Media landscape and the state of the freedom of media in selected
ENP and EU countries
Media analysis Warsaw 2019
Media landscape and the state of the freedom of media in selected ENP and EU countries Dominik Cagara, Michał Kobosko, Ewa Stasiak-Jazukiewicz, Roxane Farmanfarmaian, Anatoliy Martsynkovskyi, Natalia Moghilda
Editors
Dominik Cagara, Michał Kobosko
Technical editor
Marcin Sobala
Published by
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This publication has been produced with the assistance of the European Union. The contents of this publication are the sole responsibility of the College of Europe, Natolin and can in no way be taken to reflect the views of the European Union. Unless otherwise indicated, this publication and its contents are the property of the Natolin Campus of the College of Europe. All rights reserved.
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ENP SOUTH
Dr. Roxane Farmanfarmaian
Social and political dimension of journalism (popular topics, EU journalists about ENP and ENP journalists about EU, how well are the regions covered amongst each other, trends, gaps, cultural differences in information expectations, sources of information)
Regional overview: The restricted environment for political and investigative journalism in the region is a key issue for EU journalism, which focuses generally on practices of self-censorship, government manipulation of media, constraints on reportage, and protection of journalists. National and economic developments receive good coverage; EU reportage is less nuanced and informed about local and less mainstream mass media such as radio. It is particularly unskilled at assessing Islamic media popularity, influences and impacts, including both locally produced and regionally produced programming. It likewise tends to under-represent the reasons for, and nature of reality TV, gameshow, and talent shows as areas of major media growth and factors in audience social and political engagement and cultural value 33 relations .
In the region itself, original media coverage is focused on local political and social affairs, with regional developments being the second most important (including significant coverage of African news). Although political and territorial issues divide southern Mediterranean states, the level of shared news, language, culture and
33 http://www.mideastmedia.org/industry/2016/tv/
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social norms makes for much more positive, and frequent regional coverage than might be imagined, with regional news dominating international coverage, and cultural stories of hardship, economic and personal achievements, and political developments common to all. Shared entertainment programming is common across the region, including soap operas and dramas produced in Turkey and broadcast throughout the Arab world in translation. Interestingly, in the pan-Arab satellite world, Algeria and other Maghreb countries are perceived even by their own citizens as less close to ‘the centre of Arabism’ when compared to the Middle-Eastern or Mashreq countries. As Algerians often put it, ‘We can understand them, but they cannot understand us’. Atiqa Hachimi labels this the ‘Maghreb–Mashreq language ideology’: an old cultural hierarchy that acquired new contingency through its media exposure. One of the reasons for the persistent symbolic hegemony of the Arab East, beyond its significant capacity to invest in disseminating regional broadcasting, is the popularity of its cultural industries in the fields of television products or music. On the opposite side, the Maghrebi productions, even in the case of the locally successful music industry, never managed to `sell’ much in the rest of the Arab world34. On balance, coverage of the EU is light, and will often reproduce agency reports, and tends to focus on sensational social and cultural stories. Individual country coverage will reflect political relationships with different EU states (e.g. Morocco and Algeria will cover France in terms of current political developments between their own governments and Paris), e.g. ‘Horror In France Stemming From
34 Hachimi A (2013) “The Maghreb-Mashreq language ideology and the politics of identity in a globalized Arab world”, Journal of Sociolinguistics 17(3): 291; see also, Athique A (2014) “Transnational audiences: Geocultural approaches”, Continuum: Journal of Media and Cultural Studies 28(1): 4–17.
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Algeria’s Resolve To Import Russian Wheat’, by Hassan Houicha, was a story headlined recently in a mass Algerian newspaper, “Echorouk”35. There is little local coverage of the ENP, except in the form of economic partnerships and slights against the states’ national sovereignty; stories on the EU as a bloc institution are sparse and noncommittal, most recently, covering Brexit, and migration, where the orientation is on the plight of locals in the Mediterranean, or Europe’s position on irregular migrants (e.g. Morocco World News, “‘The European Dream Is a Lie: Spain Tells Morocco to Curb Migration”36). Stories linking Europe and the region are more common, the current EU efforts to accommodate Iran in the face of looming US sanctions being an example – though many of these reproduce agency reports. An October 2018 meeting of the EU in Beirut was covered by Lebanon’s National News Agency, but the brevity is noteworthy and typical, the entire story being: ‘NNA - The European Union (EU) mission announced in a statement issued this Wednesday that "the European Union and Lebanon have held high-level meetings in Beirut on October 2 and 3 dwelling on various topics, including human rights, democracy, governance, security and justice, within the framework of the EU- Lebanon Association Agreement concluded in 2006 and the partnership priorities agreed between the two parties in November 2016. Both sides agreed to strengthen their partnership so as to address common challenges, including those arising from conflicts in the Middle East. The parties undertook a full and frank political dialogue and committed themselves to strengthening their cooperation”37. A similar report was offered on mainstream television LBC news that night. It was not picked up by alternative media, such as Al-Manar or the Daily Star.
35 “Echorouk”, www.echoroukonline.com, 10.03.2018. 36 https://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2018/10/254563/european-dream-curb-migration/. 37 http://nna-leb.gov.lb/en/show-news/95812/EU-Lebanon-meetings-on-human-democracy- governance-and-justice.
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Morocco
EU Media coverage: EU reporting on Morocco is quite politicized. On the one hand, the media is a clear focus of EU reportage, often utilized to reflect the larger political and social environments: lack of political freedoms, monarchical control, and social disorders (e.g. in Le Monde, three successive pieces on Morocco published in March, May and June 2018 were entitled respectively: ‘The Royal Palace confronts social anger’, ‘From Tangier to Paris in the footsteps of lost children’, and ‘The Boycott [of Danone and el Afriquia Petrol stations] Disturbs the Government’). Issues of freedom of expression, investigative journalism, the protection and incarceration of journalists, and centralised political control over the media frequently dominate news by EU journalists, who often consider they are filling a gap, as such coverage is deemed unrepresented within the country itself. This to a certain extent is true though it gives an inaccurate impression that no negative social coverage is available locally in Morocco, when in fact, regularly carries stories on areas such as rape, demonstrations and poor prison conditions (see below). For EU journalists, important additional topics of interest include terrorism, migration, gender inequalities and civic unrest. On the other hand, the EU media tends positively to cover Morocco’s economic sector, providing an at times rosy picture of investment, corporate expansion, and cooperation by the government with Western business, EU financial regulation, and banking. In this way, it is considerably more supportive of the government’s position, in that the Moroccan state has made a significant effort to prioritise the economy as a subject worthy of media coverage. Trade shows, agency launches and large government-to-government partnerships are common media themes, as are the work of Moroccan designers and artists and the brands they
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develop (see for example, HuffPostMaghreb (in Arabic) ‘AMDIE: A "super agency" for the promotion of the Morocco brand’,38 and ‘German-Moroccan Energy Partnership’39). A common subject for European coverage is also tourism, and Morocco’s continued attraction as a European destination after the Arab uprisings. In this context, the place of Morocco within the ENP gathers a certain degree of coverage. In 2017, the Huffington Post, through its European Horizons programme, for example, carried a three-part report on the European Neighbourhood Policy, pointing out that Morocco would benefit from better roads and other infrastructure as a result of the partnership, and stating, ‘Putting money on the line makes EU concerns a priority for these neighbouring governments. ’Following up on stories that are linked to EU visits and agreements – providing both introductory context, and importantly, follow-up articles on developments emanating from these exchanges of expertise, investment and technology, would be an area in which ENP coverage could be usefully expanded, particularly by member state journalists. Further, clearer recognition of the sensibilities that Morocco has in regards to its position as a partner in the ENP is often elided by EU media.
Domestic media coverage: Moroccan domestic reporting on politics and society, including gender and migration issues, is broad, with local stories dominating both radio and television news, special reports and talk-show programming. The rise in radio popularity since the privatisation of the medium has opened a range of coverage, which in addition to sports, music and Islamic programming, has served to expand reports on neighbourhood issues, such as faults in infrastructure, poor
38www.huffpostmaghreb.com/2017/12/22/amdie-exportations- commer_n_18892298.html?utm_hp_ref=mg-made-in-morocco, HuffPostmaghreb is edited from Paris and Casablanca. 39 www.giz.de/en/worldwide/57157.html.
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educational practices, insufficient services for youth, and complaints over working conditions40. Television constitutes the medium of socialization par excellence in Morocco, which suffers from the digital divide: not only are 44% of the population illiterate (UNESCO, 2010), but many who can read and write are not all digitally literate. In this context, television is the most prominent mass media in the country. Talk-shows in particular are highly popular, and constitute a large part of Moroccan programming, covering family, women, political, and social issues. As a genre, they are pedagogically oriented in Morocco, offering an important avenue for the discussion of societal issues and values and “…are considered an especially political form of media due to their apparent ‘democratic structure’ 41 (p. 695). In theory, talk shows as a medium provide an opportunity for divergent perspectives to be aired, and most importantly for even marginalized voices to be heard. Hosts, including women (such as Hanane Harrath, who invites viewers to participate with their comments via Facebook or Twitter), can gain substantial followings. Prominent, and typical in format, is a bi-weekly evening show, Kadaya Wa Araa, (“Issues and Opinions”), aired in Arabic on public television channel Al Aoula. Prepared by Abderrahmane El Adaoui and directed by Mohamed Bedari. It brings politicians, leaders, union and civil society members together to debate current topics such as the king’s speeches, election results, the royal tours in Africa, the threat of terrorism, international Labor Day, and International Women’s Day. The show has a conservative aspect; different guests are invited to discuss each segment’s topics,
40 Sonay Ali (2017), “Radio and Political Change: Listening in Contemporary Morocco”, Journal of North African Studies, 22:3, pp. 411-434; www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13629387.2017.1307903. 41 Petkanas, Zoe (2014), “Negotiating Identity: Gender and Tunisian Talk Shows”, The Journal of North African Studies 19 (5), p. 695.
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which respond to official issues of the moment. Viewers watching the show from various Moroccan cities and villages can ask questions of the guests by sending an email to the show. ENP coverage in Moroccan media is mixed. On the one hand, it is highly positive when new agreements or partnership breakthroughs take place, as in Morocco World News’ and MAP’s agency stories on ‘EU Parliament Adopts Morocco-EU PRIMA Scientific Cooperation Agreement’ (published October 3, 2018). Yet, there tends to be no anticipatory reporting on such meetings, and rarely are there follow-up stories, leaving the impression too often that these are bureaucratic rather than human achievements, and lack a ‘story’. On the other hand, the relationship between Morocco and Europe, over migration in particular, but likewise, over Morocco’s sovereignty and partnership role, remain unsettled, and coverage will often highlight official statements to that effect. As MAP’s Oct. 3rd article on a visit by Moroccan Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Nasser Bourita, to Berlin, noted, a clear message was delivered indicating an ongoing view that a real partnership remained elusive, and quoted Bourita saying: "Europe should establish reliable partnerships with its neighbours. Countries like Morocco, which are so important for migration and security issues, should play a more significant role. You cannot ask Morocco to help with migration and the fight against terrorism, and treat it as an object. We want clarity. Are we real partners or just a neighbour we are afraid of?"42 The sense of under-appreciation, justifying the need to highlight its equality and credibility as a nation, permeates a great deal of the official output in regards to Moroccan-EU relations, and the Moroccan media fills an important role in presenting the Moroccan
42 http://www.mapnews.ma/en/top-news/politics/europe-needs-update-its-vision-africa-fm.
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viewpoint, and reporting on the nation’s willingness to stand up to what Moroccans often interpret as European slights by both its officials and its media. This was again on view in the recent disagreement between Rabat and The Hague over the summer of 2018, a subject covered in Morocco’s Al Massae newspaper, in Arabic, in which the Dutch Ambassador was informed not only that judgements brought against demonstrators in Hirak, in the Rif, including Dutch-Moroccan dual nationals, was an internal affair, but, quoting Minister of Foreign Affairs Bourita, ‘“I have made it clear that the Rif’s Hirak uprising is a strictly internal affair and by no means an object of diplomatic discussion.’ In later developments, the paper noted he’d stated that Morocco respected decisions of Dutch courts, and therefore, “they must respect ours. …We do not allow foreign parliaments to deal with our internal affairs”43. The way Morocco prefers to present its stance on migration was revealed in a recent story on an allegedly ‘free migration’ scheme, which was covered by television news report Today 24, and subsequently picked up by pro-government newspaper al-Ayoum. Subsequent to the Royal Navy firing on boats transporting illegal migrants on two separate days, killing one individual in each instance, the Moroccan government was headlined as confirming it was declaring war on a drug cartel that was now offering, via social media, to smuggle young Moroccans from Martel Beach to Spain. Describing this as a secret campaign to provoke the Moroccan government and the European Union (and Spain), the report quotes liberally from a ‘conversation held with Mohamed Benaissa, head of the North Observatory for Human Rights’, a frequent source for Western reportage, who is quoted pointing to drug cartels as
43 http://qushq24.com/morocco-rejects-dutch-foreign-ministers-report-on-hirak-sentences/
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responsible; the story’s reporter backs the story up with figures from Spanish news agency reports and quotes from local citizens of Tetouan and Hoceima44. More positively, Moroccan news outlets will often pick up stories in the French press on Moroccans in France, confirming an ongoing link between the two countries in regards to shared diaspora communities, and exchanges of students and business. A recent report by Le Monde Campus on Moroccan university students being the largest percentage of international students studying in France, exceeding Algerians, and Tunisians, was both reprinted and featured on television news throughout Morocco’s media, including the online site Yabiladi45.
Lebanon
EU Media Coverage: Lebanon has long been considered by the EU as one of the freer and more pluralistic states of the Mediterranean, and the media approaches Lebanese government activities, domestic issues, and international affairs more broadly than it does other states in the region. This is partly due to greater access, and more consistent practices in Lebanon regarding foreign journalist accreditation. It is likewise because the EU is one of Lebanon’s largest donors, with a particular focus on helping it contain migration that might otherwise arrive in European member states46. As such, European NGOs proliferate in Lebanon, and receive frequent coverage by EU media. A popular topic of media stories was until last year Lebanon’s inability to pass a budget, something that had pertained for the past 13 years, and which hampered the EU from providing Lebanon further funding and aid.
44 http://www.alyaoum24.com/1149147.html. 45 www.yabiladi.com/articles/details/69822/france-marocains-nationalite-plus-representee.html. 46 https://lb.boell.org/en/2016/09/06/views-south-european-neighbourhood-policy-lebanon.
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The change in EU views on the current government’s approach after it finally passed a budget in 2018 was typified by France24 television reports, such as, ‘Billions pledged at Paris conference in attempt to boost ailing Lebanese economy’, in which President Macron was quoted as saying, ‘[A]t a time when the Levant probably is living through one of the worst moments of its history ... It's more important than ever to preserve the most precious asset: a peaceful, diverse and harmonious Lebanon’47. Corruption is likewise a major topic, as noted in the ENP’s progress report: ‘There were no tangible developments with regard to legislation to make the fight against corruption more effective. Lebanon’s ranking in Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index has worsened, from 127th out of 177 in 2013 to 136th out of 175 in 2014’48. Finally, terrorism remains a particularly sensitive topic for both sides, not least because a major political player in Lebanon, Hezbollah, is deemed a terrorist organisation by the US, and incurs ambiguous perspectives by EU journalists. Summing up Marie LePen’s well-documented trip to Lebanon during her campaign in early 2017, a Huffington Post Beirut correspondent, wrote: ‘It is very difficult to determine where to start in discussing Marine Le Pen’s visit to Lebanon. In a very unique manner, every word she said, and every move she made, in addition to the reactions she provoked – both with and against - provide a microcosm of the political struggle taking place between proponents of a clash of civilizations between Islam and the West, and advocates of a liberal, multicultural, open and diverse society where Muslims do not pose an existential threat to the well-being and security of a society’ 49. The same visit, covered by Lebanon’s Daily Star, headlined its story,
47 www.france24.com/en/20180406-lebanon-france-11-billion-pledged-paris-conference-attempt- boost-economy. 48 European Neighbourhood Policy Progress Report 2014 – Lebanon, p. 5 49 https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/marine-le-pen-in-lebanon-mission- accomplished_us_58ac696ee4b03250fc905f6d.
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‘Hariri warns Le Pen: Don’t bundle Islam with terrorism ‘, and began with the line, “‘Conflating Islam with terrorism would be the worst mistake’ said Hariri”, going onto to indicate that Le Pen’s hardline view against migration into France was an important subject for the meeting50. The online DW news curation service by German DW Akademie, didn’t mention the Hariri warning in its 20 February story. Coverage by European media is frequently provided by local correspondents or freelancers, who often report for local media outlets as well. ENP projects and events are covered in a bureaucratic style by most European mass television and press reports, and rarely with much follow-up – as noted above in the Morocco section, an opportunity so far lost, and which is ripe for further EU media stories. Additionally, both the migration and terrorism reporting could be more culturally nuanced in European reports covering the complexities of Lebanese society, the different fears and linkages among its refugee and ethnic communities, and its position within the region. For example, it was not until PM Hariri was seized by the Saudis that European audiences were made fully aware of the close financial and familial linkages between the two states, a contextual aspect that underpins much of the decision-making politically and socially in Lebanon (and elsewhere, including Morocco), where tribes and elites intermarry, and corporate partnerships cross borders in ways rarely clarified by European journalists. Follow-up on the Lebanese responses reflected in the political, social and commercial implications of the kidnapping fiasco likewise have not been a feature of EU reporting, though they would explain a great deal about Saudi-Levant relations, the response of other regional states to the Khashoggi affair, etc.
50 http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2017/Feb-21/394445-hariri-warns-le-pen-dont- bundle-islam-with-terrorism.ashx.
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Domestic Coverage: Lebanese have easy access to Al Jazeera, Al Arabiya, CNN, BBC, and others through subscriptions to pirated cable bundles or satellite receivers, but they prefer local news channels. However, this does not usually translate into greater plurality of opinions. Many new sources replicate the voices expressed through traditional media, as most of the country’s news media outlets support and represent the agenda of a political personality or party. Most of them are owned, managed, and/or financed by local businesses and leaders or by regional powers in the Gulf or Egypt. As noted by an Open Society report, ‘While this structure ensures a pluralistic press system, it transforms many of the news media into propagandists for their patrons’51. Response to ENP coverage is important within Lebanon, and reflects the degree to which international journalism has played a role in domestic and regional politics. As observed by Costa during the elections in 2011, in a perspective that remains very pertinent today, despite the enormous shifts in political relationships, not least the eruption of the Syrian war and the pressures that have developed in Lebanese-Saudi relations, ‘During the electoral campaign period, both March 8 and March 14 supporters were paying attention to the influence of western media in Lebanese political life. Thus, themes and representations were chosen by local journalists working in the online English press in reaction to the images provided by western media. Media processes framed and reframed each other and different media worlds emerged as interrelated within a broad social context’52.
51 www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/mapping-digital-media-lebanon-20120506.pdf, p. 6. 52 Costa Elisabetta (2011) “Online Journalism And Political Activism In Lebanon”, Oriente Moderno, Vol 91 (1), Special Series: ‘Between Everyday Life And Political Revolution: The Social Web In The Middle East’; p. 127.
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This is translated into a local view that European journalism sees Lebanon as both a site of conflict (see Figure 1) typical of the Middle East (urbanized war, Shia/Sunni clashes, disruption by Palestinian refugees, rogue armed groups such as Hezbollah, etc.) and a globalized, commercial hub with predilections for European cosmopolitanism. Describing EU media coverage, Costa suggests that ‘The legendary Arab phoenix became a popular metaphor for Lebanon: war, violence and destruction alternating with prosperity, richness, and health. Such images influenced most of the historical knowledge about the country and they now constitute a pre- written frame for local and international journalists willing to narrate the events happening in Lebanon’.53 For Lebanese journalists, this bifurcated image is passé, and their focus has shifted to local development, internal social and political issues related to migration and new party representation (including by women), and the need for stability and continuity in the face of the conflicts surrounding them.
53 Ibid.
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Figure 1. Working on our image July 28, 2009: LebanonNow.com
This is the view most people outside the Middle East have of Lebanon Lebanese politics is a constant topic for the local media, as are social relations, the state of refugees, and regionally, the war in Syria, the actions of Israel, and the role of Iran vis-à-vis Hezbollah. Although Arab language papers have correspondents throughout the region and world, as well as domestically, the majority of international reporting is taken from agency reports, often the French, due to the shared language. On the other hand, Lebanese journalists continue to seem to be the most lively and active in the region. Most of them are fluent in at least one European language and many are very familiar with European and North-American media contexts. Furthermore, they enjoy a long tradition of access to foreign media.
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Television talk shows, which cross the otherwise clear boundary between the news and entertainment categories are a strong feature of the media scene in Lebanon, and several, including LBC’s political talk show ‘Have a Nice Day’, and FutureTV’s DNA (Daily News Analysis) have been on-air for years, and reach audiences not only locally but across the Arab world. The former airs conversations daily between different hosts and high-profile guests including bankers, political party leaders, and government representatives. DNA, with Nadim Koteich, is branded as a ‘satirical’ commentary show, and will feature foreign media reports and interviews of guests in both Lebanon the countries in which stories emanate, as most recently on Koteich’s coverage of the Jamal Kashoggi disappearance and Saudi’s changing stories. Critical of the government, his approach is to find loopholes and contradictions in a daily programme that is a product of FutureTV Politics, but is separately uploaded onto YouTube for access54. A highly admired weekly political show, LBC’s Kalam Naas (What They Say) presented by Marcel Ghanem, closed its doors in April 2018 after a decade on air (and just two months after Ghanem was prosecuted for allowing two Saudi journalists to express strong criticism of the Lebanese authorities during a 2017 November , and for then to respond to an initial summons for questioning. His statement at the time: “This clearly involves political pressure on the judicial system and attacks on freedom of expression before the coming elections”)55. Hosting political leaders, public intellectuals, journalists, and corporate personalities, the show often conducted specials on prisoners of war, migration, terrorism or other socio-political issues; no other similar show has yet been launched. Other popular talk show focus on family and youth issues, such as LBC’s ‘Hua’ (Freedom) which bills itself as a platform for freedom of expression, opinion
54 https://www.youtube.com/user/futureprogramstv4. 55 https://rsf.org/en/news/lebanese-authorities-less-tolerant-media-criticism.
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and action with the participation of Lebanese youth, addressing issues of homeless young refugees, teenage rape, and child abuse56. By encouraging audience engagement through telephone calls, emails and texts, talk shows produce a sense of public participation in current affairs, and thus contribute to an atmosphere of open discourse and culture of argumentation. Most include a Facebook site and Twitter feed to spur further audience interaction. The media area is one in which women feature prominently in Lebanon, with women’s talk shows, women anchors, and women reporters being well regarded and attaining positions of importance – and celebrity. Two representative standouts: 1. Paula Yacoubian, who hosted a long-running interview show on Rafik Hariri’s Future TV (after starting out at 17 as the youngest person to host a show in Lebanon, according to an interview in Lebanese lifestyle magazine Fit’n Style )57 and was famously invited by his son, PM Hariri, to interview him in Saudi Arabia during his detention there, recording his statement of resignation (later retracted). She recently resigned the post to run as an MP for the new Kilna Watni list, and successfully took her position in parliament in May 2018. Her story made national and regional news, including an interview in Prestige, a francophone Lebanese magazine, in which she stated: ‘It is true that I interviewed many politicians, but the bonds of friendship were not always there. I criticized the policies of different parties and they too attacked me. I criticized while still hoping to make reforms from within. To change the way people think. We are a democratic country in form only. My decision to embark on the political path was taken following the famous fraudulent discussions around the closure of the dump of Bourj Hammoud [an environmental disaster site] between
./ھوا-اﻟﺣرﯾﺔ/www.lbcgroup.tv/episodes/956 56 57 http://fitnstyle.com/Details/644/fashion-style-news-Lebanon/starts-interview- Lebanon/Paula_Yacoubian_The_Interviewer_Gets_Interviewed.
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2015-2016. 2. Rima Karaki, a reporter and anchor for al-Jadeed TV, who became famous for cutting off the microphone of a sheikh when he told her to ‘shut up’ on air in March 2015, and she’d asked him to shorten his comments. The video of the incident went viral, and gained 2.3 million views. Karaki has since written a book. Migration and refugee coverage: Lebanon suffers from ‘refugee fatigue’. In 2017, it hosted over 1.5 million Syrian refugees, half a million Palestinians in camps established after the creation of the state of Israel in 1948, and thousands of Iraqis who fled after the US invasion in 2003. Thus, in a country of about 4 million, over half are migrants and refugees. This is reflected in the coverage of Syrians, the most recent arrivals, and dates back to the period of the civil war (1975 to 1990). According to a report by the Ethical Journalism Network funded by EUROMED Migration IV – a project, financed by the European Union and implemented by in 2017 - it was during the civil war that ‘print and broadcast media were created to service warring factions, mostly along sectarian and politically ideological lines. They competed with state-run outlets and morphed into commercial, albeit partisan, ventures. Radio stations and TV channels continue presenting their founders’ views, if not in full militia fashion as during the war, but their bias is inescapable. While examples of fair and balanced coverage of migrant-related issues exist, they seem to have been overshadowed by a proliferation of hate-mongering journalism’58. The report cites a number of cases from the media in 2016, in which Lebanese attitudes to Syrian refugees in particular were shown to be intolerant and laced with hate speech and prejudice, reflecting a level of social distress and public inability to address the multiple challenges posed by the overwhelming responsibility of accommodating such large displaced communities. The report makes several
58 “How Does the Media on both sides of the Mediterranean report on Migration?”, https://ethicaljournalismnetwork.org/resources/publications/media-mediterranean-migration/lebanon.
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observations regarding the media’s task in covering the story: 1) ‘Access to reliable data and statistics. Data comes from conflicting sources with an interest at stake, so verification can be problematic’; 2) the influence of political and economic interests, combined with sectarian, religious and social elements; 3) The common use of hate speech by politicians and partisan groups; 4) the lack of voices for and by migrants themselves. As it goes on to say, ‘some media fail to be inclusive because of other priorities, interests, budgets and deadlines. In all of this social media play an increasingly visible and influential role in coverage of migrants. In some cases it’s positive, like rallying support for needy refugees, but it can also be negative, blaming them for rising crime figures, or for adding to demand for basic services and putting pressure on crumbling infrastructure.’ Though the report provides an important insight on migration coverage in Lebanon, difficulties in shifting the focus, particularly through European training, arises from two main aspects: 1) Many of the issues faced by Lebanon, and picked up by its politicians, are unquestionably the result of stretched infrastructure, insufficient funding (for basic services, for example rubbish collection), refugee unemployment as a result of stringent labour laws, and the effect of war on the refugees themselves. 2) Coverage of migrants and their impact in Europe is often similar, with cultural differences, impacts on educational and civic infrastructure, and the link to terrorism, all featuring in political and public discourses that are often picked up in media as negative stories. Thus, the Ethical Journalism Network, which has become well known for its work on Hate Speech and Rules to avoid it in responsible reportage, will likewise frequently point to failures in the European media sphere in relation to coverage of refugees and migrants. What is important to point out, is that the Lebanese media will often feature blow-back to irresponsible and negative reporting on migrants, offering important
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correctives at the time. Two of the case studies featured in the above report are good examples (though the report itself fails to observe this point):
1) ‘Al Joumhouriya newspaper published a report on 10 November 2016 headlined: “Dima Sadek Attacks OTV and Calls for Action” . The article said LBCI TV anchor/presenter Dima Sadek had joined other critics of OTV, her former employer and an arm of the Free Patriotic Movement of Lebanese President Michel Aoun, to disparage an episode of the candid camera-type program “Still Your Heart” in which actors insulted and demeaned a Syrian. The channel had aired an episode in which a refugee was terrorised when the station crew insulted and humiliated him by forcing him to get down on his knees and stomach and take off his clothes, before admitting it was a stunt. Activists attacked the station on social media. Sadek expressed revulsion at the episode, noting it proved society was sick, and called for action before disaster strikes. On November 18 Al Joumhouriya quoted Sadek as saying:
“Stop That Program.” 2) ‘Students from arts school Académie Libanaise des Beaux Arts (ALBA), at the University of Balamand, posted a YouTube video called “I wouldn’t date a Syrian” that went viral on traditional and social media. It showed French-speaking female students dismissive of Syrian young men in racial tones. The video purported to survey women students by asking if they would date Syrian men. All the women’s replies were negative citing cultural and educational differences. The video was subtitled in Arabic. . An ALBA professor published a Facebook clarification saying the video was a student assignment to highlight the issue of “veiled racism in Lebanese society and the impact of a sensitive topic on social media.” But it went awry when the video elicited angry reactions, with comments suggesting these Lebanese women were trying to dissociate themselves from their Arab identity and appear Westernised by speaking French, and blasted ALBA for its students’ insensitivity. An
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email from ALBA’s administration later reiterated an earlier statement saying the video was part of an academic project, issued an apology, and condemned all offensive racist, political or religious content.’ It is unfortunate that the report doesn’t point out this important aspect of the coverage, as this suggests a level of social consciousness and professional responsibility within the media frame in Lebanon, and a willingness to provide multi- sided coverage, both of which the report ignores.
Algeria
EU Media Coverage: The EU coverage of Algeria is relatively thin, and tends to focus on funded joint projects, the oil industry, terrorism, migration, social conflict and media issues. The majority of these are agency reports; the few in-country reports are primarily written by Algerian freelance correspondents for EU media outlets as few of the latter have staff correspondents posted long-term in Algeria itself. An example is Huffpost Algerie, which publishes frequently via dispatches produced by Algerian reporters, such as, ‘A la Cité des Sources, la partialité de l'administration favorise la spoliation des espaces verts’ by Mehdi Aliou, a local freelancer59. Of the European media, the French cover the area most widely, and will include in their coverage issues regarding the Sahel, French ex-patriot communities, and French- Algerian culture. Investigative reportage will often combine key issues – analysing social conflict, for example, in terms of oil wealth accumulation or bad economic
59 www.huffpostmaghreb.com/2014/12/02/sources-partialite-administration-favorise-spoliation- espaces-verts_n_6257422.html.
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management of rentier income. A good example is ’s interview article in Liberation, ‘Algeria: Conflicts in Gharaia are linked to gas and oil interests’, in which a French anthropologist discusses community disruption and disintegration in Gharaia district based on recent fieldwork there, offering grounded information and real insight60. In the main, however, the coverage is often critical and judgemental, a perspective the local authorities do not appreciate, and will at times respond to negatively in their own counter coverage. Thus, the relationship between the European press and Algeria at times can be fraught, in particular with the French media, especially when regarding their differing sensibilities surrounding colonial history and interpretations of the civil war. In 2017, for example, Le Monde Diplomatique published an article on lost memories during the civil war, ‘Memoire Interdite en Algerie’; the issue was refused distribution within Algeria by the authorities, leading the paper to publish a demand for explanation and reparation that proved to be unforthcoming61. Migration issues are high on EU media agendas, just as they are politically. A recent visit by German Chancellor Merkel to Algeria headlined migration as the main topic in German newspapers, including Deutchland.de, which showed a warm picture of Merkel with Algeria’s Prime Minister Ahmed Ouyahia, placed over a first line reading: ‘German Chancellor Angela Merkel praised moves to ease the repatriation from Germany to Algeria of rejected asylum-seekers during a one-day visit to Algiers’62. In contrast, the pictures and language used in the Arab and Algeria coverage were markedly different. showing a picture of Merkel frowning, and headlining the story, ‘Algeria will take back its citizens illegally in Germany; and
60 liberation.fr/planete/2015/07/10/algerie-les-affrontements-de-ghardaia-sont-lies-a-des-interets- petroliers-et-gaziers_1345329. 61 www.monde-diplomatique.fr/2017/10/A/57979. 62 www.deutschland.de/en/news/merkel-visits-algeria.
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‘Algeria will accept deportations of its citizens living in Germany’63. A more in-depth treatment was offered by German online news site dw.com that headlined the story, ‘Merkel in Algeria: Migration likely to influence trade talks’, which discussed at some length the debate in Germany over designating Algeria a ‘safe country of origin’ for returning migrants, and assessing the way Algeria had handled migrants traversing its territory as they headed north from Niger and Mali. The story includes analysis of Merkel’s aid programme to encourage cooperation by Algeria, as well as videos of migrant boat routes, and of Algerian development in the solar sector64. Unless triggered by a state trip of this nature, this kind of in-depth news coverage is rare, occurring primarily when there is a terrorist occurrence or change in the oil scene. Despite the size and economic promise of Algeria, it is relatively isolated in terms of news, not least because of the nature of its murky politics, and the constraints on media within the country.
Domestic Coverage: Algerian newspapers can be surprisingly free in their coverage of domestic politics, particularly in regards to battles between parties, including the prevailing presidential party, the FLN. As presidential, military and security service movements remain eminently shrouded in mystery, this coverage offers the illusion of openness within the domestic political frame. Thus, for example, a recent political spat between the speaker of the National People’s Assembly (APN), Said Bouhadja and other deputies in parliament, was covered closely, as pressure against him mounted to step down. Critically, the coverage reflected how dependent parliamentarians of every stripe are on the ruling party, by including not only strong
63 www.alaraby.co.uk/english/news/2018/9/18/algeria-will-take-back-its-citizens-illegally-in-germany, http://www.africanews.com/2018/09/18/algeria-germany-seek-ways-to-speed-up-deportations//. 64 www.dw.com/en/merkel-in-algeria-migration-likely-to-influence-trade-talks/a-45501791.
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statements by Bouhadja that those against him constituted ‘an outlaw band’, but more tellingly, his acknowledgement that he had written to President Bouteflika, ‘in his capacity as president of the FLN party’ and that he would ‘accept any decision that stems from him’. On the other hand, articles likewise pointed out that another unhappy MP had posted a Facebook comment on events at Parliament describing them as ‘an unprecedented bullying in the history of the state’s work, which did not occur even in the somber times of terrorism’, revealing a freedom of expression within the political field that is often under-appreciated. Economic coverage tends to focus on oil, the Algerian oil company Sonentrach (and its relations with foreign oil companies) and on Algeria’s role in OPEC. These are all generally presented through the lens of national pride, and independence from European and particularly US pressure. For the past four years, the government has celebrated October 22 as ‘National Press Freedom Day’, this year holding a conference entitled ‘The media’s role in living together in peace’. A President’s prize ceremony was conducted to honour well-known journalists, and carried on the Minister of Communication, Djamel Kaouane’s Facebook page65. Algerian newspapers focus most heavily on French relations and media coverage, as well as news and relationships with previous French African states (e.g. Camaroun, Nigere, Mauritania), and the largest papers have correspondents there. Other European news is largely picked up through agency reports, primarily AFP. A recent article by a correspondent of the daily newspaper Echarouk, suggests that both states consider the relationship difficult and capable of improvement. Headlined,
65 www.algerieautrefois.com/Services/ProgramTV/index.html.
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‘Jean Louis Levet: Algeria Neglects the Marketing of its Image Externally‘,66 the article includes calls by Levet to include advertising to market the Algerian image in Paris underground stations, much as Tunisia and Morocco do, as well as, ‘Algeria should launch advertising and promotional campaigns and invite journalists to visit it and introduce the country more.’ Focused on the need to update trade agreements, and improve the level of two-way trade between the two countries, Levet, speaking from the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, noted, ‘My mission is clear, which is how to think of new ways of partnership by focusing on training, education and creativity, taking into account local Algerian characteristics, and make training in the service of the governments to diversify the economy and the establishment of links and bridges between French and Algerian institutes and universities.’ Balancing this, and reflective of Algeria’s clear policy on terrorism containment, and its outspoken view that the Salafist threat emanates directly from Saudi Arabia, another Echarouk article in October 2015 was headlined, ‘Hakim al Qarawi: Algerian students returning from Saudi Arabia transferred Salafism to France’67 During an interview with Echarouk as well as other Algerian media after a lecture at the Montaigne Institute in Paris, Tunisian French researcher al-Qarawi, author of an Montaigne study entitled ‘Extremism in France’, states ‘These students settled in the south, specifically…They speak French, and over the years, the extremist ideas and rhetoric spread in France.’ Such articles are featured on Echaroukh’s website online, and are unique to the region – until, perhaps, the current fracas surrounding Khashoggi’s murder.
66 www.echoroukonline.com/jean-louis-levet-algeria-neglects-the-marketing-of-its-image-externally/. 67 www.echoroukonline.com/hakim-al-qarawi-algerian-students-who-returned-from-saudi-arabia- transferred-salafism-to-france/.
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Talk shows and reality shows command large audiences in Algeria, and there is a wide variety – including drama and comedy shows. A very popular show launched in 2017 on Echarouk TV is J8, based on the French equivalent, ‘Don’t touch my post’, and broadcast in Arabic. Host Farah Yasmine Nia previously presented on entertainment/musical programs Qahwa Hlib Party (2013) broadcast on El Djazairia and Zik Mag on KBC. She also participated on the first season of the hit reality show Mouziaa al-Arab. Comedy shows are also popular, as are soap operas both Algerian-made and imported from Turkey and the Gulf states, particularly during Ramadan. Unlike in other regional states, Algeria has very few bloggers, and their opinions and eclectic views are missing from the scene of social coverage online and within society. In a country so tightly controlled, such entrepreneurial activism online has neither been encouraged, nor been able to fill a gap in the field. Lebanese journalists continue to seem to be the most lively and active in the region. Most of them are fluent in at least one European language and many are very familiar with European and North-American media contexts. Furthermore, they enjoy a long tradition of access to foreign media.
Limitations and threats for free media market (gender equality, infringement of journalists rights and freedom of journalistic activities; impact of disinformation policy on media activities)
Regional Overview: Limitations on the media market are generally understood as emanating from the semi-authoritarian nature of the states in the region. Although all have constitutions, and Press Laws with clauses directly protecting freedom of
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speech, freedom of information, and freedom of the media, these are accompanied by strict Penal Codes and other regulations, most recently on Digital and Online Publication, that restrict media according to clearly set out red lines, including reportage that might threaten national security, besmirch the leadership or military, or incite public disturbance. The judiciary will tend to pass judgements in accordance with the penal restrictions, which may involve fines or incarceration of the journalists deemed to have overstepped the law. In a Facebook survey by the Arab Data Journalists Network, Freedom of Information laws didn’t appear to be helpful even in countries such as Jordan and Tunisia where they exist. The majority of respondents never used a freedom of information request68. Further, different countries in the region, including Morocco and Algeria, utilize government-controlled printing and advertising to promote or restrict print and audiovisual outlets both public and private, ensuring broad conformity with state accepted practices. Thus, if a newspaper, magazine or television channel fails to produce output agreeable to the state, it will squeeze them into extinction through economically induced failure. Other approaches by the state include appointing pro-government representatives onto staffs and boards, co-optation of private owners by the government, and silencing journalists for libel, defamation, or other anti-state behaviour. The result is that the majority of regional states, much like their ENP-E counterparts, have developed a business-government nexus in which media have become important players in a game of shared influence and communication dominance. As in Eastern and Central Europe, as analysed by Castro Herrera et al, ‘A “business parallelism”—media
68 https://ijnet.org/en/blog/arab-data-journalists%E2%80%99-network-driving-force-change-region.
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owners involved in politics and other businesses—has spread across the region’69. Likewise, the states in the ENP-S all have a number of high-profile cases of editors and journalists that are behind bars for coverage that has led the government to condemn them on grounds of threatening national security, cases regularly taken up on the international stage by Freedom House or Reporters without Borders, and which affect their ratings of a country’s freedom index in any given year. Yet, the media environment in regards to limitations and threats to what is viewed as ‘free’ by the West and the ENP, is considerably more complex than described above. The case of Tunisia offers a useful insight onto the agency exercised by populations themselves in the determination of how media freedom is accepted and defined. As noted by Hallin and Mancini in their landmark work on Media Systems, a media is the reflection of the society in which it operates70. Expecting all media to be similarly socially defined by universal concepts of free expression, investigative journalism and the task of holding government to account, is to miss the important differences in media’s role in and engagement within different societies. In the environments that pertain in many of the regional states, where civil war, conflicts on their borders, terrorism, refugee pressures and international military intervention have significantly implicated views on social stability, political opposition, foreign meddling, and ethnic/religious relations, the room for even-handed journalism can be very narrow, and reporting is frequently conflated (by government and/or the public) with incitement. Because the balance between strong policing authority, generally weak judiciary systems, and ambiguous laws knits the social system into a
69 Castro Herrero, Laia, Edda Humprecht, Sven Engesser, Michael Brüggemann, and Florin Büchel (2017), “Rethinking Hallin and Mancini Beyond the West: An Analysis of Media Systems in Central and Eastern Europe”, International Journal of Communication, Vol 11; p 4800. 70 Hallin, D., & Mancini, P. (2004), Comparing Media Systems: Three Models of Media and Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511790867.
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fabric different – and more fragile - than in the West, media is perceived as being as much a disruptive, as a collective resource, with significant symbolic power. In Tunisia, with the departure of the Ben Ali regime, the shackles that had so limited media freedom were abruptly removed, and media conformity to government requirements or indeed past laws was altered overnight, leading to a wholly unrestricted media landscape. However, within just a few weeks, social outrage at the unrestricted exercise of media as a public good came to the fore in an outpouring of popular dismay at media over-reach, and a steady rise in public demands for widely supported red lines emanated from the ‘Street’71. In an expression of agency by the previously ‘voiceless’, demonstrations took place in instances where Islamic rules and social propriety were deemed to have been overstepped – prompting the popularly elected Tunisian government to begin establishing new rules, including a prohibition against the mediatization of images of God, of nudity and of overt sexual poses. Indeed, throughout the next two years, and the governance of three different elected party leaderships in both the presidency and the parliament, further popularly mandated restrictions were put in place.72. These reflected significant, publicly expressed discomfort with investigative journalism and other reportage that was seen to undercut the work of post-revolutionary institutions and officials, the capacity of the military in the face of a rising terrorist threat, and to promote sensationalist programming that pitted different party and civic leaders against each other, often by revealing personal details and airing vendettas. Polls and surveys conducted during this period of media freedom tracked public opinion widely labelling it as ‘a media of
71 Farmanfarmain, Roxane (2017), Media, Culture & Society, Vol.39(7), pp.1043-1062. 72 Joffé, George (2014), “Government–media relations in Tunisia: a paradigm shift in the culture of governance?”, The Journal of North African Studies, 19:5, pp. 615-638.
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shame’73. Popular Tunisian support for media without restrictions, able to flout social and religious rules, and denounce the government, its practices and its officials, increasingly dropped74. This is not to say that all Tunisian journalists subscribe to these restrictions, or that there is today not a vocal group of both online and print/tv editors and others in the field that disagree strongly with the growing limitations on the media, and the shuttering of several outlets that were found by the regulators and courts to have broken the law. However, as elsewhere in the region, it is difficult to know how much the voices of these journalists resonate with the sensibilities of society at large, or as veteran Daily Star journalist and Director of the Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs at American University of Beirut, Rami Khouri contends, whether unfettered freedom of expression is the real debate. ‘The freedom of expression debate … is the wrong issue to be debating, because everyone I know around the world basically agrees that people should be free to speak out and give their opinions on a range of issues,’ he states. The real issue, in his view, is that in the Middle East free expression is not culturally linked to a similar level of value placed by Western countries on freedom of the individual75. ‘The freedom of the individual is the highest value in these countries, and must be safeguarded at all costs, ‘ he explains. ‘Billions of people around the world in fact do not see individual freedom as the primary human political and national value; rather, they see communal respect as the most important collective, personal and national value. Most people around the world
73 Farmanfarmaian, Roxane (2014), “What is private, what is public, and who exercises media power in Tunisia? A hybrid-functional perspective on Tunisia's media sector”, The Journal of North African Studies, 19:5, pp. 656-678, 74 Ibid. 75 Khouri, Rami (2017), “Freedom of Speech Is Not the Point”, Global Ethics Network, 28.09.2012, http://www.globalethicsnetwork.org/profiles/blogs/freedom-of-speech-is-not-the-point
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live in societies that consciously curtail some of the individual’s freedoms, in favour of the common good and collective wellbeing that ensue from such a social compact. This is not a debate about which approach to life and society is better; they are both appropriate, respectively, to their own communities’76. This view is widely held and debated in the media in the Middle East, and in Europe vis-à-vis Middle East practices, with little ability to form common ground. What is more, as populist governments in Hungary, Bulgaria and Poland reduce media freedoms and leverage, and adopt US President Trump’s vocal condemnation of the media as the fabricator of fake news, the label of cultural colonialism is more often heard from within the Middle East vis-à-vis EU emphasis on individual freedom of expression and media rights. In some instances, this trend in the West can be seen to have contributed to an opening for greater use of hate speech everywhere, including in the Middle East. What is more, leaders in the Middle East rarely acknowledge the restrictions on their journalists (including their incarceration) as falling outside national security laws, and broad social demonstrations rarely focus on media clampdowns. Fake news featured in the Middle East media landscape long before the Trump era, and information delivery has long been marked by practices of encoding and deciphering to get around red lines, while maintaining public pride in a diverse media landscape. In any event, it is clear that all three of the states being reported on here restrict their media according to clearly established red lines. How they do this is very different in each case: Morocco rewards good behaviour, publicly defames those that displease the authorities, and imprisons those few it can’t contain; Algeria fines those that overstep its libel laws, or drives media business out of operation based on financial pressure, preferring to avoid imprisonment, although it does occasionally
76 Ibid.
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incarcerate journalists it considers risking national security; while Lebanon will temporarily arrest problematic journalists while paying more lip service than the others to the need for freedom of expression.
Morocco
In February 2018, the Minister of Communication Mustapha el-Khalfi responded angrily when Reporters Without Borders put Morocco in [down 2 points from 2017] on their press freedom index, five places below South Sudan, where a civil war is raging. The RWB report, according to el-Khalfi, didn’t reflect the reality on the ground, or the steps forward that were being made. Yet, a few days after his outburst, a French camera team for working without a permit on the issue of abortion – although the French say they asked for the permit77. Since then, at least three Moroccan journalists were sentenced to jail-time. who is scheduled to be released on the 17 January 2019, Hamid El Mahdaouy, and cartoonist. In 2015, well-known journalist Ali Lemrabet went on when he was denied re-entry to the kingdom after a 10-year ban. Professor and publicist , founder of the Moroccan Association of Investigative Journalism, did the same after being vilified in the Moroccan official press (a common tactic of politically motivated fake news) and serving several stints in prison. Though he collapsed, he was not granted permission to leave the country78. The stories of these and other journalists and editors, are heavily covered by European reporters, and throw an important light on the increasing repression and
77 https://www.middleeasteye.net/columns/its-bad-time-journalists-and-activists-morocco-939801447. 78 El-Yaakoubi, Aziz (2015), “Moroccan intellectual collapses after hunger strike over ban’”, www.reuters.com/article/us-morocco-rights/moroccan-intellectual-collapses-after-hunger-strike-over- ban-idUSKCN0S81YS20151014.
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media censorship/self-censorship that is gripping Morocco. Indeed, the Reuters report on Monjib, states, ‘Critics say Morocco’s king is letting slide freedoms that he promised four years ago as a concession to protesters when he approved a new constitution devolving some court powers to parliament and the government in unheralded political reforms.’ Media scholars in Morocco view the reduction of media independence as increasingly acute. But they link it to a reform movement that predated the uprisings, perceiving it within a complex analysis of the deep state (the Court, or Makhzen)’s response to social openings resulting from the digital revolution, and to the government’s adoption of a sophisticated carrot-and-stick pattern, in which encouraging and rewarding media to conform is viewed as politically preferable to discouraging it through outright repression79. This approach is unique to Morocco, and the outcome is an increasingly co-opted media industry, opaque in its business holdings, closely tied to the Court, and highly diverse in its output. Morocco takes pride in pointing to RSF’s graphics that show no journalists or citizen journalists were killed in 201880. Zaid summarises the longer view: ‘A record number of libel and defamation suits were filed against print media in the years following the reforms,81 broadcast remained under state control via the National a Radio and Television Syndicate, SNRT and under close state supervision via HACA (the audio-visual regulator), and internet use is closely monitored through
79 Zaid, Bouziane (2017), “The authoritarian trap in state/media structures in Morocco’s political transition”, The Journal of North African Studies, 22:3, pp. 340-360. 80 https://rsf.org/fr/maroc-sahara-occidental. 81 In 2005 and 2006, 31 and 32 lawsuits (respectively) were filed against journalists. See Ministère de la communication, Le Rapport sur la Presse Ecrite et les Médias Audiovisuels Publics (2005 and 2006), http://www.mincom.gov.ma/rapports/.
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state surveillance.82 Morocco has failed to break with its own history of using media as an instrument of propaganda and political control. Yet the picture is mixed, as Morocco has witnessed periods of tight authoritarian control and periods of reformist tendencies, a cyclical fluctuation that has resulted in significant progress in media structure and performance and, at the same time, in the state maintaining its control over the media landscape through various mechanisms of repression.’ Typical of the double-faced nature of the legal structures and the relationship between the state and the media, the new 2016 press code eliminates jail sentences, but the penal code maintains them and the penal code appears in practice to supersede the press code at most junctures. Articles 76 and 77 of the Press Code specify fines of up to MAD 200,000 ($20,000) for publication of what might be seen as offensive content about the monarchy, Islam, and territorial integrity – that is, Morocco’s claim to the Western Sahara – the three ‘red lines’ that cannot be crossed and which all journalists learn to avoid in Morocco. Fines of that magnitude are unaffordable for most journalists in Morocco – and provide a powerful incentive for self-censorship. The press code moreover allows the state to seize foreign publications in case they breach taboo-related topics. To understand Moroccan media today, and the nature of the limitations on journalistic freedoms, the use of disinformation on media activities, and the threats that characterize the media market, it is important to look back briefly at the media response to the reforms that occurred in the 1990s. At the beginning of the decade, a new generation of non-partisan press titles, notably focusing on public affairs, emerged; two new weeklies L’Économiste and Maroc Hebdo International (1991) were launched, while La Vie Éco, which changed hands twice, employed several
82 Errazzouki, Samia (2017), “Under watchful eyes: Internet surveillance and citizen media in Morocco, the case of Mamfakinch”, The Journal of North African Studies, 22:3, pp. 361-385.
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figures that would go on to become the celebrity editor/writers of the so-called ‘independents’ (in contrast to the existing phalanx of ‘partisan press’): among them Ali Amar, Ahmed Benchemsi, Aboubakr Jamaï and Ali Lmrabet. This experience was not only one of the first testing beds for political and economic reporting in Morocco but signalled the first signs of a press that could be designed and run on entrepreneurial principles83. Undoubtedly the greatest opportunity lay in economic publishing, as it was less hampered by political constraints – and that part of the sector has continuously flourished. Nonetheless, an important development was the rise of a critical media space formed by publications that can be traced back to Le Journal Hebdomadaire (The Weekly Journal), an independent magazine established in 1997 by Aboubakr Jamai. Despite rumours it had indirect access to the palace, the paper was forced to close in 2010 after publishing a series of hard-hitting and critical articles that were widely regarded as ‘defying the red lines’ that surround Moroccan media84. However, Le Journal was key in that it singlehandedly carved out a space for independent media at a time when most of the existing media landscape was either connected to the state, political parties, or powerful individuals who swayed between the private sector and the government. What’s more, many of its journalists would go on to found important online and print publications that would expand the critical journalism field, including the weekly Tel Quel (still publishing, though currently much less outspoken than previously) and the online English-language current affairs website TalkMorocco (now closed).
83 Benchenna, Abdelfettah; Driss Ksikes & Dominique Marchetti (2017), “The media in Morocco: a highly political economy, the case of the paper and on-line press since the early 1990s”, The Journal of North African Studies, 22:3, 386-410, DOI:10.1080/13629387.2017.1307906. 84 Jacobs, Anna (2015), “Print Media and Political Reform in Morocco: The Case of Le Journal 1997– 2010” M.A., Thesis, University of Oxford, unpublished manuscript.
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Based on an ongoing study of the political economy of Morocco’s media, Benchenna et al. have stated: ‘According to several interviews with former managers of Journal and TelQuel (October 2015; April 2016), this momentum had in fact been encouraged by several counsellors and/or advisers at the Royal Palace, which led some newspaper editors to allow themselves more freedom, notably to transform the ‘reputation of Morocco abroad’ after the ‘Years of Lead’ (a label for the repressive years under Hassan II)85. However, just as the state apparatus could encourage reform, it could reduce it, and as the new King Mohammed VI’s rule went on, limitations on the media rose. ‘The new Arab language dailies famous for being ‘professional’ and politically ‘liberal’ (including Al Massae launched in 2007, and Akhbar Al Yaoum in 2009) experienced repression by the authorities, apparently worried by their growing readership and, hence, influence’. Today the press and television are more constrained than at any time since the Years of Lead in the 1980s. Restrictions and penalties come in different forms. According to The Report: Emerging Morocco 2013 by Oxford Business Group, powerful privatized business entities, such as Morocco’s three telecommunication companies, not only provide key services, but are known to adhere to state pressure to withdraw advertising money from news outlets that run counter to the state-sanctioned media narrative86. The state also pinpoints journalists via telephone tapping and wire-tapping, as well as online surveillance, sometimes even before they have completed the research for an article. A card the state often plays in Morocco is to incriminate and socially destroy
85 Benchenna, Ksikes and Marchetti (2017), op cit., p. 390. 86 According to The Report: Emerging Morocco 2013, Oxford Business Group, in regards to Maroc Telecom, Medi Telecom, and Inwi. Adverstising figures published annually by l’Economiste.ma, show telecommunications advertising spending represents 23% of the total advertising market share, http://bit.ly/1KvtrE9.
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journalists’ reputations and image, placing stories in the press that accuse the surveilled, as occurred with investigative journalist and lawyer Maati Monjib, of drunkeness, drug-taking, or committing adultery, the latter serving as an imprisonable offense. Examples are common, and it makes little difference if a journalist is working for domestic or foreign publications. Independent journalist Omar Radi, working on an article for Le Monde in 2015, had key elements of his research and reporting plan leaked to online pro-court site Le360, which published an article designed to discredit him. In May 2003, the terrorist attacks in Casablanca prompted the adoption of legislation based on a template promoted internationally by the US after 9/11, but which had been shelved in light of Islamist concerns over its powers. After Casablanca, the Anti-terrorism Law was rapidly adopted, and provides government sweeping legal powers against all forms of disturbance of the public order, resulting in a perceptible restriction of the exercise of public liberties, including the right to control media content that is deemed to “disrupt public order by intimidation, force, violence, fear or terror”87. It gives the authorities wide latitude in defining vague terms such as “national security”, and in particular, points to “the involvement in organized groups or congregations with the intent of committing an act of terrorism,” which includes “the promulgation and dissemination of propaganda or advertisement in support of the above-mentioned acts”88. The notion of complicity and assistance, which may be any form of social interaction with an individual identified as a terrorist at any point enables the state to conflate reporting with inciting, while denying the
87 Open Net Initiative, “Internet Filtering in Morocco, 2009”, http://opennet.net/sites/open.files/ONI_ Morocco_2009.pdf. A whole catalogue of illegal economic and financial activities has been included in the frame of terrorist acts as well; see Bendourou, O. (2004), ‘Libertés Publiques et Etat de Droit au Maroc,’ Fès: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. 88 Zaid (2017), op cit.
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right of citizens to know89. In this initial stage, in media scholar Bertram Turner’s view, ‘The need for international cooperation seems to have prevented the Moroccans’ European partners from commenting too explicitly on the different standards of civil rights resulting from anti-terror legislation.’ He goes on to observe that more recently, ‘It has been said that the Moroccan state does not actually depend on new legislation in order to increase pressure on the terror scene; but that it rather uses the law to demonstrate its perfect conformity with transnational standards and its international acceptance.’ In practice, the laws are ambiguous, and can be arbitrarily interpreted. According to Privacy International’s report on surveillance in Morocco, with Law 09- 08 and Article 24 of the constitution, surveillance is authorised ‘when a judicial order is issued’. However, as the report indicates, ‘the law does not clearly delineate precisely under what conditions judicial orders may be issued’90. With newly created security bodies, such as the Central Bureau of Judicial Investigations (known as the BCIJ, its French acronym) established in early 2015, the most frequent use of these legally sanctioned forms of surveillance have been used to arrest and prosecute suspected terrorists, including several journalists. In 2013, Ali Anouzla, editor of the Arabic edition of the online news site Lakome was jailed by the Royal Prosecutor for ‘material support’, ‘advocating’ and ‘inciting others to carry out terrorist acts’, after publishing a link to a propaganda video from Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. This site (French and Arabic versions) was then closed (before reappearing in 2014 under a new name, Lakome 2). Anouzla’s case continues, and he risks up to 30 years in
89 Turner, Bertram (2007), “Islamic Activism and Anti-terrorism Legislation in Morocco”, https://www.degruyter.com/downloadpdf/books/9783839409640/9783839409640- 007/9783839409640-007.pdf, p. 176. 90 “State of Surveillance: Morocco”, March 6, 2016; Human Rights Watch, “Country Reports on Terrorism 2015 – Morocco”, June 2.
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prison should the terrorism charges be confirmed by the courts91. Hamid al- Mahdaoui, editor of independent news site Bidal.info, was sentenced to three years in jail in June 2018 for threats to national security regarding the uprisings and associated stories around what’s known as the Hirak affair, having already served a year’s sentence (passed down in 2017) for filming a demonstration in al Hoceima92. The issue of migration for Morocco remains highly charged, and is often behind the regular expulsions of foreign correspondents and reporters from the country. In September 2018, France Inter reporter, Sébastien Sabiron, was expelled after 48 hours in Tangier, where he had travelled to cover the repression and displacement of sub-Saharan migrants to the south of Morocco. Though not officially arrested, he was threatened with a taser and interrogated for six hours93. The year before, four foreign correspondents were expelled, including one from the Guardian; the Minister of Communications stated at the time that this is a small minority and based primarily on a lack of accreditation, as he claimed that over 900 foreign correspondent permits had been granted that year94.
Lebanon
Censorship controls over literary and artistic works and publications in Lebanon today fall under the jurisdiction of the Directorate General of General Security. According to a 2010 study by Heinrich Boll Foundation, ‘General Security has been entrusted with the task of licensing, monitoring and censoring creative
91 https://rsf.org/fr/actualites/proces-fleuves-au-maroc-un-moyen-de-pression-supplementaire- lencontre-des-journalistes. 92 https://rsf.org/fr/actualites/maroc-rsf-denonce-une-condamnation-inique-dans-le-proces-de-hamid- el-mahdaoui. 93 https://rsf.org/fr/actualites/maroc-un-journaliste-de-france-inter-expulse-sans-raison-legale. 94 www.news24.com/Africa/News/morocco-defends-expulsion-of-guardian-journalist-20170929.
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works. Within this domain, General Security enjoys a certain degree of autonomy and a certain margin within which to manoeuvre, allowing it to control when and how much freedom will be permitted, heightening or reducing restrictions according to the prevailing political circumstances and the dictates of the various political and religious powers and parties’95. The 1977 Legislative Decree, as amended by Law no. 300 issued on March 17, 1994, is still considered the primary legal reference for deliberating publication offenses and violations. The 1994 Broadcasting Law, considered the first in the region, gives a special branch of the Judiciary, the Press and Publications Court in Beirut, the task of determining whether censorship has violated freedom of expression, whether journalists have broken the laws on, for example, defamation, incitement to sectarianism and threats to national security (including cooperation with Israel); and what level of punishment, usually in the form of fines, rather than imprisonment, is to be meted out. In practice, these courts are less specialized than anticipated in the legal framework, as judges are rarely versed in areas of publication law. Debates have occurred in Parliament in the past over increasing or decreasing the level of media control, often with little material changes to the law. As Lebanon has no journalists currently imprisoned, Freedom House raised its rating this year from 2 to 3, stating: ‘The score improved due to journalists’ greater demonstrated ability to cover sensitive political topics without fear of detention or physical reprisals in comparison with previous years.’ Even so, it still considers Lebanon as only partially free, a view also held by Reporters without Borders. Freedom House’s Lebanon Report 2018 notes that ‘There is no freedom of information law, and government documents are difficult to obtain in practice. There
95 lb.boell.org/en/2010/12/15/censorship-lebanon-law-and-practice.
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are few practical opportunities for civil society groups to influence pending policies or legislation, though they and the media are able to discuss proposals that have been made public.’ It goes on to say, ‘Books, movies, plays, and other artistic works are subject to censorship, especially when the content involves politics, religion, sex, or Israel.’ In 2007, the Samir Kassir Foundation set up The Samir Kassir eyes (SKeyes) Center to monitor violations of press and cultural freedom and defend the rights and freedom of expression of journalists and intellectuals. Engaged both in training as well as activism, it was one of over 15 human rights and media NGOs that signed a letter to David Kaye, the UN special rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression in July 2018, expressing concern over a deteriorating human rights situation, stating, ‘for many months, Lebanese security agencies, particularly the Cybercrimes Bureau ... have been summoning individuals with regard to social media posts‘96. The letter, which specified that 40 individuals had been summoned since 2016 for making public comments ‘criticizing the Lebanese authorities or political figures,’ was in response to Lebanese Center for Human Rights President Wadih al-Asmar’s announcement that he had been called in for questioning by the Internal Security Forces’ Anti-Cybercrimes Bureau. Concern by Ayman Mhanna, the director of SKEyes, as well as Progressive Socialist Party head Walid Joumblatt, who had a family member arrested a few months prior for postings on Facebook, had been rising over the increasing control being exercised by the Anti-Cybercrimes Bureau. As noted on the SKeyes website, ‘the NGOs touched on cases that were referred to the Military Court, journalists whose cases were referred to Criminal Court instead of the Court of Publications, as well as people who were
96 http://www.skeyesmedia.org/en/News/Lebanon/Rights-groups-pen-open-letter-to-UN-on-free- speech.
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released after signing a pledge that they would refrain from writing about certain officials.’ The nature of the published exchange (the story was likewise covered by the Daily Star) leads to two observations: 1) the environment for free speech and publication is deteriorating in Lebanon; and 2) it is still significantly higher than in many neighbouring states, where public references to the fundamental right to freedom of expression, as made by a number of the signatories and politicians in this case, are significantly rarer. The UN special rapporteur responded immediately urging the Lebanese government to ‘take action’.
Algeria
The Information Law establishes principles and rules on the exercise of the right to information and freedom of the press; however, its restrictions are more prominent than the freedoms it purports to protect, as specified constraints include red lines covering the Constitution, the Muslim religion, national identity and culture, national sovereignty and unity, security and national defence, public order, and the economic interests of the country. The Algerian Criminal Code and Organic Press Law both impose significant fines (which can equal years of a journalist’s salary) for defamation of political officials with no clear boundaries for how defamation is defined. An Executive Decree promulgated in April 2008, based on the Labour Law of 1990, provides formal professional status to the journalistic profession, provides for proper contracts of employment, the right to unionise and guarantees of copyright; however it did not alter the January 2001 Press Law and did not decriminalise press offences97.
97 Oxford Business Group (2008), The Report: emerging Algeria 2008, London, pp. 197-204.
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State control over the printing process gives it significant leverage over private sector publications by enabling it to demand immediate payment of outstanding printing costs from offending publications, even when their debts are due to non- payment by the government for advertising it places in their pages. This was used to great effect to close down Le Matin in 2004 and to send its director/editor, Mohamed Benchicou, to prison for two years on a trumped-up charge of financial irregularities. This was one of the most popular French-language dailies in Algeria, claiming a daily print run of 100,000 copies and being particularly closely followed by Algeria’s Berber population who form an estimated 80 per cent of the population of the capital, Algiers. Benchicou was a particularly vociferous critic of the president and, shortly before the presidential electoral campaign in 2003, he had produced a book entitled Bouteflika: une imposture Algérienne, which criticised the president in detail as a relic of the days of Algeria’s single-party state. The president’s reaction was to use the courts to pursue, first Benchicou’s newspaper to extinction and then to pursue him in person. The newspaper was forced out of business by being presented with claims so massive – debts of DA362 million ($5 million) – that it simply could not meet them, even when the courts requisitioned its assets, including the building from which it operated. It tried to continue as an internet-based newspaper but eventually folded when it could not even pay its journalists. Besides non-payment of debts, the libel law has proved to be the most effective way of disciplining journalists who are made personally liable for any transgression, as are the publications for whom they work. It is the case that the president did declare a moratorium on libel cases against journalists on July 4, 2006 but in the following six months there were still a further eight cases against leading
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Journalists and publications, a pattern that continues.98 Algeria’s journalists are adept at working around the libel law, despite its ambiguous definitions, and self- censorships is rife. Moreover, although Algeria often claims it has no journalists in prison, Said Chitour has been held in detention for 508 days without trial. On October 22, 2018, National Press Day, journalists gathered in front of the Press House, Tahar Djaout in Algiers, demanding his release. Chitour, a correspondent for the BBC, the Washington Post, and other English language publications, is accused of passing secret documents to foreign powers. His lawyers claim there is no evidence for the charge of treason99. In light of this, it is striking that the current Minister of Communications, Djamal Kaouane, stated to Radio Algeria’s Chanel 3 (state radio) during an interview on the eve of the National Day of the Press that ‘journalists ability, and freedom, to access information is a reality that those in the profession live every day.’ Moreover, Kaouane underlined that there was no constraint on that liberty save that imposed by the law as protected by the constitution. Equally of interest is that the report on the journalists’ demonstration, and the accusations, was reported by Algerian online news TSA-algerie.com. One explanation is that Algeria’s state has approached the print media much as it has Islamic parties – sequestering them in a space in which, within purposefully undefined limits, they are given a degree of freedom, on the premise that pluralism within that space suggests both competition and independence, when in fact, the process marginalises and contains the press while acting as a safety valve for public disgruntlement. As such, the Algerian press, for example, is renowned for the outspokenness of various cartoonists, who will go so far as depicting President
98 El Watan, 30.01.2007. 99 www.tsa-algerie.com/le-journaliste-said-chitour-est-detenu-depuis-508-jours-sans-jugement/.
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Bouteflika with a small crown, hunched over in his wheelchair. However, the cartoonists are very aware of how far they can go without risking government censure.
See Figure 2.
Figure 2.
By contrast, television remains very much in the government’s gift, despite recent licenses for several private satellite channels, whose activity and economic independence remain in doubt. The outlook is uncertain as the state has always jealously guarded its control over the audio-visual sector and since 2000, when private satellite television began beaming in earnest into Algeria from abroad, reacted often quite violently against them. In 2004, it closed down the company responsible for two such initiatives, Khalifa TV and KTV, arresting many of those
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involved. The Khalifa case is illustrative, as the channel was one holding of many within a conglomerate built up by an Algerian billionaire who began in the pharmacy sector, but who, by the time the company was closed down, had acquired an airline and founded a bank – all as a result of the privatisation and liberalisation wave that affected Algeria in the 1990s (much as it did elsewhere in the region). Despite very close, and well-publicized business relations with the government and the military, the government accused the company of financial malfeasance in 2002, forced Khalifa TV and KTV to shut in May 2003, and by 2004 both the bank and airlines had been put in receivership. It is quite clear that presidential sympathy for the Khalifa Group had begun to wane in mid-2002 because of Mr Khalifa’s decision to move into satellite television. This is not surprising – the very ambiguous relationships developed by al-Jazeera Television (as the Middle East’s first satellite television system) with governments and leading statesmen in the Arab world are testament to that (al-Jazeera is still banned from Algeria). President Bouteflika has been notorious inside Algeria for his jealous hold over television, since he realises that, in a country where – even today – 26.5 per cent of the population is still illiterate and even amongst the 15-to-29 year old group illiteracy runs at 9 per cent, television, far more than the print media is crucial for modern mass politics (though internet is fast catching up, and as such, also tightly controlled). Hence the presidency for a long time prevented private radio and television channels (until 2016!, see below) and has maintained an iron grip over the state-run system through press laws and the constant threat of legal sanction. Yet it was the threat of competition over television coverage that was really at issue – in the election campaign of March 2004, candidates other than President Bouteflika were only allowed one slot of an hour each to present their programmes whereas the news, day-after-day was filled by the presidency. This also has to be seen against the fact that the president had visited
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every wilaya (province) – there are forty-eight of them in Algeria – at least once in the preceding year and had, on every occasion, provided significant additional funds to improve local services – and every visit was covered in extenso by the Algerian state television. In other words, the president achieved saturation coverage as a result of his monopolisation of television, something which the other candidates could only mirror by using external satellite services. It is unsurprising therefore that the presidency did all that it could to prevent the satellite services continuing and there is no doubt that it would have considered anybody engaged in running them as predisposed to be opposed to presidential success in the elections. In other words, the simple fact of running such a service, whether or not there was direct engagement in editorial control, would have been seen as an overtly political act against the president’s interests – thus dooming the channels, and indeed, the entire corporation. Much the same occurred in the following election, and it is only now, with private channels accepted by the state, that a wider field of coverage is in theory possible during elections. However, the private channels are closely interlinked to the authorities, and if they wish to continue in business, are unlikely to exercise independence in covering political affairs. Although President Bouteflika had the opportunity just recently during National Press Liberation Day to underscore the state’s commitment to a just and free press, the real tenor of his address focused on the need of the media to support the national interest and patriotic coming together to strengthen Algeria. Although he promised that the situation would continuously improve, this has consistently been in the form of rhetoric only, and the range of independence enjoyed by the media remains narrow and ambiguous.
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Quality and structure of media in selected countries (trends in development of communication means; forms of communication - differences of preferences, social and technical development) Morocco
Morocco enjoys a plenitude of media, with a large range of newspapers and magazines, radio stations and a combination of private and public television channels. In 2014, the Minister for Communication identified 488 newspapers (including 15 partisan publications, and 171 ‘independent’ regional newspapers) and 500 national, regional and local news websites. However, these raw data tend first to hide the considerable financial difficulties the Moroccan press is facing as shown by the publications’ high ‘mortality rate’, and second, a drastic decline in the paper press distribution numbers, which are very weak in a struggling advertising market. In 1989, television station ‘2M’ was founded as a private enterprise alongside Morocco’s national television. Based in Casablanca, it was financed initially by Omnium Nord Africain (ONA – effectively, the royal family’s private interests holding company, now known as the Société Nationale d’Investissement (SNI)). In 1996, SNI sold most of the shares to the Moroccan state which now controls 68 per cent of ‘2M’, with the SNI retaining just 20.7 per cent. Today the state audiovisual operator, Société Nationale de Radiodiffusion et de Télévision (SNRT)i operates eight of Morocco’s ten domestic television channels, with a majority holding in ‘2M’ and a holding in the tenth, ‘Medi 1 TV’, and six of the country’s radio stations, with Radio Méditerrannée in the private sector. Access to satellite television is unrestricted. Moroccan media underwent a period of reform, begun in the 1990s, and increasingly, since 2003, a period of constraint, with only a superficial re-opening immediately after the uprisings in 2011. ‘The interdependent relationship between the regime and mass media took a radical turn when the opposition socialist government
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was elected in 1997’, writes Bouziane Zaid in his 2017 study on the Structure of Moroccan media100. ‘The wave of political liberalization and democratization in the second half of the 1990s resulted in major media reforms.’ In 2002 a new Press Code replaced the more repressive 1976 Press Code, and in 2016 an updated version, with provisions to regulate digital media, was approved by Parliament. The High Authority for Audiovisual Communication (Haut Autorité de la Communication Audiovisuelle, HACA) was created in 2002 to establish the legal framework for liberalizing the audiovisual sector, and oversee a public service broadcasting division. In November 2004, Parliament adopted the Audio Visual Communication Law, ending the state’s monopoly in broadcasting management. In April 2005, Moroccan Radio and Television (Radiodiffusion et Television Marocaine), the institution that earlier managed state TV and radio, was transformed from a subsidiary of the Ministry of Communication to a self-standing body, the National Company of Radio and Television (la Société Nationale de Radiodiffusion et de Télévision—SNRT). Between 2006 and 2014, HACA granted new licenses to 9 public TV stations, 16 private radio stations and one private TV station. The establishment of L’Association des Radios et Télévisions Indépendantes (ARTI) for example, in 2008 as a lobbying organisation by the private radio stations, was a critical step in the institutionalisation of the Moroccan audiovisual sector. ‘Thus,’ writes Zaid, ‘the structure of Morocco’s media was re-defined, a new print and online media law promulgated, a broadcast regulator set up, and a framework for private broadcasting was created.’ What’s more, according to Sonay’s study on radios in Morocco, ‘The professional association for radio audience ratings, Centre Interprofessionnel de Mesure d’Audience Radio (CIRAD), was created in 2012 as a
100 Zaid, Bouziane (2017), “The authoritarian trap in state/media structures in Morocco’s political transition”, The Journal of North African Studies, 22:3, pp. 340-360.
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joint project by private and public radio stations as well as by the radio advertisers’ organisation, Groupement des Annonceurs du Maroc (GAM), and a group of communication agencies, Union des Agences Conseils en Communication (UACC)101. Today there are 13 private and 4 public radio stations. Radio Medi 1, Med Radio(focusing on local associational life), Radio Aswat, Hit Radio, Luxe Radio, Radio Mars(designed as sports radio), Medina FM (focusing on rural and agricultural matters), Radio MFM (a ‘proximity’ radio focusing on local issues), Chada FM, Cap Radio, Radio Atlantic, Radio Plus and Radio Sawa. MFM Radio and Radio Plus are regional stations and have several branches. The stations as part of SNRT are Radio Nationale [Al Idaa Al Watania] (with additional 10 regional branches), Radio Chaine Inter, Radio Amazigh [Al Idaa Al Amazighia] and Radio Mohammed VI du Saint Coran. According to a Rabat interview conducted by Sonay, ‘Radio is very important in terms of music, information, local, national, and international news. You are also forced by everyday life to listen to it. If you do not have time to look for other information, you can benefit from radio. On Hit Radio you find all sorts of music, on Radio Aswatyou can follow advice on legal matters, on Medina FM a mufti answers questions on religion, and on Med Radio Mamoun Dribi helps [the audience] concerning psychological issues. On [Moroccan] television you only find soap operas’102. There is also a range of Islamic media in Morocco, but it is all tightly controlled. Much of the content is produced by the Mohammedan League of
101 Ali Sonay (2017), “Radio and political change: listening in contemporary Morocco”, The Journal of North African Studies, 22:3, pp. 411-434. 102 Ibid.
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Religious Scholars, an innovative government sponsored think tank103. In fact, the state has largely structured the Islamic field in order to counter the proliferation of extremist media that streams across the region. As such, according to a report by Huffington Post, the Islamic Affairs Ministry is producing ‘round-the-clock Islamic broadcasting on radio and television: an Islamic satellite channel called Al- Sadisa (The Sixth, as in King Muhammad VI) and a national radio network, Idha’at al- Qur’an al-Karim (The Holy Qur’an Broadcast). Eleven years since its launch in 2005, the latter has attracted 19 percent of all radio listeners in Morocco (it is officially touted as the most popular channel – but research by Sonay suggests that many listeners will claim it is their favourite, as that is viewed as the proper response, but in fact, music and private local news stations, particularly Hit Radio, receive more listening hours)104. As for Al-Sadisa, it has been estimated to garner 85 percent of the Moroccan audience for religious television broadcasts, with the remaining 15 percent divided among the network’s 120-odd competitors. Conveying a carefully constructed, disciplined message of civility and tolerance through faith, it is widely credited inside the country for reviving and building on indigenous Moroccan religious traditions’105. According to a 2016 study by America Abroad Media, upon which the Huffington Post article was based, ‘In style as well as substance, programming makes maximal use of the inherent competitive advantage of a Moroccan network targeting an overwhelmingly Moroccan audience: the appeal of local guests, local landscapes, and the indigenous traditions and folklore that bind Moroccans together. Rather than communicate in Modern Standard Arabic — a formal construct used throughout the Arab region but unevenly understood across
103 www.themaydan.com/2018/08/rise-bureaucrat-changing-religious-authority-morocco/. 104 Ali Sonay (2017), op. cit. 3 105 ‘Moroccan Islamic Broadcasting to Counter Extremism’, 11.10.2017, www.huffingtonpost.com/joseph-braude/moroccan-islamic-broadcas_b_12430208.html.
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divides of literacy and class — all discussions are conducted in Darija, the Moroccan Arabic vernacular. An example is, Qari’at min al-Maghreb (Female Reciters from Morocco), an “American Idol”-style talent competition in which young women from cities and towns across the kingdom chant excerpts from the Qur’an before a panel of judges’106.
Training. Moroccan journalists are ill-trained, despite the degrees on offer by the Institute of Information Science and Communication (ISIC), located in Rabat, which provides a wide range of formal reporting and editing courses. Additionally, BA degrees in Communications are offered by Al Akhawayn University in Ifran, taught, as are all the university’s courses, in English (though it includes courses on writing for French, and Arabic media). With two main tranches – in journalism and in advertising/promotion, the number of graduates was, in 2013 (the most recent year for which data is available), just 13. Many of these are from other states in the region. A plethora of smaller organisations, both public and private, primarily located in Casablanca and Rabat, provide additional training, apprenticeships, and hands-on experience, of various levels of quality. Benchenna et al. state that the overall level of media professionalisation is low; likewise pay is low, and accreditation is difficult to obtain – the majority of journalists and reporters are freelance. Only some 2,130 journalists were accredited by the Ministère de la Communication in 2012 (the most recent data available), most of whom worked for official national media. Indeed, nearly half (46.9%) of the accredited professionals work for state audio-visual media companies – either in public television or radio, or at Morocco’s Press Agency, MAP
106 Examining Religious Television Channels in the Middle East, www.americaabroadmedia.org/sites/default/files/Moroccan%20Islamic%20Broadcasting%20in%20Re sponse%20to%20Religious%20Extremism.pdf.
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(10.28%)107. Even though only 40% have full time contracts, 50% of Moroccan journalists remain in the field for more than 10 years108. Despite its limitation, there is a great deal of pride in Morocco linked to the media and the quality of its journalism. This was on show just this past month when a Moroccan reporter won the Alliance of Mediterranean News Agencies (AMAN) Prize for Best Article. Rahal Taoussi of the Moroccan News Agency (MAP) received first prize for his article "Migration: after the Balkan routes, the Central Mediterranean route makes EU leaders dizzy". The Moroccan News Agency was represented at the 27th General Assembly of the Alliance on Oct. 3, 2018 by its director-general Khalil Hachimi Idrissi, who is also currently chairman of AMAN109.
Lebanon
According to the Media Sustainability Index of 2005, ‘The news media, both newspaper and broadcast, present a broad range of political views, but in most cases those views are the ones espoused by forces, both domestic and external, that own or help bankroll them. Media technology is advanced, often state-of-the-art, but media management is dictated by political and family ties. Lebanese universities teach students how to perform accurate and objective journalism, but the media they
107 Haut-commissariat au Plan, National Inquiry on timetables in Morocco, 2011/2012, http://www.hcp.ma/region-drda/attachment/534458/; see also, Minister for Communication of the Kingdom of Morocco, Efforts to Promote the Freedom of the Press: Annual Report, p. 36, http://mincom.gov.ma/landing/demo/template/wordpress/media/k2/attachments/Liberte_de_la_presse _VF_07_03_ 13.pdf. 108 M. Said (2004), “Freedom of the Press, Professional Ethics and the Practice of Journalism in Morocco”, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, http://www.media-diversity.org/en/additional-files/documents/b- studies- reports/Free%20Press,%20Ethics%20and%20Practices%20of%20Journalism%20in%20Morocco%20 [FR].pdf. 109 http://www.mapnews.ma/en/top-news/general/map-journalist-rahal-taoussi-wins-aman-prize-best- article.
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wind up working for often dictate the opposite’110. The situation has shifted slightly since then with the explosion in online and social media output (and usage), but the partisan relationship is little changed. Freedom of expression is enshrined in the Lebanese Constitution as well as in international treaties to which Lebanon is a party. According to the Freedom House 2018 report on Lebanon it has among the most open media environments in the Middle East111. Criticising or defaming the president or state security forces is a criminal offence, and an audiovisual media law bans broadcasts that seek to harm the state or its foreign relations or incite sectarian violence, among other broadly worded provisions. These and similar laws have been used to intimidate and prosecute journalists who disseminate criticism of the government or powerful nonstate actors. The majority of Lebanese media is in private hands112. There are nine television broadcast stations in Lebanon. These reach more than 97 percent of the adult Lebanese audience113. The government has a small national news agency, a television channel, and radio station. In both news and entertainment, they are eclipsed by the half-dozen privately owned television stations and more than a dozen private radio stations. With few exceptions, privately owned media reflect the views of individual politicians or their political blocs and receive direct or indirect financial aid from internal and external powers. Some strive for acceptance as impartial sources of news, while others unabashedly serve as their masters’ mouthpieces. The distribution of television licenses is frequently cited—by politicians, civil society
110 Media Sustainability Index 2005; “The Media Sustainability Index (MSI) is a product of IREX with funding from USAID and MEPI, p. 91, http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0015/001520/152010e.pdf. 111 https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2018/lebanon. 112 Media Sustainability Index 2005, op cit. 113 medialandscapes.org/country/lebanon/media/television.
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advocates, and the general public—as one of the most blatant abuses of political power. “The licenses are given on a sectarian basis,” said Wadih E. Haddad, of the Voice of Lebanon, a Christian radio station launched during the civil war but popular across Lebanon’s religious sects and political blocs. “The problem is that the cabinet distributes the licenses in Lebanon. This is a mistake. It should be the National Audio-Visual Media Council,” said Ibrahim Farhat, public relations manager for Al- Manar TV, the Hezbollah station. There is one government television station, TeleLiban, and the privately owned stations include behemoth LBC (Christian origin, but with Saudi Prince bin Talal a major shareholder), Prime Minister Hariri’s family holding Future TV (Sunni), NTV, ANB, NBN (Shia Amal channel owned by party leader Nabih Berri), Hezbollah’s Al-Manar, and Tele-Lumiere (Christian Maronite). In the pro-Iranian sphere, Al- Mayadin (The Squares) stands out. It is a pan-Arab satellite television channel launched in June 2012 and broadcasting from Beirut. Muslim Shia, Muslim Sunni, Christian, Druze, and other religious sects each have either their own channel, or blocks of time for broadcasting on at least one channel with generalised programming. There is one government radio station, Radio Beirut. Voice of Lebanon is considered the most-listened-to of the 14 privately owned radio stations with newscasts. Currently there are five major radio stations in the country and a dozen small local ones, broadcasting to 85 percent of the Lebanese population (2.85 million receivers according to the latest available statistics) in the four main languages spoken in the country: Arabic, English, French, Armenian. Five of them account for the majority of listeners. The majority of the country’s radio stations have commercial licenses, broadcasting music, socio-cultural programs and entertainment talk shows. Following the example of television, only a few of them have “class-A” licenses that
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entitle them to broadcast political content and news (the government owned Idhaat Lubnan, then Sawt Lubnan, Sawt ash-Shaab, Sawt al-Ghad, Sawt Lubnan al- Hurr andIdhaat an-Nur). As is the case for other Lebanese news media, also radio news providers, with the exception of the state-owned Idhaat Lubnan/Radio Liban (Radio of Lebanon, one of the first radios in the Arab world, founded in 1939), reflect their different political and religious affiliations. In more recent times, Lebanese radio companies have been diversifying their offerings and now provide a wide range of digital services, with online streaming, dedicated websites and mobile apps. There are nine Arabic daily newspapers, two Armenian-language dailies and one each in English and French. The total circulation of all the dailies is estimated at under 150,000 daily. An-Nahar, considered the largest daily, says it distributes 45,000 copies a day within Lebanon and 5,000 abroad. As-Safir, Al-Balad, and Ad- Diyyar are considered the next largest papers. A 1953 law limits the number of daily newspapers in Lebanon to 25, of which a maximum of 15 can be in the Arabic language. Currently, newspapers also are published in English, French, and Armenian. 14% of Lebanese time is spent reading newspapers and magazines, 11% listening to the radio, 32% watching television, and 62% of time is spent on the internet and digital platforms, according to the Northwestern University and University of Qatar’s annual media survey, ‘Media in the Middle East’, 2018.
Training: Journalism training is good in Lebanon. The government’s Lebanese University offers an extensive journalism program, as does the American University in Beirut. Quality journalism degree programs are available that provide substantial practical experience. Journalism courses are also offered by several private colleges. Further, short-term training and in-service training programs allow journalists to
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upgrade skills or acquire new skills while on the job. Several foreign governments and organizations offer fellowships or other training opportunities for Lebanese journalists, and more broadly, for regional journalists in Lebanon. Most courses, however, concentrate on the “how to” aspects of practicing journalism and on technical procedures; the result is that media management remains an unfilled hole in the educational and training process. A unique addition to this field is MAP - Media Association for Peace - an NGO founded in Lebanon, claiming to be the first in the country and indeed the MENA region, dedicated to ‘’ through training, advocacy, research and publications. It mounts workshops, and takes on interns from around the region. Another important local contributor to journalism development is SKEyes, the media monitoring arm of the Samir Kassir Foundation (developed in memory of the journalist killed during the civil war). Among its various projects, it develops investigative media reports for journalists, including recently a four-part series developed in partnership with Middle East Strategic Perspectives (MESP) on covering Lebanon’s nascent natural resource industry: ‘Lebanese Media Coverage of the Oil and Gas Sector’. According to its website, ‘In August 2017, SKeyes joined a project led by the Lebanese Oil and Gas Initiative (LOGI) entitled “Enhancing Transparency and Accountability in the Oil and Gas Sector in Lebanon” with the aim of providing media professionals with the knowledge and tools to shed light on the nascent sector, increase transparency and foster a culture of accountability. To this end, SKeyes held several training workshops with media outlets across Lebanon focusing on the latest developments in the Lebanese oil and gas sector and on journalists’ role in holding officials to
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account. SKeyes and MESP also continued their monitoring of the quality of media coverage of the sector’114. Nonetheless, the Lebanese take pride in the level of their journalistic capacity, and quality of their broadcast production. For example, it was major news across Lebanon when a Lebanese American University graduate made history as the first female news anchor on a main news program in Saudi Arabia.115 Weam Al Dakheel recently became co-anchor of Al Saudiya’s 9.30 p.m. bulletin, the main news program on Saudi Arabia’s state-run television network. She is anchoring alongside Saudi journalist Omar al-Nashwan.
Algeria
In the aftermath of Algeria’s brutal civil war, a state of emergency, in effect from 1992 until February 2011, put the media under the control of the authorities. As in other states in the region, the events of the Arab Uprisings, from which Algeria was largely immune, led to a reform to its media laws. This included a 2012 Information Law, followed by a 2014 Broadcasting Law, both of which promised to achieve considerably more in the private sector especially, than has actually been seen in practice. Even so, among the main innovations included in the new media law, Article 4/10 states that information services in the country can be provided by the public sector, by political parties or associations, to private citizens subject to Algerian law and with capital owned by physical or legal bodies of Algerian nationality116. New legislation has likewise officially shifted media responsibility out of the hands of
114 http://www.skeyesmedia.org/en/a/Reports/Lebanese-Media-Coverage-of-the-Oil-and-Gas-Sector-- 2018-Report. 115 http://madame.lefigaro.fr/societe/weam-al-dakheel-premiere-presentatrice-du-jt-national-tv-arabie- saoudite-vision-2030-240918-150792. 116 Journal Officiel de la Republique Algerienne (JORA), 2012.
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government to three regulatory institutions, the Press Regulatory Authority, the Audio Visual Regulatory Authority (ARAV) and the Press Commission. Although functionally designed to be more professional and independent, the directors and members of these bodies, according to the legislation, are political appointments with the majority in each case appointed by the President; none have so far been formed. Until they are, the Minister of Information remains responsible. Nonetheless, a gradual liberalisation of the media environment that opened the press sector to private ownership, has led to a more pluralistic media environment, with more than 45 independent publications in French and Arabic as well as four state-owned newspapers (two in French, two in Arabic). Yet, the government still controls printing and advertising, which creates limits on freedom of the press. The most widely circulated newspapers are Echourouk (from about 425,000 copies), El Khabar (350,000), Ennahar (300,000), El Watan (200,000), the Quotidien d’Oran (200,000) and Liberté (125,000). However, government’s control over the printing industry means all but two major privately-held papers (al Watan and al Khabar) are dependent on state services, which in effect gives the authorities censorship oversight of press output. The state likewise dominates the advertising industry, and like other states in the region, uses advertising as a means to support pro-government publications, and squeeze those more independently minded. With the fall in oil prices in 2014, the country experienced an economic crisis leading former Minister of Communications Hamid Grine to announce that the volume of media advertising issued by government institutions would be reduced by 65 percent in 2015 and 2016. As a result of the initial 2016 cuts alone, six newspapers were forced out of business, and consequentially many journalists lost their jobs. This year, for reasons not entirely clear, after publishing for twenty-two years, the management of the eminent French-
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language newspaper La Tribune shut its doors, laying off all of its employees. The owners blamed the situation on financial troubles resulting from high taxes, printing press debts, and shrinking advertising revenues. The privatisation of the press did not lead to a significant pluralisation of opinion and content. Instead, it has only contributed to the murky nature of the industry and its links with power, as there is little transparency in financial or ownership structures, and no laws requiring this information to be made public. As such, the most successful private press are owned by conglomerates or families closely knit to government or military officials, forming a media-government partnership that serves both. As an example, the largest newspaper and private satellite television channel are both held by the Echarouk conglomerate – though there is very little public information on the company117. In comparison with other new and old media, and with many of its neighbours, television still holds central place in Algeria. The most notable change in the television landscape in Algeria in the last 15 years has been the transition from a dominating French presence to the prevalence of Middle-Eastern and Maghrebi channels in Arabic, as confirmed by several audience surveys118. Today, Algeria has one public television network: ENTV (also known as EPTV). It consists of five national TV channels: La Terrestre (the main Arabic channel, with general interest programming); Canal Algérie (French general interest programming); Algérie 3 (A3) (Arabic general interest programming); and, since 2009, Algérie 4 (Tamazight) and Algérie 5 (thematic/Koran). ENTV (or EPTV) has 19 departments (“directions” in French), of which four are regional. These include: production of programming and
117 https://dz.kompass.com/c/echourouk-entreprise-sarl/dz253988/. 118 Ahcene-Djaballah B. (2014), Audimat Classement Sigma 2014, Almanach-dz.com, 15 February 2014, http://almanachdz.com/index.php?op=fiche&fiche=4179.
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news; archiving; advertising, research and equipment; human resources, finance and security. News, sport and entertainment programming is slick, and women are visible as news anchors, reporters and actors. Algerie 5 is the only channel for Islamic- based programming, which includes Quranic reading programmes, children’s shows, short and medium-length documentaries, and a ‘reality TV’ show, ‘The Holy Quran Caravan’, which offers sixteen contestants competing in reciting the Quran, with the audience voting on who is best119. As in other parts of the region, satellite broadcasting significantly affected the Algerian audio-visual landscape, leading to a proliferation of private channels directed to Algerian viewers. March 2013 saw the establishment of 31 private satellite channels across various genres (generalist, news and political channels), though all foreign and based outside the country120. The 2014 Broadcasting Law aimed at oversight for what otherwise was broadcasting outside regulated audio-visual control. It allowed for three private satellite channels for the first time, to open offices inside Algeria, though with the caveat that permission could be withdrawn at anytime. The law sets out detailed requirements for the licensing of broadcasters, with licences only issued to Algerian nationals and ownership of broadcasters to be entirely Algerian. However, the government’s delay in granting domestic licenses for satellite channels resulted in sixty domestic satellite channels broadcasting during a short period of time in response to the absence of a regulatory infrastructure. Consequently, in May 2016, Prime Minister Abdelmalek Sallal announced that fifty channels would be shut down on the pretext that they did not have licenses to operate in Algeria. Today, according to statements by President Bouteflika, 20
119 Khaled Hroub (2012), Religious Broadcasting in the Middle East, London: Hurst and Co., p.12. 120 http://www.med-media.eu/project-countries/algeria/.
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private channels enjoy official licensing121. The main ones: news-focused El-Nahar TV and Al-Eshoroukh TV, general news and entertainment channels El Djazairia, el Bilad, and KBC, cooking channel Samira TV, and Dzair TV, which carries sports and talk shows. Since their founding (majority founded in 2013, KBC and el Bilad in 2014) they have become the most popular channels, commanding by far the largest viewership, for example, for their Ramadan soap opera offerings122. What’s more, their establishment in the Algerian market has led to a diminishment in viewership of the Gulf channels, specifically Al-Jazeera and Al- Arabiya – due, according to survey data, to the disenchantment of Algerian audiences with the ideological slant of these foreign channels123. Likewise, after decades of foreign channels’ cultural hegemony in Algeria – European, global and then regional networks, via radio, Hertzian waves and then by satellite feed – for the first time, national news sources were valued more than the ones from abroad, at least to get national and regional news. The reasons for this success can be found not only in the perceived higher independence of the new channels with regard to the state but also in their more ‘modern’ editorial style. As noted by an interviewee in a 2015 study of Algerian media-watching habits, ‘For me the important thing is to be able to have the news from journalists who are “indigenous,” who know local culture’124. All the channels have active Facebook pages for their most popular entertainment, sports and animated programmes, as well as online websites, where
121 www.tsa-algerie.com/bouteflika-demande-aux-journalistes-de-denoncer-les-derives/. 122 www.algerie-focus.com/2013/08/tout-savoir-des-habitudes-televisees-des-algeriens/?cn- reloaded=1&cn-reloaded=1. 123 Ibid. 124 Sarnelli Viola and Hafssa Kobibi (2017), “National, regional, global TV in Algeria: University students and television audience after the 2012 Algerian media law”, Global Media and Communication, Vol. 13(1), p. 77.
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levels of audience comment is high. Programming is both of Algerian origin, as well French, Belgian and Quebecois. One of the other outcomes of the passage of the Broadcasting Law was the refurbishment of the state-owned TV station A3 which resulted in a sharp growth in audience share. Launched in 2001 and aimed at reaching an international Arabophone public via satellite, it relies mostly on low-quality national productions of entertainment content (soaps, movies, women’s programmes, talk shows). Yet, by introducing more variety and a more modernized style, it has become one of the most popular channels in Algeria. Algeria’s journalists in all sectors are generally badly paid, have great difficulty accessing accreditation, and have no credible union.
Training: Media studies within Algeria are slim. The co-educational National School of Journalism and Information Sciences in Algiers offers courses and degrees, as well as a range of extracurricular activities, and an active Facebook page. Its quality of teaching is variable, and it offers no additional training for in-work journalists. Journalists instead rely on international institutions, primarily from UNESCO, the EU, and European media NGOs to provide upskilling in editing and reporting. BBC Media Action, for example, is working with the national radio station, Radio Algérienne, the national television station (EPTV) and the Algerian news agency, APS (Algérie Presse Service) in promoting a transition to public service broadcasting. The project includes all 48 of Radio Algéria’s local stations and the regional APS news agency bureaux. The training and development programme targets editorial and technical staff as well as HR, finance, sales and marketing, communications and audience research teams. Other programmes include ones by the French CFI for online journalists; COPEAM (Permanent Conference of the Mediterranean Audiovisual
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Operators) – in conjunction with EPRS (the Algerian Public Radio) on female journalism; and EU funded programmes, including PPRD SOUTH II, which as part of its regional media training workshops, launched its second stage in Algeria from 21 to 24 March 2016; and Media Hub (a project of EU contributed funding), which in 2017 trained Algerian journalists in documentary production.
Challenges and opportunities (new technologies and channels; citizen Journalism vs. Traditional Journalism; blogs, social media, cooperation, threats)
YouTube is viewed daily by half of young Arabs, according to the Arab Youth Survey125. The fastest- growing video segment is ‘short-form’ (a few minutes long),
amateur digital content – curated by Arab youth and distributed on. Social networks are a popular means to keep up with the news in the Middle East, as elsewhere. Facebook is the most popular daily among young Arabs, ahead of online news, TV, and newspapers. While young Arabs still watch Al-Jazeera and read Asharq Al-Awsat, they increasingly access these news outlets via Facebook. Thirty-five per cent of those surveyed said they get their news on Facebook, compared to 31 per cent who read news elsewhere online, 30 per cent who watch television, and only 9 per cent who read newspapers126. WhatsApp is also growing in the news space. Media organisations have specialised teams that can be contacted through WhatsApp, and prominent journalists in the region curate content for their “subscribers”, who sometimes number in the hundreds. These groups are often local
125 wamda-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/resource-url/665bf7c4c81c1dd.pdf. 126 Ibid, p. 42.
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but subscribers can join from around the world. Immigrants who wish to receive news from home can easily do so127. As noted by Damian Radcliffe in an article in Arab Gazette on the 6th Annual Report on the state of Arab social media, ‘In 2017, the big trends have included the rapid growth of visually-led social networks like Instagram and Snapchat (with the percentage of users in the Middle East often far ahead of other regions), continued uptake of messaging apps and the preference for video content – and increasingly social networks as a source for news – among Arab youth. These developments have important strategic implications for brands, media organizations and government organizations, who need to shape their communications strategies in line with these emerging consumer preferences’128. Networks linking journalists in the region have sprung up since the Arab uprisings. Arab Data Journalists’ Network, for example, founded by a digital journalist in Egypt, is based on a website — in Arabic, English and French — which features training materials, resources, tools and techniques for data-generated storytelling. There are postings of local and international news, articles and advice from experts in the field. To learn more about the practice of data journalism in the Middle East and North Africa, ADJN posted a survey on Facebook. Sixty journalists from seven countries — Egypt, Morocco, Jordan Tunisia, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon — responded. Of those, 44 percent were female and 56 percent male. The majority were from Egypt. Nearly 70 percent said they published mainly online; 18.6 percent worked for print publications, and 12 percent for radio. No one responded that they worked for TV129.
127 Ibid, p. 63. 128 arabiangazette.com/middle-east-social-media-usage-trends-revealed/, 18.02.2018. 129 https://ijnet.org/en/blog/arab-data-journalists%E2%80%99-network-driving-force-change-region.
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Yet, as noted by Elisabetta Costa in her fieldwork-based analysis of digital developments in Lebanon, ‘Contrary to techno-deterministic theories, new media develop in continuity with the former media practices. New ideas, codes and technologies enter a local field whose historical dynamics determine the new uses’130. Thus, we see that digital development in each state in the southern Mediterranean is unique, and represents a continuity within the media landscape in which it is located politically, ethnically, socially, and territorially. For its part, the European Union has funded, and co-funded a number of projects in the region to improve online journalistic capacity. CFI (project of French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Development) in conjunction with the EU, for example, has conducted a series of such projects, including Shabab Up!, a journalism training for young radio reporters from Morocco and Algeria (among other Maghreb states), and two Hackathon projects for digital radio support, with workshops held in Tunisia and Lebanon in 2018, and two rounds of awards to ten online projects in each tranche.
Morocco
In a study by Bouziane Zaid of Moroccan media, he stated, ‘The Internet penetration rate grew from just over 21 percent of the population in 2007 to 57 percent in 2015 according to the International Telecommunication Union (ITU)131. By December 2014, mobile phone penetration reached 132 percent132. Smartphone
130 Costa, Elisabetta (2011), “Online Journalism And Political Activism In Lebanon”, Oriente Moderno, Vol 91 (1), Special Series: “Between Everyday Life And Political Revolution: The Social Web In The Middle East”, p. 127. 131 International Telecommunication Union, “Statistics,” 2015. 132 Freedom House, Net Freedom Report, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/2016/morocco.
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use increased from 38 percent in 2014 to 55 percent by the end of 2015133. Internet access is generally limited however to the educated and urban segments of Morocco’s population. Articles 33 and 34 of the 2016 press law stipulate that to obtain press cards and benefit from financial state support, online news portals must acquire two types of authorizations from two different bodies, valid for one year at a time. These are the Moroccan Cinema Center (CCM)134 to shoot film, and the telecom regulator (ANRT) to host domain names under press.ma135. While these measures are in line with international practices of regulating online journalism, Zaid contends that the fact that these organizations are state-controlled means they can easily be influenced to deny authorizations or reject renewals for political reasons. With the pressure on independent press and television rising, ‘alternative political voices have moved gradually towards web news sites,’ according to a study by Benchenna, Ksikes and Marchetti136. They write, ‘In fact, the Arab uprisings in several countries with a majority of Arabic-speaking people, including Morocco, where a new constitution was promulgated in 2011, accelerated the explosion in the supply of digital news. “Here in Morocco, the reader of information on the internet was not a newspaper reader, because we had at most 300,000 readers a day, for all titles, while now we have almost 9 million online readers”, observed the director of a weekly magazine (personal communication with authors). Many digital sites have
133 ANRT Information Technology Observatory, “Survey on ICT access and usage, 2015”. 134 Le Centre Cinématographique Marocain (CCM) is in charge of the organization and promotion of the film industry in Morocco and it oversees the application of the legislation and regulation of the sector. 135 Zaid, Bouziane (2015), New press code in Morocco to still send journalists behind bars. . 136 Benchenna, Abdelfettah; Driss Ksikes & Dominique Marchetti (2017), “The media in Morocco: a highly political economy, the case of the paper and on-line press since the early 1990s”, The Journal of North African Studies, 22:3, p. 390. DOI: 10.1080/13629387.2017.1307906
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been created by former journalists of the written press, during or in the months preceding the appearance of ‘the February 20th Movement’ [Morocco’s main political driver of the 2011 uprisings]. This was the case, for instance, of several Arabic online platforms such as Lakome (Aboubakr Jamaï, co-founder of Le Journal and Ali Anouzla previously of Al Jarida Al Oukhra, Al Jarida Al Aoula and al Massae newspapers), Goud (Ahmed Najim of Nichane) and Febrayer (Maria Moukrim of Al Ayam). This growth in the publications of alternative views took different shapes and led very quickly to the erection of numerous firewalls: the launching of web platforms by factions linked to the authorities who realised what was really at stake inside and outside the country; legal proceedings against several webmasters, a political and legal reshuffle of the nature of news coverage via a complete overhaul of the ‘Press Code’ in 2016 and a strengthening of monitoring measures.’ Other important websites included TalkMorocco, in English, with occasional discussions in French and Arabic; the audience was primarily Moroccans, both within the country and in the diaspora, as well as individuals following Moroccan affairs, including researchers or journalists. Since the website was mostly in English, its direct impact in Morocco was minimal, and widely ignored by authorities. Indeed, websites in French or English, or even Arabic, that have a minimal reach within the Moroccan public, such as Lacome 2, or Le Desk (a critical, but subscription-based news analysis site), will be left largely alone. Likewise, internet-based sites sprung up that follow the government line, such as the pro-Court Le360, or the more outspoken, but mainstream, Hespress. It is sites with independent agendas and larger audience reach that concern the government. According to Samia Errazzouki, a reporter for AP, and later Reuters (and an associate of the University of Cambridge-Al-Jazeera Media Project), ‘As the Internet
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began emerging as a critical space, Morocco moved toward establishing entities that would ensure it was relatively regulated and controlled – mostly headed by commissions dominated by the King’s representatives. This began with the establishment of the National Agency of the Regulation of Telecommunications (ANRT) in 1998. The ANRT is charged with the management of the telecommunications industry, handling both the public and private sector. Though it remains largely focused on television and radio, its primary role in dealing with online media is to approve domain names under .ma. In 2009, the National Control Commission for the Protection of Personal Data (CNDP) was established. The CNDP’s ruling body and President are appointed by the King. Although these new institutions gave the state apparatus greater leverage over the field, the state nonetheless recognised it was ill-equipped to secure its stakes in the ‘game’ of online media, and embarked on a path of ‘strategies’ and ‘movements’ to embolden and empower its presence across the field – a direct reaction to the existing ‘strategies’ and ‘movements’ of citizen media’137. Among these is an increase in online surveillance since the 2011 uprisings targeting journalists and websites. Perhaps the most prominent example, though certainly not the only one, was the case of citizen journalist site, Mamfakinch 20th, closely tied to the February Movement and co-founded by Hisham Almiraat of TalkMorocco. It closely followed the demonstrations and provided live-stream reporting in French, English and Arabic. Shortly after Mamfakinch received a $10,000 ‘Breaking Borders Award’ in July 2012 from Google and Global Voices, which ‘honors people who have made a significant impact in their communities to defend and promote freedom of speech rights on the
137 Errazzouki, Samia (2017), “Under watchful eyes: Internet surveillance and citizen media in Morocco, the case of Mamfakinch”, The Journal of North African Studies, 22:3, pp 375-376.
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internet’, members of staff received an email sent by what they would later discover was state-sponsored spyware by Hacking Team known as remote control system (RCS). Mamfakinch went public about the surveillance, and received significant international coverage, including by United Kingdom-based charity, Privacy International, which ran an extensive report on surveillance in Morocco, highlighting the experience of three members of Mamfakinch138. The site closed in 2015. Other sites that have suffered government surveillance, fines and suspension Badil and Goud, both Arabic-language news sites – though still publishing139.
Benchenna et al. note that ‘The data on Moroccan news websites demonstrate, on the one hand, that these new ‘pure’ platforms are indisputably much more successful (by number of visits) than the platforms associated with paper news, which, in a country where the percentage of Internet users was only slight above half, 56.8%, in 2014, becomes even more astonishing. A survey carried out in 2015 on a specific sample of the national literate population aged 15 and older confirmed that 67% of respondents state that they read the digital press, versus only 17% for the paper press and 26% reading both types of platforms. Furthermore, the prevalent profile of web press readers in Morocco seems to differ widely from that of the paper press: more female oriented (73% of women state that they read the electronic news press, versus only 8% for paper-based news) and younger (79% of 15–24-year-old read the electronic news press, versus 8% for the paper press).
138 “Their Eyes on Me: Stories of Surveillance in Morocco”, Privacy International, https://privacyinternational.org/sites/default/files/Their%20Eyes%20on%20Me%20-%20English_0.pdf. 139 La rédaction, "La justice ordonne la fermeture du site Badil.info pendant trois mois", Yabiladi, 11 August 2015; Soufiane Sbiti, "La justice ferme le site électronique Badil.info pour trois mois", TelQuel, 11 August 2015, http://telquel.ma/2015/08/11/justice-ferme-site-electronique-trois-mois_1459204.
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As of 30 August 2016, Alexa, the online analysis tool, states that the most widely visited platforms were Moroccan Arabic news websites. Most popular was Hespress, with 2.5 million visitors per day, ranking fourth, after Google, Facebook and Youtube. Next was Chouftv (5th), followed by two football websites (elbotola.com andkhooora.com [9th and 11th, respectively]). Other general websites have become popular as well, such as, for instance, the bilingual site le 360 (13th) and several Arabic activist sites Goud (14th), Alyaoum24 (19th), Febrayer (31st) and Hibapress (34th)’ 140.
Lebanon
Reflecting the consociational nature of its politics, and the social balance of its different ethnic and religious groupings, as well as its long-standing international profile, Costa observed that ‘the internet in Lebanon has been appropriated by political parties, politicians and activists because of the opportunity for them to spread their point of view to a global audience, beyond the Lebanese public sphere. As they felt misrepresented in the international journalistic narratives, many political parties used English language sites in order to struggle for representation and recognition within an international arena. A widespread consciousness of foreign political interference in Lebanese affairs and an understanding of the power of external recognition have become widespread among Lebanese people and journalists’141.
140 Benchenna et al.(2016), op cit., p. 392. 141 Costa, Elisabetta (2011), “Online Journalism And Political Activism In Lebanon”, Oriente Moderno, Vol 91 (1), Special Series: “Between Everyday Life And Political Revolution: The Social Web In The Middle East”, p. 127.
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Internet penetration in Lebanon, as elsewhere in the region, has skyrocketed, today reaching over 75 % of the population, and representing a doubling of access since 2011. Male and female usage is roughly comparable, and the age group with highest usage ranges from age 15 to 30142. Sixty-six percent of the population uses social media, and almost 60% use mobile to access social media, the latter growing by 16% annually. Facebook claims 4 million users (close to 100% of total Lebanese online users).143 Other social media site usage includes Instagram (at 1.4 million, or 25% of all users) and YouTube. According to Alexa analytics, none of the Lebanese websites enjoy top placement in most visited sites, which are commanded primarily by American entertainment, search and job-related sites (e.g. Linked In, Instagram, Amazon)144. Independent online websites however have proliferated over the last decade within the Lebanese national field, although turnover is high. Few of the award- winning sites (all English-language) that received support from the Ebticar Media Project, a partnership between the EU, France Television (CFI) and several other funding organisations in 2014, have survived today. Among these is Mashallahnews, a multi-city collective platform launched in 2010, out of Beirut, Jeddah, and Istanbul and founded by primarily young Lebanese journalists as an online magazine focusing on the urban landscape. It got a significant boost covering the Arab Uprisings, but generally steered away from overt political reporting. In 2014/15 it engaged in a 4M Marshreq Workshop (linked to Ebticar), which focused on training, and brought together four other online winners from Lebanon, including Beirutreport (offering photomontage news focusing on culture, public space and heritage, as well as critical
142 www.emarketer.com/Chart/Demographic-Profile-of-Internet-Users-Lebanon-2016-of-population- each-group/211652. 143 www.slideshare.net/EveryLeader/digital-in-lebanon-2018. 144 www.alexa.com/topsites/countries/LB.
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commentary on media and politics), Lebanese Media Monitor (a fact-checker and media monitor for false reporting), Frame (a photojournalist site) and Knooz (a creative arts webpage). In collaboration with Knooz, Mashallahnews produced books of creative reportage, music and imagery. Although still publishing, it has considerably reduced output since 2016. Besides the much diminished Mashallahnews, only Beirutreport is still active today, and producing political commentary that is highly critical of the government, such as ‘Amid constant blackouts, Energy minister awarded prize’, which links photos and videos with caption text to produce compelling visual critiques on government incompetence145. Citizen journalism plays an important role in Lebanese online productions, and has served likewise to inform the traditional press, which at times of upheaval, or during elections, has come to rely heavily on citizen journalists and photographers for online breaking news and street credibility. Independent blogs and platforms on Facebook make up another category of online commentary and political journalism; among these is the highly regarded Megaphone News (which also hosts a twitter feed), a site calling itself an independent online media platform located on Facebook. It produces compiled background biographies of government officials and political candidates through video and voice recordings that let the targeted individuals speak for themselves, and which is designed to unmask corruption and false political claims146. Beirut Spring, by Mustapha Hamoui is a well-produced and popular blog, representing both spoof and political-cultural opinion writing. Gino’s Blog, Everything You Love and Hate about Beirut is another, featuring, art, politics, photography and music commentary – and like the others, is slick, and represents a slice of young life in Lebanon.
145 http://www.beirutreport.com/2018/10/amid-constant-blackouts-energy-minister-awarded-prize.html. 146 www.facebook.com/megaphone.news/.
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Algeria
According to Internet World Statistics Report, 45% of Algeria’s population regularly uses the internet, up from 14% in 2011, the year of the Arab uprisings147. Today, according to SlideShare, which draws its statistics from a variety of sources including the UN, World Bank, and others,148 21 million Algerians are now Internet users. Mobile use also ballooned, with growth at 200% for four years running, today reaching 116% of the population or 49 million mobile media owners. 21 million are active social media users. Internet, mobile and social media use are all still growing at between 17 and 19% annually. Faceboook statistics claim that 18 million Algerians use its social media network; Twitter and other social media platforms, are little used, however, hovering at only about 10%149. Male and female usage is approximately the same, with average age being 28 years old. A more data-friendly version of Twitter, was rolled out in 24 new countries last year, including Algeria, Egypt, Israel and Tunisia. The app was designed to make Twitter more accessible in developing regions where data plans are expensive; even so, it did not lead to a significant jump
in Twitter usage in Algeria. Website entrepreneurship in Algeria differs substantially from that in both Lebanon and Morocco, with few independent popular sites of any kind. Whether it was because the internet was so scarce at the time of the Arab Uprising, or whether Algeria’s experience of political upheaval by the young in that period was low, the triggering force that led 2011 to be an important turning point in youth activist website development seems to have passed Algeria by. In the ten most popular websites as
147 https://www.internetworldstats.com/af/dz.htm. 148 www.slideshare.net/EveryLeader/digital-in-algeria/2. 149 http://gs.statcounter.com/social-media-stats/all/algeria.
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ranked by Alexa, only two Algeria sites appear (in 9th and 10th place): Echaroukonline.com (linked to the television and newspaper of that name), and Djelfa.info, a local news and culture website focused on the province of Djelfa. It is the case also, that there is considerably less citizen journalism in Algeria than in other parts of the region – a reflection perhaps of the difference in the population’s experience of the 2011 uprisings, but likewise, because of the low level of mobile penetration, which is a significant technological contributor to the ability to conduct citizen journalism. Only over the past two years has penetration been sufficient, and there has as yet been no accompanying flowering in digital output, or sites online, where citizen journalism has found appropriate purpose. In 2017, D-Jil, a partnership of the EU, CFI, Leaders of Tomorrow (Jordan) Foundation Samir Kassir (Lebanon), and, held a competition for young digital media entrepreneurs in the southern Mediterranean – receiving over 250 applications and making a total of 30 awards in two tranches. In the first tranche, there were no Algerian recipients but in the second, which held its workshop in Beirut, five Algerian groups received invitations. Among these were Djanoub.com, a news and cultural site150 focused on the southern Sahara region – featuring stories and photography on Sufism, military support, mosque architecture, political developments and aid programmes; and Inty Magazine, a women’s site offering stories on fashion, women’s designers, health, cooking and reader commentary. The websites of the other three recipients, She's got something to say (Algérie) Algérie), and Echoes: formation, production et militantisme pour) #ﺻوﺗك SAWTEC# un journalisme citoyen (Algérie) were not accessible151.
150 http://www.djanoub.com/ar/cat/%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/. 151 https://www.cfi.fr/fr/projet/d-jil.
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Recommendations for training and programme enhancement in ENP-S.
Reporting and investigative journalism
1. Solid follow-up reporting on CFI, Media Hub and all other EU-funded journalistic training programmes should be encourage, and the field of reach widened considerably: 1. Highlight project winners; 2. Report on the Workshops and interview attendees and trainers; 3. Follow up project outcomes over time; 4) develop mentorship programme so winners are supported in helping others locally produce equally creative projects. 2. Solid anticipator and follow-up reporting on ENP-S funded projects in the region should be included as a key factor. Follow-up should include longer-term reporting on project outcomes, and on sector development. Helping to produce one article, or one blog or website, is insufficient – helping to put the spotlight on the portals, gaps, opportunities, and long-term successes is equally important. 3. Reporting on terrorism and migration efforts by the states from the perspective of the region’s difficulties, challenges, and associated issues – not just from a European perspective. Help EU journalists develop greater sensitivity to the governments’ historical, political and legal dilemmas is critical, as is training for an awareness of how the local societies feel about these issues (and respond to European developments on these issues, such as the migration rejection element of Brexit). Follow through on longer term reports on these subjects – how are repatriated migrants faring, who are the camp guards and what is their life like, etc. 4. Training should focus on solution reporting, not victim reporting, as pointed out by the Ethical Journalism network. Overwhelmingly, according to the Arab Youth Survey, young people in the Levant and North Africa feel their governments should do more.
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152 In a situation where red lines and censorship are common, this means they should be looking at stories where the government is succeeding, and stories where their governments, and particular, their communities and civic groups, can improve without significant political fallout or pushback. This includes investigative journalisms on homelessness, rubbish removal (already a big story in Lebanon, but not in Algeria or Morocco), women’s shelters, preservation of historic buildings and monuments, indigenous industry (such as fishing, carpet weaving and ceramics), etc. A very good example of this kind of ‘magazine’ investigative journalism is produced by inkyfada.com in Tunisia, where graphics, and solid reportage is published that adds significantly to the knowledge base and sense of engagement, without stepping on government sensibilities153. Likewise, reportage should look at not only the problems, but the overall context, the people’s stories on both sides, and the longer-term effects – this is something both European journalists and Arab journalists need to do better – and which eventually can produce reportage on solutions, rather than just victimisation. 5. The largest concern among young people is unemployment. Training to help improve citizen journalism, blogging, and free-lance publishing capability is key encouraging a sense of engagement, building experience and developing earning capacity. Opportunities for publishing should be a focus – and opportunities developed by the EU-funded bodies to provide more publishing in European outlets and media for Arab writers, should be explored. 6. Training to enable young journalists to begin connecting into news production via What’s App and Instagram would offer skills for the future – these are the areas that are growing particularly fast, and should be developed as skill sets. Likewise,
152 wamda-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/resource-url/665bf7c4c81c1dd.pdf. 153 https://inkyfada.com/.
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learning from IJ-Plus, how to deliver news, commentary and features in ‘short form’ is critical for young reporters in this region.
Editing
1. Train to produce more graphic renditions of information – newspapers throughout the region are overly text and photo based. The Financial Times’ regular ‘News in Graphics’ column at the back of its front section is a good example of translating numbers into easily comprehensible charts for comparison and knowledge building; likewise the humorous but often very effective graphics of USA Today could offer good templates for more accessible and smarter editing in newspapers and online production. 2. Focus should be on the entrepreneurial capacity of young people to begin their own publishing and online products – this is more common in Morocco and Lebanon – much less in Algeria. 3. Likewise, the franchising of journalism skills should be emphasised – corporate communications is a key area that all the region’s economic and corporate sectors (banks, regulators, corporations, and NGOs) generally lack, and which can connect good editing skills and the capacity to build corporate strategies and brands with real economic opportunity. The need for internal corporate newsletters and financial communications materials, think tank policy papers and conference publications is high, and often overlooked as areas in which reporting and editing skills can usefully be put. These are areas, in this region, in which economic reporting and editing carries less political toxicity and greater credibility, and thus, this area should be expanded.
Law
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1. The media is often judged by a special division of the courts in all these countries; however the judges are rarely specially skilled in press law or freedom of expression. The same can be said for most journalists in the region. Developing journalistic capacity to address the legal issues within the framework of local law and practice would be a useful area of expertise to develop, not only for reporters to engage in cases that arise, but to inform not only the public but the government of possible policy alternatives and improvements. 2. Legal expertise likewise is critical to cover terrorism issues, as these are often located within the criminal framework of the nation’s responses, and journalists require knowledge of not only local but international laws that address terrorism, deradicalization, and repatriation if they are to cover the subject sensibility and with credibility. 3. Coverage of migration likewise would benefit from legal expertise and training, as the subject frequently addresses cross-border issues, rights of transition, safe country of origin status, receiving policies in different countries, etc. Journalists from the ENP-S should cover more diaspora stories, and look at the legal status, employment laws, and nationality laws that their fellow nationals are encountering, and be able to explain these (with interest and possibly through graphic comparisons) to their publics at home. 4. Many states in the region have a tendency to change or adopt new press and information laws, a subject journalists should be trained in for informed coverage. Lebanon for example still has no information law, and journalists should be able to report on developments and policy options to shift the focus toward establishing such a law. The new press law in Morocco took two years to pass after a great deal of
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debate and several versions – this was not well reported on by either the foreign or local media – an area further training could materially affect.
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