DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THETable of ContentsCONGO (DRC) INTEGAccronyms RATED GOVERNANCE 2 INTRODUCTION ...... 5 UNDERSTANDING DO NO HARM AND CONFLICT SENSITIVITY APPROACHES ...... 6 ACTIVITYLDo No Harm...... (IGA)...... 6 OVERVIEW ON THE CURRENT POLITICAL SITUATION IN THE DRC ...... 8 Decentralization and Conflict ...... 10 CONFLICTCurrent Conflict Situation in Kasais SENSITIVTY ...... 11 Current Conflict Situation in Katanga ...... 12 ANALYSISCurrent Conflict Situation in Kivus& ...... 16 USAID IGA CONFLICT SENSITIVITY TOOLKIT AND APPROACH ...... 19 Conflict Sensitivity – Before Engagement ...... 20 IMPLEMENTATIONConflict Senstivity – During and After Engagement ...... STRAT...... EGY 24 USAID IGA’S IMPLEMENTATION PLAN – YEAR 2 ...... 25 ANANNEX ANNEX A: SELECTED TO THE RESOURCES YEAR FOR 3 WORK CONFLICT PLAN SENSITIVITY ...... 27 ANNEX B: CONFLICT ANALYSIS DEFINITIONS AND KEY QUESTIONS...... 28 SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY AND REFERENCES ...... 30

SEPTEMBER 2018

This publication was produced for review by the United States Agency for International Development. It was prepared by DAI. 1 DRC IGA, Conflict Sensitivity Analysis & Implementation Strategy - Year 3 Workplan

Program Title: Integrated Governance Activity (IGA) Sponsoring USAID Office: USAID DRC Contract Number: AID-660-C-17-00001 Contractor: DAI Date of Submission: September 1, 2018

The authors’ views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Agency for International Development or the United States Government.

2 DRC IGA, Conflict Sensitivity Analysis & Implementation Strategy - Year 3 Workplan

Table of Contents

ACRONYMS 4 INTRODUCTION ...... 5 UNDERSTANDING DO NO HARM AND CONFLICT SENSITIVITY APPROACHES ...... 6 Do No Harm ...... 6 OVERVIEW ON THE CURRENT POLITICAL SITUATION IN THE DRC ...... 8 Decentralization and Conflict ...... 10 current Conflict Situation in Kinshasa ...... 11 Current Conflict Situation in Kasais ...... 12 Current Conflict Situation in Katanga ...... 15 Current Conflict Situation in Kivus ...... 16 USAID IGA CONFLICT SENSITIVITY TOOLKIT AND APPROACH ...... 19 Conflict Sensitivity – Before Engagement ...... 20 Conflict Senstivity – During and After Engagement ...... 24 Conflict Sensitivity Achievements in Year 1 ...... 25 USAID IGA’S IMPLEMENTATION PLAN – YEAR 2 ...... 25 ANNEX A: SELECTED RESOURCES FOR CONFLICT SENSITIVITY ...... 27 ANNEX B: CONFLICT ANALYSIS DEFINITIONS AND KEY QUESTIONS...... 28 SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY AND REFERENCES ...... 30

3 DRC IGA, Conflict Sensitivity Analysis & Implementation Strategy - Year 3 Workplan

Acronyms

AU African Union CAF Conflict Assessment Framework CARG Rural Agriculture Management Council CDA Collaborative for Development Action CENI Independent National Election Commission CODESA Community Health and Development Committee COGE School Management Committee CONAKAT National Confederation of Katanga COP Chief of Party COPA Parent Education Committee CSO civil society organization DAI DAI Global LLC DCOP Deputy Chief of Party DRC Democratic Republic of the Congo EITI Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative ETD Entities Territoriales Décentralisés EU European Union FDLR Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda ICGLR International Community for the Great Lakes Region IDP internally displaced person IGA Integrated Governance Activity M&E monitoring and evaluation M23 March 23 Movement MONUSCO United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC NGO nongovernmental organization PEA Political Economy Analysis PEANA Political Economy Analysis Needs Asssessment SADC Southern Africa Development Community UN United Nations USAID United States Agency for International Development WFP World Food Programme

4 DRC IGA, Conflict Sensitivity Analysis & Implementation Strategy - Year 3 Workplan

INTRODUCTION The US Agency for International Development (USAID) Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) Integrated Governance Activity (IGA) is a five-year program, ending on January 8, 2022, and implemented by DAI. USAID IGA works with government and civil society at national, provincial, and local levels to support sustainable capacity for delivery of a range of basic services, especially related to health, education, and economic growth. USAID IGA works to reorient misaligned incentives and build greater demand for services while strengthening capacity. Transparent, inclusive, and participatory improvements to service delivery will reinforce democratic development and create the foundation for more equitable growth. USAID IGA has initially engaged in the following DRC provinces: Haut Katanga, Kasai Centrale, Kasai Orientale, Lualaba, and South Kivu, and are also working in the Walikali territory in Nord Kivu and the and the Masina commune in Kinshasa.

It has long been acknowledged that development and humanitarian activities can have unintended impacts on local conflicts. Whether they exacerbate existing community tensions or create new strains through the introduction of new resources or access, since the early 1990s, the international community has sought to mitigate these impacts using conflict sensitive or aware development approaches. Given the particularly dynamic and complex political and social context in the DRC, DAI recognizes the importance of employing a conflict sensitive approach. Through the usage of the conflict sensitive approach outlined in this deliverable, USAID IGA aims to ensure staff awareness of conflict sensitive programming, mainstream conflict sensitivity throughout beneficiary selection and programming life cycle, design interventions that consider local sensitivities and, finally, ensure a Do No Harm approach.

USAID IGA’s guiding principles for implementing a conflict sensitive program are as follows:

1. All staff will be trained on conflict sensitivity awareness and will be encouraged to apply a conflict sensitive approach to all aspects of programming, challenging previously held biases and perceptions of ongoing conflict situations. 2. Conflict sensitivity will, wherever possible, be mainstreamed as part of USAID IGA’s overall approach and included in program assessments, analysis and monitoring & evaluation (M&E) ensuring conflict-related data is collected on a regular basis and not just as issues arise. 3. USAID IGA management will take concerns about conflict-related impacts seriously and provide a safe and supportive space for staff to share worries about the impacts of programming. 4. In keeping with Do No Harm principles, USAID IGA will always seek to maximize positive and mitigate against negative conflict related outcomes. If an activity is found to be doing harm, USAID IGA will either adjust or cancel the activity.

This deliverable is intended to be an initial outline of USAID IGA’s approach to conflict sensitivity over the life of the project. The report begins with a brief outline of Do No Harm and conflict sensitivity principles, followed by an analysis of conflict dynamics in the DRC, specifically focused on the impacts of the decentralization process on USAID IGA’s target provinces. Next, the report will outline the USAID IGA conflict sensitivity approach and its application in Year 3. As this conflict sensitivity deliverable is being designed to reflect Year 3 activities, it is focused on properly managing possible conflict-sensitive activities and raising awareness in correctly engaging with relevant government agencies and civil society leaders and organizations. It will be updated on an annual basis during the work planning cycle to reflect shifting project priorities, implementation priorities, and lessons learned from previous activities.

As part of the design of this tool, DAI consulted with various other USAID and donor-funded programs, as well as Congolese non-governmental organizations (NGOs), about their conflict-sensitivity approaches. While all recognized the importance of conflict sensitivity, and most implemented some forms of Do No

5 DRC IGA, Conflict Sensitivity Analysis & Implementation Strategy - Year 3 Workplan

Harm programming, few implementers had an institutionalized approach. This deliverable serves as USAID IGA’s plan to institutionalize this approach throughout the life of the project.

UNDERSTANDING DO NO HARM AND CONFLICT SENSITIVITY APPROACHES Over the last few decades, as development and other donor-funded programming began working more frequently in conflict-affected areas, there has been a growing realization that aid, both humanitarian and development, can inadvertently feed conflict or exacerbate tensions between groups, rather than alleviate it. Mary B. Anderson’s “Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace – or War” published in 1999 serves as one of the initial guiding voices on the Do No Harm approach. The later “Options for Aid in Conflict: Lessons from Field Experience,” published in 2000 provides concrete examples for how to avoid exacerbating already existent conflict through the implementation of development programming, guiding readers through decisions about local partners, authorities and staffing, as well as how and what to provide.

DO NO HARM USAID IGA’s approach to conflict sensitivity is grounded in the theory of Do No Harm. This theory revolves around the premises that development interventions must be conducted in a manner that does not put the lives of societies in violent situations at greater risk (USAID People-To-People Peacebuilding: A Program Guide, Challenges). When providing development aid, implementers can exacerbate conflict if they do not fully comprehend the political, social and economic power dynamics, disrupting the “settlement that underpins the state” (OECD Do No Harm: International Support for State building, Introduction).

Given that decentralization projects often have political aspects working closely with national and local governments, the risk for harm is substantial. Studies have shown that “decentralization processes…can also lead to a lack of local accountability and significant opportunities for corruption and reinforce or create elites who can use devolved power to pursue their own interests” (World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security, and Development, pp 166). The OECD Do No Harm report found that there is a lack of awareness concerning the provincial elite and networks in the DRC that may negatively influence the decentralization process.

The CDA has developed a framework that will guide USAID IGA’s approach towards Do No Harm programming. The framework relies on seven key steps towards analyzing how aid can affect conflict: 1. Understanding the context of conflict 2. Analyzing sources of tension 3. Analyze connections across groups 4. Analyze the aid program 5. Analyze the aid program’s impact on sources of tension and connections 6. Considering and generating programming options 7. Testing programming options and redesigning projects.

The Do No Harm approach is beneficial as it recognizes the relationships and power dynamics at play while significantly decreasing the likelihood that USAID IGA project activities will be detrimental to the communities they intend to serve. USAID IGA’s approach to conflict sensitivity is grounded in the theory of Do No Harm.

6 DRC IGA, Conflict Sensitivity Analysis & Implementation Strategy - Year 3 Workplan

Conflicts can arise from a variety of sources during implementation, many of which are difficult to foresee without deep local knowledge and the completion of a strong conflict analysis before engagement. They can surface at any point of an activity including in the process of partner and beneficiary selection, operational aspects of implementation, and following the closure of activities as the community understands the impacts. USAID IGA works in locations in the DRC with a long history of outright violent conflict or simmering ethnic or socio-economic tensions that threaten to boil over at any point. As any sort of donor-funded intervention will have some impact on local dynamics, it is not likely to be possible for USAID IGA to mitigate against every single potential outcome. However, through measured and deliberate engagement, USAID IGA can ensure conflict and the potential for negative outcomes is considered in the design and implementation process, which would include declining to engage in communities where the possibility of further exacerbating existing tensions is too high.

One of the primary methods aid organizations have utilized in response to the desire to Do No Harm is to ensure programming employs conflict sensitive approaches. The USAID Conflict Assessment Framework (CAF) 2.0, published in 2012, which outlines USAID’s methodological approach for undertaking a conflict assessment to identify and understand dynamics of instability and violence. It defines conflict sensitivity as “the ability of an organization to: (1) understand the context in which it is operating, particularly with respect to inter-group relations; (2) understand the interactions between its interventions and the context/group relations; and (3) act upon these understandings in a way that avoids negative impacts and maximizes positive impacts vis-à-vis the conflict.”1 Conflict sensitivity is one aspect of the CAF. It is important to note that USAID IGA does not directly engage in other conflict-focused activities outlined in the CAF, including conflict management, mitigation, or prevention, but simply aim to be conflict aware and sensitive as to how USAID IGA’s goals may affect local conflict dynamics, as described in the section above.

Taking the lessons outlined by Mary B. Anderson to heart, the project aims to minimize the relationship between project activities and potential conflict using a conflict sensitive approach. There are a variety of well-known international organizations and networks, including International Alert, the Collaborative for Development Action (CDA), the Conflict Sensitivity Consortium, and SaferWorld, that have already developed and published conflict sensitivity tool kits. The USAID IGA approach pulls from both the USAID CAF, as well as these tool kits, to design an approach that ensures conflict sensitive implementation while also considering the resources and goals of the program. The approach includes three steps based on USAID’s definition of conflict sensitivity: (1) Understand the operational context; (2) Understand the potential impacts of your intervention; and (3) Develop an engagement strategy that seeks to maximize positive and mitigate negative impacts. In implementing a conflict sensitive approach, USAID IGA aims to not only avoid the potential for violent conflict caused by project activities, but to increase the effectiveness of these interventions.

1 USAID Conflict Assessment Framework 2.0 (2012), pp 4.

7 DRC IGA, Conflict Sensitivity Analysis & Implementation Strategy - Year 3 Workplan

OVERVIEW ON THE CURRENT POLITICAL SITUATION IN THE DRC To best inform USAID IGA’s approach to Do No Harm implementation, it is important to understand the realities of the DRC in terms of potential areas of conflict. To do so, USAID IGA has undertaken an initial conflict analysis to frame USAID IGA’s approach and potential areas of concern. These analyses are intended to be high-level snapshots capturing some of the political dynamics at this moment in each of USAID IGA’s targeted provincial areas. These analyses will continue to be updated in further detail as dynamics change and implementation continues.

USAID IGA started at a time of significant uncertainty and tension about the future of the DRC. Instability has been spurred by President Kabila’s efforts over the past two years to remain in power beyond the end of his constitutionally mandated two-term limit, which expired in December 2016. A political deal was mediated by the Catholic Church on December 31, 2016 aimed at appointing a transitional government by March 28, 2017 while the country prepared to conduct presidential, legislative, and provincial/local elections by the end of 2017. However, before the deadline, the DRC’s Independent National Election Commission (CENI) announced that elections could not be held before the December 2017 deadline due to issues with voter registration and ongoing violence in various areas of the country. The political opposition loudly condemned this announcement and continued to maintain that President Kabila was simply stalling future elections. As a means of dissent, political opposition called for widespread demonstrations starting in Kinshasa and eventually spreading throughout the country. This large outcry was met by calls from the international community – including the U.S. Government, European Union (EU), African Union (AU), Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), the International Community for the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) and the United Nations (UN) – for the DRC government to demonstrate its commitment to holding free and transparent elections by releasing a clear timetable for elections. US Ambassador to the United Nations Nikki Haley visited the DRC in October 2017 and called for free and fair elections in 2018. Less than one week after her visit, the CENI released its election calendar whereby presidential, legislative and provincial/local elections are scheduled for December 23, 2018.

The highly anticipated 2018 elections are currently still scheduled to take place in December. Anxiety and tensions continued to build in Kinshasa and throughout the rest of the country as the DRC and the international community waited to see if President Kabila would run for re-election. Finally, on August 9th, the long-awaited public announcement was made that the president would not stand for re-election. Instead, his party has nominated former interior minister Emmanuel Ramazani Shadary. The announcement came just hours in advance of the electoral commission’s deadline for candidates to register.

While national-level tensions in Kinshasa have dissipated for the time being, other regions of the DRC continue to face varying degrees of provincial and local tensions, exacerbated by socio-economic insecurities and seemingly constant meddling by the central government. Conflict in the DRC, while highly political, has undermined social and economic development. Per the UN Economic Commission for Africa, “…the country is emerging from a protracted economic contraction” that has been prolonged by conflict. 2 Although growth has accelerated and inflation has declined, high poverty and unemployment have created tension.

While ongoing instability and conflict in the eastern regions of the country have long been at the forefront, what were once only simmering frictions in the Kasais, conflict erupted in Kasai Central between the Kamuina Nsapu militias and the country’s armed forces causing the displacement of 1.4 million people .

2 UN Economic Commission for Africa, Conflicts in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Causes, impact and implications for the Great Lakes region, pp.16

8 DRC IGA, Conflict Sensitivity Analysis & Implementation Strategy - Year 3 Workplan

Violence rapidly spread in 2017 with roiling clashes between the police, seconded by units of the national army deployed from Kinshasa, and the Kamuina Nsapu and Bana Mura militias, as well as protests in opposition strongholds in the former Katanga province have become more frequent. Following Kamuina Nsapu’s defeat, Bana Mura militias have begun targeting Luba speaking citizens. The tensions in the Kasais are now part of a wider conflict and humanitarian and refugee crisis. The atrocities committed by both the militias and national army have drawn the attention of the international community and are being investigated as possible war crimes and crimes against humanity. The instability at the national level and failure to address these issues, or in some cases cynically stoking the tensions, furthers insecurity that these long-simmering conflicts could erupt without warning.

Among the results of these conflicts were growing clusters of refugees in adjacent countries of Angola, Uganda, Rwanda, and Zambia numbering in the hundreds of thousands. The DRC crisis was threatening to destabilize the entire region. Finally, individual national leaders from Rwanda, Angola, Botswana and South Africa started speaking out, demanding that the St Sylvestre agreement which was brokered by the Catholic Church represented by the CENCO (Conference Episcopale Nationale du Congo) and signed by representatives of the DRC government, the opposition and Civil Society organizations on December 31st 2016 to be honoured immediately by all parties. This accord called for President Kabila to step down and for free and fair elections to be organized and implemented. Finally, after being exposed to all of this additional pressure applied by his African counterparts, Kabila relented and named Emmanual Ramazani Shadari to represent the Majority Coalition in the upcoming presidential elections.

In addition to political uncertainty at the national level, tensions at the provincial and local level are further impacted by the recent implementation of decentralization and découpage. Decentralization, intended to bring government structures closer to the people, included the devolution of power from the national to provincial level for sectors such as health, education, and agriculture. The process also safeguards permits to levy local taxes and a retrocession of 40 percent of national taxes raised at the provincial level, which in turn another 40 percent are retroceded to the ETD. To acknowledge the inequity between national taxes collected on resource-rich provinces such as Haut Katanga, the constitution also creates a National Equalization Fund which distributes 10 percent of national tax to provinces with weaker tax collection or smaller revenue bases.

The découpage process, which was outlined in the 2006 constitution, divides the country from 11 provinces into 26 newly created entities (See Figure 1). The creation of the new provinces, which took effect in July 2015, was viewed as messy and poorly planned. Découpage led to further confusion about the roles of newly created provincial- level positions, disputes about who will provide which services, and, in some Figure 1: DRC Decoupagé map (Source: Foreign Affairs, 2015) cases, renewed or exacerbated conflict as power dynamics shift and are recalibrated. In 2016, Provincial Assembly members indirectly elected provincial governors, elections that took place under tight regime control and all but

9 DRC IGA, Conflict Sensitivity Analysis & Implementation Strategy - Year 3 Workplan ensured only supporters of the regime would win.3 These elections took place even though provincial elections have not occurred since 2006. They are scheduled to occur in line with the upcoming December 23rd, 2018 presidential election. Given USAID IGA’s mandate to work at both the provincial and local level, it is expected that tensions and misunderstandings about the decentralization process will have an impact on programming abilities.

Below, USAID IGA provides a high-level update at the conflicts currently impacting the program’s target regions, as well as a look at the relationship between decentralization and conflict. These analyses are organized at the former province level, focusing on USAID IGA’s target areas – Lualaba, Haut Katanga, Kasai Central, Kasai Oriental and Sud Kivu. This analysis is not exhaustive and provides only a snapshot of the current conflict situation. To ensure successful implementation, USAID IGA continually updates these analyses based on new developments at the national, provincial and local levels, specifically relying on a range of sources cultivated by staff relationships.

DECENTRALIZATION AND CONFLICT Since the 1990s, decentralization has been a tool encouraged by international actors, specifically donors, to improve governance quality and reduce conflict throughout the DRC. This perspective is grounded in the belief that shifting power out of the center and closer to the level of citizens increases government responsiveness and accountability and enhances oversight capacity. Supporters argued that, “decentralization will augment greater political legitimacy while strengthening a sense of citizen ownership of their government.”4

Supporters of decentralization also believe that it can reduce conflict by creating a further series of checks and balances. In doing so, a decentralized system removes decision-making from the central government, which is often out of touch with local issues, and empowers localities to propose appropriate solutions. Those in favour of decentralization also assert that it allows local governments to address would-be tensions proactively, through representation that is sensitive to needs of citizens. In ethnically diverse or divided societies, supporters argue that decentralization can provide incentives for minority group representation, rather than a winner-take-all system that encourages the exclusion of minority groups.5

However, decentralization as a conflict mitigation strategy has many critics. Skeptics argue that decentralization can increase the risks of ethnic conflict by emphasizing the differences between regions and encouraging affinity with ethnic or other geographic groups, rather than the states. They also argue that decentralization encourages radicalization of local politicians, who stake out hard-line positions focused solely on regional priorities.6 Additionally, decentralization runs the risk of simply creating incentives for power-grabbing and corruption at more local levels, as further resources become available to those that did not previously have access. Some examples of this behaviour have been seen in the DRC where, following decentralization, provincial authorities began taxing every possible item, even for services not provided at the Provincial level, to extract resources. Actions like this run the risk of further exacerbating tensions between those groups in power and those on the outside, ensuring obtaining and maintaining power stays the only political priority.

Whether decentralization will be a positive or negative force in the DRC is still up for debate. The roll out of decentralization continues to be messy, contributing to confusion and, at worst, exploitation. The smaller provincial assemblies are easier to manipulate either through threats or bribes. This proved to be the case for the last gubernatorial elections that were conducted immediately after the decoupage. Thus

3 International Crisis Group, Katanga: Tensions in DRC’s Mineral Heartland, pp 2. 4 Siegle and O’Mahoney. Assessing the Merits of Decentralization as Conflict Mitigation Strategy, pp 1. 5 Ibid. 6 Ibid.

10 DRC IGA, Conflict Sensitivity Analysis & Implementation Strategy - Year 3 Workplan far, the implementation of découpage has not been accompanied by the financial and personnel resources promised in the Constitution, thus provinces have yet to be able to better deliver services. From 2007 to 2013, retrocession hovered between 6 and 10 percent, falling short of the promised 40 percent. In turn, provinces have failed to further retrocede funds to the Entities Territoriales Décentralisés (ETD).7 The national government claims they are unable to cede resources due to a lack of absorptive capacity and ability to use funding at the provincial level, but few steps, such as funding new positions, training, workshops, have been taken to build this capacity. USAID IGA plays a role in such this capacity at the provincial and ETD level.

In interviews conducted at the onset of the project, Congolese and international implementers were unclear as to the impacts of decentralization on conflict in the DRC. Most felt that given the lack of resources assigned to the process, there have been limited local (ETD-level) impacts and that decentralization has not yet had any material effect on ongoing conflicts. At the provincial level, two areas emerged where the decentralization process is most likely to either exacerbate current tensions or create new ones – the first is border disputes caused by the drawing of new boundaries and the second is perceptions of inequality or grievances about resources between provinces, whether on an ethnic or political basis. These tensions, of course, often have local level impacts.

The primary conflict-related issue related to decentralization that USAID IGA contends with at both a provincial and local level are grievances related to inequalities, real or perceived, based on how provinces, ETDs, and various ethnic groups are treated by the central government. These grievances have existed in the DRC well before the decentralization process, but the shifting in previously established balances can cause tensions to further escalate or develop into conflict. Grievances focused on inequality come at all levels of society, with provinces resenting treatment by the national level and ETDs and tribes resenting treatment by both the provincial and national level.

The issue of grievances related to inequality is particularly relevant to USAID IGA in of its selection of ETDs to support. While USAID IGA has a set of selection criteria this process may not be transparent to all ETDs or Provincial level governments seeking support. To avoid exacerbating further tensions, USAID IGA must consider the diversity of both ethnic groups benefiting from the support and ETD types (commune, sector, chefferie). Failure to consider these factors may further stoke feelings of inequality and favoritism, already tense from decentralization that could have serious impacts on USAID IGA’s ability to implement.

In terms of land disputes, any process which aims to redraw borders and create new administrative centers runs the risk of creating or worsening disputes. In the wake of the implementation of découpage, there are examples of both inter-provincial disputes about borders as well as ETDs that are unhappy with their provincial assignment and could potentially act out. Territorial disputes and tensions as a result of decentralization are still potential flashpoints that USAID IGA must continue to be aware of and has made a concerted effort not to fuel through ETD selection activities.

CURRENT CONFLICT SITUATION IN KINSHASA Tensions have deescalated in Kinshasa since President Kabila’s announcement to not run for re-election, however, there remain uncertainties and anxiety around the upcoming December elections. This is a crucial and pivotal moment in the country’s history. The international and regional communities have cautiously praised Kabila’s news, reminding the electoral commission of the need to see that free and fair elections do indeed take place in December, emphasizing a credible election process.

7 International Crisis Group, Katanga: Tensions in DRC’s Mineral Heartland, pp 11.

11 DRC IGA, Conflict Sensitivity Analysis & Implementation Strategy - Year 3 Workplan

Along with the ruling party’s candidate, Emmanuel Ramazani Shadary, the opposition party Movement for the Liberation of Congo has endorsed former Vice President and rebel leader, Jean-Pierre Bemba. Bemba’s return to the DRC following the overturn of his International Criminal Court convictions brought thousands of supports to the streets of Kinshasa with police mounting a response by firing teargas.8 Meanwhile, former Katanga Governor and Kabila opposition leader Moise Katumbi’s attempted return to the country to register his candidacy have spurred protests.

CENI has since approved all but six of the total of 25 candidates registered to run. Appeals challenging the constitutional court’s ruling have been filed by the banned candidates, including Bemba. These restrictions, along with the successful blocking of Katumbi’s return have contributed to fears of possible delays and further indication of Kabila’s continued influence in the election, A recent poll conducted by the Congo Research Group at New York University in coordination with BERCI, a Congolese firm, concluded that 62% of people do not trust the DRC electoral commission to conduct free and fair elections.9 Doubts also remain in the possibility of a peaceful process and the capacity of a possible new leader to create a new, improved government.10

CURRENT CONFLICT SITUATION IN KASAIS The Kasai region is comprised of five provinces – Kasai, Kasai Central, Kasai Oriental, Lomani and Sankuru – in the south-central part of the country. USAID IGA specifically focuses on programming in the provinces of Kasai Central and Kasai “Poor nutritional status of children under 5 in the Kasais raises the risk Oriental. Decades of under-investment in infrastructure and basic of mortality, illness and infections, services has left the region largely isolated from international delayed physical development, intervention and support. As such, the human security situation in the cognitive deficits, and delayed school Kasais is significantly more severe than in USAID IGA’s other target entry and poorer school performance. areas. Here, citizens are particularly vulnerable to external shocks Unfortunately, few nutrition services related to food, health, economics, and the environment. This are available to these children necessitates a different conflict sensitivity approach, that takes into throughout the country, especially in consideration the fact that the primary issue affecting citizens is socio- remote provinces with poor economic insecurity exacerbated by political strife. infrastructure such as the Kasais.” - USAID Office of Food for Peace, Food Security Desk Review for The people of the Kasai region make their living on agriculture and Kasai Occidental and Kasai livestock production. Artisanal diamond mining and forest foraging are Oriental, Democratic Republic of also important livelihoods11. The former Kasai Oriental is home to the Congo, p. 20 DRC’s largest diamond deposits which have, thus far, been largely unexploited with little industrial mining present 12.The region is rife with high levels of malnutrition and disease, both of which are results of poor health and nutrition services, infrastructure, and water, sanitation, and hygiene services. Even, urban areas like Mbuji Mayi, lack formal planning and have only limited infrastructure.13 Analysis by the World Food Programme (WFP) in 2014 found that 62 percent of households in the former Kasai Oriental were food insecure, with 12 percent

8 Jason Burke, “Former warlord returns to DR Congo from prison to run for president”, The Guardian. 9 Fidelis Mbah, “As Jean-Pierre Bemba returns, DRC opposition eyes a shot at power”, Aljazeera. 10 John Mukum Mbaku, “What is at stake for the DRC presidential election?”, Brookings. 11 Beginning in the 1920s, the Miba Corporation conducted a significant industrial exploitation of diamond deposits in the Mbuji Mayi area. First as an entity of the Belgian King and later co-owned with the DRC National Government, the operation eventually fizzled by the early 1990s due to a rupture in relations between the Belgians and the Mobutu government. 12 USAID, USAID Office of Food for Peace Food Security Desk Review for Kasai Occidental and Kasai Oriental, Democratic Republic of Congo, pp 1. 13 USAID, USAID Office of Food for Peace Food Security Desk Review for Kasai Occidental and Kasai Oriental, Democratic Republic of Congo, pp 4. 12 DRC IGA, Conflict Sensitivity Analysis & Implementation Strategy - Year 3 Workplan identified as severely food insecure. This is the second worst ranking in the country, coming in only after South Kivu, which has experienced ongoing conflict for the past decades.

Along with these socio-economic challenges, the Kasais have experienced intense political conflict, although armed conflict in these areas has historically been lower than other USAID IGA target provinces. The region has both a history of secessionist movements and of having been significantly affected by foreign-supported rebellions, including those to overthrow President Mobutu and, later, President Laurent Kabila. With the presence of strong support for opposition in the area, the central government in Kinshasa, and Kabila specifically, remain unpopular, with dissatisfaction growing as Kabila continued to refuse to step down. Many citizens feel marginalized and that they are not fairly represented by the central government. Kasaians have expressed anger that no individual from the area has ever led the country, despite the region being home to numerous senior political figures.14 Furthermore, misunderstandings about the decentralization process among provincial officials and citizens have further led to reports of frustration with the provincial government’s inability to provide services.15

The most recent bout of conflict in the Kasais has remained ongoing since early 2016 when the government in Kinshasa refused to recognize the appointment of Jean-Pierre Mpandi as Kamwina Nsapu, the hereditary chief of Bajila Kasanga. Considered an insult to the chief, and after several run-ins with the police, he called for an uprising to protest this decision. 16 This locally rooted conflict quickly gained intensity during communal clashes, as protestors attacked symbols related to state institutions and security forces in the region. In August 2016, Kamwina Nsapu was killed by Congolese police forces, prompting his followers to continue fighting for revenge of his death as well as protesting the fact that the Chief’s body was not given traditional burial rites. The Kamwina Nsapu fighters, which are made up of a significant number of child soldiers, looted and burned government offices including that of the electoral commission. The once localized conflict quickly became intertwined in national crises leading to the growth of more than 60 militia groups in the Kasais by mid-2017. In response, the national government reinforced its military and police presence across the region often using extreme violence to quell discontent. The UN has discovered 87 mass graves in the Kasais17 and a reported 35,000 people have been forced to flee from their homes and seek refuge in Angola.18 In February of 2018, a flare up of tensions led to another 11,000 IDPs forced further north.19 To date, approximately 900,000 Congolese have been internally displaced since the 2016 conflict began.20 UNICEF has deemed the conflict a “children’s crisis”, with 3.8 million people in the Kasai region in need of humanitarian assistance, including 2.3 million children.21

As the insecurity across the Kasais continues, it becomes a symbol of widespread dissatisfaction in the region as well as a defense of transitional customs and practices.22 On the surface, this flare up of violence may appear to have erupted out of nowhere. However, the simmering conflict was ignited by the failure of Kinshasa to acknowledge a locally recognized leader, tapping into long-held political and socio-economic grievances over perceptions of marginalization at the hands of the national government, including lack of

14 Hans Hoebeke, “Kamuina Nsapu Insurgency Adds to Dangers in DR Congo”, International Crisis Group, pp 3. 15 USAID, USAID Office of Food for Peace Food Security Desk Review for Kasai Occidental and Kasai Oriental, Democratic Republic of Congo, pp 4. 16 Hans Hoebeke, “Kamuina Nsapu Insurgency Adds to Dangers in DR Congo”, International Crisis Group, pp 3. 17 International Crisis Group, “Time for Concerted Action in DR Congo”, pp18. 18 Remi Carlier, “UN denounces deadly ethnic violence in DR Congo’s Kasai province”, France24. 19 UNHCR Briefing Notes, “Rekindled tension in DR Congo’s Kasai region poses new threat to civilians, displaced”, UNHCR. 20 Ibid. 21 UNICEF Child Alert, “Kasai: A children’s crisis”, UNICEF. 22 Hans Hoebeke, “Kamuina Nsapu Insurgency Adds to Dangers in DR Congo”, International Crisis Group, pp 4.

13 DRC IGA, Conflict Sensitivity Analysis & Implementation Strategy - Year 3 Workplan investment in the province’s infrastructure. These grievances threaten to spill over into conflict across the province, including in Kasai, Kasai-Oriental, and Lomami.23

By mid-2018, the security situation in Kasai had mostly stabilized. According to the UN Joint Human Rights Office (UNJHRO), the number of violent incidents between March and April 2018 has decreased from 74 to 36.24 Further, as of early 2018, armed forces have gained control of the most areas within the region. Despite the apparent progress towards stability, ongoing ethnic tensions and sporadic violent clashes between Kamwina Nsapu and government forces continue to cause violence throughout the region. Violent incidents and human rights violations such as extrajudicial executions, sexual assaults, gender- based violence, torture, and forced recruitment of children have been reported by the UN, Amnesty International, and other human rights groups. More pronounced tensions between different ethnic groups and intercommunal conflict continue to pose a threat to stability in the region. A recent UN investigation found that both Kamwina Nsapu and DRC security forces are responsible for committing war crimes and against humanity. Members of Tchokwe, Pende, and Tetela communities that created the Bana Mura militant group in early 2017 have formed alliances with local security forces to carry out large-scale, systematic crimes and human rights abuses against the pro-Kamwina Nsapu Luba and Lulua communities within the region.25 Between March and June 2018, 150 people were killed by the Bana Mura militia group in Kamonia village, and 79 people were killed by Kamwina Nsapu.26 Despite credible investigations, government authorities have not taken any action to conduct national-level investigations into human rights violations in the Kasai. A recent research mission by Amnesty International found that only two investigations were launched by the authorities in 2017, while other serious crimes, such as the killing of 39 people in Nganza and Ndesha allegedly committed by the army, have not been investigated.27 The absence of investigations into human rights violations may exacerbate tensions between local state security/defense agents and the pro-Kamwina Nsapu communities, contributing to more instability in the region.

The ongoing violence has also continued to cause internal and external displacement of populations in early 2018. As of January, 27,000 Congolese have fled to Angola and more than 800,000 people are internally displaced within the Kasai region.28 Displaced people started returning home in early 2018, but forceful and voluntary returns have contributed to the instability and violence in communities due to various ethnic grievances on both sides.29 In some cases, refugees in Angola and the internally displaced people are unable and unwilling to return to their communities as a result of the inter-ethnic conflict in their areas of origin. Forceful return of refugees is also a major concern. UNHCR has estimated that 530 Congolese, 489 of whom were unregistered refugees, were forced to return from Angola to the DRC in February 2018, despite UNHCR’s requests to screen the unregistered group of refugees.30 The upcoming presidential elections – scheduled to be held on December 23, 2018 – may also generate further violence and internal displacement and movements across the border to Angola. The international community and

23 Hans Hoebeke, “Kamuina Nsapu Insurgency Adds to Dangers in DR Congo”, International Crisis Group, pp 2. 24 Amnesty International, “Democratic Republic of Congo: Human Rights Council Must Ensure Accountability for Serious Human Rights Violations Committed in the Kasais.” June 27, 2018, pp 2. 25 OHCHR. “Report of a Mission of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights – Accounts of Congolese Fleeing the Crisis in the Kasai Region, in the DRC,” pp 5. 26 OHCHR. “Report of a Mission of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights – Accounts of Congolese Fleeing the Crisis in the Kasai Region, in the DRC,” pp 3. 27 Amnesty International, “Democratic Republic of Congo: Human Rights Council Must Ensure Accountability for Serious Human Rights Violations Committed in the Kasais.” June 27, 2018, pp 3. 28 Reliefweb. “Humanitarian Crisis in Kasai Region, DR Congo. 29 International Refugee Rights Initiative. “Conflict and Displacement in the Kasai,” pp 13. 30 UNHCR Briefing Notes, “Rekindled tension in DR Congo’s Kasai region poses new threat to civilians, displaced”, UNHCR.

14 DRC IGA, Conflict Sensitivity Analysis & Implementation Strategy - Year 3 Workplan civil society in DRC have expressed serious security concerns about the fairness of the electoral process as well as potential political violence during the elections throughout the region. USAID IGA must proceed with caution when working at both the provincial and local level in Kasai Central and Oriental. Decentralization and, subsequently, découpage have disrupted carefully balanced tensions. The situation with the Kamwina Nsapu demonstrates the ability of a local level conflict to grow into a provincial rebellion at a moment’s notice, building on deep-seated grievances and tensions. USAID IGA must be careful not to further inflame grievances through partner selection or appearances of favoritism. USAID IGA must rely on community leaders and associations to act as connectors. Given the lack of a strong UN or donor presence in the area (as compared to the Kivus and Kantanga), there is also less information available about potential flash points, making cautious engagement and pre-entry information gathering even more important.

CURRENT CONFLICT SITUATION IN KATANGA In the former Katanga province, the inequities and disparities between the haves and have-nots are fully visible. Formerly one of the largest provinces and located in the most southeastern corner of the country, the Katanga region is the source of more than half of the DRC’s fiscal revenue31 and home to large mining concessions, including those for copper, cobalt, zinc, and other precious minerals. The largest city in the former Katanga province, Lubumbashi, features relatively wellbuilt infrastructure and advanced development. Despite high levels of wealth, many Katangans, particularly those in northern areas, still face insecurity. Because of découpage, the former Katanga province was divided into four new provinces – Haut Katanga, Haut Lomami, Lualaba, and Tanganyika. The USAID IGA project engages in the southern provinces of Haut Katanga and Lualaba.

“Conflict over land appears to be Opposition leader Moise Katumbi has been trying to return to his partly due to contradictions between home of Lubumbashi, Katanga’s capital, for months in order to who manages the land, the state or submit his candidacy for president. His coalition – “Ensemble Pour local chiefs. This is further le Changement” or Together for Change – has called on their compounded by the fact that supporters to protest in response to the government’s international Katanga is rich in mineral resources, arrest warrant issued for Katumbi that is barring him from entering and an increasing number of mining exploration permits have been issued the country. Reports indicate that in August, security forces by the state, resulting in many dispersed demonstrators in central Lubumbashi while in some families being displaced and unable neighborhoods, people reportedly barricaded the streets. While to farm.” violent conflict is not currently as prevalent in USAID IGA’s target -USAID Office of Food for Peace, provinces in the Katanga region, there remain many active armed Food Security Desk Review for groups in the region that could affect implementation, including Katanga, North Kivu, and South former Rwanda forces - such as the Democratic Forces for the Kivu, Democratic Republic of Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR)-, Mai Mai militias, and, as previously Congo, p. 9 mentioned, Bakata Katanga. Violence can erupt without warning and

exacerbate the already fragile security of the population. For example, armed conflict in the region, led by Bakata Katanga, flared between 2011 to 2014 and caused the number of internally displaced persons (IDP) in Katanga to rise 900 percent, to 500,000 total. This was exacerbated by neglect from the army, delayed action against the militant groups, and poor harvests.32 Additional, in what is now northern Tanganyika, there has been an ongoing conflict since 2013 between the Twa (Pygmies) and the Bantu (mostly Luba). This conflict is fed by incompatibility and a cycle of revenge Furthermore, throughout much of the past year, the central government has continued to repress collaborators of ex-Katangan Governor Moise Katumbi – most notably the G7 (a political opposition coalition of ex-Kabila allies).

31 International Crisis Group, Katanga: Tensions in DRC’s Mineral Heartland, pp 4. 32 Ibid, pp 19.

15 DRC IGA, Conflict Sensitivity Analysis & Implementation Strategy - Year 3 Workplan

Given the history of demands for autonomy and local control from the Katanga region, decentralization should theoretically have helped to ameliorate some of the grievances with the central government by providing local elites with the opportunity to manage their own provincial administration. However, the failure of the national government to finance the provincial administrations as promised has led to deep dissatisfaction with the decentralization process. Given Katanga’s enormous wealth and understanding of the contributions that mineral exports make to the national budget, there is a sense of entitlement to resources that are not being provided and anger over this failure.33 Some Katangans have also expressed concerns that découpage is simply a national government strategy to break apart a politically influential region that has aligned itself with opposition movements to President Kabila.34

There are several potential hotspots or tension points in the former Katanga province area that USAID IGA must be mindful of during implementation. The division of Katanga into four new provinces has caused some intra-provincial tensions. Despite the natural resource wealth in the former Katanga province, inequality remains between the wealthier southern provinces of Haut Katanga and Lualaba and the northern provinces of Tanganyika and Haut-Lomami. While these areas had difficulty accessing resources even before découpage, the division of these new provinces ensures that Tanganyika and Haut- Lomami will now have no access to the wealth of Haut Katanga and Lualaba.35 “Tens of thousands of children have been involved in armed conflict in the CURRENT CONFLICT SITUATION IN KIVUS eastern Congo since 1998. Per Child North and South Kivu are two of the few provinces that remained Soldier, approximately one in ten intact during découpage. Located in the east, the Kivus border child soldiers - 30,000 children – can Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi, and have a long history of ethnic be found in DRC. Continuing conflict tension, elite interest, and conflict over land. Considered an active in the east causes the displacement conflict zone by many, the Kivus are home to the largest of families, which makes children concentration of militia in the DRC. Some of the largest and most even more vulnerable to recruitment active include the FLDR, the Ugandan Allied Democratic Forces by armed groups. Widespread (ADF), APCUS and the Raia Mutuomboki. As of October 2018, ADF poverty and the lack of resources for education and training make it has been particularly active in North Kivu, orchestrating attacks on difficult for former child soldiers, MONUSCO and the Congolese army in the Oicha and Beni and orphans, and street children to neighboring territories.36 Most insurgent groups operate along the access education and have a normal border with Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda. Regular clashes between life.” insurgents and government troops throughout the region has led to - Eastern Congo Initiative widespread displacement and humanitarian crises. Most recently, the Mai-Mai Yakutumba have grown in strength and increasingly threaten the area around Fizi. While Fizi remained mainly stable during the month of August, violent fighting persisted in September as Mai-Mai Yakutuma took over five villages on the Kilembwe-Maindombe stretch.37 The redeployment of the FARDC troops from the Fizi territory in August had also created a security vacuum, which led to the return of the National Coalition of the People for the Sovereignty of Congo (CNPSC) group to Fizi. North and South Kivu have been plagued by a recent rise in inter-communal violence and attacks by armed groups. Recent clashes over access to land and water between the Banyamulenge and Bafuliro ethnic groups and affiliated militias near Uvira, South Kivu, have displaced more than 76,000 people. On July 7th, militias in Uvira burned ten people to death. UNHCR has warned that populations in Tanganyika province are facing mass displacement as a result of inter-communal violence between the Luba, Twa, and other ethnic groups.

33 Ibid, Katanga: Tensions in DRC’s Mineral Heartland, pp 1. 34 Ibid. 35 Ibid Katanga: Tensions in DRC’s Mineral Heartland, pp 15. 36 The Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project. “Regional Overview – Africa 2 October 2018.” 37 LaLibre Afrique. “South Kivu: Several Villages Occupied by Mai-Mai Yakutumba.” September 2018.

16 DRC IGA, Conflict Sensitivity Analysis & Implementation Strategy - Year 3 Workplan

UNHCR has reported evidence of potential atrocities in the province, including torture, murders, forced labor, and rape. 38 In addition to persistent violence, two new armed groups emerged, led by Jules Vwiranda in Beni territory (North Kivu) and Kadaradara in Kalehe territory (South Kivu).

Ethnicity has always, and continues to, play a significant role across the Kivus, especially in relation to access to land. As such, it is often noted as a driver of conflict in the region. The porous borders between the DRC, Rwanda, and Burundi have resulted in tension between the indigenous groups and immigrant populations who claim Congolese citizenship. In a region plagued with conflict and violence, where land is the means for funding conflict, it has become a commodity for economic opportunity. The International Crisis Group cites that, “local land administration institutions are biased and lack ethnic impartiality.” 39 Given USAID IGA’s focus on agricultural service delivery as part of the decentralization process, the project must ensure that engagement in the province is spread fairly across ethnic lines.

The socio-economic insecurities in the Kivus are worsened by weak political structures. After the genocide in Rwanda, more than two million Hutus, including many responsible for the genocide, fled to the DRC fearing prosecution for the new government. With Mobutu’s support, the militiamen began attaching Congolese Tutsi’s. In response, the new Tutsi-dominated Rwandese government started to back rival rebel groups fighting against the Congolese government troops and the Hutu Militias. Years of conflict and violence between indigenous ethnic groups and Congolese Tutsi’s of Rwandese descent have resulted in socio-economic underdevelopment, including lack of education, limited economic activity and inadequate health care to address sexual violence, despite the region being rich in minerals and fertile soil. In January, a large influx of Hutu migrants in Kalehe territory created tensions with local communities, similar to the movement of populations toward southern Ituri between 2014 and 2016. 40

Although peace deals were signed in 2003 and in 2009, weak governance and corruption has led to ongoing violence. Starting in 2009, the March 23 Movement (M23), a rebel group of primarily ethnic Tutsis, rebelled against the government, reigniting conflict in the region. After briefly gaining control of Goma in 2013, M23 was finally defeated by the Congolese army and UN peacekeepers. As the situation stands now, there are at least 70 armed groups currently operational in the DRC’s eastern regions. Despite the presence of 19,000 UN peacekeepers, militant groups like the FDLR and the Ugandan Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), still control weakly governed areas of the region and exploit natural resources to finance their activities. 41 Specific hotspots in the Kivus tend to be where armed groups are clustered. There are more than 120 armed groups operating across the Kivus. 42 In August 2018, the government launched a new offensive against the FDLR, RED-Tabara, and the Nduma Defense of Congo-Renove (NDC-R).

The Kivus have also fallen victim to the weaknesses of DRC’s decoupage. The armed groups in the region have strong political ties and are often used by local elite for personal gain. As such, decentralization can potentially give more power to the local elite who easily control the land and resources in the region. USAID IGA interventions in the Kivus must consider the local power dynamics, recognizing that local elite often resort to violent tactics to get their way.

North Kivu is known to be an agricultural diverse zone with the ability to grow a wide range of crops. Like the Kasais, agriculture is the primary form of livelihood with 91 percent of the population participating

38 Populations at Risk, “Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)”, Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect. 39 International Crisis Group, Understanding Conflict in Eastern Congo (I): The Ruzizi Plain, p. 19 40Kivu Security Tracker, “Monthly Report: January 2018”. 41 Council on Foreign Relations, Global Conflict Tracker – Violence in the Democratic Republic of Congo, April 6, 2017. 42 Kivu Security Tracker, “Monthly Report: July 2018”.

17 DRC IGA, Conflict Sensitivity Analysis & Implementation Strategy - Year 3 Workplan in agricultural activities.43 Given the years of on-going conflict, as well as the changing migrating patters, competition over fertile land has resulted in massive insecurity and is the main driver of conflict in the region, particularly when it comes to returning IDPs seeking to reclaim their land. Nearly half of the households are moderately or severely food insecure.44 This insecurity is further exacerbated by constraints in agricultural production, including crop disease, long distance to market centers and lack of access to arable land. North Kivu is characterized with a population that is “young, unemployed, and poor, factors which force many to turn to the market of violence.”45 Health and nutrition is also an issue in North Kivu, characterized by a lack of water and sanitation infrastructure, sexual and gender-based violence perpetrated by rebels, the army and within households, and poor dietary diversity and hygiene and sanitation practices.46 A wave of fighting in Ituri broke out earlier this year between the Lendu and Hema. By mid-March, armed men had set at least 120 villages on fire, looting, and raping during their attacks, according to the UN. 47

In Beni territory, the Congolese army (FARDC) continues to pursue its operations against the ADF in the northeast of the territory, triggering violent counterattacks, while they faced a second front of Mai-Mai groups in the southern part of the Semuliki river valley. 48 More than 1,000 people in Beni territory have been killed by militant groups over the past four years.49 According to the Kivu Security Tracker, which is a joint effort of Human Rights Watch and the Congo Research Group, 235 people were killed in Beni and more than 165 civilians have been abducted or abducted between January and September 2018.50 Deputies of the Great North caucus in Parliament claim that around 40% of the population of Beni has been displaced as a result of insecurity and violence in the city.51 In May, unidentified armed men attacked a car belonging to the Virunga National Park, killing a park ranger and kidnapping two British tourists and their driver. They were released two days later. The incident led to the closing of the national park for the remainder of the year. 52 An Ebola outbreak has recently ravaged North Kivu; sixty-seven people have been killed as of August and 105 cases have been reported since August 1. 53 On September 23rd, 2018, ADF members attached and killed 18 people in Beni, which led to a suspension of all Ebola response activities in the territory.54 The incident also led to mass demonstrations on the streets of Beni to protest the insecurity and violence in the area.

A number of insurgent groups, including FDLR, Mai-Mai Mazembe, Mai-Mai Charles, and the APCLS, have been active in the territory of Rutshuru, which is one of the most violent areas of North Kivu. Ongoing conflict between Hutu, Nande, and Hunde ethnic groups in the territory is exacerbated by Myatur and Mai-Mai insurgent groups that operate in the region. Individual and collective kidnappings and abductions remain a serious issue in Rutshuru. In August, FDLR militants attacked and kidnapped six aid workers from the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC). All six aid workers were released later the same day.55 In an attempt to restore stability in Rutshuru territory, MONUSCO brought together different communities,

43 USAID, USAID Office of Food for Peace Food Security Desk Review for Katanga, North Kivu, and South Kivu, Democratic Republic of Congo, pp 5 44 Ibid, 6 45 Ibid 46 Ibid 47 Diana Zeyneb Alhindawi and Jina Moore, “Motive for Mass Killings in Congo is Mystery, but Suffering is Clear”, The New York Times. 48 Kivu Security Tracker, “Monthly Report: June 2018”. 49 Reliefweb. “DR Congo: Upsurge in Killings in Ebola Zone.” October 2018. 50 Ibid. 51 Radio Okapi. “North Kivu: General Strike in Beni to Protest the Weekend Massacre. September 24, 2018. 52Kivu Security Tracker, “Monthly Report: May 2018”. 53 David Rankin, “Ebola spreads to Democratic Republic of Congo conflict zone”, The Times. 54 Directorate General For Disease Control, Ministry of Health, Democratic Republic of Congo, September 23, 2018 55 Reliefweb. “Protection in Danger Monthly News Brief.” August 2018.

18 DRC IGA, Conflict Sensitivity Analysis & Implementation Strategy - Year 3 Workplan including Hutu, Nande, and Hunde, to discuss common interests and develop a plan for ensuring stability in the region.56

Despite rich soil, lake access and mineral deposits, security in South Kivu has deteriorated drastically in the last twenty years. Agriculture and livestock remain the main source of livelihood in the province with a heavy reliance on crops such as coffee, sugar cane and tea. At 64 percent, the province has the highest level of food security in the DRC. 57 South Kivu also has access to a significant amount of mineral deposits with efforts being made to ensure that funds do not fall in the hands of armed groups.58 As is the case in Katanga, these mineral resources are drivers of conflict as they financially support armed groups and encourage further participation in conflict. Due to conflict in the Kivus, the education system is almost non-existent with South Kivu ranked as having the second highest illiteracy rate in the country at 36 percent. 59 Earlier this year, the governor of South Kivu launched a campaign called “Tujikinge" or "protect us" to counter insecurity and violence caused by armed bandits in the city of Bukavu and South Kivu in general.60 The campaign may be reaching its limits, though; in July alone there were six cases of violence – including burglaries and health center raids – in Bukavu caused by armed groups.61 Meanwhile the fighting in the highlands of South Kivu in Bijombo groupement continued between local militias from different ethnic groups, and exacerbated by regional alliances, displacing around 76,000 people since April 2018.62

56 MONUSCO. “Bwito Chiefdom in Rutshuru: On the Road to Peace.” August 23, 2018. 57 Ibid, 7 58 Ibid, 6 59 Ibid,7 60 Jonas Kasula Arsene, “Sud-Kivu: l’organisation RCA soutient l’opération “Tujikinge” contre l’insécurité”, Laprunelle. 61 Ibid 40. 62 Ibid 47. 19 DRC IGA, Conflict Sensitivity Analysis & Implementation Strategy - Year 3 Workplan

USAID IGA CONFLICT SENSITIVITY TOOLKIT AND APPROACH To address the previously detailed challenges and sources of conflict, USAID IGA developed a programmatic approach to conflict sensitivity. This approach recognizes the complexity of the situation the project operates in and aims to provide a framework for action. While USAID IGA works at the national, provincial and local (ETD) levels, it is believed that the project faces the greatest risk of exacerbating conflict at the ETD or local level, particularly related to decentralization and other governance factors. This is both because USAID IGA focuses most of its activities and expects to have the greatest impacts at this level, but also because the tensions in each community can be quite difficult to intuit and understand as an outsider. While there are many NGOs and other organizations that have undertaken provincial-level conflict analysis, ETD-level SaferWorld’s Guiding Principles for analysis is not always easy to obtain. As such, USAID IGA’s Conflict Sensitive Approaches: conflict sensitivity approach focuses closely on mitigating • Participatory process potential negative impacts at the local level. • Inclusive of all actors, issues and perceptions • Impartial in relation to actors The key factor to ensuring a successful conflict sensitive and issues approach is guaranteeing that all USAID IGA staff members • Transparent understand DAI’s commitment to conflict sensitivity through • Respectful of people’s ownership staff training and follow-up messaging and reinforcement. It is of their conflict and their vital that staff are trained to approach engagement and suffering programming always on alert for potential conflicts, but also • Accountability for one’s own with the ability to deal with uncertainty, honesty and humility, actions an openness to continuous learning and redesign, and, most • Partnership and co-ordination importantly, with a recognition of the complexity of the • Complementarity and coherence situation.63 Without this mindset, any attempts to conduct • Timely conflict analysis or other portions of the sensitivity tool kit will likely be futile. As such, USAID IGA allocates monetary and time resources to conduct conflict sensitivity training for staff as well as provide incentives for staff to consider sensitivity when completing activities. As activities transition from organizational diagnostics to activities with potential to generate or contribute to conflict, USAID IGA will continue to ensure implementation of the conflict sensitive approach through conducting multi-actor awareness-raising and capacity-building events. In the coming year, USAID IGA will also coordinate with the Solutions for Peace and Recovery (SPR) program to organize further conflict-sensitivity trainings. Another key factor for success in a conflict sensitive approach is through mainstreaming key concepts into the assessment process, activity design and implementation process. Further discussion of USAID IGA’s approach to training and mainstreaming are below in the Implementation Plan.

There are several specific points where the USAID IGA team foresees the need for specific conflict sensitivity lens during Year 3 of the project. These include: sharing results from the second PEA study, working with supported ETDs on improvements at the local level, granting to selected partners, and the planned support to the provincial assemblies. These points will be further addressed following the outline of the tool below.

CONFLICT SENSITIVITY – BEFORE ENGAGEMENT The steps outlined below represent USAID IGA’s approach to ensuring potential conflicts are examined and a strategy for mitigating them is determined before implementation of activities begins, rather than only addressing concerns as they arise. In thinking about these issues before full engagement in a community, USAID IGA staff are encouraged to understand the current context and forecast where potential flash-points may arise. While it is not sufficient to ensure all future issues are avoided, thinking

63 SaferWorld, Guiding Principles for Conflict Sensitive Approaches, pp 3.

20 DRC IGA, Conflict Sensitivity Analysis & Implementation Strategy - Year 3 Workplan through and documenting concerns raises staff awareness and, ideally, makes them further attuned to potential conflict if and when it arises.

It should be noted that USAID IGA does not expect to develop a conflict assessment and strategy for engagement in each ETD. However, using the tools below, USAID IGA will be able to make a rapid decision about whether further research is required.

Step 1: Understand the Operational Context In Step 1, the USAID IGA team seeks to obtain a strong understanding of the current context by undertaking a conflict analysis. This analysis is the key foundational step for ensuring conflict sensitive approaches to engagement and implementation, setting the base level of knowledge and identifying areas for further questioning. A conflict analysis takes a systematic approach to understanding the background of the conflict, distinguishing the key players and groups involved, understanding the perspectives of these groups, and identifying causes of conflict.64 Key elements of a conflict analysis include understanding the causes, root, structural and proximate, as well as triggers, key mobilizers and potential trajectories for the conflict, based on current social and political dynamics.

While there are numerous types and purposes of conflict analysis and assessments, USAID IGA’s primary purpose USAID IGA utilizes a “Good Enough” in conducting this analysis is to understand the current Approach to Conflict Analysis, developed by the Emergency Capacity Building Project, dynamics, mobilizers in both the positive and negative recognizes that even with months of analysis, sense, and key trends and triggers, to inform design and a complex conflict situation could still have implementation processes. USAID IGA’s conflict unknown pieces for the implementation team. assessments do not aim to deeply understand root causes This approach emphasizes simple and practical of conflict nor do they look for solutions – the solutions and encourages the user to choose assessments are intended to give the USAID IGA team the tools that are safe, quick and easy to knowledge they need to implement activities without implement which allows conflict sensitive furthering tensions between groups – a level of knowledge engagement without significant project delays. that is “good enough” for implementation.

Conducting conflict analysis allows for the project to understand the context as well as to design an approach with the least likely chances of causing harm. It is also vital to conduct conflict analysis because it challenges project staff to question their own assumptions about the localities and people they are engaging with, specifically aiming to not further perpetuate biased perspectives, as well as to acknowledge what we simply do not know. Beyond obtaining important information, conducting conflict analysis should challenge staff to consider that there is no one correct interpretation of conflict.65

How to Conduct Conflict Analysis? The USAID CAF 2.0 provides an analysis tool which USAID IGA employs as a baseline to explore current conflict dynamics as well as understand potential future pathways. Figure 2 provides a visual map of the key issues USAID IGA aims to understand in a conflict analysis. A detailed breakdown of the various components of the conflict analysis and list of potential questions to consider in order to obtain this information can be found in Annex C.

With oversight from the Implementation Coordination Manager, Parfait Moukoko, and Senior Technical Advisor, Cheick Samake as well as USAID IGA technical staff leading activities in relevant provincial offices are responsible for conducting conflict analyses on an as-needed basis. The primary goal of the conflict

64 Conflict Sensitivity Consortium, How to Guide to Conflict Sensitivity, pp 4 65 Ibid, pp 6

21 DRC IGA, Conflict Sensitivity Analysis & Implementation Strategy - Year 3 Workplan analysis is for the team to map the conflict using the tool from the USAID CAF 2.0 (Figure 2). This will illuminate what the team already knows and, more importantly, where there are information gaps.

The value of the conflict analysis produced by USAID IGA depends not only on the quality of data obtained but, more importantly, on the balance of voices that are included. Capturing data to complete this analysis in a neutral and unbiased manner can be difficult, particularly in the DRC. To ensure accurate information is obtained for the conflict analysis, USAID IGA triangulates data from various sources including project staff and local partners, as well as national or international organizations providing analysis. On the national or international organizations side, potential sources include the UN, specifically MONUSCO, Search for Common Ground, the Harvard Humanitarian Initiative, the Rift Valley Figure 2: Conflict Diagnosis Institute, International Crisis Group, Radio Source – USAID Conflict Assessment Framework 2.0, 2012 Okapi, and the Pole Institute. USAID IGA also relies on other donor-funded programs to share information, both in formal settings, such as the national and provincial coordination meetings, and informally on an as needed basis. As USAID IGA works across sectors, touching on governance, education, health and economic growth, the project can pull from a wide range of programming to understand the varying impacts of activities. USAID IGA staff completing a conflict analysis are expected to pull from a variety of sources, including conducting interviews with local partners, government institutions, and citizens where required to have a full grasp of the dynamics.

Whenever possible, USAID IGA engages local communities and authorities in undertaking conflict analysis. To collect the honest data required to complete a conflict assessment, USAID IGA understands how to make interviewees, whether they be government agents or citizens, feel comfortable engaging in the process. The approach USAID IGA takes is province and locality specific. For example, while in South Kivu citizens may feel more comfortable sharing insights with an outsider, due to the ethnic sensitivity in Lualaba, citizens may not be forthright with an outsider and would be more up front with an interviewer of their own ethnicity. USAID IGA identifies and then implements the right approach for the right location.

Given the focus of the project, USAID IGA’s conflict analyses rest at the ETD or local level, where it can be difficult to obtain detailed and nuanced information about local conflict dynamics through desk research. Provincial and national- level assessments are consistently being undertaken and updated by other members of the donor or UN community. USAID IGA has built relationships with relevant organizations to obtain updated provincial and national information. The ease of collecting existing data for a given provincial conflicts has, of course, varied based on the location. For example, the long-term and ongoing conflict in the Kivus has led to a large donor and UN presence. Reflecting this presence, civil-society in Bukavu is well organized, including a civil society focal point and provincial coordination meetings on a regular basis. As donor funded programming is present throughout most of the province, USAID IGA continues to expect it will be reasonably easy to obtain information about conflict dynamics in specific

22 DRC IGA, Conflict Sensitivity Analysis & Implementation Strategy - Year 3 Workplan localities. However, in the Kasais, which continue to experience significant upheaval and conflict, civil society is still nascent and there is limited information available.

STEP 2: Understand the Intervention’s Potential Impacts Once the USAID IGA team conducts a conflict analysis Potential Conflict Mitigation deemed to be “good enough” and feels they have a strong Strategies understanding of the conflict dynamics in each locality, the • Ensure transparency during the partner next step is to understand how interventions may impact the selection process. Talk openly about conflict context, in both positive and negative ways. Ideally, our work and criteria for engagement. through understanding these potential impacts, strategies • Work through local NGOs or CSOs to can be developed to ensure potential positive outcomes are make initial contact. maximized and negative outcomes are minimized. During • Host community forums or meetings this stage USAID IGA staff also seek to develop a deeper through CODESAs, COGEs etc. to understanding of how these impacts may affect the project’s ensure all voices are heard. ability to complete activities. • Encourage participatory processes. • Train staff and partners on conflict sensitivity. Developing a link between the conflict analysis and how project activities may impact these dynamics can be a difficult challenge for project staff. It is not always obvious where the risk factors lie or what may influence local tensions. One tool that USAID IGA utilizes to understand these impacts is a Risk/Opportunity analysis, which looks at both potential risks but also opportunities to ameliorate tensions through project activities and reinforcing of peace outcomes. The analysis asks the team to review the possible impact of the project on the context and of the context on the project, and look for a conflict sensitive adjustment or redesign to maximize these opportunities and minimize risks.

While most of this approach has focused on conflict sensitivity within an ETD, an important component of understanding an intervention’s impact is to also understand the potential impacts activities can have on intra-ETD relations at a provincial level. This sensitivity is particularly important given the decentralization and découpage context, as outlined in the previous section, and was considered during the beneficiary (ETD) selection process and will continue to be important throughout ETD engagement activities. If existing conflict dynamics are not taken into consideration, a potential impact of USAID IGA’s work could be to cause tensions between ETDs selected for intervention and those not. Perceptions of favoritism for certain ethnic groups or based on the preferences of the national government can greatly impede USAID IGA’s to serve as a neutral implementer in each province. This is particularly important when working with chefferies that are the most traditional type of ETD, generally being composed of only one ethnic group or tribe and sensitive to perceptions of slights of favoritism. USAID IGA has worked carefully to ensure a diverse group of ETDs continue to be selected in order to avoid perpetuating these perceptions and mitigate against conflict.

Step 3: Develop an Engagement Strategy After the conflict analysis is completed and an understanding of potential impacts is achieved, the final step in the pre-implementation process is to develop an engagement strategy that specifically outlines conflict mitigation strategies for the location. For all contexts, but particularly for highly sensitive ones, USAID IGA engages a local NGO partner that has been working in the area on an ongoing basis to develop the engagement strategy. The engagement strategy then becomes USAID IGA’s plan for how it will mitigate potential exacerbation of conflict dynamics, encourage positive opportunities, and monitor for these outcomes.

The engagement strategy is specifically based on the conflict analysis and potential impacts from steps 1 and 2 above. The strategy should take all the findings from the conflict analysis and review to inform what the project does, who will implement it, who the beneficiaries are, when it will occur and how it happens.

23 DRC IGA, Conflict Sensitivity Analysis & Implementation Strategy - Year 3 Workplan

This strategy does not need to be separate from other planning for initial engagement and, to support conflict sensitivity mainstreaming, should be part of other high-level planning discussions for entry into various ETDs.

Another component of the engagement strategy is to develop conflict sensitive indicators that can be monitored and reviewed during activity implementation to both ensure that mitigation strategies are effective and that new tensions are not arising based on the intervention. These indicators will be based on the potential impacts discussed in Step 2 and seek to capture changes in the conflict context as well as whether the interaction is causing any of these shifts and if unintended consequences are occurring. As these monitoring indicators are updated, the new data should be fed back into the conflict analysis to ensure an up-to-date picture of the current situation. Potential indicators that could indicate conflict context and impacts include66:

• Frequency of incidents of violence between Community A and B in a designated area in a three- month period; • Proportion of people in Community A and B who perceive the intervention as benefiting both communities equally (using GeoPoll’s monthly surveys); and • Number of staff who believe the project has not had an impact on conflict in the target communities and/or has enabled greater community cohesion.

The identification of conflict is included as part of USAID IGA’s selection methodology when selecting potential partners.

Finally, the engagement strategy must include contingency plans that can be implemented should monitoring reveal unforeseen circumstances or that mitigating factors are not sufficient. These should include potential strategy re-adjustments to address issues as they arise. An important component to this step is to be open to the idea that it may not be the right time for engagement in each ETD or locality. Using a Do No Harm approach mandates that USAID IGA consider the risk associated with moving forward with an activity once conflict is understood and a potential link to project activities is established. If USAID IGA is not able to develop a strategy for engagement that will sufficiently mitigate the risk of harm, it is recommended that the team not move forward with activities at that time.

USAID IGA continues to assess the capacities and needs of its local partners. Based on the information from the assessments, the team will develop a detailed engagement strategy.

CONFLICT SENSTIVITY – DURING AND AFTER ENGAGEMENT Getting the initial selection of, and entry into, a community correct is an important, but not sufficient, step for ensuring a conflict sensitive approach continues throughout the life of the project. During implementation, in ETDs deemed to be at risk of conflict, project staff must be consistently monitoring signs that activities are furthering or causing tensions and refining and updating the conflict analysis. If monitoring reveals activities are unintentionally triggering tensions or reinforcing divisions, these findings must be taken seriously and re-design should occur where necessary. It can often be difficult for project staff to honestly assess and report about whether an activity is having unintended impacts. As such, it is up to the USAID IGA management team to ensure that all staff understands that conflict sensitivity is a serious component of the project and that all issues should be immediately reported.

66 Adapted from Conflict Sensitivity Consortium, How to Guide to Conflict Sensitivity, pp 14.

24 DRC IGA, Conflict Sensitivity Analysis & Implementation Strategy - Year 3 Workplan

CONFLICT SENSITIVITY ACHIEVEMENTS During the first year of project implementation, USAID IGA worked with subcontractor Integrity to produce a Political Economy Analysis (PEA). The first step of the analysis was a Political Economy Analysis Needs Assessment (PEANA), which included an analysis of DRC’s health and education sectors as well as an examination of the country’s current political uncertainty. The study was based on research findings from three locations – Kinshasa, Haut-Katanga and South Kivu. While the report largely focused on relationships between USAID IGA target beneficiaries and future activities, it inevitably presented key political and security developments as they directly affect future programming. The full report, which was submitted to USAID in the final quarter of 2017, detailed the current political strife of the DRC and acts as USAID IGA’s conflict analysis for the 2017 calendar year.

Throughout Year 2, USAID IGA effectively managed a number of conflict-sensitive issues that arose in order to mitigate tensions and avoid undermining the project’s credibility within communities, for example: • Disappointment in the project’s transport and per diem payments to workshop and training participants; • Potential disputes between Chefferies and territory administrators over control of the CARG and access to development partner support; and • Discontent in the community actor mapping process, specifically in Katuba, Haut-Katanga. Handling such issues as they emerged contributed to the provincial teams’ consideration, learning and analysis of causes and potential implications of USAID IGA’s work. The As engagement activities increased in the later half of Year 2, USAID IGA conducted a series of multi- actor conflict sensitivity awareness-raising and capacity-building events. The provincial teams were encouraged to be fully consultative with relevant government agencies and civil society leaders when organizing such events, keeping in mind the risks associated with favoring groups. The process to identify the main CSOs and CBOs also incorporated methodologies to minimize the risk of conflict. USAID IGA ensured the process was open, participatory, and transparent to again minimize the risk of ‘preferred actors’.

Throughout Year 2, USAID IGA dialogued extensively with other implementing partners and projects working in the education, health and agriculture sectors. In doing so, USAID IGA sought to avoid duplication of activities. Furthermore, the PEAs demonstrated to USAID IGA that the project can operate safely throughout most of South Kivu, all Lualaba and Haut Katanga, Kananga and Kasai Oriental.

USAID IGA’S IMPLEMENTATION PLAN – YEAR 3 Based on the approach above, this section outlines USAID IGA’s implementation plan and expected activities related to conflict sensitivity in project Year 3. During Year 3, USAID IGA will continue the beginnings of implementation activities, as well as the continuation of selecting partner ETDs and other beneficiaries. The Chief of Party (COP) holds ultimate responsibility for ensuring conflict sensitive approaches are prioritized and mainstreamed throughout USAID IGA’s programming. Other members of the USAID IGA leadership team, including the Deputy Chief of Party (DCOP) and Governance Integration Managers, also play key roles in setting examples for the entire staff about the importance of conflict sensitivity and how it can either support or undermine USAID IGA’s goals.

Recognizing that many of USAID IGA’s staff have been working in the development field in the DRC for decades during which time they developed different methods of engagement, USAID IGA plans to continue staff training to standardize USAID IGA’s approach, establish its utility, and demonstrate DAI’s commitment to conflict sensitivity. This training was originally conducted during Year 1 and a refresher will be offered for staff during a larger team building session in Year 3 and will target USAID IGA’s two

25 DRC IGA, Conflict Sensitivity Analysis & Implementation Strategy - Year 3 Workplan new satellite offices. The training aims to create staff ownership over the conflict sensitivity approach and reinforce buy-in at senior levels. It covers the basics of conflict sensitivity, how to conduct a conflict analysis, tips for monitoring and mitigation strategies, and, most importantly, establishing a project strategy for how and where concerns related to activities can be reported. Ideally, this training is conducted by a Congolese national with experience implementing conflict sensitive programming in USAID IGA’s target areas.

In Year 3, USAID IGA expects to conduct conflict analysis based on needs identified during the partner and beneficiary selection process, as activities take place in the targeted ETDs. USAID IGA will continue to use the assessment tool to select ETD partners. Within this tool, USAID IGA includes conflict indicator questions to try to gauge whether any form of conflict or tensions are currently affecting local governance institutions, civil society organizations (CSO) or citizens. USAID IGA also collects basic demographic data, including determining the ethnic make-up of the ETD, which can illuminate potential fault lines.

Following the identification of target beneficiaries with USAID, USAID IGA finalized partners for initial engagement in the latter half of Year 2 and 3. As mentioned previously, USAID IGA has ensured a diverse representation of ethnic groups, tribes and ETD type to avoid exacerbating existing grievances. Looking at the data collected during the initial assessment, USAID IGA implementation teams will continue to decide on an ETD-by-ETD basis as to whether a) no local conflict dynamics will be affected by activities; b) conflict dynamics will likely be affected by activities; or c) there is not enough information to make this determination. In situation A, USAID IGA will proceed with engagement without further conflict-specific analysis, although staff will still look out for potential issues, as outlined further below. In situation B, USAID IGA management will assign a team to conduct the conflict analysis process outlined above. In situation C, further information will be obtained during the baseline assessment to make the decision. If following the baseline, it is still unclear, USAID IGA will air on the side of caution and conduct the assessment.

Following the completion of the pre-engagement conflict sensitive process, staff should continue to refer to the analysis and engagement strategy as activities continue to ramp up. Some Year 3 activities could potentially be impacted including the grant-making process, as non-selected ETDs may be anxious for USAID IGA to fund specific projects, raising grievances between neighbors about the local partner selection process.

While it is envisioned that conflict analysis on USAID IGA will largely take place at the ETD level, linkages specifically to provincial conflicts, as well as intra-ETD level, will also be explored. Specifically, USAID IGA seeks to understand what, if any, impact decentralization has had on local conflicts as well as how conflict and emergency situations are adversely impacting capacity of ETDs to deliver services. Questions related to these linkages have been built into USAID IGA’s initial assessments of ETDs, CSOs, as well as forums with local social accountability partners such as Community Health and Development Committees (CODESA), School Management Committees (COGE) and Rural Agriculture Management Councils (CARG), to allow for data to be collected to be fed into conflict analyses in an ongoing manner.

As with Year 1, after Year 3, the team will conduct lessons learned session. This open session will allow staff to share reflections on the project’s success in mitigating conflict in Year 3 and share observations about effective strategies. Because of this session, this Conflict Sensitivity Analysis and Implementation Plan will be reviewed and revised to reflect updated practices, as well as to focus on Year 4 activities. It will be resubmitted as an annex to the Year 4 Work Plan.

26 DRC IGA, Conflict Sensitivity Analysis & Implementation Strategy - Year 3 Workplan

ANNEX A: SELECTED RESOURCES FOR CONFLICT SENSITIVITY

Organization Name Toolkit Title Resource Location Conflict Sensitivity How to Guide to Conflict Sensitivity http://www.conflictsensitivity.org/how-to-guide/ Consortium International Conflict-sensitive approaches to http://www.international- Alert/Safer World development, humanitarian alert.org/publications/conflict-sensitive- assistance and peacebuilding approaches-development-humanitarian- assistance-and-peacebuilding Trócaire Conflict Sensitivity Toolkit: A Resource http://www.dmeforpeace.org/peacexchange/wp- for Trócaire Staff content/uploads/2015/12/conflict_sensitivity_too lkit_final_version_oct_2011_1.pdf UNDP Conflict-Related Development http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/docum Analysis (CDA) ents/cpr/documents/prevention/CDA_complete.p df USAID Conflict Assessment Framework 2.0 https://www.usaid.gov/what-we-do/working- crises-and-conflict/technical-publications

27 DRC IGA, Conflict Sensitivity Analysis & Implementation Strategy - Year 3 Workplan

ANNEX B: CONFLICT ANALYSIS DEFINITIONS AND KEY QUESTIONS

Conflict Analysis and Diagnostic Tool Component Definitions (Adapted from the USAID CAF 2.0) – For more detailed definitions, please refer to the CAF 2.0.

• Context refers to location-specific facts that cannot be changed in the short term including physical and geographic characteristics, history, socio-economic and demographic characteristics, institutions, and its relationship and exposure to the central government and external forces. o Contextual risk factors include a recent history of conflict, bad neighbors, low levels of social or human development, state discrimination in political or economic terms, and poverty.

• Grievances are deeply held feelings of dissatisfaction amongst community members about how their society is organized and the impacts it has on their lives. Grievances can arise from real or perceived issues that threatens the community’s identity, physical security, livelihoods, or interests and values. Grievances are usually specific claims advanced by certain societal actors including allegations of corruption, inequality, and stealing land. Grievances are a predicate condition for violence to occur, but not all grievances lead to violence. o Identities are markers of similarity, distinction, or affinity among individuals and groups. Identify is not inherent, but emerges from one’s relationships to others in a given context or situation. o Societal Patterns are repeated and systematized forms of interactions and transactions among individuals, groups, and institutions in the community. These patterns can give rise to grievances if the interactions are continually negative. o Institutional Performance refers to the extent to which formal and informal institutions produce outcomes that members of society consider legitimate, fair, and/or effective. Failure on these components can lead to feelings of grievance and inequality.

• Resilience is the ability of communities to withstand shocks and to continue performing as usual.

• Key Mobilizers are individuals or groups that have (or could soon have) the means and motivation to mobilize larger groups or resources to carry out organized violence or engage in political action. Not all important actors are key mobilizers. These individuals or groups have the capacity to mobilize and organize collective action around grievances and resiliencies.

• Trajectories are possible alternative futures and their potential impact on conflicts. These are broad scenarios that look at the many possible pathways a society can follow. These trajectories should focus on three possible scenarios: a) Trajectories that maintain the status quo; b) Trajectories that are likely to be conflict-inducing; and c) Trajectories that are likely to diminish the likelihood of conflict. o Trends are relatively unchanging dynamics and patterns that influence conflict over an extended period. Trends should review contextual factors, grievances and resiliencies, and key mobilizers and their potential actors. o Triggers are immediate and observable actions or events that provoke acts of violence, suppression or conflict. Examples include disputed elections or reports of acts of police brutality.

Sample Diagnostic (Conflict Analysis) Questions (Adapted from the USAID CAF 2.0)

28 DRC IGA, Conflict Sensitivity Analysis & Implementation Strategy - Year 3 Workplan

1. Has this area (province, ETD etc.) experienced prior violent conflict? If so, what was it about and how did it end? 2. Has the area undergone crises (natural disasters, coup) or periods (colonialization, conquest, repression) in its history that continue to shape attitudes? 3. How stable are the provinces or other ETDs that border the target area? 4. Has the area previously experienced conflict with a neighbor? 5. Which active or non-active conflicts have affected the target area and how did the population participate? 6. What has been the recent history of economic growth and development? 7. What is the demographic profile of the target area in terms of ethnicities, age, sex, urbanization and religious affiliation? Are there significant variations between subgroups or regions? 8. How many people have migrated to the province in recent years? Does it have many IDPs? 9. What is the ratio of the population to land, food supply, or other life sustaining resources? 10. What are the key identity groups in the target area? 11. Are there traditional political institutions? How important are they? 12. How well are traditional political institutions functioning? Have they been affected by recent conflict? 13. How do traditional political institutions interact with state institutions? 14. How was this target area affected by the decentralization and découpage process? 15. What is the target area’s relationship to the national government? 16. How large is civil society in the target area? How professional is civil society? Do NGOs exhibit good governance? 17. Where do civil society in the target area get their resources? 18. Has political violence previously or recently occurred in the area? 19. Do non-state actors (militias or peacekeepers) play a significant role in providing security services in the area? 20. Is there a UN or other donor presence in the area? What are they doing? 21. Is reliable information accessible to most the population? What are most people’s primary sources of information? 22. Triggers – a. Are major government reforms planned that could result in shifts in political or economic power? b. Are contentious elections approaching? c. Is extremist ethnic or religious rhetoric rising?

29 DRC IGA, Conflict Sensitivity Analysis & Implementation Strategy - Year 3 Workplan

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY AND REFERENCES Conflict-sensitive approaches to development, humanitarian assistance and peacebuilding. APFO, CECORE, CHA, FEWER, International Alert, Safeworld. January 2004. Conflict Sensitivity Consortium. How to Guide to Conflict Sensitivity. London, England: UKaid and the UK Department for International Development. February 2012. Hugo de Vrise. PSRP Briefing Paper 8: The Ebb and Flow of Stabilization in the Congo. Rift Valley Institute. February 2016. International Crisis Group. Africa Briefing 123: Boulevard of Broken Dreams: The “Street” and Politics in DR Congo. Nairobi, Kenya/Brussels, Belgium: International Crisis Group. October 2016. International Crisis Group. Africa Report 206: Understanding Conflict in Eastern Congo (I): The Ruzizi Plain. Brussels, Belgium: International Crisis Group. July 2013. International Crisis Group. Africa Report 239: Katanga: Tensions in DRC’s Mineral Heartland. Brussels, Belgium: International Crisis Group. August 2016. Jason K. Stearns and Cristoph Vogel, “The Landscape of Armed Groups in the Eastern Congo,” Center on International Cooperation. December 2015. Joseph Siegle and Patrick O’Mahony. Assessing the Merits of Decentralization as a Conflict Mitigation Strategy. Washington, DC: United States Agency for International Development. 2006. Mary B. Anderson. Options for Aid in Conflict: Lessons from Field Experience. Cambridge, MA: The Collaborative for Development Action, Inc. 2000. MONUSCO. MONUSCO Expresses Serious Concern Over Recent Developments in Kananga. Kinshasa, DRC. MONUSCO. March 18, 2017. MONUSCO. MONUSCO Strongly Condemns the Persistent Violence in the Kasai Provinces. Kinshasa, DRC. MONUSCO. February 11, 2017. Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development. Conflict and Fragility: Do No Harm – International Support for Statebuilding. OECD. 2010 Phillipp Sandner, “Decentralization plans for DRC’s Copperbelt Region,” DW, April 15, 2013. Pierre Englebert and Emmanuel Kasongo Mungongo, “Misguided and Misdiagnosied: The Failure of Decentralization Reforms in the DR Congo,” African Studies Review, Volume 59, Number 1 (April 2015): 5-32. Stefaan L. Marysse, “Decentralization Issues in Post-Conflict Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC),” L’Afrique des Grandes Lacs Annuaire 2004-2005 (May 2005): 187-208. Thomas Fessy, “DR Congo Unrest: Why are police in Kasai being decapitated?” BBC News, March 27, 2017. UNICEF. Technical Note: Conflict Sensitivity and Peacebuilding in UNICEF. UNICEF. June 2012. United National Development Programme. Conflict-related Development Analysis (CDA). United National Development Programme/Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery. October, 2003. United Nations Economic Commission for Africa. Conflicts in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Causes, impact and implications for the Great Lakes region. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: United Nations Economic Commission for Africa. September 2015.

30 DRC IGA, Conflict Sensitivity Analysis & Implementation Strategy - Year 3 Workplan

United States Agency for International Development. Conflict Assessment Framework Version 2.0. Washington, DC: United States Agency for International Development/Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation. June 2012. United States Agency for International Development. USAID Office of Food for Peace Food Security Desk Review for Kasai Occidental and Kasai Oriental, Democratic Republic of Congo. Washington, DC: United States Agency for International Development/Office of Food for Peace, Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance, and the Office of Health, Infectious Diseases, and Nutrition. September 2015. United States Agency for International Development. USAID Office of Food for Peace, Food Security Desk Review for Katanga, North Kivu, and South Kivu, Democratic Republic of Congo. Washington, DC: United States Agency for International Development/Office of Food for Peace, Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance, and the Office of Health, Infectious Diseases, and Nutrition. November 2015.

31 DRC IGA, Conflict Sensitivity Analysis & Implementation Strategy - Year 3 Workplan