12 July/23) On 10 July 1957 the Major NATO Commanders, including SACEUR, conferred with their respective subordinate commands. On the succeeding days representatives from the three Major NATO Commands as well as from outside agencies participated in detailed discussion. Air Marshal Constantine of SHAPE, chairman of the conference on 12 July, pointed out that the aim of the meeting was to coordinate the exer-

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED cise schedules of the three major NATO commands and to get firm national

(22) AG 2201 AO, 12 Nov 57, ACE Readiness Test Program, to all MSCs. (23) Memo, AG 1700 OT, 29 Mar 57. mm

•NATO SECRET

contributions to NATO exercises for 1958 and tentative contributions for exercises in 1959. Further, the conference offered an excellent opportunity for discussing training problems common to all three commands. Repre- sentatives from SACLANT, CINCHAN, CINCM AIR CHAN and SHAPE presented the exercises to be sponsored by their commands in 1958 and 1959, and in the case of SACLANT in i960. As a result of these projected exercise schedules, force allocations and other pertinent data were published in a revised Allied Command Europe Exercise and Maneuver Schedule for 1958 and 1959. Among the other problems discussed at the conference were the need for a NATO naval tactical training center in Northern Europe; the proposed concept which SACLANT had developed for an NCPX throughout NATO in 1959; the general concept for a large scale live exercise in i960, and the standardization of exercise schedules and exercise reports, » In concluding the conference, Air Marshal Constantine pointed out that there were tcrqf many exercises scheduled in ACE to allow the desired ends to be achieved. While combining exercises provided a solution in some cases, the danger existed of trying to achieve too much in one exercise, thus robbing participants of the maximum benefit. He emphasized the vital nature of the training question, pointing out that NATO policy was based on the concept that Soviet forces cannot be faced man to man; only with smaUer forces backed with atomic weapons could NATO defend itself. Atomic retaliation, the basis of NATO strategy, had to take first priority in NATO training. Air defense with its early warning capability was also vital and followed a close second in priority. The forces at the disposal of NATO were useless until they (24) were made combat-effective through training and maneuvers/

Land Training Areas - Central Region.

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED The problem of providing land training areas for the forces of ACE

(£4) AG 2030.OT, 20 Sep 57, Report on NATO Training Conference 1957.

141 DjÄo'O O^iXirî^iiiirâ ii aÄL had been a continuing one since 1954. The North Atlantic Council agreed that additional training areas were necessary as early as 1951 and provision was made in the 3rd and 4th Infrastructure Programs for the common funding of these training areas. Owing to the difficulty of obtaining further land, it had not been possible to provide any NATO training areas. In July 1956, CINCENT stated that the position regarding training areas and facilities was becoming more and more critical. The training areas that were available were inadequate even for current needs. In view of the future requirements, it was felt that discussions with the German Minister of Defense should be started, and that SHAPE should be responsible for the oonduct of these discussions. CINCENT asked SHAPE for guidance on the problem. SHAPE replied agreeing that responsibility for NATO Contact with the Ger- man MOD should be its own responsibility, and informed CINCENT that the (25) whole question of training areas was now under study. A series of meetings between officers from LANDCENT, NORTHAG, CINCENT and SHAPE was held during the first part of 1957 and a staff study was undertaken within OANDT Division. The conclusions of these conferees was that existing training areas in Germany were "insufficient for the present NATO forces" and would be totally inadequate when the German forces were brought up to strength. SHAPE had been informed by MOD Germany that no further land could be made available in Germany. The existing training areas in Germany covered a total of 1,115 square kilometers; and the additional land required under existing SHAPE plans amounted to 1, 400 square kilometers. The total area either already used or projected amounted to a little more than one per cent of the total area of land in Western Germany. Efforts to secure training areas outside Germany had not been successful, neither Belgium nor the Netherlands being able to provide enough training

(25) AFCE Ltr to SHAPE, 6l02/OPS/l54, 23 Jul 56. DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED Ltr from SHAPEto CINCENT, AG 6102/OT^29 Jan 57.

,Jw ^ wi* MÂT© -NATO SECRET

areas for their own forces, and it was considered that France was too far ,from the units' duty stations. It was apparent that, should efforts to obtain the necessary land for training prove unsuccessful, a redaction in training /26V standards would inevitably result.

The Vogelsang-Elsenborn Training Area. Whilst the question of land training areas as a whole was being examined, SHAPE dealt directly with MOD Germany on the specific training area of Vogelsang-Elseborn. SHAPE had originally proposed that these two existing training areas should be amalgamated and MOD Germany had agreed to this proposal. However, in May 1957 SHAPE was informed by MOD Germany, that, owing to difficulties between Belgium and Germany regarding the use of this training area, nothing further could be done on this particular project. In October 1957 SHAPE recommended the deletion of this training area from current infrastructure plans and the project was in fact suspended. However, by the end of 1957 the situation improved somewhat and, subject to formal agreement by the MODs of Belgium and Germany on the use of Vogelsang- Elsenhorn, SHAPE agreed to recommend that the suspension of the area be (27) lifted,

(26) Memo from ACOS OANDT to COFS, OT 6102, 6 Sep 57. (27) See File held in OANDT Record Room entitled "Training Areas Central Region,' including the following letters: COFS to MOD Germany, 22 Dec 55; IX Bl 1-910-49 11/56, MOD Germany to COFS, 29 Feb 56; COFS to MOD Germany, 20 Dec 56;

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED V A 4-IX B/l-4 G 2, 21 May 57, MOD Germany to COFS; COFS to MOD Germany, 12 Jtxn 57. See also Staff Study, OANDT Division, OT 6102, 9 May 57.

143 WATO COWRDBfiiTOL' NATO " SECR1Kl~ CHAPTER VI

COMMAND STRUCTURE AND ORGANIZATION

General Background. Behind all planning in Allied Command Europe lay the assumption that the enemy would launch a surprise attack. A great deal of money had been spent by NATO in order that SACEUR's forces might have the capability to react very quickly to any penetration by enemy air craft. In order to provide communications, for instance, so that the atomic strike plan and the emergency defense pleins could be carried out quickly and effectively, nearly L 200, 000, 000 had been invested. Further, almost L 19, 000, 000 had been spent for the construction of the war headquarters. Combining these with the expense of airfields and the early warning system, almost L 800, 000, 000 of NATO funds had, by 1957, been allocated to provide for the survival of and retaliation by the armed forces of ACE. In spite of this huge ejqjenditure, there remaine4 grave weaknesses in the capacity of the major headquarters of ACE to control and command their forces in wartime. The fact was all too obvious that the structure of ACE had been set up for peacetime, and was too unwieldy and too slow for wartime operation.'

) Responsibilities of SACEUR and His Commands. SACEUR's Terms of Reference stated that in wartime he would exercise the full powers of a supreme commander and that he would be responsible to the Standing Group for the overall direction and conduct of wartime operations within his command area. Specifically his functions in wartime would be: DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED (1) Ltr AG 6120 PANDP (Draft), 13 Dec 57, Command & Control in ACE. a. To ensure the rapid and effective implementation of the atomic strike plan. b. To supervise and carry out emergency defense plans. c. To establish and maintain liaison with national authorities and the North Atlantic Council. d. To take military decisions on the conduct of operations, taking into account the progress of the war and the information sent him by his subordinate commanders and by national authorities. SHAPE'S organization could be compared to that of a national Ministry of Defense, set up to deal with military problems and political and economic questions affecting the military planning within the responsibility of SACEUR. The Major Subordinate Commands (MSCs) also were organized in peace-time to deal with problems which, like those of SHAPE, were partly political and partly economic. However, with the exception of CINCAFMED, the MSCs had a primary responsibility for planning for and execution of defensive operations on land. The MSCs were responsible for the conduct of NATO operations in their area, and for close coordination with national troops. ^Since the beginning of SHAPE the various commanders had pondered the question of command and organization, but had been forced in many cases because of political or financial reasons to compromise in establishing their headquarters. Throughout 1957 problems of command organization continued to be studied by SACEUR, and certain changes were put into effect. The major changes and major actions with regard to command and control throughout ACE are set forth in the following section. )

Command Structure in the Center. It had been recognized since the establishment of Allied Command Eu- rope that arrangements for command of forces in the vital Center area left

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED much to be desired. While this was true of air and naval forces as well, MMO QQMmBMimL the greatest apparent discrepancies existing in 1957 were those in the (2) land forces command structure and arrangements/ ' Both the command structure and the physical disposition of forces in Central Europe bore the mark and after-effects of the Allied Occupation of Germany during the post-war years. In the opinion of many top military authorities not only was the command structure unwieldy, but such forces as were located in the area were not disposed properly to meet the most serious threat facing them on the ground; the bulk of Soviet forces massed in East Germany. The first consideration in the minds of SHAPE officers, including SACEUR, was to evolve a command arrangement which would provide greater flexibility and ease of command in wartime. SACEUR and CINCENT had discussed in detail the land structure in the Center, particularly below the,level of ,LANDCENT. On 7 February 1957,

General ValluyA sent to SHAPE a detailed memorandum concerning the organization of his command, in which he attempted to take into consideration the conditions of warfare from i960 onwards which would have direct influence on the organization of divisions, and on the chain of command. He stated that there were clearly too many levels in the organization of Central Europe. If one level could be eliminated the organization could be simplified. This problem was to be intensified soon by the integration of twelve German divisions and perhaps three or four corps which would be superimposed on the existing organization. In addition, the chain of command was not the same in Central Army Group and Northern Army Group, where the army level of command was not represented. CINCENT's major concern was to see how divisions could best be placed into major formations so that an effective chain of command could guarantee that decisions would be quickly taken and quickly carried out. He suggested several possibilities, such as grouping divisions

'" ' " I ! .- ^ • • DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED (2) For information on efforts to improve Air Command in the Center, see Ridgway Volume, Chapter III, Command in the Air.

146

NATO SECR £,"1 ••'.-••^«»C'.L, SHAPE 57/67 NATO Mi.flHkT-

la a homogeneous army corps, or attaching divisions directly to a common agency of the army type, capable of assuming a strategic mission. As to the question of doing away with or retaining the army group level of command, it did not appear that this should be done because of the probable nature of a future war General Norstad agreed with General Valluy1 s view that one echelon of command in the Center could be eliminated, and he asked CINCENT to study this matter further and to submit recommendations to him after CPX VH as to which level of command should be abolished. General Norstad pointed out factors which he suggested CINCENT keep in mind during the study. These factors were the tactical and logistical impact on the command structure of the introduction of missiles and the increasing availability of ground atomic

delivery means in the Center; the influence of SHAPE'S forward strategy concept and the shortened initial phase of a future war (less than 30 days) on the command structure; essential requirements for an efficient and close army- air association to fight the land-air battle (if possible the two headquarters should be in the same geographical area); the need for economy in personnel, in communications and in war headquarters infrastructure. General Norstad recommended that General Valluy consider the new Pentomic principle under which new US divisions were being organized, pointing out that the major combat units of these divisions were five combat groups, and that perhaps this principle of control, one commander controlling efficiently four or five other (4) commanders, could be applied to the organization in the Center. ' General Valluy in an interim reply agreed to study this matter and to give General Norstad firm recommendations on the problem immediately after CPX VIl/5)

(3) Memorandum from General Valluy, AFCE/42/CINC, 7 Feb 57. (4) SACEUR to CINCENT, AG 2600 P AN DP, 12 Mar 57, DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED (5) CINCENTto SACEUR 1000/ll/CINC/l29/57, 22 May 57.

147 nato confidential - -NATO SEGRiST Following CPX VII, as General Norstad had requested, General

Valluy sent his views on the structure of command for Central Europe. His

views had been developed in close consultation with his subordinate com-

manders down to the army group and ATAF level. The proposals dealt almost

exclusively with land forces since CINCENT1 s naval forces were small and,

as he said, "Air forces of Central Europe are not exclusively under my com-

mand." The land forces. General Valluy felt, were larger and more rigid,

much harder to manipulate, and remained more national in complexion.

General Valluy was convinced that it was extremely important to achieve the

largest possible degree of uniformity in divisional structure and conventional

equipment between his units. "In this way, " he said, "we should be able to

weld together the major formations of the eight different nations, use them

in a true inter-allied manner, and we should no longer have to accept the limi-

tations of national forces being tied to their national depots and lines of com-

munications, sometimes even to their national prejudices." The key to the proposals developed by CINCENT and his staff was the elimination of the corps from the command structure of the land forces. He had preserved the army group/ATAF level, which he considered extremely important, and he had made provision for a "Command Assistance Echelon between division and army in case it should be needed." General Valluy was convinced of the value of the so-called "mixed" armies in which national type army headquarters would control divisions of several nationalities, using a staff to which were assigned liaison officers for transmitting orderp, as well as an international logistics section.^ (6) Ltr CINCENT to SACEUR, 1241/jPO/PP/252, 2 Jul 57, with enclosures dtd 27 Jun 57, and annex. See also Ltr to SACEUR from General Ely, 21 Feb 57, Division 1, 3322 EMFA/12.B.5321, 135 EMFA/SS; and Ltr SACEUR to General Ely, sub: Command Organization of Allied Forces Central Europe, 12 Mar 57. DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED f • r ' . ' ""T^-. r™-- j m a • V -Tj-^CiVHiAL JJATO SECR ET

General Speidel, Commander, Land Forces Central Europe, forwarded to General Valluy detailed comments which contained an analysis of the considerations which had to be faced, particularly on the matter of boundaries (7) between major formations/ ' CINCENT came to SHAPE on 18 July to discuss with SACEUR the subject of his command organization. In these discussions it generally was agreed that one echelon of command in both the ground and air forces could and should be abolished. CINCENT favored three ground echelons: army group, army and division, but was prepared to accept other names for these echelons if deeired. SACEUR, on the other hand, at this time tended to favor army, corps and division, and also had no objection to altering the names of these echelons if desirable. It was agreed that whatever the topmost echelon, army group or army, these should be two in number and international in composition. The division echelon should be national. CINCENT felt that the intermediate echelon, either army or corps, must be international; SACEUR favored in principle a national organization with all divisions in the unit being a single nationality. He could foresee exceptions to this rule in one or two cases, however. CINCENT's position stemmed from his viewpoint that logistic and area control problems could not be solved nationally. No final decisions were made, but SACEUR directed his staff to study

closely General Valluy's thinking, and CINCENT agreed to(8 stud) y the possibi- Iity of having national commands at the intermediate level. ' On 23 August, General Norstad forwarded to key military officials of the UK, Germany, the US, Belgium, the Netherlands and France, two proposals for revising the command structure of Central Europe. The first

(7) Ltr COMLANDCENT to CINCENT, 1240£>PÏA>/526, 2 Jul 57, Study of DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED Command Structure in Central European Theatre. (8) Memorandum from COFSfor DCPANDP and DCLA, 18 Jxil 57, Command Organization in the Center.

149 nato confidential alternative provided for a structure below AIRCENT/LANDCENT of two international army groups with two ATAFs associated, with six national armies, each being represented in the headquarters of other nations deployed in the sector, and the elimination of the corps echelon. This solution would have the advantage of maintaining the pressent command structure and it would simplify coordination with the air forces. In addition, it would retain the conventional army echelon and would simplify the solution of logistics problems. Strategically it would divide Central Europe into two main areas of responsibility, the Northern European plain, and the Cassel-Frankfurt zone including the southern approaches through Bavaria. The second proposal provided for four international armies under LANDCENT, with all supporting corps. Thus, the two army groups would be eliminated. This solution would retain the conventional roles of the army corps and division, would provide a major command for each of the three major axes of advance for friendly forces, the three most likely axes of advance for enemy forces, plus an additional command to secure the southern flank.

General Norstad asked that the senior officers, including Field Marshal Templer of the UK, General Heusinger of Germany, General Hasselman of the Netherlands, General Hartoon of Belgium, General Palmer of the US, and General Ely of France, receive senior staff officers from SHAPE to (9) consider this problem when they had had time to give it sufficient thought. ' General Valluy, talked with General Norstad at some length on 1 5 Oc- tober concerning the reorganization of his forces. In addition, the senior officers from the nations to whom General Norstad had written forwarded to him their comments on the matter of command structure in the Center. On 20 December 1957 General Norstad summed up his latçst thinking on the matter for Generad Valluy in a personal letter. The factor which most influenced his thinking at that time was the realization that the nations were DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED (9) SHAPE/164/57, 23 Aug 57, with enclosures.

lÄHc, -J'- . . 150 , V ~ ^ - •• • J.

then considering the broad program of forces set forth in the Minimum Force Study, and that, if this program were approved, significant changes would be produced in the capabilities of his forces. He believed, therefore, that while certain minimum changes in command organization could be made, more radical steps should not be taken at the time. "Rather, " he said, "I would prefer in the next two or three years to make maximum use of the present organization and its important infrastructure, changing it only where necessary in the process of integrating the new German forces."

He asked General Valluy to study this matter much more closely and gave him certain guidance, The main points of this guidance were that the army groups and their associated ATAFs would be retained for the present. In due course one echelon of command between the army group and the division probably could be removed. The remaining echelon, whether it be an army or corps headquarters, should be national in composition with officers of other nations being added to its staff only when necessary. There would be no change in the northern boundary of the Center command at that time. General Norstad gave General Valluy certain other guidance as to boundaries between his two army groups and asked that he review again his proposals and develop such changes as might be necessary to conform with the i guidance he had been given.^^ ^

Assignment of General Speidel to LANDCENT. In the late 1955, General Gruenther had proposed a major reorganization of the headquarters at Fontainebleau which would have consolidated Allied Land Forces Central Europe with Allied Forces Central Europe.^ ^ The Standing Group was unable to reach agreement on the proposed reorganization at the time and no action was taken for more than a year.

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED (10) Letter from General Norstad to General Valluy, 20 Dec 57. (11) Ltr AG 2510 PPO, 31 Dec 55, Organization and Command Relationships Allied Forces Central Europe. On 5 January 1957 General Norstad withdrew the proposal and stated that he intended to keep the general headquarters structure at Fontainebleau as it then existed. At the same time, he informed the Standing Group that he had obtained from the nations concerned the formell agreement in principle to have a German officer assume the post of Commander, Land Forces Central (12) Europe, on 1 April 1957. ' At this time also, General Schuyler visited MOD Germany in Bonn and conferred with him on the possibility of placing a German officer in command of LANDCENT. The Defense Minister indicated that the German

government was prepared to furnish an officer, on about 1 April. On 8 Janu(13)- ary this request was made officially to the Federal Republic of Germany. On 24 January it was announced that Lt General Hans Speidel had been nominated for the post of Commander, Land Forces Central Europe. General Speidel was appointed to the post on 7 February and assumed his duties on 2 April.

Assignment of Combat Group Bl. In January 1957 German authorities authorized SACEUR to use Combat Group Bl, one of two combat groups in their Ist Infantry Division, in the event of an emergency in Schleswig-Holstein. SACEUR in turn allocated this unit to CINCNORTH for use in an emergency in this area. When in July Ger- man authorities assigned the Ist Infantry division along with other units to SACEUR, SHAPE assigned the infantry division in turn to CINCENT. Combat Group Bl, located in the Hamburg area and an organic unit of the division, was therefore also assigned to CINCENT. Through an administrative error CINCNORTH was not advised of this change. When the German authorities learned that the combat group had been

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED (12) Rad, SHAPEto SGN, SH 32972, 5 Jan 57. (13) Minutes, COFS Meeting with Division Chiefs, 9 Jan 57, SEC 2032. I .,-N ^-N-• •• I Wn - ^ • 152 :. j • SHAPE 57/67 NATO SEGitEI—

transferred from control of AFNORTH to AFCENT they asked that SACEUR consider allowing the units located in the Hamburg area to continue their defense commitments in Schleswig-Holstein until the German build-up allowed for stationing of stronger forces in the area. The German government intended that the elements of the first infantry division stationed there would provide the nucleus of a new infantry division to be activated later and to be stationed in Schleswig-Holstein. CINCNORTH, upon learning of the changed status of Combat Group Bl, requested clarification stating, "This unit is vital to the defense of Schleswig-Holstein." On 11 September 1957, SACEUR advised both MSCs that Combat Group Bl was to be returned to the operational control of CINCNORTH pending his decision on a proposal which the Germans had made on the organization for (14) defense of Schleswig-Holstein. The CINCENT view which was expressed forcefully by General Speidel, COMLANDCENT, and which was backed entirely by General Valluy, was that the components of the first infantry division, including Combat Group Bl,

should remain assigned to CINCENT because if force(15) s were split, he felt it would endanger the defense of Western Germany. General Norstad, after considering the viewpoints of both CINCENT and CINCNORTH, told CINCENT that he considered that operational control of Combat Group Bl must be retained by CINCNORTH for the time being. His decision was an interim one pending the final solution to the problem which would follow a settlement of the boundary question between CINCENT and CINCNORTH and the question of command arrangements in Schleswig-Holstein.^^ (14) IOCS, ACOFS PANDP to SACEUR, 16 Sep 57, German Combat Group Bl, with enclosure, Brief on German Combat Unit Bl. (15) Ltr CINCENT to SACEUR, 0931 /JPO/PP323, 13 Sep 57, sub: Assignment of an element of the German Ist Infantry Division in an Emergency to the defense of Schleswig-Holstein; w/encl Itr 1220/OPT/511, 6 Sep 57, from DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED COMLANDCENT. (16) AG 1100 PANDP, 30 Sep 57, SACEUR to CINCENT, Operational Control of Combat Group Bl. 1 t M'V v\y J1' "'' ; V-. v'V; 153

—NAlS==SSfifiS Allied Naval Command in the Baltic. One of the weakest areas in SACEUR's command so far as command control was concerned was in the naval command in the Baltic area. An allied naval command in the Baltic was needed to command all NATO naval and air forces that would take part in any battle in the Baltic Straits. This became even more urgent in 1957 with the introduction of German naval units into the area. On 24 July 1956, SACEUR had forwarded a proposed draft directive for establishment through the Standing Group of a naval command, COMNAVBALT, in that area. Danmark had not concurred with the proposed directive, SACEUR was told several months later that Denmark had approached the Standing Group, which had assured that nation that pending its concurrence SGN would take no further action to approve SACEUR's proposal or to nominate a commander for the Baltic Approaches. Danish approval of establishment of this naval command would not, it was realized, be forthcoming before the (17) Autumn of 1957 following elections in Denmark/ SACEUR proposed to CINCENT in November 1956 that Rear Admiral Sir Campbell-Walter, UK, COMNAVNORCENT, receive a temporary appointment to study this matter and to observe the activation of German naval forces in the Baltic. Genezial Valluy stated that he had no objection to Rear Admiral Sir Campbell-Walter doing this if he waited until after the establishment of the German North Sea Naval Command, but he asked that SACEUR take no decision until the Baltic Commander had had a change to submit his proposals.

"The defense of the Baltic and the Schleswig-Holstein area, " General Vallu(18)y stated, "is a matter with important implications for the Center Region."1 On 28 November 1956, General Valluy sent a letter to Genersd Schuyler stating that he had begun studies on the entire problem of command in his area

(17) AFNE 3300/1, 31 Jul 56, and StaffBrief, Naval Commandinthe Baltic, PANDP, 21 Jan 57. DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED (18) Rad, SHAPE to CINCENT, 31738; Rad, CINCENT to SHAPE, PPCE 79956 SCO IN 15100, 23 Nov 56. r-r , -t: • \ v> ' >..o:>r' •

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and these studies would include the problem of Baltic Naval Command. He sent along firm proposals for solving this problem, proposals that included the creation of an additional command or theater situated at what he termed the hinge of the Northern and Central European theaters, " initially to be directly under SACEUR and to be commanded by a British or American general officer. This special theater or command would include a German army corps, a Danish army corps, and combined Danish and German units. General Valluy already had discussed this with British military and civil authorities. He stated that he was prepared to make the necessary contacts with Northern Europe (19) to examine the means of setting up this new organization. The SHAPE viewpoint, which was sent to General Valluy on 5 December 1956, stated, "It is clear that a permanent solution to the problem of a naval command in the Baltic must wait until after the Danish elections in mid-1957, and it is for this reason that we are preparing to implement as soon as possible the interim solution in which you have already concurred." SHAPE had learned that political factors in the Northern area were such that progress could be made only very slowly and changes could be only evolutionary. The COMNAV- BALT plans were only a first step to other command changes that might be found militarily desirable in that area. Although the Force Posture ACE 1962 paper had not been considered valid by the Military Committee, it had shown certain things very clearly. One weakness in ACE was the overall command structure, and it was felt by General Schuyler that any command structure for control of the Baltic Straits must be formulatèd within this overall command structure, and this could be undertaken only by SHAPE. SHAPE had no objection to CINCENT studying command structure, particularly aspects involving his flanks, and certainly any discussions CINCENT wished to carry on with CINCNORTH were in order. However, because of the DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED

(19) Letter, General Valluy to Generad Schuyler, 28 Nov 56. SOT® ©gpaOi&WM, political sensitivities involved, General Valluy was asked to avoid further discussion with national authorities awaiting SACEUR's agreement to such proposals as General Valluy might make.^"^ The need for improving command arrangements in the Baltic became more urgent when SHAPE was advised that the Federal Minister of Defense, .Germany, had ordered the activation of a German naval headquarters, Commander Naval Forces Baltic, on 1 January 1957. The German naval headquarters would be activated on 1 April 1957 and become operative during the course of the summer. This headquarters would be located initially at Kiel. After a full exchange of views with CINCENT on 28 December 1956 at SHAPE, General Norstad directed that certain steps be taken with a view to carrying out the establishment of an interim command. Under these interim arrangements, the Commander Allied Naval Forces Central Europe would move a portion of his headquarters to Holtenau, and would act through CINCENT and COMNAVCENT, using such peacetime authority as was delegated him by SACEUR over the German Baltic units when they were assigned. He would have a small allied integrated staff composed of a few British, German and American naval officers.^^

At the same time, COMNAVCENT would begin studies to find an appropriate permanent solution for the naval aspects of the command problem for the Baltic approaches. He also would study the matter of future NATO naval exercises in that area, and in developing his war plans, would take into consideration an increasing German naval capability. SACEUR's draft directive would serve as a basis in defining the mission which, briefly stated, was "to control the Baltic straits, provide direct support for the Center's left flank, carry out offensive operations in the Baltic against enemy naval forces and lines of communications, and protect friendly LOCs." In order to do this,

(20) SHAPE/264/56, 5 Dec 56, Ltr to General Valluy from General Schuyler.

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED (21) Memo for Record, 28 Dec 56, "SACEUR Decision Concerning an Interim Arrangement for Discharge of Naval Responsibilities in the Area of the Baltic Approache it

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COMNAVCENT was authorized to organize an additional staff to be known as a North/Center Planning Group which would consist of a small group of naval officers of Danish, German, United Kingdom and American nationality. On 22 Jauiuary SHAPE sent its proposals to the governments concerned and asked for formal agreement to these arrangements. ' The German authorities did not concur in SHAPE'S proposal, but stated that formation and employment of a special integrated staff to exercise peacetime authority over 'the German. Baltic forces was not considered necessary. "The interposition of a special integrated staff just for these forces appears hardly justified because the forces of only one nation would be under such a staff, and consequently the call for integration does not appear to be mandatory." The German Minister of Defense made it very cleatr that he considered this only an interim solution, valid "until such time as comprehensive new arrangements can be made concerning the command structure in the Schleswig-Holstein/Denmark and Western Baltic/Southern Norway region."

On 23 February 1957, SACEUR proposed to the Standing Group that the German North Sea Sub-Area be established as a NATO command on 1 April 1957, the date on which German North Sea forces would become operative. This NATO headquarters, to be located at Cuxhaven, would be necessary for the exercise of the authority delegated by SACEUR to the Commander of the German North Sea Sub-Area in support of directives from higher authority. Initially the headquarters would be staffed by Germauis only, and no international (23) financial support would be needed. As a result of the German objection to the SHAPE proposals of 22 Jauiuary,

(22) Staff Brief, Allied Naval Command in the Baltic, dtd 21 Jan 57; Ltr, Allied Naval Command Arrangements in the Baltic, 22 Jan 57, AG 1530/6 PANDP. (23) Ltr AG 2800 AFNE, 17 Jan 57, German Commander Naval Forces Baltic; Ltr AG 1530/4 PANDP, 23 Feb 57, Establishment of the German North DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED Sea Sub-Area. Note: The Terms of Reference for COMNORSEACENT were included in this latter document.

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^TftTO ffnnriEi a conference was held at SHAPE on 14 March at which were present representatives from the German Ministry of Defense, from SHAPE, from COM- NAVNORTH and from CINCENT. At this conference certain wordings of the SHAPE proposal were changed and the primary tasks of the proposed integrated staff were re-defined as: (1) to study organization and command problems and the naval strategy in the area and to make appropriate recommendations to SACEUR; and (Z) to advise and assist the German naval Baltic forces concerning their build-up and initial assignment to NATO. It was agreed at the conference that the North/Center Planning Group in Holtenau should be formed and should be assigned the task of formulating war plans for all naval Baltic forces and should undertake NATO exercise planning in the area. It was also agreed that the peacetime authority of SACEUR over German naval forces assigned to NATO and located in the Baltic would be delegated through CINCENT, COMNAVCENT, and the officer to be designated COMNORSEACENT (the NATO title of Commander German Naval Forces North Sea Sub-Area). The MODs of the UK, Denmark and Germany, as well as the U. S. Department of Defense, were notified of these changes to SHAPE'S pro- (24) posais of 22 January. ' After further study of this problem in the SHAPE Staff, on 17 May SHAPE sent a proposal including terms of reference for the Allied Naval Command Organizar-ion in the Baltic on an interim basis to the authorities of the US, UK, Denmark and Germany, as well as to CINCNORTH and CINCENT. Detailed terms of reference for COMNAVNORCENT and the North/Center Naval Plan- ning Group were included. SACEUR proposed, in the absence of any objection by any of these authorities, to forward this proposal to the Standing Group in order that the organization might get under way. Considering that there were no major objections from the nations, SHAPE on 15 July 1957 forwarded to the Standing Group the proposed plan. The key statement of the letter to the DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED (24) PANDP 1530/6, 14 Mar 57, Allied NavalCommandArrangementsin the Baltic; and MOD Bonn letter IV A 181 11/57, 9 Feb 57.

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Standing Group said: "As an interim measure, the Commander Allied Naval Force« Northern Area Central Europe (COMNAVNORCENT) and personal staff transfer to Holtenau, Germany, and with an integrated staff advise and assist German Naval Baltic forces in all matters concerning their assignment to NATO. For this responsibility he will come under Commander-in- Chief, Allied Forces Central Europe (CINCENT) through the Commander Allied Naval Forces Central Europe (COMNAVCENT). In addition, under the chairmanship of COMNAVNORCENT, a North/Center Planning Group will be formed composed of members from Allied Forces Northern Europe and Allied Forces Central Europe, including members from the integrated staff, and will be responsible to CINCENT (through COMNAV- CENT) and the Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Northern Europe (CINCNORTH) through the Commander Allied Naval Forces Northern Europe (COMNAVNORTH) for the following tasks:

a. Study the organization and command problems and the naval strategy in the Baltic area and make appropriate recommendations.

b. Formulate war plans for all Allied Baltic Naval Forces and undertake NATO exercise planning in this area."

As a result of certain objections by German authorities, some minor mo- (25) difications in the proposed organization of the integrated staff were made. ' On 20 August General Norstad asked the Standing Group to approve the proposals which he had made. In view of the fact that the nations concerned had agreed in principle to the interim plan he saw no reason why it should not be possible for the Standing Group to approve it, and stated that he felt quick action was necessary to resolve this long standing problem. On 12 September the Military Committee approved SHAPE'S proposals that hftd been forwarded by the Standing Group. SHAPE then addressed the national military authorities of France, .Germany, the UK and the US, asking that, ill order to activate the organization as soon as possible, they assign the personnel necessary for this organization. The personnel were desired at Holtenau, Qg^many, not later than 15 October. Admiral Campbell-Walter of the UK DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED (2$) SHAPE 37894, 19 Aug 57, and letter from German NMR to SACEUR dtd 1 Aug 57. nato confidential 159

NAiU JBlüiUiJ1* became chairman of the planning group, which began its work in mid-October. COMNAVNORCENT completed the move of his headquarters to Holtenau on 17 October/26^

Land Boundary in Schleswig-Holstein. A boundary between AFCENT and AFNORTH had been established in SACEUR's EDP 1 /57 as running along the north bank of the Elbe River to the north of Hamburg, thence generally east to Stettin and Danzig. In the Capa- bilitie s Plan for ACE 1957, the defense of the Schleswig-Holstein area had been part of Major Campaign No 3, the aim of which was to arrest the Soviet land advance in Central Europe. This would seem to indicate a change of the boundary between Northern and Center Command to a line further to the North. The Center Commander had believed for some time that the land boundary between his command and that of the northern commander should be the Danish/ German border. CINCNORTH, on the other hand, had told SHAPE in February 1957 that he did not believe the boundary should be^bhanged until a true forward strategy was implemented and that when this was done, there would be a basis for discussion of this program. It will be appreciated that the problem of the land boundary of this area was tied in with the problem of naval command organization for the Baltic Approaches, as well as the problem of future command organization for the Center, and that a decision on any one of these three problems would influence the other two.

Extension of CINCENT's area of responsibility north to include Schleswig- Holstein would have several effects. It would give CINCENT control over this battle area, allowing him to provide more adequate air and atomic support for

(26) AG 1530/6 PANDP, 17 May 57, Interim Proposal for Allied Naval Command Organization in the Baltic; AG 1530/6 P AN DP, ISJul 57, same subject. AG 4030 PA, 23 Sep 57, same subject.

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED PANDP 1530/6, 31 Oct 57, subj: COMNAVBALTAP. SG 70/40, 12 Sep 57. A further complication arose because of CINCAFMED'a interest in the problem. However, progress was made during the year, and a study on the problem was undertaken by CINCSOUTH. The Turkish General Staff set up a Planning Board, which included representatives from COMLAND- SOUTHEAST, SIXATAF and the Turkish Armed Forces. No further progress (28) was made during 1957 on this problem.

Joint Command and Operations Cmters. The Atomic Strike Plan was developed on the assumption that joint air/ ground actions would be directed from joint operation centers. The principle of joint operation centers in the planning, coordinating and directing of air I ground operations had been proved to be the most effective system in wartime. Prior to August 1956, SHAPE had not issued a specific directive on the joint operation centers. It had been assumed that these Joint Operations Centers were actually functioning in Allied Command Europe at appropriate levels, and that the joint planning and joint actions required during an atomic war would be accomplished at the existing centers. The results of atomic exercises, such as BEAR CLAW, had demonstrated that effective joint operations centers were disappearing. In some cases, it had been found that the lack of liaison between commanders had resulted in delays which completely destroyed the effectiveness and timeliness of the actions required by atomic warfare and the atomic control policy as set forth in the Atomic Strike Plan. On 6 August 1956, General Gruenther directed that Joint Command and Operation Centers (JCOCs) be established at all joint levels of command, down to and including field army/tactical air for ce/naval task, group level (29) or equivalent.

(28) See PANDP 1220 AFSE - Defense of the TUrkish Straits - Command Organization. From ACOSPANDP to DCPANDP dtd 28 Mar 57. Also LANDSOUTHEAST/13/58 pages 21-24, History dtd 1 Jid 57 to DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED 31 Dec 57 (AFS0UTH/143/58). (29) See AG 1520 AO dtd 6 Mar 57: "SHAPE Concept of Joint Command and Operation Centers." .-...... *

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the battle. It would concentrate the German land forces under a single major subordinate commander and it would remove certain possible political difficulties relating to the command. On the other hand, retaining the present boundary had advantages too. It would tend to promote coordination and cooperation between German and Danish forces in the defense of Jutland and the Baltic Straits, and it would make possible the establishment of a general unified command and would eliminate the division of responsibilities in the Baltic Straits. At a meeting in Copenhagen in October 1957, CINCNORTH and CINCENT mutually agreed that the present boundary of AFNORTH and AFCENT should be maintained and that a joint command should be established for the Denmark/ (27) Schleswig-Holstein/Baltic area. '

The Turkish Straits Problem. Planning for the defense of the Turkish Straits was affected by two factors that caused anxiety in 1957. It was hoped that the ground atomic delivery forces proposed by SHAPE would help to strengthen the defenses, but there existed also a serious shortage of air defense weapons and under- water seaward defense equipment. The second factor was the problem of command structure in the area. The Commander First Turkish Army had been given the mission by COM- LANDSOUTHEAST of defending the Turkish Straits. A similar mission was given to the Commander Straits Area and Marmara Sea (COMSAMAR) by the Turkish national authorities. No apparent link in peacetime between these two commanders was in effect and no joint planning took place. The wartime arrangements were complicated and unsatisfactory. CINCSOUTHformed a planning team to simplify the command structure for the efficient defense of the Straits in wartime. DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED

(27) PANDP 1100, COFS Conference with MSCs, 30 Oct 57, Blue Tab D, "Land Boundary in Schleswig-Holstein; andReport by General Sugden, 28 Nov, w/encl AFNORTH 1160 CS.

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It was found that further clarification was needed and SHAPE was requested to clarify its concept as stated by General Gruenther. At a Chief of Staff Conference held at SHAPE on 19 February 1957, a presentation was made during which the SHAPE JCOC concept was examined. "Our goal is to realize maximum exploitation of SACEUR's atomic fire-power. This goal is attainable only through fast and effective coordination and control of all joint aspects of conventional or atomic warfare. Fast and effective coordination and control can be achieved only through a streamlined chain of control supported by a reasonable communications system. A streamlined chain of control requires a Joint Command and Operation at each joint level down through field army/tactical air force/naval task force group level or equivalent.

On 7 January SACEUR directed a change in the nature of his Air Oper- ations Center. The SHAPE Operations Center was established in lieu of the Air Operations Center in Room 8-B-ll, SHAPE, with the mission of serving as SACEUR's command post in the event of hostilities and during exercises. He recommended that it be manned and equipped to provide the means for SACEUR to maintain general surveillance over the disposition of his own forces and the general situation facing his command; to make timely decisions in the overall direction of operations and to transmit these decisions promptly to appropriate commanders; and to assure the rapid and effective implementation of his Atomic Strike Plan. While in peace time the SHAPE Operations Center (SHOC) would be manned and equipped only sufficiently to maintain SACEUR's and the MSCst war plans and to provide current information on Allied and Soviet bloc deployments, it must be prepared for immediate tran- (31) sition to its wartime role. In mid-1957 a draft SOP for the SHAPE operational jschelon was isBued setting forth the mission and specific functions to be carried out by the four

(30) Ibid, Footnote No (6). DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED (31) Directive, SACEUR's SOP No 4 - SHAPE Operations Center, 7 Jan 57, AG 1731/AO.

163 wffTfF SHAPS operational groups, which consisted of a Command Group, Operations Group (SHOC), Operations Support Group, and a Service Support Group. SACEUR's SOP No 4 of 7 January 1957 was cancelled since these provisions (32) were included in the draft SOP.v '

Personnel Reductions. In mid-1956, the Standing Group expressed concern that the headquarters' staffs throughout NATO military organizations were growing too large. The Standing Group pointed out that some NATO nations were finding it difficult to meet the growing costs of maintaining the numerical strength of their assigned forces, and that everything possible should be done to alleviate this situation. "One way in which concrete evidence of this could be demonstrated, " the Standing Group told SACEUR, "would be to make a significant reduction in the international ceiling of the staffs under your command." It pointed out that many of the planning tasks that originally required large staffs should then have been accomplished. SGN noted that while a certain degree of duplication was inevitable in an international staff, the experience the national representatives had gained through working on these staffs should permit some streamlining. SACEUR was told that the target for overall reductions should be 10% of the international ceiling, and he was requested to review the international staff organization within ACE with a view to making whatever reductions were 4U1 (33) possible. By November 1956, SACEUR had sent to the Standing Group an interim reply to its proposal that the ACE personnel ceiling be reduced by am overall 10%. This proposed had been sent to the MSCs for their study as well. SACEUR pointed out, command by command, the situation with regard to the staffs. He pointed out that some reductions had adready been made in ACE and that (32) Memo, PANDP/6l20/l, 21 Jun57, Draft SOP for SHAPE Operational Echelon.

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED (33) Memo for SACEUR from SGN, CSGM-466, dtd 20 Jun 56.

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NAJXL SEUÜ.ET the actual workload In the majority of headquarters had increased considerably during the past years. Using SHAPE as an example, he said that the workload in SHAPE had increased approximately one-third since 1953, although the authorized personnel was below the figure for that time. This reply was in actuality a réclama against any 10% reduction, and was accompanied by a detailed graph showing personnel productivity at SHAPE. The conclusions reached at SHAPE were that Allied Command Europe as a whole could not absorb an overall 10% reduction of its authorized personnel ceiling of 12, 153 spaces; that no personnel reduction could be applied to the support troops, for whom there was an increasing requirement; and that a final decision on the degree of a possible personnel reduction must await further study on (34) this and on the integration of Germans into ACE.* On 23 January 1957 SHAPE sent to the Standing Group again a program for a personnel reduction in the headquarters staff at SHAPE. In addition this program outlined the procedure for integrating the German personnel into SHAPE. In essence, the program proposed to reduce 17 officer posts and 11 other rank and civilian posts at SHAPE, a total of 28 posts. In addition the program proposed the transfer of 75 officer and other rank posts to Ger- many. It was estimated that completion of this program would take at least two years. The Standing Group was told that plans were being prepared for possible

reductions in certain other headquarters of ACE, and tha(35t )plan s for these would be forwarded separately as they were completed/ ' In spite of SHAPE'S objections that no substantial personnel cut could be made, and despite the token program for reduction forwarded in January, the Standing Group directed a definite and minimum reduction in personnel assigned to the international headquarters of Allied Command Europe. On 17 April 1957, SACEUR received a SGN memorandum that stated that the Council had concerned itself with the question of simplifying ACE headquarters^ DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED structures in order to ./... (34) Ltr to SGN, AG 4030 PA, 5 Nov 56, International Personnel Ceiling. (35) Ltr to SGN, AG 4030 PA, 23 Jan 57, Personnel Reduction and German Integration Program for SHAPE. wpm œwmmim^ reduce personnel and costs. The Standing Group agreed that reductions should be made, but felt that the military authorities should determine where these cuts could be best accomplished. They considered that a detailed review of functions at all levels of the international command would produce reductions in personnel. Further posts which were created to maintain the balance between nationalities probably could be deleted. The necessity for personnel ceiling reductions was reiterated and was blamed on the difficulty the NATO nations were finding in meeting their requirements to NATO both in personnel and budgetary support. The nations were reluctant to approve further increases necessary to meet air defense and other personnel requirements until each nation's share was known. "Accordingly, " SACEUR was told, "the Standing Group finds it necessary to reduce the ACE Personnel ceiling by 900 posts." This was not quite the 10% reduction originally requested by the Standing Group.

The SGN stated that there would be no change in the missions and functions assigned to SHAPE and ItB subordinate headquarters. Reductions must be made by "true organizational economies" affecting staff posts as well as support personnel. A high proportion of the 900 posts to be eliminated would be from those that were actually occupied. Support personnel only would be cut when other reorganization had rendered their duties no longer necessary. SACEUR was directed to put the ceiling reduction into effect from 1 May 1957. The Fourth and Fifth ATAFs were to be included under the new ceiling and the actual personnel numbers which authorized 2303 officers and 8950 other ranks and civilians throughout ACE were to be reduced to ceiling level by 1 January 1958. The Standing Group directed SACEUR to submit his planned reorganization reflecting the new ceiling for the international headquarters prior to 1 July 1957.^ Faced with this requirement, SHAPE immediately began action to effect this reduction. Working closely with the personnel authorities of the major DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED (36) Memo from SGN to SACEUR, SGM-260-57, 17 Apr 57, sub: Personnel.

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subordinate commands, this reduction was planned to have the least ill effect on the efficiency of ACE operations. On 18 June 1957, SHAPE told the Standing Group that the 900 post reductions had been allocated amongst SHAPE and the MSCs as follows: SHAPE - 79 Officers and 148 Other Ranks and Civilians AFNORTH - 8 Officers and 10 Other Ranks and Civilians AFCENT - 61 Officers and 273 Other Ranks and Civilians AFSOUTH - 73 Officers and 244 Other Ranks and Civilians AFMED - 4 Officers. The personnel ceiling reduction was effective 1 May 1957 and the actual personnel strength would be reduced to the new ceiling level by 1 January 1958. The missions and functions assigned to SHAPE and subordinate headquarters remained unchanged. Reductions would be made in both staff and support personnel. Since the majority of the posts to be reduced would be posts which were actually occupied, a substantial saving of personnel would result. The reduction of posts would be made proportiona/tely for each nation represented in the headquarters, with departure from this principle only in special cases. No reorganization of the overall command structure or headquarters cf ACE was planned because of these reductions, but some internal' reorganization of some of the ACE headquarters might be necessary. When they had been determined, the exact posts to be reduced would be revealed to the appropriate Ministers of Defense. If MODs and SHAPE could not agree on the manner of (37) reductions, the SGN would be further advised/ ' The ACE posts selected for reduction were outlined in full detail to the Standing Group, showing the job title, service, rank and nationality for 806 posts. The details of the remaining 94 posts were not submitted since these were the posts of the US 61st General Dispensary which were removed from the SHAPE personnel tables in April 1954. On 24 September 1957, SHAPE sent DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED (37) AG 4030 PA, 18 Jun 57, ACE Personnel Ceiling.

167 ife wj l Al ITT- 8TTCnDT SHAPE 57/67 äfcpnAL

to the Standing Group a summary by nationality, service and grade, of the reduction which would be made in the SHAPE personnel ceiling by 1 January 1958.<38>

Personnel Requirements Program. At the same time that ACE Personnel Ceiling was reduced by order of the Standing Group, SACEUR submitted a number of requests for increases in its personnel ceiling in order to take care of such additional needs as Air (39) Defense, SHOC, and the Early Warning System. Additionally, during a briefing of the Staiding Group at SHAPE on 10 July 1957, SACEUR's urgent requirements for commun! cation s-electronic s personnel were set forth. On 31 July, the Standing Group told SACEUR that it considered this a piecemeal approach which was causing a number of NATO nations considerable difficulty in evaluating personnel requirements being levied against them and in planning sufficiently in advance for provision of the necessary personnel. The Standing Group emphasized that all nations were experiencing difficulty in providing highly specialized personnel in such fields as communications - electronics. The Standing Group requested that SACEUR immediately begin to maintain an ACE Personnel Requirements Program (PRP) covering a five-year period beginning with the next calendar year. This program would be revised

(38) Ltr to SGN, AG 4030 PA, 24 Sep 57, ACEPersonnel Ceiling. See also: Ltr AG 4030 PA, 2 Aug 57, sub: Personnel reductions at SHAPE; Ltr AG 4030 PA, 23 Aug 57, sub: Personnel reductions at AFMED& AFNORTH Ltr AG 4030 PA, 29 Aug 57, sub: Personnel reductions at AFSOUTHj Ltr AG 4030.PA, 10 Sep 57, sub: Post reductions at AFCENT; SGN Msg, DEF 927642 (STAND 204) ; SGN Msg, DEF 928254 (STAND 2062). (39) AG 4030 PA, 18 Jun 57; SHAPTO 1453, 13 Apr 57; DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED SHAPTO 1481, 6 Jun 57; AG 4030 PA, 14 Sep 56; AG 4030 SIG/PT, 28 Jun 57.

168

~tii\iTO iirriinT annually on the basis of the best planning available and would be sent to the Standing Group not later than 1 November of each year. The program would include a plan listing all officers and other ranks requirements within ACE staffs and activities by nation and service Full justification would be given for any request to change the ACE personnel ceilings. The Standing Group specified that this program would include all requests already being considered by it with the exception of the requests for communications-electronics personnel; this request would be held in abeyance in view of anticipated additional requests for personnel. Any subsequent requests for increases in personnel would be considered only after receipt of the Personnel Requirements Program. "It is emphasized, " the SGN memorandum concluded, "that requests for personnel must be kept to the absolute minimum.

Because of the short time available before submission of the first report, which was due on 1 November, it was decided that it would be prepared at SHAPE without reference to MSCs. SHAPE believed that there were two areas in which personnel incr eases were clearly justified. The first of these was in communications and electronics, for which the Chief Signal Officer had compiled anticipated requirements. The second was in the area of air defense. SHAPE would not be ready by 1 November to present an overall program to the Standing Group on air defense but a partial report including signal communiclations requirements was directed by the Chief of Staff. There were many critical air defense decisions to be made before detailed personnel requirements could be determined. ^^ In compliance with the Standing Group's direction, a personnel Reqidrements Program for ACE for 1958 through 1962 was forwarded to the SGN on 17 October. Admittedly, this was not a completely accurate forecast of the personnel requirements but it did include an accurate forecast of personnel for Center Command organization and some other programs. The first part of the program

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED (40) SGM- 504-57, 31 Jul 57, sub: ACE Personnel Reqtdrements. (41) SEC 2030, COFSMtg, 22 Aug 57. was a series of summary tables of personnel requirements including an overall for ACE and a breakdown for SHAPE and each of the Major Subordinate Com- mands. The second and probably most important part of the PRP was the detailed requests with justificlation in each case for the various personnel to (42) support urgent projects, most of them signal projects/

Personnel for Air Defense and Early Warning. On 11 June 1957, SHAPE sent to the Standing Group an appraisal of the increase that would be needed in personnel for aii/defense missions in view of SACEUR's broad air defense responsibility. SHAPE was seeking no increase in its own specialized air defense staff. It was obvious, however, that air defense staffs in the regional commands would have to be strengthened. In the letter to the Standing Group these requirements were discussed by region, with a summation that showed that air defense staffs of the regional commands would require an approximate increase of 20 staff officer posts. In addition, it was necessary that air warning components be established at SHAPE and in certain areas within the regional commands. To establish these air warning components called for an increase of 25 officers and 97 other ranks. The early warning system had been activated on 30 April 1956, but it had been necessary to man the SHAPE and regional centers with temporary personnel provided on loan from national authorities. This was a short term expedient to set the system in motion, and it was desired that permanent personnel should be assigned without delay. SHAPE had not determined the net personnel increase which would be required to activate the air defense and air warning components within SHAPE and the regional commands. The Standing Group was informed that recommendations regarding necessary increases would be made within the near future.

(42) AG 4030/4 PA, 17 Oct 57, Personnel Requirements Program for ACE, DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED 1958-1962.

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On 12 December 1956 the plan for the Long-Range Early Warning System was sent to the Standing Group and to all the nations. Included with this (43) plan was a Ust of requirements for personnel to man the system. ' On li April 1957, the Standing Group asked that SACEUR submit his proposals on the personnel to be required for air defense, to include detailed national breakdowns as agreed by the nations and also any proposals to which the nations had not yet been agreed, so that the Standing Group could attempt to obtain outstanding national approvals. This course of action would allow the Standing Group and each nation to know the full extent of the personnel costs 'for the air defense staffs. The Standing Group also noted SACEUR's status report on the Long-Range Early Warning System and asked him to send fuller details on his proposals for

establishing and manning the posts by nationality(44) . It requested the same information on the Forward Scatter System/ The Standing Group had indicated that it would consider requests for additional personnel for the Regional Organization for Air Defense and for the SHAPE Operations Center, after receipt from SHAPE of the full details of the posts to be reduced. On 24 September SHAPE asked that the Standing Group continue its consideration of these two important requests for additional personnel with a view toward an early decision. As requested by the Standing Group, these two requests for additional personnel would be included in the SHAPE Personnel Requirements Program to be submitted to the Standing Group by 1 November 1957.^45^

(43) Ltr from SACEUR to SGN, AG 4030 PA, 11 Jun 56, Regional Organisation for Air Defense. Ltr AG 3170/1 SIG/EL, 12 Dec 56, Long-Range Early Warning System. (44) SGM-260- 57, 17 Apr 57. DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED (45) Ltr to SGN, AG 4030 PA, 24 Sep 57, ACE Personnel Ceiling.

171 CHAPTER VII

LOGISTICS AND INFRASTRUCTURE

Part I - Logistic s

Introduction. Among the most serious problems facing Allied Command Europe from its inception in 1951 had been that of insuring that weapons, ammunition, and materiel would be ready for use by SACEUR's forces on time and in sufficient quantity. This implied not only stocks on hand for immediate use, but prior arrangements to keep these vital supplies coming to wherever they were wanted, regardless of the disruption and the inevitable confusion which would follow any invasion of Western Europe. Serious as this logistics problem had been under conditions of conventional warfare, the advent of nuclear war, on which SACEUR's strategic plans were based, promised to increase these difficulties, many times over. During 1957, the nations of NATO became increasingly reluctant to commit themselves financiàlly until the logistic implications of the use of nuclear weapons were fully explained to them. Many discussions took place on the subject of costs, and frequent objections by the nations resulted in the slowing down of progress in both planning and construction. Certain infrastructure projects were suspended pending decisions on future costs, and planned construction was stringently serened. It was apparent that a point had been reached where existing plans for logistic support had to be altered to fit into new strategic concepts. At the same time, planned construction had to be re-aligned particularly in the case of airfields. In addition, future infrastructure needs were closely tied to the question of missile costs, and a decision was awaited DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED » from the North Atlantic Council as to how these missiles should be financed.

172 mß) s^r^xmD Planning - SACEUR's Responsibilities. A major problem in all attempts to plan the logistic support system of Allied Command Europe had been the question of defining exactly SACEUR's responsibility. In December 1950, the North Atlantic Council agreed to accept two basic principles. Nations were to be responsible for the logistic support of their own forces, while SACEUR would be responsible for the coordination of the logistic support for the forces under his command. This decision was made to safeguard the sovereignty of the nations by leaving the direction of national logistic systems to the respective national authorities. SACEUR was thus placed in a curious position. He had no powers of direction over the national logistic systems, but, at the same time, he was responsible for the overall effectiveness of the logistic support for his forces. He could recommend to the nations that they adopt his logistic plans and he was given certain powers to insure that his recommendations were understood by the nations. ^ The NATO nations assigned part of their forces to Allied Command Europe and earmarked other forces for wartime use. In the same way, the nations assigned certain logistic resources to SACEUR and earmarked other resources for wartime logistic support. These resources, which included supplies, storage and distribution facilities and other installations, were said to be "made available" to SACEUR, and he was given the responsibility for the overall policy direction of these resources. He had no peacetime control over resources which were not made available by the nations. In peacetime, for example, SACEUR had the authority to establish priorities for the build-up of supplies and, after consultation with the nations, could direct the geographic location of stocks. He could supervise the construction

(1) DC 24/3 dated 18 December 1950 gives the basic logistic principles - see also SHAPE History Vol. I, Section HI, Chapt. 9. SACEUR's responsibilities are contained in two documents - MC 53(Final) dated 7 July 1955, and MC 36/1, last revised in October 1956. For a DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED useful summary of SACEUR's logistic responsibilities - see Logistic Policy and Guidance AG 6000.01 dated 2 October 1957. All these documents - are available in AG Central Registry.

173

NATor OEtauar of facilities provided by common funding and had the authority to make inspect ions to ascertain construction progress. Among his power* also, was the authority to directly control the training of logistic units. In order that he could carry out his responsibilities, SACEUR was given the right of direct access to national authorities in charge of logistic systems. He could communicate directly with national chiefs of staff, defense ministers and heads of governments, and he could delegate authority to his subordinate commanders who, in turn, had the right to communicate directly with the appropriate national authorities at lower levels. SACEUR's wartime powers and responsibilities represented an extension of his peacetime role, with certain exceptions. In the case of absolute necessity, for example, he could request national authorities to place at his disposal any part of their logistic resources, including resources not previously made (2) available.

Logistic System Allied Command Europe. In order that SACEUR could fulfill his logistic responsibilities, an efficient logistic system had to be established and maintained in peacetime, a system that would be capable of rapid expansion in wartime. The establishment of an efficient logistic system in even one nation had always proved a difficult and complicated task;^the establishment of such a system for Allied Command times Europe was many more difficult and complicated. The rules and principles

(2) SACEUR's wartime powers and responsibilities were contained in MC 36/l. His logistic responsibilities were set out for both the forward (Combat) zone and the rear (Communication) zone. It is difficult to visualize just where these zones would have their dividing line in any nuclear war and the definition seems a little academic. SACEUR and his subordinate commanders were given additional powers in the case of an emergency, the definition of an emergency being "an unforeseen combination of circumstances which calls for immediate action." Within ACE, the Allied

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED Commanders had the responsibility for deciding what constituted an e- mergency. See SGM-225-54 dated 5 March 1954 quoted in Logistic Policy and Guidance ACE.

174 - ^ - — ; J NATO SEeitfiT according to which SACEUR could develop a logistic system created difficulties from the start, and there were many other problems involving national sovereignty, financing and flexibility. In fact, although planning had been started in 1952, it required four years of discussion and negotiation before (3) the Council approved a logistic system for Allied Command Europe/ ' The "Logistic System for ACE" which SHAPE had devised was forwarded to the Standing Group on 3 September 1955, and, after many months of discussion it was approved by the Council on 2 July 1956. The major subordinate commanders were directed by SACEUR to start using the system, and thus,

when General Norstad assumed comman(4) d in November 1956, the system had been in operation some four months. The logistic system was divided into two parts. Part I dealt with the relationship between the national logistic systems administration and SACEUR, while Part II was concerned with SACEUR's direction of the logistic resources made available to him by the nations. (5)'

(3) For an account of the early planning - see SHAPE History Volume II, Chapter IX - available in Historical Branch, SHAPE. (4) AG 1228.08/P-521/55 LOG dated 3 September 1955 is the "Logistic Sys- tem for ACE" as recommended by General Gruenther. Ctiuncil approval was given in CR(56)35 dated 2 July 1956. (5) General Gruenther had stated, when recommending the adoption of the system to the Standing Group, that no attempt had been made to define the words "made available'.' He pointed out that further study was necessary on this subject and the SGN would receive SHAPE'S recommendations at a later date. This study took two years and in June 1957, S HAPE suggested that the logistic resources possessed by national forces assigned to}SACEUR should be considered as resources 'made available. These resources would be subject to re-allocation in an emergency in wartime. Any other national resources within ACE would be considered as not made available, and would not normally be subject to re-allocation, except as agreed to by the nations in accordance with the Military Com- mittee's approved policy and guidance. DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED SeeAG 1120.08/P&M-338/57 LOG dated 27 June 1957.

175 r. Part I. Each of the two major sections of the "Logistic System" was sub-divided into three "Points, " dealing with the procedures to be adopted by SACEUR and the nations. The first Point of Part I was an elaboration of SACEUR's right to communicate directly with persons responsible for the direction of national logistic systems. A senior logistic officer at ministry of defense leyel would be designated by each nation for consultation with SACEUR and his major subordinate commanderB. Other logistic officers would be appointed at lower levels and it was the special function of these officers to initiate prompt action in response to requests from SACEUR or his representatives.

The situation might arise in wartime in which a large national force would be deployed away from its own territory, and thus away from its own logistic system. Obviously, should this occur, the deployed force would be dependent upon the logistic system of another country. Point two established procedures aimed at avoiding confusion and delay should this situation arise. Specially trained personnel from each of the nations would form "Advance Parties." These "Advance Parties" would move before any planned deployment of the larger force and work with the "host" logistic Bystem. Requests for supplies from the "host" logistic syBtem would be made, and the supplies would be sent direct from the "host" depots to the deployed force depots. After resupply had been established to the deployed force from its own logistic System, a method of reimbursement or replacement-in-kind would operate.

In order to arrive at sound command decisions, commanders would have to know, in peacetime, the capabilities of the various national logistic systems. The third Point in Part I concerned the exchange of information between the nations and the ACE commanders on such items as stockpiling, repair facilities and depot capabilities. Nations were directed to designate depots and indicate the level of stocks

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED held upon which SACEUR's forces could rely in time of war. Part II. The Nature of the mission of Allied Command Europe was such

176 . y vA/-...'.

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that in any war, certain of the nations would have to support expeditionary forces which could not be supplied from their own logistic systems. The second part of the ACE System suggested the procedures which nations should adopt with respect to stocks. It was necessary to resolve the problems raised by the positioning of stocks of one nation in another nation's territory. While the responsibility for making bi-lateral or multi-lateral agreements on positioning rested with the nations involved, it was SACEUR's responsibility to determine the geographic distribution of these stocks. Point one of Part II directed the nations to effect the necessary coordination with SACEUR, and furnish reports to provide him with essential information as to stocks held. Two peacetime ireports were established to be submitted through the major subordinate commanders, and the requirement for a third report to be issued in wartime was formulated. SACEUR was given the overall responsibility for deciding what information was needed in these reports.

SACEUR's power over those logistic resources made available to him by the nations included the right to re-allocate supplies from one nation to another. The appropriate allied commanders were empowered to exercise this right during any wartime emergency, and the appropriate procedures were established in Point three of Part II. However, a situation might arise when further supplies over and above those made available would be needed. Procedures were established in order that commanders could request nations to furnish these extra supplies.

Logistic Policy and Guidance. The establishment of the Logistic System for Allied Command Europe enabled SACEUR to give new guidance to his major subordinate commanders. During General Norstad's first year of command, SHAPE issued a single document to replace former instructions, titled: "Logistic Policy and Gui-

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED dance, Allied Command Europe.

(6) Logistic Policy and Guidance was AG 6100.01 / P&M-521 /57 LOG dated ,

177 "TTrtTn viu-K ^ff ^'jv The new policy guidance was issued just after publication of the Mini- mum Force Study, but did not reflect the strategic concepts in this study, which implied changes in assumptions for future logistic planning. National logistics systems were inadequate for the type of war which could be possible during the 1958-1963 period. The framework for the overall logistic support of ACE was a result of the consolidation of planning carried out during 1957. A logistic system was in operation, flexible enough to incorporate developments within the existing agreements.

The Logistic Implications of the Minimum Force Study. Planning Factors. The principle that nations were responsible for the logistic support of their forces was re-stated, with the following assumptions: - National logistics resources would be devoted primarily to support of forces needed for Phase I of general war. - Due to the widespread nature of expected attacks all logistic support systems would have to be maintained at a high degree of readiness. Logistic support would have to be ready to provide for the interim period before re-supply could be effected. - Conflicts short of general war would be supported from stocks held for general war, but any stocks thus used would have to be replaced quickly as a general war might follow. War Reserves. Movement in operational theaters during and immediately following Phase I would be restricted. This restriction meant that adequate supplies, dispersed and protected, must be stored within immediate access of the combat formations and air forces. These supplies must be

J... Z Oct 57. It replaced "Logistic Instructicms ACE, " dtd 25 Aug 53 and the "Logistic War Plan, " dtd 1 Mar 54. P ending the issue of a new direc-

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED tive on stock levels, Annex 'A' to the Logistic War Plan (AG 6801/S&M- 230/55 LOG) was to remain effective. The new document was prepared in a flexible manner to allow any amendments and alterations to logistic policy which might be made by SHAPE in the future, necessited by new strategic concepts contained in the Minimvun Force Study. ne CNftTB OBCH ET WAT© CONFIDENTIAL ,NATO—-SirrfW TTT

positioned in peacetime, and it would therefore be necessary to establish a stockpile. Size of the Stockpile. Although current NATO policy specified that war reserves had to be positioned to last the first 90 days of war, recent studies had shown that it might be possible to reduce the quantity of stocks held. Allowance would have to be made for damage, however, and it was estimated that a damage factor of 30% would be used for all land-based stocks. The fact that national stocks of POL in unprotected storage near major ports would probably suffer loss of more than 30% emphasized the need for early completion of the NATO pipeline system.

Re supply. Because of the widespread damage after attack, no resupply could be foreseen from European industry after D-Day. Resupply most probably would come from North America, but time would have to be allowed to recover from attacks there, and for placing industry on a wartime footing. Continental ports would be severely restricted in movement. The implications were that although some resupply might start soon after D-Day, none of significance would be expected for 90 days, except possibly bulk POL where pipelines exist and tankers could be routed to pipeline port terminals. Re- supply would require NATO coordination in order to assess requirements and priorities in relation to the resources available. Logistic Support Organization. A flexible logistic support organization would have to exist in peacetime to operate effectively during Phase I at least, as emergency expansion would be improbable. Additional units would be needed following intense nuclear attacks for repair and rehabilitation of damaged installations. Support would have to be provided on the assumption of no warning, but there should be, in any case, plans for a warning period. These plans would include the reduction of critical deficiencies in war reserves, the policy to be adopted regarding infrastructure projects in hand at the time, and the delivery of nuclear warheads to units. DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED

179

NATU ÛJJËIUB^ Replacement, Modernization and Standardization of Equipment. Some NATO Forces' equipment would be worn out or obsolete during the period 1958-1963, and it would be necessary to replace it with new and modern equipment. This should be done on a time-phased basis for economical reasons, and to allow standardization.

Strategic Reserves and Reinforcement Units. Task' Force Raised by SACEUR. In conflicts short of general war, it was proposed that SACEUR should use a special task force, and this created problems concerned with the particular aspect of airborne support. The task force would be highly mobile and SACEUR would have to make special plans in conjunction with national support systems. Standardization was particularly important. Immediate Reinforcements. The rapid mobilization of partly-manned formations within a few days would make it necessary for equipment and vehicles to be pre-stocked at planned war concentration areas. Logistic support for the first 90 days should be on hand. Strategic Reserves. The logistic support for the strategic reserves stationed outside ACE would have to be based on war reserve stocks already in position in ACE, on the assumption that, in general, these reserve forces would arrive on D + 30. Movement and Transportation. Peacetime planning should be made for shipping, discharge of cargo and its onward routing overland. This planning should be made for the operation and maintenance of the transport facilities, stockpiling of rehabilitation materiel, and a labour force to maintain traffic and restore it after nuclear attack. POL. During Phase I, there would have to be immediate availability of jet fuel and mogas,the latter being maintained in stockpiles in combat areas.

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED To ensure replenishment, all mogas storage would have to be connected to NATO pipelines.

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Medical. The management of mass casualties made it necessary to have plans for the collection and evacuation of these casualties to pre- determined medical installations. All ranks would require training in protection against radiation hazards.

Nuclear Weapon Logistics. The basic problem in the provision of logistic support for all NATO nuclear operational needs was in the assumption that a ready, integrated nuclear delivery system existed for all NATO forces. The speed of nuclear operations envisaged during Phase I would create a great problem in the support of dispersed combat units. Technicians would be required for the skilled maintenance of the nuclear warheads. Enemy attacks upon storage sites would be probable, and the storage and safekeeping of these weapons raised security problems. Support planning should start at once as far as it was possible within the framework of existing laws.

Specific Naval Maintenance and Support. Two new types of logistic support were needed for the naval forces of ACE, Underway replenishment groups were required to support the strike fleet, the anti-submarine task groups and the strategic task force. Floating Base Support Ships would be required to give the minimum support necessary for the Shield Forces when operating away from their normal bases or when these bases had been destroyed. These ships would have to be equipped and stocked in peacetime, and SHAPE prepared to furnish guidance on the number of ships required.

Specific Air Force Maintenance and Support. The first seven days stocks of war reserves should be put on or near

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED each airfield, and they should allow for the maximum operations. As far as possible, squadron servicing and support should be located at least seven kilometers, from airfields, so that the maximum equipment and personnel would survive an attack. Support facilities should be mobile, to allow the transfer of surviving equipment and personnel to undevastated areas. This was particularly important in the case of ground servicing facilities to permit the rapid deployment and reinforcement of squadrons.

Principal Logistic Problems. The logistic implications of the Minimum Force Study meant that considerable further study and planning would be necessary before a complete Io- support gistic/program could be provided for ACE forces which might be engaged in the type of war possible during the period 1958-1963. The adoption of the new logistic concepts would also create an additional financial burden on the NATO nations. The North Atlantic Council had not reached a decision on the common funding of missile sites, but it was obvious

that there would have(7 t)o be additional funds made available to cover the cost of the new facilities/ '

POL - The Suez Crisis. The Suez Canal was closed to shipping on 2 November 1956. Because of the possible effects on military stocks of POL, SHAPE requested an immediate report from all nations of stocks held at the time. The report was to be expressed- in wartime days of supply of jet fuel, motor fuel, avgas and naval boiler fuel. The nations were also asked to give an estimate for any variations in stock levels of these fuels expected during the next 60 days. The replies received at SHAPE showed that the stocks in AFNORTH and AFCENT were adequate for 30 days supply, although there were certain weaknesses which could have had an adverse effect on mission capability. In AF- DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED SOUTH, military POL stocks were inadequate.

(7) The Minimum Force Study is SHAPE/154-1/57 dtd 1 Oct 57. Thelogistics annex is ANNEX F.

;V,'.;.:-N ^Dvv. -L:^\."i.\R.i .

182 -v-,

SHAPE 57167 NATO SECRET

Chart from Brief for SACEUR on Effecia of Suez on POL stock status, dated 26 April 1957:

Country Product Oct 56 Nov 56 Dec 56 Jan 57 Feb 57 Mar 57 GREECE Jet Fuel 8 5 4 3 10 6 Mogas 7 8 9 9 4 13 Avgas 27 22 20 22 15 27 TURKEY Jet Fuel 12 Not re- 17 32 26 35 ported Not re- 10 12 10 11 12 Mogas ported BELGIUM Jet Fuel 11 11 6.5 6 13.5 11.5 Avgas 49 18.5 18.5 7.5 6.5 Not reported ITALY Mogas 9 9 6.5 6.7 7.6 7.5 Diesel 18 18 13 13 14.7 15.5 (for Army) (Number of days of war supply held)

The brief for SACEUR concluded that "The Middle East crisis hasl not affected the military stocks of POL in ACE except in a few cases, but has emphasized the importance of maintaining adequate military POL reserves, and has pointed out the critical situation which develops in areas with small POL reserves when normal resupply is interrupted. Serious concern is felt over (8) low reserves maintained by some nations." '

(8) See messages: SH 31682 dated 8 November 1956; SH 40326 " 24 November 1956; SH 32082 23 November 1956; SH 32514 " 12 December 1956; SH 33133 " IlJanuary 1957; SH 34457 " 8 March 1957.

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED Also: LogisticsQuarterlyReportofProgress, 1 October-31 December 1956; C-M(57)l dtd 8 Jan 1957 gives the Council action, and see also C-M(57)7, dtd 1 Feb 1957. SACEUR's Brief is LOG 2050.17/P&M-256/57 - "Memo- randum for the Chief of Staff from ACOS Logistics'.' Briefing for General Norstad Enclosure 3 - Effect of Suez on ACEPOL. Status, dtd 26 Apr 57. wo ^TWMimy SHAPE informed the Standing Group of the position, and recommended that every possible action be taken to assure re-supply for the forces of Allied Command Europe. Meanwhile, the nations were requested to give SHAPE monthly reports on stocks, and to take action to improve their stock- levels. On 4 January 1957, the North Atlantic Council instructed the Petroleum Planning Committee (PPC) to review the situation, in consultation with the military authorities, and report back to the Council by 9 January 1957. The PPC was not able to provide complete information because it was found that the system of POL stock reporting by the nations was inadequate. As a result of this report by the PPC, the Council asked the Standing Group for a complete evaluation of the POL situation as it affected the defensive capabilities of NATO. SHAPE in turn was requested to prepare a special questionnaire were consolidated by SHAPE and then sent to the PPC for evaluation. On the basis of the replies received, the Council decided that the nations should maintain a minimum of 30 days wartime supply of all fuels. A brief prepared for SACEUR at the end of April 1957 summarized the overall effect of the Suez Crisis on POL stocks in Allied Command Europe (see Chart following page). Suez had not caused a general reduction in stock levels. The unsatisfactory levels existed before November 1956. Intensified reporting, however, focussed attention ons stock levels, and in February 1957, the North Atlantic Council invited nations to take action tobring up to 30 days those stocks which were below that level. In Greece, Turkey, France and Belgium, flight training had to be reduced in order to conserve stocks of jet fuel. Greece had great difficulty for several months in obtaining jet fuel, due

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED primarily to inadequate allocation of funds, but in March her stock level was higher than in November. The NATO Pipeline System. While the effect of Suez on POL. stocks was being determined at SHAPE, the North Atlantic Council had before it a solution to one of the most important logistic problems. On 21 December 1956, the Council approved a control structure for the operation of the NATO Pipeline system. At this time almost L> 81.8 million had been spent on POL installations, and the total program (9) of POL infrastructure was almost 77% complete/ ' Approval by the Council cleared the way for the activation of the Central European control organization, and the control of the pipeline systems in the Northern and Southern regions. Organization - Central Region. The aim of the control organization was to establish a peacetime system which would be capable of meeting SACEUR's wartime requirements without delay. It was controlled and operated as one unit and SACEUR was given sufficient powers of supervision and coordination to support his forces/*^ In order that the peacetime aim could be met, the Coimcil set up four agencies for the control and operation of the POL system: - NATO Pipeline Committee. The Pipeline Committee was composed of a representative of each of the member NATO nations with a chairman normally designated by the Secretary General. The Committee acted on behalf of the Council on all matters of NATO-wide concern in connection with the system, in full consultation with the military authorities. It met only as required. - Central Europe Pipeline Policy Committee. Each member nation using the system had a representative on this committee, with a chairman designated by the committee. It acted in matters concerning the operation of the system, in consultation with the Central Europe Pipeline Office. In particular, this committee defined the financial and economical responsibilities, and made

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED (9) Chart IP 37/57 NATO Common Infrastructure Data Book dated 29 May 57. (10) See Annexto C-M(56)129 dated 11 December 1956. recommendations for the solution of any financial problems which arose. It met only as required. - Central Europe Pipeline Office. The Pipeline Office was staffed by representatives of the user nations, with a SACEUR representative serving as chairman, and CINCENT supplying the secretariat. This office assumed control, both operational and technical, of the system, subject to the approval of the Pipeline Policy Committee. Control was exercised by: (1) Determining standards of operation and maintenance which met the minimum requirements of NATO and the minimum standards of host countries. (2) Ensuring quality control and inspection of fuel. (3) Determining the types, quantities and destination of fuel to be

I transported and stored. (4) Consultation with appropriate national and NATO bodies or authorities to ensure full use of all available means of movement. (5) Discharging financial and accounting functions which might be required. The national representatives controlled the input and output of national stocks of fuel, maintaining the necessary records. - Central Europe Operating Agency. This agency was responsible for the operational and technical control as outlined above. It was under the control of a general manager and had several sections, e.g. Budgetary, Personnel and Operations.^1 Northern and Southern Regions. The NATO Pipeline Committee acted as a controlling agency for the Northern and Southern Regions and was composed of the samepersonnel as for the Center. The national pipeline organizations were controlled by the host nations, in full consultation with the military authorities. SACEUR exercised the supervision and coordination of the various DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED (11) For a full description of the POL. System, see C-M(56) 129, dtd 11 Dec 56. pipeline systems in accordance with his terms of reference, and had a representative at, but not integrated into, the headquarters of the national organization. Cross-service agreements were executed by host nations with user nations, if any, to cover services rendered by the host nation. SACEUR co- (12) ordinated the execution of such cross-service agreements. The legal status of the Central Europe pipeline organization was approved by the North Atlantic Council on 10 July 1957. The Policy Committee was thus able to appoint a General Manager early in August 1957. Interim financial arrangements for the operating agency were made, although discussions were not completed by the end of the year. The Policy Committee also diiéùssed

the procedures to be adopted when takin(13g) over new pipelines, and technical problems connected with their usage/ The SHAPE recommended Ninth Slice Infrastructure Program included a POL project for the extension of a pipeline in Eastern Turkey at a total cost I of approximately L 2.14 million. For three years, Turkey had placed great emphasis on this project, but SHAPE had not accepted Tvtkey's request for

either the Seventh or Eighth Slices. After re-study however, (14SHAP) E agreed that the project was justified and eligible for common funding/ Just before the meeting held at SHAPE between national military delegates and SHAPEplanners on 3-4 September 1957, Turkey suggested that

certain additions to the POL system were requireOS) d in addition to the one project already recommended for the Ninth Slice/ The purpose of the Turkish proposal was to insure against the consequences of anticipated war damage to POL facilities in Eastern and Western Turkey by the provision of alternative means of re-supply and distribution. The proposal

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED (12) Ibid - Part II of Annex. (13) CR(57)48 dated 10 Jul 57: The Legal Status of the POL Organisation. See : Logistics Quarterly Report of Progress. (14) See PROG 6100/IP-44/57 dated 28 Feb 57: Infrastructure Problems in Turkey. (15) See Chart prepared by Programs Division for SACEUR. incorporated alternative discharge facilities, 1100 kilometers of line, and associated storage at a further total cost of L 12 million. SHAPE planner« stressed the fact that infrastructure projects had to be restricted to minimum essential projects, and that the expenditure envisaged could not be viewed favourably under infrastructure arrangements at that time/* ^ There was no discussion on this subject during the September lair»* structure Conference, but Turkey placed a reservation on the Ninth Slice on . the basis of Military Committee comments excluding the projects. However* this reservation was lifted at the Military Committee meeting of 11 December 1BT.I"!

(16) See brief dtd 30 Aug 1957 prepared for Chief of Staff's visit to Tarkey. (17) See brief prepared for SACEUR: "Turkish Request for Sqpplemenkary

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CHAPTER VH

Part II - Infrastructure

Introduction. The uncertainty of the nations regarding the cost of the logistic support necessary for ACE forces during the period 1958-1963 compelled SHAPE to take measures to slow down construction of support facilities. In 1956, the nations had expressed their concern at the rise in construction costs and had called for an examination of the whole program of planned construction. SHAPE carried out a stringent screening in conjunction with the International Staff, and recommended the suspension of certain projects. Publication of the Mini- mum Forces Study had increased the problem because it was obvious that additional construction would be necessary during the next five years. As in the case of logistic planning, 1957 was a year of consolidation. Exisliag plans for future construction were delayed pending Council decisions which would enable SHAPE to plan new construction programs. Thus all construction, whether finished or not, could be examined as to the continued military usefulness of each installation.

Infrastructure and 'Allied Command Europe. Infrastructure, simply defined consisted of those fixed installations such as airfields, telecommunications networks and fuel pipelines, which were necessary to support military forces in peace and war. The infrastructure for SACEUR's forces was financed in two w ay s. The nations paid for purely national support installations themselves. The major use of these installations was by the nation which financed them. NATO common infrastructure, on the other hand, was paid for by all the DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED nations on a cost-sharing basis, and the installations were for use by two or more member nations. This system of finance had been agreed by the lKZorth

189

NXTS=BBGKEf SHAPE 5.7/67 j^x0 S^C&ElL "'" "T ""^

Atlantic Council in December 1951.8^

SACEUR's Responsibilities. SACEUR was given the responsibility of coordinating infrastructure construction, in order that the strategic deployment of his forces could be fully supported . The nations submitted projects for common financing to SACEUR and he decided on the military usefulness and the geographical location of these projects. SHAPE was responsible for preparing cost estimates and timetables showing completion dates. Engineering plans were reviewed at SHAPEto make sure that they complied with SACEUR's operational standards. SACEUR was given the right to make inspections both during and after construction. In the case of purely national construction paid for by individual nations, SACEUR was directed to do everything possible to see that nations discharged their responsibility for providing the portion of their infrastructure necessary for support of their forces assigned to ACE.

The procedures for the planning and construction of projects financed under common funding had been established by the North Atlantic Council in I953. During the first part of each year, SACEUR received submissions on projects to be included in a yearly program of construction. These submissions were screened by SHAPE and incorporated in a recommended Slice. SACEUR sent this recommended Slice to the Standing Group by 1 July for inclusion in an overall NATO Infrastructure Program. The Standing Group screened the recommendations made by the Supreme Commanders and made its recommendations to the Military Committee by 1 October. Financial (19) approval was then given by the Council after further screening/

(18) For a useful summary of the principle of NATO cost-sharing, together with a short history of NATO Common Infrastructure, see: "Facts about NATO" published by the NATO Information Service at the Palais de Chaillot. Annex B 4 Section II pages 1-2, and Section III pages 1-2. D-D(51)290(Revised) dated 7 December 1951 gives the agreement by the

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED North Atlantic Council; see alao SHAPE History Volume I Section III, Chapter 9 for the early history.

190 M/o -NASQ^gECRET SACEUR gave specific guidance to his subordinate commanders on the planning of NATO Common Infrastructure, stressing the importance of close liaison with national authorities and the NATO Technical Staff during the initial planning of new projects. He pointed out that allnew construction had to be planned on the most austere basis to satisfy only the essential minimum operational requirements.^^

NATO Common Infrastructure Programs before 1956. In April 1953, the Council had approved an overall ceiling of L. 250 million for the next three years covering Slices Five, Six and Seven, to provide infrastructure support for the ACE and ACLANT forces expected to be available by the end of 19.57.^21^ With the approval of the Seventh Slice Program in April 1956, the L 250 million authorized was entirely committed, with the exception of a contingency fund to insure completion of Slices Two to Seven. On 27 April 1956, the Military Committee submitted a request to the North Atlantic Cotincil to make additional funds available for the financing of future infrastructure projects during the period 1957-59. The Military Committee recommended (22) the sum of L 325 million/ ' "Presented at a time of international detente during which many nations were making vigorous efforts to reduce their defense appropriations and were questioning the necessity of maintaining large conventional forces, the Military Committee request was the subject of long and difficult discussions by the Council. (19) C-M(53)18, 6 Mar 53, gives the budgetary control procedures as set up by the Council. (20) Logistic Policy and Guidance ACE, page 24 para 203 (f). (21) For a historical summary in graphic form, see the Infrastructure Data Book dtd 29 May 57. The publication "Facts about NATO" also gives the historical background to Slices I through VU.

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED (22) MC 32/6(Final), 27 Apr 56. (23) MC 32/9,: 18 Dec 56, para 10.

191 •••:/.•.... VV AHVI • NA TO -JJBSRET On 14 August 1956, the Council decided to authorize further infrastructure provision covering a four year period and with a financial ceiling of Li 225 million. This financial ceiling included a 10% contingency fund and also L 19 million to finance a portion of the 1956 program in Germany. This left a sum of L 183.5 million for the two Supreme Commanders since Channel Command saw no requirement for the period covered. The Standing Group apportioned the funds available for planning purposes as follows: SACEUR L 147 million; SACLANT L 36.5 million.^ Three days after the Council decision, SACEUR submitted his Eighth (25) Slice 1957 NATO Common Infrastructure Program/ ' The EighthSlice Program was discussed at a meeting between national military delegations and SHAPE logistic planners held at SHAPE during September 1956. The delegates were told that before the Council decision to provide funds for a four-year period, SHAPE had developed a L 211 million program for a three-year period, The Eighth Slice program then .recommended had to be planned on a much reduced figure of L 147 million, and so SHAPE had developed a program of L 80 million, leading L 67 million for the remaining (26) three years. As a result of this meeting with the national delegated, a revised Eighth

Slice Program was1 submitted to the Standing Group on 10 October 1956. The Standing Group, in turn, made a preliminary report to the Military Committee (27) on 15 November 1956/ '

The 1957 Infrastructure Program - SHAPE Recommended Eighth Slice Program. The total cost estimate of SACEUR's Eighth Slice Program, as submitted

(24) STAND 1603 dtd 3 Aug56. (25) AG 6100/8/E-355/LOG, 17 Aug 56.

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED (26) AG 6100/8/IP-2/56 PROG, 28 Sep 56. This contains a summary of the meeting, with an explanation of SHAPE'S thinking by Major General Besson, ACOS Programs. (27) SG 137/52, summarized in AG 6IOO/8/IP-I2/PROG, 17 Nov 56.

J9i » mmmmm, to the Military Committee, was L 78.635 million. Stringent screening had resulted in the deletion of L 200 million. Nevertheless, the Eighth Slice (together with SACLANT's program) accounted for approximately 51% of the funds authorized by the Council for the new four-year program.Jn accordance with Standing Group instructions, SHAPE had included in its proposals only those projects whose military necessity was fully justified and which were capable of rapid implementation in the light of the current political situation, construction and economic capacity of host nations, and the availability of (28) land, so that the backlog of approved projects would not be increased. The projects were considered to be consistent with current studies on the posture and strategy of NATO forces, and comprised primarily: a. The Forward Scatter System, already approved by the Council; b. An Integrated Early Warning System; c. The conversion of a number of tactical airfields already approved under previous slices, and the construction of new airfields; d. The provision of a number of airfields together with adequate support facilities for that part of the German Air Force which would be assigned to SACEUR during the period covered.

Financing the Forward Scatter System - Eighth Slice. The Council had approved the multilateral financing of the Forward Scatter System under "the most expeditious method of provision of NATO (29) funds as will permit the accomplishment of the system!'v The Council decided that the system should be included in the Eighth Slice. At a Council meeting held on 18 July 1956, approval had been given to the provision of approximately L 12.14 million. (There were certain reservations made; see C-R(56)40 dated 21 July 1956.) The Infrastructure Committee

(28) Standing Group instructions were contained in STAND 1603 dtd 3 Aug 56.

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED (29) MC 59(Revised Final) para 16d, dtd 16 Mar 56. IM« I-.-;. V — « -TAfT SHAPE 57/67 NATO «ECREX.

was Instructed to consider a request from SACEUR for L 600, 000 to be madd available to enable studies for detailed planning to start on the system at once

Early Warning Radar System - Advance Approval. The Infrastructure Committee recommended advance approval for the provision of the technical equipment needed for the 18 radar stations prograixl med tinder the Eighth Slice. The Committee had screened the relevant part of the program, and the total cost was estimated to be L 11.85 million. ^^ The Infrastructure Committee stated that advance approval to this portion of the program would enableSHAPE to go ahead with detailed planning and arrangements for the installation of the system. The Committee asked the Co\incil to give its formal approval to NATO common financing for the construction of the integrated early warning system as laid down in MC 61 (Final). The Council also was asked to agree that the costs of maintenance and operations of the Eighth Slice projects would be commonly financed, and that as other stations were incorporated into the scheme, common financing would be approved in proportion to the degree of NATO use/31 ^ At a Council meeting held on 9 January 1957, it was decided to approve the establishment of the Early Warning System as recommended in MC 61 (Final). After discussion, the Council agreed to approve the remainder of the Infrastructure Committee's proposals subjects to its two conditions stated in C-M(56)140: 1. That the expenditure of NATO funds for the early warning system's local utilities would not exceed the amount necessary to construct these utilities up to such standards, to be agreed upon, as were necessary to satisfy minimum military requirements.

(30) C-M(56)140, and appendix I showing detailed costs.

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ICS IU ÛJLLRLÎ 2. That in cases, in particular with respect to access roads, where host countries might derive an appreciable benefit from the utilities to be thus constructed, the host country would assume a reasonable share in the cost, which share would be determined before the construction was authorized by the Infrastructure Payments and Progress Committee. The Council also noted that the Infrastructure Committee would continue (32) to screen projects on a "case-by-case" basis.

The Tactical Airfields Problem - Eighth Slice. The projects recommended by SACEUR for the Eighth Slice Program included the following: a. Construction of four new tactical airfields in Germany; b. Conversion of six national airfields in Belgium, France and the Netherlands to meet the new squadron airfield criteria; c. Conversion of fifty-four tactical airfields approved under previous programs to meet the new NATO standards; d. Extension of runways at thirty-two airfield^>rogrammed in previous slices; e. Provision of wing facilities at three airfields in Germany; f. Addition of an auxiliary strip at five airfields in Denmark and Norway; g. Strengthening of pavement at six airfields in Denmark and Turkey. The total cost of these facilities was estimated to be L. 30.615 million. The above airfield program was based on the following main requirements: a. Support of air force units expected to be available to SACEUR at end 1958, or, in the case of German units, during the first half of 1959; b. Implementation of the previously approved dispersal policy by conversion of previously programmed airfields to the new standards, and by a

J limited expandion of the airfield complex in the Central Region; DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED (32) C-R(57)2 dated 11 January 1957,para 13. This documert approves C-M(56)140.

195

r-NATO ftU.t .OAH.'y- c. Extension of runways to exploit the full operational capabilities (33) of new types of aircraft/ ' In discussing the problem of airfield construction, the Military Com- mittee reported that "SACEUR states that with the airfields approved in the Seventh Slice, the Northern and Southern Regions vfll have more than attained the minimum airfield complex whilst the Central Region, even with the additional airfields recommended in the present program, will still be short of the minimum goal. SACEUR further states that in estimating his airfield requirements, he has also taken into account the broad conclusions of the study." (This referred to the 1960-62 study.) The report of the Military Com- mittee continued: "while the overall force requirements envisaged in that study have not been broken down to countries, the present program does not exceed the overall airfield requirements as might result from the conclusions of this broad study, specifically as regards the Central Region, where the greater reduction of piloted aircraft might take place." "In view of the difficulties anticipated by the German authorities in acquiring the necessary land for airfields and of the delays inherent in implementing a construction program of the size of the German program, SACEUR considers, and the Military Committee agrees, that all airfields required for use by the German Air Force through 30 June 1959 should be retained in the Eighth Slice in order to ensure that the airfields are completed in time. This is consistent with last year's policy which provided for German airfield requirements through 30 June 1958. On the assumption that this policy would be accepted again for the present program and on the basis of force availability data developed from the 1955 Annual Review, SACEUR had originally recommended seven additional airfields for primary use of the German Air Force. However, the German reply to the 1956 Annual Review Questionnaire revealed a slight slippage in the build-up of the German Air DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED (33) MC 60 (Final), 9 Jul 56, and SHAPE'S Study 230/56 AG 1223/2 PP, 28 Sep56. M m^mwrn-, 196

"NATO aflfaHAg— Force on the basis of this information and the number of already approved airfields, SACEUR has reduced the German Air Force requirements from seven to four. SACEUR's reason for excluding the Fourth Slice Frankfurt area airfield is that the host nation has not been able to make available a site and consequently it has been assumed that within the period under review, the airfield will not be available to meet the requirements of the presently planned German Air Force build-up. The Military Committee considers that as funds for the Frankfurt, airfield have been available for some time, there is no justification for programming another at this time. The Fourth Slice funds should be utilized either at Frankfurt or at some other location in order to meet the (34) requirement for a fourth airfield in 1959."

The Eighth Slice Infrastructure Program is Approved. The Military Committee considered that SACEUR's program was sound and that there was a sufficient degree of common usage or NATO interest for the projects put forward. The Committee recommended approval by the Coun- cil subject to the following considerations: a. That continuous screening would be carried out by the International Staff and Supreme Commanders with the aim of establishing the most effective methods of implementing the proposals. b. That, during this process, the agreed concepts determining the strategy and posture of NATO forces should be borne in mind. c. That should there be any significant changes to "presently estimated force build-up, such changes will be reflected by relevant amendments to .1(35) these programs."x The program was next taken under review by the Infrastructure Com- mittee from January until 29 March 1957. During this period, there was

(34) MC 32/9 (Final), 20 Dec 56. DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED (35) Idem. much discussion on the future infrastructure requirements of ACE And pos« 8ible reductions in the number of airfields under the new 1960-62 Posture, General Norstad had decided that there was an existing military requirement for all airfields programmed under Slice Seven and proposed for Slice Eighti (36) although there might be a downwards revision afterwards. The Infrastructure Committee recommended to the Council that approval be given to an ACE Eighth Slice Program totalling 1/85.8 million« In view of the uncertainty regarding future airfield requirements, however, the committee recommended that the Council should defer the financing of nine airfields totalling L 14.2 million. The Council accepted the recommendations of the Infrastructure Com« mittee and gave approval to the Eighth Slice Program of L 71.6 million on 12 April HS?/37*

The Ninth Slice Infrastructure Program. During the first half of 1957, SHAPE logistic planners developed a Ninth Slice of Infrastructure projects for the support of SACEUR's forces in 1958. Future requirements for airfields were extremely difficult to determine, The planned expansion of the German Air Force meant that airfields would have to be ready to receive the newly trained units, yet, at the same time, the adoption of SACEUR's new force posture would mean that fewer airfields would be needed in the future. The SHAPE Recommended Ninth Slice Program was sent to the Standing Group for screening on 2 July 1957. The estimated cost was L 33.6 million, but SHAPE requested a reserve sum of L 8 million which might possibly be needed for airfield construction work. This additional money would be needed only if savings from previous slices proved insufficient or in case the contins gency fund from Slices Two-Seven was not available. The total of L 41,6 million

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED (36) See Minutes COFSMtg w/ Div Chfs, dtd 13 Mar 57. (37) MC 32/9(Final Dec). See also Chart of the Recommended Program» Appendix A to C-M(57)48. mm ck: • . SHAPE 57/67 WATO SEGftET""'

for the Ninth Slice meant that with the Eighth Slice total added, only about L 34 million remained for the ACE Slices Ten and Eleven out of the original L 147 million provided by the North Atlantic Council/38^ A new data transmission system, which would be complementary to the early warning radar system, and another new project, a NIKE training installation, were included in the SHAPE program. Over a third of the total estimated cost was for airfield projects and these were primarily runway extent si on s and pavement repairs for the new types of aircraft. The SHAPE program was presented to national military delegates at a meeting held at SHAPE on 3-4 September 1957. The thinking behind current policy was explained and it was pointed out that the Ninth Slice was necessarily developed within the limits set by current strategic planning. The Minimum Forces Study was about to be published and the implications were that the c urrent infrastructure policy would have to be changed in order that support could be given to the forces of ACE equipped with missiles. A decision was awaited from the Council on the common funding of missile sites and this would take some time. The Ninth Slice program was, therefore, a program of con- soli dati on/39) As a result of the discussions held with the national military delegates, the Ninth Sliceprogram was slightly altered, and the total funding was increased to L 42 million. 1 The Program was sent to the Infrastructure Committee for screening on 25 October 1957 and remained under review by the committee until the end of the year. A preliminary review held during the last week in October 1957 showed the differences of opinion between the various nations over the question

(38) See "Red Book" - Ninth Slice Recommended Program, 2 Jul 57, AG 6100/IP-109/57 PROG. (39) See AG 6100/DP-149/57 PROG for a good summary of the position by Maj.Gen. Besson, ACOS PROG, SHAPE. DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED

199

./ .. I- iJ fL AL3 -NALO 'ODCFTST of future infrastructure support. Some committee delegates expressed the view that any funds for new weapons installations should come from presently approved funds, while other delegates expressed the viewpoint that special provisions should be made. The United Kingdom and France placed reservations on the Ninth Slice program as a whole. Several delegates thought that SHAPE'S recommendations would commit too large a proportion of the limited funds available and no room would be left for future requirements of a higher priority. The entire program was subjected to a very careful examination. ^^

The Infrastructure Committee was unable to reach a decision on the program as a whole, but it made a proposal that L 7 million should be earmarked for certain urgent airfield repair works. The funds for this accelerated,' program would be taken from the Tenth Slice. It will be remembered that SHAPE had requested L 8 million as a reserve fund for the same purpose, and it was stated that certain projects which might have been constructed from this reserve could be included in the new accelerated program proposed by the Infrastructure Committee. A further study of the whole problem of airfield (41) requirements would be made at SHAPE and further recommendations made/

Supplementary Ninth Slice Recommendations. SHAPE submitted a supplementary program for airfield projects totalling L 4.849 million. This additional construction, to be paid for out of the L 8 million réservé, was for runway extensions and repairs in Norway and Turkey. The Infrastructure Committee invited SHAPE to nominate any Ninth Slice items which required advance approval and funding. SHAPE replied that the supplementary program items came under this heading. An international

(40) SEO 2030 - Minutes of COFS Mtg held on 25 Oct 57, and PROG 6100/lP- 177/57 PROG dtd 30 Oct 57 - Briefing Folder for COFS's Conference.

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED (41) LOSTAN 2241, Message from SGREP to SG, 24 Oct 57.

200 SHAPE 57/67 -NATO SECRET

Staff /SHAPE team had recently reviewed the program for the conversion of Turkish airfields and the team considered that advance funding was necessary to complete minimum facilities to permit combat effectiveness. SfiAPE therefore requested Council approval for advance funding of these Turkish projects/*^ The Infrastructure Committee did not reach a decision on the Ninth £lice Program by 31 December 1957. At that time, the financial position was that only about L 22 million remained for the two year peziiod 1959-1960 if the Coiincil gave approval to the Ninth Slice and supplementary programs. The funding of missile sites and the other new projects required for the infrastructure support envisaged in the Minimum Forces Study was a problem to be solved in future discussions during 1958.

Progress in Construction of Airfields. The uncertainty of nations regarding the future requirements for infrastructure was reflected in the progress of airfield construction. The quarterly reports issued by Logistics Division for the second half of 1957 underlined (he difficulty that: "Overall construction and planning progress during this period has been unsatisfactory and is the lowest on record. The reason for this is presumed to be, first, the uncertainty with respect to amount and qpurce of funds, particularly airfield savings. Second, the effect of extensive deployment changes and the belief that others might be imminent. Third, uncertainty with respect to details of several airfields facilities, flight line tawker, arrest or gear, runway extensions and protection of facilities."

(é£) AG 6100/IP-189/57 PROG, 29 Nov 57 - SHAPE's Supplementary Program. NAC AC/4- A/229, dtd 29 Oct 1957 contained the Infrastructure Decision on Advance Funding. NAC AC/4-D/806 dtd 9 Oct 1957 contains the combined team's report. SHAPTO 1579 dtd 13 Dec 1957: SHAPE request for Advance Approval DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED to the Turkish Airfields.

201

TfftTQ—^MfiB SVlATC GÜXFi^EMTSÄL SHAPE 57/67 - NATO SECRET

Improvement was expected by the division, but there was further uncertainty (43) on the implications of the Minimum Force Study.

Future Infrastructure Provision. The North Atlantic Council had deferred approval for nine airfields until the future infrastructure requirements for Allied Command Europe were clearly established. SAÇEUR already had indicated that it would be possible tçi reduce the number of airfields, and this was confirmed when the MinimUm Forces Study was published. The introduction of missiles into Allied Command Ehirope would result in a reduction of about 30 in the number of airfields. About 20 of these could be cancelled outright. Although the rest would remain in the inventory, because of either deployment problems or advanced construction, the saving by cancellation would be cönsiderable. Although there would thus be a reduced reqiiirement for conventional airfields and therefore a reduced financial requirement, there would be a considerable amount of money needed for missile infrastructure. The Minimum Force Study showed that the estimated cost of the missile sites, less housing, (44) would be about LllO million/ The question of the funding of missile sites was the subject of a letter from General Schuyler to the Standing Group on 16 July 1957. The Chief of Staff referred to a staff study which had been undertaken at SHAPE to establish 3, basis on which the nations could agree to the common funding of the missile Sites. The SHAPE study first drew attention to the importance of the NIKE weapon as an integrated part of an equally integrated Air Defense System.

(43) LOG 2300.01/P&M-541/57, 11 Oct 57. LOG 2300.O1/P&M-22/58, 9 Jan 58.

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED ¢44) See Minimum Force Study - Section II para 8 & 9, SHAPE/154-1/57. MATÔ c0nrden11ail, 202

UATn ^iPtniH ^fcr "The NIKE, as presently planned by SHAPE to be employed In air defense in AlUed Command Europe, although not requiring a common usage facility, will be largely a common benefit weapon contributing to the over-all defense rather then to the defense of specific targets of national interest. As such, in line with the precedent established in the early warning radar project, it appears reasonable that the infrastructure for these NIKE sites, which will form a part of the integrated air defense system, should be internationally financed."

In the event that common funding was agreed, SHAPE auggested that international funds from current ceilings could be used initially, with the understanding that the borrowed funds would be replaced when the nations had agreed upon a funding formula covering the NIKE facilities. Under the FY I957 Military Assistance Program, the United States had already agreed to deliver NIKE equipment to some nations, during the latter part of 1958. SHAPE recommended that the North Atlantic Council should approve, at least in principle, the common funding of the NIKE sites. On 17 September 1957, SHAPE again raised the problem in a message to the Standing Group. "The need for decision on the eligibility of NIKE site infrastructure for common funding has now become increasingly pressing. Construction for NIKE sites appears to be the most likely item which could cause delay in the operational readiness dates of NIKE Battalions in the ACE Air Defense System." Several NATO NIKE Battalion units already had started their 16-month training period in the United States, and NIKE equipment was scheduled to arrive on completion of this training. It was estimated that negotiations for the necessary land acquisition and the completion of construction would take at least 24 months. The nations concerned had coordinated with SHAPE, and subordinate headquarters had finalized the locations of some of the NIKE Battalions. The countries with firm locations should, therefore, have been in a position DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED to make arrangements for the necessary site construction, but of course they were reluctant to do this without a Council decision on the common funding 45 of/ sites/( ) The Standing Group considered that justification for the common funding of missile sites could be madeonly if an approved overall Air Defense System was in operation. It was imperative that a premature approach should not be made to the Council. SHAPE pointed out that plans for an overall Air Defense System were already in existence together with an alternative proposal for the integration of existing national air defense systems into an Allied Air Defense System. Approval of either of these systems would take some time, and once again, SHAPE drew attention to the results of delay in approval for the common funding of NIKE sites. An additional factor was now apparent: If battalions were deployed on a purely national basis, it was unlikely that they would be re- deployed outside national territories, and therefore the whole concept of the (46) forward missile belt would be jeopardized. No decision was made by the North Atlantic Council on the common funding of missile sites before the end of 1957, but an early decision was expected in 1958 as a result of the Heads of Government Meeting held during December 1957. The final communique stated that "The NATO military authorities have been requested to submit/the Council at an early date their recommendations on the introduction of these weapons in the common defense. The Council in permanent session will consider the various questions involved."

The Tenth Slice Infrastructure Program. The Major Subordinate Commanders were given guidance by SHAPE on the policy to be adopted for the Tenth Slice Infrastructure Program. The limited funds that were available should be devoted to consolidate past programming, and SHAPE believed that the normal procedure for processing past programs DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED (45) SHAPE/143/57, Ltr from COFSto SG, 16 Jul 57. SH 38558, Msg from SHAPE to SG, 17 Sep 57. (46) SCO IN 8681, SGN to SHAPE, 4 Oct 57; SH 39125, SHAPE to SGN, 16 Oct 57. 204.. mm ^mmmmm •flflTO -• ODCHli^. was unnecessary in view of the small cost involved. It was suggested that a maximum of approximately LlO million be allocated for the period to De- cember 1958, and that this money should be devoted to the completion of projects. Should Council approval be given to the common funding of missile sites, SHAPE would recommend a separate program, probably called Slice

The Problem of Infrastructure Costs. A major problem that faced NATO logistic planners was the ever- increasing cost of infrastructure projects. The budgetary control procedures established by the North Atlantic Council placed the responsibility for insuring that approved cost ceilings were not exceeded on the military authorities. During 1957, steps were taken by SHAPE and the Standing Group to keep the cost of programmed projects within the overall Slice ceilings. A review of all projects in Slices Two through Eight was undertaken at SHAPE with the aim of verifying the continued military usefulness of each project in the light of realistic completion dates and the implications of the new force posture. The review established that the current cost estimates had risen considerably above the approved ceilings. Although complete figures were not available, by August 1957 the total of excess expenditure in Slices Four through Seven was L 45, 066, 000. ^8^

Projects Considered for Suspension. Although SHAPE had stated that there was still a military requirement for all programmed projects, the Standing Group requested SACEUR to prepare lists of items which might be suspended in order to reduce the level of excess expenditure. The first list was to total L 12 million and was to be based

(47) SH 39272, 23 Oct 57.

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED (48) The figure of L.45, 066, 000 did not take into acoount the Contingency Fund of L 26, 828, 000 or the uncommitted balance of Slices Two and Three. The total ceiling for Slices Two-Seven was L 703, 199,000. See STAND 2044, 6 Aug 57, from SGN to all MODs. Xos- . j "Tm to iH n n il 1 on the assumption that the Contingency Fund would be available for use in covering part of the excess figure. A second list was requested totalling L. 25 million based on the assumption that the Contingency Fund was not avai- I lable. Finally, a third list showing all projects on a slice-by-slice basis was requested, with all unstarted projects indicated so that the excess total of L.45 million would be covered. The Standing Group asked SACEUR to prepare the lists in inverse order of priority so that projects of a high military priority would not be considered for suspension until low priority projects (49) had beensuspended. SHAPE was requested to submit the first list as quickly as possible without consulting either the nations or the Major Subordinate Commanders. A "strongly worded expression of surprise and non-concurrence from MOD France" was received, however, and SHAPE suggested that in view of this reaction and possible reactions from other nations, the Standing Group should issue a statement explaining the purpose of the lists to all concerned/^) The statement was issued by the Standing Group to all MODs on 6 August 1957. After pointing out the reasons for the decision to place in suspense certain items of low military priority, it was emphasized that no project would be cancelled at this stage. Further, if the outcome of discussions that were still being carried on between the various agencies concerned produced decisions that were favorable to the military point of view, it would perhaps be possible later to lift the suspension from all projects which were still considered by the Supreme Commanders to be militarily essential. The statement ended: "The Standing Group is confident that nations will accept, in a spirit of mutual cooperation, the suspension of any projects in their countries which

may thus, bn the recommendation(51) s of the Supreme Commanders, be placed on the suspension lists."

(49) STAND 2026 and 2027, 9 Jul 57. DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED (50) SH 37633, SHAPE to SGN, 2 Aug 57. (51) STAND 2044, 6 Aug 57. mm m^mmmi 206

gNSCTcr— OECRJST On 16 August 1957, the Standing Group forwarded a list of projects recommended for suspension to its representative in Paris for onward transmission to the Controller of Infrastructure. This list totalled L 11.498 million, and was recommended "solely on the basis of military consideration and without considering the views of the nations in whose countries the pro- (52) jects are planned."

Interim Conclusions from 1958-1963 Posture Study. At this point, SHAPE informed the Standing Group that the study on the 1958-1963 posture was well advanced, and it was expected that interim conclusions could be drawn by the end of August. It was already apparent that the results of this study would almost completely alter the second list of projects for suspension, which was ready for submission. SHAPE felt that it would be premature to submit this second list until the results of the new study could be taken into account. The Standing Group was therefore asked for agreement to postpone submission of the second list until 31 August 1957. There would also have to be some alteration to the first list already submitted. The Standing Group agreed to this request and said that it would not be necessary to submit the second list until after the meeting to be held at SHAPE (53) on 3 September 1957/ '

Positions of Overruns. The meeting referred to was the annual meeting between the national military delegations and SHAPE to discuss infrastructure programs, in this case the Ninth Slice. At the meeting, Major General Besson referred to the recent cost ceiling decision in his opening address and stated that SHAPE was submitting its second list. The position of th^overruns was:

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED (52) STAND 2060, SGNto SGREP, 16 Aug 57. (53) STAND 2066, SGN to SHAPE, 22 Aug 57; SH 37904, SHAPE to SGN, 19 Aug 57.

207

^ÄTO SECRET mm CMFFDEIMMI NATO 3ECRET

1. OVERALL, (Slices 2 - 7) Li m

Contingency Fund available 12 Contingency Fund NOT available 37

2. SLICE BY, SLICE

Slices, 2 3 4a 4b 5 6 7 Total Overruns - - 15 4 7 415 45 (Lm)

On September 24, 1957, the Infrastructure Committee considered the first Iist. The UK representative stated that his authorities were disappointed with the list, and felt that the military authorities should provide a second list of suspensions, or extend the present list ot make up a total of at least Li 12 million. Other members of the Committee also expressed their disap- pointment, The Netherlands representative thought that the list had come ai an anti-climax and that more active steps would be needed to reconcile military requirements with available funds. He stated that his authorities would not agree to further expenditure on projects if it meant that program ceilings would continue to be exceeded. The Standing Group Representative reminded the Infrastructure Committee it that/had proposed, and the committee had accepted, certain preliminary steps to be taken prior to any modifications or cancellation of individual projects. SHAPE was preparing a revised first list totalling L 12 million which would be approved by SACEUR during the first few days of October. A second list (54) would be available fairly shortly afterwards. The SHAPE second list totalled L 20.4 million and it was explained that although the Standing Group had asked for a total of L 25 million, SHAPE had gone as far as it could without calling for more detailed information from the subordinate commanders. Three POL and ammunition storage projects DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED

(54) LOSTAN 2197, SGREP to SGN 26 Sep 57.

208 jtraTtprt ifECgTT" A'/;, ...... - .

and commands and nations had been asked to supply SHAPE with information (55) on the existing status of maritime airfields. A request was made by SHAPE that the Standing Group should release details of all proposed suspensions to the nations concerned. It was felt that it was most undesirable to let nations continue to work on projects which SHAPE would not be able to support through lack of funds.^^ The Standing Group replied that it still considered that details of the lists should not be disclosed to nations until it had processed them. SHAPE was requested to adhere to the original instructions from the Standing Group and submit further projects for suspension to bring the second list total to

Li 25 million. SHAPE selected additional items fro(57m) projects on tactical airfields and forwarded those to the Standing Group. ' The Standing Group then authorized suspension of projects from SHAPE'S second list totalling L 17.7 million. Further study was required on the remaining items, and discussions were to take place with SACEUR during December. Theposition by 30 November was that SHAPE had submitted two lists of projects recommended for suspension totalling L 37 million. The Standing Group, after processing these SHAPE lists, had sent a recommended list of projects for suspension totalling approximately L> 28 million to the Infra- structure Committee.

Implications of Minimum Force Study. By this time, however, it was apparent that the question of suspension of projects was becoming closely tied to the larger problem of the implications of the Minimum Force Study. In a message to the Standing Group, SHAPE referred to a request from the Military Budget Committee that a study be made on budget provisions for the years 1957-1960. The Military Budget Committee had not yet reached a decision on the magnitude of the ceiling for 1958, and DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED (55) SH 38826, 1 Oct- 57 - this message to the SG contains a full list of projects recommended for suspension. (56) SH 38838, 2 Oct 57, SHAPEto SGN. (57) STAND 2122, 8 Oct 57; STAND 2124, 10 Oct 57. (58) STAND 2210, 29 Nov 57, gives a complete summary of recommendations.

- ~MATO ,JECllJir . mvû CORCCKF'UEFJVJÄE L NA It)—=-,

among the proposals under discussion was one for a multi-annual ceiling covering the years 1958, 1959, and i960. SHAPE did not consider it advisable to impose this sort of ceiling. If requested, SHAPE could produce multi- annual planning estimates which might be of some value to member nations in foreseeing the approximate amount of their future contributions, and to assist them in their discussions concerning cost-sharing formulas. There would have to be, however, universal understanding of the limitations and uncertainties under which SHAPE estimates were developed. .In amplification of these views, SHAPE drew attention to the problems which had a financial implication as yet undetermined. The effect upon general communications requirements by the incorporation of guided missiles systems could not, for example, be estimated at that time. The military re-organization of the Central Region might have a financial implication. The future pattern of the Air Defense System was uncertain as to costs, and, in fact, future (59) developments as a whole might have undetermined financial implications/ The Standing Group agreed with SHAPE'S viewson the question of a multi- annual ceiling, and amplified the reasons put forward by SHAPE for non-concurrence with the proposal presented by the Military Budget Committee.^^

Problems of Budget Forecasting. Objections to amy ceiling were based on operational restrictions which would be imposed, and on the extreme difficulties in arriving at accurate budget requirements four years in advance. From the military point of view, the Standing Group considered it essential that safeguards should be made to prevent any financial ceiling interfering with acceptance of new concepts. In addition, rising costs could again prove to be a factor which might necessitate supplementary requests.

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED (59) SH 39183, 19 Oct 57. (60) STAND 2166, 29 Oct 57.

210 WO 60NRDENTÏAL NATO—9DCRCI, r T '•'>' ' * N. UUSlil ^Jr Vw,"Y''../7 rj j NATO SFiCRET --

At a meeting of the Military Budget Committee held on 30 and 31 October 1957, discussions took place on a draft report for the North Atlantic Council on the "Establishment of a Ceiling for International Budgets of NATO Military Headquarters." The Standing Group Representative suggested that a statement giving the views of the military authorities should be added to the draft report. This statement read: "The Military Authorities, whilst in favor of an annual ceiling, are opposed to a multi-annual ceiling because of the operational restrictions which such a ceiling would impose and the extreme difficulty of arriving at an accurate budget estimate for some years ahead."

After some discussion, it was decided to limit the draft report to the North Atlantic Council to a 1958 ceiling only, and from it the question of a multi-annual ceiling. The SHAPE and German representatives drew attention to the fact that the 1958 budget was far advanced, for the Ninth Slice Program, and that any question of applying a ceiling or target to the 1958 budget was too late. In a note sent to the Standing Group reporting the Military Budget Committee meeting, the Standing Group Representative said that the Committee seemed likely "to agree on approximately LlO million as the 1958 ceiling.^1) At a Chief of Staff's meeting with Division Chiefs on 7 November 1957, Admiral Ramsey, DACOS PANDP, summarized the position with regard to possible savings from cancellation of airfield projects. He recalled that SACEUR stated at a North Atlantic Council meeting on 22 October 1957 that although LllO million would be required for common funding of the surface- to-air missiles, at least L 50 million would be saved by cancellation of 20 airfield projects which were in excess of the requirements outlined in the Mini- mum Force Study. One hundred and sixty-nine airfields were required under the study's concepts, against a current programmed figure of 199. Of the DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED

211

-T1MTU ^SK^RST 1 ry T v• - - " ' ""-UVwL.,. „m, ,1 .. . JI

excess 30 airfields, approximately L 27 million could be saved by the cancellation of 19 airfields, 13 of which already had been recommended for cancellation. Little or no savings could be gained from the cancellation of the remaining 11 and they would be retained. In addition, SHAPE no longer had a requirement for six airfields submitted for inclusion in the Eighth Slice but which were withheld from inclusion by the Infrastructure Committee. There was also no further requirement for an additional 20 airfields programmed for the German Air Force in SHAPE'S 1958 Force Goals. A total saving from cancellation of these 26 unprogrammed airfields came to L 42.5 million. There would also be a saving of L 1.5 million on POL projects, giving an overall saving of L 71 million.

Major General Besson explained that the figure of L 50 million he had originally furnished the Supreme Commander was perhaps misleading. The total saving was actually L 71 million as shown in the Minimum Force Study, but of that total only about L 20 million had been programmed to date. It might be possible to save even more money by transferring some air units from Germany to airfields in Belgium and the Netherlands. These latter airfields (62) would have to be finished because of the advanced state of their construction. ' In a further message to the Standing Group on 7 November 1957, the Standing Group Representative asked for further guidance as a result of the decision by the Military Budget Committee to submit the draft report to the Council. The aim of the report was to fix the 1958 ceiling for all military budgets. The Committee considered that it was a Standing Group responsibility to make any necessary apportionment of this ceiling between the NATO Commands, and that it was assumed that the military authorities would not submit budgets totalling more than the ceiling. The Military Budget Committee, through its Working Party, recommended that the Council approve the ceiling of L 10 million. The French representative had made a reservation regarding DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED (62) SEC 2030: Minutes of Chief of Staff's Meeting dtd 7 Nov 57. '•Mm m&mmmL 212

"rNA1HJL^ .SJLUMiill f 63) the financing of new projects. The landing Group accepted the ceiling of L 10 million on the understanding that neither increases in price since 1 July 1957 nor increases in costs due to the devaluation of the French franc would be taken into account. It was also understood that the continuous provision of long-term projects, such as forward scatter, and the expenditure for new cnncepts, would not be included in the 1958 Budget.^

The Position at the End of 1957. The Heads of Government Meeting held in Paris during the period 16-19 December 1957 was primarily concerned with the broader aspects of NATO policy. The final communique did refer specifically to logistics, however, and called for better use of the resources of NATO by a greater degree of standardization and integration, particularly in the fields of logistic support and the composition and equipment of forces. Many decisions were awaited by logistic planners at SHAPE on such matters as the Ninth Slice Program, cost ceilings and the common funding of missile sites. It was hoped that these decisions would be taken as soon as possible in 1958.

(63) LOSTAN 2256 and 2261, 7 Nov 57, SGREP to SGN. DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED (64) STAND 2191, 13 Nov 57.

213

tMTn CEOnCT IMAT® mmüEmiM. SHAPE 57/67 NATe SECRET -

CHAPTER VIII

COMMUNICATIONS

Introduction. "During the last few years the NATO military organization has emerged from its initial planning period and devoted itself increasingly to its operational responsibilities. The new operational concepts, related to an all-out use of nuclear weapons on both sides, have resulted in an increased centralization of operational intelligence data at the highest level. The resultant control of operations demands an increased number of channels to disseminate this data to appropriate levels and the utmost rapidity of communications, where time is a prime factor. The success of planned operations will be affected greatly by the smooth and efficient running of communications in the early stages of alert or at the outbreak of war. Since the adoption of the operational concept of MC 48, there is an inherent increased demand upon communications."^ Although this document was concerned with one important aspect of the communications requirement for ACE, the cited extract pinpoints the overall problem facing those responsible for insuring that the forces of NATO were supported by the best available communications system. The introduction of nuclear weapons with their highly complex electronics systems, high performance aircraft and guided missiles reduced the time available for warning of attack, and made it necessary for SACEUR to be provided with uninterrupted high speed communication with all elements of his command. During General Norstad*s first year as Supreme Commander significant steps were taken to improve the ACE communications system. Implementation DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED (1) SGM-645-57, 4 Oct 57: "Present and Foreseeable Reqiiirements for Communications-Electronics Personnel." MÄTO COWRDIMML 214 NAtfO OEGirET WATO CG^-DEFTTAM SHAPE 57/67 NATO stnrp f-T

of the Forward Scatter System would provide rapid and reliable communications between the early warning radar stations and SHAPE. The phased plan to provide the early warning screen itself was implemented as far as was possible. Certain problems emerged as a result of the introduction of new commun! cation s equipment; perhaps the most urgent was a lack of personnel.

The Long-Range Early Warning System. The requirement for an integrated long range early warning system had been submitted to the Standing Group in November 1955, followed by a detailed plan for the implementation of the system forwarded six months later. The Military Representatives Committee of the NAC issued MC 61 ("The Requi- rement for an Integrated Early Warning System Covering the Approaches to ACE") in June 1956, and recommended that the Council approve SACEUR's requirement. The Military Representatives Committee also recommended multi-lateral financing by all NATO nations/2^

SHAPE Planning for the Early Warning System. An Ad Hoc Committee was formed at SHAPE to coordinate the various plans for implementation of the system. At the first meeting of this committee pn 20 September 1956, the hope was expressed by the Chief Signal Officer, CSeneral Garland, that the Council would soon approve MC 61, and thus allow SHAPE to go ahead with the complete plan. It was hoped to commence site construction and equipment procurement during February 1957, install the

Ltr, SHAPE to SGN, AG 3176 AD, 30 Nov 55; "The Requirement for an Integrated Early Warnirlg System." AG 3170/1 SIG/EL, 9 May 56, "A Plan for the Provision of an Early Warning System," ^C 61, June 1956.

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED For a useful description of the early planning see: AG 1880.5 SIC/FT, 10 Sep 57, pages 138-143. See also Annex I to this document.

215 equipment during 1958 and start operation of the system at the end of 1958. ' SHAPE had sent out specifications for the radar stations in May 1956, and in consonance with established procedure, included a project for the provision of 18 individual radar stations in the 1957 Eighth Slice Infrastruc- ture Program. Although the Council had not yet approved MC 61, the Infra- structure Committee recommended approval for the common financing of the whole E-W in December 1956. In addition, the committee recommended that advance approval be given to the E-W part of the Eighth Slice which the (4) committee had screened in advance of the rest of the Eighth Slice Program/ The Council was expected to approve the Infrastructure Committee's recommendations early in 1957, and on this basis, SHAPE sent out a proposed schedule for the delivery of technical equipment and a proposed manning guide to allMODs and MSCs. The technical specifications sent out in May 1956 were still valid, and SHAPE requested that nations coordinate their efforts in the selection of equipment, cost estimates, training programs and the establishment of operational and maintenance standards for the system (5) in conjunction with action taken by MSCs.x

(3) See Minutes of the' Ad Hoc Committee prepared by Lt.Col.Mathison, 4 Oct 56. (4) C-M(56)140, 11 Dec 56, InfrastructureCommitteeRecommendations. SHAPE Ltr AG 3170/l SIG/EL, 25 May 56, gives the proposed technical specifications for the radar posts. (5) AG 3170/1 SIC/EL, 12 Dec 56. This document was later to be the cause of considerable disagreement because of differing interpretations of paragraph 8, "The express purpose of the Long Range Early Warning System is to provide early warning of an air attack against or through Allied Command Europe. The system and its operation, therefore, has been designed to perform this function, although the inherent characteristics of radar equipment do permit the performances of other air defense duties. The performance of other air defense duties would entail an additional requirement for personnel." DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED 216

^NATtO 3ECRBT m

Council Approval of Early Warning Infrastructure. The NAC approved the establishment of the E-W System to be commonly financed on 9 January 1957, and also the advance funding of certain technical equipment costing L 11.85 million. General Norstad, in a message to all MODs on 24 January 1957, wrote "It is of the utmost importance to the security of NATO Europe that the Long Range Early Warning Screen should be completed at the earliest possible date. To this end, it is important to reduce as far as possible the inevitable lead time required for production and installation of the individual radars. I hope you will now feel able to expedite the implementation of the Long Range Early Warning Screen in your respective territories. In this respect it would be of great advantage and would greatly assist coordination of actions if SHAPE and Major Subordinate Command Signals Officers were to establish contacts at early dates with the departments or agencies in your Ministries of Defense which will be responsible for implerrenting the radar program, and to this end I should be grateful if you would furnish thenames and designations of the individuals concerned in order that direct liaison may be facilitated as soon as possible.

Problems of National Viewpoints Concerning Specifications. SHAPE has been forced to adjust the date for the commencement of contractual action by the nations from February to 1 5 April 1957 as a result of the delay caused by the time taken to process implementation procedures. A more serious delay seemed likely, however, when considerable disagreement with the technical specifications as proposed by SHAPE was expressed by France, the Netherlands and Italy. As a result of correspondence between SHAPE and the MODs of these three nations, a meeting was arranged at the Palais de Chaillot in an attempt to reach a solution to the differences of opinion. It was not possible to arrive at a solution, however, and it was

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED (6) SCO OUT 33423, 24 Jan 57: SACEUR to MODB; SCO OUT 33360, 22 Jan 57, SACEUR to MODs calling for estimates on costs of radar sites and

r associated facilities I.' ; -Jf--Xt "VM1:O I I agreed to refer the matter to the highest possible military level/ Representatives from the MODs of France, the Netherlands, Italy and Turkey were invited to attend a further meeting under the Chairmanship of General Schuyler held at SHAPE on 19 March 1957. During a re-statement of the SHAPE operational requirement for the E-W System, Air Vice Marshal McGregor, ACOS Air Defense, SHAPE, said"...since the requirement was written, technical progress offered the possibility of counting to even finer limits than those stated and if there was any question of varying the requirement there was good reason to tighten rather than relax it in this respect." The meeting continued with statements by each MOD representative, and at the conclusion, General Schuyler said that SACEUR would be advised of the (8) proceedings and he would decide what further action would be required. SACEUR decided that the operational requirement set out in the original SHAPE document of 30 November 1955 was "both well founded and feasible in the time scale." He did not consider that any broadening of the SHAPE requirement was desirable and directed that the "operational requirement as now stated therefore stands." It was hoped that the national authorities

(7) SIC/EL 3170.1 dated 23 Feb 57: Memorandum from Signal Division SHAPE to ACOS Air Defense: The main points of disagreement were: a. France and the Netherlands could not agree to the SHAPE requirement for 360 radar coverage at all stations; b. France, the Netherlands and Italy agreed in principle with the requirements in SHAPE's original recommendations of November 1955, but disagreed with SHAPE'S interpretation on the necessity to count as separate aircraft, two aircraft two nautical miles apart at maximum range in any direction in the horizontal plane. c. Frfuice and the Netherlands could not agree to any requirement being stated or implied for a fighter control capability at amy one of the E-W stations (note: Paragraph 8 of the 12 December SHAPE letter) this having been not specifically mentinned in either the original specifications or MC 61. (8) AG 3170/3176 AD, 11 Apr 57: Minutes of a meeting on the Operational Requirement for Long Range Early Warning Radars. DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED See also: 158 EMFA/TRANS/F/S, 31 Jan 57, giving the French views.

'"r iifcirrrnT would be able to proceed with the task of initiating contractual action to (9) procure the necessary equipment/ ' In a message to MODs concerned on 20 April 1957, SHAPE referred to the fact that delay was inevitable since agreement had not yet been reached on the operational requirements. As a result it was not possible to finalize the technical specifications, MODs were asked to prepare as far as was possible estimates suitable for the authorization of funds by the Payments and Progress Committee/*^

National Differences of Opinion Reconciled. Discussions took place at the highest level during the summer of 1957. SHAPE was able to finalize plans after a meeting of the Infrastructiire Com- mittee held on 10 September 1957.^11)

(9) AG 3150/3176 AD, 5 Apr 57: From COFSto all MODs, MSCs, etc. (10) SCO OUT 35457, 20 Apr 57. (11) See AC/4-A/222, dtd 10 Sep 57. Decisions sheet of a meeting held by Infrastructure Committee. It was apparent that the technical differences of opinion had been resolved and a compromise solution to the problem had been worked out. The Committee agreed "that interested delegations should at once take steps to obtain from appropriate firms in their home countries capable of supplying the necessary radar equipment, complete technical descriptions setting out in detail the performance and construction of the equipment which, in the opirion of the firms, would satisfy the NATO need for early warning purposes, together with an estimated delivery schedule. Subject to the qualifications below, the SHAPE operational requirement AG 3176 AD dated 30 November 1955 and the SHAPE technical specification AG 3170/1 SIG/EL dated 25 May 1956, should serve as an indication of desirable qualities of the equipment. The qualifications are as follows: a. the SHAPE operational requirements and technical specifications should not be regarded as mandatory; b. if higher performance can be offered this would be advantageous; c. in making his selection, SACEUR will leave to one side the question of fighter control;

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED d. the technical descriptions should be sent directly to the International Staff and SADTC ; e. the obtaining of these technical descriptions shouldnot, in any way, • ""H

• i v. y ' ^ - - .1,.. 219 SACEUR, in consultation with SADTC, was empowered to select the equipment which from a military point of view would satisfy NATO purposes.. The delay that had resulted from the unwillingness of certain nations to accept SHAPE'S standards for the operational requirements had forced SHAPE to considerably re-adjust the schedule for completion of the new early warning system radar screen. It was anticipated that radars and associated equipment (12) would be selected and contracted for in early 1958, almost one year late/ '

Situation at End-1957. By the end of 1957, Phase I of the original plan for Early Warning coverage of Allied Command Europe (using existing equipment), had progressed to the point where, except for certain places in the extreme North and other places in the Southern Region, the E-W System was operating on a 24-hour basis with radars providing a carer of approximately 120 nautical miles up to 30/40, 000 feet. In the UK and certain central areas, installation of modern radars had extended the range to 240 n.m. and over 60, 000 feet. The radar 1 information was processed through Regional Air Operations Centers to the SHAPE Operations Center, both of which were also operating on a round-the- clock basis. The gaps in the system were not expected to be filled until the implementation of Phase II. It was apparent that meagre communications facilities hampered the effectiveness of the Early Warning System, a situation which would be resolved when the Forward Scatter System was in operation/* ^

(11) ./... be regarded as a formal bid, and price will not be requested. f. the technical descriptions should be submitted as soon as possible but not later than 31 October 1957, after which date no further descriptions will be considered. (12) SHAPE/171/57, 15 Oct 57. (13) See SHAPE/171/57, 15 Oct 57: Report on Progress made towards implementing the requirements of MC 48/2. DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED

220

NATO SfiCll UT Radar Data Processing and Transmission. The establishment of an efficient Early Warning System incorporating modern radars and the Forward Scatter technique for communication purposes made necessary an equally efficient system to enable data derived from the radars and other detecting sources to be assembled in such a way as to permit rapid assessment of the overall air situation. In a letter addressed to all MODs and MSCs, SHAPE stated that a project of this nature was recommended for inclusion in the Ninth Slice (1958) Infrastructure Program. Outlining the draft operational requirement, the need for such a system was established. "To date, very little technical informstion on radar data processing and transmission systems has been made available to SHAPE. Under these conditions, it it difficult to prepare the necessary specifications for a system meeting the prescribed operational requirements. As automatic or semi-automatic handling techniques in air defense are a comparatively new field, it is also necessary to acquaint all NATO nations with these systems and the operational advantages which may be expected. Further, it is necessary to insure that the SHAPE Data Transmission System for early warning purposes be* compatible with any national systems which are now being conceived or planned for air defense purposes."

SHAPE suggested that a symposium should be held in order that an overall coordinated plan might be established. The symposium was held at SHAPE on 8-12 October 1957. Owing to the reluctance of nations to proceed with the Ninth Slice Infrastructure Program little further progress was made (14) during 1957 on the Data Processing and Transmission System/ '

(14) See AG 3170.17 SIC/EL, dtd 27 May 57, for the SHAPE letter to MODs and MSCs. The enclosure gives the technical description of the proposed system. SCO OUT 37275 dtd 16 Jul 57: Refers to a SHAPE letter AG 3170/3171.1 AD dtd 3 Jul to all MODs and MSCs. This letter gives the operational requi-

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED rement for the new system. The message calls for the symposium.

221 ..,. . -

-MATH -"MH-IfH {..T Electronic Countermeasures. The increasing use of electronic equipment throughout Allied Command Europe made necessary by the adoption of the Long Range Early Warning System increased the vulnerability of that equipment to electronic countermeasures. Recognizing the need for a NATO policy on this important aspect of warfare, the North Atlantic Council approved MC 64, "NATO Electronic Warfare Policy, " on 18 October 1958. This was a comprehensive document dealing with all aspects of electronic warfare. It assigned the task of coordination and control to the Standing Group, which was made responsible for the "formulation of the policy and doctrine for, and the overall coordination of, the employment of electronic warfare by NATO forces." Requirements by the Major Commanders for new equipment and the dissemination of information on the latest developments would be among the specific tasks of the Standing Group. SACEUR's responsibility was the planning and conduct of electronic warfare within his area of command, establishing the necessary organization within SHAPE and the development of policies and plans in accord with Standing Group directives.

The urgent need for a policy on Electronic Countermeasures resulted from the lack of a NATO policy and also because of restrictions on the release of information by various nations. Whilst the Soviet Union had undoubtedly increased its potential to wage an electronic war, the NATO capability was "very meager." As a result of the NAC decision, SHAPE planners developed a policy for ECM and issued guidance to all Subordinate Commands and MODs.

(14)./... AG 3170.8 SIC/EL dated 29 January 1958 gives a summary of the Data Processing and Transmission Symposium, and the enclosure gives all the presentations made in full. AG 6100/9/lP - 109/57 PROG dated 2 July 1957 - The SHAPE Recommen- ded 1958 Ninth Slice Infrastructure Program "Red Book" gives the details of the infrastructure requirements for the System. Also a summary of the military justification, the purpose of the system and a description DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED of the project. See Logistics Chapter for a description of the progress of the Ninth Slice.

^Vv v} ^VrV'." .V V, nr I - w i- w u.-; L j/ r In order that no time be lost in implementing the policy, SHAPE formed (15) a travelling team to discuss problems connected with ECM planning.

Communications-Electronics Personnel, Changing Operational Concepts. The wartime mission of Allied Com- mand Europe as laid down by MC 48 made necessary a state of readiness based on a peacetime capability. The Political Directive, issued in December 1956, emphasized the need to maintain and improve those measures which were vital to ensure a certain retaliatory effort. The effectiveness of this effort depended entirely upon reliable communications in support of alert measures and to provide essential early warning. The introduction into NATO of new communications systems, and the proposed introduction of other electronic systems - e.g. countermeasures, weapons system- increased the requirement for personnel to man these systems. In addition, electronic equipment became increasingly complex and called for more|highly skilled personnel. As the use of complex equipment increased so would the need for even greater numbers of highly trained personnel to install, operate and maintain the equipment.

The problem of communications personnel had become more accurate since the number of international headquarters within ACE had increased from 12 in 1952 to 22 in 1957. The various facilities planned and programmed under previous infrastructure slices were completed and were operating. Although it was possible to use a limited number of civilian personnel, the Uncertain status of civilians in an emergency made action necessary to increase the number of military personnel. Progress during 1957. A SHAPE study undertaken early in 1957 indicated tfc£t a substantial increase in the number of communications-electronics personnel was required "in the near future." This study didnot, however, consider the implications of the Minimum Force Study, at that time in preparation.

# V DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED (IS) MC 64 (Final), 18 Oct 56, NAC Approval. The SG was directed to review the polity in approximately one year's time in the light of experience. ^STSC 636/56, 2 Nov 56).

2*3 '' An increase in personnel during the three year period 1957-1960 amounting (16) to 2, 952 was estimated/ In a message to SACEUR, CINCNORTH stated: "It has been apparent for some time that the failure to acquire the necessary signals personnel for my headquarters support might result in denial to me of the equipment with which my essential requirements could be met..." CINCNORTH went on to express the view that only SACEUR's personal intervention could cut the inevitable delay in obtaining peacetime personnel sufficient to man essential circuits. "Present signal resources allow me not more than one telegraph

circuit to any authority in emergency not excluding (17SACEU) R and no certainty of maintaining even this capability beyond H-Hour." SACEUR explained that a study was being forwarded to the Standing Group shortly, and would contain only one specific request for additional

personnel, a request which woul(18d) satisfy CINCNORTH's additional C-E peacetime personnel requirements/ The Standing Group was- also asked to consider an additional SHAPE request for personnel needed for the Forward Scatter System. There was

an immediate requirement for 12 additional officers,(19 bu) t other personnel would be needed for a period of at least three years/ At the end of July, the Standing Group requested SHAPE to prepare and maintain an ACE Personnel Requirements Program (PRP) covering a five- year period. This would indicate the requirement for any increase required in signals personnel. An additional difficulty to an early solution to this (16) AG 3100 SIG/PT, 21 Mar 57. (17) SCO IN 2815, 24 May 57. (18) SCO OUT 36479, 6 Jun 57. (19) SCO OUT 36491, 6 Jun 57. This message outlines the responsibilities of SHAPE as the "host" for the construction of the FS System. It goes on to expand the special need for additional personnel, pointing out that it was not practicable to have officers on loan or utilize officers already

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED at SHAPE. The growth of Signal Division is also commented, on.

MTOiäli 224 problem of personnel was that SHAPE, and indeed the whole of ACE, was faced with an overall personnel reduction/2^ The Standing Group received the PRP on 17 October 1957, and submitted to the Council a special report on the signals personnel requirement (21) for ACE based on the PRP.v ' The Council discussed the Stamding Group report on 30 October 1957. The chairman stated that he did not feel that there was any direct action which the Coxincil could take, but he suggested that each Permanent Repre- sentative should refer the problem to his appropriate national authorities in order that action could be taken nationally to ensure that "the present shortage of this highly specialized type of personnel did not occur in future." The Netherlands representative suggested that it would be necessary to have a complete statement showing the present authorized strength of C-Epersonnel in NATO headquarters in peacetime, the current deficiencies showing national commitments, and similar figures for future NATO and national requirements. The SHAPE representative at this meeting pointed out that there was a future

NATO requirement of approximately 1600, and anything up to 15, 000 personne(22) l would be required by nations for installations on their own territories.

The Forward Scatter System. Prior to 1955, SHAPE operational plans had been based on the concept of a build-up of international tension accompanied by a build-up of opposing forces. The plans developed during 1955 made it clear that within Allied Command Europe success in the initial phase of operations was vital. The

(20) SGM-504-57, 31 Jul 57, is the request for the PRP. SGM-260-57, 17 Apr 57, is the request for an overall reduction. (21) The PRP is: AG 4030/4 PA dated 17 Oct 57. SGM-645-57 is the SGN report on "Present and Foreseeable Requirements for Communications-Electronic s Personnel."

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED (22) SCO IN 9726, 30 Oct: The Council document (a re-edited version of the SGN report) was C-M(57)128.

225

,v 1 • .yoMÖ • fru-.s/'') V^ ^ r --^1 • - I ' V1wP. * NATO SEgRET concept of a surprise attack with the minimum of warning was recognized, (23) and many of the existing plans were found to be inadequate/ One of the most important elements in the new concept was the possibility of obtaining as much warning as possible of an attack. A study was made at SHAPE to determine the adequacy of the ACE communications system as it existed in 1955. General Gruenther, SACEUR, submitted the results of this study to the Standing Group in December 1955. He wrote: "At the present time, our communications are a dangerously weak link. Much effort and money has been put into improving them and much progress has been made in that direction, but the limitations imposed by the techniques and the resources that have been available have denied us the security and the effectiveness that is so important. Our radio links are liable to jamming and our land lines are vulnerable to attack and sabotage to a high degree. Moreover, we depend on the connecting up and activating of a very large number of circuits in war which are not available to us in peace. This is a time-consuming process, dependent on the continued availability of national civilian manpower, and many of the important links in our land line chain are potential atomic targets. "(24) General Gruenther recommended the adoption of the Forward Scatter technique for the ACE signal communication system. Alreadyproved reliable in the air defense systems of Canada and the United States, the forward scatter technique involved the use of the troposphere and ionosphere respectively to reflect radio waves for long and short range signals. The advantages of the system were the high rate of reliability, freedom from jamming and economy in manpower and finance. The system would have to be militarily owned

(23) The series of MC 48 papers and the various SHAPE Capabilities Planning Documents show the change in operational planning. MC 48/l, Sep 55, CTS, was a basic document.

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED (24) AG 3100 SIG, 7 Dec 55: "The Requirement for a Reliable and Secure Allied Command Europe Signal Communications System." This document gives the signal situation as it existed in 1955.

226

"' ^ODORDTWMJ and operated, thus being permanently available. The engineering and installation of the system by a single contractor was recommended to insure uniformity. The financing of the system was recommended to be under "a (25) special provision of NATO funds. "v ' The recommended signal communication system was an integral part of an overall recommended Early Warning System. SACEUR had already recommended to the Standing Group the construction of a chain of radar stations covering the approaches to ACE in November 1955. It was the special purpose of the Forward Scatter System to enable the Early Warning procedure to operate quickly and efficiently by providing critical circuits carrying the early warning, the atomic strike plan and chain of command and alert. At a meeting of Ministers of the North Atlantic Council in Paris on 15 December 1955, General Gruenther made a presentation in which he emphasized the urgent need for the provision of a forward scatter system. He estimated that the introduction of the system into Allied Command Europe would cost some 15 million pounds, and suggested that it might well be financed by some sort of international project. The United States Secretary of Defense stated that his Government was anxious to see the project started as soon as possible, and to this end his Government would finance the establishment of certain initial links recommended by SACEUR. This offer was con- ditional upon arrangements between SHAPE and the nations themselves which would provide that the system which would be installed would remain permanently the property of SHAPE, and that the personnel required to operate and maintain the individual stations would be the continuing responsibility of SHAPE, utilizing Allied military personnel. The United States Government fully

(Y Dec bb) (25) See AG 3100 SIG,/ for a technical specification of the proposed system. (26) See AG 3176 AD, 30 Nov 55: "The requirement for an Integrated Early Warning System covering the approaches to Allied Command Europe." DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED

227

SlflGftgT

vD. fî^v'T: ^r--YWAPl i. uU Ù- \JJ O Vilify t, Ju '"expected that the remainder of the system would be financed by NATO on a multi-lateral basis after there had been an opportunity to study in full the

SHAPE proposals. The Military Committee approved General Gruenther 1S original recommendations on 1 6 March 1956 and submitted its own recommendations to the North Atlantic Council. The Council approved the proposal for the establishment of the forward scatter system on 11 May 1956, recommending multi- lateral financing. In order that an early start could be made on the project, the Council noted that special funding arrangements would be made, SACEUR (28) having included 15 million pounds in his infrastructure program. '

The Development of the Forward Scatter System. On 9 May 1957, a Press Release issued from SHAPE gave details of the new communications system for Allied Command Europe. "General Lauris Norstad, Supreme Allied Commander Europe, today announced that SHAPE had signed on 1 May a Letter of Intent for the engineering and installation of a revolutionary communications system for Allied Command Europe. This new, almost jamproof network will combine over the horizon tropospheric forward "scatter" and line of sight radio relay links to further integrate the communications facilities of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The Letter of Intent was issued to two firms - International Standard Electric Corporation of New York City and Hycon Eastern Incorporated of Cambridge, Massachussetts. The combined estimated contract cost for the services of these two companies is approximately L 3, 000, 000. The issuing of the Letter of Intent signed by SACEUR on 1 May 1957 to get the Scatter System into operation received the approval of the NATO

(27) See C-R(55)59, 15 Dec 55. (28) MC 59 (Revised Final), 16 Mar 56. This document, together with

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED MC 54 (which designated SACEUR as Air Defense coordinator) was incorporated in MC 61 dated 12 Sep 56 --an overall document approving the establishment of an Integrated Early Warning System.

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NATO-=^iEGiuay (29) Infrastructure Committee/ ' General Schuyler, in a letter to the Standing Group, pointed out that "the timely cooperation and assistance of the various NATO nations (in whose territory the forward scatter stations are projected) was of paramount importance. Undue delay in the allocation of suitable radio frequencies, provision of land, construction of buildings, etc., could readily result in increased costs. In essence, the success of the ACE Tropospheric Forward Scatter Communications System project will depend henceforth, in the greatest part, upon harmoniouV-cooperation amont the NATO nations directly concerned. SHAPE will do its utmost to achieve this cooperation. Organization. The forward scatter system was planned to cover the entire NATO area. The United States had agreed to finance certain links of the system. These links were: a. Project HOT LINE, tropospheric system of three links connecting OSLO-BODÔ. b. Project DOUBLE JUMP comprising two ionospheric links connecting PARIS-NAPLES-IZMIR. The SHAPE Air Defense Technical Center was responsible for implementation of these two projects, which were expected to be completed by 1 March 1958. The NATO funded portion of the system included: a. Project ACE HIGH which was the greater portion of the whole system.

(28)./... On 9 May 56, SHAPE sent a Plan for the Provision of an Early Warning System for Allied Commamd Europe, Phase II, to the Standing Group. This was the Phase for setting up new radar stations, and incorporated the forward scatter system for communications. See AG 3170/1 SIC/EL dated 9 May 56. Appendix III gives a plan of the proposed tropospheric and ionospheric links. (29) Press Release No 57-26, dtd 6 May 57, released on 9 May 57. (30) AG 3120.2 SIC/T dtd 6 May 57. Ltr of Intent is: AG 3120/2 SIG/to, DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED 1 May 57. This was approved for financing in the Eighth Slice Program, and was scheduled for completion by April i960. b. Project WINDUP which was the ionospheric link connecting the US- funded link from OSLO to PARIS. This system was expected to be completed 22 months after financial approval had been obtained by SHAPE. The structure of the communications system can be briefly described as follows: The ionospheric links connected up the main regional commands at Paris, Naples, Oslo and Izmir. Each ionospheric station needed ten military personnel. The tropospheric links connected the early warning stations with the joint operations centers and/or war headquarters. Each tropospheric station needed six military technicians. The total number of personnel needed was estimated at 246 actual operating personnel and 50 separate headquarters technicians. The military technicians would in general be from the host country. At SHAPE, a special forward scatter section was set up within Signal Division. The ionospheric links were set up to carry one voice and 16 teletype channels, whilst the tropospheric links were designed to carry 36 voice channels with two of these convertible to 24 teletype channels. The Responsibility of the Contractor. The Letter of Intent required the contractors to engineer the preliminary system designs; survey and recommend station sites; prepare radio frequency plans; perform propagation path tests; prepare equipment specifications; submit construction and installation criteria and general architectural plans; install equipment; test ground station operation; and prepare equipment and maintenance manuals. Procedure. The host nations were required to carry out their responsibilities in the construction of Êicilities according to specifications issued by SHAPE and according to a time phase worked out by the contractors in consultation with SHAPE. DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED Based upon equipment specifications provided by the contractor, SHAPE would procure equipment in conformity with the rples for international

230 mm GmmBsrmi competitive bidding as specifically modified for this project. In essence, this modification of the rules provided that certain critical items of equipment, such as 10-kilowatt amplifiers, receiver combiners and exciter modu- lators used in the tropospheric system, would be procured from limited competitive bidding among firms who had provided such equipment in operating systems. Further Development during 1957. Immediately upon issuance of the Letter of Intent, SHAPE undertook all other preliminary work that it was possible to accomplish prior to engaging an engineering and installation contractor, and thus signing a contract. By 1 June 1957, SHAPE had: a. . Undertaken, in conjunction with the host nations involved, a comprehensive preliminary site survey program, and recommended tentative sites that were already under the control of the respective nations. b. Presented tentative frequency requirements to the nations concerned through ERFA. Based upon replies from the nations, ERFA prepared a draft frequency plan for review by the engineering contractors. c. Prepared and distributed to the nations tentative plans for personnel (31) housing which would be required for the project. By 30 October 1957, the forward scatter project was still on schedule. The contractors had submitted their preliminary report on a design system, including alternate possibilities. A group of eminent scientists in the forward scatter field had been invited to review the design system. The propagation path test schedule was in progress, and test equipment had arrived for testing under actual operating conditions. The contractors were also working on the radio frequency plan, and preliminary arrangements had been made with host countries.

(31) See AG 1880.5 SIG/PT dated 10 Sep 57. DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED It was anticipated that, barring any unforeseen delays in equipment procurement, site acquisition and construction, the system would be completed by early 196o/32*

Note on the United States Funded Portion. By Mid-October 1957, the position on the tropospheric link connecting Oslo-Trondheim-Mosjben-Bod^ was: equipment had been installed at Oslo and Trondheim and final adjustment was under way. Construction at Mosjoen and Bod^ was nearing completion, and it was expected that equipment would be installed in December 1957. The majority of the preliminary work was accomplished on the Paris- Naples-Izmir scatter circuits to a point where it appeared that all installations would be completed by April 1958.. The majority of the equipment had been placed on procurement, sites had been acquired, and construction had started on the Paris site; construction was expected to start on the Izmir and Naples (33) sites within a short time.v '

(32) See SGEB 3100.24/2-57, dtd 16-17 Oct 57: Minutes of the 25th meeting of the SHAPE C-E Board. Presentation by Lt.Col. A. A. Kurz. DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED (33) See SGEB 3100.24/2-57.

MATO CONFIDENTIAL 232

-NA1I1U UDUUa^ CHAPTER IX

INTELLIGENCE

Introduction. Inherent in SACEUR's mission was the requirement that he be completely informed of enemy capabilities and of any developments which might lead to an attack on his command. This intelligence requirement was less than adequately fulfilled during 1957 for several well-founded reasons. The primary handicap under which SACEUR's intelligence program was carried out was the fact that he had no intelligence-gathering agencies of his own. He was entirely dependent on national staffs, certain national agencies and . on the Standing Group for his intelligence information.^

SACEUR's Peacetime Intelligence Requirements. Since SACEUR was dependent on the nations and on the Standing Group for his intelligence information, it was necessary that he inform them what intelligence he needed. Whether or not they would comply with his requests was another matter and, as was demonstrated, the response varied from nation to nation. On 8 August 1956, SACEUR had set forth his intelligence requirements during peacetime, sending these requirements to authorities of all NATO nations except Iceland. It was pointed out to these authorities that all planning in SHAPE at

(1) See Chapter I for other deficiencies in the system. No attempt will be made to set forth here the details of the Soviet threat as viewed by SHAPE and other intelligence agencies in 1957. For this information the following intelligence documents should be consulted; SG 161/IO(Final) SovietBloc

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED Strength and Capabilities; SHAPE Quarterly Intelligence Reports; SHAPE Fortnightly Intelligence Reports; SHAPE Basic IntelligencelGround Forces;

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NATO SEg&ay that time was geared to the concept of warfare enviiaged in MC 48, which assumed that the Soviets would, in any war, be the aggressor and would direct a significant part of their effort against Allied Command Europe; that they would attempt to attain complete surprise; and that nuclear weapons would be employed. While SACEUR made it clear that he was most interested in intelligence

information on forces which would be brought to bear against his Commandl he did not feel that the nations should withhold from him Information on other areas. Again, while he was primarily interested in military questions, it was also essential that he have pertinent political and economic intelligence information. SHAPE listed for the national authorities the essential intelligence requirements for drafting and implementing its defense plans. Further amplification of these requirements was contained in a list of indicators. uIt is emphasized, " the addressees were told, "that intelligence Divi- sion, SHAPE, not only lacks ready access to sources, but has limited research capability and is therefore completely dependent on finished and evaluated intelligence supplied by the national staffs, the Standing Group and certain national commands in Europe." SHAPE asked nations to sent by highest appropriate priority any reports having to do with indications of imminence of hostilities; cabled reports, if possible, on any significant intelligence which would lose value if delayed; a weekly cabled report containing a joint collated estimate of the imminence of hostilities; a weekly written report containing joint collated summaries of intelligence reports received during the preceding week which contained items of significance to SACEUR; periodic intelligence reports containing military, economic, political or social intelligence of significance to SACEUR; as well

.1,,. SACLANT's Soviet Naval Order of Battle; SHAPE Supplement to SACLANT1 o

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED Soviet Naval Order of Battle; SHAPE Basic Intelligence, Air; SHAPE Basic Intelligence, Logistics.

NATO ararmay as less frequent and more considered reports of intelligence value/ On 21 March 1957, SHAPE sent to the nations and to the MSCs a letter requesting them to consider the matter of SHAPE'S peacetime intelligence requirements in some detail. It appeared that certain modifications of these requirements should be made. SHAPE was primarily interested in assuring that the peacetime intelligence requirements be presented to the NATO nations, in such a way that they could be accomplished in the most efficient, complete, and yet simplified manner. SHAPE suggested various approaches as to format and asked MODs and the MSCs to send their comments.^

Throughout 1957, SHAPEintelligence officers continued to concern themselves with how best to state their peacetime intelligence requirements. The mission of the SHAPE intelligence organization was twofold: firstly, to determine if any potential enemy was preparing to attack NATO nations and force?, and if so, when, where and how; secondly, to describe to operational planners enemy capabilities and courses of action should the enemy decide to attack at a certain place and time. There was a great difference in these missions when applied to intelligence organization at different levels of command. For example, Intelligence Division at SHAPE possessed greater capability to accomplish the first mission than did intelligence agencies at the Army Group/ATAF level. Conversely, when dealing with the second mission, the lower the level of command, the more numerous were the details needed to determine the enemy capabiUties and courses of action. Since the Army Group/AT AF level of command depended on SHAPE for intelligence, SHAPE'S requirements from the nations Jiad to include that information needed to accomplish the first mission, and to support the subordinate units.

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED (2) SHAPE Intelligence Peacetime Requirements, AG 3505/1 ID, 8 Aug 56. (3) AG 3500/17.ID, 21 Mar 57, SHAPE Peacetime Intelligence Requirements. NATO In asking the nations to send intelligence data in peacetime, it was obvious that SHAPE must indicate, as effectively and simply as possible, the kind of information required and how that information should be sent. In this latter connection there were several ways of receiving information, such as: To receive all raw information, even if not significant; to receive raw information, only if it were significant; to receive periodic summaries of intelligence; to receive periodic estimates and studies; to receive extra e&timates and studies when required.

It was possible that a combination of these alternatives would give answer to SHAPE's problem. There was also the problem of format of the document which SHAPE had earlier asked nations to comment upon. It was apparent from answers received during early July that the nations were in favor of having one document with separate sections for Army, Navy, Air and War Potential intelligence containing, if possible, the requirements of all NATO commands. On 26 July 1957, SHAPE sent to the Standing Group a Study which concluded that there was a necessity for one document setting forth the peacetime intelligence requirements for Allied Command Europe. At the present time these intelligence requirements were stated not only by SHAPE but by the Standing Group and the other major NATO Commands. SHAPE intended to incorporate in its document the requirements of its own Major Subordinate Commands. In its letter to the Standing Group, SHAPE forwarded also certain recommendations with regard to soliciting intelligence information from the nations.^

The Wartime Requirements. A plan for carrying out intelligence activities in Allied Command Europe during wartime had been developed and presented to the nations in October 1955. Volume I of the plan, dealing mainly with operational matters, had been DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED

(4) Ltr AG 3500/17 ID, SACEUR's Peacetime Intelligence Requirements, 26 Jul 57. A new document, SACEUR's Peacetime Intelligence / agreed to by all the nations. Volume II of the plan, which established per- (5) sonnel requirements, had not, however, received full national agreement/ ' At the SHAPE Intelligence Planning Conference which was held from 20-23 May 1957, the Wartime Intelligence Plan was discussed in great detail by SHAPE officers, representatives of the MSCs and of the national staffs. As a result of these talks and recommendations, action was taken to amend the Wartime Intelligence Plan, and on 14 June, the Second Revision to the Plan was issued to the nations and MSCs.^ On 24 November 1956, SHAPE issued certain requirements for intelligence which would be applicable in wartime. These were accompanied by a directive which would be implemented at the outbreak of hostilities or prior thereto if directed by SACEUR. It was assumed that general war in Europe would take place in two phases. In Phase I there would be violent fighting for about 30 days, and during the first few days the intensity of nuclear exchange would be greatest. Phase II would be a period of reorganization, resupply and limited military operations leading to a conclusion of the war. These subsequent operations woxxld involve maitaining positive control of essential sea areas, securing all NATO territory and assisting in the nuclear domination of enemy territory. The directive which SHAPE now issued was applicable only to Phase I, when the primary aim of the intelligence effort must be directed to ensure that the Atomic Strike Plan did not fail. SACEUR's intelligence requirements during this phase would be limited to those questions directly related to SACEUR's Atomic Strike Plan and to overall conduct of land, sea and air

./... Requirements, was developed and distributed to SGN, SACLANT, MSCs and MODs, on 19 Dec 57, SHAPE 242/57/ 19 Dec 57. (5) Wartime Intelligence Plan, ACE, 13 Oct 55, AG 3505/2 ID. (6) For details of the discussions, see Encl. to Ltr, SHAPE Intelligence Planning Conference, 20-23 May 57, AG 2030/l0 ID. The amendment DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED was AG 3500/23 ID, 14 Jun 57. NATO SECRgZi

operations. Also covered at the Planning Conference in May were SHAPE requirements for Counter-intelligence. The document "SHAPE Counter Intelligence Requirements of NATO National Authorities" was fully discussed by a special Committee at the SHAPE Conference and subsequently revised. On 24 July 1957, SHAPE sent to the nations this revised statement of requirements, noting that they should be considered in conjunction with the SHAP Ë Counter- intelligence Plan as given in the Wartime Intelligence Plan, ACE, Second Revision. '

The Soviet Threat. The basic document from which SHAPE derived the greatest portion of its intelligence information on the Soviet threat was prepared each year by the Standing Group, assisted by the SHAPE Intelligence Division, and forwarded to SHAPE under the title SG 161 plus serial number. Regardless of its overall value for planning purposes, the document concerned only the capabilities of Soviet bloc nations and there was no basic guidance available to SACEUR on the capabilities of the so-called neutral nations and other areas in which he was vitally interested. A second limitation of this document had been the reluctance of the Standing Group to forecast Soviet bloc capabilities for more than a five-year period. SG 161/10, which was prepared in March 1957 covered only the period 1956-1961.^9^

(7) For details of these requirements see Ltr, "SHAPE Wartime Intelligence Requirements, AG 3505/7/1 ID, 24 Nov 56, with Enclosure and Appendix A and B. (8) Ltr, SHAPE Counter-intelligence Planning, 24 Jul 57, AG 3570/1 ID. (9) See the Improvement of Intelligence Systems within NATO, 13 Dec 56, Tab B. See also SG 161/9 and SG 161/10 for details of Soviet capabilities during 1957. DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED

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Examination of ACE Intelligence System. SACEUR was vitally interested in the events which took place in the USSR, the Satellites and the Middle East during the period 19 October 1956 to 20 November 1956. His interest was not matched by a concomitant flow of intelligence information from the nations on the threatening developments then taking place. In fact, the Intelligence agencies at SHAPE were almost entirely dependent on the press and radio reports in order to keep SACE\JR, key SHAPE officers and MSCs informed. SACEUR had no way to judge the validity of these reports. For example, during the developments in Poland and Hungary in October, newspaper and radio reports told of the massing of Soviet troops on the Polish border. This fact, if true, would have had a decided effect on SACEUR's plans and actions. However, SACEUR had no means of verifying this report and it was several days before intelligence reports from some of the nations reached SHAPE on this situation.^^

During this period of intense political and military activity, SHAPE received a total of 118 intelligence signals from the NATO nations. This support varied greatly from nation to nation; some nations sent only one report whilst others sent in twenty-five of thirty. SHAPE believed that part of this poor showing Btemmed from a feeling among some NATO nations that the Middle East was outside SACEUR's area of responsibility. Nevertheless, events in the Middle East, and especially Soviet reaction to those events could have serious implications and greatly influence SACEUR's plans and decisions.^* SACEUR sent messages to each nation calling attention to the inadequate intelligence support he was receiving in this period, and directed the preparation of a detailed study on intelligence problems with the specific purpose of improving within NATO methods of determining enemy capabilities and, if possible, intentions, and the capability of obtaining advanced warning of hostilities. DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED (10) Staff Study, The Improvement of Intelligence Systems within NATO, Tab B. (11) Memo, Intelligence Support from NATO natioap, 1 Dec 56. The SHAPE intelligence staff arrived at a number of firm conclusions. It believed that, if SACEUR were to have an estimate of enemy capabilities and possible intentions for the period 1960-62, the Standing Group would have to include this period in its next document on the Soviet threat, (SG 16l/l0), which would be prepared in early 1957.

The Intelligence Staff also believed that if SACEUR were to have advance warning of impending enemy attacks, the Standing Group must have a study aimed at increasing the intelligence which nations would consider passing on to SHAPE. This study would include the improvement of security systems and other measures to which SHAPE would have to conform in order to give the nations confidence in SHAPE, thus increasing the flow of intelligence. On 13 December, SHAPE prepared the study which recommended that each NATO nation devote the maximum possible effort to the improvement of clandestine intelligence collection and other sensitive intelligence collection programs aimed at obtaining advance warning of attack. They should see that their national programs took into account SACEUR's peactime intelligence requirements and assign intelligence officers to specialize in SHAPE requirements. The time necessary to get this intelligence to SACEUR would have to be reduced to a minimum, particularly when this intelligence might relay the advance warning of attack. Even fragmentary and unevaluated reports should be sent. To speed this information, nations should provide the necessary telecommunications service. ^^

On 14 February 1957, SACEUR sent a letter to all NATO Ministers of Defence (except Iceland's) in which he stated: "During the recent period of tension involving Poland, Hungary and the Middle East, you will recall that I pointed out my dependence on your National Staffs for full and timely intelligence. Our experiences during the tension indicate the urgency of certain improvements in the intelligence systems within Allied Command Europe.

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED (12) Staff Study, The Improvement of Intelligence Systems within NATO, Tab C, 13 Dec 56. A study of the problem resulted in several pertinent conclusions which are forwarded herewith, and I urge that your most earnest and favorable (13) consideration be accorded them.'"

Exploitation of Early Warning Systems for Intelligence Purposes. The primary role of the ACE Early Warning System was to detect, at the earliest possible moment, the development of an enemy air attack, approa- - ching the NATO frontier. Subject to the limitations of the horizon effect, this attack could be detected up to a distance of 220 nautical miles at an altitude of 75, 000 feet. The integrated Early Warning System, using long range radars, was expected to become operational in 1959. The radar equipment to be used in this system would be capable also of collecting intelligence information. Specifically this equipment could give intelligence on the performance characteristics of enemy aircraft, operational flying procedures, scale of flying activity, electronic jamming techniques, and other information which would assist in determining the enemy's forward air capabilities on a continuing basis, and might give indication of intent to attack. On 18 July 1957, SACEUR sent to the nations and to the Major Subor- dinate Commanders a list of intelligence items for which early warning radars might contribute information, and urged the use of national equipment and facilities in advance of 1959. SACEUR believed it was an Air Defense responsibility to collect and collate raw radar information and take appropriate action, but that it was an Intelligence responsibility to interpret, assess and process such radar data in conjunction with other data. He recommended that information derived from the Early Warning System should be made available to Intelligence personnel at levels down to Sector Operations Centers I (SOC) for evaluation and transmission through intelligence channels to higher

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(13) AG 3500/36 ID, 14 Feb 57, The Improvement of Intelligence Systems.

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Although at the present time the Center SOCs were national, Allied early warning elements and air defense staffs had been set up on a temporary basis. Intelligence and Air Defense members of this headquarters had met and had concluded that, through suitable coordination, available intelligence might be extracted from Early Warning Radars even before the Early Warning System became an Allied responsibility, SHAPE asked the nations to consider how their national agencies should be linked up with the Early Warning System to support the Intelligence gathering capability, and to consider other technical aspects of this problem. The (14) Major Subordinate Commanders were also asked to send their views/

(14) AG 3170 ID, 18 Jul 57, "Exploitation of Early^Warning Systems for Intelligence Purposes." DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED

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CHAPTER X

AIR DEFENSE

Introduction. The lack of a coordinated air defense for Eastern Europe had been a problem since the inception of SHAPE. General Ridgway concerned himself with the problem in 1952. General Gruenther continued to try to find a workable solution. In 1954, a study on air defense was completed at SHAPE and forwarded to the SGN. Based on the work of early planners and using plans developed by such officers as Air Marshal Sir Basil Embry, the SHAPE plan contained recommendations which could give Allied Command Europe a coordinated air defense system/^

The basic problem was that each nation was responsible for its own air defense. Each nation provided the aircraft and the weapons which would be deployed in accordance with a plan prepared by that nation. Whilst NATO nations worked together under coordinated plans in other spheres of defense, in the field of air each nation retained full sovereignty. A major step towards a coordinated air defense was taken in December 1955 with the approval by the NAC of the Military Committee's recommendations contained in MC 54, "Air Defense Command and Control in NATO Europe." Essentially, MC 54 which contained recommendations made by SHAPE, named SACEUR as coordinator of the air defense of NATO Europe and charged him with the responsibility for development of an appropriate system for the coordination of air defense capabilities and efforts, in consultation and agreement (Z) with the appropriate national authorities/

(1) The 1954 study was SHAPE 626/54, 23 Oct 54. Air Marshal Embry's

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED contribution is contained in AAFCE 717/53, An Examination into Certain Aspects of Tactical Air Force Doctrine as applied to Central European Defense. (2) MC 54(Final), 12 Dec 55. The Council approved para 7 on 15 Dec 55, this being the rec ammendations of the Military Committee (C-R(55)59). WA"

An integral part of any air defense system was an adequate early warning system. To enable SACEUR to develop his air defense system, in June 1956, the Military Committee approved MC 61, "The Requirement for an Integrated Early Warning System Covering the Approaches to ACE, " and recommended that the NAC approve the establishment of an early warning system to be commonly financed. An integrated commonly financed communications system, linking the early warning stations and using the Forward Scatter technique, was also approved by the Military Committee during 1956.

By November 1956r when General Norstad assumed command of the forces of ACE, plans for coordinated air defense could be developed in the knowledge that an adequate and efficient early warning system with an equally efficient communications network would be set up on an integrated NATO 3 basisu - . ( )'

SHAPE Studies the Problem. Early in 1957 the SHAPE Air Defense Division was involved in the preparation of three studies concerned with the overall problem of implementing SACEUR's responsibilities as stated in MC 54. These studies were regional plans covering Allied Command Europe and were forecasts of the type of air Defense envisaged at varying future periods. The first of these SHAPE studies was along-term conception of air defense requirements in 1965. While the long-term study was in progress, an Interim report was prepared which could be used for the closer coordination of air defenses in the immediate future. This plan was designed to provide a logical transition from current posture to a more fully coordinated system, using those forces and facilities expected to be available in the time period under consideration.

(3) MC 61, 21 Jun 56: Military Committee approval for the E-W System. MC 59, 16 Mar 56: NAC Approval for the Forward Scatter System. See

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On 7 June 1957, copies of this plan, entitled "Draft Plan for Coordi- nation of Air Defense of NATO Europe in the i960 Period, " were sent to the Major Subordinate Commanders and to the nations concerned. They were asked to send their comments to SHAPE within a month. It was emphasized that this plan represented only SHAPE'S preliminary opinions and (4) might be modified as a result of the comments. ' The third study prepared by Air Defense Division was the 1960/62 Study which later was incorporated into the Minimum Force Study as Annex D in Volume 2. This was, in effect, a final statement of the SHAPE concept of thinking on air defense in 1957. It established the level of forces which would be needed to accomplish the NATO air defense strategy between 1958 and 1963. It was freely admitted that an enemy air attack launched in strength could not be wholly stopped, Therefore, SHAPE proposed a limited air defense sufficient to assist in deterring general war, but not so expensive that it coxild not be maintained by the nations. It was believed that the main Soviet air threat in this period would be composed of great quantities of modern, fast aircraft. It was conceded, however, that the enemy would have stocks of ballistic missiles.

The three major components which would make up the air defens(5) e system were early warning, active air defense, and passive air defense. ' It was realized that the surface-to-air missiles, with their rapid reaction capability and rates of fire, represented the best potential weapon against air attack. SHAPE recommended that fliese missiles be introduced into NATO's air defense system as rapidly as possible. Nevertheless, there

(4) For full details of this plan, see SHAPE/AD/h/57 and also SHAPE/l30/57 dated 7 Jun 57. A complete breakdown of the early warning system expected to exist by i960, early warning stations, the force goals by nation, and particularly the requirements for surface-to-air missiles, was set forth in this plan. DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED (5) See Communications Chapter for description of early warning system approved by MC 61. r,were compelling reasons, for retaining manned interceptor aircraft. The SHAPE concept of a forward missile interceptor zone was set forth with emphasis for the Central Region. SHAPE still held that SAM units should be deployed initially to form a forward missile interceptor zone close to the Iron Curtain- and on the flanks. It was felt that if this forward zone continued to operate even at a diminishing rate during the first 48 hours of a general war, it would pay for itself many times over. By use of this zone, air defense control problems could be reduced to a minimum, and the forward missile zone was capable of being lengthened and strengthened without adverse effects on other systems. The zone could not be established by any one nation and all nations would have to contribute to its establishment and operation. One of the principles of command and control was that the air defense battle should be conducted at the lowest level of command possible. This system should be fully organized and operational in peacetime, and the responsibility and procedures should not be changed in the transition to war. There was a vital need for semi-automatic data processing, handling and transmission equipment to take care of extremely dense air raids in the Central Region, and to a lesser extent on the flanks. The problem of identification of aircraft demanded a secure electronic identification system which would provide signals from all friendly aircraft instantly and directly, on control scopes of the air defense radars and on weapon control consoles. An effective electronic ground-control environment for air defense would cost about one-fourth of the associated weapons systems. The SHAPE study concluded that there should be modernization of the system, (6) considering all factors -money, manpower and resources. The concept of air defense contained in Annex D of the Minimum Force

(6) See ACE Minimum Force Study 1958-63, Volume II, Annex D. The Scientific Advisor to SACEUR issued a statement on Air Defense

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primarily to protect the retaliatory forces, but at the same time to protect NATO communities and cover the Shield Forces. While some progress had been made in the air defense posture of ACE, it was evident that further improvement would have to be based on a graduated evolution of air defense units into an integrated system for peace and war. The air defense forces shown in the Minimum Force Study were not based on plans for a fully integrated NATO European Air Defense System, although such

a system was under development. The air defense forceB shown in the Minimum Force Study were based on the assumption that the threat against Europe up (7) to 1963 would be primarily from manned aircraft.

Plan for the Integration of Air Defense. Following the various SHAPE/Staff studies, SACEUR was prepared to submit a plan for the initiation of actions leading to an integrated air defense of NATO Europe. In addition, the requirements of the Minimum Force Study enabled SACEUR to base his plan on those forces expected to be made available to him. In a letter to the Standing Group on 6 December 1957, subject: "Inte- gration of the Air Defense of NATO Europe, " SACEUR pointed to the fact that in MC 54 he had been designated as the "Coordinator of Air Defense for NATO Europe" and in order to enable him to discharge this function, SHAPE had been working in close contact with national authorities to increase the efficiency of existing air defense facilities. "Whilst some progress has been made, especially in planning, it has become more evident that real improvement in air defense depends not on patchwork measures to'harness separate endeavors, but rather on shaping a gradual evolution from the purely national air defense organizations which now exist into an integrated Allied Air Defense

(7) SGN-779-57 (Revised), 9 Dec 57, Memofor SACEUR, "Progress Report on Minimum Essential Force Requirements MC 70." DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED

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system. It is clear that the time has now arrived when action to this end must be taken if the present limited effectiveness of air defense is to be improved." SACEUR then drew attention to existing deficiencies. "Under present arrangements, air defense in peacetime is a national responsibility, and becomes an Allied responsibility, limited to the combat zones, only on the outbreak of hostilities. Our studies have shown that in a future war, the need for air defense would be at its absolute maximum during the first few hours. A change of operational control from national to Allied in time of emergency would, to say the least, almost certainly result in chaos at the time of maximum need. The existing pattern of separate peacetime national command and control networks is inefficient and militarily unsound, and if perpetuated, would not only continue to reduce our over-all effectiveness, but would aggravate the difficulties of operating under war conditions. It would be delusive to think that these separate systems could be instantane- ously fused into one homogeneous system on the outbreak of war. Experience shows that such a system to be effective in war must be in operation in peace. We must assume that the conditions of nuclear and missile warfare will make this even more true in the future.

"There are two special conditions which at this time urge early action. First, we are confronted with the problem of introducing surface-to-air missiles. Our studies strongly suggest that these missiles must be organized on an international rather than a national basis and be deployed for common defense rather than the defense of national targets. Second, the build-up of German air defense forces adds emphasis to the need for action now to establish the framework within which these forces can develop with maximum efficiency and economy. "There are, very understandably, matters of national concern which

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED must be fully considered and respected when determining how best to deal with the problem. These interests may in general be met by the establishment of

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certain principles on which we should base our future organization. These I suggest are as follows: a. Air Defense units will not be used for other tasks without national approval. b. National forces will, in general, bé deployed in national territories unless exceptions to meet over-all requirements receive national approval. c. The composition of Allied staffs should be broadly in proportion to the forces contributed to each Allied Command. d. Control and Reporting centers and stations will be manned primarily by the nation in whose territory they are located, unless unusual circumstances demand otherwise. As an example, the Control and Reporting System in Germany will probably require some manning by nations other than Germany for some years to come. e. Air Defense plans prepared by SHAPE for the Allied Air Defense Area will be coordinated by direct liaison with individual nations, and when finalized will be submitted through the Standing Group to the Military Committee. "Air Defense, to be effective, must be capable of reacting promptly and must have a minimum number of levels of control. It is clear that any Allied Air Defense System must be based on the maximum reasonable decen- tralization of operational control to appropriate regional authorities and commands. On the other hand, centralized coordination is essential to weld - them into a unified whole. It is the SHAPE view that, in the interests of both effectiveness and economy, an integrated Allied defense organization should utilize the existing Allied Regional Headquarters and appropriate national headquarters organizations wherever possible." An integrated Allied Air Defense System for the Center presented the . most urgent problem. SACEUR suggested that while the Center Region was the most important, there would be good reason for extending whatever solution was adopted to all other areas of NATO Europe, and further suggested a DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED method of phasing to accomplish this.

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SACEUR recommended that NATO authorities agree in principle to the concept of an integrated air defense system to operate under Allied control in peace as well as in war. He also asked for authorization to develop, for approval, an organizational concept and a corresponding Command and Con- /g\ trol System in concert with appropriate national authorities. *

The Forward Missile Interceptor Zone. As a resvilt of the various studies made at SHAPE, a requirement for surface-to-air missiles as a means for the interception of enemy aircraft was established. These SAMS would be used initially to set up a forward missile zone and would be introduced on a carefully planned basis as soon as possible. As it was anticipated that there would be an extremely short period of tactical warning, it was considered that the SAM units should be placed forward to form the forward missile zone close to the Iron Curtain, (9) with manned aircraft support behind and on the flanks/ ' In July I957 General Norstad recommended that the Standing Group press the NAC to approve in principle the common funding for infrastructure for the NIKE sites which would form a part of the integrated air defense system for Allied Command Europe. He further asked that, in the interim, immediate requirements for SAMS be paid for by advancing funds remaining within the NATO common infrastructure four-year ceiling. In its reply, the Standing Group told General Norstad that the approval of common funding for these SAM missiles sites should be backed up with an approved plan for the air defense of NATO Europe. After talking further (8) AG 1250 AO dated 6 Dec 57: "Actions leading towards the Integration of the Air Defense of NATO Europe, " SACEUR to SGN. (9) See: SHAPE/168/57 dtd 10 Sep 57. This is a detailed study of the concept of air defense as it developed. See also following letters: DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED AG 6440 AD, dtd 2 Aug 57, ACOS Air Defense SHAPE to CINC EUCOM, "Presentation of NIKE Problem Areas to SHAPE." AG 6440 AD dtd 5 Aug 57, ACOS Al; Defense SHAPE to Subordinate Commanders, "NIKE Program Areas."

250 JiMATf) «îPfT^i'fïrù« SHAPE 57/67 JuulL1 '•

with General Norstad, however, the Standing Group changed its point of view «lightly .and agreed that the operational flexibility which the infrastructure funding of surface-to-air units would give to SACSUR in employing these units on an extra-national basis bas highly desirable. Alko it was expected that during 1958 or 1959 about 17 SAM units would arrive in Europe. Facilities to support these units would have to be provided as a matter of urgency. It was estimated that it would take at least nine months from the beginning of construction to have these facilities ready for the unite. On the last day of December 1957, the Standing Groiqt reported to SACEUR that it supported him; it had recommended to the North Atlantic Council that funds from common infrastructure funds be provided as an interim measure for the first 17 surface-to-air NIKE units, and that units should be sited in accordance with SACEUR's Air Defense Plan. General Norstad had estimated that the cost of facilities, for these 17 units, would amount to approximately L17,000,000.^°^

(Note: The Air Defense of Germany. Following the issuance of SHAPE policy regarding the build-up and integration of the German Air Force in June 1956, COMAIRCENT was given the responsibility for implementation of that policy. A detailed summary of the various discussions that took place during 1957, and the progress achieved, can be found in the AIRCENT History for 1956-57 --AIR- . CENT 65/58, pages 21-28 and 59-64. Other useful documents are: . AD SHAPE Ltr, AG 1250/8 AD, 30 Jun 56; SHAPE Ltr, AG 1250/8, 2 Oct 56; * SHAPE Ltr, AG 1250/8 AD, 17 Nov 56; SHAPE Ltrf AG 0905.24 OT, 21 Jan 57; AIRCENT Ltr, AIRCENT-PLD-1100/276, 28 Jan 57} SHAPE Ltr, AG 1250/8 AD, 26 Mar 57.)

(10) SGN-821-57, Memo for SACEUR: "Funding o£ Surface-to- Air Missile, Sites in ACE, 31 Dec 57.

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED SHAPE/143/57, 16 Jul 57; STAND 2117, 4 Oct 57. See also Logistics chapter for Infrastructure problems. APPENDIX A Chapter I SHAPE History 1957

KEY OFFICERS at SHAPE - 1957

COMMAND ECHELON

SACEUR General Lauris NORSTAD « Deputy SACEUR Field Marshal Montgomery of Alamein Naval Deputy Admiral A. L. M. Sala Air Deputy Post unoccupied during period Chief of Staff General C. V. R. S. Schuyler Deputy Chief of Staff, Lt.General Pierre S. Brisac (until 4 Apr 57) Logistics & Administration Lt.General Andre Demetz (from 4 Apr 57) Deputy Chief of Staff, Air Marshal Hugh A. Constantine Plans & Policy Deputy Chief of Staff, Air Marshal Hugh Campbell (until 27 Aug 57) Operations (Post not filled from 27 Aug 57 to end of period).

DIVISION CHIEFS Adjutant General Brigadier General William H. Harris Air Defense Division Air Vice Marshal C. G. Lott (until 8 Mar 57) Air Vice Marshal H. D. McGregor (from 8 Mar 57) Air & Special Operations Major General Charles H. Anderson Division Budget and Finance Division Mr. G. C. Le Bigot Intelligence Division Brigadier General John Schweitzer Logistics Division Major General Heinz Trettner Organization &c Training Major General James N. Carter (until DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED Division 4 Nov 57) Major General Eric K. G. Sixsmith (from 4 Nov 57) • r\ ri m3¾¾ ^ ifcairaW ft^frll psjjpö • imüL&mw —SEGftßT

Personnel & Administration Rear Admiral Aldo Rossi (until 28 Dec 56) Divi sion Rear Admiral Ugo Ferruta (from 28 Dec 56) Plans & Policy Division Major General Jacques M. Allard (until 25 Jan 57) Major General Maurice J. Gazin (from 25 Jan 57) Programs Division Major General Frank Besson Signal Division Major General Blair Garland (until 3 Jul 57) Major General Victor A. Conrad (from 3 July 57) Headquarters Commandant Colonel M.C. Higgins Secretary of the Staff Colonel Edward L. Rowny Chief of Public Information Brigadier Lionel L. Cross Executive for National Colonel Edwinston Robbins (until 5 Apr 57) Military Representatives Brig.Gen. Ezio I. Pistotti (from 11 Aug 57) Mr. R. B. Knight Colonel J. B. de Bary Special Assistantsto SACEUR Lt.Colonel H. G. Wood Dr. K.S. M. Davidson (until 1 Aug 57) Dr. K. C. Black (from 7 Oct 57) Scientific Advisor to SACEUR DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED

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APPENDIX A Chapter III SHAPE History 1957

Background on Force Statistics

Subsequent to Lisbon, the Force Goals had been formulated and established each year in the Annual Review process. The pertinent documents on the various Annual Reviews which list these agreed Goals are set out in the chronological outline at Appendix "B". In order to make this study of value one must go beyond Force Goals and consider the entire matter oï statistical estimates of forces and planning to include such items as Force Requirements and Capabilities.

The most lucid explanation of the trade jargon employed by NATO planners is that contained in SG 20/49 of October 1952. In this document is found the statement: "Force Requirements represent a purely military estimate of the forces required to implement the war strategy determined to be the most efficient to meet and defeat the enemy threat. On the other hand, annual Force Goals are phased steps toward the attainment of these requirements. Goals are based on consideration of economic and political factors as well as military requirements; Force Requirements are targets which NATO nations should strive to reach." Unfortunately, the passage of time has obscured these early and fairly clear definitions until now the terms are so confused and interchangeable as sometimes to be almost meaningless.

Plans had been made for the defense of Europe prior to the establishment of SHAPE, and these were valid during the first year of SHAPE'S existence. Planners in those days based their contemplated needs largely on World War II experiences and established plans of action and required forces mainly on the basis of what they considered to be the need. In this fashion several early documents were published setting forth Force Re- quirements with little regard to whether or not these Requirements could be met by the nations.

The requirements established before Lisbon were unrealistic to the extent that they were not commensurate with the ability of the nations to fulfill them. Everyone was aware of this, of course, but it was only after SACEUR pointed this out strongly to the Council at Ottawa that there was established in October 1951 a Temporary Council Committee (TCC) - the DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED first set of "Wise Men." This Committee was told by the Council to conduct

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NATO a detailed review of national military resources, vis-a-vis military requirements. Forerunner to the Annual Review, the investigation of the TCC was carried out by calling on all the nations for detailed information on their defense programs for the next three years and the economic resources available to back up these for the same period. The nations were asked to report on the number of regular and reserve troops which they were planning to raise, the state of their training, and the types of equipment which they had as well as on economic capabilities. This investigation began in October 1951. The TCC submitted this detailed final report to the Council in December 1951, and made specific proposals "for force targets and military standards, which are to be considered as Firm Goals for the coming year and as Provisional Goals for the years thereafter..." On 20 February 1952 at Lisbon, the NAC convened. National Governments had had an opportunity to study the specific proposals of the TCC in the meantime. The Council then adopted the so-called Lisbon Goals contained in the TCC Report. (See Chronology following.) It should be noted that this is the first occasion on which the NATO nations agreed to meet certain commitments. SHAPE did not establish these goals.

At Lisbon in 1952, the NAC decided that there should be conducted each year "comprehensive Annual Reviews of the requirements for building and maintaining adequate defensive strength on a realistic foundation of politico-economic capabilities." This process was in actual fact a continuation of the process first undertaken by the TCC in the fall of 1951 which had resulted in the so-called Lisbon Goals. Each year since then, of course, the Annuad Review has been conducted with certain SHAPE participation and has produced Force Goals each year as shown in the Chronology. Again, these Force Goals are established not by SHAPE but by the Council as a result of the Annual Review.

At this stage the terms "Goals" and "Requirements" became more confused with the issuance of MRC/12 entitled "Estimated Force Goals for use in connection with the Annual Review 1952." This paper should have been titled "Estimated Requirements."

In September 1952 the Standing Group told SACEUR to send to them his revised major Force Requirements for the defense of ACE as of 1954. These new requirements were called for because of a new intelligence estimate and of revised strategic guidance resulting from the recent accession of Greece and Turkey into NATO. General Ridgway submitted these new Force Requirements in early November 1952 (SHAPE 1215/52)

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED and stated that although the Standing Group had asked for requirements for 1954, he was submitting requirements which bore no relation to a particular date, but which were requirements to accomplish successfully SACEUR's mission "today or at any time in the future until the concept of operations, the enemy threat, and/or the impact of new developments require revision." These requirements were published as "Revised NATO Force Requirements" in MC 26/2 Final on 24 April 1953.

These requirements were revised slightly in June 1953 as a result of certain changes in Turkish forces. When General Ridgway departed as SACEUR he sent to the Standing Group a letter entitled "Estimate of the Situation and Force Requirements" (SHAPE 704/53, 10 Jul 53). General Ridgway had decided that the availability of new weapons would affect his Force Requirements and directed his staff to make a study on that assumption. Unfortunately even though he tried to get information from the nations and from the Standing Group, he was unable to get sufficient valid data together so that his study of Force Reqmrements for mid-I956 is not definitive. As General Ridgway himself admitted to his superiors, his study was "based on arbitrary values assigned to many admitted variables and on equally arbitrary evaluation of imponderables to which no conventional planning factors are applicable and for which no empirical data are available as guidance." This Ridgway study may well be called the forerunner of-the 1957 Capabilities Plan which is the next major chapter in the story of forces for Allied Command Europe.

When General Gruenther assumed command he wasted no time in starting his staff on the New Approach. His reasons for so doing were, as he explained, two in numbei*. First, from the results being obtained in the 1953 Annual Review it was very plain that the nations were not going to furnish forces on the order which would be needed to defend Eu- rope under existing plans with conventional weapons. His second and most important reason was that atomic weapons were becoming available in quantities sufficient to indicate their use by both sides in any future war. As General Gruenther noted, "this will undoubtedly influence our strategy and our overall organization."

Early in his planning, General Gruenther was told by the Standing Group to submit to them force requirements for 1956. He was reluctant to do this mainly because it was apparent from his planning up to this time (September 1953), that any figures submitted on the basis of old planning assumptions would be meaningless. Nevertheless the Standing Group insisted, and General Gruenther sent to them 1956 Force Requi- rements. With SGN agreement, he merely modified the figures which were contained in MC 26/2 by adding certain Turkish Army figures. These

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED requirements were approved by the Council on 9 December 1953 as NATO Force Requirements in MC 26/3.

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MATn rriicnrT As a result of more than nine months planning, General Gruenther forwarded to the Standing Group on 1 July 1954 the Capabilities Plan for ACE 1957, along with a Supplementary Report on Minimum Essential Measures*

The 1957 Capabilitiesr Plan was based, insofar as numbers of forces were concerned, upon those forces which the nations had indicated in the 1953 Annual Review would be available to SACEUR in December 1956. General Gruenther had directed this planning assumption. In the words of the report: "It was considered that the major forces to be used as a basis for the Capabilities Plan should adhere insofar as possible to the country plans for 1956, the latest year covered by the 1953 Annual Review submissions. Readjustments have only to be made in those few instances where there were special reasons to support the change." The plan sets forth these assumed forces both in the detailed campaigns and in Appendix L entitled "Determination of 1957 Force Levels,"

The 1957 Capabilities Plan was considered by the Council and was approved as "a concept of operations and general strategy as a basis for current detailed recommendations and further planning" in MC 49 in De- cember 1954. At the same time,moved by SACEUR's planning and recommendations, the Council approved on 17 December 1954 MC/48, "The most Effective Pattern of NATO Military Strength For the Next Few Years." This important paper suggested a pattern of military force; called for forces with integrated atomic capability; called for priority on forces-in- being as opposed to reserve forces; and called for an effective German contribution by 1957.

All NATO authorities realized that MC/48 was incomplete since it had been prepared in a great hurry, and that a further report based on additional guidance would be needed.

Accordingly, MC/48/1 (Final) was approved by the NAC on 15 Decem- ber 1955. The following paragraph from MC/48/l which is quoted in full sets the stage for the procedures which are now followed by SHAPE in attempting to determine the proper force postures:

"It is impossible as yet to define fully the future pattern for the forces which we will require. The development of this pattern must be an evolutionary process based on continuing studies, experiments, and operational tests. However, advice and specific recommendations are made in SACEUR's annual assessment of the combat effectiveness of forces assigned or earmarked for Allied Command Europe. DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED Similar guidance is given the nations by the NATO Military Authorities during the course of the Annual Review. This advice is for the

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specific purpose of assisting and guiding nations in formulating long term improvements of their forces to ensure NATO of the best possible defense within the forces and resources made available. Further consideration is being given to the possibility of expanding these methods of presenting advice on the various military problems."

The following recommendation in Paragraph 13 is also significant in this regard:

"Therefore it is still vital that the Force Goals for forces s-ssigned or earmarked for NATO not be reduced below the general order of magnitude of jthe 1956 planned goals established in the 1953 Annual Review."

This "general order of the magnitude of forces" was further defined as implying latitude in the adjustment of Force Goals should the composition of forces require changing in light of evolutionary developments.

In a memorandum to General Gruenther on 14 Janury 1956, General Schuyler had pointed out that General Norstad believed that the 1957 Ca- pabilities Plan was out of date and that SHAPE should start developing a new Plan for 1960-63, to serve as a guide in talks with nations on their future programs. General Schuyler commented: "It is fast becoming apparent to all NATO and national authorities that the SHAPE 1957 Capabilities Plan is out of date. The projected dates for German forces have been overtaken by events; in a number of cases the 1955 Annual Review has established new force goals representing lesser forces than those previously envisaged."

General Gruenther directed the preparation of the study "Force Posture ACE 1960-62" which was prepared in SHAPE and submitted to the Standing Group on 28 September 1956 (SHAPE 231/56). The 1960-62 Study was largely overtaken by events before it was given much consideration at the top levels.

As a result of the Council's decision in December 1956 to require a complete review of NATO defense plans, the SGN undertook revision of the MC 14 and MC 48 series. The Council already had approved the Poli- tical Directive C-M(56)138 (Final) in December. These factors led inevitably to another investigation of Force Posture by SACEUR. On 8 February 1957 the SGN instructed SACEUR to send them new force posture recom-

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED mendations covering the period 1958-1962, or beyond if he desired (SGM- 105-57, 8 Feb 57). Additional instructions on preparation were sent him

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, NAia SBGnDT Hifi•i - - »">•'<-.' ; on 26 April and he was told significantly to "define the assumptions from which the Force Requirements are generated." (SGM-279-57).

The resultant Minimum Forces Study 1958-63, I October 1957, established, in its own words, "the minimum force with which ACE could carry out its mission through 1963." DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED

259 IMAT D Ö^ÜLA^IFF ED SHAPE 57/67 NATO CECH ET

• APPENDIX B Chapter IH SHAPE History 1957

Chronological Outline of Force Statistics

Document Type of Statistic Remarks

I4 DC/13, 28 Mar 50 Force Requirements Based on WUDO Plan

2. DC/28, 28 Oct 50 Force Requirements To meet Medium Term Defense (Final) Plan - based on WUDO and Re- gional Planning Group estimate

\ 3. SH/333/51, 14 Aug 51 Force Requirements First estimate made by SHAPE SH/352/51, 17 Aug 51 Staff

4. MC/26/I(Final) Force Requirements Approval by Military Committee 21 Nov 51 of SHAPE Requirements SH/333/51

5, C9-D/23, 26 Feb 52 Force Goals The so-called "Lisbon Goals" and Corrigendum Firm Goals for 1952 formulated by the TCC and 24 Mar 52 ProvisionalGoalsfor 1953 agreed to by the Council Planned Goals for 1954

6. M.R. C. 12(Final) Force Goals Estimated Force Goals for use in 25 Jun 52 By definition these are 1952 Annual Review not Force Goals

7. SHAPE 1215/52 Force Requirements Submitted by General Ridgway 8 Nov 52 - as amen- and including Greek and Turkish ded by SH 29182, Forces 21 May 53 h SH 29353, 2 Jun 53 DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED SHAPE 57/67 NATO SECRET

Document Type of Statistic . Remarks te. Date

8. MC 26/2 (Final) Force Requirements M. C. Approval of SHAPE Re- 24 Apr 53 "Revised NATO Force quirements of 8 Nov 52 as Requirements as of amended. 31 Dec 54 «

* 9. C-M(52)l 30, 12Dec52 Force Goals 1952 Annual Review and C-M(53)40 Rev Firm Goals 1953 Apr 53 Provisional Goals 1954 Planned Goals 1955

10. SHAPE 704/53 Force Requirements "Estimate of Situation and Force 10 Jul 53 Requirements" submitted by Gen Ridgway upon his departure

11. Msg SACEUR to SGN Force Requirements for Submitted to SGN by General 10 Sep 53 (See : I956 Gruenther - merely a modifi- SHAPE/SEC/93/54, cation of MC 26/2 17 Sep 53). SH30806

12. C-M(53)l 50 Force Goals I953 Annual Review 20 Nov 53 Firm Force Goals - 1954 Provisional Force Goals - 1955 Planned Force Goals - 1956

13. MC 26/3(Final) Force Reqxiirements M. C. Approval of General 9 Dec 53 Gruenther's latest estimate of Requirements

14. SHAPE/330/54 Availabilities and Capabilities Plan ACE, 1957, and SHAPE/384/54 Capabilities based on Forces which would 1 Jul 54 probably be available as of 31 Dec 56 DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MIS - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - PDN(2012)0008 DISCLOSED - PUBLICLY DECLASSIFIED

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Document Type of Statistic Remarks & Date

15. MC 48 (Final) Approval of new Approved by NAC on 17 Dec 54, 22 Nov 54 planning concepts by itself established no requirements or goals

16. ' MC 49 (Final) Approval of SACEUR's 23 Nov 54 Capabilities Plan 1957 i J C-M(54)100 Force Goals 1954 Annual Review J 26 Nov 54 New terminology Estimated Actual end 1954 \ Planned 1955 \ Planned 1956 \\ Planned 1957 , i

MC 48/ I(Final) "The Most Effective 9 Dec 55 Pattern of NATO Mili- tary Strength For the Next Few Years" \

C-M(55)126 Force Goals 1955 Annual Review 12 Dec 55 Estimated Actual, end 1955 Planned 1956 Planned 1957 Planned 1958

SHAPE/230/56 Force Posture ACE 28 Sep 56 1960-62

C-M(56)132 Part I Force Goals 1956 Annual Review 5 Dec 56 (Rev.) Actual - end 1955 Estimated - end 1956 Planned - 1957 Planned - 1958 & 1959

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