Number 89 September 1, 1988 CSIS CA N

A publication of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C.

A 1988 Update on Soviet Relations with Pretoria, the ANC, and the SACP

by Winrich Kiihne

In June 1986, during the second Soviet-African Conference for "Peace, Cooperation, and Social Progress" in Moscow, Gleb Starushenko, a deputy director of the Africa Institute of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, made an extraordinary statement on white minority rights in a future South Africa. He told an audience of Soviet, East European, and African politicians and academics that "the antiracist forces" are not pressing for "broad nationalization of capitalist property"; encouraged the African National Congress (ANC) to "work out comprehensive guarantees for the white population"; and ventured into the complexities of constitution-making by proposing that a postapartheid Parliament might "consist of two chambers - one formed on the basis of proportional representation and the other possessing the right of veto on the basis of equal representation of the four communities." A year later, in mid-1987, another deputy director of the Africa Institute, Victor Goncharov, added a new dimension to the reappraisal while in Harare, Zimbabwe, to participate in a conference on southern African regional security jointly hosted by the London-based Interna­ tional Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) and the University of Zimbabwe. In an interview published in the July 1987 issue of the South African journal Work in Progress, Goncharov distanced himself from Starushenko's remarks on white minority rights, stating that Starushenko was, in fact, expressing only his personal views which reflected the thinking of neither the Institute nor the government. At the same time, however, he stressed (as Starushenko had) the need for a political solution and criticized the attempt "by some ANC members to put before the national liberation movement now the tasks of the socialist revolution." Asked more specifically about the fate of socialism in South Africa, he said: "Yes, I believe that in the end South Africa will become socialist, maybe not in 25 years but in a century .. . . I am an optimist." Readers of his interview wondered what "optimist" meant in this context. Still another Africanist, Boris Asoyan (a former deputy director of the Africa Institute who has worked as a journalist in East Africa, on the 2 I CSIS AFRICA NOTES

staff of the Central Committee, and more recently in the of assertions but short of any evidence." At no time, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs), m~de his way into the journal asserted, had Soviet political figures, party headlines with an article in Literaturnaya Gazeta in functionaries, or academics ever expressed "the kind of October 1987 that criticized Soviet writing on Africa as skepticism reported in Africa Analysis, either to those in being dominated by "distorted perceptions" and the movement or in their research and published works." "bureaucratic platitudes." In a subsequent contribution Philip Nel, director of the Institute for Soviet Studies on President P.W. Botha remarkably free of the old at South Africa's Stellenbosch University, thought he cliches, he presented quite a sober and realistic had found support for the SACP journal's thesis. In a assessment of the state of white politics in South Africa. July 1987 interview with The S tar (Johannesburg), he The new shadings were meanwhile being reaffirmed observed that the first thorough Soviet study on white by what Western academics were hearing in bilateral politics in South Africa (The Party of Apartheid - The talks with Soviet Africanists. U.S. scholars by now were Sociopolitical Evolution of South Africa's National Party having regular meetings with their Soviet counterparts. [Moscow: Nauka Publishing House, 1987, in Russian], Since 1986, and even before in some instances, some written by Vladimir Tikhomirov, a young researcher at Soviet participants in these exchanges have been taking the Africa Institute) was marked by a dogmatic, Leninist the position that destruction of the South African approach that directly contradicted Starushenko's economy should not be an objective of the antiapartheid message. struggle; that a mixed economy and not broad Nel's 1987 interview is a classic example of the nationalization would be the best approach to solving hazards encountered in assessing Soviet politics in a the economic problems of a postapartheid South Africa; time of change. Later the same year, he broke new and that Americans and Soviets should work together ground in South African academia by flying to Moscow to find peaceful solutions for the escalating conflicts in at the invitation of the Africa Institute to evaluate at first southern Africa. This was also a point Goncharov hand what was going on with respect to Soviet thinking had emphasized in Harare. As the Soviet and U.S. on southern Africa. The very fact of his visit - how well interests in the region were equally minimal, he he was received at the Africa Institute and elsewhere counseled, they should work together to find a common and how keen academics and politicians were to speak approach. Amazingly, he did not cite a Soviet with him as a white South African - was itself an document, nor one from the ANC or the South African expression of changing Soviet attitudes. Among other Communist Party (SACP), but the January 1987 report results, he came to realize that there was no fundamen­ of the U.S. Secretary of State's Advisory Committee on tal difference between Starushenko and Tikhomirov. On South Africa as a basis for such an approach. the contrary, Tikhomirov (who had acquired a In December 1986, I contributed an article to Africa comprehensive understanding of white politics through Analysis (London) about impressions brought home research for his own book) had been heavily involved in from talks with Soviet Africanists and diplomats in drafting Starushenko's speech, including the part on Moscow. Two trends struck me as of special interest: white minority rights. (1) Quite a number of Soviet experts seemed to be worried rather than enthusiastic about the escalation of violence in black townships. (2) The more realistic CS/S AFRICA NOTES is a briefing paper series Soviet Africanists and experts on developing countries designed to serve the special needs of decision makers appeared to have lost their faith that Africa would ever and analysts with Africa-related responsibilities in advance toward socialism, and to have accepted that governments, corporations, the media, research objective factors will keep South Africa in close institutions, universities, and other arenas. It is a economic cooperation with the Western industrialized publication of the African Studies Program of the Center countries. for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C. CSIS is a private, nonpartisan, nonprofit policy research Academia's Influence on Policy institute founded in 1962. One of the problems Western observers face in assessing EDITOR: Director of African Studies Helen Kitchen. the substance of these statements is that of determining the extent to which they reflect a change in Soviet SUBSCRIPTION RATE CSIS Africa Notes is sent government policies. (For background on elements of airmail/first class to subscribers worldwide. The annual continuity and change in official policy since the 1960s, subscription price for 13 issues and occasional see David E. Albright, Soviet Policy toward Africa supplements is $48.00. Please make checks payable to: Revisited [Washington, D.C.: CSIS, 1987].) CSIS Africa Notes, Suite 400, 1800 K Street, N.W., What Goncharov said in Harare seemed to indicate Washington, D.C. 20006, U.SA Telephone: (202) 887{}219. that Starushenko's views were shared neither by Telex : 7108229583. Cables: CENSTRAT. FAX: (202) 775-3199. politicians in the Kremlin nor even by his colleagues in the Africa Institute. My report in Africa Analysis was ISSN 0736-9506 attacked by The African Communist, the London-based official organ of the SACP, as a "tendencious piece, full CS IS AFRICA NOTES I 3

For those experienced with Soviet writing and Gorbachev strongly underlined the need for a political academics, there was another major reason to doubt solution in South Africa, and did not even mention the interpretation of Starushenko's view as isolated and armed struggle. He also indicated that the Kremlin had to doubt also the existence of a sharp distinction no fundamental problems with Soviet academics between his outlook and those of Goncharov and discussing differing possible political solutions, and Tikhomirov. Aside from Anatoly Gromyko, the Africa specifically stressed the need for "new ideas" regarding Institute's director, Starushenko is the only Institute South Africa. official who is a corresponding member of the Soviet There is nothing new about Soviet academics having Academy of Sciences. This status gives him more different opinions. Diversity among Third World experts freedom to speak out on new, not yet official trends in has been increasingly evident since the 25th party government thinking than Goncharov, although both congress in 1976, where it became apparent that the are deputy directors. Starushenko is known to serve party leadership felt that a simplistic, monolithic from time to time as a "trial balloon," and hinted at this outlook on developing countries left too many questions function when he said in the course of a July 1987 unanswered. Moscow interview with the West German newspaper What is new is that the differences among researchers Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung that his ideas were are now being discussed in the public international shared by people in government, although his arena. The international ANC solidarity conference held statement was not to be understood as official. in December 1987 in Arusha, Tanzania, provided an Moreover, there is little proof that either Soviet example, unthinkable in the past. Representatives of Africanists or others took serious issue with the Soviet solidarity committee strongly criticized Starushenko's proposals on white minority rights during Starushenko and Goncharov for advocating a the Soviet-African conference in June 1986, as The negotiated settlement in South Africa and reportedly African Communist would have us believe. Neither even asked that they be punished. Deputy Chairman of participants nor the recently published summary of the the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet Y.Y. Vagris took a conference proceedings (For Peace, Cooperation and very different line. He pointed out that the possibilities Social Progress: Materials of the II Soviet-African of a political solution were being widely discussed in Scientific-Political Conference) mentioned any official circles, and said that "we are in favor of such a discussants who dismissed Starushenko's presentation settlement." as flawed. In sum, there is little reason to believe that the Western press emphasis on contradictions among Kremlin views the controversies among leading Soviet academic statements, including the seeming members of the Africa Institute about white minority controversy between Starushenko and Goncharov, often rights and other particulars of the South African does not stand up under closer analysis of the situation as a big problem. Quite the contrary may be substance. A careful reading of what was actually said true, at least as long as Gorbachev is in power. reveals that, apart from the question of white minority Unlike the academics, however, the Soviet govern­ rights, Starushenko and Goncharov agree on all ment will see little reason to limit its diplomatic relevant points: (1) the importance of a political, flexibility by committing itself publicly to a fixed position negotiated solution; (2) de-emphasizing the relevance on white minority rights or other details of a negotiated and effectiveness of armed struggle, and even more so settlement. But officials do signal preference for a uncontrolled violence; (3) advising the ANC not to give negotiated settlement, concern about uncontrolled top priority to building socialism in a postapartheid escalation of violence, and commitment to the principle South Africa (thereby reflecting a general disillusion­ that the fears of whites have to be addressed in reaching ment in Moscow about the outlook for socialism in a settlement. Starushenko, Goncharov, and other developing countries). academics are helpful in spreading this message. And it Georgy Mirsky, another well-known Soviet academic was not by chance that Boris Asoyan, who strongly specialist on developing countries, was even more blunt criticized the old writing on Africa as dogmatic and full on the third point in a recent article: "A sober of wishful ideological thinking, was dispatched to assessment of the present-day situation shows, we Lesotho as charge d'affaires in early 1988 when the ought to admit, that today there is less evidence than a Soviet ambassador to the enclave kingdom had to be quarter of a century ago that the newly independent rushed across the border to South Africa for medical states are abandoning the capitalist road of development treatment and subsequently returned to Moscow. and shifting to the noncapitalist course." It is also A most unlikely channel through whom new relevant that the Africa Institute recently created an developments in Soviet policy have been conveyed to interdisciplinary group to study the development of South Africans is Franz Josef Strauss of West Germany's capitalist countries. Bavaria, one of the few Western politicians still trusted In August 1987, General Secretary Gorbachev made by conservative whites and considered as supportive of it apparent that the academics were not just engaging in their cause. In the course of his controversial safari academic talk. In a speech in honor of the visit to through southern Africa in January 1988, Strauss said Moscow of Mozambique's President Joaquim Chissano, that intensive talks he had had with Gorbachev and 4 I CSIS AFRICA NOTES

other leading politicians during a visit to Moscow in gains in South Africa that could later turn into costly December 1987 persuaded him that the Soviets liabilities. believed they had overextended commitments in Africa, The shift of emphasis in favor of a negotiated wanted to cut their losses, would like to see a political settlement taking place in Moscow's South Africa policy solution in South Africa, and were prepared to accept does not, and in the foreseeable future probably will not, other organizations and leaders than just the ANC at amount to a break with the ANC or the SACP. the negotiating table. Speculation about termination of Soviet support for the military wing of the ANC (support which is rather Moscow and the ANC limited anyway) is at least premature. As has been the In Pretoria, the "new tendencies" in Soviet policy case in Angola, such a crude dropping of a traditional toward South Africa have led to speculation about a ally is perceived as incompatible with the USSR's status fundamental break between Moscow and the ANC­ as a global power. SACP alliance. Some in the Afrikaner community even Within the ANC-SACP alliance, the outlook on armed imagine that Moscow might be prepared to sacrifice its struggle has shifted in ways similar to the shift of relationship with the ANC in favor of an anti-Western emphasis in Moscow's policy. In the 1970s and early alliance with mineral-rich South Africa. 1980s, armed struggle was clearly viewed as the most In the West, and even more so in South Africa, important means to fight the white minority regime. speculation about a basic change in Moscow's policy Although the possibility of a negotiated settlement was toward the ANC and the SACP is largely based on a not ruled out in principle, it was rarely mentioned in misunderstanding of the relationship between armed public statements. This has changed in the latter half of struggle and a negotiated settlement. Support for the the 1980s. The National Executive Council of the ANC ANC continues, as Gorbachev assured ANC President said in an October 1987 statement: "We wish to Oliver Tambo it would during a visit by the latter to reiterate that the ANC has never been opposed to a Moscow in late 1987. The Soviets have allowed the negotiated settlement of the South African question." ANC to open an office in Moscow with quasi-diplomatic During his 1987 visit to Moscow, Tambo explicitly status, and The African Communist now takes quite a restated this position in the presence of Gorbachev. positive approach to what is happening in Moscow Earlier in the year, Joe Slovo, the former chief of staff of under Gorbachev. In a recent issue it advised readers: the ANC's military wing and now secretary-general of "South African revolutionaries must ask themselves the SACP, told South African journalist Allister Sparks what lessons they can learn from the Soviet experi­ that in his opinion "transition in South Africa is going to ence . ... We have no doubt that both the SACP and come through negotiations." the ANC will better be able to perform their leading role It would be an oversimplification to explain this if they too include glasnost and perestroika in their change in ANC-SACP rhetoric solely in terms of the vocabulary." Soviet shift. Moreover, not everybody in the ANC or the Under Gorbachev, emphasis has shifted from armed SACP is comfortable with the new emphasis on a struggle as the most decisive means of ending apartheid political solution. The young cadres in particular have and bringing whites to the bargaining table. Priority is doubts about the idea of their leaders sitting together at now given to ways and means of finding a political the negotiating table with the "racist enemy." There will solution. Aside from the questions of capability and be renewed emphasis on the armed struggle if Pretoria effectiveness, there is concern that an escalation of continues to close avenues for nonviolent opposition and violence would get out of hand and destroy South a political solution. In June 1988, the ANC executive in Africa's economy. A postapartheid, prosocialist black Lusaka, Zambia, warned that it had not renounced the government then would turn to Moscow for economic option of taking the "people's war" out of black help, an unwelcome prospect. The economies of the townships and into white communities. Soviet Union and its Eastern European allies are already overburdened with the commitments to such Redefinition of a Political Settlement basket cases as Cuba, Vietnam, Laos, Kampuchea, and For many years, Soviet and Eastern-bloc writing on Ethiopia. Eastern-bloc Third World policy has become South Africa was couched in stereotyped, dogmatic very cost- and risk-conscious in recent years. rhetoric and preached orthodox Marxism-Leninism as The most important reason for the shift of emphasis the only conceivable alternative to the present system. A from armed struggle to a political solution has little to majority government would give the country a socialist do with what is happening in South Africa. It is a matter orientation under the leadership of a Marxist-Leninist of global politics. Leaders in the Kremlin are concerned vanguard party and a state-dominated, centrally that an uncontrolled escalation of violence in South planned economy. Africa would interfere with their much higher-ranking Although flexibility, pragmatism, and other elements interest in continuing a dialogue with Washington and of the "new realism" of perestroika now characterize other Western countries on arms control, economic Soviet commentary on South Africa policy, nothing cooperation, and other matters. This concern has approaching a blueprint for a negotiated settlement has priority over the rather dubious prospect of ideological emerged. Soviet scholars are still catching up with the CSIS AFRICA NOTES I 5

long-ignored body of quite sophisticated Western and question of nationalities than on southern Africa. He South African writings on how a postapartheid South and others stress the need to solve ethnic problems not Africa might be organized constitutionally, economi­ through isolation and one-sided domination, but by cally, and politically. The general outlook can, however, getting all groups involved. The participation of lnkatha, be characterized: AZAPO, and possibly even one or another homeland (1) A postapartheid South Africa will, like most leader (besides lnkatha's Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi) postindependence African societies, adopt a socialist at the negotiating table is advocated more or less openly. label, to demonstrate its break with the capitalist­ Starushenko's statement on white minority rights oriented, racist past. contains an implication concerning the nature of the (2) But it will not be the kind of socialist orientation political system in postapartheid South Africa that Moscow and other socialist nations sponsored in warranting closer examination than it has been Mozambique, Angola, and Ethiopia in the mid- and late accorded. He advocates a parliamentary system (with 1970s. two chambers) and does not mention the need for (or (3) Instead of a centrally planned state economy, even the option of) a one-party system or a Marxist­ Soviet economists envisage a black South Africa that Leninist vanguard party. The establishment of such follows the example of Zimbabwe in building a "mixed parties in Mozambique, Angola, and Ethiopia, by economy." contrast, was hailed by Soviet commentators as a major (4) There should be no sweeping nationalization. In breakthrough. There is speculation that those in fact, as Starushenko has proposed, guarantees against Moscow who worked with Starushenko in preparing his broad nationalization could be part of a negotiated 1986 speech do not think it a bad idea to go one step settlement. farther and start a debate on how to reconcile a socialist (5) The correct "mix" between private entrepreneur­ orientation or even socialism itself with a parliamentary ship on the one hand and state activities on the other and multiparty system. would have to be worked out by the South Africans The recent announcement by the ANC executive in themselves. Lusaka that it will soon publish draft guidelines for a (6) The prospect is that a black-dominated South postapartheid constitution opens up the prospect of Africa will continue to have close and substantial more solid indicators. Two years ago the ANC's economic ties with the Western industrialized countries Department of Legal and Constitutional Affairs was and Japan. "There. are objective economic factors that commissioned to work out such guidelines, based on cannot be changed by ideology" is a sentence often the principles of the Freedom Charter. According to heard in Moscow these days. usually reliable sources, the draft will commit the ANC The gap between fears still prevalent in the West to a mixed economy, a bill of rights, a unitary state, about losing control over minerals in southern Africa multiparty government, freedom of religion and of the and the realism in Moscow is amazing. Soviet analysts press, independent trade unions (including the right to predict that objective economic factors may even lead strike), and equal rights for women. If a document to more, rather than less, competition between South embodying these principles should materialize, it would Africa and the Soviet Union to sell their respective be a convincing sign that "new thinking" in Moscow and minerals on the world market. A black government will in the ANC are compatible. be under tremendous pressure to fulfill the neglected economic needs of the black population, and therefore The "Sole and Authentic" Question more obligated than the present minority government to In the late 1970s, SWAPO's recognition by the General earn hard currency by selling minerals to the Western Assembly of the United Nations as the "sole and industrialized countries. Angola's oil and Zimbabwe's authentic" representative of the people of Namibia chrome are cited as cases in point. It is not in the field became a formidable obstacle to the efforts of the of minerals but in the military-strategic dimension that five-nation Western "Contact Group" to negotiate terms Moscow hopes to gain in the postapartheid era. It is for Namibian independence acceptable to all sides. Only assumed that a South Africa under majority rule will when SWAPO finally agreed to compromise on the join the Nonaligned Movement and steer clear of any "sole and authentic" issue was the plan adopted as UN close military cooperation with the West. Security Council Resolution 435 in 1978. Reports that Minority rights, special political guarantees for the ANC leadership seeks to have the movement whites, and group representation are not ruled out by accepted as "the sole and authentic representative of those in Moscow considering options for South Africa. the people of South Africa" warrant examination. Soviets, especially the "white Russians," have a rich During the ANC's December 1987 international experience in coping with the problem of ethnic solidarity conference at Arusha, it was Tanzania's deputy divisions and South Africans would be well advised to prime minister and minister of defense, Salim Salim, study Soviet approaches and models carefully, recent who called for the ANC's worldwide recognition as the clashes in Azerbaijan notwithstanding. It is not by sole and authentic representative. In March 1988, The chance that the debate on minority rights was opened Citizen, a conservative newspaper in Johannesburg, by Starushenko, who is more of an expert on the reported that seven African countries (Egypt, Angola, 6 I CSIS AF RI CA NOTES

Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Algeria, Tanzania, and and the ANC disagree and pursue diametrically Zambia) had agreed to afford ANC missions "full opposed policies. This issue is South African member­ diplomatic status." The number of "official" ANC ship in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). missions worldwide is now believed to be about 40. In September 1986, Washington and Moscow jointly There is no doubt that the ANC leadership welcomes blocked a motion, presented by Nigeria on behalf of a and even presses for an upgrading of the status of its number of African and other Third World states, to expel missions. But to be recognized as the "sole and South Africa from the IAEA. (See "Pretoria's Nuclear authentic representative" is not part of the ANC's Diplomacy" by Robert S . Jaster in CSIS Africa Notes official strategy, at least not yet. In this connection, it is no. 81, January 22, 1988.) noteworthy that Salim Salim's statement is not to be The reaction to Moscow's vote in the IAEA undercuts found in the Program of Action adopted at the end of the a widespread belief in the West that the ANC is a Arusha conference. In June 1988, during a hearing held movement dominated by the Soviets via the SACP. In by the Social Democratic Party in the Bundestag in the Program of Action agreed upon in Arusha, urgent Bonn, visiting members of the ANC's executive council importance was accorded to challenging both Moscow explicitly confirmed that the ANC's strategy for the time and Washington on this question. The Arusha position being is neither to seek exclusive recognition nor to form was unequivocal: "South Africa should be expelled from a government in exile. The wording corresponded with a the International Atomic Energy Agency in 1988. declaration issued by the Black Consciousness-oriented Concerted action should be organized to e~sure this." National Conference of Trade Unions (NACTU) after a This drifting apart of Moscow and the ANC executive meeting with the ANC in Harare the previous month. on the question of South Africa's nuclear isolation could, According to NACTU officials, they and the ANC agreed some analysts believe, spread to other fields over time. that the Freedom Charter is not a precondition for unity Economic sanctions are one possibility. It is by now well and that all legitimate organizations have a direct and established that certain forms of economic cooperation significant role to play in the national liberation struggle. are taking place between Soviets and South Africans, The ANC leadership obviously is aware that to push notably in the field of minerals. (See, for example, Kurt for designation as the exclusive representation of the Campbell, Soviet Policy Towards South Africa [London: black resistance would damage rather than further its Macmillan, 1986], p. 94.) Soviet attitudes on comprehen­ cause, given the complexity of resistance forces in sive sanctions against South Africa may well change in South Africa. (See "A Guide to Black Politics in South an era when economic efficiency and cooperation are Africa" by Steven McDonald in CSIS Africa Notes no. the centerpiece of perestroika. Moreover, a surprising 36, November 5, 1984.) The strategic thinkers of the number of economists in Moscow seem to share the organization (although not necessarily the rank and file) pessimism of many of their Western colleagues about appear to be satisfied with being viewed as the both the economic and political efficacy of economic "leading" representative of the liberation struggle. A sanctions in the case of South Africa. Having been the nuance perhaps not yet fully grasped by the international victim of a number of sanctions campaigns themselves, community is that the quasi-diplomatic status of some most Soviets are not enthusiastic about such measures ANC missions is not a statement of exclusive anyway. representation. As of this writing, however, there has been to my The Soviet position is consonant with these knowledge no public statement by a Soviet official guidelines. In a telegram to the solidarity conference in renouncing the call for comprehensive sanctions against Arusha, Gorbachev hailed the ANC as an organization South Africa. On the contrary, Deputy Foreign Minister marching at the front of the liberation struggle, but did Anatoly Adamishin emphasized in a recent interview not use the term "sole representative." The recent with the Soviet journal Novoe Vremya the need to apply upgrading of the ANC mission in Moscow is not viewed sanctions to push Pretoria into a Namibia settlement. as restricting Soviet interaction with other antiapartheid And Asoyan, in a talk to South African students visiting organizations. As if to illustrate this point, the Lesotho in April 1988, is quoted as having said: "I am London-based periodical Front File reported in April sure that the power of pressure on Pretoria, including 1988 that a delegation of the Pan-Africanist Congress armed struggle by the liberation organizations, is also (PAC) would visit Moscow for talks with Soviet officials an indispensable part of this process. So is the demand soon. This would be a noteworthy development, since for sanctions." Moscow (like the SACP) has heretofore taken a strong position against the PAC, both on grounds of its Chinese Angola in Context connection and because of its Black Consciousness As Gillian Gunn notes in her forthcoming CSIS Africa ("reactionary black racism" in Soviet-SACP parlance) Notes analysis of the 1988 U.S.-Angolan-Cuban-South orientation. In any case, the participation of the African-Soviet dialogue (see "A Guide to the Intricacies ANC-SACP alliance as the main antiapartheid actor in of the Angola-Namibia Negotiations," CSIS Africa a negotiating process is a sine qua non for the Soviets. Notes no. 90), Angola is no longer - if it ever was - the staging post for the Soviets to apply a An Area of Soviet-ANC Disagreement military and ideological grip on South Africa. A very There is one issue on which Moscow under Gorbachev heavy military investment notwithstanding, the Soviets CSIS AFRICA NOTES I 7

now seek a political solution that would bring this Wishful thinking in Pretoria seemed to be, or possibly investment to an end without undermining the USSR's still is, based on an oversimplified analysis of the credibility as a global power. As Franz Josef Strauss similarities between Afghanistan and Angola. Unlike the told the South Africans in January, the Soviets want to case in Afghanistan, however, there is relatively little cut their losses. Moscow and Washington now publicly time pressure on the Soviets to finish their involvement agree that the conflict cannot be solved by military in Angola, where no Soviets are dying, and where the means. Both are proceeding on the assumption that costs of resupplying the local government with military Cuban troop withdrawal and implementation of hardware are tolerable when weighed against the Resolution 435 are interdependent. perceived need to defend Soviet global credibility. Among the conflicting signals coming from Pretoria Indeed, in Angola it is the South Africans who face an in the course of the Angola-Namibia exchanges have Afghanistan-like situation. The number of white South been persistent hints that the Botha government might Africans (not to mention the much higher number of "play the Soviet card" as a maneuver to scare the West blacks) dying on Angolan soil was going up prior to the into recognizing that South Africa is a bastion which it August 1988 cease-fire, and the military situation had cannot afford to lose. If there is any substance in the been shifting to Pretoria's disadvantage, above all with reports about Pretoria playing this card "to teach the regard to air strength. West a lesson" (as it considered doing twice before in periods of frustration in the 1970s), how would Moscow Looking Ahead react? Domestic politics in South Africa have been closely tied It may well be that in Moscow there are some to the fear of Soviet expansionism since the National politicians, diplomats, or academics who toy with the Party came to power in 1948. In February 1949, idea of forming an anti-U.S. alliance with Pretoria. But Minister of Justice C.R. Swart reported to Parliament this is not mainstream thinking. Pretoria is overestimat­ that a commission appointed the previous year had ing its relevance for global Soviet policy. Statements by determined that communism was a "national danger." Starushenko, Goncharov, and others about the In 1950, the infamous Suppression of Communism Act marginal relevance of southern Africa for the Soviet was passed, stigmatizing as communism not only Union support the conclusion that politicians in Moscow orthodox Marxism-Leninism but every doctrine "which in 1988 are above all interested in a stable relationship aims at bringing about any political, industrial, social or with Washington. The so-called amerikanisty around economic change within the Union by the promotion of Gorbachev (Anatoly Dobrynin and Georgy Arbatov, disturbances or disorder . .. or by encouragement of among others) think in global terms. An "adventurous" feelings of hostility between the European and jump into bed with P. W. Botha's South Africa would Non-European races ...." It was only a matter of time damage not only the present dialogue with Washington before diplomatic ties with the Soviet Union would be but also the Soviet Union's standing in Africa and other severed. In 1955, Minister of Foreign Affairs Eric Louw parts of the Third World. ordered the Soviet consulate closed. This is not to deny that the Soviets are interested in The doctrine of a "total strategy" against the "total having a dialogue with white South Africans, above all onslaught by international communism and terrorism" with those who take a serious stand against apartheid became official policy in the 1970s. After P.W. Botha such as the political "independents" (see "Observations succeeded B.J. Vorster as prime minister in 1978, a on the South African Elections" by Heribert Adam in semiclandestine network of about 400 Joint Manage­ CSJS Africa Notes no. 73, June 4, 1987) and Frederik ment Centers (JMC) was established under the State van Zyl Slab bert's IDASA. As Boris Asoyan indicated in Security Council to execute the "total strategy." (See an April 1988 interview with a South African journalist "The Process of Decision-Making in Contemporary in Lesotho, one part of redefining Moscow's role in South Africa" by Robert I. Rotberg in CSIS Africa Notes Africa as a "normal" and not a revolutionary global no. 22, December 28, 1983.) power is to be able to talk constructively to all sides and An understanding of this functional relationship to build up an image as a ll).ediator similar to between defending white minority rule and the Washington's. simplistic view of Soviet doctrines and activities that Asoyan left no doubt, however, about Soviet rejection gave birth to the dogma of "total onslaught" is essential of any South African proposal that delinks Cuban troop to an understanding of the stir created in South Africa withdrawal from· implementation of Resolution 435. In by the statements of Starushenko, Goncharov, and fact, this linkage has since become a basis for Asoyan. Gorbachev's "new realism" undermines the Soviet-U.S. understanding, largely because it provides a credibility of the most important pillar of the "total solution to a critical Soviet dilemma - how to cut strategy" - the assumption of Soviet expansionism. losses in Angola without losing face. If Resolution 435 is The main eroding thrust of Gorbachev's "new implemented and SWAPO given a fair chance to realism" is being felt in the South African military itself. compete in a ON-monitored Namibian election, the Young white conscripts are already asking themselves: Cubans and Soviets can go home and call their mission what is the use of getting killed or permanently disabled a success. in Angola, northern Namibia, or even the townships if it 8 I CSIS AFRICA NOTES

is not about defending white values and Western verligte elements in the governing National Party, freedom against the evils of communism? The rising church leaders and groupings such as the South African number of young whites who refuse to serve speaks for Council of Churches (SACC), and leaders of the United itself. Democratic Front (UDF) and the Congress of South The learning process toward a "new realism" in white African Trade Unions (COSATU). The hope in these South African politics will be slow, very slow indeed. But quarters is that more whites will be prepared to risk a there is little doubt that the process has already begun. genuinely substantive dialogue with the black President Botha, Minister of Defense Malan, and other population if the Communist onslaught dogma can be security-minded officials at high levels are contributing proved a bogey. to this process, although unintentionally, by their recent Toward this end, an increasing number of South suggestions that the Soviet Union may be a more Africans from different professions and representative of reliable partner than the United States. different schools of thought can be expected to follow In the Department of Foreign Affairs, the learning the recent examples of academician Philip Nel, writer process is more advanced. "Total onslaught" paranoia Andre Brink, politician Alex Boraine, and Archbishop has given way to considerable empathy with the policies Desmond Tutu in accepting invitations to visit Moscow being pursued by President Chissano in FRELIMO­ and make their own evaluations of Soviet policy and governed Mozambique, for example, and more realistic objectives. assessments of the limits of Soviet policy aims and capabilities in the region. In contrast to a view still predominant in the military establishment, the DFA is not so much interested in establishing an Eastern-bloc­ type military hegemony over southern Africa as in pursuing a more subtle diplomatic strategy of regional dominance through economic interdependence and Winrich Kuhne is head of the Africa department at the cooperation. Research Institute for International Politics and Security The State Security Council's inclination to deal with of the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik in Ebenhausen the incompatibility of the two approaches by specified near Munich. He travels frequently to southern Africa and or de facto divisions of responsibility complicates both has discussed developments in the region with Soviet the policy process in governments dealing with South academics and diplomats. He is the author of three Africa and the task of the analyst. "Keep them books as well as many articles that have appeared in guessing" remains an important element of Pretoria's German and international journals. A briefing paper by Dr. Kuhne entitled "What Does the Case of Mozambique foreign policy. Tell Us About Soviet Ambivalence Toward Africa?," Receptiveness to the new tendencies in Soviet policy originally published as CS/S Africa Notes issue no. 46 in is highest among those in South Africa who hope that August 1985, is also a chapter in the book Angola, the country can be saved from violent conflict by an Mozambique, and the West, ed. Helen Kitchen honest dialogue between blacks and whites. This (CSIS/Praeger, 1987). spectrum includes van Zyl Slabbert's Dakar trekkers, members of the Progressive Federal Party, the more